Case 1:17-cv JCH-SMV Document 9 Filed 02/09/18 Page 1 of 15 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

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1 Case 1:17-cv JCH-SMV Document 9 Filed 02/09/18 Page 1 of 15 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO KENNETH AGUILAR, Petitioner, v. No. 1:17-CV JCH/SMV VICTOR RODRIGUEZ, ACTING WARDEN Sandoval County Detention Center, Sandoval County New Mexico ROBERT B. CORIZ, TRIBAL COURT JUDGE and Governor for the Pueblo of Kewa, Respondents. RESPONDENT, ROBERT B. CORIZ'S, ANSWER TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS PURSUANT TO 25 U.S.C Respondent, Robert B. Coriz ("Respondent"), by and through his undersigned attorneys states the following for his Answer to the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 25 U.S.C ( Petition ) (Doc. 1) pursuant to the Order Dismissing Kewa Pueblo and Ordering Remaining Defendants to Answer (Doc. 5) of this Court dated January 10, 2018: INTRODUCTION The Santo Domingo Tribe ( Tribe ) has governed its affairs and its members under a traditional form of government since time immemorial. The Tribal Court is a traditional court that administers justice in a manner that is fair, consistent with the Tribe's cultural and traditional values and respectful of the civil rights of the defendants that appear before the Tribal Court. In 2017, the Tribe and Tribal Officials experienced an unusually high number of petitions for writs of habeas corpus being filed against them in federal court under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C.

2 Case 1:17-cv JCH-SMV Document 9 Filed 02/09/18 Page 2 of ("ICRA"). As a result, in 2017, the Tribal Council reviewed and renewed its traditional principles of justice that explain and illustrate how the traditions of the Tribal Court are consistent with the ICRA. The Council also approved a form for use by the Tribal Court to better document the Tribal Court's advisement of rights to criminal defendants. See Exhibit 1, Tribal Court Record, at 2, which is attached and made a part of this Answer by reference. The principles of justice are not exhaustive and many of the oral traditions and customs of the Tribe are not included in the principles. Throughout this Answer, Respondent Coriz will refer to the Tribe's principles of justice to explain how the Tribal Court complied with the ICRA in its prosecution of Mr. Kenneth Aguilar. See Exhibit 2, Declaration of Robert B. Coriz ("Coriz Dec."), which is attached and made a part of this Answer by reference. ANSWER TO ALLEGATIONS IN FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND OF THE PETITION 1. Respondent admits the allegations in the first two unnumbered paragraphs of the Factual and Procedural Background regarding Jurisdiction and Venue in the Petition, except the allegation that Petitioner was subject to a "summary conviction," which is denied. Petitioner is currently incarcerated at the Sandoval County Detention Center in Bernalillo, New Mexico. 2. Respondent admits the allegation in paragraphs Regarding paragraph 4, Respondent admits the allegations, except the allegation that former Governor and Councilman, Felix Tenorio, had no authority to issue the Arrest Warrant for the arrest of Petitioner, which is denied. 4. Respondent admits the allegation in paragraph Regarding the allegations in paragraph 6, Mr. Aguilar was taken into custody by a BIA Law Enforcement Officer. Respondent admits the remaining allegations in paragraph 6. 2

3 Case 1:17-cv JCH-SMV Document 9 Filed 02/09/18 Page 3 of Respondent admits the allegation in paragraph Regarding the allegations in paragraph 8, Respondent admits the allegations, but questions the authenticity of Doc. 1-1, which Petitioner refers to as "Exhibit A." Doc. 1-1 appears to be an altered document. Compare Doc. 1-1, with Ex. 1, Tribal Court Record, at 1. The Petition provides no explanation for the different form. 8. Respondent admits the allegations in paragraphs The charges against Petitioner were brought after the Tribe appointed an Independent Special Prosecutor. See Exhibit 3, Tribal Council Notice to Santo Domingo Members and Employees, Appointment of Independent Special Prosecutor ("Special Prosecutor Notice") and Exhibit 4, Affidavit of John Day ("Day Aff."), both of which are attached and made a part hereof by reference. 9. Regarding the allegations in paragraph 12, Respondent admits that Petitioner pled "not guilty" to the charges against him. On the Arraignment form, Ex. 1, Tribal Court Record at 1, the box for "guilty" was mistakenly checked, but corrected. However, Respondent questions the authenticity of Doc 1-1 to the Petition. See 7 above. 10. Respondent admits the allegations in paragraphs Respondent admits the allegations stated in paragraph 18, but has no knowledge about the unexplained reference stated as "See, Exhibit GIN (emphasis in original)" in paragraph 18. Respondent, therefore, denies any allegations related to such unknown and unexplained reference. 12. Respondent admits the allegations in paragraph Regarding the allegations in paragraph 20, Respondent admits that, at the trial held on December 6, 2017, the Tribal Court consisted of then-governor Robert B. Coriz, then-lt. 3

4 Case 1:17-cv JCH-SMV Document 9 Filed 02/09/18 Page 4 of 15 Governor Esquipula Tenorio and Tribal Officials. At the request of Mr. Aguilar, Tribal Officials from 2016 were summoned to Court to testify on behalf of Mr. Aguilar. Exhibit 5, Declaration of Franklin Chavez ( Chavez Dec. ), 12, which is attached and made a part of this Answer by reference. 14. Respondent admits the allegations in paragraphs Regarding the allegations in paragraph 24, Respondent states that the Tribal Officials who made up the Jury found Petitioner guilty of all six charges against him. 16. Respondent admits the allegations in paragraphs Respondent admits the allegations in paragraphs Regarding the allegations in paragraph 30, Respondent admits that Petitioner was placed into custody at the time of sentencing. Respondent lacks sufficient knowledge to admit or deny the remaining allegations in paragraph 30 and, therefore, denies them. 19. Regarding the allegations in paragraph 31, Respondent admits that the ICRA does not include an expressed tribal exhaustion requirement. However, the federal courts in this jurisdiction require the exhaustion of tribal remedies, including an appeal, before filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Valenzuela v. Silversmith, 699 F.3d 1199, (10th Cir. 2012). 20. Regarding the allegations in paragraph 32, Respondent lacks sufficient knowledge about Petitioner's actual knowledge of the Tribe's remedies and, therefore, denies such allegations. Respondent acknowledges that Petitioner should hold accurate knowledge, given his past official positions within the Tribe. Respondent admits that the process for appeal is review by the Tribal Council. Petitioner failed to request an appeal and, therefore failed to exhaust his tribal remedies. 4

5 Case 1:17-cv JCH-SMV Document 9 Filed 02/09/18 Page 5 of Regarding the allegations in paragraph 33, Respondent admits that the Tribe has no written Tribal code. Instead, the Tribe is governed by its traditions and customs. Respondent denies the remaining allegations in paragraph Respondent denies the allegations in paragraph 34. I. Standard of Review Under the ICRA LEGAL ANALYSIS In reviewing Tribal Court prosecutions imposed under 25 U.S.C. 1302(a), this Court is limited in its review to the mechanism provided by Congress in the ICRA, "namely, that provided for expressly in 1303"; de novo review is not permitted. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 67 (1978). As the Supreme Court explained, Congress was aware of the intrusive effect that judicial review by the federal courts could have on an Indian tribe's powers of selfgovernment. "Congress apparently decided that review by way of habeas corpus would adequately protect the individual interests at stake while avoiding unnecessary intrusions on tribal governments." Id. As the late Judge Edwin Mechem of the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico stated in the Santa Clara case, [m]uch has been written about tribal sovereignty. If those words have any meaning at all, they must mean that a tribe can make and enforce its decisions without regard to whether an external authority considers those decision wise. To abrogate tribal decisions... for whatever good reasons, is to destroy cultural identity under the guise of saving it. Congress has not indicated that it intended the Indian Civil Rights Act to be interpreted in such a manner. Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 402 F.Supp. 5, (D.N.M. 1975); accord., Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 71. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, and others, have long noted that the Constitution of the United Sates does not apply to Indian tribes except "to the extent it expressly binds them or is 5

6 Case 1:17-cv JCH-SMV Document 9 Filed 02/09/18 Page 6 of 15 made binding on them by treaty or Act of Congress." 1 Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674, 678 (10th Cir. 1971). In Groundhog, after examining the legislative history of the Indian Bill of Rights (as the original subsection 1302, now 1302(a), is sometimes referred to), the Tenth Circuit Court rejected the contention that the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment and the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment were made applicable to Indian tribes by passage of 25 U.S.C. 1302[(a)](8). Groundhog, 442 F.2d at 681; see also Valenzuela, 699 F.3d at 1202 (in which the Court noted that Indian tribes are distinct political entities retaining inherent powers to manage internal tribal matters, citing Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 880 (2d Cir. 1996). In Poodry, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals found that the "Constitutional provisions that limit federal or state authority do not apply to Indian tribes because the tribes retain powers of self-government that predate the Constitution."). Accordingly, Petitioner's claims must be reviewed and analyzed with the recognition that "tribes remain quasi-sovereign nations which, by government structure, culture, and source of sovereignty[,] are in many ways foreign to the constitutional institutions of the federal and state governments." Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 71. Petitioner's claims must, therefore, be viewed under the provisions of subsection 1302(a) of the ICRA, not under the U.S. Constitution and strict interpretations of it. 1 As explained below, when Congress amended the ICRA in 2010 by adding subsection 1302(b), it did impose some Constitutional standards on tribes if a tribe felt a need to impose greater penalties on criminal defendants, but only if the tribe met certain higher conditions, which comport more closely to the practices of modern federal and state courts. The Santo Domingo Tribal Court has not adopted the heightened requirements of subsection 1302(b) and continues to conduct its proceedings under the traditional laws and customs of the Tribe in compliance with subsection 1302(a). 6

7 Case 1:17-cv JCH-SMV Document 9 Filed 02/09/18 Page 7 of 15 II. Petitioner Was Tried in the Santo Domingo Tribal Court in Compliance with the Provisions of Subsection 1302(a) of the ICRA, Not Under the Alternative Provisions, Heightened Requirements, and Potential Longer Sentences Provided in Subsection 1302(b) Under the ICRA as amended in 2010, a Tribal Court has the option of conducting its criminal proceedings under either subsection 1302(a) or the new subsection 1302(b), which begins with "A tribal court may..." (emphasis added). But a Tribal Court can proceed under subsection 1302(b) only if it meets the more stringent requirements of subsection (b). Instead, in an exercise of the Tribe's sovereign authority, the Santo Domingo Tribal Court conducts its criminal proceedings under its traditional law and customs in compliance with subsection 1302(a). The requirements and limitations placed on Tribal Courts in subsection 1302(b) are irrelevant in this case, do not apply, and any claims by Mr. Aguilar under subsection 1302(b) must be dismissed. III. The Santo Domingo Tribal Court Complies with 25 U.S.C. 1302(a) in its Criminal Proceedings The Santo Domingo Tribal Court allows a defendant to have an attorney if desired by the defendant, but only at the defendant's own expense. Ex. 2, Coriz Dec., 16. Tribal Court Judges are not required to have formal legal training or be licensed attorneys. Id., Coriz Dec., 3. Instead, they are the Governors of the Tribe, who have served in that role for centuries. Id., Coriz Dec., 2. The Tribal Court has a jury comprised of no less than six and up to ten Tribal Officers. Tribal Officers who are witnesses in a case are not jurors. This is how the Tribal Court meets the ICRA requirements in subsection 1302(a)(10). Id., Coriz Dec., 2, 19. Defendants are given an explanation of their rights in court at their arraignment and again at trial. If appropriate, the explanation is given in both English and Keres. A Defendant can ask questions about his rights, that are also addressed by the Court. When the Defendant shows that 7

8 Case 1:17-cv JCH-SMV Document 9 Filed 02/09/18 Page 8 of 15 he understands, he is asked to sign the Advisement of Rights Order to show his understanding, which Petitioner Aguilar did. See Petition Doc. 1-4; Ex. 2, Coriz Dec., 8. This is how the Tribal Court meets the requirements of ICRA subsection 1302(a)(6). The Tribal Court does not impose jail sentences longer than one year for any one offense, or fines greater than $5,000, as required by ICRA subsection 1302(a)(7)(B). Ex. 2, Coriz Dec., 17. However, the Tribal Court may, and when appropriate does, require that multiple sentences imposed for separate offenses be served consecutively rather than concurrently, as long as the total is less than nine years, as provided in ICRA subsection 1302(a)(7)(D). The Tribal Court respects a defendant's right against self-incrimination, conducts its hearings in public and without delay, gives a defendant the right to confront witnesses against him and call witnesses in his favor as required under ICRA subsection 1302(a)(4) and (6). Id., Coriz Dec., 16, 21. The Santo Domingo Tribal Court conducts its criminal proceedings under and in compliance with subsection 1302(a). IV. Petitioner Failed to Exhaust His Tribal Remedies; Therefore, the Petition Should be Dismissed Petitioner was entitled to appeal his conviction, but he failed to do so. He was informed of his right to appeal at his arraignment and at his trial. His right to an appeal, along with his other rights under the ICRA, were explained to him at length in both English and Keres. He asked questions about his rights, which were answered. And, he said that he understood his rights. Ex. 5, Chavez Dec., 9. He was also given a copy of and signed the Advisement of Rights Order, which includes, at section 3(i), the right to an appeal as one of the rights explained to Petitioner. Ex. 1, Tribal Court Record, at 2. 8

9 Case 1:17-cv JCH-SMV Document 9 Filed 02/09/18 Page 9 of 15 Petitioner was required to exhaust his Tribal Court remedies before he could file his Petition for relief under the ICRA. Valenzuela, 699 F.3d at As explained by the Valenzuela Court, the failure to exhaust is not excused by a petitioner's waiver of the right to an appeal, lack of attorney representation, ignorance of the law, or whether the tribal remedy available is permissive or mandatory. Id. In addition, "the aggrieved party must have actually sought a tribal remedy, not merely have alleged its futility." White v. Pueblo of San Juan, 728 F.2d 1307, 1312 (10th Cir. 1984) (emphasis added). Given Petitioner Aguilar's inexcusable failure to exhaust, his Petition should be dismissed. V. Petitioner was Allowed to Have an Attorney Represent Him at His Own Expense Mr. Aguilar did not appear in the Tribal Court without knowing his rights as a defendant. He is knowledgeable about the traditions and customs of the Tribe and the Tribal Court. He served as Lt. Governor in 2015 and He also served in the traditional role of War Captain in multiple terms in the past. Ex. 2, Coriz Dec., 5. During his two terms as Lt. Governor, Petitioner presided as Tribal Court Judge in more than 400 court cases, the majority of which were criminal cases involving allegations of violations of tribal traditional laws. Ex. 4, Day Aff., 10. Nevertheless, the Tribal Court did not omit advising Mr. Aguilar about his rights, or treat him differently than other defendants. At both his arraignment and trial, the Tribal Court made clear to Mr. Aguilar that he had the right to have an attorney to represent him at his own expense. Mr. Aguilar's right to an attorney was explained to him in both English and Keres at arraignment and trial. Ex. 5, Chavez Dec., He indicated that he understood and signed the Advisement of Rights Order to confirm his understanding. Ex. 1, Tribal Court Record, at 2. However, Mr. Aguilar did not retain an attorney. Jail records from the Santa Fe Jail show that Mr. Aguilar didn't make any calls from 9

10 Case 1:17-cv JCH-SMV Document 9 Filed 02/09/18 Page 10 of 15 the jail, even though Mr. Aguilar had been given a personal identification number or PIN to use so that he could make phone calls from the jail prior to his arraignment. Ex. 5, Chavez Dec., 6. The Tribe's Special Prosecutor 2 was present at the arraignment and trial of Petitioner and observed the explanation of rights given to Petitioner. Mr. Aguilar cannot claim he was denied the right to an attorney when he did nothing in the time allowed him to obtain an attorney. VI. Petitioner was Given a Jury Trial in Compliance with 25 U.S.C. 1302(a)(10) Under the customs and traditional law of the Tribe, criminal defendants subject to incarceration are tried to a jury as a matter of course. As Petitioner Aguilar knows or should know, having served as a Tribal Judge while he was Lt. Governor, a Defendant need not request a jury. Ex. 2, Coriz Dec., 19. Petitioner Aguilar was tried with a jury comprised of no less than six Tribal Officers. Tribal Officers who are witnesses in a case are not jurors. Id., Coriz Dec., 2. Petitioner also asserts that his trial was not public, although he doesn't allege who was excluded or by whom. The Tribal Court did not limit attendance at the trial. Mr. Aguilar was given a jury trial without having to request one and the public was not excluded. Therefore, Mr. Aguilar's claims that he was denied a jury trial or that his trial was not public, must also be dismissed. 2 In 2016, the Tribal Council became aware of serious allegations of theft of tribal funds and unauthorized use of tribal credit cards by Tribal employees and officers. Given the serious nature of the allegations, and the potential that it may have involved the Governor and Lt. Governor, the Council had a forensic audit done and appointed attorney John Day as a Special Prosecutor to assure that the investigation of the allegations was thorough, independent, non-political and unbiased. Exhibit 4, Special Prosecutor Notice; Ex. 5, Day Aff., 5-9. Mr. Day's investigation led to the criminal charges against Petitioner Aguilar. 10

11 Case 1:17-cv JCH-SMV Document 9 Filed 02/09/18 Page 11 of 15 VII. Section 1302(a) of the ICRA Does Not Authorize a Cause of Action for Due Process Against Tribal Officials Section IV of the Petition claims that Mr. Aguilar's right to due process was violated. It then gives a litany of false statements regarding the conduct of the Tribal Court proceedings against him to justify his claim, but cites no legal authority. However, even if his statements were true, federal courts have long recognized that subsection 1302(a)(8) does not authorize Constitutional due process claims. Pink v. Modoc Indian Health Project, Inc., 157 F.3d 1185, 1189 (1998); see also section I above (regarding Standard of Review). The Tribe's concept of due process is interpreted by the traditional ways of the Santo Domingo Tribe. The traditional laws and customs of the Tribe seek justice for both parties and apply fundamental fairness in its Court. This has always been their way. Ex. 2, Coriz Dec., 17. The statements made by Petitioner in section IV of the Petition must be addressed because they are false. The Arrest Warrant to arrest Mr. Aguilar was signed by former Governor and Tribal Court Judge, Felix Tenorio. Under the customs and traditions of the Tribe, the Governor may choose to empower someone else to act on his behalf, so that there s always a leader at the Pueblo. The Governor may designate a Tribal Judge from the Council, who has served as a Governor. Id., Coriz Dec., 2. As a former Governor and Tribal Court Judge, Councilman Tenorio was experienced and qualified to act as a presiding Judge. However, due to a death in his family, Judge Tenorio was not available to act as presiding Judge at the time of arraignment and trial. Governor Robert Coriz then stepped in to act as presiding Judge. Id., Coriz Dec., 4. Petitioner fails to explain how a change in judges, made to accommodate the unavailability of a sitting judge and avoid trial delays, constitutes a due process violation. As Petitioner Aguilar knows, or should know, Councilman Tenorio has served as a presiding Judge on other occasions, as needed. The 11

12 Case 1:17-cv JCH-SMV Document 9 Filed 02/09/18 Page 12 of 15 customs and traditions of the Tribal Court allow the Court to make such accommodations, and Petitioner Aguilar did not raise any concerns about Judge Coriz presiding at his trial. Petitioner also claims that a "special summary proceeding, and invented [] jury-type proceeding" were created to "in order to find the Petitioner guilty." Petition at 13. To the contrary, the allegations against Mr. Aguilar were investigated by a Special Prosecutor, who is not a member of the Tribe. He was assisted by BIA/OJS Special Agent Frank Chavez, who drafted the Statement of Probable Cause to support the Arrest Warrant (Ex. 1, Tribal Court Record, at 5-15), and the Criminal Complaint against Mr. Aguilar (Ex. 1, Tribal Court Record, at 13). Mr. Chavez is employed by the BIA/OJS. He is a Tribal member, and served as a Tribal Officer in the past. Ex. 5, Chavez Dec., 1. Petitioner's trial was conducted as other criminal trials in accordance with the principles. Mr. Aguilar pled not guilty to the charges against him. He had a jury trial with at least six Tribal Officers sitting as the jury. He was allowed to speak to the Court and the BIA/OJS Special Agent, answer questions, ask questions of the witnesses, and call witnesses, all of which he did. Ex. 2, Coriz Dec., 11, 21; Ex. 5, Chavez Dec., The Tribe's Special Prosecutor, Special Agent Chavez and former Tribal Officers took no part in the jury deliberations. In the end, Petitioner was found guilty of six counts against him by the jury. Mr. Aguilar was treated the same and given the same rights at trial as any other defendant. The Petition fails to state a claim for violation of due process, and the Petition should be denied. VIII. Petitioner Aguilar's Sentence of 360 Days for Each Count Proven Against Him Does Not Violate The ICRA The Petition claims that the Tribal Court sentenced Petitioner Aguilar to an impermissibly long sentence in violation of ICRA subsection 1302(b). As explained above in section II, the Tribal Court cannot and does not try criminal defendants under subsection 1302(b) because the Tribal 12

13 Case 1:17-cv JCH-SMV Document 9 Filed 02/09/18 Page 13 of 15 Court does not meet the requirements to do so. Mr. Aguilar's trial was conducted under ICRA subsection 1302(a). Under section 1302(a)(7)(B) of the ICRA, the Tribal Court was permitted to impose a sentence of up to one year, a fine of up to $5,000, or both for any one offense, provided that the total penalty or punishment imposed in the criminal proceeding was less than nine years. 25 U.S.C. 1302(a)(7)(D). In this case, Mr. Aguilar was found guilty of two counts of Larceny, two counts of Fraud and two counts of Conspiracy. He was sentenced to 360 days for each guilty count (Ex. 1, Tribal Court Record, at 1, 23), which complies with subsections 1302(a)(7)(B) and (D). Miranda v. Anchondo, 684 F.3d 844, (9th Cir. 2011) (section 1302(a)(7) "unambiguously permits tribal courts to impose up to a one-year term of imprisonment for each discrete criminal violation. ). CONCLUSION Former Lt. Governor Aguilar is aware of, and participated in the traditional and cultural traditions of his Tribe. As Lt. Governor, he had a solemn obligation and duty to protect and serve his people and Pueblo. Instead, he was convicted of serious criminal acts which documented that he stole from his Tribe and conspired against his Tribe for his own benefit and that of his coconspirators. He was brought to justice through the fair, unbiased and lawful proceedings in Tribal Court in full compliance with the applicable provisions of the ICRA. The traditions and customs upheld and protected by the Tribal Court are one of the most vital expressions of tribal sovereignty of the Tribe and pre-date by hundreds of years the modern rules and procedures of the federal and state courts. Congress understood the threat to tribal self-governance and sovereignty posed by trying to remake tribal courts in the image of our modern court systems and took measures when 13

14 Case 1:17-cv JCH-SMV Document 9 Filed 02/09/18 Page 14 of 15 it passed the ICRA to protect tribes from such threats. For this and the foregoing reasons, this Court should deny the Petition. Respectfully submitted, LEGER LAW AND STRATEGY, LLC By /s/ Cynthia A. Kiersnowski Teresa Isabel Leger Cynthia A. Kiersnowski 414 Old Taos Highway Santa Fe, NM teresa@legerlawandstrategy.com cindy@legerlawandstrategy.com (505) Attorneys for Respondent Robert B. Coriz 14

15 Case 1:17-cv JCH-SMV Document 9 Filed 02/09/18 Page 15 of 15 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 9th day of February, 2018, I filed the foregoing Answer using CM/ECF which caused the following counsel of record to be served by electronic means, as more fully reflected on the Notice of Electronic Filing: Barbara Creel Attorney for Petitioner Aguilar creel@law.unm.edu By /s/ Cynthia A. Kiersnowski Cynthia A. Kiersnowski Leger Law and Strategy, LLC 414 Old Taos Highway Santa Fe, NM cindy@legerlawandstrategy.com (505) Attorneys for Respondent Robert B. Coriz 15