Armed forces and security sector reform: European Union crisis management in Bosnia and Herzegovina Sérgio Luiz Cruz Aguilar 1

Transcription

1 Armed forces and security sector reform: European Union crisis management in Bosnia and Herzegovina Sérgio Luiz Cruz Aguilar 1 Introduction The European Union (EU) launched the military operation EUFOR ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), in December 2004, aiming to provide capacity-building and training support for the BiH Armed Forces as part of efforts to maintain the safe and secure environment within the country. The operation became involved in a broader security sector reform (SSR) process implemented since the end of civil war. Based on specialized literature and EU documents and reports, this paper presents some considerations regarding the role played by the EU and the EUFOR ALTHEA in the field of armed forces reform and how it could help to improve (or not) democracy and good governance in the country. Peace Process in Bosnia and Herzegovina The war in BiH ( ) resulted in more than 200,000 people died, 20,000 people missing and 1.2 million internally displaced. Moreover, the country was divided along ethnic lines with hatred and fear widespread among the population. i In December 1995, 80 per cent of the population was (at least partially) dependent upon humanitarian food aid, and annual per capita income has fallen to about USD 500, compared to about USD 1,900 in ii The Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), signed in November 1995, had 11 annexes which covered a broad range of issues including: military aspects of the peace settlement; regional stabilization; delineation of an inter-entity boundary line between; elections; human rights; assistance to refugees and displaced persons; civilian implementation of the DPA; and an International Police Task Force (IPTF). iii The DPA was seen as closely related to consociational democracy formula. According to Lijphart, plural societies can be functional if: a grand coalition is established comprising representatives of all society groups; a veto system can be exercised by one group 1 Doctor in History. Professor of the State University of São Paulo (UNESP) - Brazil. Visiting Research Fellow/ DPIR/University of Oxford-UK. Grant 2014/ , São Paulo Research Foundation (FAPESP). 1

2 when it is vital for its interests; resources and public positions are proportionally allocated to the groups; and each group may autonomously make decisions about its internal affairs. Including all groups in the political process, and preventing (through veto) a tyranny of the majority over one or more minorities, consociationalism could permit the country be functional. iv The DPA established a federation with two semi-autonomous entities: the Federation of Bosnia Herzegovina (51 per cent of the territory), and the Republika Srpska (RS) (the remaining area). The new Bosnian state was founded on the principles of a multiparty democracy based on the rule of law and free elections. The focus of DPA was to invest the three main ethnic groups with adequate political and legal representation in the country s governing institutions design which aimed to reverse ethnic cleansing conducted by these groups during the civil war. v A system of checks and balances with the main seats in statelevel institutions (common institutions) were shared among Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian parties. The presidency consists of three representatives from the ethnic groups, named constituent people, who rotate the position of chair and need to act in consensus to adopt a particular provision. The bicameral Parliamentary Assembly and the Constitutional Court operate on a similar premise. vi The established a multi-ethnic veto pillar implied that each ethnic group would be able to veto the enactment of major policies and constitutional changes. State level has a legislative branch (Parliamentary Assembly with two chambers - the House of Representatives and the House of Peoples), an executive branch (Presidency and the Council of Ministers), judicial branch, and Central Bank, all institutions financed by the two entities (two-thirds of the Federation and one-third of the RS). The Federation comprises: legislative branch (Parliament of the BH Federation), executive branch (the President and Vice-President, and the government of the Federation) and judicial branch. The RS was constituted by legislative (the National Assembly and the Council of Peoples), executive (the President and the Government) and judicial branch. The Brcko District government consist of an elected District Assembly, an Executive Board (selected by the Assembly) and independent judiciary. The judicial system created comprised: 1) in central level, Constitutional Court and the Court of BiH; 2) in the Federation, the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, and the Human Rights Court, cantonal courts, and municipal courts; 3) in the RS, the Supreme Court, 2

3 the Constitutional Court and the Office of the Ombudsman for Human Rights, courts, and district courts; and 4) Brcko District with its independent two courts (trial and appellate). Twenty years after the DPA the case of BiH let perfectly clear that in multi-ethnic states which had faced violent process, institutional arrangements and constrains are difficult to be implemented. Šabić presented that one way to regulate conflict among hostile groups is to eliminate the differences among them that are the cause of the conflict and can be done in several ways: genocide; forced mass-population transfers; partition and/or secession; and assimilation. vii Genocide and forced mass-population transfers were practiced in BiH by the ethnic groups as part of an attempt to maintain control of the territories declared independent. The last, assimilation/integration model for overcoming divisions in a divided society relies on the process of nation building or national integration in which different identities will give way to an overarching single national identity. It entails the eradication of primordial sub-national attachments and their replacement with national loyalty. viii It was the remedy for the violent conflict in BiH, based on power sharing which was put into force through the peace agreements. The formula established in BiH can be associated to concept of state building, according to Haas an extremely intrusive form of intervention in which the intervener sets out to change the institutional and political arrangement in the target state in the direction of sustainable democratic and free-market practices - viewed as the foundation for peace. ix The author used the term nation-building in the same sense but when the primary goal of the interveners is to (re)create institutions in a collapsed state. Therefore, state building should not simply aim at the cessation of hostilities, but to create conditions for peace to endure long after the interveners depart, i.e. a self-sustaining peace. In BiH, apparently, politic was not the centre of the peace processes. It seems that all international actors involved in the peace process believed that political framework could be changed with time. The top-down intervention created a divided state which, apparently, had not shown any possibility for success until now. Šabić highlighted that the formula is unlikely to be successful when sub-national social identities are too strong to be eradicated. x In BiH, despite the efforts made by the international community, loyalty to pertinent tenets of group entitlement remains, as well as fears and dudgeons that act as divisive factors. As Kymlicka and Franck pointed out, differences between groups remain as structural imperative keyed to the preservation of a 3

4 political order. The feelings and the state structure permited the perpetuation of divisions and at the same time kept demands for recognition of rights, independence, and secession. xi In BiH, so far, the apparent result is the perpetuation of ethnic division and the politic elite constantly threating the stability which has not been achieved yet. In this environment the Republika Srpska continue calling for independence. In general, the shared political space in BiH has been continually and systematically obstructed by the nationalists. Nationalism and ethno-politics preventing political dialogue as well as any reform processes. xii Thereto, with ethno-political parties dominating the politic, candidates who are not aligned with these parties have difficult to seek support and to win places in the political structure of the state. On the other hand, supporting ethno-political parties the ethnic communities show no interest in changing things inside the country. The DPA kept an ethnical divided society and political system and the Agreement is constantly evoked by the constituent people to maintain the situation unchanged and, sometimes to change in direction of secession in the case of the Serbs or to acquire more autonomy in the case of the Croats within the Federation. The reform of BiH armed forces was conducted on this complex environment. Armed Forces reform The DPA introduced three main actors of the security sector in BiH: the United Nations International Police Task Force (UN IPTF), the NATO-led troops (Implementation Force - IFOR) xiii, and the High Representative (HR). The Agreement let two annexes to deal with military aspect of the peace process. Annexe 1A targeted arrangements and the timetable for the separation of forces and the deployment of the IFOR. The Annex 1B addressed issues of regional stabilization i.e. establishment of mechanisms for regional stability and arms control but did not deliberate on the future of the military force in BiH. xiv During the civil war, three armed forces fought inside BiH - BiH army (ABiH), Army of the Croatian Republic of BiH (HVO), Army of the Serbian Republic of BiH (VRS) - a number of paramilitary groups and militias were responsible for the major part of the called ethnic cleaning. After the DPA international forces kept the peace while several IGOs, agencies, NGOs and states representatives supported the (re)construction of the country. 4

5 NATO IFOR was deployed in 1996 based on multinational divisions led by United States (North), United Kingdom (South West) and France (South East). The Office of High Representative (OHR) established in Sarajevo joint commissions and working groups in which representatives of IFOR and ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) xv participated, especially the Standing Committee on Military Matters (SCMM) and the Joint Military Commission. xvi Train and Equip programme was carried out and one of the key issues became the reduction of entities armed forces (15 per cent for 1999 xvii ) and a common security policy. xviii The political environment in the first years of 2000s contributed to accelerate the pace of the reform process. From May 2000 security and defence policies were developed xix starting the move forward enhancement and development of the State level armed forces structures and procedures xx, including civilian control over those forces and BiH Parliamentary Assembly oversight. xxi On 9 May 2003 the Defence Reform Commission was established by the HR and the SCMM was expanded to begin operating as a fledgling ministry coordinating activity with other Ministries and acting on behalf of the State of BiH in matters relating to defence. xxii By the end of November 2003 the BiH Parliamentary Assembly and both Entity legislatures enacted the new Law on Defence which established a State level joint command and control of the Armed Forces, one of the outstanding conditions to be accepted in the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP). So, the SCMM Secretariat initiated transition into a future Ministry of Defence. xxiii In mid-2004 the Ministry of Defence was active, the Parliamentary Assembly was taking its oversight role, downsizing of the entity armies was in progress, crucial laws were in place, key appointments have been made and the Book of Rules on Internal Organization for the Ministry of Defence was approved by the Council of Ministers (CoM). xxiv The entities armies were downsized by at least 25 per cent and the entities defence ministries have also adopted new organizational structures. The civilian complement of the defence ministries were cut and the Presidency s decision on the size and structure of the Armed Forces envisaged a total of 12,000 fulltime military professionals with reserves of 60,000 persons. Conscription and the duration of military service were also cut. A comprehensive defence budgeting system has been approved as well as a common defence resource management system. xxv Locations of defence institutions, doctrine, policy and procedures were agreed for command and control as well as concepts for a military intelligence branch. A moratorium on the sale of surplus small 5

6 arms and light weapons was set, technical survey and a pilot programme for the destruction of surplus arms and ammunition were completed and planning to reduce substantially the number of ammunition storage sites was drafted. xxvi In the end of 2004, all but one of NATO s 13 technical benchmarks for entry into PfP were fulfilled, except for the one requiring 65 per cent staffing of the state defence institutions. xxvii Next step of HR (and EU operation) was to enhance the State s capacity to organize the staffing, financing, training, equipping and logistical support of several permanent State level units which remained in need to be elaborated, adopted and implemented. xxviii On this situation EUFOR Althea took over the military operations in BiH and continued the armed forces reform process initiated by UN and NATO. The EUFOR ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina So far, the EU involvement in the BiH comprised: 1) the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) created in 1991, transformed into the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in December 2000 and closed down in December 2007 xxix ; 2) the European Union Administration of Mostar (EUAM), from 1994 to January 1997 xxx ; 3) as member of the Peace Implementation Council s Steering Board (PIC SB) (representatives of the European Commission and the Presidency); 4) through the EU Special Representative (merged with the function of High Representative from 2002 to 2011); 5) the delegation of the European Commission, from July 1996, which initially facilitated the external assistance given to BiH, and later dealt with the EU s pre-accession programs as part of European enlargement process; 6) the EU Police Mission (EUPM), which took over the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF) in 2002 and was closed down in 2012; 7) and the EU Force (EUFOR/Althea) from 2004 to now. EUFOR Althea was deployed on 2 December 2004 and took over responsibilities from the SFOR. xxxi It was the EU s first large-scale military operation and the Operational Commander acted under political guidance and direction of the EU s Political and Security Committee (PSC). xxxii NATO had terminated its 9-year old operation, which had decreased over the years from some 60,000 to 7,000 personnel xxxiii and EUFOR accessed the structures consigned by SFOR on the ground. The EU objective was not so much conflict resolution as 6

7 it was long-term security and stabilisation, reflecting the European Security Strategy objective to ensure stability and security in the Union neighbourhood and the ambition to bring BiH closer to the EU. xxxiv When the operation Althea was launched, the security situation on the ground was already stabilised if compared to the immediate post-dayton period. xxxv A few additional troops were released for service elsewhere [ ] because many of the troops simply switched shoulder badges (from NATO SFOR to EU Althea). xxxvi EUFOR maintained a similar operational structure to the SFOR, with headquarters in Sarajevo and three regional commands in Banja Luka, Tuzla and Mostar xxxvii as well as the Integrated Police Unit (IPU) with the same civil disturbances and heavy policing functions of the SFOR Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU). xxxviii The deployment occurred under the UN Security Council Resolution 1575 of 22 November 2004 which mandated EUFOR to exclusively inherit the role of SFOR and therefore to ensure the implementation of and compliance with Annex 1-A (Agreement on Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement) and 2 (Agreement on Inter-Entity Boundary Line and Related Issues) of the Dayton Agreement. Thus, EUFOR took over SFOR s executive and robust UN-Chapter VII mandate. xxxix One aspect in which it differs from SFOR is that EUFOR had an explicit mandate to provide support in the fight against organized crime, in order to strengthen the safe and secure environment and help BiH progress towards a self-governing and self-policing capacity. xl In 2004, Javier Solana stated that Althea had to be a new and distinct mission, as it would be in a very different position from that when NATO first deployed in xli He proposed that the operation should be focused on the fight against organised crime, nonetheless it became a supporting military task in the operations plan. Soon later, the first force commander decided to make the fight against organised crime the centrepiece of his agenda. xlii According to the HR, the launch of EUFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina marks the beginning of a new phase in the country s recovery: its transition from the era of Dayton to the era of Brussels. Hence, EUFOR was meant to buttress the comprehensive EU approach towards Bosnia and Herzegovina, enabling the country to progress towards EU integration by its own efforts. xliii EUFOR starts its operations only a fortnight after the handover which were seen as vital to demonstrate that EUFOR was serious, capable and intent upon making a difference 7

8 on the ground, sending a message of continuity. In the first semester of 2005, EUFOR comprised some 6,200 troops from 22 EU member States and 11 third countries and operations included: presence patrolling, local observation, weapons collection, specific operations to ensure compliance with the DPA and to prevent anti Dayton activities, and information campaigns. Operations targeted at organized crime and led to prosecutions and the BiH policing agencies have latterly taken the lead in proposing and planning such operations. xliv Defence reform proceeded according to general consensus regarding the elimination of entity competencies, the transfer of all defence responsibilities and personnel to the State, abolition of conscription, and the establishment of a restructured and small reserve force to back up the downsized professional army. xlv The Defence Reform Commission continued to operate on the basis of consensus to accomplish goals set in December Final agreement on the abolition of the entity armies and defence ministries and the model of an integrated army at State level was reached during the summer xlvi The reform proposals recommended by the Commission were endorsed by both entity parliaments in mid2005, correcting the systemic weaknesses and showed the commitment of BiH authorities to meet necessary criteria to participate in the NATO PfP, a declared foreign policy goal according to the HR. xlvii The reforms agreed meant a single State level Ministry of Defence, a single budget for the armed forces, a joint staff, support and operational commands. Supreme command over a professional army would be exercised by the BiH Presidency. The phased implementation of the reforms was planned to be complete in two years and would be driven by the Minister of Defence leading a team of experts, with assistance and advice of NATO, OHR, EUFOR, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). xlviii On 1 January 2006, was established a single defence ministry and military force, and the team of experts was planning, organizing, coordinating and monitoring the process of transferring all defence functions and personnel to state level, assisted by NATO and supported politically by HR. xlix In mid-january 2006 the Defence Reform Core Task was fully completed when the Minister of Defence signed the order establishing the Transition Implementation Expert Team. l The Team was set up to assist the Minister who chaired the Defence Reform 8

9 Coordination Group (highest managerial level) in which his deputies and senior military commanders participated. The Group assisted the Minister in coordinating the activity of BiH defence institutions with the international community. li In early July 2006 a decision determining the size, structure and locations of the Armed Forces of BiH (AFBiH) was signed by BiH Presidency. lii According to the Decision, the force should be fully professional, with no conscripts and no passive reserve. An implementation plan produced by the Chief of Joint Staff presented timelines for the standup of all elements of the AFBiH. liii In December 2006, due to improvements in the security situation EUFOR Althea was substantially reduce from 6,000 to some 2,500 personnel. liv In some areas routine patrolling was ended. Regional commands and other forward-operating bases throughout BiH were closed down and the forces were concentrated in Sarajevo. The operation kept the Liaison and Observation Teams (LOTs) in 44 locations to maintain EUFOR presence throughout the country. Additional battalions were being available over the horizon to reinforce EUFOR at short notice. Change had been completed in mid2007, and in October 2008 EUFOR military force comprised 2,200 personnel. lv The Law on Defence was prepared aimed to guarantee a multi-ethnic command and structures. It prescribed the Armed Force should be composed by the three constituent peoples and others (Art. 2) and the strength were linked to the last 1991 census (Art. 21). lvi Hence, the AFBiH is composed by Bosniaks (45.90 per cent or 4,826 persons), Serbs (33.60 per cent or 3,533 persons), Croats (19.80 per cent or 2,084 persons) and other nationalities (0.70 per cent or 74 persons). lvii The Law determined that chiefs and deputies, such as Chief of the Joint Staff and Commander of Operational Command could not be from the same constituent people of their two deputies. lviii Between January 2010 and April 2011, the AFBiH released close to 2,000 military personnel from duty. The NATO established a Trust Fund to assist military personnel to transition into civilian jobs and an earlier retirement was implemented founded by the BiH state budget. lix As result, in 2011 the official strength was 10,000 professional soldiers (including officers, non-commissioned officers, and enlisted personnel) with a reserve of 5,000, and 1,000 civilian employees. lx However, it was estimated the number of active troops at 8,500, and the reserves were inactive and without resources. lxi 9

10 The improvement of internal political dynamics and the initial success to set up unified armed forces in mid2000 led to a shift in an overall posture of the international presence in BiH. The HR changed his posture to a considerably softer touch and the PIC discussed possible closure of the OHR. It meant to change the OHR-supervised (and sometimes enforced) peace implementation for an EU-led integration. In April 2007, the OHR Work Plan contained 46 essential objectives for the creation of such a peaceful, viable state was approved by the PIC SB. In February 2008, the PIC SB selected five technical objectives and two political conditions that needed to be achieved by the BiH authorities prior to OHR closure. The objectives (known as 5+2 agenda) were: Acceptable and Sustainable Resolution of the Issue of Apportionment of Property between State and other levels of government; Acceptable and Sustainable Resolution of Defence Property; Completion of the Brcko Final Award; Fiscal Sustainability (promoted through an Agreement on a Permanent ITA Co-efficient methodology and establishment of a National Fiscal Council); Entrenchment of the Rule of Law (demonstrated through Adoption of National War Crimes Strategy, passage of Law on Aliens and Asylum, and adoption of National Justice Sector Reform Strategy). lxii Political conditions to be fulfilled were the signature of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) and a positive assessment of the situation in BiH by the PIC SB based on full compliance with the Dayton Peace Agreement. lxiii As they have not been fulfilled, the OHR mandate continued being extended so far. The improvement of political situation in the first part of the 2000 s favoured the process to joint Atlantic Alliance. On 29 November 2006 NATO member states invited BiH to join the alliance s PfP even if the work on transferring all property identified by the BiH Ministry of Defence as necessary for defence purposes from the entities to the state was still hampered by the RS government s repeated refusals to comply with the relevant provisions of the Defence Law. lxiv Furthermore, BiH remained in need of legislation providing for the oversight of movements of weapons and military equipment (WME) within the country, including the structures required to ensure implementation. lxv Regarding defence property and handling of weapons and ammunitions the Principles on Defence Property was signed by the three prime ministers in July A working group 10

11 charged with translating those principles into legal and political reality began work in September, but has made little progress. lxvi After lengthy debates, senior state and entity ministers signed an agreement on the final disposal of all rights and obligations over movable defence property that will continue to serve defence purposes in March lxvii Despite repeated international and bilateral appeals and declared commitments to pay for the destruction of surplus arms and ammunition, the question was not solved, and an acceptable and sustainable resolution to both the immovable and movable defence property issues remained a requirement for the BiH to meet before the transition from the OHR to a standalone office of the European Union Special Representative (EUSR). lxviii In 2009 the Joint Military Affairs (JMA) tasks have been handed over from EUFOR to the BiH authorities except one - civilian movement control which was stuck in the process of parliamentary adoption. EUFOR remained supervising the JMA. lxix The NATO decided on 23 April 2010, at its ministerial meeting in Tallinn, to accept BiH application for a Membership Action Plan (MAP), however, making this step conditional upon a resolution of the issue of immovable defence property. lxx In mid-march 2011, the BiH Presidency requested the immediate suspension of the issuance of licenses for weapons and military equipment export from BiH. lxxi On 28 April the United States Embassy, OSCE and the UNDP consigned and forwarded a set of recommendations for improving the weapons export regime to the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations". lxxii On 19 May 2011, the Chair of the BiH NATO Coordination Team tabled a proposal for the ownership and registration of prospective immovable defence properties on behalf of Bosnia and Herzegovina attempting to create conditions for the activation of the NATO Membership Action Plan without breakthrough. lxxiii In 2012 the Coordination Team was replaced by BiH Commission for NATO Integration (CNI) which brought together the BiH deputy ministers of foreign affairs, security and defence, as well as other higher ranking ministry and directorate officials to discuss issues related to NATO integration process. lxxiv Incentive and preparation for BiH military participation in peacekeeping abroad were part of the EUFOR work (as it had been during IFOR/SFOR mandate), despite to be in lower level, if compared with the main issues of the operation. The idea was that to send a multiethnic group of military abroad could improve ethnic relations within the AFBiH. In this sense, a multi-ethnic group of military observers was sent to UN peacekeeping operations in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) and Democratic Republic of the Congo 11

12 (MONUC). lxxv A multi-ethnic contingent (Explosive Ordnance Disposal platoon) was dispatched to serve with the US led coalition in Iraq. lxxvi In April 2010, the BiH Presidency approved the deployment of a static security unit to ISAF as part of the Danish contingent in Afghanistan. lxxvii Military and police officers had participated in operations, including in Afghanistan, Cyprus, DRC, Liberia and Mali. lxxviii Thereto, the Peace Support Operations Training Centre (PSOTC) was set up at Butmir Camp in Sarajevo co-located with the Operational Command. lxxix In October 2009, EU was planning for a nonexecutive, capacity building and training mission of some 200 military personnel to be activated in the next extension of the mandate. lxxx However, a serious political crisis during that year led EU to keep EUFOR but reducing the strength to some 1,400 personnel just after October lxxxi In fact, as Azinovic, Bassuener and Weber presented, over , individual contributors to EUFOR began unilaterally withdrawing or radically shrinking their contributions to the force, cutting deeply into an already thin operational and deterrent capacity. lxxxii The following discussions in the EU resulted in further downsizes, the last in September 2012 when the size of EUFOR was reduced to approximately 600 personnel. lxxxiii To counterbalance the reduction of forces some member states of the EU allocated out of theatre reserves to EUFOR, ready to deploy at short notice if required. lxxxiv On 9 March 2012, the leaders of the six political parties in the State level governing signed a document entitled Agreed Principles of Distribution of Property that outlines a framework for resolving the issues of defence and State property. Although numerous preparatory steps had been taken by the CoM, the Ministry of Defence and the BiH Commission for State Property in order the CoM and Parliamentary Assembly (at State level), and the entity governments, until October 2012 none of the legal acts needed to implement what was agreed has been adopted yet. lxxxv Furthermore, in early October 2012 the RS President claimed for abolishing the AFBiH questioning that BiH state level was not competent to legislate on both defence and military issues, and the subject could not be treated by BiH Constitution accordingly Annex 4 of the DPA. lxxxvi Despite the proposal had failed to gain serious political attraction lxxxvii, this type of posture is part of environment emphasised by the American Ambassador in which certain politicians have attempted to hijack these Dayton structures to perpetuate their narrow ethnic and personal interests. lxxxviii 12

13 The PIC SB Communiqué issued after the meeting in Sarajevo on 11 December 2014 called upon the authorities in BiH to register prospective defence property [ ] as required by the BiH Law on Defence and fully in line with the decision of the BiH Constitutional Court, as a prerequisite for activating the NATO Membership Action Plan. The Communiqué also emphasised the need to fully implement the 5+2 agenda, which remains necessary for OHR s closure. lxxxix In October 2015, the HR reported the process of registering defence property, initiated by the BiH Ministry of Defence in December 2014, was in progress only in the Federation, that prospective defence locations have been successfully registered, and several others were in various phases of the registration process. xc EUFOR Althea was the more ambitious operation under the CSDP and involved larger apparatus, not just in terms of quantity of military but also for all needs for command, control and logistics. It has been involved major commitment of troops over twelve years to date and worked beyond security-related task of providing a secure environment, aiming to help the transformation of the Bosnian state. It succeed NATO operations and had operated in a complex framework of peace-building activities performed by other organisations and agencies, as well as different EU s programmes and instruments which increased the necessity of co-ordination. EUFOR Althea performed executive functions ensuring better security environment in the country and acting in the fight against organized crime and continued the armed forces reform program initiated by NATO. The EU engagement in the Balkans took place much more in a post-conflict rehabilitation and stabilization role (peace-building and conflict prevention) than in direct conflict resolution. It had been possible because of the commitment of the EU members states to develop the crisis management agenda inside the CSDP and also because of the shift of US priority to others regions such as Afghanistan, Iraq and the global war on terror. It means one of the reasons that EU could take over more involvement in the BiH was the changes in the US security agenda. The creation of unified multi-ethnic armed forces is presented as one of the major achievements of the peace process. The AFBiH has been built during the first decade after the war and Bosnia was the shining star of peace-building and reintegration. In 2005, the first year of EUFOR Althea, BiH was perhaps the best example of what the international community could achieve when it was united in its commitment to a peace effort. But, as the HR for BiH stated in the UNSC meeting in November 2015, in the second decade, it had not 13

14 moved in the right direction. Political will to deliver reforms and an unwavering commitment to the Peace Agreement were required. According to the HR problems were systemic, reflecting the complex bureaucracy, weakness in the economy and the vested interests some political leaders and State-run enterprises had in a dysfunctional status quo. xci The creation of the AFBiH was part of a comprehensive process that presented some failures. EUFOR Althea worked with the EU Police Mission (EUPM) that, under political supervision of the EUSR, tried to create unified police force which had not been possible because of the resistance of the entities and cantons authorities. So, the security sector reform process was not concluded. If the leg of armed forces could be created, even if presenting a number of problems, the leg of police forces could not be develop and remain inside the country the presence of fifteen different police services under supervision of the entities, cantons and Bricko District s ministries of interior, plus services under the central Ministry of Interior such as State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA). Regarding the AFBiH, recent studies show a number of problems that AFBIH is facing to. Pressures have still been applied at the command level by political forces. xcii Guarding of arms and munitions sites, which are empty or loaded with (increasingly old and unstable) munitions dating to or before the war, costs manpower, resources and impacts on training. xciii The issue of defence property has not been solved yet. In fact, the major part of state property is defence property. It represented in 2009 over 30 per cent of the total (248 properties plus 86 so-called perspective defence property locations) registered as property of the former Yugoslav Ministry of Defence. xciv In 2015, the registration from 63 properties identified by the Ministry of Defence as essential for operations, 20 have been registered in the Federation and some steps remained to be done by the RS. The conclusion of it issue is essential for unlocking the condition for activation of NATO MAP. xcv Azinovic, Bassuener and Weber presented that during the defence reform process, the entity armies were abolished and a regimental system was created as an echo of the three wartime armies (the Armija BiH, the HVO, and the VRS). The 1st Guards Regiment (Croat), 2nd Rangers Regiment (Bosniak) and 3rd Infantry Regiment (Serb) were created, in order to the Serbs accept overall defence reform process. The authors argued that the British system, in which regiments are drawn from specific regions, was the wrong model for BiH where a mixture in the units was the best way to ensure the new force didn t mirror wartime division. xcvi Bassuener presented that 14

15 Each regiment has a small headquarters staff; members of the regiments wear shoulder badges signifying their membership. Article 6 of the Law on Service stipulates that these three regiments are repositories of culture and heritage to which service members can belong. There were to be six non-infantry regiments for other branches of service without this culture and heritage link but this has not happened. The regimental system does not have an operational character. But there remains an uncomfortable overlap with the operational AFBiH. Members of the regiments are concentrated in nine monoethnic infantry battalions, all of which are under the AFBiH Operational Command and included in the three (multiethnic) infantry brigades. The regimental mechanism is seen by many as an avenue for political and ethnic manipulation of the AFBiH. xcvii The AFBiH system design permits that recruits choose to serve in the military unit nearest to their hometowns and could be ethnic pressure. Infantry commanders are squeezed all the time to do ethnic regimental functions by politicians (and) veterans organizations even the mono-ethnic infantry battalions are subsumed into brigades that include battalions from all three constituent peoples. Remnants of the war are still present in ethnically polarized commemoration, in political leaders nationalist statements addressing AFBiH personal, and in nationalist symbols showed in events (regimental or conducted by veterans organizations). Insufficiency of funding compromises not only the development the force according to NATO standard, but even the maintenance of current equipment and facilities which include useless facilities let by international forces. xcviii Nevertheless, the main question remaining whether the troops and officers are capable to deal with divided loyalties or not. Some international experts are still pessimistic regarding the capacity and resistance of the armed forces to stand united in the event of internal or regional conflict. Even if it is legally prohibited, AFBiH could engage in internal security tasks to restore order in a civil disturbance. Past events have cast doubts on the cohesion, discipline and military susceptibility to political manipulation which can lend the AFBiH to disintegration under ethnical pressure. xcix The creation of unified AFBiH was under the general context to implement good governance and democracy. It was also under the general idea that time the real enforcer of civility among the groups within the states, dissipating old fears and hate would be selfinterest rather than external imposition. Considerations regarding armed forces reform in the BiH 15

16 Regarding democracy, Dahl presented that, at a minimum, democratic theory was concerned with processes by which ordinary citizens exert a relatively degree of control over leaders. c Schumpeter pointed out the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good by making the people itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will. ci These concepts, which had gotten among a number of works which dealt with this subject show principles existing in (but not limited to) the modern democracy such as control, accountability, rules, common good, representativeness, elections, decisions of authorities, transparency and security. Thereto, Plamenatz said if it is right that governments should be responsible to the governed, then it is wrong for one people to impose their rule on another. Alien rule and democracy are clearly incompatible. cii Likewise, O Donnel emphasised that the characteristics of each state and of each society heavily influence the characteristics of what democracy will be likely (if at all) to consolidate-or merely endure or eventually break down. ciii State is an interaction of various actors and democracy exists when they can influence and determine decisions made by (and actions done by) the state. Governments have to build an effective bureaucracy, ruled by effective laws, working for the public good. Government (a state ruling group) machinery is evaluated and people who express their acceptance (or not) through the right to vote (and be voted). So, the state has power (and authority to use such power) under all people and things inside its territory but it exists for the preservation of people rights. Protection is exercised physically with the security institutions and constitutionally with rules. If state power is exercised per security and defence institutions, including internal (or public) security, they have to be controlled by civilian. Theoretically and practically democratic control over security sector is an essential step in the transition process to consolidate democracy. However, practice has been showed that establishing such control normally is a challenge in countries emerging from violent conflict. In this sense, after violent processes one of the objectives to target the root causes of conflict is to build or to (re)build police and armed forces. It is done into the security sector reform (SSR) which focuses on creating conditions for local institutions to deliver security and justice services to the population. 16

17 The European External Action Service (EEAS) agrees it is essential that the justice and security institutions of the State not only perform their critical tasks in a functional manner, but that they do so under the rule of law, in full compliance with human rights obligations and subject to the same good governance principles that should apply across the public sector: transparency, participation, accountability and democratic control (e.g. civilian command, judicial review, parliamentary oversight, civil society involvement, etc.). civ A number of EU documents drew attention to democracy. The Maastricht Treaty has established the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) with the aim of [ ] developing and consolidating democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. cv In 2000 the EU established the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization (CARDS) programme targeting South-Eastern Europe. Among a number of areas it covered support for democracy, the rule of law, human and minority rights, civil society, independent media and the fight against organised crime. cvi A research funded by the European Commission analysed the EU s conceptualisation and operationalization of the concepts of human rights, democracy and rule of law. Among the findings, the authors presented that the EU has slowly but surely conceptualised democracy in a more thick manner. The definition of deep democracy has been changed over time and adapted to circumstances. Today the concept comprises: free and fair elections; freedom of association, expression and assembly; free press and media; the rule of law administered by an independent judiciary and right to a fair trial; fighting against corruption; security and law enforcement sector reform (including the police) and the establishment of democratic control over armed and security forces; civil society; gender equality; anti-discrimination, including vulnerable groups (discrimination and violence against women, minorities, and children, and gender based violence). cvii The Joint Communication on EU Support for Sustainable Change in Transition Societies presented some key principles to guide support actions which should be based on the needs and reform agenda as defined by the partner country (country ownership). They have combine long-term strategies with tangible short-term achievements. Incentives, constraints and conditionalities are not the main driver of reforms and have to be used often offering support progress. The civil society and stakeholders have to be heard. Duplication, omissions and contradiction have to be avoided, leading to the need to establish networks comprising all stakeholders. cviii 17

18 The EU attempts to build new defence and security democratic institutions (as well as a democratic state) in the BiH, giving sequence to the process was initiated by the UN and its partners under a complex post-conflict environment. However, even twenty years after the DPA, ethnical wartime divisions remain hindering the peace process. The complex political system established by the DPA would hamper agreements and its observance and the EU (and the international community in general) was not able to modify political behaviour in the BiH and so far some important principles of democracy were not been achieved. The divided state built from the DPA, even if it was the formula possible to be agreed at that time, and the better solution for immediate needs, it has been proving not being the better formula to construct unified state and society in Bosnia. Twenty years after the end of war, huge foreign assistance, NGOs presence and involvement of IGOs pushing and pulling local authorities, the situation is not what international authorities have envisioned in the late 1995 and in the early Political structures are the key for Bosnia s ability to develop a functioning state under democratic governance and rule of law. After Dayton some believed the consociational formula could work well. There was a belief that with time would be possible transform the divided state in a unified state. Soon, became clear that foreign aspirations would not be accomplished. Merdzanovic presented some elements of the consociationalism in the BiH. First, the grand coalition based in the assurance of the participation of all constituent people within state government and government. Notwithstanding, the model established is hardly consensus government because the parliament has to approve the government and its composition is only prescribed in terms of ethnic and not ideological belonging which accordingly the author results that the Council of Minister s position resembles more than one of a government within a majoritarian democracy. Although respecting ethnic composition of the population, the government would run according to political parties (political ideology) which are not always formed by ethnicities (nationalism). However the dividing line between government and opposition or between nationalist and non-nationalist parties tends to be blurred when cooperation for political power is at stake. cix Second, proportional representation in government and administration, and proportionality of seats in the parliament. Third, veto powers that in BiH imply in qualified majority vote in parliament, all decisions require a majority in both parliamentary houses, and the possibility of delegates in 18

19 the House of People block a decision proposed by the parliament invoking that it is destructive to a vital interest of their respective group. Fourth, the group autonomy which was guaranteed by the state structure created. cx Bosnia s governing system and electoral structures ensured that the nationalist parties remained dominant, hindering foreign aspirations. Using a mix of patronage and promises of protection (which generally and historically has been working well in the former Yugoslavia) is central to maintaining the nationalist parties in power. Being elected by its nationalist communities, and using particularly the veto powers a small group of politicians can block the entire legislative system. So, it can be said consociational formula evidenced, so far, not to be the best formula for national reconciliation in BiH. It could be the best formula founded to end war, but it was not able to promote a stable, secure and democratic state. Thereto, it can be said that the concept of local ownership have not been properly worked. The UNMIBH thought in 1998 that BiH leaders were able to handle the tasks such as defence and public security led to employ the term ownership according to a number of studies and practices which indicating to be the right way to improve functionality of institutions as well as the stability of the country. However, the questions produced by scholars and practitioners of SSR what?, how?, by whom?, for whom?, remained unanswered. The dilemmas whether key local actors are capable of engaging in the processes or not, who have to be engaged, when is the best time, how they should be engaged, among others, has been proved difficult to be answered in the BiH. Celador pointed out that the concept of ownership applied in the BiH let aside the civil society. Based on interviews, the author affirmed the EU mission has not widened sufficient attention to civil society and when it had been done the specific selected institutions were incorporated into the process with subordinate roles. cxi It is doubtful if combating organised crime would be placed as one of the main goals to the EUFOR Althea. Furthermore, the strategic priorities were defined by the operation took into account more the needs of the EU and its member states them BiH needs. While to guarantee the safe return of IDPs and refugees certainly had to be priority, and even if organized crime and human trafficking are issues that must be fought, it is doubtful if they were the main BiH needs. Merlingen and Ostrauskaite questioned the EU agenda, identifying organized crime, to which corruption and terrorism are articulated as supplements on a security continuum, as 19

20 the central law-enforcement issue in the country. The European Council determined BiH and its western Balkan neighbours as one of the gateways to the European Union for criminal activities and thus as a grave danger to the European Union. cxii Furthermore, the EUFOR was (and still are) a military force which would concerned and acted in defence issues not in public security issues. Doing that, organised crime was securitized and militarised in its origin since Javier Solana had elected and convinced the EU walking on this direction. The PIC decided in February 2008 conditioning the withdrawal of the HR with the 5+2 agenda. cxiii As conditions were not fulfilled the OHR remains in BiH and the EU shift the function establishing the EUSR separated of the HR in Finalising, the operation conducted by the EU in BiH to date might be described as the followed. The establishment of EUFOR Althea was possible due to the consensus reached within the EU. It can be seen as a positive view in the sense that the EU could put together its member states and approve decisions in sensitivity issues. In that country NATO and UN were the primary actors and they addressed domestic security in worse period and the EU operation was established in a more stable situation. Hence, it may be considered low-risk operation. EUFOR Althea was established in the early life of the CSDP and followed NATO operation. Consequently, it tested operational transitions with the UN and NATO and procedures, norms, structures and decision-making process which were being set up by the EU, and used NATO assets under the Berlin Plus agreement. Reforms of armed forces were exercise of ticking boxes and in a step-by-step manner. EUFOR Althea and other instruments implemented in the BiH, such as the SAA, have been seen also as a technocratic programme of institutional and economic reform. In this sense they have a toolbox with benchmarks to be fulfilled. However, the EU had difficult to effectively infuse technocratic in accordance with the missions and operations, and vice-versa. It is because the benchmarks do not take into account political difficulties and specificities of each local. Notwithstanding, the efforts made to improve the capacity of these institutions in BiH resulted in a better functionality in many areas. cxiv The top down approach exercising by EU to promote democracy had positive result in the armed forces field. However the same had not happen in the police field, as well as on the political environment. This approach of democracy promotion has only changed very recently with the EU recognition that there is no particular institutional model for democratic governance and the efforts to promote democratic governance have to take into account the 20