Lewis H. GOLDFARB, et ux., Petitioners, Virginia State Bar, et al. PROCEEDINGS AND ORDERS. Counsel for petitioners: Alan B.

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1 C RD 1 NO CFX TITLE Lewis H. GOLDFARB, et ux., Petitioners, v. Virginia State Bar, et al. DOCKETED August 5, 1974 COURT U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit DATE PROCEEDINGS AND ORDERS Counsel for petitioners: Alan B. Morrison Counsel for respondents: Stuart H. Dunn, John H. Shene field Aug. 5, 1974 Aug. 10, 1974 Aug. 19' 1974 Sept. 18, 1974 Sept. 18, 1974 Sept. 23' 1974 Sept. 27' 1974 Oct. 10' 1974 Oct. 18, 1974 Oct. 29, 1974 Oct. 29, 1974 Nov. 4, 1974 Nov. 11, 1974 Dec. 9, 1974 Dec. 20, 1974 Dec. 20, 1974 Dec. 20, 1974 Pet i.tion for writ of certiorari filed. Also record filed. Order extending time to file response to petition until Sept. 18' Order extending time to file response to petition until Sept. 18, Bri~f for respondent Fairfax County Bar Association in opposition filed. Mot on of Virginia State Bar to be didmissed as a party respondent filed. Motion of Clark c. Havighurst for leave to file a brief, as amicus curiae, and brief filed. Petitioners' reply brief filed. Bri ~f, DISTRIBUTED. Also motions. amicus curiae, of the U.S. filed. (D) Motion of Clark c. Havighurst for leave to file brief, amicus curiae, GRANTED. Petition GRANTED. Powell, J., OUT Motion of Virginia State Bar to be dismissed as a part) respondent REDISTRIBUTED. Above motion DENIED. Powell, J., OUT. Order extending time to file petitioners' brief on the I merits and appendix until Dec. 20, Motion of The Association of the Bar of the City of New York for leave to file a brief, as amicus curiae, (and brief) filed. Bri~f for petitioners filed. App~ndix filed. (over)... ~

2 74--?Q CARD 1 (cont 1 d) No. DATE Dec. 27, 1974 Jan. 13, Jan. 14, 1975 Jan. 15, 1975 Jan. 15, 1975 Jan. 16, 1975 Jan. 27, 1975 Jan. 30, 1975 Jan. 31, 1975 Jan. 31, 1975 Jan. 31, 1975 Jan. 31, 1975 Jan. 31, 1975 Jan. 31, 1975 Feb. 4, 1975 Feb. 5, 1975 Feb. 6, 1975 Feb. 18, 1975 PROCE E DINGS AND ORDERS 11otion of the District of Columbia Bar for leave to file (and) brief as,amicus curiae,filed. ~otion of Assn. of Bar of City of New York and motion of District of Columbia Bar for leave to file briefs, amicus curiae, DENIED. Powell, J., OUT. Douglas, J., OUT. Brief, amicus curiae, for the U. S. filed. Brief, amicus curiae, of State Bar of Wisconsin filed. Order extending time to file respondents' brief on the merits until Jan. 31, Motion of Solicitor General for additional time to. participate in oral argument, amicus curiae, filed.(d-g: Above motion granted and 15 min. allotted. Respondents also allotted 15 additional min. for oral argument. Douglas, J., OUT. Brief, amicus curiae, of State Bar of Texas filed. Brief, amicus curiae, of American Bar Assn. filed. Brief, amicus curiae, of Bar Association of San Francisco Mot~aa 1!8~ leave to file (anq}.. Briet, am~cus cur~ae, ot Nat~onal Organ~zat~on of Bar Counsel filed. (D-G) Bri~f for respondent Fairfax County Bar Association filed. Bri~f for respondent Virginia State Bar filed. Mot~on of American Dental Assn. for leave to file (and) brief, amicus curiae, filed. (D-G) Motion of District of Columbia Bar for reconsideration of, motion for leave to file brief, amicus curiae, filed. Mo ion of Assn. of Bar of City of New York for reconsideration of motion for leave to file brief, amicus curiae, filed. Motions of D.C. Bar and Assn. of Bar of N.Y. DISTRIBUTE Motion of American Dental Assn. for leave to file brief amicus curiae, GRANI'ED. Motion of National Organizatio: of Bar Counsel for leave to file brief, amicus curiae, GRANTED. Douglas, Marshall and Powell, JJJ, OUT. (cont'd) ". '

3 NO CFX TITLE I Lewis H. GOLDFARB, et ux., Petitioners, v. Virginia State Bar, et al. DOCKETED COURT DATE PROCEEDINGS AND ORDERS Feb. 24, 1975 Feb. 27, 1975 Mar. 14, 1975 Mar. 25, 1975 June 16, 1975 July 11, 1975 July 11, 1975 July 31, 1975 Oct. 6, 1975 Motion of District of Columbia for reconsideration of motion for leave to file brief, amicus curiae, DENIED. Motion of Assn. of Bar of City of New York for reconsideration of motion for leave to file brief, amicus curiae, GRANTED. Douglas, Marshall and Powell, JJJ, Olf. CIRCULATED. Rep y brief for petitioners filed. (D) ARGUED. Adjudged to be REVERSED AND REMANDED. Pet tion for rehearing filed. Application to stay issuance of judgment and order granting same (Burger, CJ, ). Rehearing DISTRIBUTED. SL9P4 Rehearing DENIED. Powell, J., OUT.

4 Fairfax C2E?E 7?:3ation, ' HUNTON, WILLIAMS, GAY & GIBSON 700 EAST MAIN STREET P.O. Box 1535 RICHMOND, VIRGINIA TELEPHONE (703} \ CABLE HUNTWAND August 28, 1974 Miss Sally Smith Chambers of Mr. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. United States Supreme Court Washington, D.C. WASHINGTON, D. C. OFFICE 1730 PENNSYLVANIA AVE. N.W SUITE 1060 TELEPHONE (202) FILE NO. Lewis H. Goldfarb, et al. v. Virginia State Bar and Dear Sally: We are counsel for Fairfax County Bar Association in this action in which the plaintiffs have just filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. I call this to your attention so that Mr. Justice Powell will know of our firm's participation in the action. With best wishes, I am Yours sincerely, 191/381 cc: Joseph C. Carter, Jr., Esquire Lewis T. Booker

5 - Preliminary Memo &~0 ~/\}) (', t~m?( Jj l rj October 25, 1974 Conference List 1, Sheet 3 No GOLDFARB v. VIRGINIA STATE BAR 1. Cert to CA 4 (Boreman, Field; Craven, concurring and dissenting) Federal/Civil Timely Petrs seek review of the CA decision affirming the USDC (E.D. Va.) (Bryan) in its conclusion that the Virginia State Bar was not liable under 1 of the Sherman 1, for price-fixing through the use of a ~iy minimum-fee schedule, but reversing the DC on its holding ~ that the Fairfax County Bar Association was liable under the '- 1\V r price-fixing ~y ' theory /

6 FACTS: Petrs, representing the class of all homeowners in Reston, Virginia, contracted in 1971 to purchase a home in Reston. They financed the purchase through a home mortgage, with the mortgagee requiring the purchase of title insurance. The purchase of the insurance in turn required the conducting of a title examination by an attorney. Petrs were unable to obtain the necessary legal services at a fee lower than that of the minimum-fee schedule of the Fairfax County Bar Association. TheCA accepted the DC's finding that that schedule was a significant factor in petrs' inability to obtain a lower fee. The Virginia State Bar is the administrative agency of the Virginia Supreme Court and was created by that court. The _Virginia Supreme Court has also promulgated rules and regulations covering the proper conduct of attorneys and the operation of the State Bar. The Bar is required under state law to investigate alleged violations of the standards of conduct required by those rules and regulations and to report its findings to the state court of appropriate jurisdiction for the purpose of further disciplinary proceedings. Each practicing lawyer in Virginia must belong to the State Bar. The Fairfux County Bar Association is a voluntary association comprised of members of the State Bar practicing in that county. In 1962 and 1969, the State Bar issued minimum-fee schedule reports which became the basis for minimum-fee schedules published by the Fairfax Association in those same years. The observance of such a fee schedule has been

7 - 3 - termed a matter of ethics by the Virginia Supreme Court. The State Bar has been given authority to publish opinions concerning questions of ethics, and it has published two opinions which discuss the serious ethical difficulties surrounding the habitual charging of fees less than provided on such fee schedules. The State Bar, however, has never received a communication from a local bar association concerning the failure of an attorney to observe the minimum-fee schedule, and the State Bar has never initiated or taken part in any administrative or judicial action against a member of the Bar on the grounds of failure to follow the minimum-fee schedules. Petrs initially brought this action against the local bar associations for Arlington County and for Alexandria also, but,. these two parties agreed to a consent judgment with petrs which directed them to cancel their minimum-fee schedules and which enjoined them from publishing such schedules in the future. The action against the remaining defendants was divided into liability and damages phases. At the close of the liability phase the DC ruled that the Fairfax Association, but not the State Bar, was liable for price-fixing under 1 of the Sherman Act. It concluded that the minimum-fee schedule provided a floor upon which fees could be set. The DC found jurisdiction under the federal antitrust laws by the interstate commerce which was affected by the actions challenged. A significant portion of the funds used for house-financing came from outside the State, and virtually all the lenders making such loans

8 - 4 - require that title insurance be purchased and that a title examination be conducted. Though finding a sufficient effect on interstate commerce in the interstate loans, the DC went on to note that a large percentage of persons living in Fairfax County work outside the State and that significant portions of loans made with respect to real estate in the County are guaranteed by the federal government. It rejected the defense of a "learned profession" exception to the antitrust laws, since that defense was based upon a view of professionalism which the use of a minimum-fee schedule itself contradicts by ignoring differences in ability, worth, and energies expended by those providing the services. Fee-setting "is the least 'learned' part of the profession." The DC concluded,.however, that Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), mandated a finding that the State Bar was not liable for price-fixing because its minor part in the price-fixing was state action. There would also be no need for injunctive relief against the State Bar, if it could be liable, since it has taken no action against any member of the Bar on the grounds of charging less than the minimum-fee schedule. Since the promulgation of such schedules by local associations is necessary before anyone could be charged with failing to observe minimum fees, the holding that such local schedules are illegal would eliminate the question of action by the State Bar in the future. As for damages, there were considerations based upon the Eleventh Amendment and the intent of Congress in enacting the Sherman Act which indicated that a state agency was not to be held liable for damages.

9 - 5 - The CA agreed with the DC that Parker v. Brown, supra, covered the State Bar in this case. The primary benefits from the regulation of attorneys through minimum-fee schedules accrued to the public; the supervision of the State Bar by the Virginia Supreme Court provided the necessary active supervision by independent state officials required by Parker (with the CA rejecting the notion that the inactivity of the court was to be taken to be abandonment of authority); and the program of regulation involved in the minimum-fee system did result from legislative command, since the legislature provided the machinery for regulation. The CA also found, as had the DC, that the Fairfax Association did not fall under Parker. That group's activities were not commanded by legislation, and it was not subject,to active independent state supervision. With respect to petrs' claim that the minimum-fee system restrained trade among attorneys, the CA held that a "learned profession" exception applied to the resps because the activities restrained were not trade or commerce. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Raladam, 283 U.S. 643, 653 (1931); Federal Baseball Club, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 209 (1922). Cf. American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 528 (1943); United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485, (1950). The reason for the exemption is that commercial types of competition may be destructive of ethics in the profession. See United States v. Oregon State Medical Society, 343 U.S. 326, 336 (1952). With respect to petrs' charge that the minimum-fee system restrained

10 - 6 - those engaged in providing financing and insurance for home mortgages by inflating the cost of one of the components of securing such services, the "learned profession" exception did not apply, but there was a failure in this case to show the necessary effect on interstate commerce. The fact that many residents of Fairfax County work outside the State was irrelevant. The provision of legal services incidental to house financing was not turned into interstate commerce by the fact that a significant portion of the funds for the financing came from outside the State. The Fairfax Association sought to regulate only general local se~1ices. TheCA concluded by noting that petrs were asking the court to undertake a bit of judicial legislation by determining that many aspects of the ~egal profession should be subject to the antitrust laws..' Legislative action in this area would be prospective only, but a judicial decision would have the potential of being applied retroactively and thereby causing great disruption in the profession. Judge Craven agreed that the State Bar should not be liable under the antitrust laws, but not on the basis of Parker v. Brown, supra, since the Virginia Supreme Court did not conduct active supervision of the Bar. But, as the DC noted, the State Bar played a minor role in the minimum-fee system. All that it did was to suggest that local associations might want to adopt such schedules and to circulate reports on the schedules which local associations had adopted. Judge Craven also agreed with the

11 - 7 - majority that the Fairfax Association did not fall under Parker, but he disagreed with the majority's holdings on the absence of an effect on interstate commerce and on the applicability of the "learned profession" rule. He concluded that the DC's findings were not clearly erroneous and showed that an agreement to fix the fees composing a part of the cost of housing had a sufficient impact on interstate ( ' commerce to invoke the Sherman Act. He also found that this Court had never held that there is a "learned profession" exception to the antitrust laws. Part of the purpose of practicing law was to earn an income, and to that extent the practice fell within the coverage of the Sherman Act. Hence Judge Craven would have affirmed the DC decision. On September 16, 1974, after petrs had filed their petition for certiorari here, the Fairfax Bar Association adopted a resolution rescinding its 1969 minimum-fee schedule and expressing its intention not to reinstitute such a schedule. 3 CONTENTIONS : a. Petrs contend that the situation here is indistinguishable from American Medical Ass'n v. United States, supra, with respect to the "learned profession" exception. See also United States v. Oregon State Medical Society, supra; United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Boards, supra. The CA erred in failing to realize that resps were not regulating the way in which legal services were provided. The restraint here involved entrepreneurial activity.

12 - 8 - Resp Fairfax Association argues that the "learned profession" exception applies here because of the destructiveness of competition if allowed to flourish in the legal profession. Consumers have difficulty in making quality comparisons among lawyers, and price differences would most often be determinative of a consumer's choice. Thus cost savings, at the expense of quality, would be encouraged. This effect would be very dangerous in the area of title examination. Making competition a legal necessity would create a conflict between the antitrust laws and the anti-solicitation canons of the profession. The applicability of the antitrust laws here would bring on the possibility of their applicability in other areas of the legal profession: _. ~ &, price discrimination among clients, the mergers of firms, the monopolization of the market by single law firms in small towns. If the antitrust laws are to be applied to the professions, the decision should be made by the legislature. b. Petrs contend that there is a sufficient effect on interstate commerce here to accord Sherman Act jurisdiction. There was a large amount of financing of house purchases coming into the County from outside the State. Hence the fixing of one cost of such financing could have an effect on a large amount of interstate commerce. The CA's decision on this point is inconsistent with Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320 (1967), and it conflicts with Doctors, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia, 490 F.2d 48 (CA ). Petrs also cite as

13 - 9 - support for the position theca 9's decision in Copp Paving Co. v. Gulf Oil Co., 487 F.2d 202 (1973), No , in which cert has been granted here. Petrs argue that no decision of this Court since the era following Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), supports theca's view of the reach of the Sherman Act, and the theory adopted below would undermine Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), and Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). Resp Fairfax Ass'n argues that all the transactions and all the legal services occurred within the State. The practice of real estate law is basically a local matter, and the fact that it is incidental to the transaction of interstate business by the consumer does not turn it into an interstate.matter. Burke v. Ford, supra, is distinguishable in that there the product that was subject to the restraint moved in interstate commerce. Doctors, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia, supra, is distinguishable on its facts. In this area, each case turns upon its unique facts. Other cases involving minimumfee schedules may include a substantial interstate element. c. Petrs argue that Parker v. Brown, supra, was wrongly applied below, since there is no indication of a legislative command in this case to eliminate competition in the legal profession. The decision is in conflict with decisions by this Court in analogous areas of preemption of antitrust laws. See Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 361 (1963); Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973). It is also : c.

14 inconsistent with deci~ions of other CA's. See cases cited in Petition, pp Resp State Bar points to Eastern Railroad President's Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, (1961), as further support for its claim of antitrust immunity. The CA correctly applied the Parker doctrine, although the question did not require such application, since the State Bar, as a state agency, is incapable of violating the Sherman Act. There is no conflict among the circuits on this question, since the authorities cited by petrs did not involve the finding of antitrust liability as to governmental defendants. In any event, the role of the State Bar has been a minor one and one consistent with its statutory responsibility and not in a. com _,. mercial or proprietary capacity. Resp Fairfax Association contends that the CA erred in holding that it did not fall within Parker. All that is necessary to find the active state supervision which that case requires is sufficient state involvement to allow a characterization of the activity as state-approved. The legislative command flows from the statutory authority given the Virginia SupreiLe Court to devise a code of ethics to govern the legal profession. The agency of the court, the State Bar, has twice published minimum-fee reports and two opinions on the subject, but it relies upon local bar associations to promulgate minimum-fee schedules adjusted to take into account local circumstances. Hence the Fairfax Association played the role of a virtual functionary of the State Bar. t '.. :

15 d. The State Bar also argues that, as a state agency, it is protected by the Eleventh Amendment. addition, any judgment of damages against it would have to be paid from the State Treasury. this point. In Petrs have not addressed e. Resp Fairfax Association argues that its recent decision to rescind its minimum-fee schedule and its express intention not to reinstitute such a schedule has mooted this case. First, any decision finding antitrust liability here would have to be limited to prospective application, under Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971). It would overturn I past precedent as to the "learned profession" exception and the r easonable expectations of the profession based upon it.. Until very recently, the Justice Department had never brought a suit challenging a minimum-fee schedule, and in 1961 and 1965 the antitrust division indicated that it viewed such systems as not being subject to antitrust attack. Requiring resp to pay damages would not be necessary to enforce the new antitrust rule, since any holding that such systems were subject to the antitrust laws would sufficiently deter their use. In this case, prospective relief is also unnecessary since resp has already rescinded its schedule and has said that it would not use one again. Hence there is no likelihood of recurring violation. See United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953). Even if this case were not moot, there would be no need for injunctive relief. See id.

16 Petrs, in their reply brief, argue that the recent action of the Fairfax Association does not affect their claims against the State Bar, since that body still has its opinions on the subject outstanding and has circulated reports on minimum-fee schedules. Attorneys will be able to adhere to them. The action also does not affect the claim for damages. Resp wants a decision on the prospectivity issue before any decision on this petition or on the merits. The DC rejected the argument for prospectivity only, but theca never reached the issue. This Court should not reach it until the CA has passed on it, and that cannot occur until the CA decision is reversed. Moreover, the doctrine of prospectivity should not be applied in this case. See Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. _.United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 496 (1968); Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 396 U.S. 13 (1969). f. There is an amicus brief from Clark C. Havinghurst, a professor of law at Duke University School of Law, whose concern is with the issue of the "learned profession" exception and its impact in the area of the provision of health care. He argues against the acceptance of a broad "learned profession" exception. 4. DISCUSSION: The recent action of the Fairfax Bar Association in rescinding its minimum-fee schedule does not affect the action against the State Bar or against the Fairfax Association as to the damage claim. The voluntary cessation of the challenged action does not render this case moot. "The defendant is free to return to his old ways. This, together. ' _.,. r,. ~.

17 with a public interest in having the legality of the practices settled, militates against a mootness conclusion." United States v. W.T. Grant Co., supra, 345 U.S., at 632 (footnote omitted). Petrs have a substantial basis from which to suggest that until the liability question is finally resolved, the question of the appropriate relief to redress the wrong cannot be faced. If the CA decision remains the law of this case, the unilateral action of resp Fairfax Association in rescinding and expressing the intention never to reintroduce the minimum-fee schedule would not provide strong protection for the interests of the class which petrs represent. If liability is found, then the issue of relief can be considered in the second phase of this litigation. See id., at 634. The question of the applicability of the federal antitrust laws to the use of minimum-fee schedules appears to be one which will be much litigated in the near future. The Justice Department has recently filed a suit challenging the use of such fee schedules in Oregon. United States v. Oregon State Bar, Civ. No (D. Ore., filed May 9, 1974). There is also congressional interest in the issue. See "Legal Fees," Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Representation of Citizen Interests of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., Part 1, pp (1973). One would expect that generally litigation on this question would present the same complex of questions presented in this case: the sufficiency of the effect on interstate commerce for t

18 jurisdictional purposes; the applicability of Parker v. Brown, supra; the existence and scope of a "learned profession" exception to the antitrust laws. In other cases, however, more emphasis may be placed upon the question of whether the use of the minimum-fee schedule constitutes price-fixing. The interstate commerce question is somewhat distinct, but it presents a substantial question which could well be determinative of the results of litigation on this antitrust theory. questions presented in Copp Paving, supra, pertain to the Robinson-Patman and Clayton Acts and not to 1 of the Sherman Act. The There is a brief in opposition from resp Fairfax Bar Association, a motion to dismiss from resp Virginia State Bar,. and a reply brief from petrs. There is also an amicus brief filed by Clark C. Havinghurst. 10/16/74 ME Malysiak DC and CA Opinions in Petition Appx.

19 Conference Court.... Voted on..., Argued , Assigne~..., Submitted....., Announced..., No GOLDFARB vs. VIRGINIA STATE BAR HOLD FOR JURISDICTIONAL NOT CERT. MERITS MOTION AB r--+--S,T_A_T_E,M_E_N_T,---t-----, ISENT VOT- G D N POST DIS AFF REV AFF G D ING Rehnquist, J Powell, J.... Blackmun, J Marshall, J White, J Stewart, J Brennan, J.... Douglas, J.... Burger, Ch. J....

20 Conference Court CA - 4 Voted on..., Argued...., Assigned'..., Submitted....., Announced..., No LEWIS H. GOLDFARB, ET AL., Petitioners vs. VIRGINIA STATE BAR, ET AL. 8/5/74 Cert. filed. Ol)\ HOLD FOR CERT. JURISDICTIONAL MERITS MOTION AB- NOT ~ rbt_a_t_e"t"m_e_n_t...---t---, isent VOT- G D N POST DIS AFF REV AFF G D ING Rehnquist, J Powell, J Blackmun, J.... Marshall, J.... White, J Stewart, J Brennan, J.... Douglas, J Burger, Ch. J....

21 HUNTON. 'VILLIAMS, GAY & GIBSON 700 EAST MAIN STREET P.O. Box 1535 RICHMOND, VIRCJJNIA TELEPHONE (804) \ CABLE HUNTWAND January 20, 1975 WASHINGTON, D. C. O 'FICE 1730 PENNSYLVANIA AVE. N. W SUITE 1060 TELEPHONE (202) FILE NO Hr. Michael Rodak, Jr., Clerk United States SupreTie Court Office of the Clerk Washi ngton, D.C Dear Mr. Rodak: Goldfarb et al. v. Virginia State Bar and Fairfax County Bar Association, No This is to advise you that Respondent Fairfax Bar County Association does not object to the Motion for Expedited Consideration and Argument in Tandem with Goldfarb v.. Vi r ~inia State Bar et al., filed by National Society of Pro essional Engineers, appellant in National Societ~ of?rofessional En~ineers v. United States (appeal file January 16, 197 ), on the condition tnat: (1) time allocated to Respondents in Goldfarb for oral argument is not thereby decreased; and (2) the.hearing of Goldfarb is not thereby delayed. The Motion filed by the National Society of Prof ess ional Engineers asserts that the Solicitor General intends to move for leave to argue orally as an amicus in the Goldfarb case. Respondent Fairfax County Bar AssOCiatlon does oppose that motion, if filed. In the event the motion is granted, Respondent Fairfax County Bar Association requests that it be. allotted additional time for oral argument to respond to the comb i ned arguments of the Petitioners and the Solicitor General. Finally, in any event, pursuant to Rule 44(4) of the Rule s of the Supreme Court, Respondent Fairfax County Bar

22 JAN :Z; 1 W;s HUNTON,WILLI~IS,GAY '&GIBSON OFFICE UF 1W ('LF SU ~ ' R" ' P.k~lr!~ CO URI~ ~~.S;. Mr. Michael Rodak, Jr. -2- January 20, 1975 Association requests the special permission of the Court to divi de the time for oral argument allocated to Respondents, inasmuch as the interests of the parties and the nature of the relevant legal issues differ materially as between them. 434/337 cc: Very truly 4~ Shenefiel Alan B. Morrison, Esq. (Counsel for Petitioners) Stuart H. Dunn, Esq. (Counsel for Virginia State Bar) Martin Michaelson, Esq. (Counsel for National Society of Professional Engineers) "'--. I 0 ~ ;;... ' '.,_.,.,,.~,

23 C~AM BE. RS OF JUSTICE WM, J. BRENNAN, JR. ~ltprtm.c <!Jourt of tip ~lnitd1 ~h-lf.cg ~tras~i:ngtott, gl. <!J. 20?JI ;l June 3, 1975 / RE: No Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar Assn. Dear Chief: I agree. Sincerely, The Chief Justice cc: The Conference

24 .in:pt"tmt QJqurl of f!rt J{ttittb.Jmus._asfringtmt. ~. QJ. 2llgi'l-.;l CHAMI!!E:RS OF" JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE June 3, 1975 Re: No Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar Association Dear Chief: Please join me. Sincerely, The Chief Justice Copies to Conference.. ~.,.,. ~ >\

25 June 4, 1975 No Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar Dear Chief: Please note at the end of your opinion that I took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Sincerely, The Chief Justice lfp/ss cc: The Conference

26 ~nvrtutt <q"curt cf tqt ~t~ ~tltf:ta 'llaaqmgtcn. ~. <q". 20:pJ!~ CHAMBERS OF' JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL June 5, 1975 Re: No , Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar Association Dear Chief: Please join me. The Chief Justice cc: The Conference Sincerely,. -?.:./ (,--1 /C _/. T. M.

27 .ju:prttttt Qfattrl of tlft ~tb.jtzdtg ~asqingtott. ~. <!f. 211&'~~ CHAMBERS OF..JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST June 6, 1975 Re: No Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar Dear Chief: Please join me. Sincerely, I j The Chief Justice Copies to the Conference

28 CHAMBERS OF" JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN ~ttpttlttt <!ftmrt of tqt 'Jltttittlt $)htftg 'JliagJrhtgtott. ~. <q. 21lbt''~ June 12, 1975 \ I Re: No Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar Dear Chief: Please join me. Sincerely, ~~6. The Chief Justice cc: The Conference