FILED: NIAGARA COUNTY CLERK 02/15/ :54 PM INDEX NO. E157285/2015 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 7 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 02/15/2017

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1 STATE OF NEW YORK SUPREME COURT: COUNTY OF NIAGARA MARTINE JURON vs. Plaintiff, GENERAL MOTORS COMPANY, GENERAL MOTORS HOLDING CORPORATION, COMPLAINT GENERAL MOTORS LLC, SATURN OF CLARENCE, INC., now known as, 5535 TRANSIT ROAD, INC., Index No. E157285/2015 Defendants. The Plaintiff, Martine Juron, by her attorney, Richard G. Berger, Esq., alleges that: 1. At all times mentioned in this Complaint, Plaintiff, MARTINE JURON, was and still is a resident of the County of Niagara and State of New York. 2. At all times mentioned in this complaint, Defendant GENERAL MOTORS COMPANY, upon information and belief, was and is a corporation incorporated under the laws of the State of Michigan, authorized to do business in the State of New York and has offices and does business in the State of New York. 4. Upon information and belief, the Defendant, GENERAL MOTORS COMPANY, is authorized to do business in the State of New York and has offices and does business in the State of New York. 1 of 13

2 5. At all times mentioned in this complaint, Defendant, GENERAL MOTORS HOLDING CORPORATION, upon information and belief, was and is a corporation incorporated under the laws of the State of Delaware, with its principal place of business in the State of Michigan. 6. Upon information and belief, the Defendant, GENERAL MOTORS HOLDING CORPORATION, is authorized to do business in the State of New York and has offices and does business in the State of New York. 7. At all times herein mentioned, upon information and belief, Defendant GENERAL MOTORS LLC ( New GM ) is a Delaware limited liability company with its principal place of business located at 300 Renaissance Center, Detroit, Michigan, and is a citizen of the States of Delaware and Michigan. The sole member and owner of General Motors LLC is GENERAL MOTORS HOLDING CORPORATION. GENERAL MOTORS HOLDING CORPORATION, is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in the State of Michigan. The sole member and owner of GENERAL MOTORS HOLDING CORPORATION, is GENERAL MOTORS COMPANY, which is a Delaware Corporation with its principal place of business in the State of Michigan. 8. Upon information and belief, the Defendant, GENERAL MOTORS, LLC, (New GM) was incorporated in 2009 and, effective on July 11, 2009, acquired substantially all assets and assumed certain liabilities of General Motors Corporation through a Section 363 sale under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. 9. At all times mentioned in this complaint, Defendant, SATURN OF CLARENCE, INC., upon information and belief, was and is a domestic corporation incorporated under the laws of the State of New York, with its principal place of business in the County of Erie and State of 2 of 13

3 New York. Upon information and belief, the Defendant, SATURN OF CLARENCE, INC., changed its corporate name in the year 2010 to 5535 TRANSIT ROAD, INC. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 10. Upon information and belief, in the year 2003 and thereafter until 2012, Defendant Saturn of Clarence, Inc., was engaged in the business of operating an automobile dealership and, as such, was buying, selling, distributing, servicing, testing, inspecting, repairing and maintaining automobiles, including the automobile in question, and tested, inspected, examined, serviced, maintained, repaired and sold the Saturn automobiles 11. Heretofore, and in the year 2003, the Plaintiff, Martine Juron, purchased a new Saturn Ion Motor vehicle from the Defendant, SATURN OF CLARENCE, INC., a four-door sedan which was of the model year 2003, having New York State License Plate Registration number BRV8081. At that time, the Defendant SATURN OF CLARENCE, INC. was located at 5535 Transit Road, in the Town of Clarence, County of Erie and State of New York. 12. Said motor vehicle was designed, manufactured and marketed by the GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, the predecessor to the Defendant, GENERAL MOTORS, LLC, a company that was in the business of designing, manufacturing and selling automobiles to the public for personal and commercial uses. 13. During the period 2003 through November 8, 2012, the Defendant, SATURN OF CLARENCE, INC., at the vehicle dealership in Clarence, New York, provided mechanical service and repairs to the Plaintiff for her Saturn motor vehicle on a regular basis. 14. Upon information and belief, during the period 2003 to November 8, 2012 the Defendant, SATURN OF CLARENCE, INC., provided parts, repairs and service to Saturn motor 3 of 13

4 vehicles pursuant to agreements with the Defendant, GENERAL MOTORS, LLC, and its predecessor, General Motors Corporation. 15. On the 8 th day of November, 2012, at approximately 5:50 AM in the morning of that day, while the Plaintiff was driving home from work operating her Saturn motor vehicle on Interstate Highway I-190 in a northbound direction, said Saturn motor vehicle failed in a catastrophic manner, losing power to all parts of the vehicle including the motor, transmission, and all electrical functions, causing said vehicle to come to a stop on the highway without any power, lights or emergency flashing lights. The vehicle came to a complete, dead stop on said highway at said time in the City of Niagara Falls, County of Niagara and State of New York, in total darkness, at a point south of the exit to Niagara Falls Blvd., Exit Ramp No. 22 on the Niagara Thruway. 16. On the 8 th day of November, 2012, while the Plaintiff's Saturn motor vehicle was stranded and inoperable on the Niagara Thruway, as aforesaid, the Plaintiff's motor vehicle was struck from behind by a 2005 Ford pickup truck traveling at a high rate of speed and operated by one Harry Kowaleski, Jr., who, upon information and belief, was unable to see the Plaintiff's darkened vehicle stranded in the roadway. 17. At all relevant times, Interstate Highway I-190, the New York State Niagara Thruway, located in the City of Niagara Falls, New York, was a public thoroughfare in common use for vehicular traffic. 18. The collision described above caused massive damage to the Saturn motor vehicle in which the Plaintiff was stranded in the driver's seat. 4 of 13

5 19. As a consequence of the violent collision as described above, the Plaintiff was caused to suffer severe, serious and permanent injuries, damage to the nerves, tissues, bones and blood supply, requiring extended hospital and medical care, and rendering the Plaintiff paralyzed permanently from the waist down. 20. The Plaintiff has suffered severe and excruciating pain, emotional trauma, and severe disabilities since the date of the accident, and upon information and belief, will continue to suffer said excruciating pain, emotional trauma and disabilities for the rest of her life. In addition, the Plaintiff has been prevented from performing any occupation or gainful employment, resulting in great financial loss, and will likely in the future be prevented from performing any occupation or gainful employment. 21. As a result of the foregoing, the Plaintiff has been required to obtain extensive and constant medical care and assistance in order to treat the injuries which she suffered in the accident, incurring expenses exceeding $500, to date. Upon information and belief, the Plaintiff will require continual medical care, attention and assistance for the rest of her life as a result of the injuries she sustained in the accident, at a cost that cannot be calculated at the present time. 22. The accident and the injuries to the Plaintiff described above occurred without any negligence, contributory negligence, comparative negligence or culpable conduct on the part of the Plaintiff. 23. Is a result of the foregoing, the Plaintiff has been damaged in an amount which exceeds the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts of the State of New York. 5 of 13

6 AS AND FOR A FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS, THE PLAINTIFF ALLEGES THAT: 24. In 2003 and thereafter until 2012, Defendant SATURN OF CLARENCE, INC. was is engaged in the business of operating an automobile dealership and, as such, was buying, selling, distributing, servicing, testing, inspecting, repairing and maintaining automobiles, including the automobile in question, and tested, inspected, examined, serviced, maintained, repaired and sold the Saturn automobiles 25. The Saturn motor vehicle purchased and operated by the Plaintiff and its component parts were designed, manufactured and constructed to enable the vehicle to be operated at various speeds upon public and private highways and it was the duty of Defendants GENERAL MOTORS, LLC. and SATURN OF CLARENCE, INC. to design, construct, assemble, equip, manufacture, test, inspect, service and examine the vehicle and its component parts to render it safe for the ordinary purposes of its use. 26. Defendant SATURN OF CLARENCE, INC. was under a duty to test, inspect, examine, repair, maintain and service the vehicle and its component parts to render it safe for the ordinary purposes of its use. 27. At all relevant times, Plaintiff s use of the vehicle was within the reasonable contemplation of Defendants. 28. At all relevant times, Plaintiff was using and operating the vehicle for the uses and purposes for which it was designed, manufactured, constructed, assembled, equipped, tested, inspected, serviced, maintained, repaired and sold, and in the manner in which it was intended to be used. 6 of 13

7 29. At the above time and place, the automobile was in a defective and unreasonably dangerous condition by reason of the reckless, careless and negligent acts and omissions of Defendants that the vehicle was caused to go suddenly lose all power, go out of control, and come to a dead stop on the highway, as describe above, resulting in the serious and permanent personal injuries and damages to Plaintiff. 30. Due to Defendants reckless, willful, careless and negligent acts and omissions, the vehicle contained latent defects of which Defendants knew and of which Defendants failed to warn, and Defendants further knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should have known, that the defects could not and would not be inspected and discovered by Plaintiff after Defendants relinquished possession of the vehicle. 31. The accident was caused by Defendants negligence which consisted, among other things, of the following: (a) Selling and permitting to be sold an automobile with defective ignition switch and cylinder with the result that, on November 8, 2012, as Plaintiff was driving the automobile as set forth above, the automobile malfunctioned, the vehicle to lose power and function in a catastrophic manner, causing the vehicle to stop in the roadway without lighting, power, or any function whatsoever; (b) Failing to use care in the manufacture of the automobile; (c) Improperly assembling the automobile; (d) Using defective parts in the manufacture of the automobile, to wit, a defective ignition switch and key cylinder; (e) Failing to conduct proper tests on the automobile before placing it on the market for sale to the general public; 7 of 13

8 (f) Failing to properly inspect the automobile before placing it on the market for sale to the general public; (g) Permitting the automobile to be sold with a defective electrical ignition system, ignition switch and key cylinder and mechanism, when Defendants knew that an automobile with said defective systems constituted a dangerous instrumentality on the public highways; (h) Improperly constructing and installing the keyed electrical ignition system; (i) Failing to discover the malfunctioning of the keyed electrical ignition system; (j) Providing, equipping and supplying the above vehicle with an improper, defective electrical ignition system, ignition switch and key cylinder. 32. Consequently, Plaintiff has been substantially damaged. 33. The amount of damages sought in this action exceeds the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction. AS AND FOR A SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS THE PLAINTIFF ALLEGES THAT: 34. Plaintiff repeats the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 33, above, as if more fully set forth herein. 35. At the time of the sale of the Saturn motor vehicle, Defendants warranted to the purchaser and to all persons whom it could reasonably foresee would use the automobile that the automobile and its component parts were suitable and reasonably safe and fit for the purposes for which it was intended to be used. The Defendants advertised and warranted to the public on television, on radio and in print that their vehicles, including the vehicle sold to the Plaintiff, was safe to drive and operate on the highways of the United States of America. 8 of 13

9 36. Prior to the purchase of this automobile, Defendants warranted to the purchaser and to all persons whom it could reasonably foresee would use the automobile, that the above vehicle and its component parts were of a merchantable quality and reasonably safe for the purpose for which they were intended. 37. Upon the sale of the above automobile, Defendants assumed a liability to Plaintiff and all persons whom it could reasonably foresee would be injured by the sale of an automobile that was not safe to drive on the public highways and which constituted a dangerous instrumentality. 38. The vehicle and its component parts were not of merchantable quality nor fit for the purpose for which they were intended, nor did they conform to the express or implied warranties rendered by Defendants. 39. Plaintiff was unaware of the defects in the above vehicle and its component parts which made the vehicle and its component parts unsafe for their intended use and not of merchantable quality. 40. Plaintiff could not by the exercise of reasonable care discover the defects in the above vehicle and its component parts nor did she nor could she have knowledge of the latent defects, or of the inherent and imminent danger created by the latent defects in the above product. 41. Defendants knew and yet failed to warn Plaintiff of the danger resulting from the defects. 9 of 13

10 42. Plaintiff was using the vehicle for its intended purposes and in the manner in which it was normally intended to be used. 43. The automobile was defective when manufactured by the Defendants, General Motors Corporation and its successor, GENERAL MOTORS LLC, when sold by SATURN OF CLARENCE, INC. and when the automobile left the possession and control of Defendants. 44. The automobile was sold by Defendant, SATURN OF CLARENCE, INC., without discovery or correction of the defects or defective condition created and manufactured by Defendants General Motors Corporation and its successor, GENERAL MOTORS LLC. 45. Each of the Defendants warranted to the public and to Plaintiff that the automobile was fit for the purpose for which it was designed and used, that is, the purpose of providing safe transportation, and that the automobile and its steering apparatus and steering mechanism were not defective. 46. When the vehicle was manufactured, sold, delivered and ultimately used, Defendants knew at all times and were aware of the intended purpose and use for which the vehicle was manufactured and sold. 47. The public, the purchaser and Plaintiff relied upon the judgment and skill of Defendants when the automobile was manufactured, sold, purchased and used, that the automobile and its component parts were fit and suitable for the purpose for which they were intended and were of merchantable quality. Plaintiff used and operated the vehicle in reliance on Defendants warranties. 48. At all relevant times, Plaintiff s use of the vehicle was within the use reasonably contemplated by Defendants. 10 of 13

11 49. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants breaches of warranties, the Plaintiff sustained serious and permanent personal injuries and damages on November 8, 2012 while operating the automobile manufactured, sold and maintained by the Defendants. 50. By reason of the foregoing, the Plaintiff has been damaged in an amount that exceeds the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction. AS AND FOR A THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS, THE PLAINTIFF ALLEGES THAT: 50. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 49 of the Complaint. 51. At the time of the accident, Plaintiff was using the vehicle for the purpose and in the manner in which the vehicle was normally intended to be used. 52. Plaintiff, as the user of the vehicle, could not, by the exercise of reasonable care, have both discovered the defects in the vehicle and in its keyed ignition switch mechanism and perceived its danger. 53. Plaintiff, by exercise of reasonable care, could not otherwise have averted the accident, her injuries or damages. 54. The defect in the vehicle and its keyed ignition switch mechanism and in the improper design of said system was a substantial factor in causing the accident, and the resultant injuries and damages sustained by Plaintiff. 11 of 13

12 55. Consequently, Defendants are strictly liable to Plaintiff for the damages and injuries described above and incorporated into Plaintiff s third cause of action, pursuant to strict products liability. 56. Plaintiff was covered by all of the warranties alleged in this Complaint, made by Defendants for the Saturn motor vehicle in question, and Plaintiff is covered by the assumption by Defendants of strict products liability. 57. By reason of the foregoing, the Plaintiff has been damaged in an amount that exceeds the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction. AS AND FOR A FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS, THE PLAINTIFF ALLEGES THAT: 58. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 49 of the Complaint. 59. Upon information and belief, the Defendants knew, at the time the Saturn vehicle in question was sold to the Plaintiff, and thereafter, while servicing said vehicle, and prior to November 8, 2012, that said vehicle was defective, in that it contained a faulty and defective keyed electrical ignition system, that was likely to cause serious injuries to persons operating said motor vehicle in a perfectly reasonable manner, a manner in which the vehicle was intended to be used and operated. 60. The Defendants, while knowing of the dangerous and hazardous defect in said vehicle, knew that many persons operating said vehicles would be come seriously injured and/or die as a result of the their operation of said defective vehicles. 12 of 13

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