Case 3:14-cv CWR-FKB Document 9 Filed 02/06/14 Page 1 of 19

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1 Case 3:14-cv CWR-FKB Document 9 Filed 02/06/14 Page 1 of 19 IN THE UNITED STATED DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI JACKSON DIVISION MISSISSIPPI ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE, INC. VS. MISSISSIPPI BAND OF CHOCTAW INDIANS, ET AL. PLAINTIFF CASE NO: 3:14-cv CWR-FKB DEFENDANTS PLAINTIFF S MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ITS RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS COMES NOW, e Plaintiff, by and rough its counsel of record and pursuant to e Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, files is, its Memorandum Brief in Support of its Response to Defendants Motion to Dismiss, and in support ereof, would show e Court e following, to-wit: A. Summary of Facts and Procedural History Mississippi Administrative Service, Inc., ( MAS ) is a corporation, organized and existing under e laws of e State of Mississippi, wi its current principal offices in Brandon, Rankin County, Mississippi. Its processing facilities are in Oxford, Mississippi. It has no location on tribal land. For over 25 years, MAS served as e benefit services manager/ird party administrator for e ERISA plan offered by e Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians ( MBCI or Tribe ) and its various businesses to its employees. In doing so, ey have executed numerous contracts and extensions of ose contracts for services at MAS would 1 provide or did provide. All of e contracts provide for damages associated wi e C. 1 See copies of contract extensions attached to Plaintiff s Complaint as Exhibits A, B and

2 Case 3:14-cv CWR-FKB Document 9 Filed 02/06/14 Page 2 of 19 termination of e agreement, how to terminate e agreement and what happens if no extension or new contract is executed, among oers. The most recent agreement was executed on September 27, 2010, and was to extend until September 30, The extension states at e agreement was to be made between MAS and e Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, who by definition will include, but not limited to All Tribal Government Services, Programs, Departments, Enterprises, Choctaw Residential Center, Choctaw Shopping Center Enterprise, Choctaw Electronics Enterprise, Choctaw Manufacturing Enterprise, First American Plastics Molding Enterprise, First American Printing Enterprise, Chahtaa Enterprise, Chahtaa Laundry Service, Choctaw Resort Development Enterprise, Pearl River Resort, Silver Star Casino Resort, Golden Moon Casino Resort, Hospitality Training Institute, Choctaw Golf Enterprise, Dancing Rabbit Golf Club, Choctaw Automobile Enterprise and any oer acquisitions, start-ups or 2 programs and expansions. As e entity who governs, manages, directs and/or holds e majority interest in each ese entities, e MBCI is able to bind and take actions, wheer singly or in a group, on behalf of each of ose individual entities. Therefore, eir inclusion is proper. To e extent at said entities business organizations have received a charter or auorization of corporate existence from e MBCI, ey enjoy an organizational status separate and distinct which would warrant eir inclusion in is lawsuit. The last agreement, like e prior agreements, contained oer relevant provisions. There was a termination clause which provided at e contract could be terminated on 2 Id. -2-

3 Case 3:14-cv CWR-FKB Document 9 Filed 02/06/14 Page 3 of 19 September 30, 2015, wi 60 days notice. The contract furer stated at, e agreement... shall automatically renew for continuous twelve mon periods on e same terms and conditions set for herein, or as amended in writing by an agreement between e parties. Finally, e agreement states at it is entered into and shall be governed by, and construed in accordance wi, e laws of e State of Mississippi, and any dispute shall be adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction in Jackson, Hinds County, Mississippi unless such laws are pre-empted by applicable federal laws or jurisdiction. This agreement was executed by e duly auorized representatives of each party at Jackson, Mississippi. All of e contract extensions at were attached to Defendant s Complaint, which extend back to 2000, contain e same verbage. On or about November 8, 2012, Donald Kilgore provided e first written notice at e Defendants were going to discontinue its ERISA plan. It is presumed at e rationale for e inclusion of his citation of case law was a saber-rattling of sorts given e knowledge at e Defendants contract extension included e aforementioned clause applying Mississippi law and Hinds County venue to any dispute regarding e contract. Obviously, MAS disputed is assertion. In reliance upon a duly executed, auorized agreement (in fact, a series of substantially e same agreements), MAS filed its suit in state court citing Defendants failure to honor e terms of eir contract. In response, e Defendants removed e case claiming at a federal question existed. Plaintiff disputes is claim and move is Court to deny Defendants Motion to Dismiss. -3-

4 Case 3:14-cv CWR-FKB Document 9 Filed 02/06/14 Page 4 of 19 B. Standard of Review Defendants have filed eir Motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and, in doing so, assert at e Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A Rule 12(b)(6) Motion is a test of e formal sufficiency of e Complaint, not a procedure to be invoked 3 to resolve a contest about e facts or merits of e claim. Thus, e inquiry is limited to e content of e complaint. 4 To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true to state a claim to relief at is plausible 5 on its face. If e Court, after reviewing e pleading as a whole and after assuming all factual allegations of e complaint to be true, finds at e complaint is plausible, en e 6 case should not be dismissed. C. Discussion of e Issues In reviewing e Motion, Defendants have not argued anying regarding e Complaint and wheer it states a prima facie case against em. Therefore, it is clear at ey concede at e Complaint is sufficient. Instead, ey argue 1) at tribal exhaustion is required and 2) at e only place for jurisdiction is in e tribal court. Defendants also make a ird argument m at MAS has a duty to exhaust tribal remedies because e claims are really governed by tribal law. Essentially, is argument reformulates e prior two arguments to claim at e importance of tribal law is overwhelming and at e case 3 Murray v. Amoco Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1385 (5 Cir. 1976). 4 Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1341 (5 Cir. 1994). 5 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d. 929 (2007). 6 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 and 558, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d. 929 (2007). -4-

5 Case 3:14-cv CWR-FKB Document 9 Filed 02/06/14 Page 5 of 19 should be dismissed. However, as is discussed below, e case is and was properly filed in state court. 1. Tribal exhaustion is not required. The Defendants have relied heavily upon National Farmers Union Ins. Co., Iowa 7 Mut. Ins. Co., and Bank One for eir assertion at tribal exhaustion is required. In doing so, ey articulate an argument at a party must exhaust tribal court remedies by filing a case in federal court. However, is case was originally filed in state court because e Defendants agreed, by contract, at was e proper venue. Nevereless, e foregoing cases are distinguishable from is proceeding. First, in ose cases, a tribal case was pending before federal court jurisdiction was invoked. This is critical because ere is no corresponding Tribal court case pending. This is an important distinction because National Farmers Union Ins. Co. and Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. Interestingly, [b]o decisions describe an exhaustion rule allowing tribal courts 8 initially to respond to an invocation of eir jurisdiction. In is case, ere has never been an invocation of tribal court jurisdiction; erefore, ere is no deprivation of tribal jurisdiction. In fact, a review of e language of National Farmers Union Ins. Co. discloses at it is a more narrow holding an espoused by e Defendants. In at case, National Farmers Union Ins. Co. removed a case from tribal court to federal court claiming at ey 7 National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 105 S. Ct. 2447(1985); Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987); Bank One, N.A. v. Shumake, 281 F.3d 507 (5 Cir. 2002). 8 Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520U.S. 438, 117 S.Ct at Emphasis not in original. -5-

6 Case 3:14-cv CWR-FKB Document 9 Filed 02/06/14 Page 6 of 19 9 had a right to be protected against an unlawful exercise of Tribal Court power. In eir finding to remand e case to tribal court for exhaustion of tribal court remedies, e Supreme Court stated at e rationale for exhaustion of tribal court remedies is largely based upon allowing a court whose jurisdiction is being challenged to explain e basis for 10 at jurisdiction. The purpose for is was so at [t]he forum whose jurisdiction is being challenged [will have] e first opportunity to evaluate e factual and legal bases for e 11 challenge. Thus, e explanation of e basis for such deference being in comity, and not in jurisdiction, is to allow e tribal court to entertain wheer it has jurisdiction over e tribal court action in e first place. This issue was re-examined two years later in Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. In at case, Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., after receiving a tribal court ruling at it had jurisdiction over it, filed a second action in Federal Court seeking a declaration at it had no duty to defend or indemnify, in large part because jurisdictional issues were not subject to interlocutory 12 appeal. In its opinion, e Court clarified at exhaustion of tribal remedies means at tribal appellate courts must have e opportunity to review e determinations of e lower 13 tribal courts. In short, e Court would not allow an end-run around e tribal system when e issue had been addressed by e non-federal court. However, if ere are no underlying tribal court proceedings, ere would be noing for e tribal appellate court 9 National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 851 (1985). 10 National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 857 (1985). 11 Id. 12 Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 12-13, 107 S. Ct. 971 (1987). 13 Id. at

7 Case 3:14-cv CWR-FKB Document 9 Filed 02/06/14 Page 7 of 19 to review. However, in is case, [b]ecause ere is no pending proceeding, ere will be 14 no competition between is Court and e Tribal Court in is matter. Therefore, comity would not be required. Alternatively, if e Court were to determine at National Farmers Union Ins. Co. were to apply, en abstention is not required if any of ree exceptions apply. In a footnote, e Supreme Court said at: [w]e do not suggest at exhaustion would be required where an assertion of tribal jurisdiction is motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad fai, cf. Judice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 338, 97 S.Ct. 1211, 1218, 51 L.Ed.2d 376 (1977), or where e action is patently violative of express jurisdictional prohibitions, or where exhaustion would be futile because of e lack of an adequate opportunity to challenge e court s jurisdiction. 15 In is case, it is apparent at e defense of e case is premised on a desire to harass or is conducted in bad fai. As earlier stated, Defendants have not questioned e auenticity of e signatures of two Chiefs on e ree agreements. The signatures provide proof of apparent, if not actual, auority to agree to e terms of e contracts. Now, when e Defendants wish to simply dispense wi a bona fide obligation owed to MAS, ey seek to raise a cloud of doubt by questioning e validity of e contracts despite 16 paying pursuant to e terms indicated erein. The willingness to take such a position whilst knowing at ese provisions are in contracts is patently unfair and creates 14 Drumm v. Brown, 245 Conn. 657, 684, 716 A.2d 50 (1998). See also, Vance v. Boyd Mississippi, Inc., 823 F.Supp. 905, 911 (S. D. Miss. 1996). 15 National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 857, 105 S. Ct (1985), FN See Defendant s brief, FN

8 Case 3:14-cv CWR-FKB Document 9 Filed 02/06/14 Page 8 of 19 situations wherein e Defendants and oers who are similarly situated are deprived of a state court forum to which e Defendants have agreed. Additionally, e action is violative of jurisdictional prohibitions. The contract(s) at issue clearly state at any dispute shall be decided under Mississippi law in e 17 appropriate state or federal court in Jackson, Hinds County, Mississippi. The phrase any dispute is quite clear. It means any dispute. That would include contract formation and interpretation. The Defendants could have excepted formation and interpretation by inserting four or five words, but ey chose not to do so. Therefore, e Defendants argument seeks to violate what would oerwise be an express prohibition against e assertion of tribal court jurisdiction. 18 Second, e discussion of Williams v. Lee is inapplicable to is case. Williams dealt wi a fact scenario concerning goods sold on credit to a tribal member in a store located on tribal land. In supporting tribal court jurisdiction, e test at was posited by e Supreme Court was wheer state action would infringe on e rights of reservation 19 Indians to make eir own laws and be ruled by em. Central to e Court s denial of state court jurisdiction in e case was e location of e transaction and e citizenship 20 of e parties which formed e basis of e cause of action. However, Courts have long noted at Indians at go beyond reservation boundaries have generally been held subject to nondiscriminatory state law oerwise 17 See Complaint, Exhibit A. 18 Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 79 S.Ct. 269 (1959). 19 Id. at 358 U.S. 220, 79 S.Ct at Id. Generally. -8-

9 Case 3:14-cv CWR-FKB Document 9 Filed 02/06/14 Page 9 of applicable to all citizens of e State. In is case, e contract was not entered into on tribal land. The activities governed by e contract, e processing of benefit claims, occurred off-reservation. A review of e applicable law shows at e breach occurred offreservation. See infra. Furer, e activities of e Plaintiff in complying wi its obligations under e contract took place off-reservation. Therefore, e substance of is agreement occurred off of e reservation, not on e reservation as claimed by e Defendants and as required under Williams. Third, e recitation of Montana v. United States is interesting. In Montana, e Supreme Court gave two circumstances wherein tribal jurisdiction, in e absence of treaty or federal law providing at auority, can exist. 22 A tribe may regulate rough taxation, licensing, or oer means e activities of nonmembers who enter into consensual relationships wi e tribe or its members, rough commercial dealing, contracts, leases or oer arrangements. A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil auority over e conduct of non-indians on fee lands wiin its reservation when at conduct reatens or has some direct effect on e political integrity, e economic security, or e heal or welfare of e tribe. 23 In addressing ese exceptions, it is clear at e latter one does not apply. The Defendants breach of contract suit does not involve conduct on fee lands at reatens e political integrity, economic security or heal or welfare of e tribe. Accordingly, e Defendants have not argued it as such. 21 Wells v. Wells, 451 N.W.2d 402, 405 (S. Dak. 1990); citing Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, , 93 S.Ct. 1267, 1270, 36 L.Ed.2d 114, 119 (1973; accord State ex rel. Department of Human Services v. Jojola, 99 N.M. 500, 660 P.2d 590 (1983), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, Jojola v. New Mexico, 464 U.S. 803, 104 S.Ct. 49, 78 L.Ed.2d 69, 1983). 22 Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981). 23 Id. at 450 U.S. at (citations omitted). -9-

10 Case 3:14-cv CWR-FKB Document 9 Filed 02/06/14 Page 10 of 19 That being said, e first exception also does not apply. The Supreme Court [has] noted at tribal jurisdiction under e first Montana exception has occurred only when e issue involves regulation of non-indian activities on e reservation at had a discernable 24 effect on e tribe or its members. The Defendants have not argued at is is a regulatory activity involving issues such as taxation, certification or licensing at is necessitated by commercial dealing, contracts, licenses or oer arrangements. Therefore, none of e Montana exceptions are applicable. In is case, e Defendants do not limit eir position solely to e concept at e Tribe has a right to regulate activities on at are occurring on-reservation. Instead, e Defendants argue a more expansive holding at seeks to encompass e off-reservation activities of e Plaintiff as being an on-reservation activity merely by virtue of e contract wi e Plaintiff. As stated above, almost all of e processing activity occurred occurred off-reservation in Oxford, Mississippi. Any remainder would have occurred at MAS s corporate offices in Rankin County. It should also be noted at Montana does state at a tribe may regulate certain 25 nonmember activities. May is a permissive word. That also means at a tribe can also opt to not regulate. Given e choice of law and forum clauses in e benefit services management agreement extension(s), it is clear at e Defendants opted for dispute resolution in a forum at is not tribal court. Thus, ere is no jurisdiction in Tribal Court and e selected forum, Hinds County Circuit Court, should be respected. 24 Federal Trade Commission v Payday Financial, LLC, 935 F.Supp.2d 926, , D. S. D. 2013) (emphasis not in original); citing Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle, 554 U. S. 316, 332, 128 S.Ct (2008). See also Hornell Brewing Co. v. Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court, 133 F.3d 1087, 1091 (8 Cir. 1998). 25 Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. at , 101 S.Ct

11 Case 3:14-cv CWR-FKB Document 9 Filed 02/06/14 Page 11 of 19 Defendants proffer Dolgencorp v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians as furer support for eir position in saying at e Choctaw Tribal Court, under Montana, had 26 jurisdiction. However, at case contains differences which are quite similar to ose discussed above. Dolgencorp involves a business being run on an Indian reservation and e sexual molestation of an Indian minor by a manager of at store while e tribal 27 member was working at e store. Candidly, e facts are quite similar to at of Williams v. Lee and Kennerly and it would be interesting to know why e Court upheld eir assertion of jurisdiction using Montana when Williams and Kennerly appear to be more on point. Nevereless, for e reasons cited above, Montana is and would not be applicable to is case. 2. Jurisdiction is properly outside of tribal court. a. The actions took place off-reservation. Defendants claim at it is e location of e decision to change e provision of insurance to emselves and eir employees which establishes at jurisdiction lay wi e Tribal Court. However, at reliance is misplaced. The test of e place of a contract is e place where e last act is done by eier of e parties which is necessary to complete e 28 contract and give it validity. In is case, all of e contracts state at ey were entered 26 Dolgencorp v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 732 F.3d 409 (5 Cir. 2013). 27 Id. at F. T. C. V. Payday Financial, LLC. 935 F.Supp.2d 926, 938 (D.S.D. 2013); citing O Neill Farms Inc. v. Reinart, 2010 S.D. 25, 780 N.W.2d 55, 59 (S. D. 2010); quoting Briggs v. United Servs. Life Ins. Co., 80 S.D. 26, 117 N.W.2d 804, 807 (1962); see also 2 Williston on Contracts 6:62 (4 ed.) ( The general principle applicable to is and any similar question is at e place of e contract is e place where e last act necessary to e completion of e contract was done. ) -11-

12 Case 3:14-cv CWR-FKB Document 9 Filed 02/06/14 Page 12 of into in Jackson, Hinds County, Mississippi. Furer, e general rule is at place of payment of e debt, or contractual obligation, absent clear agreement to e contrary, it is e residence or headquarters of e creditor...e breach of contract, arising from e failure to make payment as agreed, occurred in e county where such offices were located. 30 Accordingly, venue is properly fixed in e county where payment was to be performed. Mississippi law furer states at venue in a breach of contract action is proper in any 31 venue where a substantial component of e claim occurred. Thus, bo Federal and State law provide focus more upon e location where payment was to have been made as a basis for jurisdiction instead of where a decision was made to refuse to pay. The failure of e Defendants to pay eir contractual obligations is e issue, not e decision of e Tribe to move in a different direction wi eir healcare plan governs where e breach occurred. It is e failure to pay as agreed which caused damages to e Plaintiff. Those damages were sustained off-reservation. Accordingly, e breach did not occur on tribal land, but off of e reservation. However, it still must not be disregarded at e agreements between e Defendants and MAS state at e law governing any dispute is to be at of e State of Mississippi and at venue is to be in a Court of proper jurisdiction in Jackson, Hinds County, Mississippi. Therefore, jurisdiction is proper outside of tribal court. C. 29 See copies of contract extensions attached to Plaintiff s Complaint as Exhibits A, B and 30 Resolution Trust Corp. v. Cumberland Development Corp., 776 F. Supp. 1146, 1150 (S. D. Miss. 1990); citing Deering Milliken Research Corp. v. Textured Fibres, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 491, 500 (D. S. C 1970). 31 Williams v. Edwards, 880 So.2d 10 (Miss. 2004). -12-

13 Case 3:14-cv CWR-FKB Document 9 Filed 02/06/14 Page 13 of 19 b. Contract clauses have been held to confer jurisdiction in state courts. In its brief, e Defendants cite primarily to Kennerly and Williams v. Lee to support eir position at contracts can never confer state court jurisdiction over Tribes or eir members absent a federal law (IGRA) or action by a state pursuant to statutes such as Pub. L Bo of ose cases involve collection actions by merchants wi stores on reservations against Native Americans who purchased goods on credit at ose stores; 32 erefore, ey provide no guidance under our facts. However, e Supreme Court has long held at Indian Tribes may, by contract, waive sovereign immunity and, by inserting forum selection clauses, provide a basis for state court jurisdiction. In 1982, e Supreme Court discussed, in some dep, federal, tribal, state and local 33 sovereign power. The Court acknowledged at each government had different attributes 34 of sovereignty, which may derive from different sources. In doing so, e Court recognized at a sovereign power, even when unexercised, is an enduring presence at governs all contracts subject to e sovereign s jurisdiction, and will remain intact unless surrendered in unmistakable terms Department of Heal and Human Services v. Maybee, 965 A.2d 55, 57 (Me. 2009); citing Williams, 358 U.S. at , 79 S.Ct.269; Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423, 424, 91 S.Ct. 480, 27 L.Ed2d 507 (1971). Williams v. Lee 358 U.S. at 223 ( [ere can be no doubt at to allow e exercise of state court jurisdiction here would undermine e auority of e tribal courts over Reservation affairs...he was on e Reservation and e transaction wi an Indian took place ere. )(Emphasis added.) 33 Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 102 S.Ct. 894 (1982). 34 Id. at 455 U.S. 148, 102 S. Ct (Emphasis not in original). 35 Id. -13-

14 Case 3:14-cv CWR-FKB Document 9 Filed 02/06/14 Page 14 of 19 In 2001, e Supreme Court issued its ruling in e case of C & L Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 532 U.S. 411, 121 S.Ct. 1589, 149 L.Ed.2d 623 (2001). In C&L Enterprises, e tribe retained a contractor to install a roof on a 36 building owned by e tribe. The contract included an arbitration clause which stated at 37 e contract was to be governed by e law of e place where e Project was located. 38 The building was off reservation wiin e boundaries of Oklahoma. The focal question of e case was wheer e Tribe waived its immunity from suit in state court by 39 contract. The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision and wiout referring to Kennerly, ruled at e tribe consented to arbitration and at e contract, which contained a choice of law clause, auorized jurisdiction in Oklahoma state courts, e effect of which waived 40 tribal sovereign immunity. Therefore, e Supreme Court ruled at a tribe, by agreement and wiout any congressional act or auorization, can waive its sovereign immunity and 41 agree to litigate a dispute in state court. This basic holding has been upheld in oer 42 courts. [I]f contracting parties cannot trust e validity of choice of law and venue 36 C & L Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 532 U.S. 411, 414, 121 S.Ct. 1589, 149 L.Ed.2d 623 (2001). 37 Id. at Id. 39 Id. at Id. at Id. at See Aleimer & Gray v. Sioux Mfg. Corp., 983 F.2d 803, 815 (7 Cir.)( To refuse enforcement of is routine contract provision [i.e. - forum and choice of law selection] would be to undercut e Tribe s self-government and self-determination. ); Bradley v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 315 Mont. 75, 67 P.3d 306, 308, (2003); Rush Creek Solutions, Inc. v. Ute Mountain Ute Tribe, 107 P.3d 402, 404, 406 (Colo.Ct.App. 2004). -14-

15 Case 3:14-cv CWR-FKB Document 9 Filed 02/06/14 Page 15 of 19 provisions,... e Tribe s efforts to improve e reservation s economy may come to naught. 43 Furer e Supreme Court has held at activity at takes place wiin a 44 reservation but has an impact outside e reservation may be regulated by e states. In Nevada v. Hicks, e issue involved e execution of a search warrant. However, in is case, e activity wiin e reservation, taken in e aggregate, has an impact outside of e reservation in at it affects business organizations, individuals and persons who do 45 business wi e Tribe or provide services to tribal members outside of e reservation. The willingness to consider a contract valid until it is no longer desired depicts Defendants cavalier attitude at disregards e impact upon e Plaintiff or oers who are similarly situated. Therefore, e Defendants are correct, to a point, at Mississippi has not acted to obtain jurisdiction over e tribe pursuant to federal law. Mississippi cannot unilaterally obtain jurisdiction. Much more is required. However, Federal law will allow a tribe to select e governing law of a dispute as well as a forum outside of a tribal court and have e dispute resolved at forum. To prohibit such would be to hold at tribes are unequal in economic streng and bargaining power. While at may have been true in e early part of e twentie century, at is clearly not e fact now and Court rulings/opinions have evolved which support an enforcement of such provisions. 43 Aleimer & Gray v. Sioux Mfg. Corp., 983 F.2d 803, 815 (7 Cir.). 44 Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, , 121 S.Ct. 2304, 150 L.Ed.2d 398 (2001). 45 See generally, Department of Heal and Human Services v. Maybee, 965A.2d 55 (2009); State of Oregon v. Maybee, 235 Or. App. 292, 232 P.3d 970 (2010). -15-

16 Case 3:14-cv CWR-FKB Document 9 Filed 02/06/14 Page 16 of The breach of contract claims are garden-variety breach of contract claims at do not impair areas of tribal government. The Defendants have acknowledged at e Federal court would not have jurisdiction to adjudicate contract claims because it does not invoke federal jurisdiction on 46 its face. In large part, at is because a breach of contract case is not a federal case. The Defendants contend at e reason at it is a federal question is because it involves a suit against a Tribe. However, at question is created by e Defendants denial of e validity of e contract(s) at issue (including e applicable law and forum selection provisions). Unlike Montana, ere is no attempt to regulate activities on tribal land. Unlike Williams, e activities which were governed by e contract took place off of tribal land. In short, is case does not involve regulation of non-member activities on tribal land nor does it involve a cause of action at arose on tribal land. Unlike Bank One, National Farmers Union Ins. Co., and Iowa Mutual Ins. Co., ere is no pending tribal court case. This case arose out of a breach at occurred off of e reservation. This case involves a choice of law provision and a venue provision at e Defendants are attempting to renege upon. The Defendants consistently seek respect of tribal choice of law, but it does not respect e terms of e contract which have not varied in over 15 years and which was agreed to by its Chiefs and oer auorities. MAS does not seek to require a change of decision of e Defendants heal care options. Indeed, MAS, while providing information prior to e decision, has not demanded nor does it seek at any Court reverse e decision of e Tribal Council. MAS merely 46 See Plaintiff s Memorandum p. 14, footnote

17 Case 3:14-cv CWR-FKB Document 9 Filed 02/06/14 Page 17 of 19 wants e Defendants to live up to eir contractual commitments, including e choice of law and venue provisions. 4. Alternatively, a stay is more appropriate an a dismissal. Should e Court be predisposed to granting Plaintiff s Motion in favor of ordering is matter to be subjected to exhaustion of tribal remedies, e Plaintiff requests a stay as opposed to a dismissal. The underlying statute of limitations in Tribal Court is one year. The statute of limitations in Mississippi is ree years. This suit is now being litigated just over a year after e ERISA plan was terminated and just under a year when e Defendants terminated all relationships wi e Plaintiff. If e Court were to dismiss e case, e Plaintiff has reason to believe at e statute of limitations for actions against e Defendants will be asserted in such a way as to preclude e Plaintiff from proceeding in Tribal Court, or possibly State Court or is Court. That fact at a statute of limitations 47 issue could arise has always resulted in a preference for a stay. Consequently, Plaintiff would request a stay raer an a dismissal. 5. Alternatively, if e case is to be converted to a Motion for Summary Judgment, e Plaintiff would request additional time for discovery. Alternatively, if e Court is inclined to convert Defendants Motion to Dismiss into a Rule 56 Motion for Summary Judgment based upon e affidavits and oer documentation filed herein, Plaintiff would request at is Court grant time for e parties to conduct discovery at would be necessary to refute claims of e Defendants. 47 Sharber v. Spirit Mountain Gaming, Inc., 343 F.3d 974, 976 (9 Cir. 2003); Allstate Indem. Co. v. Stump, 191 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9 Cir. 1999). -17-

18 Case 3:14-cv CWR-FKB Document 9 Filed 02/06/14 Page 18 of 19 CONCLUSION Under e case law cited herein above, it is clear at e Defendants have consented and chosen a venue and applicable law at is outside e Tribal Court. This has e effect of a waiver of sovereign immunity and, under e controlling law, no exhaustion of tribal remedies. Accordingly, Defendants Motion to Dismissed should be denied. The Plaintiff furer requests any additional relief is Honorable Court deems appropriate and/or necessary. Respectfully submitted, is e 6 day of February, MISSISSIPPI ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES, INC., PLAINTIFF BY: s/c. Paige Herring C. PAIGE HERRING, OF COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF OF COUNSEL: C. Paige Herring (MSB # ) SCOTT, SULLIVAN, STREETMAN & FOX, P.C. 725 Avignon Drive Ridgeland, MS Post Office Box Jackson, Mississippi Telephone:(601) Facsimile: (601) pherring@sssf-ms.com -18-

19 Case 3:14-cv CWR-FKB Document 9 Filed 02/06/14 Page 19 of 19 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, C. Paige Herring, of counsel for Mississippi Administrative Services, Inc. do hereby certify at I have is date electronically filed e foregoing document wi e Clerk of e Court using e ECF system which sent notification of such filing to e following: C. Bryant Rogers, Esq. VanAmberg, Rogers, Yepa, Abeita & Gomez, LLP P. O. Box 1447 Santa Fe, NM Charles E. Ross, Esq. Rebecca Hawkins, Esq. Wise, Carter, Child & Caraway, P.A. P. O. Box 651 Jackson, MS Donald L. Kilgore, Esq. Office of e Attorney General Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians 354 Industrial Road P. O. Box 6258 Choctaw, MS SO CERTIFIED is 6 day of February, s/c. Paige Herring C. Paige Herring -19-