2. Upon further investigation, Plaintiff discovered that CVM has also committed acts

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1

2 2. Upon further investigation, Plaintiff discovered that CVM has also committed acts of negligence as set forth in her Second Amended Petition. Therefore, CVM Holdings, LLC and CVM Management, LLC are proper parties to this lawsuit. 3. All presently named Defendants to this action have stated that they have no objection to this motion and, indeed, both CVM entities have been added to other lawsuits arising out of the same nucleus of facts. 4. No parties will suffer prejudice by the filing of this Amended Petition. There is no Scheduling Order entered in this case nor has a trial date been set. 5. Pursuant to Okla. Stat. tit. 12, 2015(A), a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. (Emphasis added.) 6. Plaintiff has not unduly delayed making this motion, nor has this motion been made in bad faith or for dilatory purposes. It is being made in order to name the proper parties to this case and proceed forward with discovery. 7. Plaintiff has attached a copy of her proposed Second Amended Petition as Exhibit A. Upon granting of the instant motion, Plaintiff will cause to be filed her Second Amended Petition. WHEREFORE, premises considered, Plaintiff respectfully prays that this Court grant her leave to file her Second Amended Petition. PLAINTIFF S UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR ORDER GRANTING LEAVE TO FILE SECOND AMENDED PETITION PAGE 2

3 Respectfully submitted, Reggie N. Whitten, OBA #9576 Michael Burrage, OBA #1350 J. Revell Parrish, OBA #30205 WHITTEN BURRAGE 512 North Broadway Ave., Suite 300 Oklahoma City, Oklahoma Telephone: (405) Facsimile: (405) AND Michael P. Lyons (pro hac vice) Texas State Bar No Christopher J. Simmons (pro hac vice) Texas State Bar No Stephen Higdon (pro hac vice) Texas State Bar No DEANS & LYONS, LLP 325 N. Saint Paul St., Suite 1500 Dallas, Texas Telephone: (214) Facsimile: (214) ATTORNEYS FOR DIANNA WALDRIDGE PLAINTIFF S UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR ORDER GRANTING LEAVE TO FILE SECOND AMENDED PETITION PAGE 3

4 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on this 21st day of November, 2018, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served to: Toby M. McKinstry Ross N. Chaffin Tomlinson McKinstry, PC Two Leadership Square, Suite North Robinson Ave. Oklahoma City, Oklahoma AND- Pat Layden Pat Layden Law Firm, PC 23 E. Carl Albert Parkway McAlester, Oklahoma AND- W. Ray Whitman Douglas D. D Arche Luis Li Baker & Hostetler, LLP 811 Main Street, Suite 1100 Houston, Texas Attorneys for Patterson-UTI Energy, Inc., Patterson-UTI Drilling Company, LLC, and Patterson-UTI Management Services, LLC David L. Kearney Hilary S. Allen Alexandra Butts Brady Durbin Larimore Bialick 920 North Harvey Oklahoma City, Oklahoma Attorneys for Red Mountain Operating, LLC and Red Mountain Energy, LLC Robert G. Gum April Coffin Gum, Puckett & Mackechnie, L.L.P. 105 N. Hudson, Suite 900 Oklahoma City, Oklahoma Attorneys for National Oilwell Varco, LP Jeffrey G. Wigington David L. Rumley Wigington Rumley Dunn & Blair, L.L.P. 123 N. Carrizo Street Corpus Christi, Texas AND- Mr. John Halepaska The Law Offices of John Halepaska 113 Ardmore Street Castle Rock, CO AND- Mr. James T. Branam Law Office of James T. Branam, PLLC 115 West Main Street Post Office Box 39 Antlers, Oklahoma Attorneys for Charles Levi Brite as conservator of the estate of Cody Risk, Deceased and as guardian of J.R., E.R., and B.R., minor children and Sarah Ray, surviving spouse of Josh Ray, Deceased and as next friend of A.R., minor child Russell Uselton Eddie Harper Stipe Law Firm 343 E. Carl Albert Pkwy PO Box 1369 McAlester, Oklahoma Attorneys for Julie Smith, as surviving spouse and next of kin of Matthew Doyle Smith, Deceased Larry D. Ottaway Monty B. Bottom Ashley M. Thul Foliart, Huff, Ottaway & Bottom 201 Robert S. Kerr Ave., 12 th Floor Oklahoma City, Oklahoma Attorneys for Crescent Consulting, LLC PLAINTIFF S UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR ORDER GRANTING LEAVE TO FILE SECOND AMENDED PETITION PAGE 4

5 Montgomery L. Lair Clark O. Brewster Guy A. Fortney Brewster & DeAngelis, PLLC 2617 East 21st Street Tulsa, Oklahoma Attorneys for Betty Jo Cunningham, surviving spouse and personal representative of The Estate of Roger Cunningham, deceased Charles L. Richardson Raymond S. Allred Nathaniel T. Smith Richardson Richardson Boudreaux 7447 South Lewis Avenue Tulsa, Oklahoma AND- Thomas J. Henry Alan Dale Hicks Joseph Fierros The Law Offices of Thomas J. Henry 521 Starr Street Corpus Christi, Texas Attorneys for Kevin Carrillo C. William Threlkeld Sterling E. Pratt C. Todd Ward Kelly L. Offutt Fenton, Fenton, Smith, Reneau & Moon One Leadership Square, Suite 800N 211 N. Robinson Oklahoma City, Oklahoma Attorneys for Jim Brody Blagg and B&B DRLG Consulting, LLC Christopher J. Simmons PLAINTIFF S UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR ORDER GRANTING LEAVE TO FILE SECOND AMENDED PETITION PAGE 5

6 Exhibit A

7 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF PITTSBURG COUNTY STATE OF OKLAHOMA DIANNA WALDRIDGE, personal representative of the Estate of Parker Waldridge and surviving spouse of PARKER WALDRIDGE, deceased, v. Plaintiff, RED MOUNTAIN OPERATING, LLC, RED MOUNTAIN ENERGY, LLC, PATTERSON-UTI DRILLING COMPANY, LLC, PATTERSON-UTI ENERGY, INC., PATTERSON-UTI MANAGEMENT SERVICES, LLC, NATIONAL OILWELL VARCO, L.P., CRESCENT CONSULTING, LLC, CVM HOLDINGS, LLC, AND CVM MANAGEMENT, LLC, Defendants. CASE NO.: CJ JUDGE TIMOTHY E. MILLS (Consolidated for discovery purposes only with Julie Smith, et al. vs. Red Mountain Energy, LLC, et al., Case No. CJ ) PLAINTIFF S SECOND AMENDED PETITION Plaintiff Dianna Waldridge, Personal Representative of the Estate of Parker Waldridge and surviving spouse of Parker Waldridge, deceased, respectfully states for these causes of action against these Defendants as follows: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 1. On January 22, 2018, Parker Waldridge lost his life when a high pressure, uncontrolled release of gas occurred during rotary drilling operations, igniting, and resulting in a catastrophic blowout on the Patterson-UTI Rig #219 (the Patterson Rig, Rig, or Rig #219 ) in Pittsburg County, Oklahoma (the Blowout ). Sadly, four other people were also killed. At the time of the Blowout, Defendants Patterson-UTI Drilling Company, LLC ( Patterson Drilling ), Patterson-UTI Energy, Inc. ( Patterson Energy ), and Patterson-UTI Management Services, LLC PLAINTIFF S SECOND AMENDED PETITION PAGE 1 OF 34

8 ( Patterson Management ) (collectively Patterson ) directed and controlled these rotary drilling operations which were being performed using the Patterson Rig at the Pryor Trust 0718, Well No. 1H-9 (the Well ). At all times material, Defendants Red Mountain Operating, LLC and Red Mountain Energy, LLC (collectively, Red Mountain ) were the leaseholder and the operator of the Well. Crescent Consulting, LLC (in conjunction with CVM Holdings, LLC and CVM Management, LLC) ( Crescent ) provided a drilling engineer named Joel Acosta to oversee the Well operations on behalf of Red Mountain along with, among others, Brody Blagg to serve as the night shift wellsite consultant. 2. Since the Blowout, multiple witnesses have testified that during the night of January 21, 2018 and continuing into the morning of January 22nd, Patterson (along with Acosta) engaged in unsafe drilling practices and ignored established drilling protocols designed to prevent a blowout from occurring. As a result, when Parker and the day crew began their shift on the morning of January 22nd, they inherited a ticking time bomb. A tragedy would follow as a result. 3. Testimony has revealed that while Patterson was pulling pipe out of the Well ( Trip-Out, Tripping-Out or Tripping Operations ) during the night of the 21st and into the early morning of the 22nd, a cascade of errors and multiple departures from safe drilling practices occurred, including the following acts of negligence and/or gross negligence: a. Knowingly tripping out of the hole underbalanced; b. Utilizing an orbit valve as a well control device during underbalanced Tripping Operations; c. Miscalculating proper hole fill during Tripping Operations; d. Tripping-Out of the hole without documenting proper hole fill; e. Tripping-Out of the hole without performing proper flow checks; PLAINTIFF S SECOND AMENDED PETITION PAGE 2 OF 34

9 f. Contaminating a weighted pill with lost circulation material that was to be placed at the top of the curve of the wellbore during Tripping Operations resulting in a clogged drill string; g. Knowingly pumping a weighted pill contaminated with lost circulation material which resulted in a clogged drill string in a Well that was already underbalanced; h. Failing to pump a weighted pill in sufficient weight and quantity at the top of the curve of the wellbore during Tripping Operations in a well that was already underbalanced; i. Continuing Tripping Operations while it was known the Well was underbalanced and not taking proper fill; j. Failing to make proper calculations to account for the fact that the drill string was clogged and the night crew was now pulling wet pipe out of the hole resulting in loss of fill; k. Failing to take reasonable precautions to prevent the swabbing effect of pulling a heavy, wet drill string and bottom hole assembly ( BHA ) clogged with lost circulation material out of the hole; l. Resetting, disabling, and ignoring numerous alarms concerning changing well conditions that occurred throughout the evening and early morning hours; and m. Failing to properly determine and alert others that the well had not taken proper fill, had lost significant amounts of the mud column during the Tripping Operations and that the Well was showing signs of an impending well control event. 4. While Patterson was making these critical mistakes, Acosta and at least one mud engineer supplied by National Oilwell Varco, L.P. ( NOV ) were supposed to be monitoring the Well. Acosta was the drilling engineer and, as a result, had been charged with formulating a drilling prognosis that included a proper mud weight for the Well. NOV was supposed to prepare a mud program that was appropriate for the conditions in the Well s formation so that Acosta could include it in his drilling prognosis. At any point during the evening of the 21st and into the morning of the 22nd while Patterson was making these mistakes Acosta or NOV s mud engineer could have acted to exercise their stop work authority in order to prevent Patterson from continuing PLAINTIFF S SECOND AMENDED PETITION PAGE 3 OF 34

10 their unsafe conduct. Further, neither Patterson nor Acosta recognized the Well was showing signs of a looming well control event throughout the night and into the morning of January 22nd. 5. In addition to the conditions caused by the ill-fated Tripping Operations, unbeknownst to Parker and the other men who lost their lives, Patterson s accumulator the machine that actuates the Rams (the Accumulator ) for Patterson s Blow Out Preventers ( BOPs ) in the event of a blowout was improperly maintained and in a state of severe disrepair. Patterson s own documents reveal that as early as September 2017, the Accumulator showed signs it was not properly maintained and contained safety-critical levels of water in the hydraulic fluid. Moreover, at least two days before the Blowout, numerous Patterson employees, including the Rig Manager and Rig Superintendent for Rig #219, received the results of laboratory testing that contained conspicuous warnings in the form of a skull and crossbones graphic (literally) and warned that the Accumulator s hydraulic fluid was milky, contaminated with water, and had lost all viscosity. It characterized the condition as a Severity Level 4, warned that water contamination was at a critical level for hydraulic systems and raised additional concerns about the inner workings of the Accumulator. The Rig Manager for Rig #219 has testified that he never saw the , but admitted the document should have been taken seriously and would have precipitated a call to his Rig Superintendent had he seen it. The Rig Superintendent for Rig #219 testified he received the lab testing report by in the days before the Blowout, but did not remember if he looked at it. He testified that the report would warrant some follow-up to look at the report and determine if it was accurate; however, he conceded that he did neither and was unaware of any policy or procedure within Patterson that dictated how he was supposed to handle the situation had he seen it. PLAINTIFF S SECOND AMENDED PETITION PAGE 4 OF 34

11 6. The standard of care required that the Well be shut-in if the Accumulator was in disrepair. Instead, Patterson ignored the problem and did nothing. As a result, Patterson s failure to act rendered its Accumulator a mission-critical piece of safety equipment unfit for use. Tragically, when they were needed most, the blind rams on the BOP didn t close fully because of the Accumulator s inability to function properly. Sworn testimony from both Patterson and Red Mountain s employees confirms that the blind rams on the BOPs did not close when the Blowout occurred. 7. In the words of Red Mountain s Vice President of Engineering Operations, Tim Cummings, this Blowout was 110% preventable. Truer words have not been spoken. The testimony and the evidence in this case demonstrates that the Blowout was not only preventable it would not have happened but for Defendants repeated acts of negligence and recklessness. 8. Rather than recognizing the need for serious change, Patterson s response to this tragedy has been to do nothing: Patterson has represented to the Court in this case that it has failed to conduct an internal company investigation into this Blowout in accordance with its own policies and procedures; Testimony from Patterson s employees indicates that Patterson has undertaken no formal disciplinary actions concerning any of the employees involved; Patterson employees involved in the Rig #219 Blowout have testified they ve been offered no additional training or guidance to prevent this from happening in the future; and Patterson has made no changes to its drilling policies and procedures. When asked what they would change about their actions in relation to the Blowout, Patterson s employees have uniformly testified, Nothing. The evidence in this case will demonstrate that Patterson refuses to learn from its mistakes even when people continue to die. PLAINTIFF S SECOND AMENDED PETITION PAGE 5 OF 34

12 9. The Blowout which tragically killed Parker Waldridge marked the deadliest oilfield disaster since the Transocean Deepwater Horizon oil and gas well blowout and explosion which occurred in the Gulf of Mexico on April 20, Not unlike that disaster, this tragedy was preventable had safety been the primary concern. 10. According to federal workplace safety data, Patterson is no stranger to workplace fatalities having the second worst worker fatality rate among its peers in the industry. Prior to the Blowout on Rig #219, Patterson Energy and Patterson Drilling have collectively been cited more than 110 times for serious safety violations in the past ten years and, on at least one occasion, has been told by federal regulators that its lack of concern for safety created a seriously dangerous environment for its workers. Going back to 1999, according to available records, Patterson has been involved in the deaths of at least 50 workers and has received hundreds of thousands in fines from OSHA. It would appear this tradition was permitted to continue in Quinton, Oklahoma on Rig #219, as OSHA again cited Patterson with multiple Serious safety violations following the death of five souls. Patterson is appealing those OSHA safety violations. THE PARTIES 11. Plaintiff Dianna Waldridge is the surviving spouse of Parker Waldridge, deceased, and the Personal Representative of the Estate of Parker Waldridge. Mrs. Waldridge is a resident of Crescent, Oklahoma and a citizen of the State of Oklahoma. Prior to his death, Parker Waldridge was a resident of Crescent, Oklahoma and a citizen of the State of Oklahoma. 12. Defendant Red Mountain Operating, LLC, is a limited liability company with one or more members that reside in Oklahoma. Defendant Red Mountain Operating, LLC has appeared herein and can be served through its counsel of record. 13. Defendant Red Mountain Energy, LLC, is a limited liability company in the State PLAINTIFF S SECOND AMENDED PETITION PAGE 6 OF 34

13 of Oklahoma, with one or more members that reside in Oklahoma. Defendant Red Mountain Energy, LLC has appeared herein and can be served through its counsel of record. 14. Red Mountain Operating, LLC and Red Mountain Energy, LLC are collectively referred to herein as Red Mountain. 15. Defendant Patterson-UTI Drilling Company, LLC is a limited liability company in Texas, with headquarters and principal place of business located at West Sam Houston Parkway North, Suite 800, Houston, Texas Defendant Patterson-UTI Drilling Company, LLC has appeared herein and can be served through its counsel of record. It is a wholly owned subsidiary of Patterson-UTI Energy, Inc. 16. Defendant Patterson-UTI Energy, Inc. is a Delaware corporation, with its headquarters and principal place of business located at West Sam Houston Parkway North, Suite 800, Houston, Texas Defendant Patterson-UTI Energy, Inc. has appeared herein (subject to its challenge to jurisdiction) and can be served through its counsel of record. 17. Defendant Patterson-UTI Management Services, LLC is a limited liability company in Texas, with its headquarters and principal place of business located at 4510 Lamesa Highway, Snyder, Texas Defendant Patterson Management Services, LLC has appeared herein and can be served through its counsel of record. Defendant Patterson Management Services, LLC is a wholly owned subsidiary of Patterson-UTI Energy, Inc. 18. Patterson-UTI Energy, Inc, Patterson-UTI Drilling, LLC, and Patterson-UTI Management Services, LLC, are collectively referred to herein as Patterson. 19. Defendant National Oilwell Varco, L.P. (hereinafter NOV ) is a foreign limited partnership, doing business, engaging in business, and transacting business in the State of Oklahoma. NOV has appeared herein and can be served through its counsel of record. PLAINTIFF S SECOND AMENDED PETITION PAGE 7 OF 34

14 20. Defendant Crescent Consulting, LLC (hereinafter Crescent ) is a limited liability company in the State of Oklahoma, with one or more members that reside in Oklahoma, doing business, engaging in business, and transacting business in the State of Oklahoma. Crescent has appeared herein and can be served through its counsel of record. 21. CVM Holdings, LLC, (hereinafter CVM Holdings ) is a domestic limited liability company doing business, engaging in business, and transacting business in the State of Oklahoma. CVM Holdings may be served with process by serving its attorney of record, Monty B. Bottom and the law firm of Foliart, Huff, Ottaway & Bottom at 201 Robert S. Kerr Avenue, 12 th Floor, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma CVM Management, LLC, (hereinafter CVM Management ) is a domestic limited liability company doing business, engaging in business, and transacting business in the State of Oklahoma. CVM Management may be served with process by serving its attorney of record, Monty B. Bottom and the law firm of Foliart, Huff, Ottaway & Bottom at 201 Robert S. Kerr Avenue, 12 th Floor, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma CVM Holdings and CVM Management are collectively referred to herein as CVM. 23. Defendants Patterson, Red Mountain, NOV, Crescent, and CVM are collectively referred to as Defendants. VENUE AND JURISDICTION 24. This is a wrongful death action resulting from the death of Parker Waldridge brought by his surviving spouse and personal representative pursuant to 12 O.S The Blowout that took Mr. Waldridge s life occurred in Pittsburg County, Oklahoma, which falls within the jurisdiction of the District Court of Pittsburg County for the State of Oklahoma. As such, venue is proper in this county pursuant to 12 O.S PLAINTIFF S SECOND AMENDED PETITION PAGE 8 OF 34

15 25. The amount in controversy exceeds the sum of $75,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs. 26. Patterson Energy is subject to personal jurisdiction in Oklahoma for the claims forming the basis of this lawsuit. Patterson claims that Patterson Energy is a holding company with no employees, no revenues, and no equipment when defending itself in this lawsuit; however, it takes a much different position when speaking to the public, to investors, or to potential investors. It would appear that Patterson Energy s sole existence is to make money at the expense of the employees that work for its subsidiaries. All the while, Patterson Energy exercises control over its subsidiaries by stacking the senior leadership of each with the same leadership of the parent corporation and controlling the day to day business activities, or, as the case may be, failing to adequately emphasize safety in the operations of Patterson Drilling. 27. Patterson Energy owns one-hundred percent of Patterson Drilling and Patterson Management. It shares both officers and directors, and exercises pervasive control over both subsidiaries. For example, the President of Patterson Drilling, James Holcomb, is required under his employment agreement with Patterson Drilling to report directly to the chief executive officer, Andrew Hendricks, Jr. Mr. Hendricks is not only the chief executive officer for Patterson Drilling but also the president and chief executive officer for Patterson Energy. Patterson Energy s senior leadership, including Mr. Hendricks, openly state that the safety of Patterson Drilling s operations is a primary concern of Patterson Energy, demonstrating its control over its subsidiary. Patterson Energy s safety policies which are written by Patterson Management at the request of Patterson Energy reflect that Patterson Energy is responsible for the promulgation and implementation of those policies. 28. Indeed, compensation of Patterson Energy s leadership is also significantly PLAINTIFF S SECOND AMENDED PETITION PAGE 9 OF 34

16 dependent on Patterson Drilling s profitability as well as its safety record. According to Patterson Energy s 2018 proxy filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission, Patterson Energy s CEO, Andy Hendricks, along with Patterson Energy s other top executives, did not receive a portion of their 2017 compensation because safety as a key performance indicator was not met regarding maintenance of Patterson-UTI s leadership position in operating and safety standards. As a result, for example, Mr. Hendricks only received $14,253,839 in compensation, losing a $250k safety incentive for the operational safety of Patterson Drilling. According to the 2018 Proxy Statement filed with the SEC, the compensation deduction was specifically attributed to the tragedy involving the five workers killed in Quinton, Oklahoma. All five senior executives for Patterson Energy as well as the President for Patterson Drilling were docked safety incentive bonuses. 29. Patterson Energy boasts about its direct control over the purchase, upgrade and use of its equipment around the country, including in Oklahoma, and including the equipment involved in this Blowout. Based upon Patterson Energy s own consolidated financial statements, Contract Drilling operations comprise more than half of its operating revenues over the last five years, and Patterson Energy makes no distinction between itself and the activities of Patterson Drilling, holding itself out as one and the same in its references to its employees, rigs, operations, activities, and even with respect to its claimed emphasis on safety. Patterson Energy s own press releases reflect that the employees lost in the Blowout were Patterson Energy s employees and reiterate its continued alleged commitment to safety. 30. Patterson Energy s senior leadership also exercises direct control over Patterson Management. The CEO, CFO, and General Counsel for Management as well as the managing members of Patterson Management are also senior executives for Patterson Energy. Mr. PLAINTIFF S SECOND AMENDED PETITION PAGE 10 OF 34

17 Hendricks, for example, is in direct control of Patterson Management, having the authority and exercising the authority to make management decisions involving Patterson Management and having the authority to hire and fire employees of Patterson Management. This includes direct authority and decision-making involving Patterson Energy s decision to delegate authority to Patterson Management in the creation and implementation of Patterson Energy s safety programs and policies for use by its subsidiaries such as Patterson Drilling. These are the very same safety protocols and the very same safety training at issue in this case. Patterson Management, through the control of common leadership with Patterson Energy and Patterson Drilling, receives all the cash collections from the subsidiaries, like Patterson Drilling, and transfers money back to the parent, Patterson Drilling, through accounting entries controlled by the very same people who control the accounting for Patterson Energy and the rest of the subsidiaries. 31. Clearly, Patterson Energy s senior leadership has control over Patterson Drilling s operations and safety practices abroad, and, specifically, in the operations in Oklahoma. Patterson Energy ultimately has control over Patterson Management as well as all of its subsidiaries utilizing parallel executive management structures. 32. Patterson Energy filed challenges to personal jurisdiction in this lawsuit which were denied by the Court after a hearing. In a sworn statement from Mark Cullifer made on behalf of Patterson Energy, he maintains under oath that Patterson Energy did not supply any equipment, did not have any affiliation with the decedent or with any other party related to any activities at the Well, although he concedes later that Patterson Energy does have an affiliation with Patterson Drilling. Patterson Energy s position before this Court has been, at best, misleading and dishonest. 33. Patterson Energy s own annual reports and disclosures boast of the number of drilling rigs it owns, its revenues from its drilling operations, and capabilities of its drilling PLAINTIFF S SECOND AMENDED PETITION PAGE 11 OF 34

18 equipment. Patterson Energy even boasts of having 24 drilling rigs that are based in Oklahoma, including the Rig that is at issue in this lawsuit. 34. Patterson Energy repeatedly releases information on a monthly basis to existing and prospective investors where they openly refer to Patterson Energy s market leading positions in contract drilling and the number of drilling rigs Patterson Energy operated for the particular month. On February 8, 2018, the CEO for Patterson Energy, Andy Hendricks, Jr. released a statement to report that Patterson s revenues in 2017 were over $2.4 Billion, compared to $916MM in In that same press release, Hendricks stated, Before reviewing the financial results, I want to express again that all of us at Patterson-UTI [Energy] are mourning those who lost their lives in the tragic accident in Oklahoma. There is nothing more important to us than the safety of our employees and others we partner with in the field. A little more than sixty days after Hendricks statements to the public, Mark Cullifer, on behalf of Patterson Energy, offered his affidavit before this Court and swore that Patterson Energy had no employees who were working on this Well at the time of this Blowout. Hendricks then went on in his press release to discuss all of Patterson Energy s rig upgrades to the Apex rotary drilling rigs used by Patterson. 35. The Contract under which the Well made the subject of this lawsuit was drilled includes indemnification in favor of Patterson Energy and all of its subsidiaries again highlighting the connection between Patterson Drilling and its parent, Patterson Energy, who are both represented by the same General Counsel. 36. Patterson Energy, through the direct control of its subsidiaries Patterson Management and Patterson Drilling, conducts rotary drilling operations throughout Oklahoma, as well as the United States and Canada. By voluntarily engaging in rotary drilling operations in Oklahoma, Patterson has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in PLAINTIFF S SECOND AMENDED PETITION PAGE 12 OF 34

19 Oklahoma. The tort claims that form the basis of this lawsuit are a direct result of the activities Patterson purposefully directed to Oklahoma. As such, Patterson Energy, Patterson Management, and Patterson Drilling are all subject to this Court s jurisdiction. To that end, the Court denied Patterson Energy s challenge to personal jurisdiction on August 28, BACKGROUND FACTS 37. On January 22, 2018, at the time of the Blowout, Patterson was in the process of drilling the Well, which was operated by Red Mountain. In order to facilitate Patterson s drilling operations, Red Mountain and Patterson entered into an IADC Daywork Drilling Contract setting forth the respective obligations of Patterson and Red Mountain. According to this contract, Patterson s safety policies and procedures governed all the work being performed on the Rig (whether performed by Patterson or another company). In addition, Patterson had the ultimate responsibility over well control. 38. Red Mountain was responsible for this Well s design and the Well s Drilling Program (otherwise referred to as the Drilling Prognosis) (the Plan ). Red Mountain retained the services of Crescent (and/or CVM as the case may be), i.e., Joel Acosta, to formulate the Plan along with the input of Red Mountain s Tim Cummings. The Plan required Patterson to drill to a vertical depth of approximately 7,700 feet and a horizontal length of 10,286 feet. A critical aspect of the Plan was the selection of the mud weight that would be used during Patterson s drilling operations. On behalf of Red Mountain, Cummings and Acosta hired NOV to assist them in the creation and revision of a mud program. In order to determine the mud weight, Red Mountain and Acosta asked for and received a significant amount of data for other off-set wells that had been drilled in the same formation. In each instance, the mud weights utilized for the off-set wells averaged approximately 9.0 ppg. NOV eventually provided Red Mountain and Acosta with a PLAINTIFF S SECOND AMENDED PETITION PAGE 13 OF 34

20 proposed mud plan that recommended mud weights ranging from ppg. Despite NOV s recommendation and the data on other off-set wells that showed higher mud weights, the Defendants would ultimately utilize lower mud weights that would result in the Well being drilled underbalanced. Documents produced in this case demonstrate at critical times the mud weight was 8.1 to 8.3 ppg during the drilling of the Well. 39. As the company providing recommendations for a mud program, NOV supplied the mud/drilling fluids and technicians to administer/monitor the mud program. As would later be confirmed, the mud program was not adequate to prevent the Blowout and was not adequate to facilitate the desired drilling operations being performed on the Rig. Furthermore, the mud program which was itself inadequate was not followed by Red Mountain, Crescent, and Patterson, and NOV failed to ensure that the mud program was adequate and failed to ensure that the mud program was being carried out in a reasonably safe manner. 40. Shortly before the Blowout occurred, Patterson had drilled to a depth of approximately 13,500 feet when it was decided to Trip-Out the entire assembly of pipe, its bottomhole assembly ( BHA ) and the Rock Bit ( Bit ), i.e., (the Drill String ), out of the Well based on the request by Red Mountain and Acosta. During the time leading up to the Trip-Out of the BHA, monitoring data strongly suggested that gas was in the Well. Nevertheless, reasonable steps were not undertaken to maintain well control or shut the Well in prior to a complete loss of control. 41. Joel Acosta, Crescent s Vice President of Operations, an owner of CVM, and an alleged professional engineer, managed Crescent s operations for Red Mountain. Acosta, on behalf of Red Mountain, had ordered that the Well be drilled using a lighter mud column than the mud program recommended by NOV (the Mud Engineer) and significantly lighter than other similar offset wells. Acosta wanted the Well to be drilled light in an effort to save time and money and PLAINTIFF S SECOND AMENDED PETITION PAGE 14 OF 34

21 to prevent potential damage to the formation. 42. During the day on Sunday, January 21st, it was widely known by Acosta and the Patterson crew that the Well had produced a gas flare off and on throughout the day a signal that gas was making its way into the Well while drilling operations were underway. Despite being aware of this, Acosta ordered that the mud weight be kept in their back pocket. 43. Patterson s Rig Manager, Tony Thompson, and the night shift driller, Lionel Deanda, have testified that on the evening of January 21st and into the early morning hours of January 22nd, they were subjectively aware that the Well was underbalanced, but still agreed with a plan to Trip-Out of the hole utilizing the Orbit Valve as a well control device. Both were subjectively aware that this practice was unsafe and could result in a loss of well control. They did it anyway. The mud weight during this exercise was reported as 8.3 in and 8.2 out. The Pason data shows flow during each stand pulled from the hole while Tripping Out. Deanda testified that he and Thompson were both aware the Well was not taking proper fill yet another sign of a looming well control event. 44. At least one reason why the Well was not taking proper fill appears to be because Patterson had failed to properly pump a heavy weighted pill ( ECD Pill ) at a location ordered by Acosta to maintain hydrostatic pressure at the kick off point and prevent an uncontrolled influx of gas from migrating into the vertical section of the Well. Instead, Patterson pumped a pill that contained lost circulation material ( LCM ) which clogged the BHA and clogged the drill string. 45. The testimony to date shows that Thompson and the rest of the Patterson crew knew the ECD pill was stuck in the drill string but proceeded with Tripping Operations in an underbalanced state anyway. Following the failed placement of the ECD pill, Patterson continued to trip the clogged drill string out of the hole, pulling wet. This meant that the drill string, PLAINTIFF S SECOND AMENDED PETITION PAGE 15 OF 34

22 because it was clogged, contained the mud designed to help control the Well. The clogged string and clogged BHA added weight that would lead to a swabbing effect of the vertical section of the Well. This only further compromised well control in an already underbalanced Well, as the heavy BHA and drill string acted like a stopper in a syringe, drawing the fluids up the well bore as they Tripped-Out. Signs that this was occurring was ignored throughout the night and into the early morning hours. 46. Both Patterson s Rig Superintendent (Bryan Cornelison) and Patterson s Rig Manager (Tony Thompson) over Rig #219 during this time testified that they were unaware of any training, policies or procedures that have been formalized by Patterson for pulling wet or dealing with a clogged drill string under the circumstances. Lionel Deanda, Patterson s Driller who was physically operating the controls to remove the drill string, testified that he had not received any training for Tripping Out in the manner performed on the night of the 21st and into the morning of the 22nd. Thompson and Deanda both testified they were unaware of any prohibition by Patterson of Tripping-Out of the hole in an unbalanced state. Both have admitted this operation was unsafe. 47. During the Trip-Out of the horizontal leg of the Well, the Pason data demonstrates a loss of at least 36 barrels of mud out of the hole and reveals that the Well was not taking proper fill. Deanda testified this was consistent with a potential well control event to come. Nevertheless, no action was taken and no one was notified. Deanda testified that he failed to properly keep a trip sheet that would track the mud displacement for the last 69 stands of pipe during the Trip-Out of the vertical section of the Well both a violation of the standard of care and a violation of Patterson s policies. All of these mistakes would contribute to what would become a disastrous night with fatal consequences the following day. PLAINTIFF S SECOND AMENDED PETITION PAGE 16 OF 34

23 48. Pason data confirms that significant additional mud losses occurred while Patterson Tripped-Out of the vertical section of the Well. Based on all available data and testimony, it appears Patterson swabbed the Well, creating a plunger effect with the heavy, clogged BHA. Incredibly, Thompson has admitted the Pason data demonstrates that several thousand feet of pipe was tripped out of the hole without the Well taking proper fill. Thompson also admitted that loss of the mud column coupled with failing to spot the pill properly could result in a loss of well control. The Chemical Safety Board has already concluded that conditions created on the evening of January 21st and the morning of the 22nd resulted in gas influx into the vertical section of the Well. 49. By the time of the shift change in the 6:00 a.m. hour of January 22nd, the Well was, in fact, a ticking time bomb. Despite the repeated miscues by the evening shift, no one took steps to alert anyone to the fact that the Well had shown signs of a looming well control event all throughout the night. Testimony by Acosta demonstrates that he was aware the ECD pill had been botched the evening before, yet he made no attempts to review the Pason data or follow-up with the night Well Site Consultant (Blagg) regarding what had occurred during the Trip Out on the night shift. No one at Patterson attempted to notify anyone of what should have been great cause for concern over the evening s events. 50. That morning, Parker Waldridge came on shift at 6 a.m. Mr. Waldridge served as a WSC on behalf of Crescent. Crescent contracted with Red Mountain to provide wellsite management at the Well. Mr. Waldridge reported directly to Acosta who was the first in command at Crescent as it concerned this Well. He had not been present during the Trip-Out operations that took place during the evening of the 21st into the morning of the 22nd. On the morning of the Blowout, Parker had a safety meeting early that morning. He then attended a call with Red PLAINTIFF S SECOND AMENDED PETITION PAGE 17 OF 34

24 Mountain and Acosta around 7:30 a.m. He called his wife, Dianna, at 7:43 a.m. It would be the last time they would ever speak. He went to the Rig Floor sometime after 8:06 a.m. to observe the morning s activities on the Rig floor with the BHA and to photograph the bit change. 51. The Well was flowing. At 7:57 a.m., the Patterson Day crew opened the blind rams to begin testing the BHA. Under Patterson s safety policies and procedures and any accepted standards of care, the Well should have been shut in at this point, but no one noticed what was happening. The Pason data shows that the mud pits below the rig floor were rapidly filling up at this time. By the time of the Blowout, another 107 barrels of mud had been lost out of the Well. Deposition testimony from members of the Patterson crew confirms that no alarms were heard by anyone. The CSB has confirmed that both the audible alarms inside the Doghouse as well as the horn outside on the Rig floor had been disabled. In fact, between 10:30 p.m. on the evening of January 21st until the Blowout at approximately 8:35 a.m. on the morning of the 22nd over 1000 different alarms went off on Rig #219. Nearly 100 of those alarms provided evidence of a well control event. 52. Testimony from survivors of Patterson s day crew further confirms that in the minutes before the kick, mud was flowing out of the stack. The Patterson Derrickman has testified that he saw mud coming over the stack in the minutes before the Blowout. In the moments leading up to the Blowout, at least two Patterson employees have testified they heard Josh Ray, the day shift Driller, come on the squawk box and indicate that he was going to shut the well in. Tony Thompson, who was standing on the Rig floor at the time, was surprised when the Well didn t close and began to burp uncontrolled out of the stack. 53. It is believed Josh Ray attempted to shut the Well in remotely from the control panel located behind the Driller s station. The remote controls to the Accumulator are located PLAINTIFF S SECOND AMENDED PETITION PAGE 18 OF 34

25 behind the driller s chair inside the Doghouse. Those attempts failed to close the blind rams completely. 54. Stacked atop of the Well s equipment used to construct and complete it (the Wellhead Assembly ) is an assembly of high-pressure valves, the BOPs, that can be used to close ( Shut-in ) the Well and prevent it from flowing to the surface. Rig #219 had three individual BOPs: an Annular Preventer (the Annular ), a double Ram-Type Preventer (the Double Ram ) and single Ram-Type Preventer (the Single Ram ). All these BOPs were atop the Wellhead Assembly. The Rig s BOPs could be operated to OPEN or CLOSE from the Doghouse remotely and/or manually down on the ground. The Accumulator used on Rig #219 was a hydro-pneumatic machine that actuated the BOPs, among other things. 55. The testimony and documents to date demonstrate that Patterson s Accumulator was in disrepair, Patterson knew it was in disrepair, and it failed to actuate the Blind Rams at the moment it was needed most. 56. Around 8:35 a.m., high pressure gas came out of the Well with tremendous force, shooting mud out of the Well bore. The gas would find an ignition source, igniting the gas and leading to an inferno which tragically claimed the lives of Parker Waldridge, Josh Ray, and three other men who sought shelter in the Doghouse (Matthew Smith, Roger Cunningham and Cody Risk). 57. Within seconds of the Blowout, Tony Thompson, the Rig Manager, ran down the staircase from the Rig floor to the ground level. He ran straight for the Accumulator and attempted to shut the Well in through the use of the manual controls on the Accumulator. According to his deposition testimony, Thompson carelessly opened all of the stations on the Accumulator simultaneously, needlessly drawing power to stations that actuated equipment other than the Blind PLAINTIFF S SECOND AMENDED PETITION PAGE 19 OF 34

26 Rams. With the Accumulator already in disrepair, Thompson s actions only ensured that the Blind Rams would not close. 58. While the Fire raged, Parker was trapped in the Doghouse along with the four other men. Documents obtained from the Medical Examiner s Office demonstrate that these men were trying to get out of the Doghouse to flee to safety but could not. Tragically, all five men were burned to death. The resulting Fire was so intense that authorities had to rely on dental records in order to confirm the identities of Mr. Waldridge and these four other men. 59. NOV designed and manufactured the Doghouse where these five men lost their lives. Based on the documents and testimony to date, it appears that NOV designed the Doghouse in such a manner that caused its door to be hinged the wrong way, thus, any person needing to utilize the door in an emergent situation (i.e. to escape a flaming inferno on the Rig floor) would be exposed to the flames. In addition, Patterson modified an already ill-conceived design by NOV by changing the configuration of the quick escape staircase designed by NOV and moving it behind the Doghouse. If a fire occurred on the Rig floor, not only would a crew member have to open the door causing exposure to the threat on the Rig floor, but any escape was blocked by an air conditioning unit that was placed behind the Doghouse door. Tragically, in order to escape the Doghouse, these five men would have had to open the door, expose themselves to the heat and flame of the fire, close the door to get around the opened door, and then exit down the stairs toward the rear of the Doghouse one at a time. 60. In addition to the Doghouse, NOV designed and manufactured the Accumulator. It is undisputed the Accumulator did not function properly to close the BOPs at the time of the Blowout. Testimony from Patterson employees demonstrates that one reason it did not function as intended is because Tony Thompson operated all the handles simultaneously. It appears that NOV PLAINTIFF S SECOND AMENDED PETITION PAGE 20 OF 34

27 failed to provide proper instruction and warnings to Patterson concerning the safe and proper use of the Accumulator. It also appears that, in addition to failing to maintain the Accumulator, Patterson did not properly train its crew on how to safely operate it in the event of an emergency. 61. Patterson s maintenance records demonstrate that the Accumulator showed signs of serious maintenance and mechanical deficiencies two days before the Blowout. Records obtained from Pilot Thomas demonstrate that Patterson, by January 20th, was aware that the hydraulic fluid in the Accumulator was milky and lacked viscosity. In addition, grave concerns were raised by the Pilot Thomas report about internal parts inside the Accumulator breaking down based on elevated amounts of iron, aluminum, silicon and other materials found in the fluid. Pilot Thomas warnings about the Accumulator were ignored and explain why the Blind Rams did not close. 62. According to those who knew him best, Mr. Waldridge was a loving father, devoted husband, loving son, caring grandfather, and dedicated worker. Mr. Waldridge predeceased his wife, Dianna Waldridge, their four daughters, his mother, and six grandchildren. Their lives will never be the same as a result. CAUSES OF ACTION Count One: Negligence Red Mountain 63. Each of the foregoing paragraphs is incorporated herein for all purposes. 64. At the time of the Blowout, Red Mountain was the Operator of the Well and had entered into Agreements with various Contractors and Subcontractors to perform work on the Well. Red Mountain owed a duty of ordinary care to persons working at the Well, including Mr. Waldridge, to ensure that the working conditions at the Well were safe under all circumstances. Red Mountain failed to use that degree of care, which should be used by an Operator of ordinary PLAINTIFF S SECOND AMENDED PETITION PAGE 21 OF 34

28 prudence under the same or similar circumstances and, as a result, the Blowout and Fire occurred. Red Mountain was also negligent for failing to properly instruct and supervise its employees and/or agents, including Patterson, as described above and further below. Red Mountain s acts and omissions as stated herein constituted negligence. This negligence includes, but is not limited to: a. Allowing hazardous conditions to exist at the time of the Blowout; b. Negligently approving work to be performed by the Contractors, such as Patterson, it provided at the Well; c. Failing to hire a Drilling Contractor who was competent to safely perform all rotary drilling operations at the Well; d. Failing to ensure that the drilling operation was conducted in a safe and prudent manner; e. Failing to provide a safe workplace; f. Failing to properly supervise the work being done at the time of the Blowout; g. Failing to ensure that the equipment being used in the drilling operation was working, was well-maintained, in good working order, not defective, and properly used; h. Failing to prepare a reasonably safe well plan; i. Failing to ensure that the well plan was followed; j. Failing to ensure that all workers were properly trained; k. Failing to warn of a dangerous condition on the Wellsite; l. Failing to ensure that adequate safety policies and procedures were in place and properly implemented at the Wellsite; and m. Failing to exercise appropriate stop work authority. PLAINTIFF S SECOND AMENDED PETITION PAGE 22 OF 34

29 65. Red Mountain s negligence was a proximate cause of Plaintiff s injuries. Count Two: Negligence Patterson 66. Each of the foregoing paragraphs is incorporated herein for all purposes. 67. Patterson was the Drilling Contractor on the Well, who was obligated to supply the infrastructure and equipment, including the Rig, as well as trained and competent personnel and other rotary drilling operational resources to operate and control the Rig during rotary drilling operations. Patterson Energy, at a minimum, undertook to train the employees of Patterson that were working on the Rig through its wholly owned subsidiaries Patterson Management and Patterson Drilling. Patterson Energy had ultimate control over the management, operations, policies, procedures, and capital expenditures for equipment involving its wholly owned subsidiaries, Patterson Management and Paterson Drilling. Patterson Drilling had the most direct control over the drilling operations and emergency response to changing conditions and failed to use ordinary care with respect to its conduct. Patterson failed to use that degree of care, which should be used by a Drilling Contractor of ordinary prudence under the same or similar circumstances. Patterson Energy, Patterson Management, and Patterson Drilling were also negligent for failing to properly train, instruct, and supervise its employees and/or agents, as described above and further below. Patterson s acts and omissions as stated herein constituted negligence. This negligence includes, but is not limited to: a. Allowing hazardous conditions to evolve, exist, persist and worsen on the Patterson Rig before and at the time of the gas release, Fire and Blowout; b. Failing to ensure that the drilling operation was conducted in a safe and prudent manner; c. Failing to provide a safe workplace at the Rig; PLAINTIFF S SECOND AMENDED PETITION PAGE 23 OF 34