THE ELECTORAL PROCESS AND SECURITY SECTOR SYNERGY A

Transcription

1 THE ELECTORAL PROCESS AND SECURITY SECTOR SYNERGY A Paper Delivered by Professor Attahiru M. Jega, OFR, Hon. Chairman, Independent National Electoral Commission, to EIMC 6 Participants of Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Abuja on August 21, 2012 PROTOCOL Introduction I am honoured that I have been asked to deliver this lecture to this cream of the security and intelligence community of Nigeria. I thank the Director and staff of the Institute for this invitation. I am not an expert in security, but in the past three years or so, I have been involved in managing one of the most important emerging security issues in our country and indeed the African continent, namely electoral security. Easily, elections have become a major source of security concern in Nigeria and the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), being the major manager of elections in Nigeria has had its fair share of this concern. In the run up to the 2007 general elections, it was widely reported that there was an attempt to bomb the headquarters of INEC using a petrol tanker laden with fuel. Again in 2011 as we prepared for the general elections, you may recall, a bomb exploded at the INEC office in Suleija killing innocent poll workers. More worrisome was the extensive post- election violence that engulfed a number of States in Northern Nigeria in 2011, in which innocent citizens were killed, particularly nine young Youth Corps who were working for INEC. Indeed, in many ways election in Nigeria is akin to war. For one thing, mobilization by the election commission is massive, akin to preparations for a major war. The 2011 elections required the assemblage of close to a million poll workers, party workers, security personnel and election observers. The election entailed the acquisition of over 120,000 ballot boxes, printing of about 400 million ballot papers and managing a voter s roll of over 73 million entries. In fact, in the registration of voters that preceded the elections, the machines used in the exercise would have formed a chain of over eighty kilometers if placed end to end and the over 400,000 staff used in the exercise out numbered the collective strength of the entire armed forces of the West African sub-region. For added measure, the electoral commission had to organize all these across very challenging geographical and social terrains. For another thing, the heat and passion associated with elections in Nigeria often make elections appear like war. Pre-election violence has led to the death of many politicians, their supporters and innocent citizens. Widespread intimidation of voters persists and organized thugs spread fear across communities in the build up to elections. In any case, elections in Nigeria are a winner takes all situation in which loser lose everything and winners win everything, akin to payment of reparations by an enemy defeated in a war. It is not therefore surprising that elections in Nigeria pose serious security challenges, not only in terms of security of the men and materials deployed for the elections, but also in terms of protecting the voters and candidates. The 2011 elections amply 1

2 demonstrate these challenges at various stages, from the registration of voters, through nomination of candidates and elections proper, to the post-election period during which winners and losers emerge. I will try to share with you some of our experiences in handling election security during the 2011 election, particularly the very special synergies we established with the security sector. Dimensions of insecurity in the electoral process First, however, I would like to outline the dimensions of electoral insecurity so as to underscore the enormity of the problem in Nigeria. Electoral insecurity pervades the entire electoral cycle. We can identify at least thirteen sets of security issues during the election cycle. These include physical attacks on INEC staff and facilities, attacks on security personnel on election duties, misuse of security orderlies by politicians, especially incumbents, attacks on, attacks on members of the public, violence at campaigns, intimidation of voters, snatching of election materials, kidnapping and assassination of political. These have become lasting features of the Nigerian electoral cycle. Indeed, they might be getting worse, going by the terrible violence that followed the 2011 elections, not withstanding that the whole world praised those elections as easily the best that the country has ever had. Thus, if good elections could produce such level of violence, then the actions of our politicians and their security implications must be a major source of concern to all of us. You would agree with me that INEC is not in a position to counter the rising insecurity around elections in Nigeria, since it is not designed to do so. Consequently, synergy with the security sector will always be a desideratum in the conduct of free, fair and credible elections, which is the mandate that Nigerians have given to INEC. Table 1: Dimensions of electoral insecurity in Nigeria PRE- ELECTION PERIOD ELECTION PERIOD POST- ELECTION PERIOD 1. Physical attacks on INEC staff and facilities Physical attacks on INEC staff and facilities Physical attacks on INEC staff and facilities 2. Intimidation of by political thugs Intimidation of voters Intimidation of by political thugs 3. Physical attacks on political Attacks on security personnel on election Physical attacks on political duties 4. Arson targeting INEC facilities Misuse of security orderlies Arson targeting INEC facilities 5. Kidnapping of political Physical attacks on political Kidnapping of political 6. Possession of illegal weapons and substances like drugs 7. Violence at party meetings and conventions 8. Assassination of political 9. Intimidation of members of the public by political thugs Possession of illegal weapons and substances like drugs Violence at party campaigns Assassination of political Snatching and/or destruction of election materials Possession of illegal weapons and substances like drugs Violence at party meetings and conventions Assassination of political Intimidation of members of the public by political thugs 2

3 10. Physical attacks on potential voters Kidnapping of INEC staff Physical attacks on potential voters 11. Attacks on security personnel on election duties Kidnapping of political Attacks on security personnel on election duties 12. Snatching and/or destruction of voter registration materials Violence at polling and collation centres Snatching and/or destruction of election materials 13. Cyber attack on INEC database Falsification of results and destruction of result sheets Destruction of election litigation evidence Fig. 1: Electoral Cycle and Electoral Insecurity Explaining electoral insecurity But the question is: Why has election that should be a routine, peaceful event through which citizens select the people to govern their affairs become a warlike enterprise in which people are killed and maimed? One dominant explanation of electoral insecurity in Africa points to worsening social conditions and the emergence of a pool of young people who are easily enticed into violent activities by politicians. It is suggested that rather than a blessing, Africa s youth bulge has become the most pressing source of insecurity, particularly around elections. Thus, the continuing electoral crisis in Egypt has been linked to the fact that as much as sixty per cent of the Egyptian population is below the age of thirty. However, while the youth bulge may be a trigger factor in election insecurity, it is not a sufficient explanation because it does not explain why many countries with such demographic characteristics also have peaceful elections. This points to the fact that 3

4 there must be certain intervening variables that convert what should be the most productive part of the population into cannon fodders for election violence. An important intervening variable must therefore be the behaviour of politicians, both within and outside government. A second explanation suggests that elections in countries like Nigeria are marked by insecurity because of their recency. The argument is that security challenges in elections constitute only a phase in the growth of electoral democracy that will pass with time. While it is true that compared to more established democracies, elections in a country like Nigeria is still relatively recent, particularly considering the several years of military truncation of our democracy, it is not clear from this argument how much time is needed to wean our electoral process of this teething insecurity. More over, this evolutionism is not supported by empirical evidence because election insecurity seems to be getting worse in intensity and ramifications, suggesting that it is not to do with an evolutionary phase but with the fundamentals of the system. Another common explanation is one of electoral corruption, resulting either from absence of rules or from the failure of both politicians and the electoral management body to adhere to the rules. Thus, the argument is one of weakness of democratic institutions, particularly the EMB, leaving people with no option than to take to selfhelp, leading to violence. I do not think that the problem is one of absence of rules because the legal framework for elections is largely adequate. But the explanation is correct to the extent that it observes the failure of stakeholders to adhere to the rules, including the EMBs. However, this should not be seen as a voluntary matter, whereby politicians and the EMB choose to obey the rules or not to obey them. Instead, it the failure of rules is fundamentally related to the political economy of countries like Nigeria, deriving from the class structure of such countries. The important general point, however, is that while these explanations are not necessarily wrong, we must agree that electoral insecurity cannot be treated sui generis. It is organically linked to wider insecurity in society. Since elections are major events in which we select those who control the state, which in countries like Nigeria opens a vista of access to and control of enormous resources, broader security challenges become exacerbated during elections. Therefore, generally, electoral insecurity is to be understood in the context of wider insecurity, which has its roots in the Nigerian socio-economic structure and, through that, the Nigerian state and the character of its ruling class. Managing insecurity in the electoral process in Nigeria Managing electoral insecurity entails that we answer all or some of the following questions: 1. Why does insecurity occur in the electoral process? 2. What needs to be secured? 3. Who/what are the threats and vulnerabilities? 4. What are the implications if they were damaged or lost? 5. What is the value to the electoral process? 6. What can be done to minimize exposure to the loss or damage? These generic questions are however answered in the specific context of the threat assessment. I will however limit my discussion to the last question namely what we did in the 2011 election to minimize exposure to loss or damage consequent on 4

5 insecurity in the electoral process. In other words, I will discuss the preventive and mitigative action we took in the election. As in the management of all forms of insecurity, there are two types of mitigative and preventive action possible in managing electoral insecurity namely, containment and adaptation. Containment is a direct or positive form of mitigation. It refers to direct strategies for stopping or curbing an attack or its impact. Adaptation on the other hand has to do with creating conditions that make attack impossible, unnecessary or, if it happens, harmless. It can also mean the capacity of a system to adjust rapidly after an attack or quickly resumes normal functions following an attack (disequilibrium). Thus, stability is a function of adaptation. Fig. 2: Management of Electoral Insecurity RISK MITIGATIO THREAT: What is the threat? Is it manmade or natural? Is it trying to destroy a target or destroy defenses? Is it low intensity or high intensity? Etc ATTACK: Is an attack imminent? Can we predict when and how it will occur? EXPOSURE: What is the likelihood that the attack will occur? VULNERABILITY: From past experience, how prone are aspects of our system to attacks? M A N A G E M E N T O F I N S E C R I T Y CONTAIN direct or mitigation refers to for stoppi attack or i ADAPTATI conditions improbable, happens, ha It can also is able to a attack or functioning attack (dise 5

6 The Interagency Consultative Committee on Election Security (ICCES) In terms of containment, the Interagency Consultative Committee on Election Security (ICCES) was the main agency used by INEC. It was the quintessence of synergy between the electoral management body and the security sector, and has emerged as a best practice that other EMBs are desirous of establishing. We began from the assumption that the primary challenge of electoral risk management for EMBs like INEC is their dependence on agencies outside their control to secure the electoral process. In some countries, control of security agencies on election duties is turned over to the EMB at elections. However, it was more the inadequacies of previous strategies of securing elections, rather than control of security agencies per se, that accounted largely for electoral insecurity in Nigeria. But why did we think so? First, there was inadequate coordination among security agencies around elections. Indeed, INEC tended to speak to the various agencies separately. While it is true that various security agencies have different legal roles, professional inclinations and organizational tendencies, effective security of elections requires that agency idiosyncrasies must recede in favour of interagency synergy. Second, the tendency in the past was to assume that all States and communities across the country have the same security challenges around elections. A single plan that fits all situations tended to dominate electoral security thinking namely, that what INEC needed was adequate numbers of policemen to secure electoral materials protect INEC officials and keep order at polling/collation centres. But beyond these, it is a fact that there are unique security challenges facing different States, local government areas and specific communities around elections, which call for adequate planning based on local knowledge and synergy among security agencies. Third, since a single, general understanding of electoral security pervades thinking, there seems to have been inadequate involvement of security agencies themselves in planning electoral security. This has meant that training, logistics, planning, monitoring and evaluating security deployment have not benefitted from the rich perspectives of different agencies, as well as specific contents from different localities. Finally, election security planning has tended to be too centralized. Thus, security officials outside the national headquarters only have to implement handed-down orders, which may be incongruous with situations on the ground. ICCES was therefore a new approach to the containment of electoral insecurity. As the name suggests, ICCES is a consultative platform, not a legal structure. It was designed to increase the level of consultation, coordination, harmonization and managed decentralization of election security/risk management. It is an advisory body to support INEC to ensure effective security around elections, which is critical to the conduct of free, fair and credible elections in 2011 and beyond. Through ICCES, INEC sought to give a greater role to security agencies to provide well-coordinated plans for securing elections. It was also intended to bring local perspectives of security agencies in the States into planning and implementing election security. Rather than a single, top-down plan often developed in Abuja, ICCES sought to give more voice to security officials on the ground to provide adequate local context to election security. Finally, the strength of ICCES included that the security agencies on the ground were expected to provide the plans and, therefore, the template for 6

7 evaluating their performance. This is different from the old practice whereby security agencies in the States were unwilling to accept responsibility for failure because they were made to implement essentially handed down plans. The purpose of establishing ICCES can then be summarized as follows: 1. Coordinate the design of a comprehensive election security management system for INEC. 2. Develop locally focused plans for providing security before, during and after elections. 3. Harmonize the training, deployment and actions of security personnel on election duties. 4. Assess existing security threats across the country that have implications for elections and produce a red, amber and green electoral security map for the country, which will be regularly updated. 5. Advise INEC on rapid response to security threats around elections, including voter registration. 6. Ensure a reduction in transaction costs to INEC of dealing with individual security agencies on issues of elections. 7. Evaluate the performance of security agencies on election duties and recommend improvements and sanctions, where necessary. 8. Harmonize the election budgets of security agencies and source funding commonly, if possible. On the whole, there were sixteen participating security and quasi-security agencies including the Office of the NSA, the Police, the Army, Navy and Air Force, SSS, Prisons, Civil Defence, NIA and NYSC. The participating agencies also requested detailed specification of tasks that INEC would want each of them to perform. Table 2: ICCES Participating Agencies 1 Office of the National Security Adviser 9 Nigeria Police Force 2 Police Service Commission 10 Ministry of Police Affairs 3 Nigerian Air force 11 Nigerian Navy 4 Nigerian Army 12 State Security Service 5 National Intelligence Agency 13 Nigeria Customs Service 6 Nigeria Immigration Service 14 National Drug Law Enforcement Agency 7 Federal Road Safety Corps 15 Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps 8 Nigerian Prisons Service 16 National Youth Service Corps Table 3: Specific tasks of ICCES participating agencies 7

8 AGENCY 1. Office of the National Security Adviser 2. Ministry of Police Affairs SPECIFIC TASKS Contact the Service Chiefs to assist INEC and get their buy in for ICCES Increase security surveillance during registration/election Coordinate the activities of ICCES Monitor the performance of security agencies during voter registration and elections Dissuade public officials from misusing security details attached to them for political ends Provide support to Police to perform their role during registration/election vehicles, communication, etc 3. Nigeria Police Force Provide adequate personnel to man/keep order at polling units, registration area centres and other INEC facilities Provide security for registration/election equipment and other materials during delivery, registration/election and retrieval. Apprehend law breakers and prosecute them Dissuade public officials from misusing police security details. Bind over suspected trouble makers to keep the peace Conduct pre-emptive raids on criminal hideouts Work with recognized local/community security outfits to monitor illegal activities during the registration/election. Enforce restriction on movement of persons that may be in force during registration/election. 4. Police Service Commission Monitor the registration/election process, particularly the performance of police officers on election duties. Train police officers on conduct during elections Develop a reward system for police officials who perform creditably during election. Develop and share with the police a template for monitoring activities of police officers on election duties, including likely disciplinary and reward measures. 5. Nigerian Army Provide surveillance in the vicinities of registration/election areas as determined by engagement rules to be developed by ICCES Assist in restricting movement during the registration/election exercise Assist in protecting registration/election materials where police and other agencies are not able to do so Establish as standby rapid deployment squads in all States in case of serious crisis Assist in delivery of INEC materials where necessary Assist in retrieving INEC registration/election equipment, materials and personnel after registration/election where necessary Prepare to assist and evacuate civilians in the case of serious crisis 8

9 6. Nigerian Navy Increase surveillance of Nigeria s seaports and continental shelf during the elections Assist in the deployment of INEC equipment and personnel where necessary. Assist the Navy in restricting movement along waterways during the registration/election exercise Assist in protecting registration/election equipment/materials where police and other agencies are not able to do so Establish as standby rapid deployment squads in all States in case of serious crisis Assist in delivery of INEC materials where necessary Assist in retrieving INEC registration/election equipment, materials and personnel after registration/election where necessary Prepare to assist and evacuate civilians in the case of serious crisis during registration/election 7. Nigerian Air force Increase surveillance of Nigeria s airspace and airports during the elections Assist in the deployment of INEC equipment and personnel where necessary. Assist in restricting movement along waterways during the registration/election exercise Assist in protecting registration/election equipment/materials where police and other agencies are not able to do so Establish as standby rapid deployment squads in all States in case of serious crisis Assist in delivery of INEC materials where necessary Assist in retrieving INEC registration/election equipment, materials and personnel after registration/election where necessary Prepare to assist and evacuate civilians in the case of serious crisis 8. State Security Service Monitor the registration/election closely and alert INEC and other security agencies, especially in the framework of ICCES on security problems. Develop a framework for sharing intelligence regularly with other agencies during the registration/election. Enforce restriction on movement of persons that may be in force during registration/election. Apart from the containment strategy through ICCES, INEC also adopted adaptation measures. I will only outline them briefly as follows: 1. Back up of VR data outside the Commission so that if there is an attack on our database, we still have adequate backup. 2. Establishment for the first time of a Security Standing Committee of the Commission to ensure a hands-on treatment of security challenges in elections. 3. Insurance of staff on electoral duties, including ad hoc staff on election duties. 9

10 4. Insurance of INEC equipment. 5. Extensive voter education against election violence, especially targeting the youth. 6. Strengthening of INEC s alternative dispute resolution, particularly by engaging political parties on the need to resort to other methods of dispute resolution apart from litigation, which seems to inflame passions. 7. Storage of sensitive materials in CBN and interparty inspection and distribution to build confidence. Post-election violence I cannot complete this lecture without saying a few words about the mindless violence that followed the 2011 general elections. Not only were many innocent citizens killed in that unnecessary carnage, but also nine young Nigerians serving their country in the NYSC, who worked for INEC during the elections, were murdered in cold blood. It was a terrible tragedy and Nigerians must do everything to ensure that such mindless killings never happen again. First, let me say that there is a paradox about the post-election violence of The paradox is that an election that was generally acclaimed to be one of Nigeria s best was also followed by such violence. What that points to immediately is that we must go beyond the election to find an explanation for the violence. That leads back to my opening comments that election violence must be understood in the context of deeper social, economic and political currents in the country. What we saw appeared like pent-up anger triggered by perceptions about the elections. What then were these perceptions and what brought them about? My sense is that they derived from what I describe as a crisis of rising expectations in the context of zero sum elections. Following the problems of the 2007 elections and the national demand for electoral reforms, there was a palpable rise in expectations that the 2011 elections would be far better than previous ones. Many citizens therefore looked forward to the elections, particularly with the appointment of what many considered a good electoral commission. But then, the zero-sum nature of elections in Nigeria persisted, which led to the negative mobilization of communal (ethnic) feelings by politicians. Thus, rising expectations were turned into relative deprivation and frustration by negative mobilization. It seems that negative mobilization of the populace by political parties was based on the message that if the elections are free and fair, then our party should win. The converse was then that if our party lost the elections, then they were not free and fair. It was this type of negative mobilization that accounted for much of the violence that followed the elections. Perhaps in ICCES we missed this point of rising expectations in the context of zero sum elections and the negative consequences it could produce after winners and losers are declared. Thus, we may have focused too much on pre-election and Election Day insecurity and did not pay adequate attention to post-election insecurity. With the benefit of hindsight, perhaps we should have brought a stronger element of futures analysis and scenario building into the work of ICCES. I therefore appeal to you, the experts, to take this into consideration as we prepare for the 2015 general elections. Conclusions: Towards

11 I am sure that you would all agree with me that the 2011 electoral process provided an opportunity for an unprecedented synergy between INEC and the security sector through the instrumentality of ICCES. Going forward, we must build on the gains of 2011 and deepen this synergy. ICCES has been a revelation and we must leverage on it as we prepare for Going forward, we at INEC have been considering how to more effectively counter electoral insecurity. I will outline some of the issues that have been raised so that you the experts can properly advise the Commission. The major trends in the internal discussions are as follows: 1. All INEC activities should have a risk assessment component before they are approved for implementation. 2. More attention should be paid to retrieval of men and women deployed, especially when at risk. In the past, emphasis was on retrieval of materials. 3. An Election Risks and Security Programme (ERSP) should be established at INEC s Electoral Institute to focus on the study of election risks and insecurity. We are working with the International IDEA to establish a fully functional Elections Risk Management System at the Commission. 4. A Basic Security in Election Duties (BaSED) Training Module should be developed by the Electoral Institute. The module would be taken online with certification by all staff on election duties, including ad hoc staff before they are deployed. 5. ICCES structures should be completed especially at the Local Government level. 6. The envisaged functions of ICCES should be fully implemented. 7. There should be a comprehensive research to evaluate the work of ICCES so far and suggest improvements. At the Commission, look forward to getting your inputs on these and other issues. May I also take the liberty of being here to propose that you consider organizing a seminar on Securing Elections in Nigeria: Lessons and Prospects as part of preparations for the 2015 elections. INEC will be happy to collaborate with you on that. Once more I thank you for the opportunity to deliver this lecture and I look forward to future synergies between INEC and the Institute. 11