Philip Gass and John Drexhage

Transcription

1 2008 International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) Published by the International Institute for Sustainable Development Setting the Stage for Cancun: the April AWG meetings in Bonn The International Institute for Sustainable Development contributes to sustainable development by advancing policy recommendations on international trade and investment, economic policy, climate change, measurement and assessment, and natural resources management. Through the Internet, we report on international negotiations and share knowledge gained through collaborative projects with global partners, resulting in more rigorous research, capacity building in developing countries and better dialogue between North and South. Philip Gass and John Drexhage April 2010 IISD s vision is better living for all sustainably; its mission is to champion innovation, enabling societies to live sustainably. IISD is registered as a charitable organization in Canada and has 501(c)(3) status in the United States. IISD receives core operating support from the Government of Canada, provided through the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and Environment Canada; and from the Province of Manitoba. The institute receives project funding from numerous governments inside and outside Canada, United Nations agencies, foundations and the private sector. International Institute for Sustainable Development 161 Portage Avenue East, 6th Floor Winnipeg, Manitoba Canada R3B 0Y4 Tel: +1 (204) Fax: +1 (204) info@iisd.ca Web site:

2 Setting the stage for Cancun: the April AWG meetings in Bonn Philip Gass and John Drexhage April International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) Published by the International Institute for Sustainable Development IISD contributes to sustainable development by advancing policy recommendations on international trade and investment, economic policy, climate change and energy, measurement and assessment, and natural resources management, and the enabling role of communication technologies in these areas. We report on international negotiations and disseminate knowledge gained through collaborative projects, resulting in more rigorous research, capacity building in developing countries, better networks spanning the North and the South, and better global connections among researchers, practitioners, citizens and policy-makers. IISD s vision is better living for all sustainably; its mission is to champion innovation, enabling societies to live sustainably. IISD is registered as a charitable organization in Canada and has 501(c)(3) status in the United States. IISD receives core operating support from the Government of Canada, provided through the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and Environment Canada, and from the Province of Manitoba. The Institute receives project funding from numerous governments inside and outside Canada, United Nations agencies, foundations and the private sector. International Institute for Sustainable Development 161 Portage Avenue East, 6th Floor Winnipeg, Manitoba Canada R3B 0Y4 Tel: +1 (204) Fax: +1 (204) info@iisd.ca Website: 1

3 The following is a summary of not-for-attribution discussions and official meeting summaries undertaken by John Drexhage, Philip Gass and others on the IISD climate change and energy team leading up to, and including, the UNFCCC negotiating session in Bonn in April The UNFCCC meetings in Bonn April 9-11 The UNFCCC climate change negotiations resumed in Bonn April 9 th -11 th. The two central topics up for discussion at this session were the role and profile of the Copenhagen Accord going forward as well as developing the meeting schedule for 2010 leading up to COP 16 in Cancun Mexico. With respect to the Copenhagen Accord, while some parties had not given an indication as to whether they support it 1, all of the key parties needed to support it including Annex I, the United States, and the BASIC countries expressed their willingness to associate with the Accord, as well as most AOSIS, African, and LDC countries. Unfortunately, at Bonn some of their countries backed away from the Accord, more towards the positions of Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and the ALBA 2 countries which sought to prevent the influence of the Copenhagen Accord in a negotiating text in Some of these countries explained that this change in position was based in a view that the Accord was a political document, as opposed to a formal negotiating document, and that it did not have the support of all countries. As expected, this development was much to the chagrin of Annex I countries (primarily the EU and Umbrella Group), who wished to see the agreed upon topics of the Accord play strongly into 2010 negotiations. U.S. negotiator Jonathan Pershing called the tactics of these parties completely out of line and that the proposed middle ground reached in the Accord turned out to be quicksand 3. While it is noted by parties that the Accord is a general document lacking much precision, there is a feeling that some of the items agreed within can be brought back into the discussions of the current AWG-LCA negotiating text. This would be a positive development as it would prevent the creation of yet another third negotiating track within the process, and allow the items agreed to in Copenhagen to be reflected in the work ahead, possibly lending to compromise in areas previously deadlocked. As for the AWG-KP there is still much pressure on parties to keep this track active and moving forward, including the Annex I targets ascribed to the Copenhagen Accord (these targets would also be listed in an AWG-LCA outcome). The question of the conditionality of these targets still needs 1 A current count puts more than 140 parties ascribing to it and a handful explicitly against it. 2 ALBA Member states: Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Venezuela 3 Ben Sills, UN Climate Talks Fracturing as Negotiators Delay Decision, Business Week, 11 April, 2010, Available at: 2

4 to be addressed, and there is still the question of how a two-track outcome may be resolved. One potential outcome a source identified is that the AWG-KP may work all the way to completion on an agreement, but that the final agreement may be so stringent that there is now way it would eventually come into force, as there would not be the party support behind ratification. It is already a given that the U.S. would not be a part of any sort of continuation of the Kyoto Protocol, and there are also feelings that the Umbrella Group has little appetite for a two-track outcome. One comment we received is that the KP discussion has moved beyond the rational to the emotional. An outcome of the track is needed, but beyond that there is still much unanswered as to how it could come into force. The EU has softened its stance on the KP considerably since mid 2009 when it sought to reconcile the two tracks into a single outcome. Now statements led by the UK prior to Bonn, and backed up by EU group statements at the Bonn session seem to accept a willingness to have the KP continue in a second commitment period. While some see this as a great breakthrough, that may reignite negotiations and help heal the fractures of Copenhagen, others see it as an uninformed, or simply ineffective position to take given the Umbrella Group s stated aversion to a second Kyoto Commitment period. This issue is explored in more detail in following sections. A positive development was the reception of the new Chair of the AWG-LCA, Ms. Margaret Mukahanana-Sangarwe of Zimbabwe, who had a reputation going into Bonn as a trustworthy consensus builder. While she faced a fractured group at Bonn and several near failures and stalemates to develop a work plan for 2010 (one media outlet aptly described the negotiations at Bonn as a form of trench warfare ), in the end a work plan was agreed in the early hours of Monday morning. 4 This work plan at least gives her, as Chair, the ability to draft a negotiating text that will guide the parties in While the developing parties firmly held that no reference to the Copenhagen Accord could be made explicitly in the work plan, they acquiesced that the Chair could indirectly reference it as work undertaken by the COP allowing her to draw on the Accord in developing a negotiating text, which was a key element required for Annex I support of the plan. As remarked by one NGO representative: they reached the edge of the abyss...and they stepped back. Such is the state of negotiations at this point that not falling into the abyss is considered a victory. While a great deal of the focus was on the AWG-LCAs attempts to develop a work plan there were also road clocks along the way to achieving conclusions of its own, and end talks were suspended for a while as the AWG-LCA sought a conclusion. Key aspects of the AWG-KP conclusions 5 include a continuation of negotiations on the issues discussed at Copenhagen, the development of a 4 Conclusions on organization and methods of work in 2010 adopted by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention at its ninth session: 5 Conclusions adopted by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol at its eleventh session: 3

5 paper compiling pledges for emissions reductions and a technical paper on transforming these pledges into quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives. A focus on substantive issues, over process and legal form, is also being pushed as a way to make progress this year after much of the 2009 roadblocks came over discussions on the latter. While an agreement in Cancun is not possible without action on Mitigation (Targets, NAMAs, etc) there is a possibility that some agreement may be able to be made in Cancun on substantive issues (Financing, REDD, Agriculture, etc), with some of the formal process to continue afterwards culminating in a legal agreement at COP 17 in South Africa. That said, without a resolution to the outstanding conditional nature of many Annex I targets, there is virtually no chance these targets can be formalized for the essential mitigation component of any agreement. One issue in both groups will be the influence of some of the more radical ALBA countries that sought to prevent the Copenhagen Accord from coming into force in the final plenary session at Copenhagen, and again fought stringently to see it ignored at Bonn. There is significant concern that their influence on issues may be disruptive given their ideological opposition to anything seen as bearing a U.S./Capitalist influence. This is particularly concerning on the topic of Markets where the group is ideologically opposed to the idea of markets in general and set the discussion on Markets at Copenhagen back six months to a year by some accounts. While they lost the battle to have the Accord completely ignored going forward, their sway over the G77 to marginalize the document is unsettling. This leads into another issue fundamentally with the G77 & China group. Divisions within this group, while prominent ion the opening plenary, became less pronounced as the session carried on, and the group was able to hold together under a single negotiating position in the closing plenary. It was clear though that the group did suffer from internal divisions, and group members made several remarks about how it was a hard battle within the group to come to a consensus. While it is difficult to know just how divided the group is given they come to their consensus behind closed doors, it appeared that they had more difficulty than usual in getting all members behind a single position. With diverse factions including the major developing economies, least developed countries, and the ALBA group, it is easy to see how reaching consensus would be difficult. Following this group in 2010 as it tries to keep its members on the same page will be interesting, and telling as to the prospects for agreements in Cancun. For now however, the G77 & China remains a solid negotiating bloc, at least publicly. A closed door preparatory meeting was held in Mexico in March as well as an African Group meeting in Nairobi, which both discussed ways in which to improve the negotiations themselves, and find a way to bring the elements of the accord into the discussion. Negotiators have expressed a need for more informal space for negotiators apart for the sessions, which could help to resolve some of the deadlock. How this will take place however is yet to be seen, and leads into the 4

6 discussion regarding the formal negotiating calendar. With respect to the actual meeting calendar, the parties agreed upon two additional sessions on top of the April and May-June sessions in Bonn and COP 16 in December. The first will likely be one week in August in Bonn; followed by one week in Bangkok in September-October (the Conclusions adopted do request interested parties to submit proposals to host the meetings, which would cut costs). There has been musing about the potential to tie in a UNFCCC meeting to the World Energy Congress in Montreal in September, but the general belief that the timing of the WEC so close to the end of Ramadan could preclude such a meeting. The belief is both that any more than an additional two weeks would not contribute much to the process, particularly given the expressed desire to focus on informal talks, and that the lateness of the Barcelona session in November 2009 did not contribute much given the focus was already on Copenhagen at that point. Managing expectations for 2010 was the mantra of one source. There is a push for an acceptable compromise coming from parties, not just the secretariat, and a realization that the unrealistic expectations and the focus on process at Copenhagen cannot be repeated. In addition to the aforementioned mitigation component, another key part of the talks will be the need for some form of U.S. policy, even if it is simply a cap on emissions without a cap-and-trade mechanism. China, Brazil, South Africa and India have indicated a willingness to move forward, and may be able to exert pressure on the likes of ALBA to compromise, but much of this potential remains to be seen. China was noticeably quiet at the closing AWG-LCA plenary in Bonn, preferring to let other countries hold the G77 line. The following is a day-to-day summary of the Bonn session. Bonn Day 1 The AWG-LCA plenary opened the day, then broke at 1:30 resuming at 5:00 pm after the AWG-KP plenary went ahead at 3:00. It seemed remarkably low-key considering what many were expecting. Many of the parties were on the same messaging they were on at Copenhagen and the ALBA folks, while not as animated as Copenhagen, still saw the Copenhagen Accord as a violation of the Convention, and want it completely ignored going forward. Democratic Republic of Congo now represents the Africa Group (in place of Algeria) and Yemen leads the G77 and China (in place of Sudan). I was not surprised that the DRC presented a more friendly approach to his interventions on behalf of his group than the fiery rhetoric of Algeria last year. Yemen was also an improvement from Sudan, and pretty much stuck to the G77 script, but with fewer theatrics than his predecessor. Generally developing party statements were mostly a re-statement of known positions. Those in support of the Accord make it clear that while the document leads political capital to the process it is 5

7 not a negotiating text. The only real split amongst the developing world was some saw value in a chair s text that incorporated areas of agreement from the Accord and the negotiating text from 2009, which others wanted the text back at the negotiating table exactly as they left it in Copenhagen. China had an interesting intervention in which it stated that parties not in Annex I had to have mitigation objectives for Cancun (but that Annex I must lead in this respect of course). They did mention some successes in Copenhagen providing clarity of mandate and setting goals for They stated more time has to be spent on substantive matters, which was positive, but they were also strictly against any compromise that does not reflect a strict legal process. Whether this was a true position of theirs, or a negotiating strategy to come across as a peacemaker was tough to judge. They certainly didn t push back against the more strident anti-accord G77 members in plenary meetings, but it is difficult to know what happened behind closed doors. Egypt, Bolivia, Pakistan and Venezuela were most vocal against the Accord playing any role going forward. They want to go straight back to the text as it was left in Copenhagen and see little value in a new chair s text, some comparing a new chair s text to the secret text that the developed world tried to spring on them in Copenhagen (in their words). As for the developed world there were a couple of interesting interventions. The EU wants everyone to know loud and clear that they support the KP track and see it as a vital part of any solution. This mirrors some of what Miliband said last week about the UK. It was quite a contrast, knowing how they wanted to merge the KP track as little as six months ago. They are giving a lot of ground up here, but it will remain to be seen if it is worth it. By any account they have essentially said they are on board for another commitment period of the KP. The Umbrella group members were much less enthusiastic, either not addressing the issue, or outright against it (see Russia below). Canada s intervention talked about how Copenhagen was complex but the outcome gave the chair solid guidance. The Copenhagen Accord gives parties the basics needed to draft commitments for Cancun, and gives the chair as much latitude as she needs going forward. It was interesting as they were pretty much the only party to not make an explicit reference to the importance of the original negotiating text as it was left at Copenhagen, only making a reference to the need to reflect the progress at Copenhagen in a Cancun outcome. You could almost infer that they would be happy if the Accord became the only text, but of course none of the developing countries would ever go for that. Russia practically called for the complete suspension of the AWG-KP until Cancun. He said that they already know what parties are offering on their 2020 targets, and there are disagreements from developing countries on these numbers but they are not going to change so what is the point of talking about it. He advised revisiting it in Cancun. He also called for an end to all evening meetings and putting in firm six pm deadlines for all sessions saying negotiators need to sleep at 6

8 night and he feels that some parties endlessly repeat what their fellow group members say and delay forever just so they can say they made an agreement in the middle of the night. This last piece drew healthy applause from the crowd. Of course, this session had a firm six pm deadline on Sunday and wrapped up with the final gavel of the AWG-KP at 1:56 am Monday morning, so applause or not, negotiations still run on UN hours which often see near endless delays and marathon negotiating sessions. We have remarked numerous times about the splintering of the G77, but after watching the opening plenary, while there were differences between some parties, it was nowhere near the splintering that has happened in Annex I. On one side you have the EU making sure everyone knows how important they feel the Kyoto Protocol is to an agreement in Cancun and beyond and at the other end Canada really only interested in the Accord and Russia saying there is no point even talking about Kyoto (U.S. aversion to Kyoto goes without saying). On the topic of number of meetings, the G77 & China line was three additional, the Umbrella Group hinted at not wanting any, and China, breaking from the G77 line earlier in the day was willing to settle for two. This may have been a bit of a ploy on their part. They called for up to 10 weeks of meetings in their official submission, and in the morning the G77 & China line was three, and in the afternoon they put it down to two. Perhaps they saw the writing on the wall and wanted to look like they were compromising, rather than stick to their submission and look bad when they came home with fewer additional meetings than they were asking for (of course this is just speculation). The secretariat is calling for donations, and offers to host meetings, from parties to help offset any costs. Sounds like cash is an issue, but the secretariat took some heat for making this known, with several countries (Egypt the most notable) saying it is up to the parties to decide how many meetings they want to hold and then it is pretty much up to the secretariat to find the money to make it happen. A side event was hosted by project Catalyst that outlined current mitigation commitments to Basically, the pledges in the Copenhagen Accord on mitigation add up to between Gigatonnes of reductions by 2050 (14-16 Gt of that by Annex I). This leaves the world with approximately a shot of keeping temperature rise under two degrees, but only if additional targets are made after Just the mitigation pledges alone will lead to a temp rise of degrees. Problem areas for analysts include unclear rules on LULUCF, China s intensity target, uncertainty past 2020 for all countries, a lack of proper reporting of historical emissions in many developing countries, and the biggest one being no definition of BAU. Without a clear definition of BAU (which is tied to the problems on historical emission numbers) there is truly no way to properly quantify the emissions reduction commitment of any party that makes a BAU reduction commitment. There were also a couple of things of note on day one outside of the formal negotiating process. ECO was producing their daily pieces and a few other ENGOs were distributing pieces as 7

9 well. It is looking like the ENGOs are blaming Obama for a failure to pass climate policy, which seems to be a bit of a naïve assessment of the US political situation, but is not surprising (one article lamented that he would make a push for health care to pass but won t make the same commitment on Climate Change). It still seems that there is little view of just how bloody that Health Care battle was for Democrats or the intricacies of the US Senate. There is a mentality of he s the leader...if it was important to him he would make it happen. Many in the developing world (with all powerful leaders) have a hard time reconciling the checks and balances of the U.S. system. Members of the youth contingent (many of which are Canadian) could also be overheard remarking that if Obama cared about the environment he would just force the Senate to pass Waxman-Markey, which is an uninformed, as well as potentially damaging position to take. It will be interesting to see if they will continue to sour on Obama. There was also another interesting ENGO piece being distributed that matches suspiciously closely to the plenary remarks of the ALBA folks. It claims to be endorsed by 202 organizations but none of them put their name on it and the website link for more information was broken. Finally, a group of Climate Change deniers called the Committee for a Constructive Tomorrow (CFACT) had set up a display booth in the hotel Maritim, an act usually reserved for ENGOs and research organizations. Giving them even higher profile it was situated randomly right next to the door to the main plenary hall. Their presence riled some in the NGO community given their inflammatory propaganda materials and attempts to draw negotiators and others into question and answer sessions that they filmed with a camcorder. The Secretariat replied that any accredited organization could apply for a booth and groups, as long as they were accredited and not disruptive (their acts while confrontational, were mild compared to some of the protests by proactive groups at previous sessions) they would not be discriminated against on ideological grounds. Day 2 The central issue on the second day was debate over the AWG-LCA draft conclusions outlining the work plan for There were several problems with it identified by developing countries but the main issue boiled down to giving the flexibility to the Chair to draft a negotiating text based on the AWG-LCA report at Copenhagen, work done afterwards, and the Accord. The ALBA group and some others such as the Saudis believe that the negotiating text as it was left at Copenhagen is the only text available for negotiation and therefore do not want to give the chair the flexibility to draft a text (mainly because they don't want the Copenhagen Accord to influence it). The G77 group, while including several members who actually support the Accord, aligned with the ALBA position as their group message. Others including Annex I, but most vocally the US and EU want the Accord to be part of the negotiating text so they wanted to give the chair the flexibility to draft a text 8

10 including elements of the Accord. The AWG-LCA Chair came forward with a second set of draft conclusions in the afternoon. Again the G77 & China opposed this redrafted document and would not relent on any inclusion of the Copenhagen Accord explicitly. They oppose on the grounds that there is no need for a Chair s text, the AWG-LCA reported text at Copenhagen is in their opinion the only path forward. Of course this would mean there is no way to work the Copenhagen Accord back into the negotiations, which is certainly their entire plan. G77 & China were willing to allow parties to make submissions to the text, which they said would allow parties to propose the Accord for inclusion, but developed countries feel this would not give the weight to the Accord it was due given the support of over 140 parties to the document. Bonn Day 3 Meetings on the third day were postponed indefinitely as parties worked to try to find some reconciliation through informal negotiations, despite a hard deadline of six pm to finish all work, the closing plenary of the AWG-LCA still had not started at seven pm and the closing meeting of the AWG-KP was suspended pending the AWG-LCA outcome. When the parties convened the final meeting there appeared to be little that either side was willing to give in compromise to the other. The G77 & China would not abide any reference to the Accord in the draft conclusions, and Annex I would not abide its exclusion. After two and a half hours the Chair proposed that Annex I accept a verbal commitment from her that she would imply from the rather ambiguous phrase work undertaken by the COP that she could draw from the Copenhagen Accord in drafting a negotiating text from the group. While not happy with the lack of a specific reference to the Accord, Annex I accepted this compromise and the G77 & China, having at least prevented explicit reference to the Accord in the Conclusions on the work plan, did not object to the Chair s ability to reference the Accord in her work in this way. While the meeting still took an additional 2.5 hours (and then another 2 for the AWG-KP) this was the major breakthrough parties needed to develop a way to move forward to Cancun. While agreement on a work plan seems like an extremely minor victory, and the acrimony amongst the parties is just as contentious as Copenhagen, at least there is now a way to move forward, which was at real stake of being lost all together. The Executive Secretary remarked that a get out of jail free card had been played by parties in Copenhagen, but could not be used again, pressing the need for progress this year, which can at least begin with a new draft negotiating text from the Chair. The Executive Secretary s Meeting with Civil Society Executive Secretary Yvo de Boer held a briefing with Civil Society on the Saturday; the following summaries are his responses on various topics. 9

11 Status of the Negotiations: You can divide Copenhagen outcomes into three issues. (1) A Set of issues near completion (REDD, Tech, Capacity bldg). There is text here that can be completed easily. Then there are more political issues (2). The Accord can be used subtly as a way to make progress on these, but if the Accord is front and Centre it will not work as an influencing tool. Then there are issues where we are far from completion such as finance, markets (3). On issues requiring further resolution under the LCA, we are the past point of discussing in silos. Don t think it will be possible to finalize certain issues ahead of others. Need to take a package approach. Near completion issues can be recognized and will be put together with other topics in Cancun, the rest will have to be settled in the year following. Prospects for COP 16: I don t think the outcome of COP 16 will be legally binding. Consider the issues like this: You own a house and someone asks you to sell it below market value, you are also asked to sign a purchase agreement for a more expensive house which you have never seen. The house is the Kyoto Agreement, you are a developing party. Parties want to know what they are buying into before taking the plunge. Expect COP 17 for an LCA legally binding instrument. Political and technical issues should be handled separately from technical ones. Let negotiators address the technical and seek advice from the higher level on the political ones. Meeting schedule for 2010: As to how to organize the negotiations, there is convergence towards two additional meetings, plus using the June meetings. Some discussion over 1 or 2 weeks and an emerging discussion over one of these meetings being ministerial level and whether ministers should be at the start of COP, as opposed to the end. This would enable political input earlier. Careful discussion about what you can do before COP and what can be left until after. Hope after Cancun we can move into a different process where we distinguish between political and technical work. The climate change denier s booth at this event: Whatever observer organizations beliefs are, they can get a booth at AWG sessions if they are registered. On the role of the G20: You can go to G20 to discuss mitigation, but the other pillars of the BAP will remain unaddressed. At the G20 you will not see the 100 least developed countries that do not contribute to climate change and suffer the most. They are just not at the table. These countries come to the UN because they have no other forum. We have to make the UN process work better. On unanimous decision making: People have to remember it was industrialized countries led by the US who voted against majority decision making at the beginning of the COPs for fear of being cornered on financial issues. Unanimity does assure that everyone agrees to the outcomes. Bali and other meetings proved it can be done. It is definitely a painful process. On rules: there are consultations taking place on revising (unanimity). Honestly I don t think rules are the problem. It was interesting that the objections raised at the end of COP 15 were objections with respect to the group that negotiated the Accord, that parties were only given an hour to 10

12 consider it, and that Obama gave a press conference. The objections were about process not substance. Consensus does not mean unanimity. Countries that sought to object to the accord had orders to block an agreement no matter what but not isolate themselves. If you show respect to the process and representation, and take time to have parties consider agreements you can reach agreement. On ethics: Negotiators narrow down what has to be agreed as they see the clock ticking down. If you can assure a Cancun text allows you to come back to plenary you can reach agreement. On the role of heads of state: There needs to be continued involvement, but not the same way as in Copenhagen. A conscious effort to find solutions on key political issues is necessary (Finance and Governance for example). On the future of the KP: A growing number of industrialized countries (meaning the EU) are now saying they are willing to put their numbers in two places. Many are hailing that as a significant victory. I think it is a myth. Yes, they are sincere that they are willing to put targets in a second commitment period under the KP. The US indicated it is willing to take a binding target under the Convention, but only if MDEs take a legally binding commitment as well. The MDEs are only willing to take actions, not a firm international legal commitment. The US will then say fine we will do the same as the MDEs. You will not be able to convince other industrialized countries (i.e. the Umbrella Group) to accept a different regime from the US. While this talk has seemed positive, I m not sure how long it will hold. It is not politically realistic. We urgently need an HONEST discussion about the future of the KP. On obstructionist parties: It is important to know that no country will want to be blamed for bringing this down if it happens in Cancun. All want a solution and none want to be singled out for causing a failure. On the Accord and Mitigation Commitments: What is on the table does not measure up to science, does not even get close. Civil Society should pressure for increased levels of ambition to get us into that range. At the end of the day in Copenhagen we were very close to 50% world and 80% industrialized reductions in the agreement. We did not think we would get as close to that agreement. We are on a journey that is long. We want an agreement so we have to measure how far we can push an agreement before it breaks. Have to get the best we can, which is better than nothing. On the Pledges (mitigation and financial): Draft decisions are being created now to do an analysis of the pledges of the parties and put them in a document (pledges of the Accord). Hope those conclusions make it through the negotiations. Top down vs. bottom up: In terms of top down and bottom up I would not agree we are moving 11

13 from one to the other. Kyoto was not top down. Targets were put forward by parties; they were not imposed or questioned in a serious way. EU, US and Japan reached their targets through horse trading. Sovereign states volunteered their targets. It is the same situation now. Don t thing think there has been that dramatic a change. On the access issues at Copenhagen: I as the Executive Secretary failed to appreciate and anticipate the ramification of having 120 heads of states at Copenhagen. There were also security problems with the observer organizations that did not represent their positive overall history. Need optimal participation while meeting security requirements. Have to consider discrimination to people who do not have a substantive role in the process ( hanger s on ). There are people who are there because it is an important event and they say they want to be there. There are exhibit and booth people. There is a third group for side events. There is a fourth category that has a commitment to the negotiations themselves. Problem in Copenhagen was we had the same badges for everyone. Want to think about if can we discriminate a bit more to ensure all observers that want to be part of the negotiations can be a part without having to admit all of the other people for which the negotiations themselves was not an important part of their attendance. On the large party delegations: Yes there were large party delegations into the hundreds, but there was also a non-governmental delegation with over 1000 registered participants. The Secretariat cannot restrict party access no matter how big or how unofficial their accredited delegates are. It is not the Secretariat s role to tell parties which members of their delegation are important, plus he noticed several NGO reps wearing party badges as well, so perhaps they should not criticize as much. Reviewing Pledges on Financing: We need a review of fast start finance, where it is coming from, where it is going and what it is intended for. Need to make sure that it is not simply a climate wash or simple reduction from other ODA. The First International Climate Financing Meeting in the UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown co-chaired the first meeting of the UN Secretary General s High Level Advisory Group on Climate Finance March 31 st. The group, which includes government leaders (UK, Ethiopia, Norway, Guyana), finance ministers, and other prominent figures such as George Soros, Obama Advisor Larry Summers, and Nick Stern, has been tasked with looking at how the world will deliver on the Copenhagen Accord commitment to provide $100 billion of public and private financing per year for adaptation and mitigation in developing countries The group was established in February by Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon and in addition to Brown the group is also co-chaired by Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia. The first meeting focused on potential sources of new funds, and how to use public funds to leverage private funding. Some of the public source options discussed includes a levy on 12

14 international shipping and aviation; increased carbon trading; a Robin-Hood tax on financial transactions 6 ; and using the International Monetary Fund s drawing rights. A work plan was also laid out for the coming months through its planned report back to COP-16 in November. The group does not consider itself a negotiating group, taking on more of an advisory role to the formal process. The UK Government also used the meeting as an opportunity to launch Beyond Copenhagen: the UK Government s international Climate Change Action Plan ( The most prominent points of the plan include supporting the European Commission s work to identify steps required to move to a 30% reduction target, strengthening the UN decision making process (after what happened at Copenhagen) and an openness to commit to an appropriately designed second Commitment Period under the Kyoto Protocol as a way to get to a legal agreement. With this move the UK conceded considerable ground on its previous negotiating positions. The trade off, explained by Climate secretary Ed Miliband, would be that major developing economies would have to enshrine mitigation actions into a new legal agreement under the AWG-LCA track. There is no mistaking this move is a gesture to change the dynamics of the negotiations, but the focus on form over substance is difficult to reconcile, given all signs point to a need to do the reverse. This point that has raised some criticism as being an uninformed decision, at odds with both the EU and much of the rest of Annex I. Others have characterized it as an olive branch to developing countries designed to re-engage those put off by what happened at Copenhagen and quell the myth that developed countries want to kill the Kyoto agreement. The move does take some pressure and focus off of the U.S. and China (and their respective mitigation commitments). Essentially what the UK is saying is that if a second commitment period under Kyoto is necessary in order to ensure a long term cooperative agreement for all parties, then the UK (and presumably in their hope the entire EU) would be comfortable operating under this restraint. Also not to be lost are the strategically placed words of appropriately designed in the official statement in reference to a second Kyoto Commitment Period. This wiggle room may come back into play as negotiations develop. The G8/G20 situation IISD has gathered that unfortunately neither climate change not fossil fuel subsidies are expected to play any sort of significant role at any of the G8/G20 meetings, at least for now. The general feeling is the world leaders that comprise this group are intent on seeing what transpires at the UNFCCC meetings held prior to the G8/G20, as well as a possible Major Economies Forum meeting, which has yet to be scheduled. After the UNFCCC meeting in April there may be more clarity on what, if 6 Jeffrey Sachs discusses the Robin Hood model here: Jeffrey Sachs, Robin Hood tax s time has come, The Guardian, 18 March 2010, Available at: 13

15 any role the G8 might take. On the G20 side there is even less reason to be optimistic as the actual meeting time for the G20 is quite short on substantive issues and that issues of the world economy and financial reform are far and away the number one priority. This covers not just climate change issues, but also the issue of fossil fuel subsidies. While parties are preparing subsidy lists, and expressing the importance of addressing the issue of subsidies, there is a general feeling that they will find a variety of excuses for why each party s list of subsidies will be fairly short. Expectations are lowering as to what this initiative will achieve, with perhaps little beyond monitoring and reporting. 14