Understanding the Rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party

Transcription

1 SEPTEMBER 8 ISSUE NO. 58 Understanding the Rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party SATISH MISRA ABSTRACT In the last five years, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has undergone a massive transformation and is today the country's most formidable political force. The party won the 4 general election with a convincing majority under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi who assumed power in May 4. Today the BJP is in power in states, either on its own or with its allies. This rise can be attributed to various factors, including the party leadership, organisational skills, and effective ground work. This brief analyses the journey of the BJP. INTRODUCTION In ve years since 3, when Narendra Modi was declared its prime ministerial candidate, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has managed to widen its geographical reach and strengthen its electoral and political supremacy across the country. Today, the BJP is the richest, largest, and most dominant political party in India. is expansion was made possible by the foundations that were laid following the party's rst electoral defeat in the 984 general polls. e party then decided to abandon the ideals of positive secularism and Gandhian socialism that it had adopted in its inception in 98, under the leadership of Atal Bihari Vajpayee who would later serve as prime minister. In the late 98s and the 99s, the BJP went back to the Hindutva ideology of its 3 precursor, the Bharatiya Jan Sangh (BJS). In the 984 elections, the BJP won only two Lok Sabha seats, provoking serious introspection within the party and its ideological parent, the Rashtriya Swyamsevak Observer Research Foundation (ORF) is a public policy think-tank that aims to influence formulation of policies for building a strong and prosperous India. ORF pursues these goals by providing informed and productive inputs, in-depth research, and stimulating discussions. The Foundation is supported in its mission by a cross-section of India s leading public figures, academics, and business leaders. To know more about ORF scan this code ISBN: Observer Research Foundation. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from ORF.

2 Sangh (RSS). e electoral failure was seen as proof that the moderate policy of Vajpayee would not work. Vajpayee was replaced as BJP president by Lal Krishna Advani, who promptly revived the BJS's hard-line Hindutva 4 as the core ideology of the party. Advani used the Hindutva rhetoric of pseudo secularism and Muslim appeasement to great e ect in winning popular support among the Hindus, 5 aided by the soft-hindutva politics the Indian 6 National Congress played then. e next logical step was to join the RSSbacked Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) which was leading the Ramjanmabhoomi movement. Soon, Advani became the face of a countrywide campaign to build a Ramjanmabhoomi temple in Ayodhya where the Babri masjid once stood. e hardline Hindutva politics paid rich electoral dividends in the next general elections in 989 when the BJP won 85 7 Lok Sabha seats. In the 99 general elections, it increased its strength to and its vote share went up to. percent from 8.4 percent in 989 and 7.4 percent in 984. In the 996 general elections, the BJP's seats in Lok Sabha went up to 6 and it staked claim to form the government as the single largest party, which was accepted. us, the rst ever BJP-led government was formed under the leadership of Vajpayee but it lasted for only 3 days as it failed to garner the support of other non-congress, non-left political parties to muster a majority. Vajpayee resigned, rather than face a vote of con dence 9 in Parliament. In the next general polls in 998, the BJP obtained 8 seats in the Lok Sabha and formed a coalition government called the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), which lasted 3 months from 9 March 998 to 7 April 999 when it lost a no-con dence motion by a single vote. ereafter, in September-October 999, the BJP-led NDA won 7 seats in the general elections, with the BJP once again getting 8 seats. Vajpayee became prime minister for the third time and his government lasted the full term until the next general polls in 4. THE BJP'S RISE: A CONFLUENCE OF FACTORS e BJP's rise to power can be attributed partly to Advani's organisational skills, as well as the party's return to the Hindutva agenda while keeping the liberal image of Vajpayee alive in popular memory. What further helped the party was the fact that the electorate wanted a change from the long years of Congress rule. Slogans like Party with a di erence and an appeal to the electorate to give the BJP a chance captured the con dence of the electorate. A little over six years of the Vajpayee government, between 998 and 4, established the party as a credible alternative to the Congress. However, the BJP-led NDA lost the next two general elections due to various factors, making way for a Congress-led coalition, the United Progressive Alliance (UPA), to run the government until a series of scams, high in ation and unemployment and policy paralysis grounded it in the 4 elections. is time, the BJP was led by Modi, a four-time chief minister of Gujarat and the party's prime ministerial candidate. He managed to capitalise on the popular discontent against the UPA government and won the party a majority, on its own, in Lok Sabha. e last time a party had ORF ISSUE BRIEF No. 58 SEPTEMBER 8

3 won a majority on its own was when the Congress won 44 seats in the 984 elections that followed the assassination of Indira Gandhi. Ever since Modi became prime minister on 6 May 4, the BJP has been working like a well-oiled electoral machine. It has won one state election after another and is dominating the national discourse like no other party has done in recent memory. Modi-Shah Partnership e rise of Modi has also marked the rise of Amit Shah as BJP president. Rajnath Singh, who headed the party in the run-up to the 4 electoral victory, reportedly wanted to continue in the post and stay out of the government. But this was not acceptable to Modi as that could have meant a dual power centre. Rajnath Singh had an excellent rapport with the RSS and that is why Modi did not want him to continue. e name of party General Secretary J P Nadda, a politician from Himachal Pradesh, was brought into contention and the RSS was agreeable to him. e move was made to juxtapose Shah against Nadda. Modi resolved it by inducting Singh and Nadda into his cabinet and appointing Shah, his old and trusted colleague from Gujarat, as party president. is was an exception to the long-held convention that the prime minister and the party president should come from di erent states. Shah has galvanised the party, bringing in a certain ruthlessness and unprecedented administrative acumen in the way the organisation is run. It is said that his party colleagues are more in awe of him than admiring. Upon taking charge, Shah introduced many changes in the party's administrative style and structure. He modernised the party set-up and developed a system that rewards individuals who deliver. He ushered in a corporate-style system of vertical heads for programmes, in contrast to the horizontal nature of the party under the previous presidents. For Shah and the party, elections are nothing less than war. His advice to party colleagues after taking charge was: Elections are to be fought with clarity of mind and with the 3 single objective of victory. He enjoys the total support of Modi, stands rm in his decisions and brooks no interference from any leader. By most accounts, he has a no-nonsense style of leadership, and keeps a tight schedule and long hours of work, inspiring his team to follow 4 suit. Shah has also developed closer working relations with the RSS, as a result of which the RSS leadership and functionaries are playing a 5 bigger role in running the oganisation. RECENT ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE: A SNAPSHOT In 3, the BJP was in power in ve states Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, R ajasthan, Chhattisgarh and Goa and was sharing power with ally JD(U) in Bihar and Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD) in Punjab. Its political fortunes have changed dramatically since then. By May 8, the BJP, either on its own strength or with its alliance partners, was ruling in of the 3 states and union territories, expanding to the regions and states where it was never in power before. In 5 states, it has its own chief ministers and in the other six, it shares power with its allies (Bihar, Jammu and ORF ISSUE BRIEF No. 58 SEPTEMBER 8 3

4 Table : BJP's Performance in 4 General Elections States Total Seats Seats Won by BJP Poll % Andhra Pradesh Arunachal Pradesh Assam Bihar Goa 54. Gujarat Haryana Himachal Pradesh Jammu and Kashmir Karnataka Kerala.45 Madhya Pradesh Maharashtra Manipur.98 Meghalaya 9.6 Mizoram Did not contest Nagaland Did not contest Odisha.88 Punjab Rajasthan Sikkim.39 Tamil Nadu Tripura 5.77 Uttar Pradesh West Bengal 4 7. Chhattisgarh 4.83 Jharkhand Uttarakhand Andman & Nikobar Islands 48.9 Chandigarh 4.49 Dadar & Nagar Haveli Daman & Diu NCT of Delhi Lakshadweep.43 Puducherry Did not contest Total Source: Election Commission of India Kashmir, Andhra Pradesh, Meghalaya, Nagaland and Sikkim.) In ve out of the 5 states where it has its own chief ministers, it does not have a majority of its own (Maharashtra, Assam, Jharkhand, Manipur 6, 7 and Goa). Since then, two states have fallen o the map TDP pulled out of the NDA leading to break in partnership in Andhra Pradesh, and BJP pulled out of the coalition governments in Jammu and Kashmir. 4 ORF ISSUE BRIEF No. 58 SEPTEMBER 8

5 In 3, the BJP wrested power in Rajasthan, while retaining power in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh. In Rajasthan, it won convincingly with 6 seats in the assembly of 8 and a vote share of 45. percent. In Madhya Pradesh, it won 65 seats in a house of 9 3 with percent votes. In Chhattisgarh, it repeated its victory by winning 49 seats out of 9 with a vote share of 4.4 percent. In Mizoram, which also went to vote at the same time, it did not win a single seat despite elding 7 candidates and got.37 percent votes. Assembly elections for Arunachal Pradesh, Odisha and Sikkim were held along with the general elections in 4. In Arunachal Pradesh's 6-member assembly, the BJP won seats with 3.97 percent votes. It joined the government two years later in October 6 after the President's rule was imposed and the Congress, which had won a clear 3 majority of 4 seats in 4, was split. In Sikkim, it did not win a seat and polled only.7 percent of the votes but became a part of the gover nment since the r uling Sikkim Democratic Front (SDF) is a coalition partner at 4 the centre. In Odisha, it won seats in a 47- member assembly with 8 percent of popular 5 votes. After the 4 general elections, assembly elections were held in Maharashtra, Haryana, J&K and Jharkhand in the same year. In Maharashtra, the BJP won seats in a 88- member assembly with 7.8 percent votes while its ally Shiv Sena won 63 seats and 6 together they formed the government. In Haryana, it won 47 of 9 seats with a 33. percent vote share and formed its rst government in the state where it had been a junior alliance partner in two previous 7 governments. In J&K, it won 5 of 87 seats (additionally, two members are nominated to the assembly), gaining the highest percentage of votes (3 percent), with a majority of the 8 seats coming from the Jammu region. It joined hands with the People's Democratic Party (PDP), which had won 8 seats, to form a coalition government. In June 8, the BJP pulled out of the coalition and the Governor's 9 rule was imposed. In Jharkhand, the BJP won 37 of 8 seats, 3 falling a few seats short of the majority. A coalition government was formed with the All Jharkhand Students Union (AJSU) and Raghubar Das, a party leader, became the rst from a non-tribal community to head a government in the state. In 5, the BJP tasted defeat in the assembly elections of Delhi and Bihar. In Delhi, it could win only three of 7 seats, though 3 polled 3.9 percent of votes. In Bihar, it faced the united opposition from the RJD, JD (U) and Congress, winning only 53 of 43 seats with percent votes. In 6, the BJP won the Assam elections and formed its own government for the rst time in the state, while failing to make much headway in Kerala, Puducherry, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal. In Assam, it won 6 of 6 33 seats with 9.8 percent votes. In Kerala, it won one seat, though it improved its vote share by 34 winning.6 percent votes. In the Union Territory of Puducherry, it failed to win any 35 seat while polling.4 percent votes. e West Bengal elections were disappointing too. It could win only three seats while polling.8 36 percent votes. In 7, the assembly elections were held in Goa, Manipur, Punjab, Uttarakhand, Uttar ORF ISSUE BRIEF No. 58 SEPTEMBER 8 5

6 Pradesh, Gujarat and Himachal Pradesh. e BJP formed the government in Goa and Manipur despite not being the single largest party and came to power in Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand and Uttar Pradesh convincingly. In Goa, the BJP won 3 seats in a house of 4 while registering the highest percentage of 37 votes at 3.5. In Manipur, it won of 6 38 seats with 36.3 percent votes. It wrested power from the Congress in Himachal Pradesh by winning 44 seats, out of 39 68, with a vote share of 48.8 percent. In Uttarakhand, it won 57 of 7 seats with a percent vote share. In Uttar Pradesh, it registered an unprecedented victory by winning 3 of 43 seats and registered percent of votes polled. In Punjab, where it was a junior partner of the SAD led government, it could win only three of 7 seats while polling 5.39 percent 4 votes. e party retained Gujarat but its tally was the lowest in the last two decades. It won 99 seats out of 8 though it polled percent of votes. In 8, the BJP registered a landmark victory in Tripura, ending 5 years of CPI(M) rule by winning 35 seats in a 6-member 44 assembly and polling 43. percent votes. In Meghalaya and Nagaland, however, its electoral performance was below expectations. It won two seats in a 6-member assembly in 45 Meghalaya with 9.63 percent votes and of 46 6 seats in Nagaland with 5.3 percent votes. In Karnataka, it emerged as the single largest party with 4 seats in a 4-member 47 assembly while polling 36. percent votes. However, it failed to form the government as the Congress and JD(S) joined hands to claim a majority. BJP'S WINNING STRATEGIES e BJP has been able to expand its political base in the country because of various factors including superior electoral strategies, planning, hard work, and a voter outreach programme that was far better than those of its rivals. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi and BJP president Amit Shah, the party devised electoral strategies taking into account micro details of caste, sub-castes, religious compositions and other speci cs of the constituencies while selecting party candidates. Under them, electoral victory at 48 any cost became the driving force of the BJP. Part of the strategy was to carefully identify ambitious or dissident leaders from rival parties. ose were then wooed and inducted into the party. is had begun in the run-up to the 4 general elections when a host of Congress leaders like former UP Chief Minister Jagd amibka Pal, Satpal Mahara j and Purandeswari were admitted into the BJP. Many others like Chaudhary Birendra Singh joined the ruling party later. A Congress leader and prominent minister in the former Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi's cabinet in Assam, Himanta Biswa Sarma, was admitted a year 49 before the assembly elections and proved critical in the BJP's win. In Uttarakhand, many Congress leaders, including ministers, were admitted to the party before the respective 5 assembly elections. Another strategy was to identify castes and sub-castes which have not been part of the power structure and give tickets to their members. e party also reached out to the economically weaker and socially backward groups. In UP, the party roped in the non-yadav 6 ORF ISSUE BRIEF No. 58 SEPTEMBER 8

7 castes from other backward castes and non- Jatav Dalits among the Dalits; it would reap 5 rich electoral dividends. Similarly, it formed an alliance with tribal groups that have been demanding separate statehood in Tripura and 5 won a landslide victory in 8. ere were many other important factors that helped the BJP achieve its electoral dominance and geographical spread. Some of these are to be discussed in turn. Financial Resources Money plays a big role in India's electoral politics and the BJP is aware of it. e party has managed to increase its nancial resources Table : BJP Growth in Indian States and Union Territories, 3-8 Year States Total Seats Results Contested Won % of Votes Polled 3 Rajasthan Madhya Pradesh Chhattisgarh Mizoram Andhra Pradesh Telangana Arunachal Pradesh Odisha Sikkim Maharashtra Haryana J & K Jharkhand Delhi Bihar Assam Kerala Puducherry Tamil Nadu West Bengal Goa Gujarat Himachal Pradesh Manipur Punjab Uttarakhand Uttar Pradesh Karnataka Meghalaya Nagaland Tripura Source: Election Commission of India. ORF ISSUE BRIEF No. 58 SEPTEMBER 8 7

8 considerably in the years since Modi came to power at the centre. A report of the Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR) said that the income of the BJP between 3-4 and 4-5, within one year of its coming to power at the centre, skyrocketed from INR crore in 3-4 to INR crore in 4-5 a rise of 44. percent or by INR 96.6 crore, the highest for any political party. It topped the list of income, with the Congress coming a distant second, with an income of INR crore in 3-4, which went down to INR crore in 4-5. e gap between the incomes of the rst two parties was INR 377. crore. In fact, the BJP's income of INR crore was 5.9 percent of the combined incomes of the six national parties (BJP, Congress, BSP, 53 NCP, CPI(M), CPI). Similarly, when it came to expenditure, in 4-5, the BJP spent the most with INR 93. crore, followed by the Congress with INR 765. crore a gap of INR 48 crore. e BJP spent most on advertisement and publicity (INR crore or 5.9 percent), followed by travelling (INR 9.57 crore or percent). In 6-7, the BJP spent INR 66.4 crore for election/general 55 propaganda. ADR's report for 6-7 showed that the income of the BJP increased by 8.8 percent from INR crore in 5-6 to INR 34.7 crore in 6-7. e BJP's income of INR 34.7 crore was percent of the total income of all seven national parties (BJP, Congress, BSP, NCP, CPI(M), CPI and Trinamool Congress) put together. During the same period, the income of the Congress decreased by 4 percent from INR 6.56 crore in 5-6 to INR 5.36 crore in 6-7. As for expenditure, the BJP declared the maximum expenditure of INR 7.57 crore during 6-7, while its nearest rival, the Congress, declared an expenditure of INR crore less than half of the BJP's. If donations (above INR,) received by all the national political parties for 6-7 are considered, the BJP received INR 53.7 crore coming from 94 donations which was more than nine times the aggregate 57 declared by the other national parties for the same period. A substantially higher income, and bigger expenditure on publicity and electoral propaganda than its rivals, has helped the BJP in its outreach programmes. ese nancial resources have helped in the party's extensive outreach to the electorate. Expansion of Mass Base Under the Modi-Shah leadership, the party was turned into a mass-based party from a 58 cadre-driven one. e BJP launched its membership drive asking citizens interested in joining the party to give a missed call on a dedicated phone number; they were then registered as members and their personal and professional details were taken. By 5, the BJP had become the biggest political party in the country and the world, surpassing the Communist Party of China in membership 59 when it crossed 8.8-crore mark. Soon the 6 membership breached the -crore mark. e BJP also began to penetrate into the rural countryside, focusing on reaching the backward castes and the poor. e party paid attention to castes, sub-castes and social 8 ORF ISSUE BRIEF No. 58 SEPTEMBER 8

9 groups that have been neglected by other parties. e BJP political strategists, for example, picked up non-yadav backward castes and non-jatav Dalits. Similarly, members of tribal communities were brought 6 into its electoral strategy. e BJP also reaped dividends from the sustained work of RSS-backed organisations in remote tribal a r e a s o v e r s e v e r a l d e c a d e s. e s e organisations include the Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram, Ekal Vidalays, Sewashram, and Sewa 6 Baharti. e prime minister, after the demonetisation policy that was announced in November 6, said the move was designed 63 to help the poor. Earlier, the party was perceived as a party of the rich, urban middleclass. Centralised Decision-Making e Modi-Shah partnership has also e ected major changes in both the style of functioning as well as in the decision-making processes of 64 the BJP. Earlier, all major policy decisions of the party were taken after broad-based consultation among top leaders in what was described as the core group concept. Decision-making is now centralised, with all the important decisions being made at the level of Modi and Shah, which are then conveyed to the others at the appropriate 65 party fora. In the earlier system, over half-adozen central leaders were involved in deliberations and decision-making. In matters relating to particular states, important state leaders were taken into con dence; today 66 decisions are merely conveyed to them. is marks an interesting change in the way leadership functions within the larger Sangh Parivar to which the BJP belongs. e RSS, the parent ideological organisation of the Sangh Parivar, was established by KB Hedgewar on the principle of ek chalak anuvartitva (follow one leader), which was continued by his successor MS Golwalkar. Later, the third RSS chief Balasaheb Deoras introduced the concept of sah chalak anuvartitva (follow many leaders) and sarv s a m a v e s h a k ( i n c l u s i v e l e a d e r s h i p ). Apparently, the Modi-Shah duo prefers the Hedgewar-Golwalkar model of leadership and 67 decision-making. A couple of senior leaders, who have been p a r t o f t h e p a r t y a n d t h e p a r t y - l e d governments, told this author on condition of anonymity that earlier the party used to be a family (parivar) that feeling is gone now. Workers and local leaders are feeling neglected. While earlier, the party took pride in saying that it is a party of workers, today it has become a party of leaders. e selection of Rajya Sabha candidates is one example. e state leaderships are not consulted nor are the names of candidates discussed in the party's Parliamentary Board, which used to be the norm. e practice of intense debates and discussions about various issues confronting the party or the party-led government at various party fora and meetings has been replaced with sermons from the top. Asking questions or raising doubts are strongly discouraged. Former Finance and External A airs Minister in the Vajpayee government Yashwant Sinha, who joined the BJP in 993 and quit the party in early 8, in an interview with this author said that while in the pre-modi-shah era discussion-based consensus shaped the party ORF ISSUE BRIEF No. 58 SEPTEMBER 8 9

10 policies on di erent issues, now these are determined at the level of the prime minister and the party chief. Earlier the party's top leadership was surrounded by equals and now it is surrounded by vassals," Sinha said. He added that today, BJP has become opulent; it is run in corporate style. Leaders were accessible to the cadre in the pre-modi era but now it is virtually impossible to meet the party president. Shah operated a vast patronage system and that was how he ensured loyalty of the middle- and lower-ranking leaders of the party. For example, there used to be lively interaction between the top leadership and the party MPs at the customary meeting every Tuesday during parliament sessions. is hardly happens today. Further, senior leaders such as former Deputy Prime Minister LK Advani and former party chief and union minister Murli Manohar Joshi have been sidelined from the decision-making processes and made members of a newly constituted committee, the 'Margdarshak Mandal', which 68 has not even met. Former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee (now deceased) and Prime Minister Modi have also been part of this committee. e new style of centralised decisionmaking is less time-consuming. e party's command structure has helped the party to implement its policies and programmes e ectively, as loyalty can be commanded from the top. E m p h a s i s o n Yo u n g a n d H i n d u t v a Hardliners e party's emphasis is on young leaders. In the states where the BJP has won assembly elections, relatively unknown and low-pro le leaders have been picked up as chief 69 ministers. Most of them were handpicked by the prime minister and are assumed to be loyal to him. Some examples are Manohar Lal Khattar in Haryana, Devendra Fadnavis in Maharashtra, Raghubar Das in Jharkhand, Biplab Dasgupta in Tripura all of whom have an RSS background. All these new leaders, whether in the government or in the party, are Hindutva hardliners. All those from the non- RSS background, brought into the party during the Vajpayee-Advani era, have been neglected or pushed out. ese include Yashwant Sinha, Arun Shourie, Varun Gandhi and Sunil Shastri. By making Hindutva the motivational force of the party and bringing in its followers to key positions in the party as well as in the state governments, the party's top leadership is getting a harder g r ip on the par ty's organisation. Decisions being made at the top rungs of leadership are being e ectively implemented. At the same time, the new leadership is proving useful in keeping alive the momentum of militant nationalism and the underlying narrative of upholding the majority community's core interests, thus helping the party in its electoral quests. CONCLUSION ere is hardly any doubt that the BJP has transformed itself in a period of ve years, evolving into an almost unrecognisable political machine. e party's rapid expansion, resulting in its current pan-india presence, has also brought in a new set of challenges. A possible electoral defeat at the national level ORF ISSUE BRIEF No. 58 SEPTEMBER 8

11 can trigger questions about the present model that has helped the party to come to power at the Centre and in states. Similarly, the e cacy of the strategy to expand the party's support base among non- Jatav Dalits, non-yadav backwards castes, tribal communities and other social groups may be questioned in case of a reversal of the party's electoral fortunes. It remains to be seen whether changes brought in by the Modi-Shah leadership that have helped the party achieve its pan-india presence will continue to be the norm in the years to come. Or will it be replaced under an alternative set of circumstances? e BJP's success or defeat in the next general elections may o er some clues. ABOUT THE AUTHOR Satish Misra is a Senior Fellow at Observer Research Foundation.. 'Positive secularism' was a concept that was against secularism that was being largely followed by the Left of centre parties including the Congress which, according to the BJP, was only favouring the minorities particularly the Muslims and was hurting the interests of Hindus. 'Gandhian socialism' was a band of socialism that sought to be di erent from socialism as followed by the Congress and other parties. It was claimed it meant to take developmental bene ts to the poorest of the poor in the villages.. ere is no agreed de nition of 'Hindutva'. Broadly, the word was coined by Hindu Mahasabha ideologue, Viyank Damodar Savarkar in the early 's of the last century. Hindutva sought to di erentiate itself from Sanatan Dharm that was the way of life for the majority of inhabitants of India. Hindutva was adopted by the Rashtriya Swyamsevak Sangh when it was set up in 95. It aimed at making Hindus strong and militant by asserting that Hindu interest is national interest. Hindutva seeks to unite Hindus and semitise the faith. 3. Asghar Ali Engineer, ' e BJP & its years', e Hindu, June, thehindu//6//stories/553.htm. 4. Ibid. 5. 'Soft Hindutva' is a term used by media analysts and commentators which broadly means following Sanatan Dharm that allows every citizen to follow the faith according to their choice. While 'Soft Hindutva' has been popularly used to distinguish between the BJP that takes a hard Hindutva line and the Congress that follows a soft approach to religious issues, it is a far more complex issue. 6. Ibid. 7. Partha S Ghosh, BJP and the Evolution of Hindu nationalism: From Periphery to Centre, New Delhi, Manohar, 999, p Ibid. 9. Kenneth J Cooper, 'Indian government falls after 3 days in power', Washington Post, 9 May 996, 3-days-in-power/f84cd ba75-4fcbf55438/?utm_term=.8acbc ORF ISSUE BRIEF No. 58 SEPTEMBER 8

12 . Nilanjan Mukhopadhyay, ' ree years of Narendra Modi govt: Role of BJP, rise of Amit Shah and the battle ahead', Firstpost, 9 May 7, rstpost.com/politics/three-years-of-narendramodi-govt-role-of-bjp-rise-of-amit-shah-and-the-battles-ahead html.. Ibid.. Ibid. 3. 'Amit Shah rises', e Economist, 9 July 4, amit-shah-rises. 4. Devendra Kumar, 'Amit Shah: He is more than just an election machine', e Economic Times, 4 August 7, 5. ' e Chief's Strategy', Indian Express, 7 August 7, columns/amit-shah-bjp-election-strategy-the-chiefs-strategy /. 6. 'Modi Says BJP in Power in States. e Truth is it has a Clear Majority in Only ', e Wire, 7 May 8, 7. 'BJP r ules states now, Congress reduced to 4', e Tr ibune, 4 March 8, 4/55636.html. 8. Statistical report on general election, 3, to legislative assembly of Rajasthan, Election C o m m i s s i o n o f I n d i a, h t t p : / / e c i. n i c. i n / e c i _ m a i n / S t atisticalrepor t s / A E 3 / RajAE_3_stat_report.pdf. 9. Statistical report on general election, 3, to legislative assembly of Madhya Pradesh, Election C o m m i s s i o n o f I n d i a, h t t p : / / e c i. n i c. i n / e c i _ m a i n / S t atisticalrepor t s / A E 3 / RajAE_3_stat_report.pdf.. Statistical report on general election, 3 to legislative assembly of Chhattisgarh, Election Commission of India, New Delhi, CGAE_3_stat_report.pdf.. Statistical report on general election, 3, to legislative assembly of Mizoram, Election C o m m i s s i o n o f I n d i a, h t t p : / / e c i. n i c. i n / e c i _ m a i n / S t atisticalrepor t s / A E 3 / MizoramAE_3_stat_report.pdf.. Statistical report on general election, 4, to legislative assembly of Arunachal Pradesh, Election C o m m i s s i o n o f I n d i a, h t t p : / / e c i. n i c. i n / e c i _ m a i n / S t atisticalrepor t s / A E 4 / Stat_Rep_Arunachal_Pradesh_4.pdf. 3. 'BJP formally joins Arunachal Pradesh government, Tamiyo Taga to be inducted into cabinet', Financial Express, 4 October 6, nancialexpress.com/india-news/bjp-formallyjoins-arunachal-pradesh-government-tamiyo-taga-to-be-inducted-into-cabinet/476/. 4. Statistical report on general election, 4, to legislative assembly of Sikkim, Election Commission o f I n d i a, h t t p : / / ceosikkim.nic.in/files/election%histor y / S TAT I S T IC A L % REPORT_GE%4.pdf. 5. Statistical report of general election, 4, to legislative assembly of Odisha, Election Commission of India, ORF ISSUE BRIEF No. 58 SEPTEMBER 8

13 6. Statistical report of general election, 4, of legislative assembly of Maharashtra, Election C o m m i s s i o n o f I n d i a, h t t p : / / e c i. n i c. i n / e c i _ m a i n / S t atisticalrepor t s / A E 4 / StatReportMaharashtra_AE4.pdf. 7. Statistical report of general election, 4, of legislative assembly of Haryana, Election Commission of India, 8. Statistical report of general election, 4, of legislative assembly of Jammu & Kashmir, Election Commission of India, 4.pdf. 9. 'Governor's rule in Jammu and Kashmir after BJP ends alliance with PDP', Hindustan Times, Jun 8, 3. Statistical report of general election, 4, of legislative assembly of Jharkhand, Election C o m m i s s i o n o f I n d i a, h t t p : / / e c i. n i c. i n / e c i _ m a i n / S t atisticalrepor t s / A E 4 / StatReportJharkhandLA4.pdf. 3. Statistical report of general election, 4, of legislative assembly of Delhi, Election Commission of India, 3. Statistical report of general election, 4 of legislative assembly of Bihar, Election Commission of India, India Votes, Ajoy Ashirwad Mahaprashasta, Six charts that show the BJP's goal of a 'Congress free India' is a distant dream, e Wire, 6 May 6, 'Puducherry election results 6: Congress-DMK combine wrests power', Financial Express, 9 May 6, nancialexpress.com/india-news/puducherry-election-results-6-countingof-votes-begins/593/. 36. West Bengal general legislative election 6, Election Commission of India, 6, Goa assembly election results, Statistics Times, March 7, politics/goa-assembly-election-results.php. 38. Manipur assembly election results, Statistical Times, March 7, politics/manipur-assembly-election-results.php. 39. Himachal Pradesh Legislative assembly election statistics 7, Himachal Pradesh general studies, 4. State Election, 7, to the Legislative Assembly Of Uttarakhand, Election Commission of India, 7, Parties.pdf. 4. State Election, 7 to the Legislative Assembly Of Uttar Pradesh, Election Commission of India, 7, Parties.pdf. ORF ISSUE BRIEF No. 58 SEPTEMBER 8 3

14 4. State Election, 7, to the Legislative Assembly Of Punjab, Election Commission of India, 7, s.pdf. 43. State Election, 7 to the Legislative Assembly Of Gujarat, Election Commission of India, 7, arties.pdf. 44. State Election, 7 to the Legislative Assembly Of Tripura, Election Commission of India, 8, arties.pdf. 45. State Election, 8 to the Legislative Assembly Of Meghalaya, Election Commission of India, 8, Parties.pdf. 46. State Election, 8 to the Legislative Assembly Of Nagaland, Election Commission of India, 8, Parties..pdf. 47. Karnataka state results, General election to vidhan sabha trends and results, Election Commission of India, 8, 'Winning at Any Cost the New Normal in Indian Politics: Election Commissioner', e Wire, 8 August 7, 'Himanta & BJP ready to hug - Move for personal bene t, says Gogo is turning a new leaf', e Telegraph, 4 August 5, story_3886.jsp. 5. Amit Singh, 'Is Amit Shah's idea of a 'Congress-free India' one where BJP is full of Congress leaders', e Wire, 3 March 7, 5. Milan Vaishnav, 'Modi's victory and the BJP's future', Foreign A airs, 5 March 7, airs.com/articles/india/7-3-5/modis-victory-and-bjps-future. 5. Ramasheshan, Radhika, 'What the Tripura victory signi es for the BJP', March, 8, es-bjp.html. 53. Analysis of Income & Expenditure of National Political Parties for FY- 4-5, ADR, 3 Jun 6, les/analysis_of_income_and_expenditure_of_national_polit ical_parties_for_fy_4_5_updated_with_details_of_inc_english.pdf. 54. Ibid. 55. Analysis of income and expenditure of BJP and INC: FY-6-7 ADR, Apr 8, Ibid. 57. Analysis of Donations Received above Rs, by National Political Parties FY 6-7, ARD, 3 May 8, 4 ORF ISSUE BRIEF No. 58 SEPTEMBER 8

15 58. Gyan Varma, 'BJP.: A mass-based political par ty', Mint, December, 4, 'BJP becomes largest political party in the world', Times of India, 3 May 5, ndia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/ cms?utm_source=contento nterest& utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst. 6. 'BJP World's Largest Party With Over Crore Members: Amit Shah', NDTV, 3 Apr 5, 6. 'It is Modi, not BJP won this election', e Hindu, June 4, opinion/op-ed/it-is-modi-not-bjp-that-won-this-election/article6477.ece. 6. 'Behind the BJP's spectacular success in Northeast, years of silent work by Sangh', e Indian Express, 7 March 7, /. 63. Jatin Gandhi, 'Note-ban decision in national interest, to bene t poor, farmer: PM Modi', Hindustan Times, 7 November 6, t-poor-farmer-pm-modi/story-kwwdlx4g4gsubpzoxflekm.html. 64. Nilanjan Mukhopadhyay, op.cit. 65. Pratul Sharma, 'Under Shah, BJP an unstoppable juggernaut', e Week, 7 October 7, Ravish Tiwari, 'Modi, Amit Shah rede ning BJP's language of business', India Today, 4 October 4, Nilanjan Mukhopadhyay, op.cit. 68. 'LK Advani, Joshi dropped from BJP's parliamentary board, Cong slams move', Firstpost, 6 August 4, rstpost.com/politics/lk-advani-joshi-dropped-from-bjps-parliamentaryboard-cong-slams-move-6853.html. 69. Sanjay Singh, 'BJP chief Amit Shah turns to former RSS workers, young faces to form team', Firstpost, 7 August 4, rstpost.com/politics/bjp-chief-amit-shah-turns-toformer-rss-workers-young-faces-to-form-team-6674.html. ORF ISSUE BRIEF No. 58 SEPTEMBER 8 5

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