DOLMANS INSURANCE BULLETIN

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1 DOLMANS INSURANCE BULLETIN Welcome to the January 2018 edition of the Dolmans Insurance Bulletin In this issue we cover: REPORT ON Costs in Part 20 proceedings - beware the QOCS pitfall! - Sharon Maddox (Claimant) v Dwr Cymru Welsh Water (Defendant/Part 20 Claimant) and Rhondda Cynon Taf County Borough Council (Part 20 Defendant) FOCUS ON Court of Appeal bucks the trend in Social Services negligence cases RECENT CASE UPDATE Admissions - fresh evidence - withdrawal of admission Costs - proportionality Fundamental dishonesty Occupiers liability - car parks - ice Provisional assessment - Part 36 - costs cap Setting aside Judgments - fraud If there are any items you would like us to examine, or if you would like to include a comment on these pages, please the editor, Justin Harris, Partner, at justinh@dolmans.co.uk 1

2 DOLMANS REPORT ON COSTS IN PART 20 PROCEEDINGS - BEWARE THE QOCS PITFALL! Sharon Maddox (Claimant) v Dwr Cymru Welsh Water (Defendant/Part 20 Claimant) and Rhondda Cynon Taf County Borough Council (Part 20 Defendant) The above case (in which Dolmans represented Rhondda Cynon Taf County Borough Council) serves as a timely reminder of the costs pitfall that can follow in Part 20 proceedings, even when Qualified One Way Costs Shifting (QOCS) would otherwise apply and the Claimant s claim in the main action fails. Background The Claimant alleged that, on 18 September 2013, she was walking along the footway, when she stepped on the edge of a defective stop tap cover that flipped up, causing her to trip and fall. The Claimant, therefore, issued a claim against the Defendant (Dwr Cymru Welsh Water) for compensation for personal injuries allegedly suffered as a result of her accident. The footway in question was part of the adopted highway, which was maintainable at the public expense by the relevant Authority (Rhondda Cynon Taf County Borough Council) and, as such, the Defendant/Part 20 Claimant subsequently issued Part 20 proceedings against the Authority for indemnity in relation to any damages and/or costs awarded in favour of the Claimant. The Claimant decided not to join in the Authority as a Second Defendant. Allegations The Claimant alleged that the Defendant had been negligent. No breach of statutory duty was pleaded against the Defendant. However, the Defendant/Part 20 Claimant alleged that it was entitled to rely upon the Authority s system of inspection and maintenance (and effectively any Defence under Section 58 of the Highways Act 1980), although the Defendant/Part 20 Claimant alleged (in the Part 20 proceedings) that the Authority had been negligent and in breach of Section 41 of the Highways Act

3 DOLMANS REPORT ON The Trial - Claim Dismissed The Trial was eventually heard before a District Judge in the Pontypridd County Court, with all parties being represented at the hearing. Dolmans (on behalf of the Authority) had previously served a robust Defence to the Part 20 proceedings, citing that the footway was subject to a regular system of maintenance and inspection on an annual basis, that the footway had last been inspected prior to the date of the Claimant s alleged accident on 9 November 2012 (when no defects were noted at the location) and that the Authority had no record of any similar complaints and/or accidents during the 12 month period prior to the date of the Claimant s alleged accident. In addition, the Authority s Defence specifically relied upon the decision in Gary Samuel v Rhondda Cynon Taf County Borough Council and Dwr Cymru Welsh Water (LTL ), in which the Authority was again represented by Dolmans and where it was held that highway inspectors were not required to undertake a physical inspection of every stop tap cover/ apparatus during their inspections. The relevant highways inspector gave oral evidence in support of the Authority s Defence and was commended by the District Judge as a diligent employee. The District Judge (being satisfied with the Authority s system and having reiterated the decision in Samuel) was content that there was nothing more that the Defendant/Part 20 Claimant or the Authority could have done to avoid the alleged accident and that both had acted reasonably. As such, the Claimant s claim was dismissed and the Part 20 claim against the Authority also failed. The Costs Arguments The costs position between the Claimant and the Defendant was relatively straightforward. The Claimant had effectively lost and was ordered to pay the Defendant s costs of the main action in the usual manner. However, as this was a QOCS matter, the Defendant s costs were not to be enforced without the Court s permission. The Authority applied for its costs in the Part 20 proceedings to be paid by the Part 20 Claimant, arguing that QOCS did not apply in the Part 20 proceedings. 3

4 DOLMANS REPORT ON The Authority relied upon the Court of Appeal s decision in Wagenaar v Weekend Travel Limited & Serradj ( ), in which it was held that QOCS protection did not extend to Defendants who were Claimants in third party or contribution proceedings. Notwithstanding the decision in Wagenaar and the fact that the Part 20 claim against the Authority had failed, the Part 20 Claimant argued that, unlike in the main action, costs should not follow the event in the Part 20 proceedings. The Part 20 Claimant argued that the District Judge had discretion under Part 44.2 of the Civil Procedure Rules and suggested that there should be no order as to costs in the Part 20 proceedings. In support of its argument, the Part 20 Claimant argued that the Authority possessed all of the evidence required to defend the Claimant s claim and that the Part 20 Claimant, therefore, had no option but to issue Part 20 proceedings in order to rely upon such evidence. The District Judge was not convinced by this argument, finding that it was for the Defendant/ Part 20 Claimant to ensure that all relevant evidence was before the Court without the need to issue Part 20 proceedings. Having regard to the decision in Wagenaar in particular, the District Judge held that the Authority was entitled to its costs in the Part 20 proceedings (which were summarily assessed) and ordered the Part 20 Claimant to pay the same within 21 days. Conclusion In this matter, the Defendant/Part 20 Claimant found itself having to effectively bear its own costs in the main action and pay all of the Authority s costs in the Part 20 proceedings. The decision illustrates that care must always be taken before a party decides to issue Part 20 proceedings in an action and that the potential costs consequences of doing so should not be underestimated, even where QOCS would otherwise apply. Tom Danter Associate Dolmans Solicitors For further information regarding this article, please contact Tom Danter at tomd@dolmans.co.uk or visit our website at 4

5 DOLMANS FOCUS ON COURT OF APPEAL BUCKS THE TREND IN SOCIAL SERVICES NEGLIGENCE CASES The trajectory in case law and government initiatives in recent years has been towards making it easier for victims of abuse to pursue claims for compensation. The Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse (IICSA) was established to examine how the country's institutions handled their duty of care to protect children from sexual abuse and to facilitate avenues of compensation. In the autumn of last year, the Supreme Court determined that a local authority should be fixed with vicarious liability for wrongful acts of foster carers (Armes v Nottinghamshire County Council 2017 UKSC 60). 6 months ago, the Scottish Parliament scrapped the 3 year limitation period, allowing victims of childhood abuse dating back as far as 1964 to seek compensation though the civil courts. Therefore, few would have predicted the Court of Appeal's decision in CN & GN v Poole Borough Council (CN) (2017 EWCA Civ 2185) on 21 December Background In May 2006, Mrs N and her children, CN and GN, were living in accommodation arranged by Poole Borough Council. CN was disabled and was a child 'in need' within the Children Act The family were victims of abuse and anti-social/criminal behaviour caused by a neighbouring family. Proceedings ensued on behalf of CN and GN for the Council's failure to protect them in accordance with its duties under the Children Act, asserting that the Council should have removed them from their accommodation. At first instance, Master Eastman ruled he was not satisfied that there was any foundation in law for the assertion that there was a common law duty in favour of the children under the Children Act in these circumstances. The claims were struck out. The children appealed on the basis that the Master had failed to have regard to the case of JD v East Berkshire NHS Community Trust [2005] UKHL 23, which established that a local authority could owe a duty of care to a child in relation to its investigation of child abuse and the commencement of care proceedings. In March 2016, the High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the Order striking out the claims. The council was subsequently granted permission to appeal. 5

6 DOLMANS FOCUS ON The Court of Appeal s Ruling The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the Council s appeal. It overruled JD v East Berkshire. It found that when the Court in JD v East Berkshire decided a duty of care was owed to children not in care, it relied on the fact that children could bring actions under the Human Rights Act 1998 and, therefore, breach of duty claims should run consistent with human rights claims. However, the Court of Appeal was of the view that this rationale was not now commensurate with the Supreme Court decision in Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police 2015 UKSC 2, where it was held that human rights claims and breach of duty claims are different. The result in CN means that the law reverts to the position two decades ago under X v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 3 WLR 152, ie that local authorities do not owe a duty of care when making child protection decisions about whether to remove a child into care. The Claimants have sought permission to appeal to the Supreme Court. The Implications of the Decision Whist recognising that the facts of CN can be distinguished from the usual type of so called failure to remove claims local authorities are used to seeing, it is the ratio of the case which will have a direct impact on thousands of such cases currently being pursued. In CN the harm suffered was caused by a neighbouring family, as opposed to emanating from within the family home. However, it is clear that following this case, no duty of care can be owed by a local authority in the exercise of its functions to investigate and prevent significant harm to children, whatever its cause. However, this may not be an end to the matter. The recourse to claims under the Human Rights Act 1998 (Article 3 right not to be subjected to torture/inhumane treatment; Article 8 right to respect for private and family life) remains unaffected by CN, as does the right to pursue claims via the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority. Some Claimant Solicitors have indicated an intention to proceed with cases by alleging that the social workers have voluntarily assumed specific responsibility for the safety of Claimants (as was contended in X v Hounslow LBC 2009 EWCA Civ 286) and have been negligent in the manner that they carried out this responsibility. 6

7 DOLMANS FOCUS ON Local authorities need to be aware of this Judgment and its impact on existing cases. This decision offers the prospect of a potential defence to many such claims. Consideration will need to be given as to whether to resile from any admissions in light of the ruling and as to whether any offers to settle should be withdrawn. Each case will need to be examined on its own merits and careful consideration of all factors, including potential costs consequences, will be required. Nicola Edwards Partner Dolmans Solicitors For further information regarding this article, please contact Nicola Edwards at nicolae@dolmans.co.uk or visit our website at 7

8 DOLMANS RECENT CASE UPDATE Admissions - Fresh Evidence - Withdrawal of Admission Wood v (1) Days Healthcare UK Ltd (2) Secretary of State for Health (3) Shropshire Community Health Service (4) Balle A/S (t/a F Reac A/S) (5) Berwick Care Equipment Ltd [2017] EWCA Civ 2097 The Court of Appeal has considered the position where a Defendant, D1, presented with a claim that was said to be of low value, admitted liability, but was later confronted with a significant increase in the value of the claim. The Claimant/Respondent was injured when her chair riser, part of her NHS supplied wheelchair, developed a fault. She brought proceedings against five companies/bodies and initially indicated that her claim was a fast track claim. The First Defendant/Appellant was the manufacturer of the wheelchair, and in June 2010 its loss adjusters made a formal admission of liability. Sometime later, the Claimant s Solicitors indicated that the claim had increased significantly in value, and, when proceedings were commenced, a claim in excess of 300,000 was pleaded. At that stage, the First Defendant reviewed its admission and, upon discovering material that would give it a defence, applied for permission to withdraw the admission. At first instance, the Judge found that there was no new evidence about the circumstances of the accident and that although the value of the claim had increased since 2010, that was a risk which was inherent in any personal injury claim. At the same time, the Judge granted the Claimant s Application for Summary Judgment against the Second Defendant. The First Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeal overturned the Judge s decision. It held that it was indisputable that highly material new evidence had come to light in the form of further evidence as to the extent of the injuries caused and, therefore, the value of the claim and the loss adjusters had no reason to realistically contemplate the amount of the claim being increased so dramatically. The Judge s stark approach that a risk of increase in quantum was inherent in any such claim would tend to discourage speedy admissions of liability in small claims; such admissions being made by having regard to considerations of saving costs and proportionality. It was held that the entire change in character and amount of the Claimant s claim in 2012 should, given all the circumstances, have justified the grant of permission to withdraw the pre-action admission. That conclusion was reinforced by the fact that the Judge had granted Summary Judgment against the primary care Trust and the NHS Trust. Therefore, the Claimant had the certainty of a Final Judgment against a Defendant who was good for the money. Appeal allowed. 8

9 DOLMANS RECENT CASE UPDATE Costs - Proportionality May v (1) Wavell Group Ltd (2) Bizzari Lawtel The Claimants, M, brought a nuisance claim against the Defendants, W, seeking an injunction and damages for continuing noise caused by construction work at their neighbour s property. The Claim Form stated that damages were claimed in excess of 50,000, but no more than 100,000. Before a Defence was filed, M accepted a Part 36 offer of 25,000. M claimed costs of just over 208,000. On Detailed Assessment, the Master took a two stage approach initially, carrying out a line by line assessment of the reasonable costs, which came to a figure of 99,655 plus VAT, and then further reduced the costs to a figure of 35,000 plus VAT, to take account of proportionality. M appealed against the second stage reduction. The Judge held that the Master had misinterpreted and misapplied the new proportionality test in CPR 44.3(5). The rules do not specifically state that the assessment has to be undertaken in two stages, but they do require the Costs Judge to apply two tests, namely reasonableness and proportionality, and it is open to the Costs Judge to have an eye to both as he or she undertakes an item by item assessment, having in mind a figure or range of figures which would be proportionate, but it is equally open to the Judge to apply the tests sequentially. In practice, a Costs Judge would probably have both tests in mind when undertaking the item by item assessment, but would undertake a form of cross-checking when the total is ascertained to see whether it falls within the range of proportionate totals, and then undertake an adjustment if it does not. The rules required focus on the specific factors in CPR 44.3(5) and a determination as to whether there was a reasonable relationship between them. It was unlikely that the Rules Committee had intended that a Costs Judge could, or should, bypass an item by item assessment and simply impose what they believed to be a proportionate global figure. The tests of reasonableness and proportionality were intended to work together to achieve fairness whilst having regard to the policy objectives. Applying that test to the facts of this case, the Master had considerably undervalued the sums in issue, gave little weight to the complexity of the litigation and reduced the costs disproportionately because of early settlement. When the reasonable costs were compared against a claim with a value of between 50,000 to 100,000 (as opposed to the settlement figure of 25,000 taken into account by the Master), in a reasonably complex claim, requiring specialist expert evidence, in what was likely to be hard fought litigation, they appeared less disproportionate. The Judge allowed costs of 75,000 plus VAT. 9

10 DOLMANS RECENT CASE UPDATE Fundamental Dishonesty London Organising Committee of the Olympic & Paralympic Games v Sinfield [2018] EWHC 51 (QB) The Claimant, S, sustained an injury to his left arm whilst volunteering at the 2012 London Olympic and Paralympic Games. In his claim for damages for personal injury against the London Organising Committee of the Olympic & Paralympic Games (LOCOG), S made a claim for gardening expenses asserting that the accident had caused him to employ a gardener to look after his two acre garden, a task which he and his wife had previously carried out. The total claimed, including for future gardening expenses, was just short of 14,000, and represented 41.9% of the total Special Damages claim. Liability was admitted and general damages were agreed in the sum of 16,000. Accordingly, the gardening expenses claim was approximately 28% of the total claim for damages. During the claim, S disclosed invoices purportedly from the gardeners employed and served a Witness Statement setting out the claim. LOCOG obtained a Witness Statement from one of the gardeners who stated that he had not provided the invoices purported to be from him, that he had worked for S before the accident and that his work did not change or increase after the accident. LOCOG served an Amended Defence alleging fundamental dishonesty and relied upon s.57 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act S served a Supplemental Witness Statement admitting that he had prepared the invoices. S stated that the gardener had never provided invoices, so when his solicitor had asked him to provide proof of the sums claimed, S self-billed, which is what he would do in his own business when required to pay someone who had not provided an invoice. S further admitted that the gardener had been employed before the accident and did not do any additional hours post-accident. S sought to explain this on the basis that the claim had been badly worded in his previous Witness Statement and what he was seeking to claim was the cost of the gardening that he had done himself previously, but was now no longer able to do. S also served a further Schedule of Loss indicating that he had sold his property and downsized. The gardening claim in the further Schedule was in the sum of 1,657.96, inclusive of interest. The Trial Judge found that in the Preliminary Schedule of Loss, S was muddled, confused and careless about the gardening expenses claim, but there was insufficient evidence from which he could infer that S was dishonest about it. However, the creation of the false invoices and the misstatement in his Witness Statement were dishonest and S must have known this. The dishonesty was fundamental to the gardening claim, but did not contaminate the entire claim. The Trial Judge held that S was not fundamentally dishonest. If he were wrong about that, it would be substantially unjust for the entire claim to be dismissed when the dishonesty related to a peripheral part of the claim and the remainder of the claim was honest and genuine. S was awarded damages in the sum of 27, LOCOG appealed. 10

11 DOLMANS RECENT CASE UPDATE The Judge held that a Claimant should be found to be fundamentally dishonest within the meaning of s.57(1)(b) if the Defendant proved, on a balance of probabilities, that the Claimant had acted dishonestly in relation to the primary claim and/or a related claim (as defined in s.57 (8)), and that he had substantially affected the presentation of his case, in respect of either liability or quantum, in a way which potentially adversely affected the Defendant in a significant way, judged in the context of the particular facts and circumstances of the litigation. Dishonesty was to be judged according to the test set out by the Supreme Court in Ivey v Genting Casinos UK Ltd (t/a Crockfords Club) [2017] UKSC 67. If the Judge was so satisfied, he had to dismiss the claim, including any element of the primary claim in respect of which the Claimant had not been dishonest, unless, in accordance with s.57(2), he was satisfied that the Claimant would suffer substantial injustice. "Substantial injustice" had to mean more than the mere fact that the Claimant would lose his damages for those heads of claim that were not tainted with dishonesty. What would generally be required was some substantial injustice arising as a consequence of the loss of those damages. Applying that approach to this case, it was held that the Trial Judge had been wrong to find that S had been merely muddled and careless in relation to the Preliminary Schedule of Damages. The Schedule contained dishonest misstatements. However, even on the Trial Judge's findings, he should have concluded that S had been fundamentally dishonest. S presented a claim for Special Damages in a significant sum and the Trial Judge found that the largest head of damage was evidenced by the dishonest creation of false invoices and by a dishonest Witness Statement. Both pieces of dishonesty were premeditated and maintained over many months until the true picture was uncovered. S presented his case on quantum in a dishonest way which could have resulted in LOCOG paying out far more than it could properly, on honest evidence, have been ordered to do after a Trial. Further, the Trial Judge was wrong to make a finding of substantial injustice on the basis that he did. He made no findings capable of supporting a conclusion that if the whole claim was dismissed it would result in substantial injustice to S and the Trial Judge was wrong to characterise the gardening claim as peripheral when, as originally presented, it was a very substantial part of the claim. Accordingly, the Judge allowed the appeal and dismissed S s claim for damages under s. 57(2) of the 2015 Act. 11

12 DOLMANS RECENT CASE UPDATE Occupiers Liability - Car Parks - Ice Ivor Cook v Swansea City Council [2017] EWCA Civ 2142 The Claimant had slipped and fallen on ice in an unmanned car park that was owned and operated by the Defendant Local Authority. The Local Authority did not grit unmanned car parks in bad weather. They operated a reactive system upon receipt of a report from a member of the public about a dangerous area. At first instance, the Local Authority s system was found to be appropriate. The Claimant appealed, submitting that the Judge failed to make a clear and explicit finding on breach of duty under Section 2(2) of the Occupiers Liability Act It was held that it was reasonably plain from the Judgment that the Judge had found that the Local Authority had not breached its duty under Section 2(2), expressly finding that the Local Authority had discharged its duty of care by having a reactive system in place. Whilst the Judge had acknowledged that the system could have included giving instructions to their employees - wardens and cashiers - who visited the car park, he did not state that it should have been done or that failing to do so involved a breach of duty. There would have been no difficulty in implementing a system requiring wardens and cashiers to report icy conditions, but that was not a final or definitive conclusion on the issue. The Judge was not wrong to find that there was no breach of duty. There was force in the Local Authority s arguments at Trial as to why it would be unreasonable, in all the circumstances, to impose a duty of care that would effectively require it to grit its unmanned car parks whenever icy conditions were reported. A balancing exercise was required. In carrying out the balancing exercise it was held: The risk of ice in cold weather was an obvious danger and people could be reasonably expected to watch out for it and take care. The car park did not pose a particular risk compared to any of the other Local Authority car parks. Any injury due to slipping could be trivial or serious. The Local Authority s car parks provided 24 hour parking. If unmanned car parks had to be gritted whenever icy conditions were reported, the Local Authority was likely to have to prohibit the use of all unmanned car parks in periods of adverse weather, to the inconvenience of local residents and visitors. The alternative would be to man the car parks or arrange regular gritting, which would involve significant use of staff and material resources. That would be a disproportionate and costly reaction to the risk and would divert resources from situations where attention was more urgently required. 12

13 DOLMANS RECENT CASE UPDATE The conclusion on the balancing exercise reached by the Court of Appeal was that the assessment provided compelling reasons for upholding the Judge s decision that there was no breach of duty. Appeal dismissed. Provisional Assessment - Part 36 - Costs Cap W Portsmouth & Co Ltd v Lowin [2017] EWCA Civ 2172 Following settlement of her claim, the Claimant, L, had made a Part 36 offer in respect of her costs of the action. The offer was not accepted. On provisional assessment, L was awarded costs in excess of her offer and the Master ordered the Defendant, P, to pay L s costs of the assessment on the indemnity basis pursuant to CPR (4). However, the Master stated that the cap in CPR (5) (which states that the Court will not award costs of more than 1,500, plus VAT, plus court fees if the matter concludes at provisional assessment) still applied. L successfully appealed and it was held that L was entitled to uncapped indemnity costs. P appealed to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal allowed P s appeal holding that the costs cap in CPR 47.15(5) is neither disapplied nor modified in respect of an award of indemnity costs under CPR 36.17(4). Setting Aside Judgments - Fraud (1) Shahan Salekipour (2) Amir Saleem v Jashan Kaur Parmar (in her own right and as executrix of Mohinder Singh Parmar, deceased) sub nom Re Parmar (deceased) [2017] EWCA Civ 2141 The Claimants had brought County Court proceedings against the Defendant, their former landlord, to recover sums allegedly owing to them. Their claim, which largely turned on credibility, was dismissed as the Judge preferred the Defendant s evidence. The Claimants then brought a fresh action asking the County Court to rescind its Judgment and order a new Trial on the basis of a Witness Statement which showed that one of the Defendant s witnesses had been pressured to give perjured evidence. The claim was struck out as an abuse of process. The Claimants Application to set aside the striking out was dismissed on the basis that the County Court had no jurisdiction to rescind one of its previous Judgments. That dismissal was upheld by the High Court. The Claimants appealed. 13

14 DOLMANS RECENT CASE UPDATE The Court of Appeal held that the County Court did have jurisdiction to set aside one of its previous Final Judgments obtained by fraud under Section 23 of the County Courts Act A party s right to have a Judgment set aside on the ground of fraud was a principle of equity and proceedings for such relief were proceedings for relief against fraud within the meaning of the equity jurisdiction in Section 23(g). There was no reason to limit S.23(g) to exclude such a claim. The finality provided in Section 70 stipulated that County Court Judgments and Orders were final as between the parties, except as otherwise provided by statute. Section 38 was such a provision. It entitled the County Court to make any Order that could have been made by the High Court, and the High Court had an inherent power to set aside an earlier Order and direct a new Trial where appropriate. It was irrelevant that Section 23 had not previously been invoked in the instant context. The parties disagreed as to the correct test to be applied to the fresh evidence. The Court of Appeal was of the view that the correct test was that stated in Hamilton v Al-Fayad (No 4) [2001] E.M.L.R. and the question was whether there was a real danger that the deception had affected the outcome of the Trial. However, the Court found that the Claimants evidence also satisfied the test in Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Highland Financial Partners LP [2013] EWCA Civ 328, [2013] 1 C.L.C. 596, in that their new evidence would have entirely changed the way the Trial Judge reached her decision. It was highly likely that had the Judge known of the Claimants evidence, the alleged subornation and perjury would have had a material impact on her assessment of the credibility of the Defendant s evidence. It was noted that the consequence of perjury and fraud in any particular case would depend on the circumstances but, in the instant case, the striking out of the Claimants claim should not be upheld. Appeal allowed. For further information on any of the above cases, please contact: Amanda Evans at amandae@dolmans.co.uk or Judith Blades at judithb@dolmans.co.uk 14

15 DOLMANS TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES training seminar At Dolmans, we want to ensure that you are kept informed and up-to-date about any changes and developments in the law. To assist you in this, we can offer a whole range of training seminars which are aimed at Local Authorities, their Brokers, Claims Handlers and Insurers. All seminars will be tailored to make sure that they cover the points relevant to your needs. Seminars we can offer include: Apportionment in HAVS cases Bullying, harassment, intimidation and victimisation in the workplace personal injury claims Conditional Fee Agreements and costs issues Corporate manslaughter Data Protection Defending claims the approach to risk management Display Screen Regulations duties on employers Employers liability update Employers liability claims investigation for managers and supervisors Flooding and drainage duties and powers of landowners and Local Authorities for drainage under the Land Drainage Act Common law rights and duties of landowners in respect of drainage Flooding and drainage duties and powers of Highway Authorities for drainage and flooding under the Highways Act Consideration of case law relating to the civil liabilities of the Highway Authority in respect of highway waters Highways training Housing disrepair claims Industrial disease for Defendants The Jackson Reforms (to include : costs budgeting; disclosure of funding arrangements; disclosure of medical records; non party costs orders; part 36/Calderbank offers; qualified one way costs shifting (QWOCS); strikeout/fundamental dishonesty/fraud; 10% increase in General Damages) Liability of Local Education Authority for accidents involving children Ministry of Justice reforms Pre-action protocol in relation to occupational disease claims overview and tactics Public liability claims update If you would like any further information in relation to any of our training seminars, or wish to have an informal chat regarding any of the above, please contact our Training Partner, Melanie Standley at melanies@dolmans.co.uk 15