IN THE MĀORI LAND COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AOTEA DISTRICT A Applicant

Transcription

1 378 Aotea MB 118 IN THE MĀORI LAND COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AOTEA DISTRICT A UNDER Section 19, Te Ture Whenua Māori Act 1993 IN THE MATTER OF BETWEEN AND Te Rūnanga o Ngāti Maru (Taranaki) Trust HAIMONA MARUERA Applicant TE RŪNANGA O NGĀTI MARU (TARANAKI) TRUST Respondent Hearing: 19 December 2017 (Heard at New Plymouth) Counsel: J Kahukiwa for Applicant L McErlane for Respondent Date: 20 December 2017 ORAL JUDGMENT OF JUDGE L R HARVEY Copies to: J P Kahukiwa Corban Revell, Solicitors, DX DP92558 jkahukiwa@corbanrevell.co.nz L McErlane mcerlane@ascendcapital.co.nz

2 378 Aotea MB 119 Introduction Haimona Maruera seeks an injunction to restrain Te Rūnanga o Ngāti Maru (Taranaki) Trust from entering an Agreement in Principle (AIP) to settle the Ngāti Maru historical claims with the Crown in Wellington, tomorrow at 3.00pm. Mr Maruera, by his counsel, argues two principal grounds in support of his application: (a) the trustees of the Rūnanga are not competent to represent the interests of the Ngāti Maru tribe of Taranaki and to sign the AIP, due, in part, to what is an improper cloaking by this Court of the Rūnanga with a mandate to do so; and (b) the Rūnanga has improperly excluded tribal beneficiaries from its register who are members of the iwi and therefore entitled to vote in any polls or hui convened for tribal purposes. Mr McErlane, for the Rūnanga, opposes the application and says that it is the Crown who have recognised the mandate of his client to act as agent for a post settlement governance entity that may be formed at some time in the future with the consent of the iwi. The purpose of that entity, he says, will then be to enter into a Deed of Settlement with the Crown to resolve all the tribe s historical claims, if the iwi ratifies any such settlement. Issue The issue for determination is whether the injunction application should be granted. Procedural history The application was received late Monday afternoon and then drawn to the attention of the Deputy Registrar yesterday morning. Mrs Hodge then sent it to me at 11.05am while I was in presiding over the bi-monthly list Court at New Plymouth. Following a review of the papers, at the end of the list Court at 2.35pm, I directed the case manager to liaise with the parties and their counsel to convene a hearing by telephone at 3.30pm. Present on the call were Mr Kahukiwa and his client Mr Maruera and Mr McErlane and his client, Holden Hohaia the chairman of the Rūnanga. Mr Hohaia left the hearing soon after due to a previous commitment.

3 378 Aotea MB 120 In addition, in his memorandum dated 18 December 2017 accompanying the application, Mr Kahukiwa requested the assignment of this proceeding to a Judge, other than myself. He submitted that, given the nature of the substantive claim, and the need to avoid the prospect of any Judge reviewing his own orders, another Judge should be assigned to these applications. To a large extent, he contended, the issue is one of law, and does not require an in depth familiarity with the facts. Mr Kahukiwa confirmed that in making this request, no suggestion of bias was being made, but rather in the nature of the principles set out in the Saxmere decisions, 1 these applications, at least on the face of it, needed to be dealt with in an entirely objective way. At the hearing this issue was not raised or otherwise pursued. Indeed, Mr Kahukiwa expressed his satisfaction that the application had been brought on for hearing at short notice within 24 hours and that the parties had been given more than sufficient time to make their arguments. In any event, I refer to my judgment Maruera v Te Ohu Kaimoana Trustee Ltd Ngāti Maru (Taranaki) Fisheries Trust, 2 dated 31 March 2015 which relied on Re JRL; ex p CJL where Sir Anthony Mason stated: 3 There may be many situations in which previous decisions of a judicial officer on issues of fact and law may generate an expectation that he is likely to decide issues in a particular case adversely to one of the parties. But this does not mean either that he will approach the issues in that case otherwise than with an impartial and unprejudiced mind in the sense in which that expression is used in the authorities or that his previous decisions provide an acceptable basis for inferring that there is a reasonable apprehension that he will approach the issues in this way. Although it is important that justice must be seen to be done, it is equally important that judicial officers discharge their duty to sit and do not, by acceding too readily to suggestions of appearance of bias, encourage parties to believe that by seeking the disqualification of a judge, they will have their case tried by someone thought to be more likely to decide the case in their favour. Background The issue of who represents Ngāti Maru dates back to 2004 and was referred to in my decision Pue v Kīngi Te Rūnanga o Ngāti Maru (Taranaki) Whenua Tōpu Trust dated 27 1 See Saxmere Company Ltd v Wool Board Establishment Company Ltd at [2008] NZSC 94, [2010] 1 NZLR 35 and [2010] 1 NZLR 76 2 (2015) 335 Aotea MB 47 (335 AOT 47) 3 (1986) 161 CLR 342 at 352

4 378 Aotea MB 121 March For convenience, the relevant extracts of the procedural background to these longstanding proceedings are set out below: 4 [9] In 2004 Ngāti Maru Wharanui Pukehou Trust ( NMWPT ) was appointed the interim representative of Ngāti Maru for particular purposes, primarily concerning hauora funding and fisheries matters. This decision was made following a determination that, in the absence of any legitimate alternative, NMWPT was the only realistic contender for the role as a tribal representative for appointment to a body called Te Whare Punanga Korero, a pan tribal organisation involved in Māori health. However, it was emphasised that the appointment could only be on an interim basis as the Māori reservation trust did not, at that time, appear to be structurally capable of maintaining a representative role for the tribe indefinitely. It was also made plain to the iwi that a more permanent representative body needed to be established and so a period of 24 months was set aside for that purpose. [10] For many reasons, including ongoing litigation, the Trust was eventually constituted on 15 January 2010 to represent Ngāti Maru. This was following a long period of discussion, debate and consultation within the tribe over representation issues generally and during a period when hearings before the Court were still in progress. The current trustees as at the date of final hearing are Tamzyn Pue, Jan Mātuku, Holden Hohaia, Tom Rangihaeata and Maioha Tokotaua. High Court proceedings [13] As foreshadowed, in April 2004 at the request of the High Court, an application was heard per s 30 of the Act to determine the appropriate representative for Ngāti Tama and Ngāti Maru in the context of representation on Te Whare Punanga Korero Trust (a pan tribal Māori health advisory body). On 16 July 2004 the Court determined that Te Rūnanga o Ngāti Tama was the appropriate representative for Ngāti Tama. It was acknowledged that the issue was for Ngāti Maru more complex. However with the consent of all parties it was considered that the best way forward was for the Court to direct the trustees of NMWPT to convene a further meeting of its beneficiaries to discuss and resolve the issue of representation for Te Whare Punanga Korero Trust. The Court appointed NMWPT as interim representative of Ngāti Maru. The application was adjourned for two years to enable the establishment of an appropriate entity to represent Ngāti Maru Applications [14] On 19 September 2005 Rata Pue sought directions in relation to a pending application to establish a whenua tōpu trust over Ngāti Maru land. On that same day he filed an application seeking direction in relation to the trustees of NMWPT. Rowena Henry also filed an application that day, for the appointment and replacement of NMWPT trustees following general meetings held on 19 October 2003, 14 March 2004 and 14 November I directed that all applications would be heard together at the next New Plymouth Court. [15] That hearing was held on 14 October 2005 where various claims were made regarding the legitimacy of the general meetings that had been held over the last three years. The general consensus of those present at the hearing supported a re-election. In line with this I indicated that a written direction would issue in relation to the election to be held. [16] The general meeting was held on 10 December Michael Kopu, Toby Patu, Robert Maxwell and Rowena Henry were nominated as replacement trustees of NMWPT. Orders were then made on 22 December 2005 in Chambers reducing the number of trustees by two and appointing, together with the remaining trustees, the persons nominated at the general meeting as trustees by way of replacement. I also indicated that any party was permitted to apply for a rehearing within 28 days. 4 (2015) 335 Aotea MB 1 (335 AOT 1)

5 378 Aotea MB 122 Application for enforcement of obligations of trust [17] On 2 February 2006 Rata Pue filed an application for a rehearing regarding the appointment of replacement trustees. I granted the rehearing and set the proceedings down for hearing on 24 February Mr Pue also filed a subsequent application seeking the enforcement of obligations of the trust over NMWPT. [18] In my decision of 10 March 2006 I concluded that the order made on 22 December 2005 appointing Jan Mātuku, Rata Pue, Lesley Patu, Leonie Joseph, Ron Puata, Michael Kopu, Toby Patu, Holden Hohāia, Rowena Henry, Robert Maxwell and Phoebe Mason as NMWPT trustees be affirmed. I then issued directions concerning the operation of NMWPT. The application for enforcement of obligations of trust concerning NMWPT was dismissed. [19] Subsequently it emerged that Mr Pue had been declared bankrupt and he resigned as a trustee of NMWPT. At the conclusion of that application I indicated that the two year expiry date was nearly up regarding the s 30 proceedings and set that matter down to be heard. Application to create a whenua tōpu trust [20] On 9 February 2007 I appointed Nathan Milner to represent the NMWPT trustees for the purpose of establishing a whenua tōpu trust as a representative entity for Ngāti Maru. Hearings were held on 19 October 2007 and 13 December 2007 where Mr Milner advised a draft trust deed had been drawn up for consultation with NMWPT, Ngāti Maru beneficiaries and other interested agencies including the Office of Treaty Settlements, and Te Ohu Kaimoana. Issues were also raised during the December hearing in relation to the performance of the NMWPT trustees. [21] The proceeding was set down for a special sitting on 5 March 2008 to hear progress on the creation of the representative entity. This sitting was followed by directions that the trustees attend a hearing along with six representatives of the Claims Progression Trust ( CPT ) for the purpose of ascertaining why issues remained extant between CPT and NMWPT. The CPT was a body created by a group within the iwi seeking a mandate. In an attempt to move matters forward I appointed CPT representatives as interim advisory trustees to NMWPT to create a whenua tōpu trust and a common law trust for fisheries matters. [22] Further hearings were held on 21 August 2008, 23 October 2008 and 5 December A number of issues remained extant and concerns were raised over the fact that NMWPT were failing to work cooperatively in an effort to undermine, it was said, the efforts being made to reach a resolution of the outstanding issues then plaguing the Trust and the beneficiaries. At the conclusion of the December 2008 hearing I adjourned the application until April 2009 to receive a report on the voting process to be undertaken. In July 2009, the final hearing was held to discuss the election process and the nominees, after which I adjourned the matter for a written decision to issue. [23] On 15 January 2010 I issued a lengthy decision constituting the Trust. However, due to voting irregularities and improprieties, I ordered that a fresh election be held. Paul Carr, Rona Hancock, Maria Kīngi, Cynthia Kīngi Brown, Jan Mātuku, Ron Puata and Rangi Tapatu were appointed interim trustees for 12 months. I then directed the trustees to prepare various documents in relation to the operation of the Trust and to provide a progress report in April. [24] Hearings were held on 23 February 2011 and 10 March 2011 to discuss the trustee election for the Trust and for Ngāti Maru (Taranaki) Fisheries Trust. An election of trustees was held on 5 May Subsequently on 21 September 2011 I appointed Paul Carr, Maria Kīngi, Cynthia Kīngi Brown, Ron Puata, Rangi Tapatu, Tamzyn Rose Pue and Christopher Manukonga as responsible trustees along with Michael Koopu and Jan Mātuku as advisory trustees. At that time I dismissed the applications before the Court and directed that a new application be generated by the Registrar for the trustees to attend the next New Plymouth Court in December 2011 to provide an update on the Trust s activities, their future plans and the outcomes of the meeting of beneficiaries.

6 378 Aotea MB 123 Application for rehearing and removal of trustees [25] On 21 October 2011 Mr Pue then filed applications for rehearing of the appointment of trustees that occurred on 21 September 2011 and for the removal of Mrs Kīngi, Cynthia Kīngi Brown and Messrs Puata, Tapatu and Carr as responsible trustees. Mr Pue alleged that the trustees had committed multiple breaches of trust sufficient to warrant their removal. The trustees opposed that application and said that it was misconceived and groundless. [26] As foreshadowed, on 31 October 2012 I issued an interim decision dismissing the rehearing application, appointing interim responsible trustees and directing that an audit of the accounts for the Trust be undertaken. For various reasons, including a lack of readily available and relevant information, the audit took time to complete. Following that, further hearings were held to consider the allegations made against the then trustees for breaches of their duties. In addition, a new set of proceedings concerning Ngāti Maru and its fisheries assets was commenced in 2015 which resulted in two further judgments. 5 There matters lay, from the Court s perspective, until the present application was filed yesterday. The short point is that the issue of mandate for this iwi has been ongoing before this Court for over 13 years. So, clearly there is some background to the events that have led to the present application and the AIP. Submissions for Haimona Maruera Mr Kahukiwa submitted that the trustees are not competent to enter into the AIP. He argues that the agency provisions of the trust order issued at the time the trust was constituted are effectively invalid. He referred to the order of this Court dated 15 January 2010 and in particular recital D of the trust order which refers to the Rūnanga acting as the representative for the iwi. Counsel also cited the decision of the Māori Appellate Court Taipari v Gordon as authority for the proposition that this Court cannot cloak a trust with that representative status nor determine the members of a tribe. 6 Counsel referred to the legislation creating the Māori Trustee, Te Tumu Paeroa, underscoring the need, in his submission, for any law empowering a Court or third party with a right to imbue another with that authority, to be explicitly defined. In addition, Mr Kahukiwa contended that the Rūnanga control the register of members and have effectively excluded his clients and what they claim are a sizeable part of the tribal 5 See Te Ohu Kaimoana Trustee Ltd v Ngāti Maru (Taranaki) Fisheries Trust Ngāti Maru (Taranaki) Fisheries Trust (2015) 341 Aotea MB 211 (341 AOT 211) and Maruera v Te Ohu Kaimoana Trustee Ltd Ngāti Maru (Taranaki) Fisheries Trust (2015) 335 Aotea MB 47 (335 AOT 47) 6 (1999) 19 Waikato Maniapoto Appellate MB 156 (19 APWM 156)

7 378 Aotea MB 124 population from participating. In other words, it was argued that a significant minority of the iwi have been disenfranchised by the Rūnanga and that this must call into question the integrity of its processes and its standing to claim to represent the tribe. Counsel then submitted that, while it may be said that the AIP is non-binding, history has shown that once the process is in train it invariably concludes with settlement legislation. He argued that he AIP is in fact a contract and so if it is entered into by the Rūnanga then it will bind the tribe into the future. His clients seek a brief pause to enable the serious issues they have raised to be properly examined and determined. This action, counsel contended, will not result in any prejudice to the Rūnanga and its supporters. Mr Kahukiwa also submitted that if there would be no prejudice to the iwi in the signing of the AIP, why was counsel for the Rūnanga arguing that the loss of interest would be prejudicial? The Rūnanga could not have it both ways, he submitted, for either the AIP was binding or it was not. Submissions for Te Rūnanga o Ngāti Maru (Taranaki) Trust Mr McErlane rejected the applicant s arguments and made two principal points. First, the Rūnanga s mandate has been recognised by the Crown. That process was a Crown decision which included an assessment of the mandate. Second, the AIP is in effect nonbinding in that it does not commit the iwi to the settlement. Counsel confirmed that the Rūnanga was simply acting as an agent for a yet to be formed post settlement governance entity. That body, if it is established with the consent of the tribe, would then seek to enter into a deed of settlement with the Crown, which would also be subject to a process of ratification. So, the signing of the AIP, counsel submitted, would not cause prejudice to those claiming to be effected since the agreement was not irrevocable. As to prejudice, counsel confirmed that, from the date of signing of the AIP, interest would accrue and so any injunction to halt that process would have a direct and measurable negative impact on the interests of the iwi. The Law Section 19 of Te Ture Whenua Māori Act 1993 states:

8 378 Aotea MB Jurisdiction in respect of injunctions (1) The court, on application made by any person interested or by the Registrar of the court, or of its own motion, may at any time issue an order by way of injunction (a) against any person in respect of any actual or threatened trespass or other injury to any Maori freehold land, Maori reservation, or wahi tapu; or (b) prohibiting any person, where proceedings are pending before the court or the Chief Judge, from dealing with or doing any injury to any property that is the subject matter of the proceedings or that may be affected by any order that may be made in the proceedings; or (c) prohibiting any owner or any other person or persons without lawful authority from cutting or removing, or authorising the cutting or removal, or otherwise making any disposition, of any timber trees, timber, or other wood, or any flax, tree ferns, sand, topsoil, metal, minerals, or other substances whether usually quarried or mined or not, (d) on or from any Maori freehold land; or prohibiting the distribution, by any trustee or agent, of rent, purchase money, royalties, or other proceeds of the alienation of land, or of any compensation payable in respect of other revenue derived from the land, affected by any order to which an application under section 45 or an appeal under Part 2 relates. (2) Notwithstanding anything in the Crown Proceedings Act 1950, any injunction made by the court under this section may be expressed to be binding on the Māori Trustee. (3) Any injunction made by the court under this section may be expressed to be of interim effect only. (4) Every injunction made by the court under this section that is not expressed to be of interim effect only shall be of final effect. The principles in relation to the grant of an interim injunction are well settled. 7 The Court of Appeal in Roseneath Holdings Ltd v Grieve held: 8 [35] The object of an interim injunction is to protect the plaintiff from harm occasioned by any breach of rights, that is the subject of current litigation, for which the plaintiff might not be adequately compensated by an award of damages by the court, if successful at the trial. Against that object it is necessary to weigh the consequences to defendants of preventing them from acting in ways which the trial may determine are in accordance with their rights. The well established two stage approach to addressing applications for interim injunctions involves first, ascertaining whether there is a serious question to be tried and secondly, considering the balance of convenience if the relief sought is granted. The obligations of trustees are well settled and need not be repeated here. The relevant legal principles were set out by the Court of Appeal in Rameka v Hall. 9 I adopt all of the above principles. 7 Klissers Farmhouse Bakeries v Harvest Bakeries Ltd [1985] 2 NZLR 129; Henry Roach (Petroleum) Pty Ltd v Credit House (VIC) Pty Ltd [1976] VR 309. See also Lomax v Apatu Awarua o Hinemanu Trust (2013) 22 Tākitimu MB 282 (22 TKT 282) 8 [2004] 2 NZLR 168 (CA) 9 Rameka v Hall [2013] NZCA 203

9 378 Aotea MB 126 Discussion I do not accept that the balance of convenience favours the applicant or that the steps being taken to advance the settlement negotiations are irrevocable. That there may be a serious question to be tried remains unclear. This must also be considered against the reality that, even if a mandate had been affirmed by the Court, per s30 of the Act, for example, amendments to those provisions make the acceptance or rejection of any such status at the behest of the Crown for its purposes. In other words, even if a mandate was confirmed, the Crown can only ever be bound should it choose that course. It is a matter of public record that the mandate of the Rūnanga to represent Ngāti Maru in settlement negotiations was recognised by the Crown on 29 March Terms of negotiations between the Rūnanga and the Crown s representatives were then entered into on 27 July The extent to which courts of competent jurisdiction can intervene in such matters has been discussed in a series of decisions including Fenwick v Trustees of Nga Kaihautu o Te Arawa Executive Council, 10 Potaka-Dewes v Attorney General 11 and Watene v Minister in Charge of Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations. 12 Then in Milroy v Attorney General the Court of Appeal stated: 13 [18] But where the action challenged does not itself affect the rights of any persons and is undertaken in the course of policy formulation preparatory to the introduction to Parliament of legislation, the courts will not intervene. Proposed legislative conduct of the Crown said to depart from a previous stance and to be inconsistent with Treaty rights may be within the jurisdiction of the Waitangi Tribunal and may be the subject of representations to the Select Committees of Parliament. But, as Goddard J said, the courts cannot help. It is also evident that, should settlement negotiations progress, the Rūnanga is not likely to become the tribe s post settlement governance entity. Indeed, counsel for the Rūnanga confirmed that the role was simply agent for a settlement entity yet to be formed if the iwi agrees with that outcome. Mr Kahukiwa submitted that the ability of the Court to cloak the Rūnanga with that agency function is beyond its jurisdiction. Even if that submission was correct, it would not displace the ability of the Crown to make its own assessment of the role of the Rūnanga in progressing the settlement process. That is a political decision over 10 HC Rotorua CIV , 13 April 2006, Allan J 11 [2009] NZAR 248 (HC) 12 Watene v Minister in Charge of Treaty of Waitangi HC Wellington CP 120/01, 11 May 2001, Goddard J 13 Milroy v Attorney-General [2005] NZAR 562 (CA) at [18]

10 378 Aotea MB 127 which the courts have no role. As the Court of Appeal confirmed in Milroy, the Waitangi Tribunal and the Select Committee process remain avenues for dialogue. The records of the Court confirm that the creation of the Rūnanga followed a series of hui, consultations and a process of voting by ballot over a period of years if the original proceedings are considered as the starting point for the mandate discussions. Initially, in 2004, the trustees of the tribal marae, Ngāti Maru Wharanui Pukehou Trust, were recognised by the Court, per s 30 of the Act, as the most appropriate representatives of the iwi for certain purposes following a request from the High Court. 14 There was no appeal against those orders. Over a further period of years, after the receipt of independent advice, an application to create the Rūnanga as a whenua tōpu trust was filed, following numerous meetings of the iwi. Those hui invariably took place at the tribal marae, the proper place for such deliberations. They received significant publicity and notification. As such, the Court did not simply decide to constitute a whenua tōpu trust without any request or direction from the iwi. Moreover, in the context of the present application, as counsel underscored, it is the Crown that has satisfied itself that the Rūnanga is the appropriate entity to enter negotiations. The order constituting the trust in its present form was issued over 7 years ago. I am not aware of any successful appeal being prosecuted against that decision. As I observed during the hearing yesterday, while the applicant s supporters maintained a majority on the Rūnanga, the provisions complained of were not objectionable. Even when that majority shifted, there were limited, if any, sustainable complaints as to the terms concerning the ability to represent the iwi. As the trustees were exhorted to acquaint themselves with its terms it seems difficult to accept that they did not know about it or its effect. It will also be remembered that, at the time, the Rūnanga trustees had ample access to legal advice. If the trustees of the Rūnanga, past or present, wished to alter any of the terms of the trust order, all they needed to do was convene a hui of beneficiaries and have the provision changed. The superior Courts have confirmed that the appropriate procedure for making changes is that set out in s 244 of the Act. 15 The short point is that the time for seeking a remedy by way of rehearing, appeal or review of the orders constituting the trust or with specific terms of the trust order, has long since passed. The solution is a variation per s 244 of the Act. 14 See 141 Aotea MB (141 AOT 29-30) and 146 Aotea MB (146 AOT ) 15 Trustees of the Pukeroa Oruawhata Trust v Mitchell [2008] NZCA 518

11 378 Aotea MB 128 Unfortunately, it would appear that the issues that lay at the centre of the previous proceedings, for those continuing to claim an interest, remain unresolved. It is difficult to discern, however, the extent to which the courts can provide a remedy to several of those issues including the process for determining tribal membership. In the end, it is for the iwi themselves through their own processes to decide who can properly be described as a member of the tribe. Understandably, given the trauma of nineteenth century land confiscation and conflict wrought on the iwi and hapū of this region, the reconstruction of tribal enclaves necessarily takes time, given the issues involved and the disconnection from traditional knowledge bases that were an inevitable consequence of that cultural dislocation. That there may be disputes over the definition and membership of iwi in the modern era is not new and indeed, was a feature of untold title investigations and partition proceedings before the Native Land Court and its predecessor in confiscation districts, the Compensation Court. The extent to which a process for assessing, disputing and appealing tribal membership applications will doubtless form part of the constitutional documents of any post settlement governance entity that may be created in due course. In that way, the authority for determination may yet rest conclusively with the iwi itself rather than any third party. 16 In the end, the decision on whether Ngāti Maru will settle its historical claims with the Crown will be a matter for the iwi to determine in due course if the Crown provides a settlement offer that the tribe believes worthy of consideration. That process, if it is to proceed, will take time to unfold. It will involve further detailed negotiations toward a Deed of Settlement. If the Deed is then ratified, it will require legislation. That process will also take time and involve the Select Committee process. Until a Bill is laid before Parliament, any person claiming to be affected, including neighbouring iwi and hapū with overlapping interests may seek an appropriate finding from the Waitangi Tribunal. Put another way, I accept the submission of counsel for the Rūnanga that, even if the AIP were to be signed, that is no guarantee of a final settlement, notwithstanding Mr Kahukiwa s submission that history has demonstrated how invariably an AIP leads to settlement. Moreover, if the beneficiaries of the Rūnanga consider that its trustees are acting in breach of their duties then they are entitled to seek relief by way of application for an 16 That said, s 7(5) of Te Rūnanga o Ngai Tahu Act 1996 provides: (5) If Te Rūnanga o Ngai Tahu rejects an application made under subsection (3), the person making the application may, within 6 months after the date upon which that person is notified of the decision of Te Rūnanga o Ngai Tahu, apply to the Māori Land Court to hear and determine the question.

12 378 Aotea MB 129 examination of the conduct complained of supported by evidence. I understand from Court staff that applications seeking to re-litigate matters that have already been determined have been discussed from time to time, along with proposed applications for review which are awaiting the filing of evidence in support. In due course, any such applications can expect to receive timetabling directions. In the meantime, and for the reasons stated above, I am not persuaded that the tests for the issue of an injunction have been satisfied. Decision The application for injunction is dismissed. Counsel may wish to exchange memoranda as to costs. These orders are to issue immediately, per r 7.5, Māori Land Court Rules Pronounced at am in New Plymouth on Wednesday this 20 th day of December L R Harvey JUDGE