Sign of the Times: Local Sign Ordinances Following Reed v. Town ofgilbert

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1 Sign of the Times: Local Sign Ordinances Following Reed v. Town ofgilbert Presented By: G. Gregory Kamptner, Deputy County Attorney County of Albemarle Adam D. Melita, Deputy City Attorney City of Norfolk Tara A. McGee, Senior Assistant County Attorney County of Chesterfield Moderator: Martin R. Crim, Vanderpool, Frostick & Nishanian PC City Attorney for the City of Manassas & Town Attorney for the Towns of Culpeper, Haymarket, & Occoquan Friday, October 16, :45 a.m. - 12:15 p.m. LGA's 40 th Anniversary Conference Fall 2015 at Hotel Roanoke, Virginia

2 Table of Contents Introduction...1 Enforcement of Current Sign Ordinance...2 Prepared by Anthony Williams and Tara McGee Signs and the First Amendment: Relevant Jurisprudence...6 Prepared by Adam Melita, Alan Smith, and Greg Kamptner Model Sign Ordinance...43 Prepared by Martin Crim Interim Sign Ordinance (Town of Occoquan) Submitted by Martin Crim Adopted Sign Ordinance for County of Chesterfield...73 Submitted by Tara McGee Proposed Sign Ordinance for City of Norfolk...93 Submitted by Adam Melita

3 Introduction On June 28, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court dealt a crushing blow to most localities' sign ordinances when it issued its opinion in Reed v. Town ofgilbert, Arizona. In Reed, the Supreme Court, for the first time, opined that regulating signs by putting them in descriptive categories such as "Ideological Signs," "Political Signs," and ''Temporary Directional Signs" was impermissible content-based regulation that violated the First Amendment. The Reed decision had an impact on the vast majority of sign ordinances across the country and certainly across our fine Commonwealth. Accordingly, the LGA acted quickly to form an ad hoc committee to study the Reed decision and distribute information and analysis to LGA members. The following are the LGA members who have graciously given of their time and expertise to serve on the Ad Hoc Sign Ordinance Committee: Martin R. Crim, City Attorney, City of Manassas G. Gregory Kamptner, Deputy County Attorney, County of Albemarle William M. Mac ali, Deputy City Attorney, City of Virginia Beach Tara A. McGee, Senior Assistant County Attorney, County of Chesterfield Adam D. Melita, Deputy City Attorney, City of Norfolk Allan F. Smith, Assistant County Attorney, County of Prince William Anthony C. Williams, City Attorney, City of Winchester The panelists express their appreciation to all of the committee members, who provided input and assistance in the creation of many of the materials included in this handout. We hope that these materials will be helpful to you in analyzing and re-writing your locality's sign ordinance in the wake of Reed. 1 of 125

4 To: LGA Members From: Sign Ordinance Ad Hoc Committee Subj.: U.S. Supreme Court Decision - Reed v. Town of Gilbert Date: July 29,2015 MEMORANDUM On June 18,2015, the United States Supreme Court decided the case of Reed v. Town of Gilbert Arizona, et. ai., wherein the Court examined whether or not a locality's sign ordinance that assigns different size and posting requirements based on the type of noncommercial speech displayed violates the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. This memorandum is intended to assist Virginia local government attorneys in the enforcement of your locality's sign ordinance in light of the decision in this case. The traditional model sign ordinance, which is most often used to classify temporary signs, identifies different types of signs with monikers like "real estate sign," "political sign," "ideological sign," "directional sign," "construction site sign," and "garage sale sign." The model then sets out standards, which control quantity, placement, size, timing of display, and potentially other characteristics of each category of sign. In other words, the quantity, placement, size, timing of display, and other features of a sign are limited not on the basis of the structure of the sign itself, but instead entirely on the basis of the message the sign displays. In the Reed decision, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that where a local ordinance defines the categories of temporary, political, and ideological signs solely on the basis of their messages and then subjects each category to different restrictions, the ordinance is I1content based 11 requiring strict scrutiny review. In other words the ordinance must further a I1compelling governmental interest l1, be I1narrowly tailored 11 to achieve that interest and must leave open "ample alternative channels of communication." The Town of Gilbert's ordinance failed to survive strict scrutiny review; however, the Court stated that its decision will not prevent governments from enacting ordinances that are content neutral to I1resolve problems with safety and aesthetics, including regulating size, building materials, lighting, moving parts, and portability.11 The decision further states that localities I1may be able to forbid postings on public property, so long as it does so in an evenhanded, content neutral manner. 11 The Court also suggested that an ordinance that is I1narrowly tailored to the challenges of protecting the safety of pedestrians, drivers and passengers 11 (such as warning signs marking hazards on private property or signs directing traffic) might survive strict scrutiny Rev. 7/27/15 2 of 125

5 In the wake of the Reed decision, it is important to note that: Content-based sign laws - those that differentiate speech based on its communicative content - are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests and leave open ample alternative channels of communication. Government regulation of speech is content-based if a law applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed. Previously, the Fourth Circuit has used the following test for determining if a regulation is not content-based: "1) the regulation is not a regulation of speech, but rather a regulation of places where speech may occur; 2) the regulation was not adopted because of disagreement with the message the speech conveys; or 3) the government's interests in the regulation are unrelated to the content of the affected speech." Brown v. Town of Cary, 706 F. 3d 294 (4 th Cir. 2013). The Fourth Circuit's test has been overruled by the Reed decision. An ordinance regulating temporary directional signs will be considered to be content-based to the extent that it differentiates what regulations apply based solely on the message that it conveys (i.e. conveying the message of directing the public to a church or some other "qualifying event"). The locality will bear the burden of demonstrating that the Code's differentiation of signs based on content (i.e. between temporary directional signs and other types of signs, such as political signs and ideological signs) furthers a compelling governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to that end. In the coming months, the Local Government Attorneys of Virginia hope to provide a Model Ordinance to address the issues raised by the Reed decision. Until that time, localities are encouraged to adhere to these guidelines for enforcing their current ordinance in light of the Court1s ruling. In the context of the recommendations below, keep in mind that if your ordinance differentiates its sign restrictions in a manner that is not content-neutral, you can still enforce those restrictions if you can justify the differentiation under a strict scrutiny analysis; however, since that standard is a difficult one to reach, the advice below presumes that the portions of your ordinance that are not content-neutral will not be justifiable under a strict scrutiny standard. 1. Severability. Does your ordinance have a severability provision? If so, then you should consider reviewing your ordinance to enforce the provisions that are still enforceable, since the enforceable portions can be severed from the unenforceable portion. For example, limitations on banner size, materials, methods to affix and display period can be enforced, but you can no longer enforce a regulation that banners only be used to convey certain messages (such as "Now Hiring", "Community Event", "Grand Opening", etc.) or regulations that differentiate amongst banners based on the messages they convey Rev. 7/27/15 3 of 125

6 2. Permissible Regulation. A concurring opinion in the Reed decision suggests that regulations can differentiate based on these categories: content-neutral size regulations. building-mounted versus free-standing, sign location and setbacks, illumination, fixed versus electronic messages, private versus public property, commercial versus residential property, on-premises versus off-premises, temporary versus permanent, and number of signs per street frontage/mile of roadway. To the extent your ordinance regulates these categories in a content-neutral manner, these portions of your sign ordinance can still be enforced. 3. Commercial vs. Noncommercial Speech. There is nothing in the Reed decision which overtly overrules the Court's long-standing jurisprudence that regulations can distinguish between commercial and noncommercial speech. Then again, the Reed decision involved sign regulation that made distinctions amongst types of noncommercial speech, so the Court had no reason to discuss the difference between commercial and noncommercial speech. Accordingly, while the distinction between the regulation of commercial and noncommercial speech still exist after Reed, the language and analysis of the unanimous Reed decision raises a doubt about the continuation of that distinction in the future. 4. Risk Assessment. In reviewing your ordinance for provisions that can still be enforced, your first review should be from a "grammar" perspective: what regulations are content-neutral and still enforceable? However, once you review the words of your. ordinance, you need to also do a risk assessment. First Amendment rights receive strong protections from the courts and, once violated, they are impossible to remedy. If you think enforcement of part of your ordinance is a "gray area", then don't enforce it at this time. One example of a risk assessment is discussed in the following paragraph, about temporary signs. 5. Temporary Signs. The Supreme Court has long held that citizens' First Amendment rights require that they have the opportunity to express their noncommercial ideas or opinions through temporary signs. Of course, like in the Town of Gilbert, the temporary sign regulations are often content-based. When considering how much of your current ordinance to enforce, it is recommended that you allow as much as possible - or all temporary signs up to the maximum number, size and location limits afforded under your current ordinance. Moreover, allowing more temporary signs is a decision with relatively low long-term risk, since these types of signs typically are not sufficiently permanent to become nonconforming uses that would be allowed to remain or continue after the adoption of a new ordinance. 6. Nonconforming use. Perhaps one of the biggest concerns about signs that are erected in this interim period between the issuance of Reed and your new sign ordinance is the possibility of a sign epidemic and thereafter all of those overly-large or unappealing signs being claimed as nonconforming uses. To become a nonconforming use, the use has to have been legal when erected. If your larger or more permanent signs have to go through a sign permit process, see the paragraph below Rev. 7/27/15 4 of 125

7 7. Sign permits. If permanent signs in your locality have to go through a sign permit process, then the issuance of a sign permit will be a governmental act that may allow that sign to become legally nonconforming even after your new ordinance is adopted. So be careful about what permits you issue in the interim. Ifyour sign permit process does not have a stated deadline for decision, consider using more review time than you have typically in the past to try to negotiate with the applicant, especially if you are trying to act quickly to adopt a new sign ordinance. Keep in mind, though, that even without a time frame identified in your ordinance, the time you take to analyze a sign permit application has to be reasonable, or else it could be considered an illegal prior restraint of speech. 8. Interim ordinance. There are typically a large number of stakeholders interested in a new sign ordinance commercial businesses, developers, homeowners' associations and residents. It will take forever to get input and feedback from all of these groups on a new sign ordinance. Consider drafting an interim sign ordinance in which you revise existing regulations using only the content-neutral categories that were championed by the concurring opinion in Reed and get it adopted without (or with little) stakeholder input. Then, with a content-neutral ordinance in place and enforceable, you can take more time to revise and improve your sign ordinance and obtain feedback from the stakeholder groups. See the permissible regulation section, above, for the broad categories of regulation you could impose in a content-neutral manner in an interim ordinance. 9. Signs in Rights of Way. To the extent your locality works with VDOT, temporary signs placed in the roadway median or in the grassy right of way adjacent to VOOT roads are still illegal because the state law prohibiting such signs <Virginia Code ) is content neutral. If your locality controls your own rights of way, check to see if your prohibition on signs in rights of way is content-neutral and, therefore, enforceable. 10. Regulation of signs through Zoning Conditions. Though the conditions of a zoning case or special use permit approved by your locality become amendments to your zoning ordinance, they can also be analyzed as a request by an applicant for approval of the signs that it seeks to use in its development. Analyzed in this manner, the conditions in a zoning case or special use permit should be able to be more specific than the general sign ordinance provisions. However, be mindful of your risks in analyzing zoning conditions regulating signs; Virginia Code provides that any unconstitutional zoning condition can be declared void and further provides for the recovery of compensatory damages, costs and attorney fees Rev. 7/27/15 5 of 125

8 Signs and the First Amendment: Relevant Jurisprudence and the Importance of Reed v. Town of Gilbert BY: Greg Kamptner, Albemarle County Adam D. Melita, City of Norfolk Alan F. Smith, Prince William County LGA of Virginia - Sign Ordinance Committee August 2015 This outline is intended to provide a summary of the legal issues that the local government attorney should consider when evaluating how local sign regulations will be analyzed for compliance with the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. The primary reason for this outline is to aid localities in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 135 S.Ct (2015), which significantly affects most localities' sign ordinances. The information is presented in 4 parts. The first part of this outline, which begins on page 3, summarizes the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Reed, its immediate impact on local sign regulations and on Fourth Circuit jurisprudence on this issue. The second part of this outline, which begins on page 10, summarizes key U.S. Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit opinions addressing First Amendment challenges to various localities' sign regulations. These opinions are organized chronologically. They reveal the courts' ongoing efforts to balance the government's interest in mitigating the harms caused by uncontrolled signs against a citizen's or business's right to free speech. In general, the courts have held that sign regulations may be unconstitutional if they are too comprehensive in their coverage ("overbroad") or too selective ("underinclusive"). This historical jurisprudence also reveals a trend of increasing protection for commercial speech, from a time when it was thought that the First Amendment did not protect it at all, until the present, where it appears to enjoy nearly as much protection as noncommercial speech. These opinions are also intended to provide context for and demonstrate the significance of the U.S Supreme Court's decision in Reed v. Town of Gilbert. The third part of this outline, which begins on page 24, discusses in depth the Supreme Court's decision in Reed v. Town of Gilbert. Principally, it addresses how the court's opinion defines the "content-neutral" vs. "content-based" test. The language employed by the court is subject to being read in different ways. The broadest reading, which may not be the most favored one, would purport to make the majority of sign regulations presumptively unconstitutional. This discussion is intended to provide sufficient context to Reed to enable a local government attorney to begin to determine whether changes the local sign regulations/ordinance are necessary or appropriate. 6 of 125

9 The fourth part of this outline, which begins on page 31, presents a short (nonexhaustive) discussion of other First Amendment mandates that affect the constitutionality or content-neutrality of a sign code.. Because Reed is essentially a case about how to test for content-neutrality, it does not directly discuss some of the other lines of attack that are often used against sign codes, such as underinclusivity and overbreadth. The information in this last part is intended to help a local government attorney spot weaknesses in the overall structure of sign regulations so that they can be amended to better withstand potential First Amendment challenges. 7 of 125

10 I: PARJ'1. A SUM,MARY OF REED AND THE CUR~ENT STATE QF THE LAW '1 I. Introduction Signs take up space, obstruct views, distract motorists, displace alternative uses for land, and pose other problems that legitimately call for regulation. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2232 (2015), quoting City of Ladue v. Gil/eo, 512 U.S. 43,114 S. Ct (1994). II. It is within the constitutional power of a locality to improve its appearance. Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 104 S. Ct (1984); Brown v. Town of Cary, 706 F.3d 294, 305 (4 th Cir. 2013) ("It is beyond dispute that the Town's stated interests in promoting aesthetics and traffic safety are substantial"); Arlington County Republican Committee v. Arlington County, 983 F.2d 587 (4 th Cir. 1993). Localities "have a weighty, essentially esthetic interest in proscribing intrusive and unpleasant formats for expression." Taxpayers for Vincent, supra. As explained by Edward T. McMahon, "More enlightened communities recognize that community appearance is important.... [C]ontrolling outdoor signs is probably the most important step a community can take to make an immediate visible improvement in its physical environment.... Almost all of America's premier tourist destinations have strong sign ordinances because they understand that attractive communities attract more business than ugly ones." Edward T. McMahon, Responsible Tourism: How to Preserve the Goose that Lays the Golden Egg, Virginia Town & City, May Likewise, improving traffic safety is a substantial governmental goa\. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 491, 101 S. Ct. 2882, 2884 (1981); Brown, 706 F.3d at 305. In Reed, the United States Supreme Court concluded that content-based regulations are unconstitutional unless they are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest Under the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause, a 10caUty "has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95, 92 S. Ct (1972). "Content-based laws-those that target speech based on its communicative content-are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests." Reed, 135 S. Ct. at In Reed, the United States Supreme Court explains when a regulation is content-based: "Government regulation of speech is content based if a law applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed. [citations omitted] This commonsense meaning of the phrase 'content based' requires a court to consider whether a regulation of speech "on its face" draws distinctions based on the message a 8 of 125

11 speaker conveys. [citation omitted]. Some facial distinctions based on a message are obvious, defining regulated speech by particular subject matter, and others are more subtle, defining regulated speech by its function or purpose. Both are distinctions drawn based on the message a speaker conveys, and, therefore, are subject to strict scrutiny." Reed, 135 S. Ct. at The Court identifies another category of content-based regulations: "laws that cannot be justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, or that were adopted by the government because of disagreement with the message [the speech] conveys [citation and internal quotation marks omitted1." Reed, 135 S. Ct. at In Reed, the town's sign ordinance required a sign permit for most signs, but contained 23 categories of "exempt" signs, including ideological signs, political signs, and temporary directional signs. Temporary directional signs (4 square feet, placed not more than 12 hours before event, removed within 1 hour after event) were subject to more restrictive size and durational standards than those for ideological signs (20 square feet, no durationallimit) and political signs (16 square feet [residential districts1, 32 square feet [commercial districts], placed not more than 60 days before election, removed within 15 days after election). A church posted temporary directional signs announcing its Sunday services on Saturday mornings, earlier than allowed under the town's sign regulations (not more than 12 hours prior to the "qualifying event"). The church was cited for violating the sign regulations. The church and its pastor, Reed, (collectively, the "church") filed a complaint in federal court, arguing that the town's sign regulations violated the First Amendment. Both the trial court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held in favor of the town and upheld the town's sign regulations. The church appealed the Ninth Circuit's decision to the United States Supreme Court. The issue in Reedwas whether the town's sign ordinance was content-based because it created sign categories based entirely on the sign's message. The United States Supreme Court held that the town's sign regulations were content-based on their face because temporary directional signs were defined on the basis of whether a sign conveys the message of directing the public to church or some other "qualifying event"; political signs were defined on the basis of whether the signs message is "designed to influence the outcome of an election"; ideological signs were defined on the basis of whether a sign "communicat[es] a message or ideas" that do not fit within the sign regulations' other categories. The Court in Reed rejected the following three arguments that the town's sign regulations were not content-:based: o The town's justifications for regulating the signs were unrelated to the signs' content The Court rejected the argument that the sign regulations should be found to be content-neutral because the town's justifications for regulating temporary directional signs were unrelated to the content of the 9 of 125

12 o o sign. The Court said that the "government's benign motive, content neutral justification, or lack of 'animus toward the ideas contained' in the regulated speech" was not relevant when the regulations are content-based on their face. The town's sign regulations neither endorsed nor suppressed ideas: The Court then dismissed the town's argument that its sign regulations for temporary directional signs raised no concerns that the government was endorsing or suppressing ideas or viewpoints, and the regulations for political and ideological signs were neutral as to particular ideas or viewpoints. The Court explained that "'the First Amendment's hostility to content based regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic.' [citation omitted] Thus, a speech regulation targeted at specific subject matter is content based even if it does not discriminate among viewpoints within that subject matter. [citation omitted]." Under the town's sign regulations, ideological signs were given more favorable treatment than political signs, and both were give more favorable treatment than temporary directional signs. The Court said that this was "a paradigmatic example of content-based discrimination." The town's sign regulations turned on who was speaking through the sign: The Court found that the town's argument that the sign regulations were content-neutral because they turned on "the content neutral elements of who is speaking through the sign and whether and when an event is occurring" was mistaken on both factual and legal grounds. The Court said that speech regulations based on the identity of the speaker "are all too often simply a means to control content. [citation omitted]" and that laws "favoring some speakers over others demand strict scrutiny. [citation omitted]." Lastly, the Court observed that "a regulation that targets a sign because it conveys an idea about a specific event is no less content based than a regulation that targets a sign because it conveys some other idea." Reed, 135 S. Ct. at Content-based regulations must satisfy strict scrutiny by the courts, and will be upheld only if the regulations are narrowly tailored to serve compelling governmental interests. In Reed, the town relied on aesthetics and traffic safety as justifications for its regulations. As for aesthetics, the Court said that temporary directional signs were "no greater an eyesore" than ideological and political signs, yet the town allowed unlimited proliferation of larger ideological signs while strictly limiting the number, size, and duration of smaller, temporary directional signs. The Court said, "The Town cannot claim that placing strict limits on temporary directional signs is necessary to beautify the Town while at the same time allowing unlimited numbers of other types of signs that create the same problem." Reed, 135 S. Ct. at As for traffic safety, the Court concluded that the town had failed to show that limiting temporary directional signs was necessary to eliminate threats to traffic safety, but limiting other types of signs was not. The Court 10 of 125

13 observed that a "sharply worded" directional sign seemed more likely to distract a driver than a sign directing traffic to a church meeting. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at The court's opinion in Reed indicates that it may find that certain contentbased sign distinctions do satisfy strict scrutiny: "[The] presence of certain signs may be essential, both for vehicles and pedestrians, to guide traffic or to identify hazards and ensure safety. A sign ordinance narrowly tailored to the challenges of protecting the safety of pedestrians, drivers, and passengers-such as warning signs marking hazards on private property, signs directing traffic, or street numbers associated with private houses-well might survive strict scrutiny." Reed, 135 S. Ct. at The classes of signs referred to by the Court in the foregoing paragraph are presumably private signs because the messages on public signs erected by the government are "government speech" that escape First Amendment strictures. Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, (2015) ("When government speaks, it is not barred by the Free Speech Clause from determining the content of what it says"); see Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, , 111 S. Ct (1991), cited in Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2235 (Breyer concu rring). III. Reed abrogates the content neutrality analysis of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and other Circuits in which sign regulations making message-based distinctions were found to be constitutional on their face if the distinctions were viewpoint neutral Before the Supreme Court's decision in Reed, many localities' sign regulations included distinctions based on the function or the message of the sign (e.g., "political signs" that pertain to a candidate or an issue in an upcoming election; "real estate signs" that advertise the sale of a land or buildings). Sign regulations such as these, which neither promoted nor discouraged a particular viewpoint, were considered to be viewpoint neutral and were found by many courts to not be content-based regulations that violated the First Amendment. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals followed this approach. See, e.g., Central Radio Company, Inc. v. City of Norfolk, 776 F.3d 229 (4th Cir. 2015) (vacated and remanded to the Fourth Circuit for reconsideration in light of Reed); Brown v. Town of Cary, 706 F.3d 294 (4th Cir. 2013); Wag More Dogs v. Cozart, 680 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2012). The Reed court explained that the crucial first step in the content neutrality analysis is to "determin[e] whether the law is content neutral on its face." Reed, 135. S. Ct. at In the second step, a facially content neutral law will still be categorized as content-based if it "cannot be justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, or [it was] adopted by the government because of disagreement with the message [the speech] conveys [citation and internal quotation marks omitted]." Reed, 135 S. Ct. at As explained by the Fourth 11 of 125

14 Circuit Court of Appeals in Cahaly v. Larosa, 2015 WL at *4 (August 6, 2015) (invalidating a South Carolina ban on certain robocalls): "This formulation conflicts with, and therefore abrogates, our previous descriptions of content neutrality in cases such as Brown v. Town of Cary. See 706 F.3d at 303 ('[I]f a regulation is 'justified without reference to the content of regulated speech,' [citation omitted] 'we have not hesitated to deem [that] regulation content neutral even if it facially differentiates between types of speech.") (quoting Wag More Dogs, Ltd. Liab. Corp. v. Cozart, 680 F.3d 359, 366 (4th Cir.2012) (last alteration in original». Our earlier cases held that, when conducting the contentneutrality inquiry, '[t]he government's purpose is the controlling consideration.' Clatterbuck v. City of Charlottesville, 708 F.3d 549, 555 (4th Cir.2013) (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 791). But Reed has made clear that, at the first step, the government's justification or purpose in enacting the law is irrelevant. 135 S. Ct. at " In sum, Reed rejects the defense of viewpoint neutrality in a facial analysis that had been applied by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and other courts. The Reed Court explained that IV. '''[T]he First Amendment's hostility to content based regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic.' [citation omitted] Thus, a speech regulation targeted at specific subject matter is content based even if it does not discriminate among viewpoints within that subject matter. [citation omitted]." Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2230 (under the town of Gilbert's sign regulations, ideological signs were given more favorable treatment than political signs, and both were given more favorable treatment than temporary directional signs). Content neutral time, place, and manner regulations are permitted under Reed and prior cases, provided they further a substantial governmental interest, are narrowly tailored, and leave open alternative forms of communication If a regulation is determined to be content neutral, reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions may be imposed on commercial or noncommercial signs. The following is a brief, not exhaustive, list of sign qualities that may be regulated in a content neutral manner: o The maximum square footage of a sign's "face" and the aggregate square footage of all signs allowed on a parcel. o The number of signs allowed on a parcel. o The height of a sign. o Where a sign may be located on a parcel, such as through setback regulations applicable only to signs. 12 of 125

15 o The physical nature of the sign, such as whether it may be a freestanding sign, a wall sign, or a sign affixed to another element of a building such as a canopy or awning. o o The materials that may be used in a sign. Whether a sign may have moving elements. o Whether and how a sign may be illuminated. o Whether the message on a sign must be fixed or whether it may have an electronic message that changes. o If an electronic message may change, how frequently it may do so. o Whether a sign must be permanently attached to the ground (e.g., a freestanding sign) or whether it may be portable and under what circumstances. o Whether a sign may be permanent or temporary (duration) and under what circumstances. Whether regulations pertaining to the foregoing sign qualities survive a First Amendment challenge depends on whether they pass all of the following additional tests: o Further a substantial governmental interest A locality has a substantial governmental interest in preserving its aesthetic character and promoting traffic safety. Brown, 706 F.3d at 305; American Legion Post 7 v. City of Durham, 239 F.3d 601 (4th Cir. 2001) 'ob>---folare narrowly tailored to furtl:'ler that interest A regulation is narro)nly ta#lilo.n-r~ed<l---- if the governmental interest promoted would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 109 S. Ct (1989), cited in American Legion Post 7 (preserving aesthetic character would be undermined by exempting flags or noncommercial entities from regulations). See, Part 4, Section II of this outline (discussing underinclusivity). o Leave open ample alternative channels of communication: Whether a regulation leaves open ample alternative channels of communication depends on the scope of the regulation and the nature and location of the sign. See American Legion Post 7 (comparing the permissible regulation of signs on public property. on private property. and residential private property). V. Two open questions after Reed: distinctions between commercial v. noncommercial signs and on site v. off-site signs Commercial speech is "expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience." Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 561, 100 S. Ct. 2343, of 125

16 (1980). It does no more "than propose a commercial transaction." Virginia State Board ofpharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 96 S. Ct (1976). Noncommercial speech is speech that is not commercial speech. Historically, the content-based regulation of commercial speech has been subject to a lower standard than that accorded noncommercial speech. For commercial speech, the locality must show that it has a substantial interest in the regulation, the regulation directly advance that interest, and the regulation may not be more extensive than necessary to serve that interest. Central Hudson. Under the test established in Central Hudson, the regulation of a commercial sign is evaluated under the following factors: (1) whether the commercial speech was entitled to First Amendment protection; (2) whether the state has a substantial interest in regulating the speech; (3) whether the sign regulations directly advance the governmental interest asserted; and (4) whether there is a reasonable fit between the means and ends of the sign regulations. As discussed in Section II, above, the content-based regulation of noncommercial speech is justified only if the locality can show that the regulation serves a compelling governmental interest. In Reed, the signs at issue pertained to noncommercial speech and the Court did not need to address the commercial-noncommercial speech distinction. Whether Reed has eliminated the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech remains an open question. However, one should be mindful that the Court's analysis does not appear to leave much room for a contentneutral distinction. Another open question is whether the on-site/off-site sign distinction is content-based or whether it may survive judicial review as a content neutral "place" regulation. Under the actual court opinion in Reed, such a distinction might be found to be content-based because one must consider the content of the message in order to determine whether it pertains to, for example, an onsite business or a business located elsewhere. One of the Reed concurrences-joined entirely by justices who had signed on to the official court opinion-states that the on-site/offsite sign distinction is content-neutral. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at of 125

17 1P; f:lf;lj2 C::A E~~fIII MAR) ~$ 9F;gl:C;;J$'QNSdIN ~VPEDI Nl'H.I~,,$\;JR"E:Y ;.'. '. '. I Taken together, the cases below describe the legal landscape up to and including the Reed decision handed down on June 18, 2015, in which the Court attempted to resolve a split among the circuits regarding the proper test for determining whether a sign regulation is "content-neutral" or "content-based." The reviewed cases include: o Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (factual commercial speech is protected under 1 st Amend.). o Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro Twp., 431 U.S. 85 (1977) (prohibition against commercial "For Sale" signs was content-based and unconstitutional). o Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (sign code allowing commercial billboards and noncommercial billboards with certain messages but prohibiting all other noncommercial billboards was unconstitutional). o Members of City Council of City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) (sign code prohibiting signs on public property, including rights-of-way, but allowing signs on private property was constitutional). o Arlington County Republican Comm. v. Arlington County, Va., 983 F.2d 587 (4 th Cir. 1993) (rule prohibiting more than two, political yard signs on residential property was unconstitutional). o o o o o o City of Ladue v. Gil/eo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994) (sign code that prohibited all signs, but exempted ten types, was so underinclusive that it was unconstitutional). Am. Legion Post 7 of Durham, N.C. v. City of Durham, 239 F.3d 601 (4th Cir. 2001) (restrictions on size, number, and location of noncommercial flags was constitutional).* Covenant Media of S.C., LLC v. City of N. Charleston, 493 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2007) (sign code treating off-premises signs differently than on-premises signs was constitutional).* Wag More Dogs, LLC v. Cozart, 680 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2012) (sign code that did not regulate paintings but regulated business signs was constitutional).* Brown v. Town of Cary, 706 F. 3d 294 (4 th Cir. 2013) (regulations allowing all works of art and holiday decorations but prohibiting other signs larger than maximum square footage were constitutional).* Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 135 S.Ct (2015) (sign code with different size, number and display period rules for various temporary signs based entirely on the type of message being displayed was unconstitutional). * Note: the holdings in these cases may have relied on interpretations that are no longer reliable after Reed V. Town of Gilbert, Ariz. 15 of 125

18 I. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) - 4 opinions: 5 justices for court opinion (Blackmun). 1 concurring (Burger), 1 concurring (Stewart), 1 dissenting (Rehnquist). 1 did not participate (Stevens). a. Statute made pharmacist who publishes, advertises or promotes the sale of any prescription drug guilty of unprofessional conduct. Id. at b. In the past, U.S. Sup. Ct. precedent indicated that purely commercial speech was not protected by the 1 st Amend. Id. at 758. c. But in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 825 (1975) the Court clearly stated that commercial speech is covered by the 1 st Amend.: "We conclude, therefore, that the Virginia courts erred in their assumptions that advertising, as such, was entitled to no First Amendment protection and that appellant Bigelow had no legitimate First Amendment interest. We need not decide in this case the precise extent to which the First Amendment permits regulation of advertising that is related to activities the State may legitimately regulate or even prohibit." d. Factual commercial speech is protected. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770. "If there is a kind of commercial speech that lacks all First Amendment protection, therefore, it must be distinguished by its content. Yet the speech whose content deprives it of protection cannot simply be speech on a commercial subject. No one would contend that our pharmacist may be prevented from being heard on the subject of whether, in general, pharmaceutical prices should be regulated, or their advertisement forbidden. Nor can it be dispositive that a commercial advertisement is noneditorial, and merely reports a fact. Purely factual matter of public interest may claim protection." Id. at e. "Commercial speech" defined: i. Speech which does "no more than propose a commercial transaction" is commercial speech. See, Bd. of Trustees of State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, (1989); Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 340 (1986). ii. Where commercial and noncommercial speech are inextricably intertwined, courts apply the test appropriate to the most protected (Le., noncommercial) speech. Riley v. Nat7 Fed'n of the Blind of N. Carolina, Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988) 16 of 125

19 f. Commercial speech can be regulated in a variety of ways. "Some forms of commercial speech regulation are surely permissible. We mention a few only to make clear that they are not before us and therefore are not foreclosed by this case." Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770. i. Time, place, manner restrictions on speech. Id. at 771. ii. False or misleading advertisements: 1. "Untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its own sake." Id. 2. "The First Amendment, as we construe it today, does not prohibit the State from insuring that the stream of commercial information flow cleanly as well as freely." Id. at iii. Illegal activity. Id. at 772. II. Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro Twp., 431 U.S. 85 (1977) - unanimous opinion (Marshall). a. Sign code prohibited "For Sale" and "Sold" signs on residential properties. Thus, the speech at issue was commercial speech, not political speech. Id. at 86. b. Before the prohibition, such signs were allowed. In the few years prior to enacting the ban, the white. population declined and the non-white population rose from 11.7% to 18.2%. The evidence indicated that this demographic shift was due to "white flight." Id. at c. Purpose of the prohibition was to prevent a perception of white homeowners fleeing a racially integrated community. Id. at 86. d. Court found that the prohibition was a regulation of content. Id. at 94. Thus, township was required to prove that it was enacted to achieve an important governmental objective. Id. But the evidence was insufficient. Id. at 95. "The Township Council... acted to prevent its residents from obtaining certain information. That information, which pertains to sales activity in Willingboro, is of vital interest to Willingboro residents, since it may bear on one of the most important decisions they have a right to make: where to live and raise their families. The Council has sought to restrict the free flow of these data because it fears that otherwise homeowners will make decisions inimical to what the Council views as the homeowners' self-interest and the corporate interest of the township: they will choose to leave town. The Council's concern, then, was not with any commercial aspect of 'For Sale' signs with offerors communicating offers to offerees but with the substance of the.. information communicated to Willingboro citizens." Id. at of 125

20 III. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) - 5 opinions: 4 justices for plurality (White), 2 justices concurring in the judgment only (Brennan), 1 dissenting (Stevens), 1 dissenting (Burger), 1 dissenting (Rehnquist). a. San Diego adopted a prohibition against all signs used for the display of a commercial or other advertisement to the public. Id. at Two exemptions from this prohibition were created: i. On-site signs were exempt. Id. at 494. ii. 12 specific sign types were exempt, some but not all of which were defined by content: e.g., government signs, signs at public bus stops, religious symbols, signs at shopping malls, "for sale"/"for lease" signs, and temporary political campaign signs. Id. at b. Thus, under the sign code all commercial, on-site signs were allowed but all off-site commercial signs and all non-commercial signs (except for the 12 exempt ones) were prohibited. Id at 503. c. Plurality (4) of the justices found that the ordinance violated the Amendment for two reasons. i. First, the prohibition against on-site noncommercial billboards did not extend to on-site commercial billboards, thereby unconstitutionally restricting noncommercial speech in a manner that was not justified by the city's stated concern about distracting and unattractive sign displays. Id. at 513. ii. Second, the ordinance permitted billboards to carry some noncommercial messages (e.g. religious symbols, news items, and temporary campaign signs) while other messages were prohibited. Id. at 515. Thus, the regulations unlawfully prescribed "appropriate subjects for public discourse." Id. at d. Court upheld the prohibition against off-site commercial signs. Id. at 512. i. Restrictions on commercial speech are evaluated using the 4-part Central Hudson test (Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Servo Comm'n, 477 U.S. 557, 507 (1980)): 1. 1 st Amend. does not protect illegal or misleading commercial speech. 2. The restriction seeks to implement a substantial governmental interest. 3. The restriction directly advances that interest. 4. The restriction reaches no further than necessary to accomplish the given objective. 1 st 18 of 125

21 ii. Court rejected underinclusivity argument, holding that "[O]ffsite commercial billboards may be prohibited while onsite commercial billboards are permitted." Id. at 512. e. Citywide ban on all noncommercial billboards was unconstitutional. Id. at 521. i. Noncommercial speech enjoys greater protection under 1 st Am. than commercial speech. Id. at 513. ii. "Although the city may distinguish between the relative value of different categories of commercial speech, the city does not have the same range of choice in the area of noncommercial speech to evaluate the strength of, or distinguish between, various communicative interests." Id. at 514. IV. Members ofcity Council of City oflos Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) - 2 opinions: 6 justices for court opinion (Stevens), 3 dissenting (Brennan). a. City of Los Angeles prohibited the posting of any sign on public property, but exempted all of the following signs (Id. at 792): i. Metal plaque or plate or individual letters or figures in a sidewalk commemorating an historical, cultural, or artistic event, location or personality for which the Board of Public Works, with the approval of the Council, has granted a written permit.. ii. The painting of house numbers upon curbs done under permits issued by the Board of Public Works under and in accordance with city code. b. Challengers argued that the prohibition was unconstitutional because it was (1) facially invalid, and (2) overbroad. Id. at 796. i. Facts did not support an overbreadth challenge. Id. at 802. ii. Facial challenge was based on argument that city's justification of eliminating blight is not sufficient to justify the restriction. Id. at 802. c. Prohibition was content-neutral. Id. at 804. i. A content-neutral restriction on signs must be narrowly tailored to serve the city's goal of eliminating visual clutter. Id. at Advancing esthetic values falls within the exercise of a state's police powers. Id. at "Justice WHITE, writing for the plurality [in Metromedia], expressly concluded that the city's esthetic interests were sufficiently substantial to provide an acceptable justification for a content 19 of 125

22 neutral prohibition against the use of billboards; San Diego's interest in its appearance was undoubtedly a substantial governmental goal. We reaffirm the conclusion of the majority in Metromedia." Id. at 807 (internal citations omitted). 2. Fact that ordinance prohibited signs on public property, but allowed them on private property, does not undermine the city's justification for the restriction. Id. at A partial ban still addresses the problem of visual blight, even if it does not entirely eliminate it. Id. at 811. ii. A content-neutral restriction on signs must leave open other modes of communication that are adequate. Id. at 812. d. In dicta, court expresses concern with creating an exemption for political campaign signs, since such an exemption might have to allow a number of other political messages (e.g., "Jesus Saves"; "Abortion is Murder") in order to avoid the risk of creating illegal, content-based discrimination. Id. at 816. V. Arlington County Republican Comm. v. Arlington County, Va., 983 F.2d 587 (4th Cir. 1993) a. County had a sign rule limiting number of temporary signs in residential districts to a maximum of 2 per property. Id. at 589. b. Court applied test for noncommercial speech (ld. at 593): i. Does the rule burden speech? ii. If so, is it content-neutral or content-based? iii. If content-neutral, does the rule serve some substantial interest of the government? iv. If so, is the rule narrowly tailored to further that interest? v. If so, does the rule leave open ample alternative channels of communication? c. Court assumed the rule was content-neutral, since plaintiffs conceded that that argument was not the gravamen of their complaint. Id. at 594. d. Rule promotes aesthetics and traffic safety. Both are legitimate substantial governmental interests. Id. e. But the rule fails the "narrowly tailored" test. i. Portion of the rule that allows as many as 2 signs satisfies the narrowly tailored test because the legislature decided that the rule was sufficient to promote its interests and because the legislature is not required to eliminate all less restrictive alternatives. Id. 20 of 125

23 ii. Portion of the rule that prohibits more than 2 signs is not narrowly tailored, since other methods can be used to address aesthetics (like regulating the condition or design of the sign) and traffic safety (like setback requirements). Id. f. The two-sign maximum also fails the "ample alternative channels of communication" test. There is no alternative to a homeowner's posting a political message on his own property. Id. at 595. VI. City of Ladue v. Gi//eo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994) - 2 opinions: unanimous (Stevens); 1 concurrence (O'Connor). a. City prohibited all signs but exempted the following types (Id. at 47): i. Municipal signs. ii. Subdivision and residence identification signs. iii. Road signs and driveway signs for danger, direction, or identification. iv. Health inspection signs. v. Signs for churches, religious institutions. and schools. vi. Identification signs for other not-for-profit organizations. vii. Signs identifying the location of public transportation stops. viii. Ground signs advertising the sale or rental of real property limited only to the fact of proposed sale or rental and the seller or agent's name and address or telephone number. ix. Commercial signs in commercially or industrially zoned districts. (Note: only 3% of the land in the City of Ladue was zoned commercial or industrial). x. Signs that identify safety hazards. b. Homeowner plaintiff desired to post an 8.5 x 11 in. sign in the window of her house reading "For Peace in the Gulf." Id. at 46. Because it was a window sign, it was illegal under the applicable sign code. Id. at 47. c. Court recognized two grounds for a constitutional challenge to a sign code (Id. at 50-51): i. It restricts too little speech because the exemptions discriminate speech based on content. ii. It prohibits too much protected speech. d. Court held that the regulatory scheme was unconstitutionally underinclusive. Id. at of 125

24 i. Court assumed that the prohibition against window signs was content-neutral. Id. at 53. ii. The regulations "almost completely foreclosed a venerable means of communication that is both unique and important." Id. at 54. "Often placed on lawns or in windows, residential signs play an important part in political campaigns, during which they are displayed to signal the resident's support for particular candidates, parties, or causes. They may not afford the same opportunities for conveying complex ideas as do other media, but residential signs have long been an important and distinct medium of expression." Id. at 55. iii. Even though the restriction may have been content-neutral, it did not leave open ample alternative channels for communication. Id. at 56. VII. e. This case specifically involves a "ban" on certain types of sign. See id at The justices were "not confronted here with mere regulations short of a ban." Id. at 58 n.17. Am. Legion Post 7 of Durham, N.C. v. City of Durham, 239 F.3d 601 (4th Cir.2001) a. The city's sign code restricted flags. "Flag" was defined as "a piece of fabric or other flexible material solely containing distinctive colors, patterns, standards, words or emblems used as a symbol of an organization or entity, including but not limited to political jurisdictions... " Id. at 604. i. In nonresidential districts, maximum size was 216 sq. ft. ii. In residential districts, maximum size was 25 sq. ft. iii. Maximum number was 6 per property (2 per pole, max. of 3 poles). iv. Commercial flags were subject not to these rules, but to more stringent rules found in the sign code. ('''[f]lags displaying a logo, message, statement, or expression relating to commercial interests... must also conform with all sign regulations under Section 12' ofthe City/County Zoning Ordinance." Id. at 608.) b. American legion Post 7 desired to display a 238 sq. ft. flag at its property, which was located in a residential district. Id. c. Court applied test for noncommercial speech. i. Regulations do burden speech. Id.at 607. ii. Flag rules are content-neutral. 1. Even though the regulations restrict commercial flags more strictly than noncommercial flags, the legion did not allege that it was content-based. Id. at 608. Rather it argued that 22 of 125

25 the rule was overbroad because the City should only be concerned with commercial flags. Id. 2. "We conclude that the 1998 ordinance is content-neutral because it does not facially distinguish between noncommercial messages based on content and because there is no evidence of a content-based purpose." Id. at 609. [Note: the latter half of this analysis is likely inconsistent with the rule in Reed.] iii. City had a substantial governmental interest in the aesthetic character of the community. Id. at iv. Regulations are narrowly tailored to promote that interest because all flags are regulated in some way, which contributes to the city's goal regarding aesthetics. Id. at 610. v. Ample alternative channels of communication exist because the flag display has not been entirely banned. Rather the "ordinance merely establishes a relatively liberal set of limits on l1ag size and provides a procedure for obtaining temporary and permanent waivers by means of a 'special use' permit.... " 'd. at 611. VIII. Covenant Media ofs.c., LLC v. City ofn. Charleston, 493 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2007) a. City had sign regulations that treated all off-premises signs as billboards, and established special rules for them. 'd. at 425. The difference between an off-premises sign and an on-premises sign was defined as: i. Off-premises: all signs "identifying or advertising a business, person, or activity, or goods, products, services or facilities not located on the premises where the sign is installed or directing persons to a different location from where the sign is installed." 'd. at ii. On-premises: all signs "identifying or advertising a business, person, or activity, or goods, products, services or facilities located on the premises where the sign is installed." 'd. at 425. b. District Court ruled that this distinction between on-premises and offpremises signs was content-based. 'd. at 433. c. 4th Cir. reversed, finding that the sign code's differing treatment of signs based on location was not content-based. 'd. "Expanding on [Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989)]'s formulation for determining the content neutrality of a regulation, the Supreme Court has explained that a regulation is not a content-based regulation of speech if (1) the regulation 'is not a 'regulation of speech," but rather 'a regulation of the places where some speech may occur;' (2) the regulation 'was not 23 of 125

26 adopted 'because of disagreement with the message [the speech] conveys;" or (3) the government's interests in the regulation 'are unrelated to the content of the [affected] speech.'" Id. at (citing Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, (2000)). [Note: Reliance on this test from Hill is likely inconsistent with Reed.] "Examined in light of these criteria, it is clear that North Charleston's Sign Ordinance was not a content-based regulation. North Charleston was not concerned with the message that a sign (such as a billboard) conveyed but instead with where particular signs were located." Id. at 433. "A city can regulate the location of a particular type of signs, as long as the type of signs are not distinguished by the messages they convey." Id. (citing Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 512). IX. Wag More Dogs~ LLC v. Cozart, 680 F.3d 359 (4th eir. 2012) a. Owner of a doggy daycare business installed a 960 sq. ft. painting on the side of the building in which the business was located, seeking to create goodwill among people using an adjacent dog park, many of whom were her customers. Id. at 363. b. County's sign code defined this sort of sign as a "business sign" because it was a sign that identified "the products or services available on the premises or advertising a use conducted thereon." Id. at 362. Under this classification, the property owner could put up a sign no larger than 60 sq. ft. Id. at 369. c. Facial challenge was rejected: i. Sign code was found to be content-neutral: 1. Even though county officials need to evaluate the sign's content to know how to regulate it, that fact "is not an augur of constitutional doom." Id. at Plaintiff was required to prove that county adopted the challenged sign regulation "because of disagreement with the message in conveys," and she failed to do so. Id. at 368 (citing Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 719 (2000)). [Note: Reliance on this test from Hill is likely inconsistent with Reed.] ii. Sign code passes intermediate scrutiny test because it was adopted to address traffic safety and aesthetics, both of which are substantial governmental interests. Id. at of 125

27 iii. Ample alternative channels of communication test is met because the store owner could put up a 60 sq. ft. sign. Id. d. As applied challenge was rejected: i. Because the sign related to the business, its message was commercial speech. Id. at 370. ii. Because the "business sign" limitation was a content-based restriction on commercial speech, it must advance a substantial governmental interest and be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest (intermediate scrutiny). Id. at 370. It passes this test the same way it passed the same test under the facial challenge. Id. e. Plaintiff also alleged that the definition of "sign" was vague. i. "Sign" was defined as: "[a]ny word, numeral, figure, design, trademark, flag, pennant, twirler, light, display, banner, balloon or other device of any kind which, whether singly or in any combination, is used to direct, identify, or inform the public while viewing the same from outdoors." Id. at 362. ii. Two ways that the definition could be found to be vague: 1. "[A] regulation can 'fail[ ] to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits.'" Id. at 371 (citing Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000). 2. U[A] regulation can 'authorize[ 1or even encourage[ 1arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.'" Id. iii. Court found that the sign code passed these tests and was not vague. Id. X. Brown v. Town of Cary, 706 F. 3d 294 (4th Cir. 2013) a. Town's sign code limited signs in residential districts to 2 signs no more than 5 sq. ft. per face and no more than 42 in. in height. Id. at 298. It also allowed a wall sign up to 2 sq. ft. in area. Id. b. Using fluorescent orange paint, homeowner painted a sign on his house that read "Screwed by the Town of Cary" and ran to 15 ft. in length with letters that varied from 12 to 21 in. in height. Id. Town issued violation notices for sign that was too large and contained illegal "high intensity colors or fluorescent pigments." Id. c. Sign code was found to be content neutral. i. Sign code exempted "holiday decorations" and "public art" from any restrictions. Id. at of 125

28 ii. Court expressly rejected the "absolutist reading" of content neutrality, in which a sign code is content-based if it requires that the content of the message be examined. 'd. at 302. iii. Court used the same Hill-based test that was used in Wag More Dogs: "A regulation is not a content-based regulation of speech if (1) the regulation is not a regulation of speech, but rather a regulation of the places where some speech may occur; (2) the regulation was not adopted because of disagreement with the message the speech conveys; or (3) the government's interests in the regulation are unrelated to the content ofthe affected speech." 'd. at 302. [Note: Reliance on this test from Hill is likely inconsistent with the rule in Reed.] iv. "[I]t is clear that while the Sign Ordinance distinguishes content, the distinctions themselves are justified for reasons independent of content." 'd. at 304. The exemptions are based solely on the Town's "asserted and legitimate interests of traffic safety and aesthetics." 'd. at Exemptions for holiday decorations and public art are justified because they are assumed to enhance, not harm, aesthetic appeal. 'd. 2. Seasonal displays have a more temporary effect on traffic than permanent signs. 'd. v. Regulations are narrowly tailored to promote that interest because the size and color limitations target exactly the evils that the regulatory scheme is designed to prevent. 'd. at 305. vi. Ample alternative channels of communication test is met because signs are allowed on this property. Id. d. Plaintiff also alleged that the definition of "sign" was vague. This claim was rejected by the court. 'd. at 305. i. Both "holiday decorations" and "public art" are defined in the code. Id. at 298, 306. ii. It is not possible to confuse the sign at issue with "public art" or a "decoration." Id. XI. Reed v. Town ofgilbert, Ariz., 135 S.Ct (2015) - 4 opinions: 6 justices for court opinion (Thomas), 3 concurring (Alito), 1 concurring in the judgment (Breyer), 2 concurring in the judgment (Kagan). 26 of 125

29 a. Town's sign code required a permit for any outdoor sign except for 23 exempt types. Of those types, three are relevant to this lawsuit (Id. at 2224): i. Ideological Sign - Max. 20 sq. ft. size; no time limit on display; no limit on number. ii. Political Sign - Max 16 sq. ft. (residential) or 32 sq. ft. (nonresidential); display time limited to 60 days before primary election and 15 days after general election; no limit on number. iii. Temporary Directional Signs Relating to a Qualifying Event - Max. 6 sq. ft.; display time limited to 12 hrs. before event and 1 hour after; max. number of 4 per property. b. Plaintiff was cited for violating sign code because he was displaying "Temporary Directional Signs Relating to a Qualifying Event" longer than the allowable display period. Id. at c. Court held that these sign regulations are content-based. 'The restrictions in the Sign Code that apply to any given sign thus depend entirely on the communicative content of the sign." Id. at "[Al speech regulation targeted at specific subject matter is content based even if it does not discriminate among viewpoints within that subject matter." ld. at d. As a result, constitutionality is tested under the strict-scrutiny standard. "A law that is content based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government's benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of 'animus toward the ideas contained' in the regulated speech." Id. at (quoting from Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 429 (1993». e. The sign code fails strict scrutiny because the rules are not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest. 1. Rules are too underinclusive to promote aesthetics, since other, larger signs with longer durational limits are allowed with no limit on the total number. Id. at ii. Rules are too underinclusive to promote traffic safety and town has not proven that these signs are any more distracting than the ideological and political signs that are also allowed. Id. at f. Governments can still regulate signs in a content-neutral way by restricting size, materials, lighting, moving parts, portability, and those located on public property. Id. 27 of 125

30 g. Concurrence of 3 of the 6 justices who signed on to the opinion of the court lists at least 9 regulatory tools "that would not be content based" (Id. at 2233): i. Sign size. ii. Sign location, including distinctions between freestanding signs and wall buildings. iii. Whether a sign is lighted or unlighted. iv. Whether a sign has a fixed messages or an electronic, changeable message. v. Placement of signs on private or public property. vi. Placement of signs on commercial or residential property. vii. Whether a sign is on-premises and off-premises. viii. Restricting the total number of signs allowed per mile of roadway. ix. Imposing time restrictions on signs advertising a one-time event. 28 of 125

31 ~~1r~:,:E~" '". IR~12'J'l r,afj'iir?..r.ii;d> :>: -.,-;';", '.;' ';-'.<\'.:; :! ~,-;.", ):. -;\"_'-,;v' ;,~ ;,::}:r::".,,.~);.~ -/J::,-,~,.:\' ~ i/'. I. The test for "content-based" a. Reed: "Government regulation of speech is content based if a law applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed. This commonsense meaning of the phrase 'content based' requires a court to consider whether a regulation of speech 'on its face' draws distinctions based on the message a speaker conveys." Reed, 135 S.Ct. at 2227 (citations omitted). b. The narrow reading (favored by localities): A sign code is content-based if it prescribes different regulatory treatment for different signs when the only distinguishing feature between the two is the content. i. There is nothing inconsistent between identifying "signs" as a discrete subject suitable for regulation and maintaining contentneutrality. After all, the Reed court acknowledges that a sign codea collection of rules that only apply to those forms of speech defined as "signs"-can indeed be content-neutral. "The Town has ample content-neutral options available to resolve problems with safety and aesthetics, including regulating size, building materials, lighting, moving parts, and portability." Id. at ii. Reed does not directly address sign regulations that involve a mixture of content and content-neutral distinctions. (For example, an "on-premises" sign involves an assessment of content-a message that references something related to the property where it is postedand a content-neutral element-the location where it is posted.) Rather, Reed only deals with sign regulations where content is the basis for the distinction. The reason why the Town of Gilbert's rules were content-based was because the "entire" difference in treatment of the relevant signs was determined by the message or idea displayed on the sign. "The restrictions in the Sign Code that apply to any given sign thus depend entirely on the communicative content of the sign." Id. at 2227 (emphasis added). "Not 'all distinctions' are subject to strict scrutiny, only contentbased ones are." Id. at 2232 (emphasis in original). iii. The Alito concurrence includes additional comments from 3 of the 6 justices who wrote for the court in the Reed. 29 of 125

32 1. Alito, Kennedy, and Sotomayor affirmatively state that the following regulations-among others-are content-neutral (Id. at 2233): "Rules. distinguishing between on-premises and offpremises signs." "Rules imposing time restrictions on signs advertising a one-time event." 2. These distinctions clearly require some review of content. But they are not "based" or "entirely dependent" on content. "Rules of this nature do not discriminate based on topic or subject...." Id. Uustifying why different rules for one-time events would be treated as content-neutral). c. The broad reading (disfavored by localities): A sign code is content-based if it takes into consideration any element of the content of a sign in order to distinguish which restrictions apply. i. This approach would implicitly overrule Supreme Court precedents, including: 1. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 512 ("offsite commercial billboards may be prohibited while onsite commercial billboards are perm itted."). 2. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 817 (prohibition against posting temporary signs on public property was contentneutral, despite fact that the code exempted commemorative plaques on sidewalks and house numbers on curbs). ii. The broad reading could jeopardize the ability to regulate signs in a content-neutral way, since a "sign"-the target of every sign codeis defined in such a way that only a subset of all visual speech is captured within the ambit of the regulatory framework. iii. In an effort to downplay fears that the rule it expresses might render nearly all sign regulations subject to the strict scrutiny of a contentbased analysis, the Reed court observes that "some lower courts have long held that similar content-based sign laws receive strict scrutiny, but there is no evidence that towns in those jurisdictions have suffered catastrophic effects." Reed, 135 S. Ct. at These circuits include the 1 st, 5 th, 8 th, 9 th, and 11th (but not the 4th). 1. As early as 1985, the 1 st Cir. Ct. App. held that a sign code was content-based because signs with different messages were subjected to different restrictions: "No political signs are allowed in any district in the Town of Needham; yet such signs as 'For Sale' 30of125

33 signs, professional office signs, contractorsl advertisements, and signs erected for charitable or religious causes are allowed in all districts. Furthermore, in business and manufacturing zones, large commercial advertising signs are permitted which pertain to products, accommodations, services, or activities on the premises on which they are located, but no political signs are permitted. Thus, it appears that the bylaw is concerned with the content, as opposed to the time, place, or manner, of the speech." Matthews v. Town of Needham, 764 F.2d 58, 60 (1 st Cir. 1985) (Citation omitted). 2. When the City of Houston, Tex. was sued for restrictions on speech imposed under its sounds ordinance and parade permit rules, the 5 th Cir. Ct. App. held that "[a] regulatory scheme that requires the government to 'examine the content of the message that is conveyed' is content-based regardless of its motivating purpose." Servo Emp. Int'l Union, Local 5 V. City of Houston, 595 F.3d 588, 596 (5 th Cir. 2010) (citing Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221,230 (1987». 3. The 9 th Cir. Ct. App. invalidated a sign code that prohibited off-site signs while exempting certain governmental signs and flags, memorial tablets, recreational signs, and temporary political, real estate, construction, and advertising signs, based on its rule that "[b]ecause the exceptions to the restriction on noncommercial speech are based on content, the restriction itself is based on content." Nat'l Adver. CO. V. City of Orange, 861 F.2d 246, 249 (9 th Cir. 1988). 4. The 11th Cir. Ct. App. invalidated a sign code in the City of Neptune Beach, Fla. on the basis that "because some types of signs are extensively regulated while others are exempt from regulation based on the nature of the messages they seek to convey, the sign code is undeniably a content-based restriction on speech." Solantic, LLC v. City of Neptune Beach, 410 F.3d 1250, 1266 (11th Cir. 2005). 5. The 8 th Cir. Ct. App. invalidated a sign code that defined signs in a way that exempted all of the following: o o Flags of nations, states, and cities, and fraternal, religious, and civic organizations. Merchandise, pictures of models of products, or services incorporated in a window display. 31 of 125

34 o Time and temperature devices. o National, state, religious, 'fraternal, professional and civic symbols or crests, or on site ground based measure display device used to show time and subject matter of religious services. o Works of art which in no way identify a product. The constitutional defect lay in the fact that, "to determine whether a particular object qualifies as a 'sign' under (17) and is therefore subject to the regulations, or is instead a "non-sign" under (17)(a)-(e) or exempt from the sign regulations under or , one must look at the content of the object.... Simply stated [ (17), , and ] [are] content-based because [they] make[ ] impermissible distinctions based solely on the content or message conveyed by the sign." Neighborhood Enters., Inc. v. City of Sf. Louis, 644 F.3d 728, 737 (8 th Cir. 2011). iv. A review of the definitions of "sign" presently being used by localities in these circuits reveals that content is still considered when assessing whether the visual speech falls under the scope ofthe sign code, but the definitions do not depend entirely on the content. In the following examples, the underlined language requires zoning officials to assess content in order to determine whether the sign code even applies. These practical examples suggest that a broad interpretation of the Reed test has not caught on in those areas of the country that have been using almost the same test for decades. 1. In the 1 st Circuit, the Town of Needham, Mass. (which was the subject of the st Cir. opinion cited above) now uses the following definition of "sign": Sign: Any device designated to inform or attract the attention of persons who are not on the premises on which the device is located. Any exterior building surfaces which are internally illuminated or decorated with gaseous tube or other lights are considered signs. The following, however, shall not be considered signs within the context of this article: a) flags and insignia of any government except when displayed in connection with commercial promotion; b) legal notices or informational devices erected or required by public agencies; 32 of 125

35 c) standard gasoline pumps bearing thereon in usual size and form the name, type, and price of gasoline; d) integral decorative or architectural features of buildings, except letter, trademarks, moving parts or parts internally illuminated or decorated with gaseous tube or other lights; e) on-premises signs guiding and directing traffic and parking, not exceeding two square feet in area and bearing no advertising matter; f) devices hand-carried or mounted on vehicles, unless regularly or recurrently located for fixed display; g) signs on newspaper vending machines or newspaper racks, which are limited in context to the name and logo of the newspaper sold via such machine or rack and to the means of purchasing a newspaper from such machine or rack. Needham Sign By/aw 5.2 (emphasis added). 2. The largest city in the 1 st Circuit, Boston, Mass., defines a "sign" as follows: Sign. Any structure, device, light, letter, word, model, banner, pennant, insignia, trade flag, or representation which is designed to be seen from outside a building and which advertises or announces a use conducted or goods, products, services or facilities available, including electric signs in windows or doors, but excluding window displays of merchandise and signs incidental to the display of merchandise. Zoning Code, City of Boston In the 5 th Circuit, the City of Houston, Tex. (which was the subject of the th Cir. opinion cited above) defines a "sign" as: SIGN shall mean any outdoor display, design, pictorial or other representation that shall be so constructed, placed, attached, painted, erected, fastened or manufactured in any manner whatsoever so that the same shall be used for advertising. The term "sign" shall include the sign structure. Every sign shall be classified and conform to the requirements of each of such classifications set forth in this chapter. 33 of 125

36 The Houston Sign Code 4802 (2008) (emphasis added) 4. The City of Orange, Cal. uses the following definitions in its sign code: SIGN - Any writing (including letter, word, or numeral), pictorial presentation (including illustration or decoration), emblem (including device, symbol, or trademark), flag (including banner or pennant), or any other device, figure or similar character which: A. Is a structure or any part thereof, or is attached to, painted on, or in any other manner represented on a building or other structure or device; and B. Is used to announce, direct attention to or advertise; and C. Is visible from outside the building or structure. SIGN, COMMERCIAL - A sign whose message concerns goods or services offered for consideration by a person or entity engaged in a profit-oriented business. SIGN, NONCOMMERCIAL - Any sign that is not intended to augment any commercial enterprise or to generate income. Noncommercial signs include, but are not limited to messages that are religious, civic or political in nature. Orange Municipa/ Code (emphasis added). 5. In the 11th Circuit, the City of Neptune Beach, Fla. (which amended its sign code just a few months before the prior version was found to violate the 1 st Amendment in So/antic, 410 F.3d 1250) defines a sign as: "Sign means any identification, description, illustration, or device illuminated or nonilluminated, which is visible from any outdoor place, open to the public and which directs attention' to a product. service, place, activity, person, institution, or business thereof, including any permanently installed or situated merchandise, or any emblem, painting, banner, pennant, placard, designed to advertise, identify, or convey information, with the exception of customary window displays, official public notices and court markers required by federal, state or local regulations; also excepting, newspapers, leaflets and 34 of 125

37 books intended for individual distribution to members of the public, attire that is being worn, badges, and similar personal gear. Sign shall also include all outdoor advertising displays as described within Section , Florida Building Code, and all signs shall conform to the requirements of Section 3108 of the Florida Building Code. The term shall exclude architectural features or part not intended to communicate information." Code of Ordinances of the City of Neptune Beach, Florida (emphasis added). 6. In the 8 th Circuit, the City of St. Louis, Mo. (which was the subject of the st Cir. opinion cited above) defines a "sign" as: Sign Any structure or part thereof, or any device attached to, painted on, or represented on a building or other structure, upon which is displayed or included any letter, word, model, banner, flag, insignia, decoration, device, or representation used as, or in the nature of, an announcement. direction, advertisement. or attention directing device. Revised Code of the City of Saint Louis, 1994, Annotated (emphasis added). 35 of 125

38 FIR$X'~A, I. Commercial v. Noncommercial (a.k.a. "Political") Speech a. Reed does not involve commercial signs, so it comes as no surprise that the concurrence in Reed does not list commercial v. noncommercial signs as a pet se content-neutral distinction. And the Supreme Court has repeatedly expressed the prime importance of political (a.k.a. "noncommercial") speech. "We have recognized that the First Amendment reflects a 'profound national commitment' to the principle that 'debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,' and have consistently commented on the central importance of protecting speech on public issues." Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988) (internal citations omitted). "In analogous cases under the Speech Clause, this Court has noted the 'Constitution's special concern with threats to the right of citizens to participate in political affairs.'" Borough of Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488,2498 (2011) (citing Connick v. Myers,461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983». "'[S]peech on public issues occupies the 'highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values' and is entitled to special protection.'" Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 444 (2011) (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983». b. Nevertheless, there is an apparent trend towards providing more protection to commercial speech than was afforded historically. Therefore it is useful to keep in mind the current definitions and standards for recognizing commercial speech and testing restrictions of commercial speech for compliance with the 1 st Amendment. i. "Commercial speech" defined: 1. Speech which does "no more than propose a commercial transaction" is commercial speech. See, Bd. of Trustees of State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, (1989); Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 340 (1986). 2. Where commercial and noncommercial speech are inextricably intertwined, courts apply the test appropriate to the most protected (Le., noncommercial) speech. Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N. Carolina, Inc., 487 U.S. 781,796 (1988). 36 of 125

39 ii. For commercial speech, the test of constitutionality still seems to be the 4-part Central Hudson test (Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec., 477 U.S. at 507): 1. 1 st Amend. does not protect illegal or misleading commercial speech. 2. The restriction seeks to implement a substantial governmental interest. 3. The restriction directly advances that interest. 4. The restriction reaches no further than necessary to accomplish the given objective. iii. This test is very similar to the intermediate scrutiny test used for evaluating a content-neutral restriction on noncommercial speech (see Arlington County Republican Comm., 983 F.2d at 593): 1. The restriction serves a substantial governmental interest. 2. The restriction is narrowly tailored to further that interest. 3. Ample alternative channels of communication remain open. iv. By comparison, the standard strict scrutiny test requires showing that: 1. The restriction is serves a compelling governmental interest. 2. The restriction is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, (2015) (see a/so Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2231). v. All content-based restrictions on speech are tested using the "strict scrutiny" standard. This is a high hurdle. 1. Content-based regulations will only satisfy strict scrutiny if they are "narrowly tailored" to serve a "compelling governmental interest." a. A compelling governmental interest is an interest of "the highest order." Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 566 (1993) (regarding the free exercise of religion). b. Traditional examples of compelling governmental interests include the allocation and collection of taxes, maintaining the integrity of the social security system, eradicating racial discrimination in education, the operation of military conscription laws, enforcing child labor laws, and protecting public health and safety. 37 of 125

40 II. Testimony of Steven K. Green, Legal Director, Americans United for Separation of Church and State, before the House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution, July 14, The court's opinion in Reed indicated that it may find certain content-based sign distinctions to satisfy strict scrutiny: "[The] presence of certain signs may be essential, both for vehicles and pedestrians, to guide traffic or to identify hazards and ensure safety. A sign ordinance narrowly tailored to the challenges of protecting the safety of pedestrians, drivers, and passengers - such as warning signs marking hazards on private property, signs directing traffic, or street numbers associated with private houses well might survive strict scrutiny." Reed, 135 S. Ct. at Promoting traffic safety and aesthetics are generally considered to be substantial governmental interests, see Brown v. Town of Cary, 706 F.3d 294, 305 (4 th Cir. 2013) ("It is beyond dispute that the Town's stated interests in promoting aesthetics and traffic safety are substantial"), but that does not mean they will also be considered compelling. c. Because Reed does not expressly overrule earlier precedent, it may be that both the Central Hudson test and the strict scrutiny test could be used when a sign code imposes different standards based solely on whether the sign contains a commercial or a noncommercial message. i. If the commercial version of the sign is treated more strictly than the noncommercial version, Central Hudson test should apply. it If the noncommercial version of the sign is treated more strictly than the commercial version, then strict scrutiny test should apply. Underinclusivity, Exemptions, and Prohibitions a. Underinclusivity. i. Underinclusivity arguments attack the constitutionality of a regulatory scheme by attempting to prove that the restrictions do not effectively further the asserted governmental interest: "Exemptions from an otherwise legitimate regulation of a medium of speech may be noteworthy for a reason quite apart from the risks of viewpoint and content discrimination: They may diminish the credibility of the government's rationale for restricting speech in the first place." City of Ladue v. Gil/eo, 512 U.S. 43, 52 (1994). 38 of 125

41 "[U]nderinclusiveness can raise 'doubts about whether the government is in fact pursuing the interest it invokes, rather than disfavoring a particular speaker or viewpoint. '" Williams- Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656,1668 (2015) (citing Brown v. Entm't Merchants Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2740 (2011)). ii. Thus, even a content-neutral regulation can be unconstitutional if the exemptions are too many or too broad, despite the fact that the exemptions themselves are content-neutral. b. Exemptions under Reed. i. The sign code challenged in Reed created 24 exemptions from the default rule which prohibited the display of any sign without first securing a permit, 23 of which describe certain sign types. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at Some of these exemptions are based entirely on the sign's content: 1. Real Estate Signs 6 square feet or less in area and a maximum of 6 feet in height, in compliance with Section 4.404: Real Estate Signs. 2. Residential Open House Signs. 3. Political Signs, in compliance with Section : Political Signs. 4. Ideological Signs, in compliance with Section 4.402J: Ideological Signs. 5. Garage Sale Signs, in compliance with Section 4.402K: Garage Sale Signs. 6. Interim business identification banners, in compliance with Table 4.402: Temporary Banner Regulations. 7. Temporary Directional Signs Relating to a Qualifying Event, in compliance with Section 4.402P: Temporary Directional Signs Relating to a Qualifying Event. 8. Restaurant Menu Signs 6 square feet or less in area, not including Drive-Through Restaurant Menu Signs, displayed within 10 feet of the business entry. 9. Required street addresses or address directory signs. Town of Gilbert, Land Development Code 4.402(0). ii. Reed suggests that content-based exemptions may trigger strict scrutiny, since the maximum size and number limitations that define which signs require a permit and which are exempt vary depending on the sign's content. 39 of 125

42 "The Town's Sign Code is content based on its face. It defines 'Temporary Directional Signs' on the basis of whether a sign conveys the message of directing the public to church or some other 'qualifying event.' It defines 'Political Signs' on the basis of whether a sign's message is "designed to influence the outcome of an election." And it defines 'Ideological Signs' on the basis of whether a sign 'communicat[es] a message or ideas' that do not fit within the Code's other categories. It then subjects each of these categories to different restrictions." Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227 (citations omitted). iii. However, the sole difference between the three types of signs at issue in the Reed case was the content. None of the definitions of these three problematic signs incorporated content-neutral characteristics such as location, construction, or appearance. See, e.g., Neighborhood Enters., Inc. v. City of Sf. Louis, 644 F.3d 728, 737 (8 th Cir. 2011) (distinctions that were "based solely on the content or message conveyed by the sign" held to be content-based) (emphasis added). c. Can the definition of "sign" itself be content-based? i. Does it matter whether an exemption is expressed as such (as in Reed) or incorporated into the definition of "sign" itself (as in Neighborhood Enters., Inc., 644 F.3d at 737)? 1. If the definition of "sign" is used to exclude certain visual speech which otherwise would be captured/defined as a "sign," then the definition itself arguably functions in the same way as an exemption and should be analyzed as such. For example: Sign. A communication device, structure, or fixture that incorporates graphics, symbols, written copy, and/or, lighting intended to promote the sale of a product, commodity, or service, or to provide direction or identification for a business or a facility. Signs shall not include any flag. badge. or insignia of any governmental unit. nor shall it include any item of merchandise normally displayed in a business window. Murals, statuary, architectural features such as trademarked building forms, decorative canopies or awnings, and corporate color accents shall be considered signage where they are integral to the conveyance of a commercial message, except where determined by the Design Review Board to be architectural, rather than communicative, in nature. 40 of 125

43 2. But if certain speech that does not meet the general definition of "sign" is identified as such, by way of clarification, then those clarifications do not function as exemptions. For example: Sign. Any object, device, display, or structure, or part thereof, visible from a public place, a public right of way, or any parking area or right of way open to use by the general public which is designed and used to attract attention to an object (other than the sign itself), person, institution, organization, business, product, service, event, or location by any means involving words, letters, figures, designs, symbols, fixtures, logos, colors, illumination, or projected images. For the purpose of clarification, examples of items which do not satisfy the necessary elements of this definition include, but are not limited to, works of art. architectural elements incorporated into the style or function of a building, and flags of any nation, state, or other geopolitical entity. For purposes of this definition a work of art is any item expressing creative skill or imagination in a visual form, such as a painting or sculpture, which is intended to beautify or provide an aesthetic influence to a public area or area which is visible from the public realm and which in no way identify or specifically relate to a product or service on the premises. ii. Regulating all visual speech is a constitutionally suspect approach because it exposes the government to a overbreadth challenge: "A clear and precise enactment may nevertheless be 'overbroad' if in its reach it prohibits constitutionally protected conduct." Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114 (1972). 'To be sure, [the narrow tailoring] standard does not mean that a time, place, or manner regulation may burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government's legitimate interests. Government may not regulate expression in such a manner that a substantial portion ofthe burden on speech does not serve to advance its goals." Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989). iii. Governments are entitled to regulate less than every form of speech that might impact its stated substantial governmental interest: "A State need not add ress all aspects of a problem in one fell swoop; policymakers may focus on their most pressing concerns. We have accordingly upheld laws-even under 41 of 125

44 strict scrutiny-that conceivably could have restricted even greater amounts of speech in service of their stated interests." Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1668 (2015). "The First Amendment does not require States to regulate for problems that do not exist." Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191,207 (1992). "It does not follow from the fact that the city has concluded that some commercial interests outweigh its municipal interests in this context that it must give similar weight to all other commercial advertising. Thus, offsite commercial billboards may be prohibited while onsite commercial billboards are permitted." Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 512 (plurality opinion). 42 of 125

45 LGA AD HOC COMMfITEE MODEL SIGN ORDINANCE DIVISION I. - GENERAL PROVISIONS Sec. 1. Purpose and intent. Sec; 2. - Definitions. Sec Pennit required. Sec Pennit not required. Sec Prohibited signs. Sec. 6. Measurements of sign area. Sec. 7. Maintenance and removal. Sec General requirements. Sec Nonconfonning signs. Sections DIVISION II. - Sec Sec. Sec. ARTICLE DIVISION I.- Sec Findings, purpose and intent; interpretation. (a) p,!ip9~e_()(tm.s_1!i!i~i!! j~!<!.!e.8!:lla!e_ Q1.!! _ color, umination, movement,, location, height and condition of all signs placed on private property for exterior observation, thus the of nrnoertv of the various 1 43 of 125

46 convenience to citizens and encouraging economic development. This article allows adequate communication through signage while encouraging aesthetic quality in the design, location, size and purpose of all signs. This article shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the First Amendment guarantee of free speech. If any provision of this article is found by a court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, such finding shall not affect the validity of other provisions of this article which can be given effect without the invalid provision. (b) Signs not expressly permitted as being allowed by right or by special use permit under this article, by specific requirements in another of this chapter, or otherwise expressly allowed by the [governing body] _fo!~im~l!.. (c) A sign placed on land or on a building for the directing persons to a use conducted therein shall and subordinate part of the principal use of article is to establish limitations on signs in building or use to which they are while balancing the individual and section. (d) These regulations are intended to Df()m<ote property to which they are are legible and appropriate motorists, and are condition. (e) identification, protection or to be an integral but accessory Therefore, the intent of this are appropriate to the land, their intended purpose subsection (a) of this (f) (g) d instance of visual speech that may be of the City/CountyfTown. Rather, they that are most likely to meaningfully affect all of the harms that may be created by the, they strike an appropriate balance that preserves means of visual display while still reducing and caused by signs. ~~~~~;~~ludjkqql~i ~- A-Frame sign means a two-faced sign with supports that are connected at the top and separated at the base, forming an "A" shape not more than four feet high. These are also referred to as "sandwich board" signs. They are included in the term "portable sign." Advertising means any words, symbol, color or design used to call attention to a commercial product, service, or activity. Animated sign means a sign or part of a sign that is designed to rotate, move or appear to rotate or move. Such a sign is sometimes referred to as a "moving sign." 2 44 of 125

47 Awning sign means a sign placed directly on the surface of an awning. Building frontage means the length of the main wall of a building which physically encloses usable interior space and which is the architecturally entrance for use by the general public. Said frontage shall above grade.. wall that contains the main at a height of ten (10) feet Business sign means a sign which directs activity available on the premises. Canopy sign means a sign attached to a Chalk-board sign means a single-faced, with chalk or similar markers. Changeable copy sign means letters or illustrations can be sign. tenants or owners service or commercial that includes multiple oblong or square, attachable by one this includes pennants. lights that flash, blink. or turn on and off ",,'n_r"'r1'"h''''' sign supported by a fence, retaining wall. or by on or in the ground and not attached to a building. sign that is supported by structures or supports in or upon the support from any building or wall. Height, means the maximum vertical distance from the base of the sign at normal grade to the top of the highest attached component of the sign. Normal grade shall be construed to be the lower of: (1) Existing grade prior to construction; or (2) The newly established grade after construction, exclusive of any filling, berming, mounding or excavating primarily for the purpose of mounting or elevating the sign of 125

48 Illegal sign means any sign erected without a required permit or which otherwise does not comply with any provisions of this article. Illuminated sign means a sign that is backlit, internally lighted, or indirectly lighted, but does not include a neon sign. Marquee means a permanent structure projecting beyond a building wall at an entrance to a building or extending along and projecting beyond the wall and generally designed and constructed to provide protection against the weather. Marquee sign means a sign attached to and projections from a building, with changeable, fixed in compliance with applicable date of this chapter of and restrictions of the a business, product, service or than the premises on which the sign is to a building, structure, vehicle or the than a wall, awning or marquee sign, affixed to a wall on which it is mounted. Roofsign means a sign erected or constructed, in whole or in part, upon or above the highest point of a building with a flat roof, or the lowest portion of a roof for any building with a pitched roof. m~l!t~a_n.!l!.ly ~~\j~~ (~ritil!&!e~!: ~P!:~ ~r}!.u_ll!e_f<!i!. pis~opil! pr!~~n~tl0!l-,- illu t.!l!t!o!l_ol _' " decoration, emblem, device, symbol or trademark, fl,banner or pennant or any other device, figure or character) visible to and ~~~i~:!g;cp'fu ~,1!'!f.njm:ffifj{f~s;cij1,W,~'II1}l~ 4 46 of 125

49 !I.9!,,~y~r.! ti!e_ ~e!l!l_':.s~gi('_c!~~ _n.9~ ~l!c!l!d~ _I!u_b!i~ _3!lJ _h.9!ic:lay_ c:llspl!ly~,_ol3! hjte~~.!l!i_ f~ltujres except those that identify products or services or advertise a business use. The tenn "sign" also does not include the display of merchandise for sale on the site of the display. [OR] Sign. Any object, device, display, or structure, or part thereof, visible from a public place, a public right-of-way, any parking area or right-of-way open to use by the general public, or any navigable body of water which is designed and used to attract attention to an institution, organization, business, product, service, event, or location by any means involving words, letters, figures, designs, symbols, fixtures, logos, colors, projected images. The tenn does not include public art, architectural elements the style or function of a building, or flags of any nation, state, or other not related to a commercial business, product or service. The tenn "sign" also the display of merchandise for sale on the site of the display. Sign/ace means the portion of a sign Sign structure means any structure ~~21'~~!r?m-eans ~J(Jj&~;il!,gJ:,'t.l!.. an ~ gil si intended to_ business or LUlI.U;U1VU, be considered to be used for the license plates, inspection sticker. or ~(I!a!c!-!~-c:ll!te J~a! 2~0! _b~_ of such vehicle or trailer. wallar painted on or against a flat vertical surface of outside the window and attached to or within 18 inches (a) In general. A sign pennit is required prior to the display and erection of any sign except as provided in section 4 of this Article. (b) Application/or permit. (1) An application for a sign pennit shall be filed with the City/County(fown [Community Development Department or equivalent] on fonns furnished by that department. The appjicant shall provide sufficient information to detennine if the proposed sign is 5 47 of 125

50 permitted under the zoning ordinance and other applicable laws, regulations, and ordinances. An application for a temporary sign shall state the dates intended for the erection and removal of the sign. (2) The City/Countyffown Zoning Administrator or designee shall promptly process the sign permit application and approve the application, reject the application, or notify the applicant of deficiencies in the application 1f!_R'I~IDJLaf~!:!e_~ip!._ Any_ application that complies with all provisions of this zoning ordinance, the building code, and other applicable laws, regulations, and ordinanc be approved. (3) If the application is rejected, the City/Countyff provide a list of the reasons for the rejection in writing. An application for non-compliance with the terms of the zoning ordinance, building,ppiiica:ble law, regulation, or ordinance. (c) Permit fee. A nonrefundable fee as set City/Countyffown Council shall (d) Duration and revocation of issuance of a sign permit (or permit shall be void. The 30 days unless another time is following the permit), the (1) code, or other applicable law. (e) in the Historic Overlay District (HOD) require Board (ARB) except when a sign permit is not (f) _,Y~ ~~.pl~~.!l!ay_~e_a'pp!~.v~ py ~pt:!clf!l_u~t:! pt:!f!illt i.!l_~_ plans may be approved by special use permit in the districts for uses y special use permit. The comprehensive sign plan shall establish the time, manner, and placement of signs, frequency of message changes, the materials, the hours of lighting, the height of signs, the total number of square feet of sign surface, and the number of signs to be placed on a site. Height of signs shall not be modified above the height permitted in the Zoning Ordinance. Sec. 4. ~ Permit not required of 125

51 A sign permit is not required for: (1) Signs erected by a governmental body or required by law. (2) Rags up to 16 square feet in size not containing any commercial advertising; provided, that no freestanding pole shall be erected in the public right-of-way nor be within five (5) feet of a service drive, travel lane or adjoining street. (3) The changing of messages on marquees and the repair of an existing permitted sign, except that repair of a nonconforming sign must comply with 9(e). (4) Temporary signs as follows: a. One (1) sign, no more than twelve (12) where a building permit is active. b. c. e. (6) signs per parcel. Additional minor signs are permitted in certain districts a permit. (7) A-frame signs more than fifty (50) feet from the nearest public right of way. (8) Pavement markings. Any sign applied directly and entirely to and flush with an asphalt, concrete, or similar paved surface. (9) A permanent window sign, provided that the aggregate area of all window signs on each window or door does not exceed twenty-five percent (25%) of the total area of the window or door of 125

52 Sec Prohibited signs In addition to signs prohibited elsewhere in this Code or by applicable state or federal law, the following signs are prohibited: (a) General prohibitions. (1) Signs that violate any law of the Commonwealth relating to outdoor advertising. (2) Signs attached to natural vegetation. (4) Vehicle or trailer signs. (5) Freestanding signs more than (6) Signs hanging from supports, (7) Any sign displayed of this chapter. (b) Prohibitions based on (1) permitted by this (2) ot apply to flags expressly permitted under no more often than once every seven flashing, scrolling or intermittent lights or, except where such signs are expressly permitted uminated tubing or strings of lights outlining property lines doors, windows or wall edges of any building, except for exceed three months per year. (5) flame, scent, mist, aerosol, liquid, or gas. (6) Signs that emit sound. (7) Any electronic sign that is generated by a series of moving images, such as an LED, digital display, or other video technology, whether displayed on a building, vehicle, or mobile unit. (8) Strings of flags visible from, and within 50 feet of, any public right-of-way. (9) Pole signs less than 6 feet in height of 125

53 (c) Prohibitions based on location. (2) Signs erected on public land other than those approved by an authorized City/Countyffown official in writing, required by law without such approval, or pennitted under Virginia Code E. Any sign not so authorized is subject to immediate removal and disposal by any authorized official. Removal of the sign under this provision does not preclude prosecution of the person responsible for the sign. (3) Signs on the roof surface or extending above parapet wall. (4) Neon signs, except in windows. (5) Any sign located in the vision as regulated by the provisions of (6) Window signs whose aj.!:~!te1~ale percent (25%) of the total area (a) Supports, upright detennining the way as to placed on a (b) are designed in such a however, when a sign is tructure that is designed to serve a separate area of such structure shall not be OIIlIPuted in accordance with the preceding tenants or users on a property or in a building, not exceed the maximum sign area computed as if (c) (1) the following principles: a. With signs regular polygons or circles, the area can be calculated by the mathematical fonnula for that polygon or circle. With signs that are not regular polygons or circles, the sign area is calculated using all that area within a maximum of three abutting or overlapping rectangles that enclose the sign face. b. The pennitted area of a double-faced sign shall be considered to be the area on one side only. If one face contains a larger sign area than the other, the larger face shall be used in calculating the sign area. A double-faced sign must have an internal angle between its two faces of no more than 45 degrees of 125

54 c. For projecting signs with a thickness of four inches or more, the sign area also includes the area of the visible sides of the sign, calculated as a rectangle enclosing each entire side view. (2) The supports, uprights or structure on which any sign is supported shall not be included in determining the sign area unless such supports, uprights or structure area are designed in such a manner as to form an integral background of the display. (d) Maximum height. The maximum height for any sign shall be 25 feet unless otherwise specified within this chapter. Sec Maintenance and removal. (a) All signs shall be constructed and Statewide Building Code. (b) All signs and components thereof shall clean condition. (c) The building official may notice any sign which, in his unsafe, and, as such, presents an is necessary to render a sign safe, the expense of [Buildings and the Virginia Uniform or which is not kept in a reasonably good state state of repair within 30 days of a written notice (2). a nuisance may be abated by the City/County(fown under Code , , and/or Sec General requirements. (a) Placement. Except as otherwise permitted, all freestanding signs shall be set back from any street right-of-way at least half the height of the sign. (b) Illumination. All permitted signs may be backlit, internally lighted, or indirectly lighted, unless such lighting is specifically prohibited in this article of 125

55 (1) In the case of indirect lighting, the source shall be so shielded that it illuminates only the face of the sign. However, shingle signs shall be indirectly illuminated or have shielded direct lighting, unless otherwise prohibited within this chapter. Indirect lighting shall consist of full cut-off or directionally shielded lighting fixtures that are aimed and controlled so that the directed light shall be substantially confined to the sign to minimize glare, sky glow, and light trespass. The beam width shall not be wider than that needed to light the sign. (2) Internal illumination shall be limited to the UU'UUl!<ltlVll standards for parking lot lighting in 1lI!~~$~~4f,1._~~ ~_sj1!lij _b_e_ge_fi!1i _ap_ ill!l~1i!a.!i9!l_sp~_a~_<#_ more than.05 foot candle at the lot line, traffic, affect highway (c) Sec. 9. NonC(Jtnt(Jtrl (b) No nont(:ontorm chapter or prior ordinances, which do not which are accessory to a nonconforming may remain except as qualified below. status of signs and of the physical be that of the owner of the property. Upon notice owner shall submit verification that sign(s) were to provide such verification shall be cause for sign(s) into compliance with the current ordinance. be enlarged nor shall any feature of a nonconforming sign, (c) Nothing in this section be deemed to prevent keeping in good repair a nonconforming sign. Nonconforming signs shall not be extended or structurally reconstructed or altered in any manner, except a sign face may be changed so long as the new face is equal to or reduced in height and/or sign area. (d) No nonconforming sign shall be moved for any distance on the same lot or to any other lot unless such change in location will make the sign conform in all respects to the provisions of this article of 125

56 (e) A nonconforming sign that is destroyed or damaged by any casualty to an extent not exceeding fifty (50) percent of its area may be restored within two (2) years after such destruction or damage but shall not be enlarged in any manner. If such sign is so destroyed or damaged to an extent exceeding fifty (50) percent, it shall not be reconstructed but may be replaced with a sign that is in full accordance with the provisions of this article. (1) A nonconforming sign which is changed to becoming conforming or is replaced by a conforming sign shall no longer be deemed nonconforming, and thereafter such sign shall be in accordance with the provisions of this article. (a) DIVISION 11.- BY USE AND DISTRICT Section Residential district signs. (a) Except as otherwise prohibited in this Article, the following signs are permitted as accessory to residential uses in residential districts. Moving signs and electronic message signs are prohibited on residential properties in all residential districts. TYPE Tem or. Permanent Size (each/total) 16 sij16 sf. 3 sfj3 sf. Illumination None. Indirect of 125

57 Setback Maximum Hei ht Location Flag pole :s 8" diameter Unlimited Ie None 4ft. Freestanding, portable, wall, or windo 90da s None 4ft. Wall or window sign or affixed to mailbox Unlimited (b) Except as provided otherwise in this Article, the following signs are permitted as accessory tq~~'i~\rllili)~!t?s~d_e!l!i!!1_d!f~t~ t~. _~Jl!2~.i!?U~A~s_ accessory uses for non-residential uses in all residential TYPE Flags Article, the following signs are permitted up to one minor sign per business is of 125

58 (b) Window signs. Window signs are permitted up to 25% of the area of a window and count toward the maximum square footage of wall signs. Window signs are permitted only on the first floor of a building unless the business advertised is only on the floor where the window sign is displayed. (c) Off-Site Signs for Commercial Use oflimited Duration. Up to three off-site signs, each not to exceed 6 square feet and 7 feet in height, shall be permitted for a commercial use lasting for 3 or fewer days on property zoned. No more than one pennitted temporary sign shall be displayed per lot. Display of signs shall be limited to 48 hours prior to commencement, and 48 hours after cessation, of the use or activity advertised. Section Industrial district signs. Except as provided otherwise in this Article, in industrial districts. In addition, up to one the area of a window and count toward the maximum are pennitted only on the first floor of a building floor where the window sign is displayed. LGA AD HOC COMMITTEE MODEL SIGN ORDINANCE ver 3.docx of 125

59 Interim Sign Ordinance (Town of Occoquan) Article VIII. Signs and Advertising* DIVISION 1. GENERALLY Sec Purpose and intent. (a) The purpose of this article is to regulate the size, color, illumination, movement, materials, location, height and construction of all signs placed for public observationfl:ees in order to: (1) Protect the public health, safety, convenience and general welfare; (2) facilitate the creation of a convenient, attractive and harmonious community; (3) Protect property values; and (4) Further the urban design and economic development objectives of the town comprehensive tewft-plan. (b) This article is intended to promote signs that are: (1) Compatible with the landscape/streetscape and architecture of surrounding buildings, including historic sites and structures; (2) Legible and appropriate for the zoning district in which they are found; (3) Not distracting to motorists; and (4) Constructed and maintained in a structurally sound and attractive condition. Sec Applicability. This article shall apply to all signs erected within the town following the effective date. No sign legally erected prior to the effective date shall be altered or moved, except in compliance with the provisions of this article. Sec Nuisances. Any sign in violation of this article is a public nuisance and is subject to remoyal. Sec Penalty for violation. Except as otherwise provided in this article, failure to comply with this article shall be punishable as provided in Virginia Code section -t:--: A of 125

60 Sec Sign permit required. Interim Sign Ordinance (Town of Occoquan) Except as provided in this article, no sign shall be erected, installed, used, altered, relocated, replaced, or reconstructed until a sign permit has been issued.! For the purposes of this article, all signs are considered accessory uses and, unless specifically qualified, shall be located on the same property with the principal use to which they pertain. Sec Definitions. The following words, terms and phrases, when used in this article, shall have the meanings ascribed to them in this section, except where the context clearly indicates a different meaning: A-Frame sign means a two-faced chalk-board sign with supports that are connected at the top and separated at the base, forming an "A" shape. These are also referred to as "sandwich board" signs. Animated sign means a sign or part of a sign that moves or appears to move. Auxiliary sign means a sign that is not more than one square foot in area, not located within five feet of any lot line, and not illuminated. Awning sign means a sign placed directly on the surface of an awning. Banner means a temporary sign of flexible material designed to be installed with attachments at each of four comers. Billboard sign means the same as "Off-premises sign." Box sign means a sign contained in a box. transparent on one side, which is not more than six square feet in area and not more than one foot deep. Canopy sign means a sign attached to a canopy. Chalk-board sign means a single-faced, framed slate or chalk-board that can be written on with chalk or chalk markers. Changeable copy sign means a sign or part of a sign that is designed so that characters, letters or i11ustrations can be changed or rearranged without altering the face or surface of the sign. Censtructien sign means a temporary sigr idertifyirg those ergaged ir corstruction of any building site. DireetienCl[ sign mears ar OR premises sigr desigred to guide vehicalar aad/or pedestrian traffic by using such words as "EntraRce," "Exit," "ParkiRg," "One 'Vay," "More Shops" or similar directional instruction, but not including any ad'/ertising message. Directery sign mears a sign on which the name and locations of occapants or the use of a buildirg is giver. 58 of 125

61 Interim Sign Ordinance (Town of Occoquan) Flag means a flexible material which communicates via distinctive color and/or design and which is flown from a pole; this includes pennants. Flashing sign means a sign used for identification, direction, advertising or promotion that includes lights that flash, blink, or turn on and off intermittently. Ground mounted sign means a sign that is supported by structures or supports in or upon the ground and independent of any support from any building.! ientijic8ti8n sign means a sign that displays only the address, telephone namber, 'Neb address, bhsiness hoars, QR code and name or crest, insignia, or trademark, occapation or profession of an occapant or the name of any bail ding on the premises. Interim Sign means a temporary sign intended to be replaced by a permanent sign pending architectural review board approval. Illegal sign means any sign erected without a permit as described in section or which does not comply with any provisions of this article. Illuminated sign means a sign illuminated internally by an artificial light source. lnstitblti8n81 hbllletin h88ft! sign means a sign containing a sarface apon 'Nhich is displayed the name of a religioas institution, school, library, commanity center, mu:nicipal park, or similar institational or commanity service ase, and the annoancement of its services or activities. Marquee sign means a sign attached to and made part of a marquee or any other similar projection from a building. l',/enbl hex mean a permanently affixed, enclosed frame ased to display menas for a restaarart or food service basiness. Monument sign means a sign affixed to a structure built on grade in which the sign and the structure are an integral part of one another; not a pole sign. Neon sign means an electric sign containing exposed tubes filled with fluorescent gas. Off-premises sign means a sign that is routinely rented for purposes of advertising directs attention to any business, commodity, service or establishment conducted, sold or offered at a location other than the premises on which the sign is erected. Pttddle sign means a sign which is attached to an original sign. Pole sign means the same as "Ground mounted sign." Portable sign means a sign that is not permanently attached to a building or other principal structure. Flags and banners, while moveable, are defined separately. Projecting sign means any sign, other than a wall, awning or marquee sign, affixed to a building and supported only by the wall on which it is mounted. Right-oj-way means access over or across particularly described property for a specific purpose. 59 of 125

62 Interim Sign Ordinance (Town of Occoquan) Roofsign means a sign erected or constructed, in whole or in part, upon or above the highest point of a building with a flat roof, or the lowest portion of a roof for any building with a pitched roof. Sign means any device employing letters, words, symbols, etc., used or intended to attract the attention of the public from streets, sidewalks or other outside public right-of-way. For the purposes of this article, the term "sign" shall include all structural members. The term "Sign" does not include decorations. whether permanent or temporary. that do not incorporate letters, numerals. or logos. Sign area means as defined in section Temporary sign means a sign or advertising display designed or intended to be displayed for a specific period of time, as provided in sections and Wall sign means a sign attached to a wall, or painted on or against a flat vertical surface of a structure, which displays only one advertising surface. Waterfront sign means a sign facing the river on riverfront property. Way finding sign means towr spohsored sighs or maps irdicatihg locatioh of places of irterest or routes ih towh. Window sign means all signs attached to or applied directly onto the internal surface, or set back less than one foot from the interior surface, of any window in view of the general public from outside the structure. Sec Prohibited signs. (a) The following signs are expressly prohibited unless specifically stated otherwise. (1) Off-premises signs, including billboards, except as provided ir sectior (2) Portable signs, or any sign that is not permanently affixed to a building, structure or the ground, except as allowed in section (q). This prohibition shall not apply to authorized temporary signs. No movable sign, and no part of any such sign or its support, shall be placed in any portion of a public right-of-way. (3) Changeable copy signs, excluding approved institutional bulletin boards, theater signs, and fuel price signs as permitted by this article. (4) Simulated traffic signs or any sign that may be confused with or obstruct the view of any authorized traffic sign or signal. (5) Animated signs, including but not limited to pennants, propellers, discs and wind socks. This prohibition shah not apply to the hands of a clock, a weathervane, balloons meeting the requirements of section (s), digital media meeting the requirements of section (r), or flags meeting the requirements of section (d) or (f). 60 of 125

63 Interim Sign Ordinance (Town of Occoquan) (6) Flashing signs and electronic message boards, including time and temperature signs, but not including digital media meeting the requirements of section (l-8-r). (7) Glaring signs with light sources of such brightness as to constitute a hazard or nuisance-as determined by the architectural revie..." board, but not including digital media meeting the requifements of section (r). (8) Strings of colored lights outlining property lines, sales areas, or any portion of a structure unless part of an approved sign or sign-structure. This prohibition shall not apply to seasonal decorations. (9) Roof signs. (10) Signs affixed to a tree, other natural vegetation or rocks. (11) Signs that obstruct the visibility at intersections or block any window, door, fire escape, stairway or any opening intended for light, air or access to any building. (12) Signs erected in or over a public right-of-way, or on public land except as permitted in this Gedeby the Town or a State agency. (13) Home occupation sign. Reserved. (14) Canopy sign. (15) Neon or LED signs (i.e. Open/Closed, Coffee, etc.) except as permitted by section {r}. (16) Signs that emit sound, odor or smoke. (17) Signs attached to utility or other poles in the public right-of-way except as authorized by the utility or pole provider. (18) Signs attached, painted or otherwise affixed to, or placed in or upon, any parked vehicle or trailer which is obyiously and conspicuously parked so as to advertise the business to the passing motorist or pedestrian; and the primary purpose of which is to provide additional signage, or is to serve the function of an outdoor advertising sign. Reserved. (19) In the Historic District, lighted vending machines when any part of the machines is visible from the public right-of-way. (b) Tacking, painting, posting, or otherwise affixing of signs or posters or handbills visible from the public highways on the walls of buildings, barns, sheds, trees, posts, poles, fences, walls, cars or other structures, except as provided for in this article, is prohibited. Sec Exempt signs and flags. Sign permits shall not be required for the following signs; however, all other applicable regulations of this article shall apply. If any of the following exempt signs include a logo, 61 of 125

64 Interim Sign Ordinance (Town of Occoquan) business name, trademark, or similar identifying element, it will COl:lnt toward be treated as a commercial signage. (a) Address or identification signs as defined in section , not to exceed two sql:lare feet in area-:-reserved. (b) Changing the message content of an approved institutional bulletin board or theater marquee sign. (c) Commemorative plaql:les and historical markers erected by a recognized historical agency or go';ernmental body. Reserved. (d) Flags set back from each property line at least the height of the pole on which it is hung; emblems and insignias of any governmental agency or religiol:ls, charitable, pl:lblic or nonprofit organization; howe"<'er, no single flag shall exceed 50 square feet in area. (e) Disabled parking space sign. Reserved. (f) Directional Not more than two auxiliary signs per lot.; not exceeding one sql:lare foot in area, not located within five feet of any lot line, not incorporating bl:lsiness Harne or logo, and not illl:lminated. (g) Security and warning signs posted on private property warning the pl:lblic against trespassing, or similar messages, provided that any sl:lch sign does not exceed 1.5 sql:lare feet in area. Reserved. (h) Private drive signs, one per entrance, not exceeding two sql:lare feet in area, with the message content limited to the words "Private Drive" and the address of any residences l:ltilizing the private roadway. Reserved. (i) Public signs, including traffic, utility and other regulatory signs. (j) Seasonal or temporary displays of patriotic, religiol:ls or civic character on private property, not advertising a prodl:lct or service, displayed from November 1 to January 15 or at other times for a period not to exceed 30 days. Reserved. (k) Signs not visible beyond the boundaries of the lot or parcel upon which they are located, or from any public right-of-way. (1) Temporary political signs on private property, if posted with the permission of the property owner, not to exceed a total of sixteen square feet in area and not exceeding six feet in height. Temporary signs may be displayed for a maximum of 90 days. If pertaining to an election or referendl:lm, sl:lch signs shall be removed within fiye days after the election. If, after reasonable notice, Sl:lch signs are not remoyed, the town may remove them; and the candidate, organization or person who caused the sign to be erected may be charged for the removal. (m) Temporary priyate yard sale signs, not exceeding three in nl:lmber per yard sale and not. placed in a pl:lblic right of way. All sl:lch signs are to be remoyed within 24 hours of the end of the sale. Reserved. 62 of 125

65 Interim Sign Ordinance (Town of Occoquan) (n) Temporary real estat:e SigHs, locat:ed OH the premises, Hot exeeedibg fo1:lr sqhare feet ib area fur sihgle family residebtial districts, or eight sq1:lare feet ib area for other zohihg districts. Ne real estate sigb shall exceed a height of six feet. DBe real esta:t:e sigb shall be permitted OB each let, except OB eomer lots, whieh may haye two s1:leh SigBS. Temporary real estate SigHS shall be rernot/ed vt'ithib seyen days of the settlemebt or lease of the property. Reserved. _(1) Real estate SigHS m1:lst clearly swe what: is for sale or rent (e.g., b1:lildibg or b1:lsiness). (2) Real estate SigHS for Hew deyelopments require temporary/interim sigb permits ih aecordabee with seetiob (3). (0) Signs attached temporarily to the interior of a whole window or glass door. Such signs, individually or collectively, shall not cover more than 25 percent of the surface area of the transparent portion of the window or door to which they are attached and shall not be posted for more than 30 days. (p) Vehicle safety ibspeetiob sigbs Bot exceeding teb sq1:lare feet ib area. Such sigbs may be either a 'Nail sigb or attached to an existing aathorized gro1:lhd mounted sigb struct1:lre (obe per business) not to exceed the height of the gro1:lbd m01:lbted sigb. Reserved. (q) Up to two portable signs, A-frame and/or chalk-board, per business. Size shall not exceed two feet by three feet. Frames shall be either wood or metal and may be black, natural wood tone, or similar historic color as recommended for the business' hanging/wall sign. The A frames/chalk-boards shall not have a pre-printed logo; must be placed away from doorways and the public right-of-way; if leaning or standing, may not project more than two feet from the building; shall not be placed within any portion of the right-of-way; and, if a chalk-board, may be hung on the exterior of the building with hooks or eyes or leaned against the building independently or on a stand. (r) One digital media device per business for window display.:! to promote the b1:lsiness' prod1:lcts or seryices, b1:lt not displaying a static store name or logo and not to exceed 25% of the window area. (s) Balloons no more than 50 inches in circumference and not displayed higher than 10 feet from the ground. (t) One wall-mounted menu-box sign per restaurant or food-service business, no larger thab PNO feet by three feet and either not illuminated or illuminated with steady white light. (u) Web address strip or other words as part of a One window display ene-per window of each building located in a commercial zoning district, on a clear background with letters no larger than three inches in recommended ARB colors and placed along the top or bottom of the window frame. (v) Magnetic or permanently affixed vehicle signs where the signs are incidental to the vehicle's daily use in conducting business in conjunction with the vehicle sign. In order to be deemed an "incidental" vehicle sign, the vehicle must be used in the daily operation of the business, 63 of 125

66 Interim Sign Ordinance (Town of Occoquan) properly parked in a legal parking space for not more than 12 continuous hours per business day, and in working order. If the vehicle does not meet these requirements, the sign will be considered a prohibited sign under section (a)(2). (w) Decorati'fe yard: flags OH residehtiallots, fohr sqhare:reet ih area or less and HloHHtecl on a Hletal or 'llooclen frahle. Reserved. (x) Signs erected by the Town of Occoquan on public property or with the permission of the property owner. Sec Signs requiring temporary/interim sign permit. (a) The followihg sighs shall reqhire the isshahce of a temporarylihterihl sigh permit l:ly the architectural re'fiew l:loard: prior to their erectioh. The permit shall cite the lehgth of tihle ahy shch sigh Hlay l:le clisplayecl. If after the expiratioh of the tehlporarylihterihl sign pefhlit shch sighs are Hot rehlo ecl, the towh Hlay rehlo'/e thehl ancl charge the costs of rehloyal to the ehterprise or proprietor respohsihle. (1) TeHlporary ahcl seasoha} prodhce stahd sighs, the total area of which shall Hot exceed 16 sqhare feet, Hor shall ahj' sign exceed fohr feet in height. (2.) Construction signs, Hot to exceecl one per street frontage. The total area of all shch signs shall not exceed 16 sqhare feet. SHch signs shall he rehloyed williih 14 days following completion of constmction. (3) TeHJ:porary residehtial shl:ldivision ahd Hlodel hohle iclemification signs. One sigh Hlay l:le erected for not Hlore thah two years at each prihcipal ehtrahce to the de'lelophleht. SHCR signs shall Hot exceed eight feet ift height or 16 sqhare:reet ih area. 1ft addition, OHe HlOde} hohle sign of Hot Hlore thah fohr sqhare feet Hlay he HlaiHtaifted at each Hlodel hohle. (4) Temporary sighs ahftohhcihg a chlie, philahthropic, educatiohal or religiohs eveht. 8Hch SigHS shall not exceecl16 sqhare feet ih area or six feet in height. The 10catioH of the sigh shall he detefhlihecll:ly the architectural review l:loard. 8Hch sighs shall Hot l:le erectecl more thah 14 clays prior to the eveht and shalll:le rehlo'led..."ithih five clays after the e'leht. Reserved. (b) Special events hbanners shall require the issuance of a permit by the Town Maaager prior to their erection. All other l:lanners, inclhdiag those promoting comhlereiai prodhcts or vlith logos, are prohil:litecl. Banner colors shall be consistent with those recommended in the ARB guidelines. The applicant is limited to four colors per banner, including black and white. Banners shall be installed in a taut manner to restrict movement and shall be maintained in this manner at all times. The fihal decisioh of the appropriatehess of a l:lahher yershs other ARB appro'led signage 64 of 125

67 Interim Sign Ordinance (Town of Occoquan) rests '/lith tke business owner. Banners are discouraged in the Historic distriet if otker signage will appropriately convey the merchant's message. +Be-bBanner permit. SHall cite the lengtk of time any Slick baooer may be displayed. Tkia time span-shall be for 20 consecutive days for grand openings or closings, 10 days for "feamred artist" and "book signings", and 10 days per business, and no more than twice in one calendar year;4ef other special events (suck as anniversary). Such banners shall be attached to an existing principal structure (with a clearance of at least 12" from the edge of the store or building) or sign pole. They must not obscure architectural features of the building (such as windows, railings or ornamentation) and shall not exceed 16 square feet in total area. They may be hung in a horizontal or vertical manner and shall be attached at all four comers in a taut manner. THey skall be removed '<'lithin t\'lo days follm ing tke end of tke event as per permit. Ifafter the expiration of the permit such banners are not removed, the town may remove them and charge the costs of removal to the applicant. Banners installed and used for special events and festivals sponsored by the Town of Occoquan may be erected without a permit and shall be removed within two days after the event. Sec Gt-!neral sign standards. (a) Determination ofsign height. The height of a sign shall be measured from the average elevation of the street to which the sign is oriented. (b) Number ofsign faces. No sign shall have more than two sign faces. (c) Determination ofsign area. The area of a sign shall be determined by measuring the surface area encompassing any regular geometric figure (square, circle, rectangle, etc.) enclosing all parts of the sign face. The supports or structure on which any sign is supported shall not be included in determining the sign area unless such supports or structure are designed in such manner as to form an integral background of the display; except, however, when a sign is placed on a fence, wall, planter or other similar structure that is designed to serve a separate purpose other than to support the sign, the entire area of such structure shall not be computed. (d) Computation ofarea. To compute area of sign faces separated by an interior angle of 45 degrees or more, both sign faces shall be included. When sign faces are separated by an interior angle of less than 45 degrees, one sign face shall be included; however, the area of the largest sign face shall be used when two faces are unequal in area. (e) Blank space. At least 50 percent of total sign area must remain blank space. Sec Development standards for permitted sign types and flags. All new signs and flags and all existing signs and flags which are replaced, reconstructed, extended or changed structurally or in content shall comply with the following development 65 of 125

68 Interim Sign Ordinance (Town of Occoquan) standards. No sign shall cover, cross or otherwise hide columns, railings, belt courses, or other decorative architectural features of a building, including balconies. (a) Ground mounted signs shall have a maximum height of eight feet. (b) Projecting sign development standards are: (1) Angle of projection shall be 90 degrees. (2) The limit on projection shall be five feet or one-third the width of the sidewalk, whichever is less. (3) Projection over a right-of-way is prohibited if it obstructs pedestrian or vehicular traffic. (4) Minimum clearance shall be seven feet. (c) Wall sign development standards are: (1) The limit on projection shall be six inches. (2) Permanent window signs shall be limited in area to 25 percent of the window area or 25 square feet, whichever is less, and shall be included in the sign area calculation. (d) Awning and marquee signs development standards are: (1) The location must be parallel to the face and not projecting above or below the face of the awning, or marquee. (2) The limit on projection shall be within one foot of the vertical placement of curbs, but shall in no way interfere or obstruct either pedestrian or vehicular traffic. (3) The limit on projection of a marquee shall be to within one foot of the face of the building but in no way shall interfere or obstruct either pedestrian or vehicular traffic. (e) Waterfront signs shall be no wider or taller than the riverfront face of the building. They may be wall or ground mounted or projecting, but if ground mounted or projecting then no part of the sign shall be visible from Mill Street or Poplar Lane. (f) Flags shall be no larger than square feet. The angle of projection shall be between 45 and 90 degrees; multiple businesses on the same zoning lot shall hang flags at the same angle of projection. Flags shall not obscure other businesses or architectural features of a building; they shall not interfere with pedestrian walkways or rights-of-way; when hung over a right-of-way, they shall have a seven foot ground clearance. Sec Construction and maintenance standards. (a) Building code compliance. All signs shall be constructed in compliance with the Virginia Uniform Statewide Building Code. 66 of 125

69 L I_n_te_ri_m_S~ig:::..n_O_r_dl_ n_an_c_e~(t_o_w_n_o_f_o_cc_o...,!qu_an--,-) ----' (b) Condition ofsigns and flags. All signs, flags and components shall be maintained in good repair and in a safe, clean and attractive condition. (c) Repair or removal ofnuisance signs or flags. Any sign, flag and/or support declared by the zoning administrator to be an immediate or imminent hazard to life or property may be caused to be immediately removed or repaired. All costs associated with the removal or repair shall be charged to the owner of the premises. (d) Removal ofobsolete signs orflags. Any sign or flag that is obsolete because of discontinuance of the advertised activity, or any other reason that would cause the sign or flag andlor support to be obsolete, shall be removed within 30 days of becoming obsolete. Thereafter, that sign or flag will be illegal. Sec Nonconforming signs. (a) Generally. Any sign lawfully in existence on the effective date of this ordinance, which does not conform to the provisions of this article, and any sign accessory to a nonconforming use, shall be deemed a nonconforming sign and may remain except as qualified in subsection (b) of this section. No nonconforming sign shall be enlarged, extended, structurally reconstructed or altered in any manner. (b) Removal ofnonconforming signs. Nonconforming signs may remain, provided they are kept in good repair, except for the following: (1) Damage or destruction ofnonconforming sign. A nonconforming sign that is destroyed or damaged to the extent exceeding 50 percent of its appraised value shall not be altered, replaced or reinstalled unless it is in conformance with this article. If the damage or destruction is 50 percent or less of the appraised value, the sign may be restored within two months of the destruction, but shall not be changed in any manner. (2) Damage or destruction ofuse. A nonconforming sign shall be removed if the structure or use to which it is accessory is destroyed or demolished to the extent exceeding 50 percent of the principal structure's appraised value. (3) Change ofuse. Whenever a change of use occurs upon a zoning lot that contains a nonconforming sign, such sign shall not be permitted without being modified in such manner as to be in full compliance with this article. Sec Outdoor Merchandise Displays. Outdoor merchandise displays by businesses with first floor frontage are permitted during business hours. The merchandise must be stored inside when the business which displays it is closed. Merchandise shall not be placed in the public right-of-way, nor shall it obscure the architectural features of a building (columns, railings, belt courses, balconies or other decorative 67 of 125

70 Interim Sign Ordinance (Town of Occoquan) features) or extend past the length of the storefront. Permanent display tables or racks or other permanent display pieces are prohibited outside of buildings. All items and displays shall be safe and stable with no risk of overturning due to wind or contact. No signs may be placed upon or hung from outdoor merchandise. DIVISION 2. SIGNS AND FLAGS PERMITTED BY ZONING DISTRICf Sec Generally. This division specifies the types and sizes of signs and flags permitted within the various zoning districts within the town. Sec Residential zoning districts; permitted signs and flags. (a) General regulations. (1) Minimum setback. The minimum setback shall be five feet from all public rights-of-way unless further restricted by the provisions of this article. (2) Illumination ofsigns in residenfial disfricfs. The following s,s.igns may not be illuminated except as expressly permitted in this sectionby white light only: _a. Institutional bulletih boards. b. Residential development identification sighs. (b) Signs and flags for permitted principal uses. Signs and flags for permitted principal uses are regulated as follows: (1) For single-family and two-family dwellings, no signs or flags are allowed except for those exempt from permit requirements and temporary signs authorized in sections and , respectively. (2) For residential developments, permanent subdivision or de'/elopment signs indicating only the name and/or address of the premises are allowed. The identification sign shall be ground mounted sign(s) are permitted, ane-with the maximum number, sign area and height shall be determined as follows: a. For developments of ten units or less, one ground mounted sign, not to exceed six square feet in area or eight feet in height. The sign may be illuminated by steady white light only. b. For developments of 11 units or more, one ground mounted sign at each major entrance, not to exceed 12 square feet in area or eight feet in height. The sign may be illuminated by steady white light only. (c) Signs for accessory uses. Signs for accessory uses are regulated as follows: 68 of 125

71 Interim Sign Ordinance (Town of Occoquan) (1) For accessory management or rental offices, one wall or projecting sign up to four square feet in area. (2) For other accessory uses, one wall or projecting sign up to four square feet in area. (d) Signs for special exception and conditionally permitted uses. Signs for special exception and conditionally permitted uses are as provided in the permit. reg1:llated as follows: (1) For iastit1:ltioaal b1:l11etia boards, oae grouad mouated or wall siga per use, aot to exceed eight sq1:lare feet ia area aad, if a gro1:lad m01:lated sign, six feet in height. (2) For other special exceptioa aad coaditioaally permitted 1:lses, oae slga of any type idertifyiag obly the narne and/or address of the premises, aot to exceed eight sq1:lare feet ia area aad, if a ground mourted siga, six feet ia heigkt. Sec Business and old and historic districts; permitted signs and flags. (a) General regulations. (1) All development and construction signs requiring a permit shall comply with the requirements of sections and (2) Any sign erected within 100 feet of either an existing residential use or a residential zoning district shall be non:illuminated and limited to 16 square feet in area. (3) The maximum permitted area of a waterfront sign is two square feet per linear foot of the building's riverfront width. If more than one business is located on a riverfront parcel, then they may share the maximum permitted area in a single sign or in multiple signs, each of which meets the restrictions imposed by this Chapter. (b) Signs andflags for individual businesses on a single zoning lot. A single business located on one zoning lot may erect signs and flags as follows: (1) With the exception of riverfront property, the maximum number of signs and flags in combination per business shall be four; riverfront businesses may also have one waterfront sign. No zoning lot shall be permitted to have both a ground mounted sign and a projecting sign, unless one is a waterfront sign. (2) Types of signs permitted are wall, ground mounted, projecting, awning, waterfront or marquee. (3) The maximum size of signs other than waterfront signs shall be, for: a. A wall or marquee sign, 16 square feet. b:a ground mounted sign, 16 square feet. c. An awning sign, one square foot per linear foot of the awning, up to ten square feet. 69 of 125

72 Lmm Interim Sign Ordinance (fown of Occoquan) d. A projecting sign, one square foot per linear foot of building frontage on which the sign is to be attached, up to 16 square feet. e. Paddle signs are permitted prol/ided the measuring of the square foot area of such signs shall be the total square foot area of all the signs, induding the area of the open space between each sigh-: (c) Signs andflagsfor multiple businesses on a single zoning lot. Multiple businesses located on a single zoning lot may erect signs and flags as follows: (1) With the exception of ri verfront property, the maximum number of signs and flags in combination per business shall be four; riverfront businesses may also have one waterfront sign. (2) Types of signs permitted are wall, ground mounted, projecting, awning, marquee, and waterfront; or paddle signs. All signs must be harmonious as to color and lettering, and must be eithef-.in historic or restoration shadesarb colors. (3) The maximum size of signs other than waterfront signs shall be 16 square feet. (4) Other than a waterfront sign, each business on a single zoning lot may have four signs and flags in combination, one of which may be a projecting sign. (5) Other than a waterfront sign, no more than one ground mounted sign per business, maximum of 16 square feet in area and eight feet in height is allowed. (6) Only the Town of Occoquan may erect directional signs indicating "More Shops" or other signs with similar wording. Sec Sign permit procedures. DIVISION 3. ADMINISTRATION (a) Applicability. A sign permit shall be required for all signs erected after December 12, 1995, except for those signs specifically excluded from the sign permit requirements as provided in section (b) Filing ofapplication; fees. Applications for sign permits shall be filed on a form provided by the town by the applicant or his agent. Applications for permits for signs in the Old and Historic District shall be subject to review and approval by the architectural review board, shall contain infonnatlon required in subsection (c) of this section, and shall be accompanied by a fee, as established from time to time by resolution of the to'lin council. All applications for permits for signs outside the Old and Historic District shall be subject to the review and approval of the Town Manager Zoning Administrator, and shall contain information required in subsection (c) of this section, and shall be accompanied by a fee, as established from time to time by resolution of the town council. Denial of a pennit by the Town Manager may be appealed to the Town Council. 70 of 125

73 c===-- I_n~re~ri~m~S~ig~n_O~r~ru= n=~~c~e~~=o~w~n=o~f~oc~ro~q~u~~) ~ (c) Information required. All applications for sign permits shall contain or have attached thereto the following information in either written or graphic form: (1) Name, address and telephone number of the sign erector and the sign owner. (2) Positions of the sign in relation to adjacent lot lines, buildings, sidewalks, streets and intersections. (3) Type of sign and general description of structural design and construction materials to be used. (4) Purpose of the proposed sign. Reserved. (5) Drawings of the proposed sign, which shall contain specifications indicating the height, perimeter and area dimensions, means of support, method of illumination, colors, and other significant aspects of the proposed sign. (d) ReeeFding o:/sign permit. The atchitectural review board shall maintain a record of all sign permits issued. All sign permits shall be numbered in the order of their issuance. In addition, the architectural revievl board will maintain a list of non conforming signs (Le. signs legally erected prior to January I, 2012 that would not otherwise be permitted) as they are discovered or recognized. If the architectural re'lie'll board denies a sign application, the applicant may request that a written statement be issued no later than two weeks after the denial, citing the code section and/or architectural review board guidelines basis for denial. Reserved. (e) Inspections. A final inspection shall be completed after installation of approved signs. Any discrepancies between the approved sign and the sign as constructed shall be identified and may result in the halt of construction or sign removal, if so ordered by the zoning administrator or the architectural reyiew board Town. (f) Revocations. The zoning administrator Town or the architecrural re'lievl boatd may revoke a permit or approval if it is found that there has been concealment or misrepresentation of material facts in either the application or plans. Sec Temporary sign permit procedures. (a) All applications for signs requiring the issuance of a temporary sign permit, as established in section , shall contain all information requested by the architectural review board prior to the issuance of such permit. The approved permit shall include the expiration date of the temporary permit. The applicant may request extensions of the permit for good cause. Temporary signs remaining after the expiration of the permit shall be considered obsolete. (b) All applications for banners, as established in section , shall contain all information requested by the Town Manager prior to the issuance of such permit. The approved permit shall include the expiration date of the temporary permit. The applicant may request extensions of the 71 of 125

74 Interim Sign Ordinance (Town of Occoquan) permit for good cause. Banners remaining after the expiration of the permit shall be considered obsolete. Sec Expiration of sign permits; signs not constructed. A sign permit shall expire and become null and void if the approved sign is not erected within a period of 12 months from the date the permit was originally issued. The Townarehitectaral re ie'n board may grant one extension of the sign permit for a period of six months, but in no case shall a permit be valid for more than a total of 18 months. Extensions may be granted only when the proposed sign is in compliance with all current applicable regulations. Sec Variaaees to sign FeguiatioHs HOt permitted. Unless specifically ahthorized in this diyision, no variance to the standards established for reghlating the type, size or location of signs shall be ahtliorized, except by affirmative action of the town cohnch. Reserved. Sec Removal of signs. (a) Illegal signs. The zoning administrator or the architectural revie'll board Town may remove or order the removal of any illegal sign at the expense of the property owner. Placement of an illegal sign shall be a class 4 misdemeanor. (b) Structurally unsafe signs. Whenever.. in the opinion of the zoning administrator or building official, the arehitectural rellie"", board a sign becomes structurally unsafe or endangers the safety of a building or premises. or endangers the public safety, or is in need of maintenance, the zoning administrator shall order that such sign be made safe, repaired or removed. Such order shall be complied with within five days of receipt of the order by the person owning or using the sign or the owner of the building or premises on which such unsafe sign is affixed or erected. 72 of 125

75 AN ORDINANCE TO AMEND THE CODE OF THE COUNTY OF CHESTERFIELD, 1997, AS AMENDED, BY REPEALING CHAPTER 19 (ZONING ORDINANCE) AND AMENDING AND REENACTING SECTIONS , , THROUGH AND RELATED TO SIGNS AND ASSOCIATED FEES BE IT ORDAINED by the Board of Supervisors of Chesterfield County: (1) That Chapter 19 o/the Code o/the County o/chesterfield, 1997, as amended, is repealed and Sections , , through and are amended and reenacted to read as/ollows: : Adopted as Amended 9/16/15 73 of 125

76 Sec Enforcement of Chapter. 000 C. Repetitive Violations. 1. Computer Controlled Variable Message Electronic (EMC) Sign. If 2 notices of violation for an EMC sign are issued within 12 months, the planning department may issue a suspension of the sign permit for a period of up to 30 days. For each violation following the initial suspension period, the director of planning can suspend the sign permit for a period of up to 30 days. During suspension periods, the EMC sign shall be disconnected from electric power. 2. Planning Sign Permit. The planning department may deny a planning sign permit application for up to 1 year from the issuance of the most recent notice of violation if a property, business, or organization has received 2 notices of violation for regulations related to signs requiring a planning sign permit in any 12 month period. 000 D. Misdemeanor Violations. With the exception of violations which may be subject to civil penalties as outlined in E., violations of this chapter shall be considered misdemeanors. 1. Notice of Violation. 000 b. Contents of Notice and Time Period to Comply. The notice shall set forth: o the nature of the violation; o the time period required for compliance; o a statement informing the recipient of the right to appeal the notice within 30 days to the board of zoning appeals in accordance with this chapter; o the appeal fee; o location of information regarding the filing of an appeal; and o a statement that the notice of violation is unappealable if not appealed within 30 days of the date of the notice. With respect to violations involving the parking or display of motor vehicles, prohibited signs, limited duration signs, or computer controlled variable message electronic (EMC) signs, the person shall remedy the violation within 24 hours of service of the notice, unless an extension is granted. For all other violations, the person shall remedy the violation within 10 days after service of the notice, unless an extension is granted : Adopted as Amended 9/16/15 74 of 125

77 Sec Fees. 000 Building Permit for New Single, Two Family or Townhouse Dwelling Sign Permit Schematic or Overall Development Plan Site Plan Planning All other Approved Schematic, Overall Initial Submittal plus 2 Revision Submittals Submittals Subsequent to First 3 Submittals 40 per unit o o 1400 plus 70 per acre in excess of 1 acre 700 per submittal 1400 plus 70 per acre in excess of 1 acre[l) 350 per submittal!l] Appeal Planning Director's Decision on Site Plan 700 Plan Transfer to Electronic Format per Sec G. 130 Deferral Request from Planning Commission Hearing{ Meeting 1000 for first deferral plus 2000 for each deferral thereafter [l}[2] Notes for Table C. [I] For any office, commercial or industrial use within an enterprise zone, enterprise subzone or technology zone as designated by the county code, an application fee shall not be required. [2] Fee to be paid by applicant requesting or consenting to deferral : Adopted as Amended 9116/15 75 of 125

78 Sec Purpose and Intent of Sign Standards. The purpose and intent of sign standards are to regulate publicly visible displays or graphics, protect and enhance the character of roads and surrounding areas, prevent diminishing property values due to excessive signage, safeguard the public use and nature of roads, and minimize motorist distractions. The standards are specifically designed to: o promote maximum sign legibility; o prevent over-concentration of signs as well as excessive height, bulk and area of signs; o promote safety by requiring that signs not create a hazard due to collapse, fire, collision, decay or abandonment, obstruct firefighting or police surveillance, nor create traffic hazards by confusing or distracting motorists or by impairing a driver's ability to see pedestrians, obstacles or other vehicles, or to read traffic signs; and o identify a destination. Sec Prohibited Signs. The following shall be prohibited: o Unless specifically permitted, changeable copy signs; o Sound or smoke producing signs; o Moving signs intended to attract attention, regardless of whether or not the sign has a written message or whether all or any part of it moves by means including, but not limited to, rotating, fluttering or being set in motion by movement of the atmosphere. This prohibition includes pennants, but does not include commercial or noncommercial flags, routine operation of the hands of a clock, or computer controlled variable message electronic (EMC) signs; o Commercial signs held or carried to attract attention; o Persons dressed in costumes and acting to attract attention to a commercial activity; o Attention getting devices such as pennants, streamers, balloons or inflatable devices of any configuration acting to attract attention to any use other than noncommercial activity at a residential use; o Signs with flashing lights, intermittent lights or lights with changing degrees of intensity, excluding computer controlled variable message electronic (EMC) signs; o o Internally lighted canopies or awnings constructed of translucent material; Commercial signs on a parked automobile, motor vehicle, tractor trailer or trailer when used primarily for the purpose of, and serving the function of, a sign, except when parked in the operator's driveway, when loading or unloading, or when parked to the side or rear of a nonresidential building and not visible from adjacent roads; : Adopted as Amended 9/16/15 76 of 125

79 o Signs greater than 48 square inches on a parked automobile, motor vehicle, tractor trailer or trailer, which display a commercial message that is unrelated to an activity or enterprise of the owner or operator of the vehicle or trailer; and o Outdoor advertising signs. Sec Sign Permits. A. Signs Requiring a Sign Permit. A sign permit shall be required for a sign, excluding banners, originally built or enlarged to be in excess of 8 square feet, and for any enlargement, structural alteration or modification of these signs other than sign refacing. B. Signs Requiring a Planning Sign Permit. On a vacant lot, a lot occupied by a nonresidential use, property at the entrance to a residential community, or an 0, C and I property, a planning sign permit shall be obtained for any sign for which a sign permit is not required except for offsite signs outlined in Section C.5. Applications shall not be submitted more than 30 days prior to the proposed display date. C. Sign and Planning Sign Permit Applications. 1. Number of Required Applications. Exc"ept for computer controlled variable message electronic (EMC) signs, a single application may be made for multiple signs as follows: o signs within a single project; and o limited duration signs on multiple properties. A separate application shall be required for each EMC sign. 2. Application Information. Applications shall include information deemed necessary by the planning department to ensure compliance with this division. Sec General Re ulations. A. Signs Generally. Unless otherwise provided, the following regulations shall apply to al1 signs and are in addition to other regulations contained herein: 1. Except as otherwise specified in this division, commercial signs shall be related to the premises. 2. A noncommercial message may be substituted, in whole or in part, for the message displayed on any sign which conforms to this chapter without consideration of message content. Such substitution of message may be made without any additional approval, permitting, registration or notice. The purpose of this provision is to prevent any inadvertent favoring of commercial speech over noncommercial speech, or favoring of any particular noncommercial message over any other noncommercial message. Whenever a zoning lot has not used all of its permissible sign area, then the unused portion may be used for the display of signs displaying noncommercial messages. Anyon-site commercial message may be substituted, in whole or in part, for any other on-site commercial message : Adopted as Amended 9/16/15 77 of 125

80 3. Signs posted by, or required to be posted by any government or governmental agency shall be exempt from this division. 4. Signs posted solely for traffic control, public safety, or hazard warnings shall be exempt from this division. 5. Signs shall be structurally safe and maintained in good condition. 6. Signs shall not obstruct an opening intended to provide light, air, or building ingress or egress. 7. Freestanding signs shall not overhang any portion of a building. 8. Signs shall not unreasonably obstruct the view of other signs from roads. 9. Signs shall not be posted on trees, utility poles or traffic control devices. 10. Sign position, shape and color shall not interfere with, obstruct the view of, or cause confusion with, a traffic sign, traffic signal, or other traffic control device. 11. Sign lighting shall not impair a driver's vision, obstruct police surveillance, or cause direct glare into or upon, property other than that on which the sign is located. 12. Signs shall not obstruct firefighting access. 13. For signs requiring a sign permit, a survey prepared by a registered civil engineer or surveyor certifying the location, height, and area of the sign shall be submitted following erection of the sign, if requested by the planning department. 14. Unless otherwise specified in this chapter, signs shall be permanent. 15. For freestanding signs outlined in Section which require a sign permit, the permit number and date of issuance shall be permanently affixed so as to be clearly legible from the ground. 16. Twelve (12) months after the advertised use or activity ceases, a sign shall be removed, unless a shorter time period is specified in this chapter. B. Comprehensive Sign Package for Nonresidential Communities. Prior to the first site plan approval for a nonresidential community, a comprehensive sign package for all proposed signs shall be submitted to the planning department for approval. The sign package shall include information necessary to ensure compliance with this chapter, such as, but not limited to, conceptual sign renderings or descriptions with sizes, lighting, and general locations. All signs shall conform to the following: letter style and graphic display of signs shall be similar; : Adopted as Amended of 125

81 area, location, and material of signs shall substantially conform to building and site design; freestanding sign structures shall be similar; a single type of building mounted display shall be used; background colors of sign boxes shall be similar; and other than the primary sign, signs for each individual use shall have the same background color which shall be one of the colors of the primary sign. C. Measurement of Signs. 1. Building Mounted. The area of building mounted signs shall be determined as follows: Projecting Sign. The area of a rectangle or square encompassing the extreme limits of each individual sign face, including all background visible from any direction at anyone time; Canopy or Awning Sign. The area of the surface upon which the sign copy is located; Individually Mounted or Painted Copy Sign. If the copy is not emphasized by an architectural or painted element of the building, the sum of the area within a series of rectangles or squares encompassing each individual figure. If the copy is emphasized by an architectural or painted element of the building, the area shall be determined in accordance with the requirements for Other Building Mounted Signs as outlined below; and Other Building Mounted Signs. The area of a rectangle, square, circle, triangle or combination thereof encompassing the extreme limits of copy. 2. Freestanding. a. Area. The area of a sign shall be that of a rectangle, square, circle, triangle or combination thereof encompassing the extreme limits of copy. The area of a 2 or more sided sign, where the interior angle between sides exceeds 90 degrees, shall be the sum of the area of the copy on all sides. b. Height. Except as stated herein, sign height shall be the vertical distance from grade level to the top of the sign copy: the height of a sign installed on an artificially created berm, mound or similar feature shall include the height of such feature; or the height of sign adjacent to a road and installed below the grade of the nearest travel lane shall be the vertical distance from such lane grade to the top of the sign copy : Adopted as Amended 9/16/15 79 of 125

82 Sec Sign Setbacks and Lightin A. Signs Permitted in VDOT Right-of-Way. In addition to the signs outlined in B., the following signs may be placed within the right-of-way if approved by the Virginia Department of Transportation: signs posted by, on behalf of, or with permission of, a governmental agency or public utility; noncommercial signs within a median strip at the entrances to residential, nonresidential, or mixed use communities; and limited duration banners across a road in Special Design Districts related to a noncommercial activity within the District. B. Road Setbacks. Except where expressly stated, signs shall meet the following requirements: 1. Road Setbacks. Except as outlined herein, setbacks shall be measured from the existing right-of-way. If a sign is permitted to be located within an ultimate right-of-way shown on the comprehensive plan, or an existing right-of-way, the owner shall be responsible for relocating the sign to conform to the setback requirements at such time that the road is widened. Signs shall conform to the following setbacks: a. Except as outlined b., signs shall be set back as follows: in Special Design Districts,S feet from the right-of-way; or in other areas, 20 feet from the edge of the pavement or face of curb as applicable, but in no case less than 1 foot from the right-of-way. b. Along the following roads, signs may be located within the ultimate right-of-way shown on the comprehensive plan if the right-of-way is dedicated, free and unrestricted, to the county, a license agreement is obtained from the board of supervisors, and the signs are set back 20 feet from the edge of the pavement or face of the curb, as applicable: o Route 60 between the Powhatan County line and Winterfield Road; o Route 60 between Old Buckingham Road and the Richmond corporate limits; o Route 360; o Route 10 between the Richmond corporate limits and Buckingham Street; o Route 10 between Jefferson Davis Highway and the Hopewell corporate limits; o Huguenot Road; o Courthouse Road between Route 60 and Route 360; o Harrowgate Road; and o Jefferson Davis Highway. 2. Other Property Line Setbacks. Signs shall be set back 15 feet from all other property lines :94%2.2 Adopted as Amended 9/ of 125

83 C. Lighting. 1. Generally. Lighting shall be arranged and installed so that the light source is not visible from adjacent roads, adjacent R, R-TH or R-MF property, or adjacent A property designated on the comprehensive plan for residential use. Lighting shall not blink, fluctuate or move. 2. Sign Lighting on Rand MH Property, and on A Property Designated on the Comprehensive Plan for Residential Use--Hours Limitations. Excluding residential community entrance signs and signs on public park or school properties, nonresidential use signs shall not be lighted between the hours of 10 pm. and 6 a.m. 3. External lighting. External lighting shall be limited to white lighting in spots or floods which are concealed or screened from view. If external lighting is used, internal lighting shall not be permitted. Incidental building lighting shall not be considered external sign lighting. 4. Internal Lighting. Internal lighting shall be contained within translucent copy or internally illuminated sign boxes. Sign box internal lighting shall be restricted to the sign face. If internal lighting is used, external lighting shall not be permitted. Sec Buildino Mounted Signs. A. Nonresidential Use-Signs Generally. 1. If the side or rear lot line adjoins R, R-TH, R- MF property, or A property designated on the comprehensive plan for residential use, no building mounted sign shall be visible from such property unless the sign is located a minimum of 150 feet from such property. 2. The color of a sign's raceway shall match that of the building face on which the sign is mounted. 3. Building mounted signs shall not project above the building's roofline or parapet wall. A roofline or parapet wall shall not be artificially extended to accommodate signage. 4. A projecting sign shall not extend more than 36 inches from the building, roof, or canopy to which it is attached, exceed a face-to-face thickness of 8 inches, or exceed the height of the fascia or parapet wall. The sign shall be attached so as to maintain a minimum clearance of 8 feet above grade. 5. Permitted building mounted signage may be placed on a drive-through canopy fascia. The area of a dri ve-through canopy fascia shall be included in determining total building mounted signage unless the color of the fascia is 1 of the following colors, excluding the color of any sign copy: black; white;or a significant color or significant accent color of the building : Adopted as Amended 9/ of 125

84 B. Nonresidential Use Building Mounted Sign Area. 1. Determination of Building or Tenant Face Length. The area of permitted signage thall be based upon the building or tenant face length to include the length of any canopy. The building or tenant face length shall be determined as follows: for a single tenant building, the greater of the length of the face generally parallel to the road or the length of the building face where the primary exterior entrance exists; for a multi-tenant building with tenants having individual exterior entrances, the length of the face of tenant space where the primary exterior entrance exists; or for a building with tenants having individual exterior entrances and tenants having common exterior entrances, signage for tenants with individual exterior entrances shall be based upon the length of the face of the tenant space where the primary exterior entrance exists, and signage for the remainder of the building shall be based upon the length' of the building face minus that for each tenant with an individual exterior entrance. 2. Determination of Permitted Signage. a. Length of Signage. Under no circumstances shall the collective length of building mounted signs on a building or tenant face exceed 70 percent of the length of the building or tenant face, as applicable. b. Area of Signage. Permitted signage shall be 1.25 square feet for each 1.0 linear foot of building or tenant face length for the first 120 feet plus 1.0 square foot for each additional 3.0 linear feet of such length, provided that a minimum of 30 square feet of signage shall be permitted. c. Permitted Increases in Area of Signage. The permitted sign area in b. may be increased as follows: Building Outside of a Nonresidential Community or Outparcel in a Nonresidential Community. If a freestanding sign is not erected, the permitted 1.25 square feet of signage for each 1.0 linear foot of building or tenant face length may be increased to 1.75 square feet for each 1.0 linear foot of such length. Building at Road Intersections. The total sign area may be increased by 50 percent provided that the sign area exposed to any single road shall not be increased beyond that normally permitted for that building face. This increased sign area shall be calculated based on the maximum area of building mounted signs permitted before any other permitted increase in sign area. Building Fronting on 2 Roads, or Building with Public Parking to Front and Rear. The sign area for a use which extends from the front to the rear of a building may be :94%2.2 Adopted as Amended 9/16/15 82 of 125

85 increased by 100 percent to allow a sign on both the front and rear building face. The sign area exposed to any road or view from the parking area shall not be increased beyond that normally permitted for that building face. This increased sign area shall be calculated based on the maximum area of building mounted signs permitted before any other permitted increase in sign area. C. Other Nonresidential Use Building Mounted Signage. The following signs shall be permitted and shall not be included in the permitted aggregate area of building mounted signs: Door and Window Signs. Signs mounted on, or externally visible through, a door or window, not to exceed the lesser of 15 square feet or 25 percent of the total window or door area on the face of the building through which the sign is visible, shall be permitted, provided the view into the establishment from the bottom half of the door or window is not obstructed. Under Canopy Signs. 1 under canopy sign not to exceed 8 square feet shall be permitted in front of each tenant's main entrance. D. Building Mounted Signage on Property with Residential as Principal Use. Signs shall not be internally illuminated; Building mounted signs shall not project above a building's roofline or parapet wall; Single family dwelling units or multifamily units with individual exterior entrances shall be permitted 1 square foot of signage for each unit; and Multifamily units sharing a common exterior entrance shall be permitted 4 square feet of signage for each common entrance. Sec Freestandin Si ns. A. Generally. 1. Number. Except where specifically stated, a project shall be limited to 1 freestanding sign. 2. Sign Structure. Except for limited duration signs, freestanding sign structures shall either be covered with a material having a similar color and finish to the principal building, be covered with a material and color used elsewhere on the sign, or be an architectural detail such as a column or a decorative wall. 3. Changeable Copy. Except on property occupied by a residential use, changeable copy may be incorporated into permitted permanent freestanding signs as follows: : Adopted as Amended 9/16/15 83 of 125

86 a. Area of Changeable Copy. Permitted sign area may be increased by 25 percent for the purpose of including changeable copy, provided the area of the changeable copy IS limited to one-half or less of the total area of the sign face. b. Location of Copy. Changeable copy shall be incorporated into permitted freestanding signs as follows: Signs Erected on or after, April 25, Changeable copy shall either abut the freestanding sign face, be incorporated into a freestanding monument sign, or be integrated into the freestanding sign face. Signs Erected Prior to April 25,2001. Except as provided below, changeable copy incorporated into a sign shall abut the existing sign face as close as practical. A nonresidential community project with a non-changeable copy sign shall be permitted a separate sign solely incorporating changeable copy. The area of the changeable copy sign shall be limited to 50 percent of the permitted sign area for the nonresidential community and be of a monument style using similar materials and colors to that of the existing sign. 4. Freestanding Sign Landscaping. Except for signs located within areas which were paved as of April 25, 2001, or signs outlined in Sections and , the base of freestanding signs shall be landscaped with grass, groundcover, shrubs or trees consistent with site landscaping : Adopted as Amended 9/16/15 84 of 125

87 B. Except as otherwise permitted in this division, the following freestanding signs shall meet the requirements outlined in Table B : Adopted as Amended 9/16/15 85 of 125

88 Notes for Table B.1. [1] In addition to permitted freestanding signs, commercial flags not to exceed the square foot limitations for a permitted freestanding sign and a height of 40 feet, to include the pole to which attached, shall be permitted. The area of any permitted freestanding sign shall be reduced by the total area of all commercial flags. A maximum of 1 commercial flag shall be permitted on each pole. [2] Architectural elements enclosing the top area of copy shall be permitted provided the element height does not exceed 25 percent of the allowable sign height. [3] Property fronting 2 or more major arterial roads shall be permitted along each such road 1 freestanding sign conforming to the size and height limitations. [4] Property fronting a major arterial road and a collector road, or 2 or more collector roads, shall be permitted along each such road 1 freestanding sign. Signs along a major arterial road shall conform to the size and height limitations. Signs along a collector road and within 300 feet of an R, R-TH or R-MF property, or A property designated on the comprehensive plan for residential use, shall not exceed 10 square feet and a height of 8 feet. All other signs along a collector road signs shall not exceed 30 square feet and a height of 10 feet. Signs along a collector road shall not be externally lighted nor include changeable copy. [5] The sign square footage for a project with multiple tenants sharing common building entrances may be increased by 10 square feet. [6] The sign square footage may be displayed in more than 1 sign provided the total area of all signs does not exceed the permitted square footage. Signs may be temporary. [7] 1 such sign shall be permitted for each road entrance into the community, provided that 2 signs shall be permitted if each sign is attached to a decorative fence or wall located on opposite sides of the entrance. Each sign shall be limited to 32 square feet, provided that the sign area may be increased by 1 square foot for each dwelling unit in excess of 320, but in no case shall a sign exceed 100 square feet. In a residential development having multiple neighborhoods not generally connected by local roads, the planning department may allow 1 sign, not to exceed 12 square feet and 7 feet in height at each neighborhood entrance from an arterial, collector or residential collector road. [8] Noncommercial signage may be provided in more than 1 sign provided that the aggregate area of all such signs shall not exceed 8 square feet. A maximum of 1 sign may be a commercial sign not to exceed 4 square feet. Signs may be temporary : Adopted as Amended 9/16/15 86 of 125

89 Sec Additional Signs. The signs in this section shall be in addition to other signs permitted by this division. 1. Freestanding Sign at Entrances to Projects in 0, C and I Districts. 2 on-site signs, each not to exceed 4 square feet and a height of 5 feet, shall be permitted at each road entrance to a project. Signs shall be limited to 2 colors, one for lettering and one for background. Lighting shall be limited to internal means. 2. Freestanding Signs at Entrances to Establishments 0, C and I Districts Located Outside a Nonresidential Community that Share Access to a Road. Where 2 establishments are required by the transportation department to share access to a road, each establishment shall be allowed 1 sign, either on- or off-site, along the shared access. Each sign shall not exceed 4 square feet and a height of 5 feet. 3. Freestanding Off-site Signs for Specific Public and Semi-Public Places. Assembly uses exceeding 10,000 gross floor area, hospitals on greater than 25 acres, transit uses, or other public uses without a direct entrance to a major arterial road shall be permitted 1 off-site sign. If the signs are located on a major arterial road, 2 signs shall be permitted on opposite sides of such road. Signs shall not exceed 7 square feet and a height of 7 feet. 4. Drive-through Facility Stacking Lane Signs. Adjacent to each stacking lane, 2 signs shall be permitted provided they are not legible from off site. Signs shall be limited to 6 feet in height. In Special Design Districts, the cumulative area of all such signs shall not exceed 24 square feet, and in all other areas 45 square feet. 5. Establishments Accommodating Orders from Parking Spaces or Fueling Stations. 1 sign, not to exceed 4 square feet, shall be permitted adjacent to each space or station. The sign shall be attached to columns supporting a canopy. The color of the sign box shall match the color of the column on which the sign is mounted. 6. Fuel Dispenser Mounted Signs. 8 square feet of signage, attached to, or immediately above, each fuel dispenser shall be permitted. Signs shall not be internally illuminated. Sec Limited Duration Signs. A. Permitted Limited Duration Signs. Limited duration signs shall be in addition to other signs permitted by this division. B. Limited Duration Signs in 0, C, and I Districts, and in A Districts Designated on the Comprehensive Plan for Nonresidential Use. 1. Noncommercial Freestanding Signs. A mixed use or nonresidential community, or zoning lot not located within a mixed use or nonresidential community shall be permitted 2 noncommercial signs. 1 additional such sign for each 500 linear feet of road frontage in : Adopted as Amended of 125

90 excess of 1000 feet shall be permitted; however, in no case shall the number of such signs exceed 4. Each sign shall not exceed 32 square feet and 7 feet in height. Each sign shall be displayed for no longer than 100 consecutive days. Display of such signs on each community or lot shall be limited to a total of 120 days within any calendar year. 2. Noncommercial Banners Across Roads in Special Design Districts. In a Special Design District, 1 banner, not to exceed 250 square feet, related to a noncommercial activity within the District, either on-site or off-site of the property on which the activity is to occur, shall be permitted. The sign shall be located across a road. Display of the banner shall be limited to 60 consecutive days. Display of such banners within each Special Design District shall be limited to a total of 120 days within any calendar year. 3. Commercial Freestanding Signs on Occupied Property. A mixed use or nonresidential community, or a zoning lot not located within a mixed use or nonresidential community shall be permitted 2 commercial signs, each not to exceed 32 square feet and 7 feet in height. 1 additional such sign for each 500 linear feet of road frontage in excess of 1000 feet shall be permitted; however, in no case shall the number of such signs exceed 4. Display of each sign shall be limited to 60 consecutive days. Display of such signs by an individual tenant or owner shall be limited to a total of 120 days within any calendar year. The director of planning may approve time extensions on property with vacancies or real estate for sale. 4. Building Mounted Banners on Nonresidential Community. A nonresidential community shall be permitted 2 banners, each not to exceed the greater-of 50 square feet or 15 percent of the area of the building face or tenant unit face on which the banner is mounted. Display of each banner shall be limited to 60 consecutive days. Display of such banners by an individual tenant or owner shall be limited to a total of 120 days within any calendar year. 5. Building Mounted Banners on Zoning Lot Outside of a Nonresidential Community or Outparcel within a Nonresidential Community. A zoning lot outside of a nonresidential community or outparcel within a nonresidential community shall be permitted 1 banner, not to exceed the greater of 50 square feet or 15 percent of the area of the building face or tenant unit space on which the banner is mounted. Display of such banner shall be limited to 30 consecutive days. Display of such banners by an individual tenant or owner shall be limited to a total of 120 days within any calendar year. 6. Commercial Signs on Vacant Zoning Lot. A vacant zoning lot shall be permitted 2 commercial signs, each not to exceed 32 square feet and 8 feet in height. A zoning lot fronting 2 or more major arterial or collector roads shall be permitted 2 such signs along each such road. Signs shall be removed at such time that the activity which it advertises ceases. 7. Off-site Signs for Noncommercial Use of Limited Duration. A noncommercial use lasting 14 or fewer days shall be permitted 10 off-site signs on either 0, C or I property, or A property designated on the comprehensive plan for nonresidential use. Each sign shall not exceed 32 square feet and 8 feet in height. 1 sign shall be permitted per zoning lot or community. Display of signs shall be limited to 15 days prior to commencement, and 48 hours after cessation, of the advertised use. Each organization shall be limited to the display of such signs 4 times within any calendar year :94%2.2 Adopted as Amended 9/16/15 88 of 125

91 C. Limited Duration Signs in R, R-TH, R-MF and MH Districts. and in A Districts Designated on the Comprehensive Plan for Other than Nonresidential Use. 1. Noncommercial Signs at Residential Community Entrances. At each entrance into a residential community, 1 noncommercial sign, not to exceed 32 square feet and a height of 7 feet, shall be permitted. Display of each sign shall limited to 60 consecutive days. Display of such signs on each community shall be limited to 120 days within any calendar year. 2. Banners for Nonresidential Use on Zoning Lot not Occupied by a Residential Use. On a zoning lot not occupied by a residential use, 1 banner, not to exceed 32 square feet and a height of 7 feet, shall be permitted. A zoning lot fronting 2 or more major arterial or collector roads shall be permitted such signage along each such road. Display of each banner shall be limited to 60 consecutive days. Display of such banners on each lot shall be limited to 120 days within any calendar year. 3. Commercial Signs on Vacant Zoning Lot. On a vacant zoning lot, 1 sign, not to exceed 16 square feet and 10 feet in height, shall be pennitted. 1 additional such sign for each 500 linear feet of road frontage in excess of 1000 feet shall be permitted. A zoning lot fronting 2 or more major arterial or collector roads shall be pennitted such signage along each road. Signs shall be removed at such time that the activity which it advertises ceases. 4. Noncommercial Signs on Vacant Zoning Lot. On a vacant zoning lot, 1 sign, not to exceed 16 square feet and 10 feet in height, shall be permitted. 1 additional such sign for each 500 linear feet of road frontage in excess of 1000 feet shall be pennitted. A zoning lot fronting 2 or more major arterial or collector roads shall be pennitted such signage along each road. Display of each sign shall be limited to 100 consecutive days. Display of such signs on each lot shall be limited to 120 days within any calendar year. 5. Off-Site Signs for Commercial Use of Limited Duration. 3 off-site signs, each not to exceed 6 square feet and 7 feet in height, shall be permitted for a commercial use lasting for 3 or fewer days on an R, R-TH, R-MF or MH property, or on A property designated on the comprehensive plan for other than nonresidential use. 1 such sign shall be displayed on a zoning lot. Display of signs shall be limited to 48 hours prior to commencement, and 48 hours after cessation, of the use or activity advertised. Sec through Reserved. Sec Definitions. For the purposes of this chapter, the following words and phrases shall have the following meanings: Banner: A type of limited duration sign consisting of a piece of fabric or other flexible material, other than a flag or pennant, and secured so as to not be a moving sign : Adopted as Amended of 125

92 000 Canopy, drive-through: Permanent roof structure made of rigid materials providing protection from rain or sun to a drive-through activity. Canopy, pedestrian: Permanent roof structure made of rigid materials providing protection from rain or sun to a pedestrian area. 000 Community, mixed use: Development containing a mixture of residential and nonresidential uses. Community, nonresidential: Group of buildings or uses containing three or more nonresidential establishments that are planned, developed or managed as a unit. Community, residential: Recorded subdivision or multi-family project. 000 Copy: Display on a sign surface in permanent, electronic or removable letter, graphic or numeric form. Copy includes any associated background distinguishable from the sign structure or building. 000 Flag, commercial: Sign consisting of a piece of cloth or other flexible material, used to attract attention to a commercial use or activity and attached to a flag or light pole. A commercial flag shall be included in the calculation of freestanding signage on the property. Flag, noncommercial: Sign consisting of a piece of cloth or other flexible material that only depicts the emblem or insignia of a nation, political unit, educational, charitable, religious, civic or similar group, or is a decorative flag that does not display a commercial message. A noncommercial flag shall be not be included in the calculation of signage on the property Floor area, gross: Sum of the horizontal area of all floors of a building measured from the exterior faces of the exterior walls or from the center line of walls separating two buildings, but not including outside storage areas, attached garages or carports, enclosed porches or rooftop enclosures housing mechanical equipment. Also referred to as "gfa". Figure: Gross Floor Area : Adopted as Amended 9116/15 90 of 125

93 Pennant: Lightweight plastic, fabric or other similar material, suspended from a rope, wire, or string, usually in series, and designed to move in the wind. A pennant mayor may not contain copy. 000 Refacing: Replacement of a sign face with a new face of equal size to that of the original that does not alter any other aspect of the sign. 000 Sign: Display of figures or copy visible to the public for the purpose of making anything known or attracting attention. The term sign includes the sign structure and commercial flags, but excludes works of art or architectural features that do not include or imply a commercial message. Sign box: Structure that encloses the sign face and other components. Sign, building mounted: Permanently attached sign, erected or painted on the outside wall, roof, window or door of a building. Building mounted signs do not include freestanding signs. Sign, changeable copy: Sign upon which copy can be changed or altered, except for scoreboards. Changeable copy signs include the following: Manual: Sign with copy that can be changed or altered by manual means. Electrical: Sign with copy that can be changed or altered on a fixed display surface composed of electrically illuminated or mechanically driven changeable segments. Electrical signs include the following: Fixed message electronic. Sign with copy that has been preprogrammed to include only time, temperature, and date, and does not operate in a flashing, traveling or rolling fashion. Computer controlled variable message electronic (EMC). Sign with copy that can be changed or altered by means of computer-driven electronic impulses, excluding fixed message electronic signs. 000 Sign, freestanding: Sign supported by a fence, wall, upright structural members or braces that are on, or in, the ground. Freestanding signs do not include signs attached to a building. Sign, illuminated: Sign with an artificial internal or external light source that illuminates the sign. Sign, limited duration: Temporary sign or banner permitted for a limited time period. Sign, outdoor advertising: Sign or structure used as an outdoor display for the purpose of making anything known, when the matter advertised or displayed is not related to the premises where such sign is located. Outdoor advertising signs do not include the off-site signs specifically permitted in this chapter : Adopted as Amended 9/16/15 91 of 125

94 Sign, permanent: Sign attached to the ground or a structure, intended to exist for the life of the structure or use, and which cannot be easily removed. Sign, projecting; Sign, attached to a building wall, projecting at an angle and extending more than 18 inches from the building wall face. Sign structure: An assembly of materials used to support a sign, including the exterior form and finishes that define sign copy area. Sign, temporary: Sign, not permanently affixed to the ground or a structure, designed or constructed such that it can be moved or relocated without requiring any structural or support changes. Sign, tramc control: Sign solely regulating safe driving, parking or traffic movement. Sign, under canopy: Sign mounted perpendicular to a building face located under, and attached to, the ceiling of a building mounted canopy. Sign, window: Sign attached to a door or window that is legible from the exterior of the building. Sign, Special Design District entrance: Freestanding sign located at, or near, the entrance to a Special Design District. (2) That this ordinance shall become effective immediately upon adoption : Adopted as Amended 9/16/15 92 of 125

95 Proposed Sign Ordinance for City of Norfolk EXHIBIT A 2-3 Definitions. Sign. Any object, device, display, or structure, or part thereof, visible from a public place, a public right-of-way, any parking area or right-of-way open to use by the general public, or any navigable body of water which is designed and used to attract attention to an institution, organization, business, product, service, event, or location by any means involving words, letters, figures, designs, symbols, fixtures, logos, colors, illumination, or projected images. For clarification, examples of items which typically do not satisfy the necessary elements of this definition include, but are not limited to, works of art, architectural elements incorporated into the style or function of a building, and flags of any nation, state, or other geopolitical entity not related to a commercial business, product or service. For purposes of this definition, a work of art is any item expressing creative skill or imagination in a visual form, such as a painting or sculpture, which is intended to beautify or provide an aesthetic influence to a public area or area which is visible from the public realm and which in no way identifies or specifically relates to a commercial business, product or service. 93 of 125

96 Proposed Sign Ordinance for City of Norfolk EXHIBIT B 16-1 Legislative statement and findings. CHAPTER 16: SIGNS Purpose statement. The purpose of this chapter is to: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) Promote and protect the public health, safety and welfare of the inhabitants of the city; Enhance opportunities for visual communication, including promoting legibility of such communications; Preserve property values; Create a more attractive economic and business climate within the city; Enhance and protect the physical appearance of all areas of the city; Reduce the distractions, obstructions and hazards to pedestrian and automobile traffic caused by the excessive number, excessive size or height, inappropriate means of illumination or movement, indiscriminate placement, overconcentration, or unsafe construction of signs; Enable customers, motorists, visitors, residents, and other persons moving through the public spaces of the city to be able to identify destinations and locations; and Ensure that the right to free speech is protected Findings. In conjunction with the adoption of the purposes set forth above and the regulations in this chapter, the city council makes all of the following findings: (a) (b) Unlike oral speech, signs may cause harm by taking up space, obstructing views, distracting motorists, displacing alternative uses of land, and endangering the safety of persons or property. The city has a substantial and compelling interest in all of the purposes set forth above and has a substantial and compelling interest in regulating signs in such a way that the harms caused by signs might be reduced and mitigated. Regulation of the size, height, number and spacing of signs throughout the city is necessary to protect the public safety, to assure compatibility of signs with surrounding land uses, to enhance the business and economy of the city, to protect the public investment in the streets and highways, to maintain the tranquil environment of residential areas, to promote industry and commerce, to eliminate visual clutter and blight, 94 of 125

97 Proposed Sign Ordinance for City of Norfolk to provide an aesthetically appealing environment, to provide ample, meaningful opportunities for persons who desire to display information by means of a sign to have their information seen and understood, and to provide for the orderly and reasonable display of advertising and other messages for the benefit of all persons in the city. (c) (d) (e) (f) These regulations do not apply to every form and instance of visual speech that may be displayed anywhere within the jurisdictional limits of the city. Rather, they are intended to regulate those forms and instances that are most likely to meaningfully affect one or more of the purposes set forth above. These regulations do not entirely eliminate all of the harms that may be created by the installation and display of signs. Rather, they strike an appropriate balance that preserves ample channels of communication by means of visual display while still reducing and mitigating the extent of the harms caused by signs. Some signage has a single targeted function that makes identifying such signs by description impossible without referring to the function. For instance, an off-premise sign is one that contains a message related to a business, product, service, entertainment or attraction sold, offered, created, furnished, or conducted at a location other than the premises on which the sign is erected. Because such a sign can be misleading if mistaken for a sign that identifies where the referred-to business, product, service, entertainment or attraction is located, it is essential to public safety and public welfare to regulate off-premise signs. Whenever a sign is described, in part, by referring to the function it serves, the provisions of this chapter that limit such a sign are designed to be neutral with respect to the content of the speech appearing on it. These regulations are neither intended nor designed to restrict or control signs for the purpose of promoting or stifling any messages that might appear on them Applicability. The regulations of this chapter shall govern and control the location, erection, enlargement, expansion, alteration, operation, maintenance, relocation, and removal of any sign within the city. These regulations shall also govern the removal of signs determined to be physically unsafe or which create a safety hazard to the public. These regulations dictate the display, location and physical characteristics of signs subject to the procedures of this chapter. The regulations of this chapter shall be in addition to any applicable provisions of the Virginia Outdoor Advertising Act, 1950 Virginia Code Annotated section , et seq. (1984 Repl. Vol & 1989 Supp.), and the Uniform Statewide Building Code applicable to the construction and maintenance of signs. The regulations of this chapter do not apply to property owned by the city 95 of 125

98 Proposed Sign Ordinance for City of Norfolk and used for public purposes, by the Commonwealth of Virginia or any governmental body created by the Commonwealth, or by the United States Definition of terms. For the purposes of this Chapter 16, signs and their features and characteristics shall be defined and classified as follows: A-Frame sign. A sign consisting of two sign faces placed together at an angle of 90 degrees or less to form an "A" shape structure which tapers from a wide base to a narrow top. Awning. A structure made of cloth, metal, or other material affixed to a building in such a manner that the structure may be raised or retracted to a flat position against the building, but not including a canopy ) Awning sign. A sign that is mounted or painted on or attached to an awning. (See Figure Figure 16-1: Awning Sign Banner. A sign constructed of plastic or fabric of any kind that is attached to supports, a framework or a flat surface. Billboard. See "outdoor advertising sign." Building frontage. The portion of the principal building of an establishment which faces a public street. If a principal building is arranged on the lot so that the main entrance faces a parking area, then the zoning administrator may make a determination that the portion facing the parking area may be considered the building frontage. Canopy. A structure, other than an awning, made of cloth, metal, or other material which may be totally or partially attached to a building for the purpose of providing shelter to patrons or automobiles, or as a decorative feature on a building wall. A canopy is not a completely enclosed structure and cannot be raised or retracted ) Canopy sign. A sign that is painted on, printed on, or attached to a canopy. (See Figure 96 of 125

99 Proposed Sign Ordinance for City of Norfolk Figure 16-2: Canopy Signs side elevation front elevation side elevation front elevation side elevation front elevation Erect. To construct or allow to be constructed, but not including any activity involving solely the change of advertising message or normal maintenance of a sign or sign structure. Feather sign. A lightweight sign mounted along one edge on a single, vertical, flexible pole the shape of which may resemble a sail, bow, or teardrop. Flag sign. Any generally rectangular or triangular sign or part of a sign made of fabric or other pliant material attached to a flagpole only along one side and which predominately displays distinctive colors, images, shapes or designs rather than legible words, letters, numbers or other linguistic characters. 97 of 125

100 Proposed Sign Ordinance for City of Norfolk Flashing sign. A sign with either flashing, running, or laser-generated lights or with lights that flash, blink pulse, strobe, scroll, or create an illusion of movement or that have a conspicuous and intermittent variation in illumination, appearance, color, or pattern. Freestanding sign. Any sign placed upon or supported by the ground independently of any other structure, including a pole, monument or ground sign. Gas pump sign. A sign affixed to a gasoline pump. Ground sign. A freestanding sign, other than a monument or pole sign, placed upon or supported by the ground independently of any other structure. Illuminated sign. A sign with artificial light projecting through the face or portions of the face or directly shining on the face. Inflatable sign. An inflated, nonporous sign filled with air or other gas that does not move, flutter, or undulate and is mounted to a structure, cord, cable or rod or staked to the ground. Interstate highway system. The interstate system of highways as defined in 74 Stat. 415 (1960), 23 U.S.c. Sec. 103, or amendments thereto. Lot frontage. The portion of a property boundary or a lot line which abuts a public rightof-way. Maintain. To preserve, keep in repair, continue, allow to exist, or restore in accordance with the provisions ofthe zoning ordinance. Marquee. Any fixed hood, other than a canopy or awning, supported solely by the building to which it is attached that projects from the building and extends beyond the building wall. The location of any marquee shall be restricted to the main entrance to a building. Marquee sign. A sign attached to or hung from a marquee. Monument sign. A freestanding sign mounted or affixed to a freestanding base or pedestal secured permanently to the ground and not attached to a building or any other structure, but not including a ground sign. (See Figure 16-3.) Figure 16-3: Monument Sign 98 of 125

101 Proposed Sign Ordinance for City of Norfolk Nonconforming sign. Any sign which was lawfully erected in compliance with the applicable regulations of the zoning ordinance prior to the effective date of this chapter and which fails to conform to the current standards or restrictions, the use of which has not been discontinued for longer than two (2) years. Oft-premises sign. A sign which directs attention to a business, product, service, entertainment or attraction sold, offered, created, furnished, or conducted at a location other than the premises on which the sign is erected.. Outdoor advertising sign. A sign structure providing displays or display space for general advertising and not primarily or necessarily for advertising related to the premises on which erected or to nearby premises. Such signs, commonly referred to as "billboards," are generally designed so that the copy or poster on the sign can be changed frequently and the advertising space is for lease. Outdoor advertising signs may contain light emitting diode (LED) electronic displays which comply with state and federal law. Specific regulations for outdoor advertising signs are found in section Pennant. Any generally rectangular or triangular sign attached only along one side, not affixed to a flagpole, and designed to flap in the wind. Pole sign. A freestanding sign erected and maintained on a freestanding mast or pole secured permanently to the ground and not attached to a building or any other structure, but not including a ground sign. (See Figure 16-4.) Figure 16-4: Pole Sign Portable sign. Any sign designed and intended to be transported or movable, including but not limited to: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) Signs with wheels or with wheels removed. Signs with chassis or support constructed without wheels. Signs designed to be transported by trailer, wheels or boat. Signs converted to or constructed as A-frame signs. Signs attached temporarily to the ground, structures or other signs. 99 of 125

102 Proposed Sign Ordinance for City of Norfolk (f) Signs mounted on a motor vehicle or boat for advertising purposes parked on or off the public right-of-way or shore, except when the motor vehicle or boat is being used in the normal, routine operations of the business. Premises. A contiguous parcel of land with its appurtenances and buildings that functions as a unit. For the purpose of this ordinance, an outparcel along the perimeter of a shopping center or similar multi-tenant use that contains a freestanding building and a parking area separate from the shopping center as indicated on an approved site plan shall be considered a premises separate from the premises of the shopping center. Primary highway system. That portion of the state highway system as designated or as may hereafter be designated by the state as part of the federal-aid primary system of highways, which designation has been approved by the Secretary of Transportation of the United States, pursuant to 70 Stat. 374(1956), 23 U.S.c. Sec Projecting sign. A sign other than a wall, awning, canopy or marquee sign that is wholly or partially dependent upon a building for support and that projects more than fifteen (15) inches from such building. (See Figure 16-5.) Figure 16-5: Projecting Sign Public service message board. Any sign having a conspicuous and intermittent variation in illumination, message, color, or pattern powered by electricity and which displays different copy changes on the same lampbank or message facility and installed on land owned by the city or any other governmental entity established by the Commonwealth of Virginia. Roof line. The highest point of a flat roof and mansard roof and the lowest point of a pitched roof. Roof sign. A sign that is mounted or painted on the roof of a building, or that is wholly dependent upon a building for support and that projects above the highest point of a building with a flat roof, the eave line of a building with gambrel, gable or hip roof or the deck line of a building with a mansard roof. (See Figure 16-6.) 100 of 125

103 C===.~ P_ro~p_o_se_d_S~ig~n_O_r_di_na_n_c_e_fo_r_Ci~~~o_f_N_o_rto_l_k ~ Figure 16-6: Roof Signs side elevation front elevation side elevation front elevation Sign face. That part of the sign which is or can be used for visual representation or communication. The term includes any background or surrounding material, panel, trim or ornamentation, color, and direct or self-illumination that differentiates the sign from the building, structure, backdrop surface, or object upon or against which it is placed. The term does not include any portion of the support structure for the sign, provided that no representation or message is placed or displayed on or designed as part of the support structure. Sign height. The distance from the highest point of a sign to the finished elevation of the road providing principal access to the site on which the sign is located as measured from the bottom of the curb or edge of pavement. (See Figure 16-7.) Figure 16-7: Sign Height 101 of 125

104 Proposed Sign Ordinance for City of Norfolk Temporary sign. A sign constructed of cloth, canvas, vinyl, paper, plywood, fabric, or other lightweight material not well suited to provide a durable substrate or, if made of some other material, is neither permanently installed in the ground nor permanently affixed to a building or structure which is permanently installed in the ground. Vending machine sign. Any sign fastened to or painted on a vending machine. Visible. In the context of a sign, capable of being seen such that the message is legible or comprehensible without visual aid by a person of normal acuity. Wall sign. A sign fastened to the window or wall of a building or structure in such a manner that the window or wall becomes the supporting structure for, or forms the background surface of, the sign or a sign painted directly on the wall of the structure. (See Figure 16-8.) Figure 16-8: Wall Sign Window sign. A sign that is applied or attached to or suspended from the exterior or interior of a window or located within the interior of a structure so that its message can be read from the exterior of the structure including but not limited to window paintings, applied graphics, and signs located inside a building but visible primarily from the outside of the building. Window sign, permanent. Any window sign designed to withstand fading, chipping or peeling over time that is not constructed of cloth, canvas, vinyl, paper, plywood, fabric, or other lightweight material. Window sign, temporary. Any window sign that is composed of ink, paint or other applied product which is not designed to withstand fading, chipping or peeling over time or that is constructed of cloth, canvas, vinyl, paper, plywood, fabric, or other lightweight material not well suited to provide a durable substrate. Yard sign. A temporary sign placed upon or supported by the ground independently of any other structure, but not including any A-frame sign. 102 of 125

105 Proposed Sign Ordinance for City of Norfolk 16-5 General standards Classification of sign types. The following table describes and classifies each of the sign types defined in this chapter which meet more than one definition.l Billboard/Outdoor advertising sign Monument sign Pole sign Ground sign Public service message board 2 (when freestanding) Banner Flag sign Inflatable sign Pennant Feather sign Portable sign (including A-frame signs) Yard sign Awning sign Canopy sign Marquee sign Projecting sign Public service message board 2 (when fastened to wall) Permanent window sign Temporary window sign Notes: 1 Depending on available technology, many of the sign types identified in this table may also be definable as flashing signs or illuminated signs. 2 These signs are also classified as flashing signs and as illuminated signs Sign measurements. (a) Determination of sign face area. The area of a sign face shall be determined by computing the entire area within a single geometric form that completely encloses the sign face. This form is defined by the extreme limits of lettering, representations, emblems or other figures together with all surrounding material, color, lighting, trim or ornamentation that either form the integral part of the display or differentiate the sign from the background where it is placed. (See Figure 16-9.) 103 of 125

106 Proposed Sign Ordinance for City of Norfolk Figure 16-9: Sign Area Freestanding Canopy Sign. Calculate sign area by imaginary panel drawn around copy. Do 001 calculate decorative graphics. calculation similar for attached caoopy and/or marquee. 104 of 125

107 Proposed Sign Ordinance for City of Norfolk Mixed Case lettering. Ckaw imaginary panel around either ascenders or decenders. but not both. Signs without integral background. Calculate sign area by Imaginary panel drawn Broond sign copy. Signs with integral background panel. Calculate sign area by area of actual background panel surrounding sign copy. Awnings - Calculate sign area by Imaginary panel drawn around copy. 00 not calculate decorative graphics (b) (c) (d) Number of sign faces for marquee signs and projecting signs. Any marquee sign or projecting sign which is oriented to the building upon which it is mounted at an angle less than 45 degrees shall be deemed to have one (1) sign face. Otherwise, it shall be deemed to have two (2) sign faces. Area of sign with more than one face. For all signs with more than one face, the sign area shall be computed as including 100 percent ofthe area of all sign faces. Sign location. Signs shall be located facing the street, lot line, or building frontage from which the allotment is computed. (e) Sign allocation based on building frontage or fa~ade. For all signs which have the allowable area allocated based on dimensions derived from the dimension of building frontage or fa!;ade area, no accessory building shall be only considered when computing the allocation Traffic and access safety. (a) Confusion with traffic signals. 1\10 sign shall be maintained at any location which obstructs, impairs, obscures, interferes with the view of, or is confused with, any traffic control sign or devices regardless of whether or not it meets other size, location and setback requirements of this 105 of 125

108 Proposed Sign Ordinance for City of Norfolk chapter. Nor shall any sign interfere with, mislead or confuse traffic flow. A sign's position, size, shape, color and illumination, but not its content, shall be considered when making such a determination. (b) Obstruction of sight distance triangles prohibited. No sign, nor any part of a sign other than a supporting pole or brace no greater than eighteen (18) inches in width or diameter shall be located lower than nine feet from grade within the area of any sight distance triangle as defined in Article I, Chapter 2 of this ordinance. No required landscaping located in the sight distance triangle shall be greater than 24 inches in height. (c) Illumination. Obstruction of accessways. No sign or sign structure shall obstruct free ingress to or egress from a fire escape, door, window or other required accessway to or from a building or site. (a) (b) (c) Design of light source. All lighting fixtures used to illuminate a sign shall be full-cutoff, as defined by the Illuminating Engineering Society of North America (IESNA), and shall have fully shielded or recessed luminaires with horizontal-mount flat lenses that prevent upward light scatter and protectthe dark night sky. Location oflight source. No receptacle or device housing a permitted light source which is attached to the sign itself shall protrude more than fifteen (15) inches from the face of the sign or building to which it is attached (no more than sixty (60) inches for outdoor advertising signs). If ground lighting is used to illuminate a sign, the receptacle or device should not protrude more than twelve (12) inches and must be fully screened from view by landscaping material. Level of illumination and mitigation of glare. In no event shall the illumination of any sign resulting from any internal or external artificial light source exceed 100 lumens. (1) Mitigation of glare generally. Whenever an artificial light source is used to illuminate a sign, such source shall be located, shielded and directed away from property lines and rights-of-way and shall not cast unreasonable or objectionable glare on adjacent properties and streets. (2) Mitigation of glare adjacent to residential areas. An illuminated sign on a lot abutting or situated in a location within 100 feet of a residential zoning district shall be so designed, located, shielded, and directed so as to prevent the casting of direct light upon adjacent residential properties. 106 of 125

109 Proposed Sign Ordinance for City of Norfolk Landscaping. The following regulations apply to any sign which is required by the provisions of this chapter to have landscaping installed around it: (a) (b) (c) (d) Location. The sign shall by situated in the centerofthe landscape area. Materials and maintenance. All landscape areas shall consist of continuous plantings of species approved by the city's Department of Recreation, Parks and Open Space. Plantings shall be free of disease, maintained in a healthy condition, and promptly replaced in the event that they die. No interference with traffic safety. All landscaping shall be located so as not to obstruct motorist's view of vehicles moving within a parking area or entering and exiting a driveway or right-of-way and to not protrude into any sight distance triangle as defined in Article I, Chapter 2 of this ordinance. Ground lights. Whenever lighting is used to illuminate a sign, low, evergreen shrubs shall be planted in order to screen the light fixtures from view from any right-of-way Signs in public places. Installation of any sign on public property is governed by section 42-10(b) of the City Code. Signs installed in a public right-of-way or installed on public property for a public purpose are not governed by the regulations of this chapter. < Sign maintenance. The owner of a sign and the owner of the premises on which any sign is located shall be jointly and severally liable to maintain every sign, including its illumination sources, in compliance with this chapter and all applicable laws, in a safe and secure condition, in a neat and orderly condition, and in good, working order at all times, and to prevent the development of any rust, corrosion, rot or other deterioration in either the physical appearance or the safety of every sign General requirements Prohibited signs. Except where specifically permitted by the regulations of the applicable zoning district or overlay district or by an Alternative Signage Special Exception (as set forth in section below), all of the following signs are prohibited in all zoning districts: (a) (b) A sign not expressly permitted under the regulations of this chapter or other applicable provision of the zoning ordinance. A sign that moves or give the appearance of moving and any sign which flutters, undulates, swings, rotates, oscillates or otherwise moves by natural or artificial means, including any pennant but excluding flag signs displayed in compliance with the provisions of this chapter. 107 of 125

110 Proposed Sign Ordinance for City of Norfolk (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) A flashing sign, except for a public service message board or an outdoor advertising sign displayed in compliance with the provisions of this chapter. A sign which is false or misleading such that it creates a threat to vehicular, bicycle, or pedestrian safety. A portable sign, but not including an A-frame sign displayed in compliance with the provisions ofthis chapter. An awning sign or canopy sign that projects vertically above or below or horizontally beyond the physical dimensions of the awning or canopy upon which it is affixed. An off-premises sign except for an outdoor advertising sign or a public service message board displayed in compliance with the provisions ofthis chapter. A sign which is structurally unsafe or hazardous. A sign located on a zoning lot where no principal use exists, except for a temporary sign located on a lot being offered for sale or lease at the time of application for the sign certificate. A feather sign. A temporary sign that is still on display after the shorter of either of the following: (1) The time for removal that was indicated in the application for the sign certificate which authorized it. (2) Three (3) months after the date it was first displayed Sign certificate required. (a) (b) General rule. Except as specified below, no sign shall be erected, enlarged, expanded, reconstructed, relocated or maintained on private or public property unless a sign certificate shall have been issued by the zoning administrator evidencing the compliance of such sign with the provisions of this zoning ordinance, including the payment of any registration fee required under this section, and with all applicable provision of the building code pursuant to chapter 11.1 of the City Code. Special rule for billboards. In addition to the certificate required herein, a state permit issued by the Virginia Department of Transportation may also be required for outdoor advertising signs located within 660 feet of highways that are part of the interstate or primary highway systems. 108 of 125

111 [ Proposed Sign Ordinance for City of Norfolk (c) Exemptions. Notwithstanding the general rule set forth in subsection (a), above, the following signs and sign-related activities shall be exempt from the sign certificate requirement to the extent indicated. Except where indicated in this subsection, such signs shall also not be counted towards the maximum sign allotment allowed for the applicable use or premises. (1) Routine maintenance. Routine sign maintenance or changing of lettering or parts of signs designed to be regularly changed, including sign face changes. (2) JIIegible signs. Any wall sign, window sign, or temporary sign located within five (5) feet of a building the physical attributes of which do not provide for the differentiation of words, letters, figures, designs, symbols or logos by an observer with typical visual acuity situated in a public place, a public right-of-way, or any parking area or right-of-way open to use by the general public. (3) Uniform signage. Any sign erected in compliance with the provisions and standards of the Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices. (4) Pavement markings. Any sign applied directly and entirely to and flush with an asphalt, concrete, or similar paved surface. (5) Notice signs. Signs posted by or required to be posted by a governmental entity in compliance with a provision of federal, state, or local law located on a premises where an activity that necessitates the posting of such signage is or may be occurring. (6) Flag signs. All flag signs shall be counted towards the maximum sign allotment allowed for the applicable use or premises. (7) Single-family and two-family residential uses. Any sign located on property with a single-family dwelling, two-family dwelling, semidetached dwelling, or townhouse residential use and which complies with the applicable limitations of section 16-8, below. All such signs shall be counted towards the maximum sign allotment allowed for the applicable use or premises. (8) Window signs. (9) Vending machine signs. (10) Gas pump signs. 109 of 125

112 Proposed Sign Ordinance for City of Norfolk Registration fee. (11) Interior signs. Any signs in the interior of a building not directed so as to be seen from outside the building. (a) General rule. Except as specified below, a registration fee shall be paid in relation to the issuance of any certificate required by the provisions of this chapter. (b) Exemption from registration fee. Any sign already in existence as of October 15, 1991 is exempt from the registration fee, even though a sign certificate is still required and such signs are still counted as part of a premises' or use's total allowable sign allotment Replacement and removal requirements. (a) Replacement and removal of sign faces when not in use. In the event that a use has ceased operating on the site for a period of six (6) months, all related sign faces shall be removed. The face of any sign that conforms to all zoning regulations that apply and that can be reused shall be replaced with a blank, white face until use ofthe building or premises has resumed. (b) Nonconforming signs. In the event that a legally established nonconforming sign, other than a sign that has been designated as a Norfolk Historic Landmark in accordance with the applicable provisions of chapter 9 of this ordinance, is damaged or destroyed to an extent exceeding fifty (SO) percent of the sign's replacement cost (as determined by the zoning administrator), such nonconforming sign shall be either removed or replaced by a sign which conforms in all respects with the standards required by this chapter. Any non-conforming sign, including any associated supporting structure, which has not been used for a period of two (2) years shall be removed. The owner of the property shall be responsible for compliance with this requirement. (c) Incomplete construction. Wherever the construction or installation of a sign has been commenced but has not been completed within a reasonable time and where no building permit related to the installation remains valid and unexpired, the portions of the sign that have been constructed or installed shall be removed Substitution of messages. A noncommercial message may be substituted, in whole or in part, for any other message displayed on any sign which conforms to this chapter without consideration of message content. Such substitution of message may be made without any additional approval, permitting, registration or notice. Furthermore, anyon-site commercial message may be substituted, in whole or in part, for any other on-site commercial message. 110 of 125

113 Proposed Sign Ordinance for City of Norfolk 16-7 Specific sign construction, installation, and design standards Freestanding signs. The following requirements shall apply to all freestanding signs with the exception of outdoor advertising signs: (a) Location. (1) The sign shall be set back no less than five (5) feet from any existing public right-of-way except in a Historic and Cultural Conservation District. (2) In any Historic and Cultural Conservation District, the sign shall only be located in the front yard. (b) (c) Sign faces. Each sign shall be limited to no more than two (2) sign faces. Landscaping. A square, rectangular, oval, or circular area of ground shall be landscaped in accordance with section , above. The landscaped area shall be no less than either the area of the largest face of the sign or an area extending 3 feet from every portion of the sign's pedestal or base, whichever is greater Window signs. No more than 30% percent of the window and glass door area may be obscured by window signs such that the interior of the building cannot be readily seen from a public place, public right-of-way, or parking area Certain signs affixed to building features. Any flag sign affixed to a building or any sign affixed to an awning, canopy, or marquee shall be elevated as follows: (a) (b) Awning sign. The lowest portion of the protruding building feature shall be at least 7.5 ft. above grade. Canopy sign or marquee sign. The lowest portion of the protruding building feature shall be at least 8.5 ft. above grade. (c) Flag signs affixed to a building. The lowest portion of the pole shall be at least 8.5 ft. above grade A-frame signs. No A-frame sign shall exceed four (4) ft. in height or six (6) sq. ft. per sign face Permitted Signs General rule. All signs that are permissible in conjunction with the use on the premises and in accordance with the zoning district and character district in which the sign is to be located are indicated on Table 16-A, "Permanent Signage," and Table 16-B, "Temporary Signage." Special rule for certain uses and districts. In addition to any signs allowed under the general rule set forth above, the following signs are also permissible: 111 of 125

114 Proposed Sign Ordinance for City of Norfolk (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) Alternative signage. Any sign permitted by an Alternative Signage Special Exception, as set forth in section below, or other applicable provision of the zoning ordinance. Billboards. Any outdoor advertising sign that complies with the provisions of section 16-9, below. Real estate sales. On real property which is being offered for sale or lease at the time of application for a sign permit, one yard sign limited to a maximum height of 4 ft. and a maximum area of 8 sq. ft. Inflatable signs. On a premises located in a Commercial, Mixed Use Planned Development, or Commercial Planned Development district, one (1) inflatable sign mounted to either the roof of a building or the ground, limited to one per business, and displayed no more than four (4) times per year and for no longer than seven (7) consecutive days. Temporary window signs. On a premises located in any district otherthan a Residential, Business and Commerce Park, Office, or Industrial district, temporary window signs, subject to the location and area limitations set forth in section and displayed for no longer than three (3) months. A-frame signs. Commercial drive-throughs. On a premises where a commercial drivethrough use is located, two (2) freestanding signs for each drive-through lane and which are illegible from all public rights-of-way, limited to a maximum height of 10 ft. and a maximum area of 32 sq. ft. per sign face All other signs prohibited. No sign certificate shall be issued unless the proposed sign is permissible under either the general rule or special rule set forth in this section, above, and complies with all other applicable requirements of this ordinance Outdoor advertising signs. signs: The following standards and requirements shall apply to all outdoor advertising Special exception required. A special exception must be obtained, pursuant to the special exception procedures of Article V, Chapter 25 prior to undertaking any of the following activities: (a) (b) The installation of a new outdoor advertising sign. The replacement of an outdoor advertising sign on the same parcel. For the purpose of this subsection, none of the following actions shall constitute a replacement of an outdoor advertising sign which is adjacent to and facing 1-64, 1-264, or 1-564: 112 of 125

115 Proposed Sign Ordinance for City of Norfolk Maximum height. (1) Changing the technology of the sign face, including a conversion to an LED electronic display. (2) Increasing the surface area of the sign to the maximum permitted by subsection , below. (3) Increasing the height of the sign to the maximum permitted by subsection , below. (a) (b) Facing an interstate highway. No outdoor advertising sign adjacent to and facing an interstate highway shall exceed 45 feet in height at its highest point, measured from the grade of the interstate highway at the point of its nearest proximity to the sign. Not a highway other than an interstate highway. No outdoor advertising sign adjacent to and facing any other highway or street shall exceed 35 feet in height at its highest point, measured from the grade of the highway or street at the point of its nearest proximity to the sign Location. (a) (b) (c) (d) Outdoor advertising signs may only be authorized to be located in the C-2, C-3, C-4, 1-1, 1-2, and 1-3 Districts. No outdoor advertising sign shall be erected upon the roof of any building, attached to any building, or painted or posted on any building. No outdoor advertising signs shall be setback less than 20 feet from any public right-of-way. No outdoor advertising sign shall be oriented to be viewed from any waterway or body of water within or surrounding the city Sign area and faces. (a) (b) No outdoor advertising sign in the C-2, C-3 and C-4 Districts shall have a surface area exceeding 450 square feet per sign face. No outdoor advertising sign shall have more than two (2) sign faces. No outdoor advertising sign in the 1-1, 1-2, and 1-3 Districts shall have a surface area exceeding 750 square feet per face. No outdoor advertising sign shall have more than two (2) sign faces Separation requirements. (a) No outdoor advertising sign shall be less than 500 feet from any other outdoor advertising sign located on the same side of the same street. 113 of 125

116 Proposed Sign Ordinance for City of Norfolk (b) (c) (d) At street intersections, no outdoor advertising sign shall be located less than 500 feet from any other outdoor advertising sign as measured along consecutive or intersecting street right-of-way lines. No outdoor advertising sign shall be located within 200 feet of any rightof-way of any underpass, overpass, bridge or tunnel or any plaza serving such facility. No outdoor advertising sign shall be located less than 300 feet from a residential zoning district boundary fronting on both sides of the same street right-of-way Landscaping. A square, rectangular,'oval, or circular area of ground no less than 20% of the area of one face of the sign shall be landscaped in accordance with section , above Restricted areas. Outdoor advertising signs are prohibited from being erected facing certain streets or portions thereof which have been designated by city council. In such designations, city council may consider any or all of the following factors: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) Promotion of highway safety. Convenience and enjoyment of public travel. Protection of pedestrians. Attraction oftourism. Preservation and enhancement of property values. Public health, safety and general welfare. Protection of major public and/or private investments that have previously been, or currently are being, made to improve environmental quality and community appearance. (h) Objectives for neighborhood revitalization and community improvement in plans and programs adopted by the council DeSignated streets. Based on the criteria stated above, the following streets or portions of streets have been designated by city council as streets where outdoor advertising signs are prohibited: (a) (b) (c) Admiral Taussig Boulevard. International Terminal Boulevard. Hampton Boulevard. 114 of 125

117 Proposed Sign Ordinance for City of Norfolk (d) Ocean View Avenue and Shore Drive from the Hampton Roads Bridge Tunnel to the Virginia Beach city line. (e) Brambleton Avenue from Hampton Boulevard to Interstate 264. (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (I) (m) (n) Northampton Boulevard from the city limit to Military Highway. Interstate 264 from the city limit line for a distance of 3,000 feet into the city. Downtown tunnel for a distance of 3,000 feet from the point where the tunnel crosses the shoreline entering the city. Midtown tunnel for a distance of 3,000 feet from the point where the tunnel crosses the shoreline entering the city. Virginia Beach Boulevard from the city limit for a distance of 3,000 feet into the city. Church Street. Granby Street. St. Paul's Boulevard. Waterside Drive/Boush Street Applications and the permitting process Application requirements. Applications for a sign certificate shall be submitted to the zoning administrator on forms provided by the department of city planning and codes administration. (a) Permanent signs. For all signs other than temporary signs, every application shall include: (1) The street name and street number of the building or the site on which the sign is to be erected. (2) Names, addresses, and telephone numbers of the applicant, owner of the property on which the sign is to be erected or affixed, the owner of the sign, and the licensed contractor erecting or affixing the sign. (3) An existing conditions inventory drawn to approximate scale indicating the proposed location of the sign{s), an outline of the principal building(s), the locations and dimensions of all existing signs on the site, landscaping, and the location of any traffic signs or signals near or adjacent to the site. 115 of 125

118 Proposed Sign Ordinance for City of Norfolk (4) Two (2) scaled drawings of the plans and specifications of the sign to be erected or affixed. Such details shall include accurate dimensions, materials, layout of the copy, and size of the proposed sign. For wall signs, dimensions of the building wall on which the sign is to be affixed and the dimensions and location 01 the proposed wall signs shall also be included. (5) Current photographs of the street sides of the premises in question, showing all existing signs on the premises. For proposed wall signs a photograph of the entire facade of the building on which the sign is to be erected. (6) Applications for permits for outdoor advertising signs, in addition to the above information, shall contain a survey showing at least the following: the location of all outdoor advertising signs within 500 feet on both sides of the street; all structures on the site; all adjoining residential zoning districts; and all setbacks and side or rear yards applicable in the zoning district. (7) A landscaping agreement for freestanding signs (on a form provided by the zoning administrator) on which the property owner or authorized agent agrees "to install and maintain the required landscaping. Timing of initial installation may be based on appropriate planting seasons and shall be indicated on the agreement. (8) A registration fee as provided for in Article IV, section 19-4, unless exempt under section (b}. (9) Other information as the zoning administrator may require to determine full compliance with this chapter and other applicable regulations. (b) Temporary signs. For all temporary signs, every application shall include: (1) Two (2) scaled drawings of the plans and specifications of the temporary sign to be erected including dimensions, installation method, and any other certifications as required by the Virginia Uniform Statewide Building Code. (2) Current photographs of the site and location of where the temporary sign will be located. (3) A written scope of when the temporary sign will be installed and when it will be removed. 116 of 125

119 Proposed Sign Ordinance for City of Norfolk Review and approval. (4) Other information as the zoning administrator may require to determine full compliance with this chapter and other applicable regulations. (5) A registration fee as provided for in Article IV, section (a) (b) (c) Review by zoning administrotor. Upon the filing of an application for a sign certificate, the zoning administrator shall examine the plans, specifications and other data submitted, and may, if deemed necessary, inspect the premises upon which the proposed sign is to be erected. Issuance of sign certificate. If the proposed sign is in compliance with standards contained in this chapter and all other applicable provisions in this ordinance, the zoning administrator shall issue a sign certificate for the proposed sign. In the event that no sign certificate has been issued within 60 days from the latest date when an all information necessary to make a complete application was submitted and the proposed sign is in compliance with the standards contained in this chapter and all other applicable provisions in this ordinance, then the certificate shall be deemed to have been issued atthe end ofthe 60 day period. Failure to commence work. If the work authorized pursuant to a sign certificate has not been commenced within six (6) months after the date of issuance, the sign certificate shall become void. Prior to the ending of the sixth-month period, upon written request by the applicant, the zoning administrator, if it is determined that the sign certificate is still valid, may extend by three (3) months the date by which all work must be completed. At the discretion of the zoning administrator, further extensions may be granted Alternative Signage Special Exception. (a) (b) Eligibility. Large scale land uses with common design elements (such as a shopping center, an office park, a special district such as the airport, or large institutions such as a university or medical center with multiple buildings on a campus) may apply for a special exception to authorize alternative signage pertaining only to a particular center or campus, in lieu of the sign regulations that would otherwise be required under this chapter. Approval and amendment process. Application, consideration, and approval or denial of an Alternative Sign age Special Exception and any subsequent amendments to an approval shall conform to and be governed by the procedures set forth in chapter 25 ofthis ordinance. 117 of 125

120 Proposed Sign Ordinance for City of Norfolk Enforcement Private signage agreements. Nothing in this chapter shall prevent any persons from establishing, by deed restrictions or private agreement, sign regulations which are more stringent than those set forth in this chapter. Such private agreements shall not be enforced by the city Violations. (a) (b) Failure to obtain required registration or permits. Any person who erects, reconstructs or moves any sign for which a sign certificate is required after the effective date of this ordinance shall be deemed a violation of this ordinance subject to the procedures and penalties described in Article IV, Chapter 23 of this ordinance. In addition, any person responsible for a sign which falls within the prohibitions of Section or the removal requirements of Section and who fails to remove such sign shall be in violation of this ordinance and subject to the procedures and penalties described in Article IV, Chapter 23 of this ordinance. Continuing violations. Each day that a violation continues shall be deemed a separate offense Penalties for violations. Penalties shall be imposed pursuant to section 23-4 of this zoning ordinance. 118 of 125

121 Proposed Sign Ordinance for City of Norfolk Table 16-A - Permanent Signage "'In addition to the signs identified in this table, other sign$ may be permissible under the special rules set forth in section R-l, R-2, R-3, R- 4, R-5, R-6, R-7, R-8, R-9, R-IO, R-ll, R-12, R 13, R-14, R-15, MHP, Residential Uses in PD Districts Single-Family, Two-Family, Semi-Detached Dwelling and Townhouse Multi-Family, Uses not otherwise noted MaXimum area (per sign face): Maximum area (total of all signs): 32 sq. ft. Maximum number: 1 per 50 ft. of building frontage Minimum distance from property line: 6 ft. Maximum area (per sign face): 32 sq. ft. Maximum number: <100ft. lot frontage: 0 lot frontaae: 1 Minimum distance from right-of-way line: 5 ft. Not Permitted Not Permitted Not Permitted Maximum area (per sign face): 9 sq. Maximum height: 2.5 ft. Maximum number: Located at a vehicular entrance to the site: 1 per entrance Located elsewhere on the lot: no maximum No sign oriented to the waterfront sha 11 be permitted except one un lighted sign not exceeding five feet in sign surface area Maximum area (per sign face): <100ft. lot frontage; sq. ft ft. lot frontage: 32 sq. ft. Maximum area (per sign face): 9 sq. ft. Maximum height: 2.5 ft. C-l, C-2, C-3, C 4, Commercial Uses in PD Districts Any Use Maximum area (total of all signs facing a public street): <32 ft. building frontage: 32 sq. ft. >32ft. building frontage: 1 sq. ft. per linear ft. of building frontage Maximum number: <100ft. lot frontage: ft. lot frontage: 1 >200 ft. lot frontage; 1 plus 1 for each additional 200 ft. lot Shopping centers with >40,000 sq. ft. of building area may have 1 additional sign located at the entrance to the center with a maximum area of 50 sq. ft. and a maximum height of 12ft. or 16 ft. if set back 20 ft. from the Maximum area (total of all signs): 1/2 sq. ft. per linear ft. of frontage Maximum number: Located at a vehicular entrance to the site: 1 per entrance Located elsewhere on the lot: no maximum 119 of 125

122 Proposed Sign Ordinance for City of Norfolk 1-1,1-2,1-3,1-4, 1-5, PO-I Any Use Maximum area (per sign face); 9 sq. ft. Maximum area (total of all signs facing a public street): Maximum area (total of I Maximum height: 2.5 ft. <32 ft. building frontage: 32 Maximum number: all signs): sq. ft. 1/2 sq. ft. per <100ft. lot frontage: 0 Maximum number: linear ft. of frontage >32 ft. building frontage: 1 sq ft. lot frontage: 1 Located at a vehicular entrance ft. per linear foot of frontage >400ft. lot frontage: 1 plus 1 for to the site: 1 per entrance each additional 400 ft. lot Located elsewhere on the lot: no maximum BC-1, BC-2 Any Use Maximum area (total of all signs): <32 ft. building frontage: 16 sq. ft. >32 ft. building frontage: 1/2 sq. ft. per linear foot of frontage Maximum area (total of ~;~;~~~ ~~;'b~r~'-.-. Maximum number: 2 all signs): 1/2 sq. ft. per Located at a vehicular entrance linear ft. of frontage to the site: 1 per entrance Minimum distance from right-of-way Located elsewhere on the lot: no line: 25 ft. maximum 0-1 Any Use Maximum area (total of all signs): Lowest portion installed at least 20ft. above grade: 2% of fa~ade, up to 100 sq. ft. Highest portion installed less than 20ft. above grade: 16 sq. ft. or 1 sq. ft. per linear ft. of building frontage, whichever is Maximum number: Lowest portion installed at least 20ft. above grade and <100ft. offrontage: 1 Lowest portion installed at least 20 ft. above grade and >=100 ft. offrontage: 2 Highest portion installed less than 20ft. above grade: no maximum Maximum area (per sign face): 50 sq. ft. Maximum height: 12 ft. Maximum number: 2 Minimum distance from right-of-way line: 25 ft. Maximum area (total of all signs): 1/2 sq. ft. per linear ft. of frontage Maximum area (per sign face): 9 sq. ft. Maximum height: 2.5 ft. Maximum number: Located at a vehicular entrance to the site: 1 per entrance Located elsewhere on the lot: no maximum 120 of 125

123 Proposed Sign Ordinance for City of Norfolk D-1, D-2, D-3, D-4, D-5, G-l I Any Use Permitted Maximum area: Maximum area (per building facade): Located on Boush Street, Brambleton Avenue, <20ft. above grade: 1.5 sq. ft. per Monticello Avenue (north of Virginia Beach Maximum area (per sign linear foot of lot frontage Boulevard), st. Paul's Boulevard, Virginia Beach face): 9 sq. ft. >=20ft. above grade: 100 sq. ft. or 2% Boulevard, or Waterside Drive: 100 sq. ft. of fac;ade, up to 600 sq. ft. Located on any other street: 24 sq. ft. Maximum area (total of Maximum height: 12 ft. all signs): 1/2 sq. ft. per I Maximum number: linear ft. of frontage Maximum number: <20ft. above grade: no maximum Maximum number: 1 Located at a vehicular >=20ft. above grade: 1 plus 1 if entrance to the site: 1 >100 ft. per entra nee At least 50% of signs >=20 ft. above grade Located elsewhere on shan be located in the uppermost 20% of Minimum distance from right-of-way line: 5 ft. the lot: no maximum the building fa~ade [t@t1~'fi~'l$t~ttm101t~ g, p iler: 1 Maximum area (per building frontage): Facing the public street on which the principal access is located: 1 sq. ft. per linear ft. of building frontage Facing a public street not containing the principal access: 1/2 sq. ft. per linear ft. of building frontage sq. ft. per g. ft. INot permitted I Not permitted I Not permitted Maximum area: 8 sq. ft. Total of all signs HC-G2, HC-G3 Nonconforming I Not permitted I Not permitted shall not exceed HC-WFl, HC WF2, HC-EF Commercial Uses Commercial Uses Conforming all signs) Maximum area (per building frontage): Facing the public street on which the principal access is located: 1 sq. ft. per linea r ft. of bu ilding frontage Facing a public street not containing the principal access: 1/2 sq. ft. per... linear ft. of' Maximum area (per building frontage): 100 sq. ft. or 2% of the building fac;ade on Maximum height: 6 ft. Maximum height: 6 ft. Not permitted I Not permitted Commercial Uses which the sign is located, whichever is I Not permitted I Not permitted I Not permitted in Buildings >35 ft. in Height _~I'~ater Maximum number: 1, if building frontage >50 ft. 32 sq. ft. Total of all signs shall not exceed 32 sq. ft. HC-HH I Any Use Not Permitted Not permitted Not permitted 121 of 125

124 Proposed Sign Ordinance for City of Norfolk IN-1 Any Use Maximum area (per sign face): Located at the principal building entrance: 24 sq. ft. Lacated elsewhere on the building: 1 sq. ft. per linear ft. of building frontage Maximum number: Located at the principal building entrance: 1 Located elsewhere on the building: 1 per building frontage Maximum area (per sign face): 32 sq. ft. Maximum height: 8 ft. Maximum number: 1, monument style only Minimum distance from right-of-way line: 5 ft. Maximum area (per sign face): 9 sq. ft. ~aximum area (total of all I Maximum height: 2.5 ft. signs): 1/2 sq. ft. per linear ft. of frontage Maximum number: Located at a vehicular entrance to the site: 1 per entrance Located elsewhere on the lot: no maximum Maximum area (per sign face): <20 ft. above grade: 1.5 sq. ft. per linear foot Maximum area (per sign face): 48 sq. ft. Maximum area (per sign face): 9 sq. ft. IN-2, asp Any Use of lot frontage >=20ft. above grade: 100 sq. ft. or 2% of to 300 sa. ft. Maximum number: <20ft. above grade: no maximum >=20ft. above grade: 1 plus 1 if fa~ade length >100 ft. Maximum height: 12 ft. or 16 ft. if set back 20 ft. from public right-of-way Maximum number: Located at a principal entrance to the campus: 1 per entrance, may be lighted Located at the entrance to a building on the Minimum distance from right-of-way line: 5 ft. Maximum area (total of all signs): 1/2 sq. ft. per linear ft. offrontage Maximum height: 2.5 ft. Maximum number: Located at a vehicular entrance to the site: 1 per entrance Located elsewhere on the lot: no maximum 122 of 125

125 Proposed Sign Ordinance for City of Norfolk Table Temporary Signage *In addition to the signs identified in this table, other signs may be permissible under the special rules set forth in section Maximum area (per Single-Family, Two- signs) banner): 8 sq. ft """0"'" \,.~ y/~..., Family, Semi 12 sq. ft. (anyone No sign certificate ft. INot permitted 13 months Detached Dwelling sign) required R-1, R-2, R-3, R-4, R and Townhouse Maximum number: Maximum number: 1 5, R-6, R-7, R-8, R-9, no limit per dwelling unit R-10, R-ll, R-12, R 13, R-14, R-15, MHP, Maximum area (total of all signs): PD-R Maximum area: 48 Maximum area (per 24 sq. ft. ~V"d,,',,,"" ","" 6 "m" per yearpersign, limited to 20 A-Frame signs shall be Multi-Family, Uses sq. ft. banner): 32 sq. ft. Minimum height (wall mounted): 8 Maximum days each located within 10 feet not otherwise ft. Number: 1 per of a pedestrian noted Maximum height (ground): Equal to zoning lot A-Frame signs: must be removed entrance while business is closed and during severe weather events Banner signs shall be Maximum area (per flag): 24 sq. ft. Yard and Banner signs: 6 times located within 20 M,,'m,m.~ (,,'" IM"'m,m.~ ("". ft. of per year per sign, limited to 20 Minimum height (wall mounted): 8 Iof all SignS): ~_Sq. ft. banner): 16 sq. ft. Maximum a pedestrian entrancei C-1, C-2, PD-MU, POdays each ft. IAnyUse Number: 1 per A-Frame signs shall be C, TOO Maximum height (ground): Equal to business A-Frame signs: must be removed located within 10 feet Maximum number: 1 Maximum number: 1 ~ce from nearest property line while business is closed and of a pedestrian per street frontage per business ha...ir'ylllrv1< n1!mho... " during severe weather events entrance 50% of Banner signs Maximum area (per flag): 24 sq. ft. Yard and Banner signs: 6 times Maximum area (per Maximum area (per shall be located within per year per sign, limited to 20 sign): 60 sq. ft. banner): 16 sq. ft. Minimum height (wall mounted): 8 Maximum 20 ft. of a pedestrian days each C-3 and C-4 I Any Use I ft. Number: 1 per entrancei A-Frame Maximum number: 1 Maximum height (ground): Equal to business A-Frame signs: must be removed signs shall be located per 50 ft. of lot nict~nrt:l frnm n'::>:lrj:)d nronprtv linp while business is dosed and within 10 feet of a < ' Maximum area (per flag): 24 sq. ft. Yard and Banner signs: 6 times Maximum area (per Maximum area (per per year per sign, limited to 20 A-Frame signs shall be 60 sq. ft. banner): 16 sq. ft. Minimum height (wall mounted): 8 Maximum days each located within 10 feet 1-1, 1-2, 1-3, 1-4, 1-5, I ft. Number: 1 per Any Use of a pedestrian PO-I, BC-1, BC-2, 0-1 Maximum height (ground): Equal to business A-Frame signs: must be removed entrance Maximum number: 1 Maximum number: 1 distance from nearest property line wh ile business is closed and per street frontage per business I\I1:::avimllm nllmnpr~, during severe weather events 123 of 125

126 Proposed Sign Ordinance for City of Norfolk Any Use (except as listed below) Maximum area (per Maximum area (per Maximum area (per flag): 24 sq. ft. I sign): 60 sq. ft. banner): 16 sq. ft. Minimum height (wall mounted): 8 ft. Maximum height (ground): Equal to I Maximum number: 1 Maximum number: distance from nearest property line per street frontage 1 per business II...:_..._L..... ""I Maximum Number: 1 per business Yard and Banner signs: 6 times per year per sign, limited to 20 days each A-Frame signs: must be removed while business is closed and during severe weather events A-Frame signs shall be located within 10 feet of a pedestrian entrance 0-1,0-2,0-3, 0-4, 0-5, G-1 Museum Amphitheater, Arena, Stadium, Library, Maximum area (per Theaters, Educational sign): 60 sq. ft. Facility, College/University, Conference Center, Governmental Operations (non- Maximum number: 1 industrial) per street frontage Maximum area (per banner): 200 sq. ft. Maximum number: 3 per zoning lot Maximum area (per flag): 24 sq. ft. Minimum height (wall mounted): 8 ft. Maximum height (ground): Equal to rli<t,mcp from nearest orooertv line Maximum Number: 1 per business Yard signs: 6 times per year per sign, limited to 20 days each Banner signs S 32 square feet: 6 times per year per sign, limited to 20 days each Banner signs> 32 square feet: 3 months A-Frame signs: must be removed while business is closed and during A-Frame signs shall be located within 10 feet of a pedestrian entrance HC-G1, HC-G2, HC-G3, HC WF1, HC-WF2, HC-EF, HC-HH HC-EF 'CO... tliatr.~tvicfij.1 Maximum area: 16 sq. ft. (total of all signs) 8 sq. ft. (anyone Residential Uses sign) Studio, Arts in buildings >35 feet in height,...os:e...'.. Maximum number: no limit Maximum area (total I of all signs): 24 sq. ft. Commercial, Uses not otherwise noted I Maximum number: 2 per zoning lot Maximum area (total of all signs): 24 sq. ft. Maximum area (per banner): 8 sq. ft. Maximum number: 1 per zoning lot Maximum area (per banner): 16 sq. ft. Maximum number: 1 per zoning lot Maximum area (per banner): 200 sq. ft. Minimum height (wall mounted): 8 ft. fl.11::r.vil"l"'lllm htliaht (ornllnrt\~ FnlJal to..._... Maximum area (per flag): 24 sq. ft. Minimum height (wall mounted): 8 ft. Maximum height (ground): Equal to distance from nearest property line Maximum number: 2 Maximum area (per flag): 24 sq. ft. Not permitted Maximum Number: 1 per business Maximum Number: 1 per 3 months Yard and Banner signs: 6 times per year per sign, limited to 20 days each A-Frame signs: must be removed while business is closed and during severe weather events Yard signs: 6 times per year per sign, limited to 20 days each Banner signs S 32 square feet: 6 times per year per sign, limited to 20 days each Banner signs> 32 square feet: 3 business Pu1ini"""lIr"n hoiaht (wail mnllnted): 8 ft. months A-Frame signs: must be removed 2 Maximum number: Maximum number: distance from nearest property line while business is closed and during per zoning lot 3 per zoning lot _.._L... ""I severe weather events No sign certificate required; Certificate of Appropriateness not required Certificate of Appropriateness not required; A-Frame signs shall be located within 10 feet of a pedestrian entrance Certificate of Appropriateness not required; A-Frame signs shall be located within 10 feet of a pedestrian entrance 124 of 125

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