Taking stock of the media s performance in Uganda s 2011 elections

Transcription

1 Taking stock of the media s performance in Uganda s 2011 elections By Monica B. Chibita (DRAFT. NOT TO BE CITED IN CURRENT FORM) Department of Journalism and Communication Makerere University P.O. Box 7062 Kampala Uganda Contacts mbchibita@gmail.com, cc. monica@masscom.mak.ac.ug Cell:

2 Taking stock of the media s performance in Uganda s 2011 elections Monica B. Chibita, Makerere University, Uganda Anthony Clive Bower in an article in the Global Journalist says: A strong correlation exists between a free media environment and the degree that we can call an election democratic. That is, assessing an election s outcome not by who wins but if the process itself was free and fair. A poll itself cannot be considered open and fair unless the media in a country are able to report on all aspects of the election cycle without interference Ideally there will be diverse coverage in terms of form and content, and the number of outlets covering the elections should grow as Election Day approaches. i The media play, or can play, four essential roles in elections provision of information to enable voters make informed decisions; provision of a platform for debate through allowing exchange of opinions amongst the different contending groups and citizens; acting as a watchdog for fairness during election campaigning and polling and providing voice to the voters. However, there is a difference between the roles the media could play and the roles they actually do play during elections in different parts of the world. Frere (2009), who has conducted extensive research on the media and elections in Central Africa, argues: For an electoral process to qualify as free and fair, not only must the election unfold in adequate political and administrative conditions, but citizens must also have access to sufficient information about the parties, candidates and voting procedures to ensure that they will make an enlightened and valid choice. Elections will only be free if all parties can express themselves: candidates, political parties, citizens, civil society and, of course, journalists.

3 Frere adds: A single media channel/outlet, even a public one, cannot perform singlehandedly all missions that fall to the media[sic] during a democratic electoral process. To ensure that voters have access to the views of political parties, civil society or fellow citizens, it is important that a range of voices be heard openly. Each newspaper, radio or television is free to adopt its own editorial line, [but] it is the whole range of voices expressed through the media that will enable citizens to have sufficient information to forge their own opinion. (2009) In other words, the ideal sound should be of an orchestra rather than of a solo. How well the media serve the interests of democracy (i.e. promoting participation and enabling competition) depends on their work not just on Election Day or even through the campaign period, but between elections and campaign periods as well. Broadly, balance and pluralism are essential parts of the equation, but it is possible to have media channel pluralism without actual diversity. Frere (2009:5-6) breaks down the potential role of the media during elections into the roles the media play at different stages of the electoral process as follows: Outside the election period the media: Inform citizens (fully, honestly and rigorously); Monitor the activities of public and private actors on behalf of citizens; and Serve as a platform for the view of various elements of society During the pre-election period, the media 3

4 Provide information on the electoral process (voter registration, voting procedures, etc.); Analyse electoral stakes; Supervise the implementation of the election (in terms of its transparency or rigour); and Assess the outgoing government s achievements and shortcomings. During the electoral campaign, the media Allow parties and candidates to express themselves; Cover the various aspects of the campaign; Present, criticize and compare programmes; Follow and report the organization of the election; and Allow citizens and civil society to express themselves on matters of public interest. On election day, the media Observe and report on voting operations; Denounce dysfunctions in procedure and execution; Publish partial results (if authorized); Analyse available data (voter turnout, etc.) and Cover accounts of the ongoing electoral exercise given by independent observers. During the announcing of results, the media Announce overall and/or detailed results and tell citizens where detailed results can be found; Analyse results and their implications; Cover the reactions of the various parties and candidates to the results; and Cover any potential demonstrations linked to the electoral process. 4

5 In covering challenges and appeals that invariably follow the announcement of results, the media reveal the reasons behind the appeals as well as report the unfolding of the appeal procedure. During the announcing of final results, the media Announce/publish final results; Comment on final results; and Cover the reactions of the various parties and candidates to the final results announced. During the period of swearing in/assumption of office of newly elected officers, the media Cover newly elected authorities as they take office; Remind newly elected representatives of their campaign pledges; and Inform citizens (fully, honestly and rigorously) Outside the election period, the media return to their routine roles of Monitoring the activities of public and private actors on behalf of citizens and Serving as a platform for society s various components to express their views and interests. Frere (2009:5-10) also identifies some besetting obstacles that the media in this part of the world face in the course of covering elections. Although Frere here refers specifically to post-conflict societies in Central Africa, the obstacles do not differ significantly from those documented by, for instance Kibazo and Kanaabi (2007) ii, OSSIA/AfriMap 2009 iii, Freidrich Ebert Stiftung (2010). iv Prominent among these obstacles are weaknesses in the management and operations of media organisations, incompetent editorial and non-editorial personnel, lack of professionalism, the media s tendency to be close to the ruling elite through media ownership and general state patronage; the executive s continuing involvement in the day-to-day operations of the public media; the uneven geographical 5

6 distribution of the media; a general lack of respect for press freedom which results in, among other things, self-censorship and weak regulatory authorities who lean more towards the protection of the interests of the sitting government rather than regulating the media industry for pluralism and diversity and one might add, an increasingly unpredictable legislative environment that instils fear and uncertainly in journalists. Another, key obstacle is inequalities in resources, some of which tend to be marshalled specifically at election time and deployed not only in increasing coverage in favour of one candidate or party, or another, but also in influencing the editorial judgement of otherwise poorly paid media personnel. Monitoring the 2011elections The African Centre for Media Excellence (ACME), a Kampala-based independent, non-governmental, non-partisan and non-profit professional organisation whose stated mandate is to help African journalists to seek and achieve professional excellence and to improve journalism and mass communication in Africa was requested by stakeholders in the media industry to develop editorial guidelines for the coverage of the 2011 elections in Uganda to ensure a degree of professionalism in the coverage of the elections. ACME, in consultation with the media fraternity and other partners subsequently developed the Guidelines for Media Coverage of Elections in Uganda and mobilised media houses to sign onto these. The ACME electoral coverage guidelines The guidelines sought to set parameters for key areas including: Provision of information Accuracy Distinguishing between news and opinion Sourcing and the use of unnamed sources Live interviews Balance and fairness Corrections and replies Opinion polls and election projections Vox pops 6

7 Responsibility and good journalism Coverage of incumbent and government activities Equity and consistency Full coverage of the electoral process Electoral violence Discrimination Bribery and corruption (on the part of journalists) These guidelines were largely in consonance with other election coverage guidelines such as ARTICLE Elections in Iraq: Guidelines for Election Broadcasting in Emerging Democracies; Commonwealth Broadcasting Association. Commonwealth Election Broadcasting Guidelines; Commonwealth Broadcasting Association and Mary Raine, Covering Elections in Small States: Guidelines for Broadcasters; Kenya Correspondents Association, The Kenyan Section of The International Commission of Jurists, and Article 19, Guidebook on Election Coverage for Media Correspondents in Kenya; International Centre for Journalists, Free and Fair: A Journalist s Guide to Improved Election Reporting in Ghana and Electoral Commission, Uganda is Ours (Our Votes Are Our Voices): Code of Conduct for Media in Uganda During Electoral Process (unpublished). The guidelines were developed through a relatively participatory process and aimed to create an agreed framework for monitoring the performance of the Ugandan media against election coverage standards broadly agreed in the profession. This process was funded by the Deepening Democracy Programme (DDP). Also in 2010, DDP provided funds for Memonet, a consortium of independent media organisations including the Print, Radio and Television Observatory (Prato LLC) v, Human Rights Network for Journalists-Uganda (HRNJ-U) and the Uganda Court Reporters Association (UCRA), to systematically monitor elections coverage in Uganda between August 2010 and January 2011 for fair, balanced and constructive coverage. Memonet released two reports: one on 14 th December 2010 and another 7

8 on 12 th January The final report did not come out until April 2011 and was launched on May 19, The European Union also conducted a Monitoring exercise covering the period 23 rd January-16 th February and released their report on 19 th May The high level of agreement between the two independent monitoring exercises provides an opportunity to critically analyse trends in the coverage of the 2011 elections. This paper thus seeks to take stock of the performance of the Ugandan media in covering the presidential and parliamentary elections in Uganda in 2010/2011. In doing this, the paper takes into consideration some of the criteria set forth in the election coverage guidelines, which in turn were based on internationally agreed election coverage guidelines. The paper also analyses the findings of two media monitoring reports covering the 2011 electoral period: Memonet vi and European Union (2011) vii. The context of election coverage The broadcast media in Uganda were liberalised in The liberalisation and privatisation of the media sector in Uganda has unleashed a new set of ownership dynamics in the media sector that reflect a distinctly urban and commercial priority. According to media council statistics, as of July 2010, there were 204 licensed radio stations ( While a small percentage of them are nonoperational for various reasons, information obtained from the Uganda Communication Commission indicates that the majority of these are in fact currently on air ( Approximately 45 of the licensed radio stations were at the time of monitoring based in the capital city, Kampala, and largely operated in five of the over 30 languages and dialects of the people of Uganda. viii Media Council statistics also indicate that there are at least 40 licensed television stations, most of which were also based in Kampala or one of the other urban centres. The Uganda Broadcasting Corporation (radio and TV), dubbed the public broadcaster is still 100% government owned and controlled although it struggles to fulfil the mandate 8

9 of a public broadcaster. The UBC covers approximately 3/4 of the country and broadcasts in 24 languages. The newspaper market is dominated by The Monitor, part of The Monitor Printing and Publishing Corporation, in which the government holds 53% shares, and the Daily Monitor where the Nation Media Group is majority shareholder. The Vision Group has subsidiary, local language papers including Bukedde, Etop, Orumuri and Rupiny covering the major regions of the country. The Vision group also publishes a range of magazines. In addition to the Daily Monitor, the Nation Media Group owns the Saturday Monitor and the Sunday Monitor. Other major publications include The Observer, The Red Pepper and The Independent. In all there were at least 50 publications at the time of monitoring. Hardly a decade after the liberalisation of the broadcast sector in Uganda, the competition has snuffed out some of the radio stations, and bigger media are beginning to buy out smaller ones. The potential for media concentration is also evident as both the Nation Group and the Vision Group have expanded into the radio and television sectors. The Vision Group in particular has seen tremendous growth, establishing a local language radio station in each of the key regions of Uganda. The 2011 election was the third election since Uganda opened up to multi-party electoral politics. While in 2006 the incumbent President Museveni had four challengers, in 2011 he had seven. One of these was Dr. Kiiza Besigye, his former ally who was now running against him for the third time. In the past election tensions between the two had been extremely high. Dr. Besigye had shortly before the elections been accused of rape and suffered considerable disruption to his campaign as he had to appear repeatedly in court to defend himself against this and accusations of recruiting rebels. While President Museveni and his camp campaigned on a continuity ticket, Dr. Besigye s campaign emphasized change now. 9

10 The 2011 election also came at time when relations between the central government and the government of the Buganda Kingdom were particularly sour. The two had between 2006 and 2011 clashed over, among other things, Buganda s perceived right to a federal status, issues of land ownership and distribution, and the extent of the Kabaka s political powers. These tensions had come to a head in September 2010 when the central government sought to prevent a visit by the Kingdom s leadership to Kayunga, one of its territories for security reasons. The move resulted in violent riots that government employed tremendous force to quell. More relevantly, CBS, seen as the mouthpiece of the Buganda government, was closed down and stayed closed until October Several journalists were arrested and four stations closed down. Open air talk-shows that had become an important avenue for open political discussion both in English and the local languages were banned. A general chill descended on the media, the bulk of whom subsequently toned down their socio-political content for survival. On the regulatory front, government moved to contain the media by presenting a media bill that threatened to severely curtail freedom of the press in an effort to ensure law and order. The media challenged the bill in various fora but the government insists the bill will be passed. The Media monitoring sample and the methodology Against this background, Memonet monitored the coverage of the 2011 elections in two phases. In the first phase Memonet concentrated on the print media and focused on news on page 1, 2 and 3. Election campaign periods are times when candidates and parties vie for front-page media attention. The placement of a story, not just its presence, is perceived as having a bearing on the story s impact. A page one story is more likely to attract public attention than one buried deep inside the paper. Furthermore, even though the print media are read by a small percentage of mostly urban elite, they are significant because not only is this the major source of news for many radio stations, particularly those that cannot finance fully-fledged news departments, they are also a source of ideas for discussion on radio which 10

11 reaches nearly 90% of the population. This has the potential to influence the public agenda at a time when this matters most. In a context like Uganda s the question we need to be asking is not only who makes it to the front page/s more often than whom, but also why or by what means? The exercise started on October 25 th nomination day and ended on February 28 th, approximately a week after the conclusion of the presidential and parliamentary elections. The first phase of Memonet s monitoring covered the period 25th October to November 30 th, 2010 while the second phase covered December-February Fourteen newspapers were covered in the first phase. These included The Monitor; Saturday Vision; Sunday Vision; Daily Monitor; Saturday Monitor; Sunday Monitor; Red Pepper; Saturday Pepper; Sunday Pepper; Bukedde; Bukedde ku Sande; Etop; Rupiny and Orumuri. The Monitor, the Monitor and the Red Pepper are dailies while Bukedde is a bi-weekly. The rest are weeklies. In the second phase, Memonet covered election-related news from ten FM radio stations around the hours of 9.00a.m. and 9.00p.m. They also analysed news on pages 1, 2 and 3 in select daily and weekly newspapers in December The stations covered included UBC radio, Central Broadcasting Service (CBS) in the Central region; Spice FM and Liberty in the West; Unity FM and Radio Lira in Northern Uganda; Vision Radio and Radio West in Mbarara in the South West and Open Gate and Rock Mambo FM in the East of the country. The newspapers included New Vision, Daily Monitor, Red Pepper, Bukedde (all dailies); The Observer and Eddoboozi (bi-weeklies) and Rupiny, Orumuri and Etop which are weeklies. Memonet did not cover television because of its limited reach. The range of language covered by these media outlets include English, Luganda, Lumasaba, Runyankore, Rutooro, Luo, Japadhola and Ateso. These together are fairly representative of the major languages spoken in the different regions of the 11

12 country. They also represent a fair proportion of the most commercially viable languages of the media (which include Luganda for the Central and Eastern region, Luo for the Northern region, Ateso for the North-Eastern region and Runyoro/Rutooro/Runyankore Rukiga for the Western and South-Western regions. The European Union s sample included commercial radio and television stations The Central Broadcasting Service (CBS), Simba FM, Wavah Broadcasting Services (WBS) TV and Nation Television (NTV). It also included state-owned Uganda Broadcasting Corporation (UBC) Radio and TV. These were monitored daily between 6:00 and 9:00 and between 5.00 and midnight from 23 rd January, 2011 to16th February, All editions of the privately-owned Monitor and the partially state-owned New Vision were monitored throughout the sample period. In addition the European Union conducted in-depth interviews with 126 candidates from the various districts. The languages of the media covered included English and Luganda for the privately owned media. Analysis In the analysis, we ask the following questions, based on a comparison of the two monitoring reports: 1. What was the performance of the media in terms of volume of election coverage compared to 2006? 2. What tone did the media employ in covering different candidates and their parties? 3. Which candidates, parties and issues received prominence? 4. What issues did the candidates focus on? 5. To what extent were candidates accorded the right of reply? 6. How equitable was access to the media? 7. How did issues of gender feature in the coverage? Volume of election news 12

13 According to the European Union s media monitoring team, There were high levels of media coverage of candidates and parties standing for election, as well as election preparations, throughout the monitoring period. Overall, Memonet noted a greater volume of election news in the papers around the 2011 elections than around the 2006 elections. This could be attributed to the fact that there are more media outlets, but also to the fact that the print media in particular sensed a higher interest in elections in their core readership because the stakes were high. The 2011 election brought more prominently the tension between the forces of change and of continuity. There were, however, lower levels of coverage of election related news compared to other news in the local language papers according to Memonet. This may be attributed to the fact that there is no daily local language paper and the fact that the local language papers do not attract as much corporate or government advertising, and are therefore not as well resourced as their English counterparts. As such they were not able to deploy reporters as widely as their better resourced counterparts. Generally speaking, the local language papers have smaller staff and less logistical capacity and thus limited capacity for originating stories. The results from Memonet s monitoring indicate that The New Vision, which is a public company with the NRM government holding 53% shares devoted more space to elections coverage in general than all the other papers. Its sister paper, Bukedde devoted more coverage to elections than any of the other vernacular papers. The Monitor was the only credible competitor to The New Vision in terms of volume of electoral news coverage and among the English papers. Memonet reports that in terms of issues covered, of all radio stations, the Uganda Broadcasting Corporation turned out to be the most diverse in its coverage. This is because most stations are poorly resourced and could ill afford to station correspondents in all the areas where there was election-related activity at one 13

14 time. As a result they relied on the newspapers which meant they reported news late and were unable to frequently update their news. Because of FM radio s emphasis on entertainment, most radio stations only carried in-depth news bulletins in the morning and in the evening. Most FM stations tended to focus on local news from their specific area of operation and much less on national issues. There was more coverage on local radio stations of local area parliamentary candidates for instance than on the presidential candidates. In terms of parties, the NRM received most space in all the papers put together followed by the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) and the Democratic Party (DP). These were also the two strongest parties judging by their representation in parliament relative to other parties. The European Union team observes, however, that, some key media failed to provide equitable coverage for candidates and parties, generally to the disadvantage of the opposition. The Uganda Broadcasting Corporation (UBC), in particular, failed to fulfill its constitutional obligation as a state-owned broadcaster to treat each presidential candidate equally. It also failed to treat parliamentary candidates in an equitable manner, showing a substantial bias towards the incumbent president and the ruling NRM party. ix Coverage of President Museveni and the NRM by UBC Television amounted to nearly fourteen hours, compared with just 56 minutes devoted to the President's main challenger, Dr. Besigye, and the four political parties supporting his presidential bid. (media_datacharts_finalresults_en.european union election coverage 2011.pdf) Right of Reply Equitable coverage is also evidenced by whether candidates have the opportunity to use the media to clarify issues or corrects misrepresentation. One of the priority areas of evaluation for the media monitors therefore was Right of Reply. Right of 14

15 Reply is of particular significance during election periods because the time to convey one s message is limited and the stakes are high. One misunderstood message can affect who leads the country or region for (in the case of Uganda) the next five years. To what extent did the different candidates have right of reply in the media outlets monitored by Memonet? Right of reply has as much to do with the media s diligence and availability of space as with the power that the misrepresented individual yields. Memonet s results indicate that in the first phase of their monitoring, no candidate enjoyed right of reply in any of the local language papers monitored. According to Memonet, this could be because the local language papers steered clear of controversy in the first place, and therefore did not tend to ruffle feathers. Memonet also noted that on FM radio, 90% of stories on presidential candidates needed nor reply because they were non-controversial. The Red Pepper and The Monitor performed the best on this count while The Monitor faired rather poorly. Generally, the less powerful the candidate, the less likely they were to get Right of Reply. The NRM, being the ruling party, and having been at the helm since 1986, only opening up the political space to other parties in 2004 has had the longest time to build its grassroots network and ideological machinery. It also has access to tremendous state resources. The opposition has argued on numerous occasions that the NRM wantonly uses state resources to run its party-political campaign machinery. The Memonet report also attributes the large amounts of space devoted to president Museveni to incumbency and the resources that come with it, as well as the role of the Presidential Press Unit which was ready to supply the media with ready-made stories and/or footage. This was beefed up by the work of the Media Centre and the NRM Communication Centre. A related factor to consider is the amount of money the NRM party spent on advertising compared to its counterparts. But most importantly, the NRM has a large footprint over the media landscape and therefore commands a large amount of the goodwill with both state-owned and 15

16 privately owned media. Besides, the state manages the regulatory machinery for the media, and appoints most of the regulators. The Chairpersons of the Broadcasting Council and the Media Council are directly answerable to the minister, who is also authorized by law to give guidance on operational matters in these bodies. Tone Memonet defined tone as character of voice expressing a feeling. They categorised stories rather simplistically as positive, neutral or negative where neutral was the ideal. A positive score denoted favouritism towards a particular candidate or party. A negative score denoted bias. A neutral score stood for balance. Following this categorization, Memonet notes that the local language papers (particularly Etop, Orumuri and Rupiny) were 100% positive in their tone in reporting president Museveni. This is significant because the Vision Group, to which these three belong, was until 2004 government owned, though it is now a public company, with government shareholding amounting to 53%. In addition the local language papers have little competition from other local language papers in their respective regions and therefore play a key role in public opinion formation in these areas. Their role is cemented by the fact that each of them has a sister radio station in the same region and in some cases a TV station, and increasingly enjoys considerable synergies with the other members of the Vision Group. The Vision Group is relatively well resourced with a network of journalists spread throughout the country. Again, considering that no other political party has this kind of advantage, this is significant. This hegemonic position was compounded by the NRM s considerable influence with the Uganda Broadcasting Corporation which has a national reach and broadcasts in 24 languages, most of them indigenous, and the state-funded Presidential Press Unit (PPU) which deployed staff at all presidential events and supplied footage, photographs and ready-made stories to the various media houses. 16

17 As far as tone is concerned according to the European Union, the NRM and independent candidates largely received positive coverage in the New Vision. Although The Monitor afforded more coverage to President Museveni than to Dr. Kiiza Besigye, coverage of the incumbent president was more critical than that of his main rival. (media_datacharts_finalresults_en.european union election coverage 2011.pdf). The Monitor gave seven times more space to Museveni than to Dr. Besigye (76,266cm2 as opposed 12,841cm2). Of the 76,266cm2, 34% was positive coverage for President Museveni. The Monitor also devoted significant space to independent candidates. It should be noted that the majority of independent candidates were in fact NRM leaning people who had been defeated in the party primary elections but felt dissatisfied with the conduct of the exercise. The EU team made the following conclusion about the New Vision s coverage of the elections: New Vision had shown a significant degree of editorial independence in recent years, but during the election campaign it appeared to adopt the position of being a government newspaper. (media_datacharts_finalresults_en.european union election coverage 2011.pdf). Prominence Apart from story placement, direct quote is another way prominence is distributed. How often a candidate is quoted directly is normally indicative of the opportunity the different candidates had to put their policies in their own words although in places where the media are wary of legal reprisal, it may also show who they are most careful not to offend through misrepresentation of facts. According to Memonet 48%of the time president Museveni spoke he was quoted directly. For Mao it was 20.8%, 8% for Kiiza Besigye, 8.5% for Bwanika, 7.5% Otunnu, 3.2% Bidandi Ssali, and 2.4% Betty Kamya. Of the content reviewed, there was no direct quote from Sam Lubega, the only independent presidential candidate in the race. The incumbent once again seems to have been at a clear advantage. Issues coverage 17

18 The election coverage monitors also gave priority to the issues addressed by the various candidates and parties and what prominence the media gave these. This was important not only because it signalled the agenda presented to the public for debate, but also because it brought out similarities and differences based on medium, individual candidate, political party, target region of the news outlet and language. Did the print media prioritise the same issues as the electronic media? Did the media capture any real differences in the priority issues highlighted by different candidates and their parties? Was there a difference in what the media covered from the presidential campaigns versus the parliamentary campaign? Was there any convergence between the agenda of the candidates and that of their constituents? Were there any issues that were more important in some regions than in others? Did the English papers and the local language papers in the same region highlight the same issues? The European Union team did not focus on issues highlighted by the media, but Memonet s findings indicate that in the print media during the monitoring period, security was accorded the highest attention (23% of election news space) while Human Rights got the least attention (2%). Stories where presidential candidates addressed the economy were accorded the most coverage (22%) while those addressing issues of justice got little attention (0.05%). Security got the most attention in the parliamentary candidates campaign (48%) while agriculture fared relatively poorly (0.24%). The electronic media mostly highlighted the economy in the presidential campaign, devoting 19% of election coverage airtime to this. Ironically, presidential candidates agenda on the state of Uganda s roads got the least coverage in the electronic media even though the issue of roads seemed to be high on the public agenda judging by public debate particularly on radio and television talk-shows. Security was presented as the key issue for parliamentary candidates but agriculture, which accounts for over 80% of the population s employment, was accorded the least time. 18

19 Although there was an improvement in volume of election coverage from the 2006 elections, Memonet and the European Union team concurred that the news was much more descriptive than analytical so most news stories reported happenings at campaign rallies and other events rather than policy positions or leadership qualities of individuals. Memonet also noted a disparity in the depth of coverage between the English media and the local language, especially print media. People who read the English papers seem to have got a better deal than those who read the vernacular papers in terms both of depth and diversity. Also, it was noted that the opposition was not given much time or space in the local language media, perhaps, again, related to the ownership patterns of these media. At least two recent studies indicate that while the opposition are relatively minor players in especially the electronic media sector, the NRM s compound influence when you consider the Vision Group, UBC, and stations fully or partially owned by NRM cadres across the country is considerable (See Nkata 2010;Kibazo and Kanaabi (2007:6) x. Accuracy and balance The monitors also looked out for evidence of accuracy and balance in monitoring this aspect of the media s performance, Memonet looked at what other sources apart from rally pronouncements and other candidates pronouncements the media used to put their stories together. I.e. to what extent did journalists do their homework. The overall finding was that the main sources for radio station news were party manifestos, rallies and press releases. The NRM manifesto was the most frequently cited, perhaps because it was also the most widely promoted, and because the NRM had been in power for 25 years and its policies were well documented. There was little effort to challenge candidates pronouncements at political rallies. The EU team in particular observed that the UBC was blatantly biased in favour of president Museveni and the NRM party. This observation concurred with several other accounts of the reporting of the 2011 elections and the period surrounding it. 19

20 Just like it was in 2006, there was one female presidential candidate in the race, Ms Betty Kamya. Generally speaking according to Memonet, the one female candidate, was largely ignored in the print media though she received better coverage in the electronic media and particularly radio. Betty Kamya (along with Dr. Besigye) did complain to the Electoral Commission s Complaints Liaison Committee about lack of equal coverage in the state-owned media. However, she did not get much redress because the powers of the committee were limited. The Committee convened a meeting where the complainants and UBC agree that there would be equitable coverage, but this was difficult to enforce. It should be noted that the Media Centre, media relations machine for the president s office could have compromised the independence of the committee. Apart from the UBC s felt obligation to devote more space to the president and his party compared to other parties, Memonet attributes the limited coverage Kamya received partly to a male dominated media industry, general bias in the media against women as sources, and possible weaknesses inherent in the candidate or her campaign. Memonet had this to say: Election news was largely gendered where male candidates made more news than their female counterparts in all media categories under review. 98.2% of presidential coverage was accorded to male candidates while 1.8% went to the lone woman candidate in the race. even the parliamentary race which had 443 women candidates, the print media gave them less prominence-4.6% in the dailies and 31.9% in the weeklies. Access to the media On the surface, there were not many reports of denial of access to the media in the print media. However, the EU report suggests that because of the way government had clamped down on media that were deemed to be inciting the public in the riots resulting from a stand-off between the Buganda government and central government in 2009, many journalists confessed to practicing self-censorship. This was more prevalent in the electronic media than in the print media. Thus, 20

21 There were high levels of media coverage of candidates and parties standing for election, as well as election preparations, throughout the monitoring period. However, some key media failed to provide equitable coverage for candidates and parties, generally to the disadvantage of the opposition. The Uganda Broadcasting Corporation (UBC), in particular, failed to fulfill its constitutional obligation as a state-owned broadcaster to treat each presidential candidate equally. It also failed to treat parliamentary candidates in an equitable manner, showing a substantial bias towards the incumbent president and the ruling NRM party. According to Memonet, coverage of President Museveni and the NRM by UBC Television amounted to nearly fourteen hours, compared with just 56 minutes devoted to the president's main challenger, Dr. Besigye, and the four political parties supporting his presidential bid. The European Union interviewed 126 political party local leaders as follows from the different regions of Uganda: 35 from the Ruling NRM party 45 from FDC/IPC 28 from other opposition parties 18 independent candidates Their overall impressions are summarized below: The government s dominance of state-owned radio, the only broadcasting network covering almost all areas of the country, was not balanced by private radio stations established outside the capital, which generally provided opposition candidates with very limited access, exacerbating the uneven playing field in favour of the incumbent president and the ruling NRM party. Many of these stations are owned by individuals politically affiliated to the NRM. There were consistent reports that a number of radio station owners refused or were reluctant to cover the activities of opposition parties for fear of retaliation by members of the NRM and local authorities. These reports also reveal that some editors-in- 21

22 chief asked their journalists to avoid critical reports of NRM candidates and that many journalists submitted themselves to self-censorship. Interviews with politicians conducted by the EU team indicated 89% of those interviewed from the ruling NRM felt that they had free access to the local media, 37% from other political party felt the same way and 27% from FDC. 44% of independents said they felt they had free access to the local media. Interestingly, the largest number of people who responded that it depends on the medium were from the opposition parties, and in particular the IPC. The majority (78%) from other parties felt that other parties, and in particular the NRM had better access to the local media while 10% said it depended on the party s resources. The majority of opposition candidates interviews also did not think that the local media report fairly on their campaign while the majority of NRM candidates thought they did. Conclusions As argued earlier, the media play, or can play, four essential roles in elections provision of information to enable voters make informed decisions; provision of a platform for debate through allowing exchange of opinions amongst the different contending groups and citizens; acting as a watchdog for fairness during election campaigning and polling and providing voice to the voters. All these fall flat on their face if the very foundations of diversity are undermined by power, by a lack of adequate resources, or by professional shortcomings. In the Ugandan case, all three were present. The president and the NRM were clearly favoured in terms of volume of coverage, tone and prominence. The combination of the Vision Group and the UBC with their multi-lingual and multi-regional reach, massive influence in policy, legislation and regulation, access to the state-funded machinery of the Media Centre and the Presidential Press Unit is a formidable one by any measure. It is not enough 22

23 therefore that there are 200 radio stations, 50 newspapers and 40 registered TV stations. Although there is pluralism of outlets, a few factors militate against this translating into diversity: the media ownership patterns are skewed in favour of the ruling party; commercial interests limit the range of content covered during the electoral period; access to the media is also skewed in favour of the ruling party, and to a certain degree those with the means to buy space. Sometimes there is an intersection between these two, as demonstrated by the EU monitoring report, where the candidates and parties that spent the most on advertising also had the largest volume of coverage. The varying perceptions of diversity between the ruling party and the opposition are also indicative of a problem. While the NRM candidates were satisfied that the media had covered all contestants equitably, the majority of opposition candidate did not think so, which raises questions about whether the media are in fact serving a diversity of interests or aligning with the winning side. Notwithstanding the legal and political obstacles, the media s own professionalism also came into question. The monitoring reports show that media professionals to a large extent did not show adequate rigour in sourcing their stories, or balance in the coverage of male vs. female candidates, for instance. They also suffered themselves to be sponsored by candidates on the campaign trail. Right of reply was not accorded equally to all candidates. These problems may be typical of elections in this part of the world, but they nevertheless cast a long shadow on things like the number of media outlets and languages, the reported improvements in volume of coverage, and the UBC s efforts to provide a diverse menu for the information of the electorate. Bower s prophetic concluding words therefore provide food for reflection: 23

24 media openness goes hand-in-hand with the degree of political liberalisation. That emerging democracies often fail to grasp this debate is a critical factor for a country s political maturity. Dissent is healthy. Countries that come to terms with this and strive to support an open, independent media are ultimately stronger for it xi. i Bower, Anthony Clive Elections and the media in emerging democracies: A look at the press s role in three ex-soviet nations p ii Kibazo, P. and Knaabi H FM stations in Uganda: Quantity without quality. Kampala: EAMI and Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung. iii OSIEA On Air: Uganda. Public Broadcasting in Africa Series. OSIEA: Nairobi iv Freiedrich Ebert-Stiftung African Media Barometer: Uganda Windhoek and Kampala: FESmedia 24

25 v Prato is an associate member of the Association for the Measurement and Evaluation of Communication (AMEC) and operates a media aggregation portal at vi Uganda. Media Coverage of the 2011 Elections. Final Monitoring Report. February 2011 vii Election Observation Mission Uganda Elections Monitoring of the Media. February 2011 viii This excludes the state radio which operates in 24 languages. State television operates mostly in English with one bulletin each in Luganda (the majority language) and Kiswahili, the regional lingua franca. ix This would be in contravention of Section 22(1) of the Parliamentary Elections Act which states that parliamentary candidates should not be denied reasonable access to the state media x Nkata Ian, A report on rapid feasibility assessment for establishment of radio stations in Uganda: a reported submitted to the SAS Foundation (unpublished) xi Bower, Anthony Clive Elections and the media in emerging democracies: A look at the press s role in three ex-soviet nations p