Her Majesty the Queen (appellant) v. Hussein Jama Nur (respondent)

Transcription

1 Her Majesty the Queen (appellant) v. Hussein Jama Nur (respondent) Attorney General of Canada (appellant) v. Hussein Jama Nur (respondent) and Attorney General of Quebec, Attorney General of British Columbia, Attorney General of Alberta, Pivot Legal Society, John Howard Society of Canada, Canadian Civil Liberties Association, British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, Advocates' Society, Canadian Bar Association, Canada's National Firearms Association, Canadian Association for Community Living and African Canadian Legal Clinic (interveners) Her Majesty the Queen (appellant) v. Sidney Charles (respondent) Attorney General of Canada (appellant) v. Sidney Charles (respondent) and Attorney General of Quebec, Attorney General of British Columbia, Attorney General of Alberta, Pivot Legal Society, Canadian Civil Liberties Association, British Columbia Civil Liberties Association and Canadian Association for Community Living (interveners) (35678; 35684; 2015 SCC 15; 2015 CSC 15) Indexed As: R. v. Nur (H.) Supreme Court of Canada McLachlin, C.J.C., LeBel, Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Wagner and Gascon, JJ. April 14, Summary: The accused (Nur and Charles) were convicted under s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code with possessing prohibited or restricted firearms when the firearm was loaded or kept with readily accessible ammunition. Section 95(2)(a) of the Code imposed mandatory minimum sentences for the offences (three years for a first offence and five years for a second or subsequent offence). The accused challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentences, claiming that they violated s. 12 of the Charter (i.e., constituted cruel and unusual punishment). The Ontario Superior Court, in decisions reported [2010] O.T.C. Uned (Charles) and [2011] O.T.C. Uned (Nur), rejected the Charter challenge and sentenced Charles to seven years' imprisonment (second or subsequent offence) and Nur to 40 months' imprisonment (first offence). The accused appealed. The Ontario Court of Appeal, in decisions reported 311 O.A.C. 316 and 311 O.A.C. 344, allowed the appeals. The court held that the mandatory minimum sentences imposed by s. 95(2)(a) violated s. 12 of the Charter. The court, however, affirmed the sentences imposed at trial. The Crown appealed. The Supreme Court of Canada, Moldaver, Rothstein and Wagner, JJ., dissenting, dismissed the appeals. The court agreed that the mandatory minimum sentences imposed by s. 95(2)(a) violated s. 12 of the Charter. Accordingly, the mandatory minimum sentences in s. 95(2)(a) were null and

2 void under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, The court stated that in most cases, including those of Nur and Charles, the mandatory minimum sentences of three and five years respectively did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. But in some reasonably foreseeable cases that were caught by s. 95(1) that might be so. The mandatory minimum sentences were not shown to be justified under s. 1 of the Charter. It followed that s. 95(2)(a) was unconstitutional as presently structured. That conclusion made it unnecessary to consider the arguments of the accused that s. 95(2)(a) also violated s. 7 of the Charter. The court stated that its decision did not prevent judges from imposing exemplary sentences that emphasized deterrence and denunciation in appropriate circumstances. Nur and Charles fell into that category. The court, therefore, upheld the sentences imposed by the trial judges in their cases. Civil Rights - Topic 3822 Cruel and unusual punishment - What constitutes - Sentences - General - [See all Civil Rights - Topic 3829]. Civil Rights - Topic 3829 Cruel and unusual treatment or punishment - What constitutes - Mandatory minimum and consecutive sentences - The Supreme Court of Canada stated that "This Court has set a high bar for what constitutes 'cruel and unusual... punishment' under s. 12 of the Charter. A sentence attacked on this ground must be grossly disproportionate to the punishment that is appropriate, having regard to the nature of the offence and the circumstances of the offender... the test of gross disproportionality 'is aimed at punishments that are more than merely excessive'... A prescribed sentence may be grossly disproportionate as applied to the offender before the court or because it would have a grossly disproportionate impact on others, rendering the law unconstitutional" - See paragraph 39. Civil Rights - Topic 3829 Cruel and unusual treatment or punishment - What constitutes - Mandatory minimum and consecutive sentences - The Supreme Court of Canada stated that "... a challenge to a mandatory minimum sentencing provision on the ground it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under s. 12 of the Charter involves two steps. First, the court must determine what constitutes a proportionate sentence for the offence having regard to the objectives and principles of sentencing in the Criminal Code. Then, the court must ask whether the mandatory minimum requires the judge to impose a sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the fit and proportionate sentence. If the answer is yes, the mandatory minimum provision is inconsistent with s. 12 and will fall unless justified under s. 1 of the Charter" - See paragraph 46. Civil Rights - Topic 3829 Cruel and unusual treatment or punishment - What constitutes - Mandatory minimum and consecutive sentences - The Supreme Court of Canada stated that a s. 12 challenge to a mandatory sentencing provision compared a fit and proportionate sentence for the offence with the sentence imposed by the mandatory minimum - The court then addressed the question of who should be taken as the offender in analysing the constitutionality of a mandatory minimum provision (i.e., consider only the offender who brought the challenge

3 or others in reasonably foreseeable situations - hypotheticals) - See paragraphs 47 to 77 - The court concluded that "when a mandatory minimum sentencing provision is challenged, two questions arise. The first is whether the provision results in a grossly disproportionate sentence on the individual before the court. If the answer is no, the second question is whether the provision s reasonably foreseeable applications will impose grossly disproportionate sentences on others. This is consistent with the settled jurisprudence on constitutional review and rules of constitutional interpretation, which seek to determine the potential reach of a law; is workable; and provides sufficient certainty" - See paragraph 77. Civil Rights - Topic 3829 Cruel and unusual treatment or punishment - What constitutes - Mandatory minimum and consecutive sentences - Section 95(1) of the Criminal Code made it an offence to be in possession of a prohibited or restricted firearm and readily accessible ammunition without a licence - At issue was whether s. 95(2)(a) of the Code which imposed mandatory minimum sentences for the offences (three years for a first offence and five years for a second or subsequent offence), was contrary to s. 12 of the Charter - The Supreme Court of Canada held that the mandatory minimum sentences in s. 95(2)(a) constituted cruel and unusual punishment contrary to s. 12 of the Charter - Section 95(2)(a) could not be saved by s. 1 - Further, a sentencing provision that violated s. 12 of the Charter could not be cured by the prosecutorial discretion to proceed by summary conviction - The court declared the mandatory minimum sentences imposed by s. 95(2)(a) to be of no force or effect under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, See paragraphs 38 to 120. Civil Rights - Topic 3829 Cruel and unusual treatment or punishment - What constitutes - Mandatory minimum and consecutive sentences - The accused (Nur and Charles) were convicted under s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code with possessing prohibited or restricted firearms - Section 95(2)(a) of the Code imposed a three year mandatory minimum sentence for a first offence and five years for a second or subsequent offence - Nur was sentenced to 40 months' imprisonment (first offence) and Charles to seven years (second or subsequent offence) - The accused appealed, arguing that the mandatory minimum sentences in s. 95(2)(a) constituted cruel and unusual punishment (Charter, s. 12) - The Supreme Court of Canada agreed that the mandatory minimum sentences violated s The court stated, however, that its decision did not prevent judges from imposing exemplary sentences that emphasized deterrence and denunciation in appropriate circumstances - Nur and Charles fell into that category - The court, therefore, upheld the sentences imposed by the trial judges in their cases - See paragraphs 4 and 5 and 38 to 120. Civil Rights - Topic 8348 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms - Application - Exceptions - Reasonable limits prescribed by law (Charter, s. 1) - [See fourth Civil Rights - Topic 3829]. Courts - Topic 79 Stare decisis - Authority of judicial decisions - Prior decisions of same court - Supreme Court of Canada - The Supreme Court of Canada stated that "... This Court does not and should not

4 lightly overrule its prior decisions, particularly when they have been elaborated consistently over a number of years and when they represent the considered view of firm majorities... Deciding whether to do so requires us to balance correctness against certainty... We must be especially careful before reversing a precedent where the effect is as it would be here to diminish Charter protection..." - See paragraph 59. Criminal Law - Topic 5805 Sentencing - General - Statutory range mandatory (incl. mandatory minimum sentence) - [See all Civil Rights - Topic 3829]. Criminal Law - Topic Sentencing - Considerations on imposing sentence - Use or possession of firearms - [See fourth and fifth Civil Rights - Topic 3829]. Criminal Law - Topic 5871 Sentence - Possession and use or sale of weapons or ammunition - [See fifth Civil Rights - Topic 3829]. Cases Noticed: Reference Re Firearms Act (Can.), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 783; 254 N.R. 201; 261 A.R. 201; 225 W.A.C. 201; 2000 SCC 31, refd to. [para. 6]. R. v. Smith (E.D.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045; 75 N.R. 321, refd to. [paras. 39, 125]. R. v. C.A.M., [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500; 194 N.R. 321; 73 B.C.A.C. 81; 120 W.A.C. 81, refd to. [para. 43]. Reference Re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486; 63 N.R. 266, refd to. [para. 43]. R. v. Ipeelee (M.), [2012] 1 S.C.R. 433; 428 N.R. 1; 288 O.A.C. 224; 318 B.C.A.C. 1; 541 W.A.C. 1; 2012 SCC 13, refd to. [para. 43]. R. v. Morrisey (M.L.) (No. 2), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90; 259 N.R. 95; 187 N.S.R.(2d) 1; 585 A.P.R. 1; 2000 SCC 39, refd to. [paras. 45, 125]. R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295; 58 N.R. 81; 60 A.R. 161, refd to. [para. 51]. R. v. Morgentaler, Smoling and Scott, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30; 82 N.R. 1; 26 O.A.C. 1, refd to. [para. 51]. R. v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc. and Chedore, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 154; 130 N.R. 1; 49 O.A.C. 161, refd to. [para. 51]. R. v. Heywood (R.L.), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761; 174 N.R. 81; 50 B.C.A.C. 161; 82 W.A.C. 161, refd to. [para. 51]. R. v. Mills (B.J.), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668; 248 N.R. 101; 244 A.R. 201; 209 W.A.C. 201, refd to. [para. 51]. R. v. Ferguson (M.E.), [2008] 1 S.C.R. 96; 371 N.R. 231; 425 A.R. 79; 418 W.A.C. 79; 2008 SCC 6, refd to. [paras. 51, 173]. R. v. Goltz, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 485; 131 N.R. 1; 5 B.C.A.C. 161; 11 W.A.C. 161, refd to. [paras. 54, 125]. R. v. Brown (B.B.), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 749; 173 N.R. 317; 97 Man.R.(2d) 169; 79 W.A.C. 169,

5 refd to. [para. 56, footnote 1]. Fraser et al. v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2011] 2 S.C.R. 3; 415 N.R. 200; 275 O.A.C. 205; 2011 SCC 20, refd to. [para. 59]. Minister of National Revenue v. Craig, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 489; 433 N.R. 111; 2012 SCC 43, refd to. [para. 59]. Bedford et al. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2013] 3 S.C.R. 1101; 452 N.R. 1; 312 O.A.C. 53; 2013 SCC 72, refd to. [para. 59]. R. v. Henry (D.B.) et al., [2005] 3 S.C.R. 609; 342 N.R. 259; 376 A.R. 1; 360 W.A.C. 1; 219 B.C.A.C. 1; 361 W.A.C. 1; 2005 SCC 76, refd to. [para. 59]. R. v. MacDonald (E.), [2014] 1 S.C.R. 37; 453 N.R. 1; 341 N.S.R.(2d) 353; 1081 A.P.R. 353; 2014 SCC 3, refd to. [paras. 80, 126, footnote 2]. R. v. Anderson (F.), [2014] 2 S.C.R. 167; 458 N.R. 1; 350 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 289; 1088 A.P.R. 289; 2014 SCC 41, refd to. [paras. 89, 161]. PHS Community Services Society et al. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2011] 3 S.C.R. 134; 421 N.R. 1; 310 B.C.A.C. 1; 526 W.A.C. 1; 2011 SCC 44, refd to. [paras. 92, 151]. Lavallee, Rackel & Heintz et al. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 209; 292 N.R. 296; 312 A.R. 201; 281 W.A.C. 201; 164 O.A.C. 280; 217 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 183; 651 A.P.R. 183; 2002 SCC 61, refd to. [para. 95]. R. v. Bain, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 91; 133 N.R. 1; 51 O.A.C. 161, refd to. [paras. 95, 180]. R. v. Smickle (L.), [2012] O.T.C. Uned. 602; 110 O.R.(3d) 25; 2012 ONSC 602, refd to. [para. 97]. R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103; 65 N.R. 87; 14 O.A.C. 335, refd to. [para. 111]. RJR-MacDonald Inc. et Imperial Tobacco Ltd. v. Canada (Procureur général), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199; 187 N.R. 1, refd to. [para. 112]. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony et al. v. Alberta, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567; 390 N.R. 202; 460 A.R. 1; 462 W.A.C. 1; 2009 SCC 37, refd to. [para. 116]. R. v. Snobelen, [2008] O.J. No (C.J.), refd to. [para. 126]. R. v. Nasogaluak (L.M.), [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206; 398 N.R. 107; 474 A.R. 88; 479 W.A.C. 88; 2010 SCC 6, refd to. [para. 132]. R. v. Felawka, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 199; 159 N.R. 50; 33 B.C.A.C. 241; 54 W.A.C. 241, refd to. [para. 136]. R. v. Elliston (S.), [2010] O.T.C. Uned. 6492; 225 C.R.R.(2d) 109; 2010 ONSC 6492, refd to. [para. 137]. R. v. Chin (Y.R.) (2009), 457 A.R. 233; 457 W.A.C. 233; 2009 ABCA 226, refd to. [para. 137]. R. v. Nixon (O.), [2011] 2 S.C.R. 566; 417 N.R. 274; 502 A.R. 18; 517 W.A.C. 18; 2011 SCC 34, refd to. [para. 162]. R. v. O'Connor (H.P.), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411; 191 N.R. 1; 68 B.C.A.C. 1; 112 W.A.C. 1, refd to. [para. 162]. R. v. Babos (A.), [2014] 1 S.C.R. 309; 454 N.R. 86; 2014 SCC 16, refd to. [para. 164]. R. v. Keyowski, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 657; 83 N.R. 296; 65 Sask.R. 122, refd to. [para. 165]. R. v. Jack (B.G.) (1996), 113 Man.R.(2d) 260; 131 W.A.C. 260 (C.A.), refd to. [para. 166]. R. v. Jack (B.G.), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 334; 214 N.R. 294; 118 Man.R.(2d) 168; 149 W.A.C. 168, refd to. [para. 166]. R. v. Wiles (P.N.), [2005] 3 S.C.R. 895; 343 N.R. 201; 240 N.S.R.(2d) 1; 763 A.P.R. 1;

6 2005 SCC 84, refd to. [para. 170]. R. v. Skolnick, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 47; 42 N.R. 460, refd to. [para. 197]. Statutes Noticed: Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982, sect. 1, sect. 7 [para. 189]; sect. 12 [para. 16]. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, sect. 95(1), sect. 95(2)(a) [para. 11]. Authors and Works Noticed: Canada, Hansard, House of Commons Debates, vol. 141, No. 33, 1st Sess., 39th Parliament (June 5, 2006), pp [paras. 138, 143]; 1943 [para. 143]. Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, Evidence, No. 30, 1st Sess., 39th Parliament (November 7, 2006), p. 1 [para. 131]. Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, Evidence, No. 34, 1st Sess., 39th Parliament (November 23, 2006), pp. 1 [para. 131]; 3, 4, 8 [para. 139]. Canada, Report of the Canadian Sentencing Commission, Sentencing Reform: A Canadian Approach (1987), pp. 136 to 137 [para. 113]. Doob, Anthony N., and Cesaroni, Carla, The Political Attractiveness of Mandatory Minimum Sentences (2001), 39 Osgoode Hall L.J. 287, p. 291 [para. 114]. Doob, Anthony N., and Webster, Cheryl Marie, Sentence Severity and Crime: Accepting the Null Hypothesis (2003), 30 Crime & Just. 143, generally [para. 114]. Hansard - see Canada, Hansard, House of Commons Debates. Pomerance, Renee M., The New Approach to Sentencing in Canada: Reflections of a Trail Judge (2013), 17 Can. Crim. L.R. 305, p. 313 [para. 96]. Tonry, Michael, The Mostly Unintended Effects of Mandatory Penalties: Two Centuries of Consistent Findings (2009), 38 Crime & Just. 65, generally [para. 114]. Counsel: Andreea Baiasu, for the appellant, Her Majesty the Queen; Nancy L. Dennison and Richard A. Kramer, for the appellant, the Attorney General of Canada; Dirk Derstine and Janani Shanmuganathan, for the respondent, Hussein Jama Nur; Carlos Rippell and Michael Dineen, for the respondent, Sidney Charles; Julie Dassylva and Gilles Laporte, for the intervener, the Attorney General of Quebec; Rodney G. Garson, for the intervener, the Attorney General of British Columbia. Joshua B. Hawkes, Q.C., for the intervener, the Attorney General of Alberta; Written submissions only by Michael A. Feder, Julia K. Lockhart and Adrienne Smith, for the intervener, the Pivot Legal Society; Bruce F. Simpson, for the intervener, the John Howard Society of Canada; Kimberly Potter, for the intervener, the Canadian Civil Liberties Association; Nader R. Hasan and Gerald Chan, for the intervener, the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association; Anil K. Kapoor and Lindsay E. Trevelyan, for the intervener, the Advocates' Society; Eric V. Gottardi and Nikos Harris, for the intervener, the Canadian Bar Association;

7 Solomon Friedman, for the intervener, Canada's National Firearms Association; Joanna L. Birenbaum, for the intervener, the Canadian Association for Community Living; Faisal Mirza and Anthony N. Morgan, for the intervener, the African Canadian Legal Clinic. Solicitors of Record: Attorney General of Ontario, Toronto, Ontario, for the appellant, Her Majesty the Queen; Attorney General of Canada, Toronto, Ontario, for the appellant, the Attorney General of Canada; Derstine Penman, Toronto, Ontario, for the respondent, Hussein Jama Nur; Edward H. Royle & Associates, Toronto, Ontario; Dawe & Dineen, Toronto, Ontario, for the respondent, Sidney Charles; Attorney General of Quebec, Quebec, Quebec, for the intervener, the Attorney General of Quebec; Attorney General of British Columbia, Victoria, British Columbia, for the intervener, the Attorney General of British Columbia; Attorney General of Alberta, Calgary, Alberta, for the intervener, the Attorney General of Alberta; McCarthy Tétrault, Vancouver, British Columbia; Pivot Legal Society, Vancouver, British Columbia, for the intervener, the Pivot Legal Society; Barnes Sammon, Ottawa, Ontario, for the intervener, the John Howard Society of Canada; Fasken Martineau DuMoulin, Toronto, Ontario, for the intervener, the Canadian Civil Liberties Association; Ruby Shiller Chan Hasan, Toronto, Ontario, for the intervener, the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association; Kapoor Barristers, Toronto, Ontario, for the intervener, the Advocates' Society; Peck and Company, Vancouver, British Columbia, for the intervener, the Canadian Bar Association; Edelson Clifford D'Angelo Friedman, Ottawa, Ontario, for the intervener, Canada's National Firearms Association; Ursel Phillips Fellows Hopkinson, Toronto, Ontario, for the intervener, the Canadian Association for Community Living; Faisal Mirza Professional Corporation, Toronto, Ontario; African Canadian Legal Clinic, Toronto, Ontario, for the intervener, the African Canadian Legal Clinic. This appeal was heard on November 7, 2014, before McLachlin, C.J.C., LeBel, Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Wagner and Gascon, JJ., of the Supreme Court of Canada. On April 14, 2015, the judgment of the Court was delivered in both official languages and the following opinions were filed: McLachlin, C.J. (LeBel, Abella, Cromwell, Karakatsanis and Gascon, JJ., concurring) - see paragraphs 1 to 120; Moldaver, J., dissenting (Rothstein and Wagner, JJ., concurring) - see paragraphs 121 to 199. Appeals dismissed.

8 Editor: Elizabeth M.A. Turgeon Civil Rights - Topic 3822 Cruel and unusual punishment - What constitutes - Sentences - General - The Supreme Court of Canada stated that "This Court has set a high bar for what constitutes 'cruel and unusual... punishment' under s. 12 of the Charter. A sentence attacked on this ground must be grossly disproportionate to the punishment that is appropriate, having regard to the nature of the offence and the circumstances of the offender... the test of gross disproportionality 'is aimed at punishments that are more than merely excessive'... A prescribed sentence may be grossly disproportionate as applied to the offender before the court or because it would have a grossly disproportionate impact on others, rendering the law unconstitutional" - See paragraph 39. Civil Rights - Topic 3822 Cruel and unusual punishment - What constitutes - Sentences - General - The Supreme Court of Canada stated that "... a challenge to a mandatory minimum sentencing provision on the ground it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under s. 12 of the Charter involves two steps. First, the court must determine what constitutes a proportionate sentence for the offence having regard to the objectives and principles of sentencing in the Criminal Code. Then, the court must ask whether the mandatory minimum requires the judge to impose a sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the fit and proportionate sentence. If the answer is yes, the mandatory minimum provision is inconsistent with s. 12 and will fall unless justified under s. 1 of the Charter" - See paragraph 46. Civil Rights - Topic 3822 Cruel and unusual punishment - What constitutes - Sentences - General - The Supreme Court of Canada stated that a s. 12 challenge to a mandatory sentencing provision compared a fit and proportionate sentence for the offence with the sentence imposed by the mandatory minimum - The court then addressed the question of who should be taken as the offender in analysing the constitutionality of a mandatory minimum provision (i.e., consider only the offender who brought the challenge or others in reasonably foreseeable situations - hypotheticals) - See paragraphs 47 to 77 - The court concluded that "when a mandatory minimum sentencing provision is challenged, two questions arise. The first is whether the provision results in a grossly disproportionate sentence on the individual before the court. If the answer is no, the second question is whether the provision s reasonably foreseeable applications will impose grossly disproportionate sentences on others. This is consistent with the settled jurisprudence on constitutional review and rules of constitutional interpretation, which seek to determine the potential reach of a law; is workable; and provides sufficient certainty" - See paragraph 77. Civil Rights - Topic 3822 Cruel and unusual punishment - What constitutes - Sentences - General - Section 95(1) of the Criminal Code made it an offence to be in possession of a prohibited or restricted firearm and readily accessible ammunition without a licence - At issue was whether s. 95(2)(a) of the

9 Code which imposed mandatory minimum sentences for the offences (three years for a first offence and five years for a second or subsequent offence), was contrary to s. 12 of the Charter - The Supreme Court of Canada held that the mandatory minimum sentences in s. 95(2)(a) constituted cruel and unusual punishment contrary to s. 12 of the Charter - Section 95(2)(a) could not be saved by s. 1 - Further, a sentencing provision that violated s. 12 of the Charter could not be cured by the prosecutorial discretion to proceed by summary conviction - The court declared the mandatory minimum sentences imposed by s. 95(2)(a) to be of no force or effect under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, See paragraphs 38 to 120. Civil Rights - Topic 3822 Cruel and unusual punishment - What constitutes - Sentences - General - The accused (Nur and Charles) were convicted under s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code with possessing prohibited or restricted firearms - Section 95(2)(a) of the Code imposed a three year mandatory minimum sentence for a first offence and five years for a second or subsequent offence - Nur was sentenced to 40 months' imprisonment (first offence) and Charles to seven years (second or subsequent offence) - The accused appealed, arguing that the mandatory minimum sentences in s. 95(2)(a) constituted cruel and unusual punishment (Charter, s. 12) - The Supreme Court of Canada agreed that the mandatory minimum sentences violated s The court stated, however, that its decision did not prevent judges from imposing exemplary sentences that emphasized deterrence and denunciation in appropriate circumstances - Nur and Charles fell into that category - The court, therefore, upheld the sentences imposed by the trial judges in their cases - See paragraphs 4 and 5 and 38 to 120. Civil Rights - Topic 8348 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms - Application - Exceptions - Reasonable limits prescribed by law (Charter, s. 1) - Section 95(1) of the Criminal Code made it an offence to be in possession of a prohibited or restricted firearm and readily accessible ammunition without a licence - At issue was whether s. 95(2)(a) of the Code which imposed mandatory minimum sentences for the offences (three years for a first offence and five years for a second or subsequent offence), was contrary to s. 12 of the Charter - The Supreme Court of Canada held that the mandatory minimum sentences in s. 95(2)(a) constituted cruel and unusual punishment contrary to s. 12 of the Charter - Section 95(2)(a) could not be saved by s. 1 - Further, a sentencing provision that violated s. 12 of the Charter could not be cured by the prosecutorial discretion to proceed by summary conviction - The court declared the mandatory minimum sentences imposed by s. 95(2)(a) to be of no force or effect under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, See paragraphs 38 to 120. Criminal Law - Topic 5805 Sentencing - General - Statutory range mandatory (incl. mandatory minimum sentence) - The Supreme Court of Canada stated that "This Court has set a high bar for what constitutes 'cruel and unusual... punishment' under s. 12 of the Charter. A sentence attacked on this ground must be grossly disproportionate to the punishment that is appropriate, having regard to the nature of the offence and the circumstances of the offender... the test of gross disproportionality 'is aimed at punishments that are more than merely excessive'... A prescribed sentence may be grossly disproportionate as applied to the offender before the

10 court or because it would have a grossly disproportionate impact on others, rendering the law unconstitutional" - See paragraph 39. Criminal Law - Topic 5805 Sentencing - General - Statutory range mandatory (incl. mandatory minimum sentence) - The Supreme Court of Canada stated that "... a challenge to a mandatory minimum sentencing provision on the ground it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under s. 12 of the Charter involves two steps. First, the court must determine what constitutes a proportionate sentence for the offence having regard to the objectives and principles of sentencing in the Criminal Code. Then, the court must ask whether the mandatory minimum requires the judge to impose a sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the fit and proportionate sentence. If the answer is yes, the mandatory minimum provision is inconsistent with s. 12 and will fall unless justified under s. 1 of the Charter" - See paragraph 46. Criminal Law - Topic 5805 Sentencing - General - Statutory range mandatory (incl. mandatory minimum sentence) - The Supreme Court of Canada stated that a s. 12 challenge to a mandatory sentencing provision compared a fit and proportionate sentence for the offence with the sentence imposed by the mandatory minimum - The court then addressed the question of who should be taken as the offender in analysing the constitutionality of a mandatory minimum provision (i.e., consider only the offender who brought the challenge or others in reasonably foreseeable situations - hypotheticals) - See paragraphs 47 to 77 - The court concluded that "when a mandatory minimum sentencing provision is challenged, two questions arise. The first is whether the provision results in a grossly disproportionate sentence on the individual before the court. If the answer is no, the second question is whether the provision s reasonably foreseeable applications will impose grossly disproportionate sentences on others. This is consistent with the settled jurisprudence on constitutional review and rules of constitutional interpretation, which seek to determine the potential reach of a law; is workable; and provides sufficient certainty" - See paragraph 77. Criminal Law - Topic 5805 Sentencing - General - Statutory range mandatory (incl. mandatory minimum sentence) - Section 95(1) of the Criminal Code made it an offence to be in possession of a prohibited or restricted firearm and readily accessible ammunition without a licence - At issue was whether s. 95(2)(a) of the Code which imposed mandatory minimum sentences for the offences (three years for a first offence and five years for a second or subsequent offence), was contrary to s. 12 of the Charter - The Supreme Court of Canada held that the mandatory minimum sentences in s. 95(2)(a) constituted cruel and unusual punishment contrary to s. 12 of the Charter - Section 95(2)(a) could not be saved by s. 1 - Further, a sentencing provision that violated s. 12 of the Charter could not be cured by the prosecutorial discretion to proceed by summary conviction - The court declared the mandatory minimum sentences imposed by s. 95(2)(a) to be of no force or effect under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, See paragraphs 38 to 120. Criminal Law - Topic 5805

11 Sentencing - General - Statutory range mandatory (incl. mandatory minimum sentence) - The accused (Nur and Charles) were convicted under s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code with possessing prohibited or restricted firearms - Section 95(2)(a) of the Code imposed a three year mandatory minimum sentence for a first offence and five years for a second or subsequent offence - Nur was sentenced to 40 months' imprisonment (first offence) and Charles to seven years (second or subsequent offence) - The accused appealed, arguing that the mandatory minimum sentences in s. 95(2)(a) constituted cruel and unusual punishment (Charter, s. 12) - The Supreme Court of Canada agreed that the mandatory minimum sentences violated s The court stated, however, that its decision did not prevent judges from imposing exemplary sentences that emphasized deterrence and denunciation in appropriate circumstances - Nur and Charles fell into that category - The court, therefore, upheld the sentences imposed by the trial judges in their cases - See paragraphs 4 and 5 and 38 to 120. Criminal Law - Topic Sentencing - Considerations on imposing sentence - Use or possession of firearms - Section 95(1) of the Criminal Code made it an offence to be in possession of a prohibited or restricted firearm and readily accessible ammunition without a licence - At issue was whether s. 95(2)(a) of the Code which imposed mandatory minimum sentences for the offences (three years for a first offence and five years for a second or subsequent offence), was contrary to s. 12 of the Charter - The Supreme Court of Canada held that the mandatory minimum sentences in s. 95(2)(a) constituted cruel and unusual punishment contrary to s. 12 of the Charter - Section 95(2)(a) could not be saved by s. 1 - Further, a sentencing provision that violated s. 12 of the Charter could not be cured by the prosecutorial discretion to proceed by summary conviction - The court declared the mandatory minimum sentences imposed by s. 95(2)(a) to be of no force or effect under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, See paragraphs 38 to 120. Criminal Law - Topic Sentencing - Considerations on imposing sentence - Use or possession of firearms - The accused (Nur and Charles) were convicted under s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code with possessing prohibited or restricted firearms - Section 95(2)(a) of the Code imposed a three year mandatory minimum sentence for a first offence and five years for a second or subsequent offence - Nur was sentenced to 40 months' imprisonment (first offence) and Charles to seven years (second or subsequent offence) - The accused appealed, arguing that the mandatory minimum sentences in s. 95(2)(a) constituted cruel and unusual punishment (Charter, s. 12) - The Supreme Court of Canada agreed that the mandatory minimum sentences violated s The court stated, however, that its decision did not prevent judges from imposing exemplary sentences that emphasized deterrence and denunciation in appropriate circumstances - Nur and Charles fell into that category - The court, therefore, upheld the sentences imposed by the trial judges in their cases - See paragraphs 4 and 5 and 38 to 120. Criminal Law - Topic Sentencing - Considerations on imposing sentence - Use or possession of firearms - The

12 accused (Nur and Charles) were convicted under s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code with possessing prohibited or restricted firearms - Section 95(2)(a) of the Code imposed a three year mandatory minimum sentence for a first offence and five years for a second or subsequent offence - Nur was sentenced to 40 months' imprisonment (first offence) and Charles to seven years (second or subsequent offence) - The accused appealed, arguing that the mandatory minimum sentences in s. 95(2)(a) constituted cruel and unusual punishment (Charter, s. 12) - The Supreme Court of Canada agreed that the mandatory minimum sentences violated s The court stated, however, that its decision did not prevent judges from imposing exemplary sentences that emphasized deterrence and denunciation in appropriate circumstances - Nur and Charles fell into that category - The court, therefore, upheld the sentences imposed by the trial judges in their cases - See paragraphs 4 and 5 and 38 to 120.