CHANGING PATTERNS OF LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN TWO AFGHAN BADAKHSHANI DISTRICTS: THE IMPACT OF OPIUM AND HEROIN. MARC THEUSS

Transcription

1 CHANGING PATTERNS OF LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN TWO AFGHAN BADAKHSHANI DISTRICTS: THE IMPACT OF OPIUM AND HEROIN MARC THEUSS 1

2 RESEARCH LOCALES: BADAKHSHAN Tajikistan China Pakistan 3.5 years in Afghanistan 3 months research: Afghan (Badakhshan) Tajikistan (GBAO) 2

3 RESEARCH LOCALES: WAKHAN TAJIKISTAN CHINA PAKISTAN 3

4 RESEARCH LOCALES: SHUGHNAN TAJIKISTAN CHINA PAKISTAN 4

5 RESEARCH LOCALES: GBAO Allows for empirical triangulation 5

6 BACKGROUND TO RESEARCH Multiple professional trips to Wakhan (1 to Shughnan) Wakhan/Shughnan similar: contextual/parametric variables Counter-intuitively anecdotal evidence of radical difference: Political outcomes Political processes Power relations Conflict processing A research enigma. Why? Tentative hypothesis: Cross-border heroin trade vs market of addiction 6

7 ANALYTICAL MODEL Methodologically problematic to study OPE Did not want to pre-empt the importance of OPE RESOURCES CATEGORIES: ACTORS NETWORKS STRATEGIES POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC OUTCOMES 7

8 PARAMETRIC SIMILARITIES/DIFFERENCES Geography Agro-ecology Religion Ethnicity SHUGHNAN WAKHAN 8

9 GEOGRAPHY Mountainous Peripheral Remote SHUGHNAN WAKHAN 9

10 AGRO-ECOLOGY Low land-holding High household sizes 1 cropping season per year Previously: moderate land Radically reduced now 1 cropping season SHUGHNAN WAKHAN 10

11 RELIGION Shia Ismailis Respect 49th Imam (Aga Khan) SHUGHNAN WAKHAN 11

12 Shughnis (Pamiri) Minority non-indigenous Sunis: Drug dealers Government bureaucrats ETHNICITY Wakhis (Pamiris) Minority non-indigenous Sunis: Politico-military Drug dealers Government bureaucrats 12 SHUGHNAN WAKHAN

13 SHUGHNAN: HEROIN/POSITIONALITY Shughnan transit point between: Largest opiate producing nation in world Global heroin nexus UNODC: 50% Afghanistan s GDP opiate-related 13

14 SHUGHNAN: ESTIMATE OF RESOURCE BASE 2003 Ministry of Defence made a drug swoop: Bashur bazaar MoD. Pashtun senior Generals and Tajik soldiers 14

15 SHUGHNAN: ESTIMATE OF RESOURCE BASE 400 KGs heroin seized 50 KGs opium 15

16 SHUGHNAN: ESTIMATE OF RESOURCE BASE Based on 4 week working stock Market price 2,000 USD/KG 16

17 SHUGHNAN: ESTIMATE OF RESOURCE BASE Annual heroin trade 9.6 million USD 2 week working stock: 19.2 million USD Probably much higher: stock located off shop-sites: 40 million USD 17

18 OPIUM TRADE: MARKETS OF ADDICTION ESTIMATE OF RESOURCE BASE 20% population addicted 10,000 population = 2,000 addicts 18

19 OPIUM TRADE: ESTIMATE OF RESOURCE BASE Annual consumption million USD opium 19

20 DIFFERENCES COMMODITY HEROIN SHUGHNAN OPIUM WAKHAN 20

21 DIFFERENCES GROSS REVENUE 40 USD MILLION SHUGHNAN 2.4 USD MILLION WAKHAN 21

22 DIFFERENCES EXCHANGE USE /PURPOSE GLOBAL TRADE SERVICE LOCAL ADDICTION SHUGHNAN WAKHAN 22

23 NO. TRANSACTIONS/YEAR 100 KGS PER CROSSING: Addict buys once weekly (average) Based on 7 grams/day consumption ,000 addicts 100,000 transactions SHUGHNAN WAKHAN 23

24 REVENUE PER TRANSACTION SHUGHNAN: WAKHAN: 200,000 USD 24 USD 24

25 THE ARGUMENT The nature of the resource bases in respective districts influences: Kinds of actors involved in the economic system Way actors articulate themselves in networks vis-à-vis systems Sorts of strategies that are appropriate, to achieve objectives Proviso: find that this relationship is not deterministic Strategies can change, despite the same resource base Very different outcomes emerge rapidly 25

26 WAKHAN 26

27 ACTORS Tajik Suni Badakhshanis Incentivised by state-building privileging Sunis (Zahir Shah) More recent mujaheds Ex-security commander /opium trader Non-indigenous opium trader 27

28 NETWORKS: ASSOCIATIONAL GLUE Ethnicity: Tajik Politico-military: Jamiat-e-Islami Geography: Badakhshani Religion: Suni 28

29 STRATEGIES: FORCE 100 household survey in 3 villages: Land taken against will: 28% Threats of force: 21% Force: 11% Slapping Beating Torture Mock executions Electrocutions 29

30 STRATEGIES: INSTRUMENTALISATION OF ADDICTION 2002 Director of Education (Wakhan) Paid teachers in-kind in opium Made a profit on the side 30

31 STRATEGIES: DEBT MECHANISMS Wheat for opium Cash for opium Debt term: 1 to 6 months Interest rate = 60% Interest rate = 90% 31

32 PUNITIVE DEBT FOR ESSENTIALS 1% 2% 4% Food and opium a necessity 20% Food insecurity politicised Addiction promoted 38% Addiction instrumentalised Food Power asymmetry Opium 35% Opium: a necessity 32

33 OUTCOMES 33

34 % Population with debt 100 Peak during Jehadi-era % %

35 LAND OWNERSHIP CROP TRENDS 10,00 9,00 8,00-38% 7,00 Jeribs: 1/5 hectare Land Wheat Patak Poppy Orchards Barley Baquly Sugar Beat 6,00 5,00-35% 4,00 3,00 2,00 1,00 0,

36 LAND TRANSFER: INSIDE OUTSIDE 40% Sold within community Sold to outsider 60% 40% sales: outsiders 30% land owned Suni Badakhshanis 36

37 VERTICALISATION OF LAND Minimum 15% land owned by 3: Commanders Drug dealers Government bureaucrats Hybrid mixture Latifundism Remote-control extraction: agents 37

38 POWER RELATIONS Power-locked Radical asymmetry Rare example of enduring asymmetry Opium encourages avoidance 38

39 SHUGHNAN 39

40 ACTORS: PASHTUN DRUG-DEALER Most powerful drug dealer: Pashtun From Kabul/Pashtun belt east of Kabul Was Khalqi Fought in Afghan Airforce (Soviet-era) Personal friend of President Najibullah Sophisticated trader: Gems Commodities Antiques Intelligent/knowledgeable 40

41 PASHTUN/TAJIK STATE ACTORS Drugs swoop (2003) Pashtun Generals in Kunduz Presently high up in Government Stole drugs From state and non-state actors Drugs not declared - stolen Suni State actors 41

42 CRIMINAL STRONGMEN: INTERNATIONAL Senior drug dealers in Khorog Former UTO commanders Links to criminals: Tashkent/Moscow Ismaili 42

43 DISTRICT INDIGENOUS ELITE Shughni Ismaili Cosmopolitan Educated Soviet-era apparatchiks Product of Soviet minority politics 43

44 NETWORKS 44

45 CROSS-BORDER HEROIN TRADE 15 Afghans moved over to Khorog Pashtuns/Tajik Badakhshanis Network: Khorog/Bashur/Baharak Associational glue: politico-military Localist Family/kin 45

46 BUSINESS-TRADING : NETWORKS 3 elite political-entrepreneurs: Chief of Police (Baharak) Drug dealer(s) in Khorog Pashtun commodity-dealer (Bashur) No associational glue: Religious Socio-professional Ethnicity Politico-military In works of Khorogi drug dealer: It is about heroin and money 46

47 TAJIK BADAKHSHANI/SHUGHNI ELITE Local Shughni elite coopted Second-tier positions are Shughnis Into Tajik Badakhshani state apparatus Chief of Border Security, KhAD, Dep Woliswol Shughnis junior partners 47

48 STRATEGIES: CROSS-BORDER TRADE 48

49 SHIFTING ELITE STRATEGIES. FROM: FACTIONALISM AND FLUID ALLIANCES Factionalism Local elite fragmented PDPA factions Deployed patrons Badakhshanis fragmented Faizabad vs Baharak Alliances: fluid/capricious Extreme violence Rationale: control-border 49

50 TO: STABLE POWER ASYMMETRY - AT ELITE-LEVELS Woliswoli Junior partners: Shughni Senior: Suni Tajik Badakhshanis Predictable asymmetry 50

51 HOW/WHY?: COOPERATION BENEFICIAL Cooperative behavior: profitable Uncooperative behavior: not profitable Factionalism: 200 deaths Loss of drugs/money 51

52 HOW/WHY?: REDUCTION IN INTER-JEHADI TENSIONS Inter-jehadi tensions: diminished Baharak disarmed Faizabad more powerful Therefore less rivalry 52

53 EMBRYONIC LEGITIMACY/PATRONAGE Spring food insecurity Drug dealer supplies flour 40% reduction in price Flour war 53

54 STRUCTURES OF FLOUR MARKET: SPRING/EARLY SUMMER WFP included 42% drug dealer 31% flour consortium Flour market politicised WFP not included 58% drug dealer Flour market dominated By 1 political entrepreneur 54

55 EMBRYONIC LEGITIMACY/PATRONAGE Did not make loss on deal However, only made small profit Could have made: 50,000 USD Actual profit: 4,000 USD 55

56 WHY? First act of charity Legitimacy Long term power-asymmetries Reduce de facto power of state Reduce power indigenous elite actors Physical security/protection 56

57 OVERWHELMING FORCE/LEVERAGING OF PATRONAGE Drug seizure Bashur 100 armed MoD forces Overwhelming force MoD forces threatened by Rabbani Deployed threats of patronage Americans as super-patron 57

58 OUTCOMES 58

59 CROSS-BORDER TRADE: PROFESIONALISED Centralised Professionalised Concentrated Verticalised 59

60 SUMMARY: ECONOMICS OF RESOURCE BASE Indicator Shughnan Wakhan Nature of trade Global nexus Petty trade Revenue High Low Logisitical difficulty Low High Transactions Low High Profit Highly profitable Moderately profitable Geographical focus Concentrated Dispersed 60

61 SUMMARY: ACTORS Variable Shughnan Wakhan Diversity Heterogeneous Homogeneous Positionality International National Regional Provincial District Provincial District Character Sophisticated Crude Politically connected? Internationally, Kabul Provincially Education High Low World-view Cosmopolitan Parochial Experience (business; modern bureaucratic administration) Experienced Inexperienced 61

62 SUMMARY: NETWORKS Indicator Shughnan Wakhan No. networks Multiple One nexus Nature Fluid/capricious but stabilising Fossilised Composition Heterogeneous Homogeneous Geographical scope Cross-border/international Provincial Associational glue Complex Simple 62

63 SUMMARY: STRATEGIES Indicator Shughnan Wakhan Instrumentalise: addiction Moderately important Important Power sharing Important Unimportant Exploitative institutions Unimportant Important Cultivating legitimacy Important Unimportant Force Overwhelming force Coercion and brutality Patronage for positionality Important Unimportant 63

64 SUMMARY: OUTCOMES Indicator Shughnan Wakhan Conflict processing Embedded Disembedded Conflict processing Peaceful Violent Addiction Increased (heroin) Radically increased (opium) Land Minor land-loss Massive land loss Land-concentration Unchanged Latifundism/verticalisation Power-relations (Suni vs Ismaili elites) Mutually beneficial Mutually profitable Unequal gains Power-relations Stabalising Power-locked Power asymmetry Moderate Extreme Arrangement of drug economy Professionalising Centralising Vertical Concentrated Dispersed but verticalising 64

65 AFGHAN CENTRAL STATE: FRAGMENTED STATE Shughnan: high revenues High levels of state interest Wakhan: petty trade Insignificant state penetration Conclusion. Wakhan: Left to district/provincial potentates Autonomous extraction Shughnan: Multiple interest groups (state/non-state) Violent competition Fragmented state (not failed state) Economic extraction primary driver of state centre-periphery relations 65