Case: 1:14-cv Document #: 62 Filed: 06/16/16 Page 1 of 11 PageID #:3220

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1 Case: 1:14-cv Document #: 62 Filed: 06/16/16 Page 1 of 11 PageID #:3220 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION CHER THOMPSON, Individually; SHIRLEY TRENT; ) LINDA IGOE; THERESA MARTIN; CHERYL ADAMS; ) DONNA HOLZBERGER; PAMELIA MITCHNER; ) SIMON PARSONS; MARGARET LORRAINE WOLFORD; ) FAITH MANNO BALSIER; CAROLYN SCHWARTZ; ) Case No. 14 CV 7980 RODNEY JORDAN; SARAH WOODRUFF WATKINS; ) CAROL SHIELDS; PAMELA KISELA; CAROL ) REICHERT; SANDRA WOOD; NATASHA ) ALEXANDERIA POPOVICH; YVETTE MARIE REIDY; ) JOSE LUIS CALDAS; PATRICIA BIAS; NANCY ) Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman JOHNSON BLASINGAME; MARY SEARS; KATHLEEN ) FREDERICK WOOD; JOANN MONDRUS; SCOTT ) WESSEL; SANDRA KAY BERRY; and on behalf of all ) others similarly situated, ) Plaintiffs, ) v. ) ) AMERICAN AIRLINES GROUP, INC., a Delaware ) Corporation, f/k/a AMR Corporation, and AMERICAN ) AIRLINES, INC, a Delaware Corporation. ) PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION Plaintiff CHER THOMPSON individually and on behalf of the class persons defined infra respectfully request, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that this Court enter an order certifying that this action may proceed as a class action against Defendants AMERICAN AIRLINES GROUP, INC., a Delaware Corporation, f/k/a AMR Corporation, and AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC, a Delaware Corporation (hereinafter American ) and appointing his attorneys as class counsel. INTRODUCTION The named Plaintiffs, former American flight attendants who retired prior to January 1, 2014, seek to bring this lawsuit against American as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This lawsuit is brought on behalf of named Plaintiffs and 1

2 Case: 1:14-cv Document #: 62 Filed: 06/16/16 Page 2 of 11 PageID #:3221 others similarly situated, as defined below, and recites causes of action relating to Plaintiffs entitlement to their travel pass benefits. The Amended Complaint includes five counts against American for: (1) breach of contract; (2) promissory estoppel; (3) negligent misrepresentation; (4) fraudulent misrepresentation; and (5) tortious interference with contract. As alleged in Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, American gave oral and written representations to the flight a ttendants memorializing American s promises that the Plaintiffs would maintain their boarding priority status and travel benefits attained at the time of their retirement and/or separation from the company. P. Amend. Compl. 2. Despite these written representations and oral promises, and notwithstanding public statements made by American, Plaintiffs travel pass benefits were stripped away following Plaintiffs retirement and/or separation from the company. See P. Amend. Compl. generally. Prior to September 10, 2014, all American flight attendants, regardless of their employment status as active or retired, were historically designated at a D2 status for purposes of travel priority. Having a shared D2 designation by both active and retired persons resulted in mutual opportunities for employees and retirees to utilize their travel pass benefits. Effective September 10, 2014, American removed the D2 designation from Plaintiffs and replaced it with a newly-minted travel priority designation of D2R. This change in status occurred months to years after Plaintiffs had retired or otherwise agreed to separate from the company. P. Amend. Compl. 1, 5. The downgrade to D2R status placed and continues to leave the Plaintiffs behind over fifty thousand (50,000) active employees and their families for whom the D2 status was retained. Plaintiffs demoted D2R status has wholly diminished and routinely 2

3 Case: 1:14-cv Document #: 62 Filed: 06/16/16 Page 3 of 11 PageID #:3222 eliminated the ability of the Plaintiffs to utilize their travel pass benefits earned and contracted for at the time of their retirement. DEFINITION OF THE CLASS As alleged in Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, the proposed class is defined as: a. Individuals who retired at the age of 55 years or older and had 10 or more years of company seniority; b. Individuals who severed employment with a minimum of five (5) years of occupational seniority whose age plus years of occupational seniority equals forty; c. Individuals who accepted travel separation packages for unlimited D2 travel for a certain block of time; d. Individuals who left employment under the Special Voluntary Early Out Retirement Packages from ; and e. Other retired and/or separated employees who were given, in accord with American s corporate policy, the same travel classification that they had immediately prior to leaving their positions. ARGUMENT This lawsuit is eminently suited for class treatment because it arises out of a single act of the Defendants which uniformly stripped the Plaintiffs of their travel benefits. The alternative to a class action would be a series of thousands of individual lawsuits, the basis of which would be the challenge of American s action in downgrading a retiree s travel priority designation. Each suit would raise the same issues regarding the consequences of American s decision to renege on the promises and agreements made upon the separation or retirement of the Plaintiffs. Each suit would seek the same relief of reinstatement of the stripped travel pass benefits and monetary damages. The impact of the demoted status for each of the Plaintiffs will encompass the same 3

4 Case: 1:14-cv Document #: 62 Filed: 06/16/16 Page 4 of 11 PageID #:3223 analysis of flight capacities and loss of flying opportunities. To the extent that monetary relief is sought, the method for calculating individual losses will be uniform and quantifiable on a per annum valuation of benefits lost. A class action under Rule 23 will provide the most efficient means of adjudication. To achieve class certification, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the four prerequisites of Rule 23(a) are met: (1) the proposed class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims of the representative party are typical of the claims of the class; and (4) the representative party will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a). In addition to meeting the requirements of Rule 23(a), the requirements of one of the three different types of class actions set forth in Rule 23(b) must also be satisfied. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b). Whether to grant or deny class certification is a determination that must be made by the court at an early practicable time. Fed.R.Civ.Pro 23(c). As the Seventh Circuit decided in Bieneman v. City of Chicago, 838 F.2d 962 (7th Cir. 2001), the propriety of class certification does not depend on the outcome of the suit, and one reason for early certification is to identify the stakes of the case so that the parties may choose their litigation strategies accordingly. See also Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, , 94 S.Ct. 2140, , 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974). When there is doubt as to whether the prerequisites for a class action exist, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the allowance of the class. Rogers v. Baxter International, Inc., No. 04 C 6476, 2006 WL (N.D.Ill. Marc. 22, 2006). As Plaintiffs have timely filed this Motion for Class Certification and met all the requirements of Rule 23(a) and subparts (1) and (3) of Rule(b), certification is appropriate. 4

5 Case: 1:14-cv Document #: 62 Filed: 06/16/16 Page 5 of 11 PageID #:3224 I. RULE 23(A) REQUIREMENTS HAVE BEEN MET a. Rule 23(a)(1): Numerosity In order to satisfy Rule 23(a)(1), the plaintiff must establish that the class is so large that joinder of all members is impractical. While there is no magic number for determining when Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(1) is satisfied, case law indicates that when a class contains at least 40 members, it is adequate. See. e.g. Chandler v. Southwest Jeep-Eagle, Inc., 162 F.R.D. 302, 307 (N.D.Ill. 1995); see also Gaspar v. Linvatec Corp., 167 F.R.D. 51, 56 (N.D. Ill. 1996)(finding that a class of 18 members was numerous enough to meet the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(1); Dale Electronics, Inc. v. R.C.L. Electronics, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 531, 534 (D.N.H. 1971)(holding that a class of 13 members met the numerosity requirements). Plaintiff does not need to prove the exact number of class members, and class certification may be granted upon a reasonable estimation of the size of the class. Marcial v. Coronet Ins. Co., 880 F.2d 954, 957 (7th Cir. 1989). The court may rely on common sense to determine whether an estimate of class size is reasonable. See Ringswald v. County of DuPage, 196 F.R.D. 509, (N.D. Ill. 2000). As alleged in Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, it is estimated that the class of flight attendants to be represented in this suit may be upwards of twenty thousand (20,000) persons. P.Amend. Compl. 42. While the exact number of Class members will be obtained through discovery, Plaintiffs assert that for purposes of this motion, they have satisfied the Rule 23(a)(1) numerosity requirement. b. Rule 23(a)(2): Commonality Rule 23(a)(2) makes a class action proper only when there are questions of law or fact common to the class. To satisfy Rule 23(a)(2), the proposed class members claims must generally arise from a common nucleus of operative fact, and there must be at least one 5

6 Case: 1:14-cv Document #: 62 Filed: 06/16/16 Page 6 of 11 PageID #:3225 question of law or fact common to the class. Markham v. White, 171 F.R.D. 217, 222 (N.D. Ill. 1997). Commonality is not defeated by some factual variations among class members. Peterson v. H & R Block Tax Services, Inc., 174 F.R.D. 78, 82 (N.D. Ill. 1997). The change in designation from D2 to D2R was created by American to downgrade, in one fell swoop, the Plaintiffs travel entitlements. P. Amend. Compl. 6. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants induced them into leaving their employment by making promises and representations about their travel pass benefits. P. Amend. Compl. 8-9, 53-58, 59-65, 66-76, Where, as here, Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendants have engaged in standardized conduct towards the members of the proposed class, commonality is found. Halperin v. Nichols, Safina, Lerner & Co., 1996 WL , at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 29, 1996). Given the preceding facts, it is apparent that Plaintiffs have satisfied Rule 23(a)(2). c. Rule 23(a)(3): Typicality In order to satisfy Rule 23(a)(3), the claims and defenses of the class representatives must be typical of the claims and defenses of the putative class members. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(3). A plaintiff s claim is typical of a proposed class if it arises from the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other class members and [is] based on the same legal theory. De La Fuente v. Stokely-Van Camp., Inc., 713 F.2d 225, 232 (7th Cir. 1983). As with commonality, factual distinctions between the claims of the named class members and those of other class members do not necessarily defeat a finding of typicality. Id at 233. The typicality inquiry focuses on whether the plaintiff s claims have the same essential characteristics as those of the proposed class members. Retired Chicago Police Ass-n v. City of Chicago, 7 F.3d 584, 599 (7th Cir. 1993). 6

7 Case: 1:14-cv Document #: 62 Filed: 06/16/16 Page 7 of 11 PageID #:3226 In the present matter, the claims of the Plaintiffs and all members of the proposed class arise from the Defendants conduct in degrading their travel pass benefits. Furthermore, all Plaintiffs and proposed class members will present the same or similar evidence to demonstrate the reasonableness of their detrimental reliance on American s oral and written promises and agreements. Because Plaintiffs and each member of the proposed class have been subjected to the same conduct by Defendants, Plaintiffs claims are typical of the claims of the class they seek to represent. Further, each Class member s claim is based on the same legal theory. Therefore, Plaintiffs assert that Rule 23(a)(3) is satisfied by these facts. d. Rules 23(a)(4) and 23(g): Adequacy Rule 23(a) s final requirement is that the class representative must fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(4). Adequate representation depends on three factors: (1) the plaintiff s attorney must be qualified, experienced, and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation; (2) the plaintiff must not have interests antagonistic to those of the other class members; and (3) the named representative must have a sufficient interest in the outcome to ensure vigorous advocacy. See Nielsen v. Dickerson, 1999 WL , at *6 (N.D. Ill. May 20, 1999); see also Chandler v. Southwest Jeep-Eagle, Inc., 162 F.R.D. 302, 309 (N.D. Ill. 1995). A frequent inquiry with regard to the adequacy of the representative party is whether the representative party s interests are coextensive with those of the class. See, e.g., In re Southwest Airlines Voucher Litigation, 799 F.3d 701, (7th Cir. 2015) quoting Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997). In the present matter, lead Plaintiff, Cher Thompson, retired in 2012 from American after forty three (43) years 7

8 Case: 1:14-cv Document #: 62 Filed: 06/16/16 Page 8 of 11 PageID #:3227 of employment as a flight attendant. The terms of her retirement were in accord with the VEOP agreement. Ms. Thompson has diligently and tirelessly worked to gather all relevant information from her fellow retirees. Ms. Thompson has endeavored to keep the retired flight attendants informed of all activities at American which have an impact on travel benefits and she is the conduit for the posting and sharing of information relating to travel pass benefits. Ms. Thompson and the named Plaintiffs all seek the reinstatement of their D2 status and related monetary damages. Plaintiffs interests are not antagonistic to those of other class members. They are personally vested in ensuring vigorous advocacy of their claims as their individual harms are representative of the harms suffered by the proposed class. In addition to the adequacy of the class representative, class counsel must also meet the adequacy requirements. Rule 23(g) provides four factors that the court must consider in determining the adequacy of class counsel: (1) the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims; (2) counsel s experience in handling class actions; (3) counsel s knowledge of the applicable law; and (4) the resources counsel will commit to representing the class. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(g)(1)(A). Here, Plaintiffs counsel have thoroughly investigated plaintiffs claims and have spent and will continue to spend considerable time and resources committed to the representation of the class. Plaintiffs attorneys are in regular communication with lead Plaintiff and other of the representative Plaintiffs in the continuing prosecution of this litigation. Furthermore, counsel has extensive knowledge of the applicable law and regularly litigates breach of contract matters on large scale bases. Counsel is seasoned in the handling of complex cases, including mass tort 8

9 Case: 1:14-cv Document #: 62 Filed: 06/16/16 Page 9 of 11 PageID #:3228 litigation involving hundreds of plaintiffs. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs assert that Rules 23(a)(4) and 23(g) are satisfied. II. RULE 23(B) REQUIREMENTS HAVE BEEN MET Certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) class requires the Court to find that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3). a. Rule 23(b)(3): Predominance Rule 23(b)(3) requires that the plaintiff show that common questions of law or fact predominate over any individual questions. Predominance is usually decided on the question of liability. Fry v. UAL Corp., 136 F.R.D. 626, 637 (N.D. Ill. 1991). Quoting Dura-Bilt Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Corp., 89 F.R.D. 87, 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), the court in Fry found that, if the liability issue is common to the class, common questions are held to predominate over individual questions. Predominance is shown in this case by the shared employment history of the Plaintiffs as flight attendants; their retirement and separation circumstances; their original designation of D2 status as of the date of their separation or retirement from American; the collective actions of American in representing and in using the designation as an inducement for Plaintiffs voluntary departure from the company; the singular action by American in stripping Plaintiffs of their designation and the impact and damages resulting from the placement of fiftythousand (50,000) active employees ahead of the Plaintiffs for travel priority status. Furthermore, the relief sought by Plaintiffs, including the reinstatement of their former status is identical. Moreover, to the extent a monetary value of Plaintiffs lost benefits is deemed appropriate from the date of retirement, such damages can be quantified on a per annum basis. 9

10 Case: 1:14-cv Document #: 62 Filed: 06/16/16 Page 10 of 11 PageID #:3229 b. Rule 23(b)(3): Superiority Rule 23(b)(3) requires that a class action be the superior method for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the claims at issue. Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 23(b)(3). Factors pertinent to evaluating superiority include the interest of class members in litigating their claims in separate actions; the extent and nature of any litigation already commenced concerning the controversy at issue; the desirability of concentrating the litigation in the particular forum and any difficulties in managing the class action that might arise. Id. Given the predominance of common factual and legal issues, resolution of these issues in one consolidated class action is superior to thousands of individual trials. Such trials would require each class member to pursue his or her claim individually, entail needless duplication, and waste the resources of both the parties and the Court. The fact that there is a large number of Class members is no argument at all against certification. Carnegie v. Household Intern., Inc., 376 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 2004). Here, there is no better available method for the fair and efficient adjudication of Plaintiffs claims, making this lawsuit properly suited for class treatment. III. RULE 23(B)(1) REQUIREMENTS HAVE BEEN MET Under Rule 23(b)(1), a class action may be maintained when adjudications with respect to individual class members would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 23(b)(1)(B). Plaintiffs and members of the proposed class were all had identical travel benefits designations and status and were stripped of those benefits through the single action of Defendants. Consequently, individual adjudication on the relief as sought reinstatement of Plaintiffs travel pass benefits would affect the interests of all Plaintiffs and potential class members. A ruling on the reinstatement of travel pass benefits 10

11 Case: 1:14-cv Document #: 62 Filed: 06/16/16 Page 11 of 11 PageID #:3230 would be dispositive of the issues, and therefore certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) is also proper. CONCLUSION The proposed class meets the requirements of Rules 23(a), (b)(1), (b)(3), and (g). For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court certify the class as defined above, and appoint Plaintiffs attorneys as class counsel. Dated: June 16, 2016 Respectfully submitted, /s/ Nancy Richter Nancy Richter SLAVIN & SLAVIN LLC Attorney for Plaintiffs 100 N. LaSalle St., 25 th Floor Chicago, Illinois / P 312/ F nrichter@slavinlegal.com 11