LOUISIANA ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD IN RE: ARTHUR GILMORE, JR. NUMBER: 18-DB-002 RECOMMENDATION TO THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT INTRODUCTION

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1 LOUISIANA ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD IN RE: ARTHUR GILMORE, JR. NUMBER: 18-DB-002 RECOMMENDATION TO THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT INTRODUCTION This is a readmission proceeding based upon a petition and application for readmission filed by Arthur Gilmore, Jr. (Petitioner), a disbarred attorney. 1 The Office of Disciplinary Counsel ( ODC ) filed a response, opposing the application, but later revised its position to state that the ODC took no position on the application. After considering the hearing testimony and reviewing the documentary evidence submitted by Petitioner, the hearing committee ( committee ) assigned to the matter concluded that Petitioner had met his burden and recommended that Petitioner be conditionally readmitted to the practice of law for a period of three (3) years only if certain listed conditions were met. For the following reasons, the Board recommends that Petitioner be readmitted, subject to a three-year probation period and the conditions described herein. Additionally, the Board recommends that Petitioner be assessed with the costs and expenses of this matter. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Petitioner, an elected member of the Monroe City Council at the time, was convicted in federal court of racketeering by accepting bribes from a developer in exchange for taking actions 1 Petitioner is 61 years old and was admitted to the Louisiana Bar on 4/15/83. His Louisiana Bar Roll Number is 01059, and his primary registration address is 900 Saint John St., Monroe, LA He was disbarred by order dated October 19, 2016, retroactive to June 9, 2013, the date of his prior interim suspension, and with credit given for time served on interim suspensions during the periods June 19, 2011 through September 21, 2011, and May 5, 2012 through April 3, Respondent also received an admonition in 1992 for failing to promptly remove his suspended law partner s name from the law office s newspaper advertisement.

2 favorable to the developer in matters before the Monroe City Council. The developer testified in the criminal trial that in 2007 he had regularly given Petitioner cash contributions and in-kind donations in exchange for favorable assistance with certain zoning variances. The developer subsequently became an informant for the FBI. In a recorded conversation in 2008, Petitioner brought up certain business matters involving the developer which were pending before the city. The conversation later turned to Petitioner s recent re-election and Petitioner said he was still taking campaign contributions. After Petitioner mentioned the campaign contributions, the developer gave Petitioner $1,000 saying all he asked for was a fair shake and that Petitioner do something for him to which Petitioner replied, No problem. In a recorded conversation in 2009, after discussing a pending proposal before the city council affecting a city contract with the developer, Petitioner requested $207 from the developer on behalf of a constituent whose utilities were about to be disconnected. That evening, the council approved the proposal, and the developer gave $207 to Petitioner a couple of days later. Petitioner was found guilty of racketeering in May In September 2013, he was sentenced to twenty-four months in federal prison, which sentence was below the sentencing guidelines range. When imposing the reduced sentence, the district court judge explained there were mitigating circumstances in that the Government s main witness engaged in an ongoing program of planned enticement to provoke [Petitioner] into agreeing to bribes in exchange for perceived favors from [Petitioner s] position with the Council. In re Gilmore, (La. 10/19/16), 218 So.3d 100, 102; Ex. Joint 1. In affirming the conviction on appeal, the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Petitioner was not entitled to a jury instruction on entrapment. Id., citing United States v. Gilmore, 590 Fed.Appx. 390 (5 th Cir. 2014). 2

3 As a result of the federal conviction, Petitioner was disbarred by the Louisiana Supreme Court on October 19, 2016, retroactive to June 9, 2013, the date he had last been placed on interim suspension. Petitioner was also given credit for the time he served on interim suspension during the periods of June 19, 2011 to September 21, 2011, and May 2, 2012 to April 3, In re Gilmore, supra. Petitioner was disbarred based on his commission of a serious crime under La. Supreme Court Rule XIX, 19, and his violation of the following Rules of Professional Conduct: 8.4(b)(commission of a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer), 8.4(c)(engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), 8.4(d)(engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), and 8.4(e)(stating or implying an ability to influence improperly a judge, judicial officer, government agency or official or to achieve results by means that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law). On January 2, 2018, Petitioner filed a Petition and Application for Reinstatement to the Practice of Law [sic]. On April 12, 2018, the ODC filed a response to the petition and application in which the ODC asserted its opposition to the application. The ODC requested that a hearing be scheduled and that, after due proceedings, the petition and application be denied. On July 27, 2018, the ODC filed a pre-hearing memorandum in which it stated a changed position. After explaining that in the original disciplinary proceeding, the Supreme Court declined 2 In the criminal proceeding in federal court, Petitioner was originally found guilty of RICO Act and Hobbs Act violations in May 2011 after which Petitioner was placed on interim suspension by the Louisiana Supreme Court. In re Gilmore, (La. 7/19/11), 65 So.3d The federal court later granted Petitioner s motion for new trial and vacated his conviction. The Louisiana Supreme Court then dissolved Petitioner s suspension on September 21, In re Gilmore, (La. 9/21/11), 72 So.3d 342. The government then filed a motion for reconsideration of the ruling granting the motion for new trial in federal court. The motion for reconsideration was granted, and the May 2011 convictions were reinstated. The Louisiana Supreme Court then placed Petitioner back on interim suspension on May 2, In re Gilmore, (La. 5/2/12), 88 So.3d 441. In March, 2013, the federal district court granted a second motion for new trial in the criminal case and the Louisiana Supreme Court subsequently dissolved Petitioner s interim suspension on April 3, In re Gilmore, (La. 4/3/13), 110 So.3d

4 to impose permanent disbarment, which sanction had been recommended by ODC due to the nature of Petitioner s criminal conviction, the ODC stated that it takes no formal position on [Petitioner s] application in this proceeding. ODC s Prehearing Memorandum, p. 3. However, the ODC requested that the committee recognize its inherent authority to recommend against reinstatement if the committee should conclude based on the evidence that Petitioner does not possess the requisite character, integrity, and fitness to practice law. Petitioner filed his pre-hearing memorandum also on July 27, Petitioner maintained that he would present clear and convincing evidence of his satisfaction of all criteria for readmission and of his character and fitness to return to the practice of law. The hearing in this matter was held on August 8, 2018, before Hearing Committee No Petitioner appeared with counsel, Brian E. Crawford. Deputy Disciplinary Counsel Robert S. Kennedy, Jr. appeared on behalf of the ODC. Petitioner testified on his own behalf and also called the following witnesses who all testified to his character and fitness to return to the practice of law: Robert Steven Tew (current District Attorney for the 4 th Judicial District/ former co-worker of Petitioner for fifteen years in District Attorney s Office/previously served two terms on the Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Board); Brenda M. Howell (attorney/friend of Petitioner/former co-worker of Petitioner for fifteen years in District Attorney s Office); Frederick W. Adams (French professor at ULM/friend since childhood); Lisa Trammell Sullivan (Hearing Officer for the 4 th Judicial District Court since 1995); B. Scott Leehy (District Court Judge/former co-worker of Petitioner in the District Attorney s Office); Benjamin Jones (Court Administrator and Pro Tem Judge in 4 th Judicial District Court/previously temporarily appointed to Louisiana Supreme Court for six months); Tammy D. Lee (City Court Judge, City of Monroe/former opponent of Petitioner 3 Hearing Committee No. 35 was comprised of Pamela A. Stewart (Committee Chair), Tyler G. Storms (Lawyer Member), and C. Bennett Humphries (Public Member). 4

5 in election for City Court Judge/family friend). The ODC did not call any witnesses. Exhibits Gilmore 1 in globo (including Gilmore 1-A through 1-F), ODC 1, and Joint 1 were all admitted into evidence without objection. Exhibit 1-A included letters of recommendation from Mr. Tew, Judge Leehy, and Ms. Sullivan. The hearing committee filed its report on September 25, The committee recommended that:... Petitioner/Respondent be conditionally readmitted to the practice of law for a period of three (3) years only if all of the required conditions listed below are met: 1) He must satisfy the Judgment by Consent in the matter, Bank of America vs. #17,1865 Arthur Gilmore, Jr., 4 th JDC, Parish of Ouachita, as described in Exhibit Gilmore 1 at page 10. 2) He must satisfy the Consent Judgment in the matter, Bank of America vs. #2015- CV Arthur Gilmore, Monroe City Court, as described in Exhibit Gilmore 1 at page 10. 3) He must satisfy the Promissory Note with Confession of Judgment in favor of the Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Board in the principal sum of Three Thousand Nine Hundred Fifty-four Dollars and Five Cents ($3,954.05), as described in Exhibit Gilmore 1 at pages ) Petitioner/Respondent shall participate in a minimum of two (2) additional hours of Ethics as part of an approved continuing education course per year for three (3) years. 5) Any violation of any single term or condition of this conditional readmission to the practice of law shall result in a motion to revoke his conditional readmission with an expedited hearing to be conducted by the Disciplinary Board in a summary fashion as directed by the Disciplinary Board. Committee Report, p.8. On September 28, 2018, Petitioner filed an Objection to Report of Hearing Committee #35 With Alternative Request For Clarification. Petitioner objected to the recommendation that he be readmitted for three years only. Petitioner maintains that while the Court may impose conditions in connection with readmission, there appears to be no precedent or authority under Rule XIX for readmission for only a limited period of years. Petitioner alternatively requested clarification of the recommendation, stating that if the intent was to simply place conditions on 5

6 Petitioner s practice for a three-year period, with those conditions lifted after full compliance, Petitioner would likely not object to such recommendation if clarified. On October 12, 2018, the ODC filed an objection to the committee s report asserting that the committee failed to recommend sufficient and explicit conditions upon Petitioner s current financial status. The ODC requested that the Board impose the following conditions upon Petitioner s readmission: 1) That Petitioner must satisfy the conditions set forth in the committee s report, specifically that Petitioner satisfy all consent judgments and promissory notes enumerated in the report and furnish proof of satisfaction prior to the matter being submitted to the Court for review. 2) In the event Petitioner is required to maintain a trust account in connection with his practice, for three years following readmission Petitioner be required to furnish quarterly reports to the ODC demonstrating full compliance with all Rules of Professional Conduct requirements regarding trust accounts. 3) Language be included in the Court s judgment expressly advising Petitioner that his failure to comply with any condition of readmission will subject him to summarily being declared ineligible to practice upon showing of clear and convincing evidence of same to the Court, with said ineligibility to remain in place pending a considered assessment of his fitness to practice by the Court. The ODC filed its brief to the Board on November 13, The ODC again presented a modified argument. ODC basically argued for the conditions set forth in Items 1 and 2 above except that in the brief, ODC requested financial oversight for two years instead of three, and ODC requested oversight of Petitioner s personal financial status in addition to oversight of his trust account. Petitioner filed his brief to the Board on November 15, Petitioner reasserted his position that if the intent of the committee was to recommend readmission for a limited three-year period, such a time limitation is not authorized under the Louisiana Supreme Court Rules, and is unprecedented, arbitrary and impractical. Petitioner maintained that the committee s report is unclear as to whether full payment of all judgments and/or notes referenced in the report is required 6

7 before conditional readmission is allowed. Petitioner did not object to having to satisfy the conditions set forth by the committee with the exception that Petitioner objected to having to satisfy the consent judgments and the promissory note all in full before readmission, if that was the intent of the committee. Oral argument of this matter was held on December 13, 2018, before Board Panel C. 4 There was no objection by the ODC to readmission subject to conditions. The only issues in dispute involved the nature of the conditions to be imposed. HEARING COMMITTEE REPORT The committee filed its report on September 25, The report included the following synopsis of the testimony presented and findings, conclusions, and recommendation made by the committee: A. Petitioner/Respondent, Arthur Gilmore, Jr., Witnesses: 1. Petitioner/Respondent, Arthur Gilmore, Jr., testified that he graduated Southern University law school in 1982, was licensed to practice in the spring of 1983, went to work for the Ouachita Parish District Attorney s Office in 1984, and began his private law practice in He started work with the Ouachita Department of Family Services in late He ran for Monroe City Council in 1986 but lost. He was elected in 1996, 2000, 2004, and He has been married 38½ years and has four (4) children, ages 30, 31, 27, and 18. He was initially convicted of Hobbs and RICO violations in He served his sentence in federal prison in Yankton where he was assigned to the educational department and was a GED tutor. He obtained early release from probation in September-October He has most recently been employed as a substitute teacher. He is active in his church, Mary Goss, and his [sic] been involved in the Back-to-School Drive, Blood Drive, and Vacation Bible School. Petitioner/Respondent also provided general testimony confirming he had fully complied with the terms and conditions of his prior disciplinary orders, had not 4 Board Panel C is composed of Danna E. Schwab (Chair), Melissa L. Theriot (Lawyer Member), and Charles H. Williamson, Jr. (Public Member). 5 It is true that Petitioner was originally found guilty of Hobbs Act (extortion) and RICO Act (racketeering/bribery) violations in However, that decision was ultimately set aside on a motion for new trial. Petitioner was retried in May 2013 and found guilty of RICO (racketeering/bribery), but not Hobbs Act (extortion), violations. In re Gilmore, (La. 10/19/16), 218 So.3d 100, ; Ex. Joint 1. 6 Petitioner was released from Yankton in May He was in a halfway house until he was finally released from federal custody on July 30, He was then on probation until September-October of

8 engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, recognized the wrongfulness of his conduct and had deep remorse for his activities, that he had no other professional misconduct in the interim, that he had satisfied his MCLE requisites for the year, paid his LSBA dues, paid filing fees and disciplinary costs to the Disciplinary Board, as well as administrative and enforcement fees, had no clients to whom funds were claimed or due, and had no mental or physical infirmity that caused his charges. The client did attempt to testify regarding his having the requisite honesty and integrity to practice law, but ODC objected to this aspect of testimony. On cross-examination of Petitioner/Respondent, Deputy Disciplinary Counsel, Robert S. Kennedy, Jr., asked Petitioner/Respondent about a complaint filed during Petitioner/Respondent s period of disbarment by Darlene Walker Caesar which alleged the Petitioner/Respondent had assisted her sister, Robin Walker, with a power of attorney and the revocation of Ms. Caesar s power of attorney. The Petitioner/Respondent denied providing any such services or any legal services relating to Ms. Walker or her family during this time. He also testified that he had no complaints during his practice. 2. Steven Tew, District Attorney, 4 th Judicial District, testified that he had worked with Petitioner/Respondent for fifteen (15) years and known him for twenty (20) years. He further testified that the letter offered by Petitioner/Respondent in Gilmore-1 at page 18 was his letter in support of Petitioner/Respondent and was accurate except that the reference to 2007 should be Further, Mr. Tew testified that he had served on the Disciplinary Board for two (2) three (3) year terms, being appointed in 2010 and serving until December Brenda M. Howell testified that she had been a practicing attorney since 1982 and had known the Petitioner/Respondent since the early 1990 s and worked with him since Her tenure with the District Attorney s Office was She considered the Petitioner/Respondent a professional colleague and friend. She testified that his reputation within the legal community was one of honesty and character. She testified their personal relationship had included phone calls about the kids growing up. 4. Dr. Frederick Wayne Adams, PhD, testified that he has been a professor at ULM for thirty-nine (39) years and teaches French. He has been acquainted with Petitioner/Respondent for over thirty-five (35) years. They grew up together and attend the same church. He testified that the Petitioner/Respondent s reputation in [sic] that of a listener, determined, a family man, and ethical. He has not encountered anyone to say the contrary now of Petitioner/Respondent. He had not discussed remorse or responsibility with the Petitioner/Respondent. 5. Lisa Tramell [sic] Sullivan, Hearing Officer, 4 th Judicial District, testified that she has been a hearing officer since 1995, hearing non-support matters and family issues. She has known the Petitioner/Respondent since about He was an Assistant District Attorney in charge of non-support. She testified that the Petitioner/Respondent has an exceptional reputation, is easy to work [sic], and is impeccably fair. She testified that his reputation is still the same regardless of the conviction and that the Bar has been the poorer without him. She also confirmed that the letter offered by Petitioner/Respondent in Gilmore- 8

9 1 at page 21 is her letter in support of Petitioner/Respondent, no changes are needed to the letter, and it still expresses her opinion. 6. Honorable Bernard Marvin Scott Leehy testified that he has been a judge about eleven (11) years, [sic] He was a Monroe City judge about ten (10) years before, and an Assistant District Attorney for seven (7) years before that. When questioned about the conviction of Petitioner/Respondent, Judge Leehy testified that that was not he [sic] Arthur Gilmore that he knows. He also confirmed that the letter offered by Petitioner/Respondent in Gilmore-1 at page 19 is his letter in support of Petitioner/Respondent and it is correct as written. Since the conviction, he has had fairly infrequent contact with the Petitioner/Respondent, maybe five to six times out and about. He testified that if the Petitioner/Respondent did this [committed the offense(s) for which he was charged], it would be out of character for him and that Petitioner/Respondent was certainly capable of dealing [sic] in the courtroom and had no issues with clients. He would have given the same answer before the conviction as he gives now. 7. Honorable Benjamin Jones, testified that he was a court administrator and was appointed by the Supreme Court to function basically as a twelfth judge in Monroe. He served as judge since September 25, 1992, served on the Supreme Court in 2009 when Judge Traylor retired, and was Outstanding Jurist of the Year for He testified that he knew the Petitioner/Respondent well and the Petitioner/Respondent s reputation was a good reputation for truth and honesty. The circumstances [of the conviction] were not characteristic of the Petitioner/Respondent. He testified that he did not think that the Petitioner/Respondent would repeat the conduct again if he were a lawyer or in political office. He testified that he had no concerns about the Petitioner/Respondent s return to the practice of law. On cross-examination of Petitioner/Respondent [sic], Deputy Disciplinary Counsel, Robert S. Kennedy, Jr., asked Judge Jones if convicted felons could serve on a jury or possess a firearm, and how different this was with the practice of law. When asked how Judge Jones reconciled the conviction with his opinion of Petitioner/Respondent, Judge Jones testified that there were two (2) occasions with small amounts of money and he thought this out of line with the Petitioner/Respondent s character. Judge Jones testified that Petitioner/Respondent is the same person after prison as before, is not discourteous and not bitter and still is quick to laugh. When asked about his knowledge of the Petitioner/Respondent since 2011, Judge Jones testified that they were friendly but never social. He testified that the Petitioner/Respondent s reputation in the community was that this was not normal conduct. 8. Honorable Judge Tammy Lee testified that she had been City Judge for seventeen (17) years, having been elected in October The Petitioner/Respondent had run against her in her first election. She was a family friend before and after her election and knows the Petitioner/Respondent socially. She testified that the Petitioner/Respondent s reputation is that of very amiable, community oriented, dedicated to church, reaches out to the community, is at funerals, and is there for family. She testified that the 9

10 Petitioner/Respondent had never stopped being there, e.g. he attended her dad s funeral. She testified that the Petitioner/Respondent is community oriented. She further testified that the Bar misses the Petitioner/Respondent dearly. She testified that his overall reputation as a community-involved person overweighs the conviction. She has seen the Petitioner/Respondent at funerals and birthday parties and was the coordinator when his daughter was presented as a debutante. She testified that the Petitioner/Respondent is always reaching out and tries to assist. When Ben Humphries, our lay member of the Hearing Committee, inquired as to whether an attorney s felony conviction would affect her opinion as a judge, she responded it would not. * * * LAW AND FINDINGS OF FACT Readmission following disbarment is governed by Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XIX, Section 24. Section 24(E) establishes the substantive criteria for reinstatement, which are as follows: E1. The lawyer has fully complied with the terms and conditions of all prior discipline orders, except to the extent that they are abated under section 25. The committee has determined that the Petitioner/Respondent has provided clear and convincing evidence through the testimony of the Petitioner/Respondent and the Petitioner/Respondent s Exhibit Gilmore 1 that Petitioner/Respondent has fully complied with the terms and conditions of all prior discipline orders, except to the extent that they were abated under section 25. E2. The lawyer has not engaged nor attempted to engage in the unauthorized practice of law during the period of suspension or disbarment. The committee has determined that the Petitioner/Respondent has provided clear and convincing evidence through testimony of the Petitioner/Respondent and the Petitioner/Respondent s Exhibit Gilmore 1, as well as the contents of Exhibit ODC-1, that Petitioner/Respondent has not engaged nor attempted to engage in the unauthorized practice of law during the period of suspension or disbarment. The claim to the contrary made by Darlene Walker Caesar which alleged the Petitioner/Respondent had assisted her sister, Robin Walker, with a power of attorney and the revocation of Ms. Caesar s power of attorney was clearly refuted by the Petitioner/Respondent at the hearing at [sic] during the Petitioner/Respondent s deposition which was admitted as ODC-1. The committee notes that the contents of the deposition, page 34, lines 18-20, contain the statement of Deputy Disciplinary Counsel, Robert S. Kennedy, Jr., that he was in the process of closing this complaint at the time of the deposition. E3. If the lawyer was suffering under a physical or mental disability or infirmity at the time of suspension or disbarment, including alcohol or other drug abuse, the disability or infirmity has been removed. Where 10

11 alcohol or other drug abuse was a causative factor in the lawyer's misconduct, the lawyer shall not be reinstated or readmitted unless: (a) the lawyer has pursued appropriate rehabilitative treatment; (b) the lawyer has abstained from the use of alcohol or other drugs for at least one year; and (c) the lawyer is likely to continue to abstain from alcohol or other drugs. The committee has determined that the record reflects no information or documentation indicating that there was a physical or mental disability or infirmity at the time of the disbarment and that this criteria [sic] is not applicable. Additionally, Petitioner/Respondent has provided clear and convincing evidence through testimony of the Petitioner/Respondent that there was no such physical or mental disability or infirmity. E4. The lawyer recognizes the wrongfulness and seriousness of his conduct [sic] for which the lawyer was suspended or disbarred. The committee has determined that the Petitioner/Respondent has provided clear and convincing evidence through testimony of the Petitioner/Respondent, specifically noting that he had deep remorse for his activities and the Petitioner/Respondent s Exhibit Gilmore 1 in which the Petitioner/Respondent states on page 17, Petitioner/Respondent readily accepts responsibility for the error of his conduct as an elected official. Petitioner/Respondent is deeply sorrowful and contrite for his action and the damage caused by his lack of judgment to his family, the public and his faith. Moreover, Petitioner/Respondent is remorseful for the damage he caused to the legal profession and publicly elected officials by his actions. E5. The lawyer has not engaged in any other professional misconduct since suspension or disbarment. The committee has determined that the Petitioner/Respondent has provided clear and convincing evidence through testimony of the Petitioner/Respondent and the Petitioner/Respondent s Exhibit Gilmore 1, as well as the contents of Exhibit ODC-1, that Petitioner/Respondent has not engaged in any other professional misconduct since disbarment. The claim to the contrary made by Darlene Walker Caesar which alleged the Petitioner/Respondent had assisted her sister, Robin Walker, with a power of attorney and the revocation of Ms. Caesar s power of attorney was clearly refuted by the Petitioner/Respondent at the hearing at [sic] during the Petitioner/Respondent s deposition which was admitted as ODC-1. The committee notes that the contents of the deposition, page 34, lines 18-20, contain the statement of Deputy Disciplinary Counsel, Robert S. Kennedy, Jr., that he was in the process of closing this complaint at the time of the deposition. E6. Notwithstanding the conduct for which the lawyer was disciplined, the lawyer has the requisite honesty and integrity to practice law. The committee has determined that the Petitioner/Respondent has provided clear and convincing evidence through testimony of the Petitioner/Respondent and the Petitioner/Respondent s Exhibit Gilmore 1, 11

12 as well as the testimony of a number of former colleagues and friends, that Petitioner/Respondent has the requisite honesty and integrity to practice law. While many of those testifying or who provided letters which are a portion of Gilmore 1 testified that they had not been in contact with or had had limited contact with the Petitioner/Respondent since his disbarment and the Petitioner/Respondent himself admitted to such lack of recent contact in his sworn statement found in Exhibit ODC-1, the individuals testified as to his current reputation within the community and the Bar Association. There was also testimony of the Petitioner/Respondent himself as to his current church-related community involvement, as well as testimony of Dr. Frederick Wayne Adams, PhD, who did have current knowledge and interaction, as well as more recent knowledge and interaction with Judge Tammy Lee. The committee does have some concern regarding the outstanding consent judgments noted in Exhibit Gilmore 1 at page 10. E7. The lawyer has kept informed about recent developments in the law and is competent to practice and has satisfied MCLE requirements for the year of reinstatement or reinstatement [sic]. The committee has determined that the Petitioner/Respondent has provided clear and convincing evidence through testimony of the Petitioner/Respondent and the Petitioner/Respondent s Exhibit Gilmore 1, page 24, that Petitioner/Respondent has kept informed about recent developments in the law and is competent to practice and has satisfied MCLE requirements for the year of reinstatement or reinstatement [sic]. These matters appear uncontested and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel offered no contrary proof to the testimony of Petitioner/Respondent that all these elements have been satisfied. E8. The lawyer has paid to the Louisiana State Bar Association currently owed bar dues. The committee has determined that the Petitioner/Respondent has provided clear and convincing evidence through testimony of the Petitioner/Respondent and the Petitioner/Respondent s Exhibit Gilmore 1, page 25 and page 35, that Petitioner/Respondent has paid to the Louisiana State Bar Association currently owed bar dues. This matter appears uncontested and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel offered no contrary proof to the testimony of Petitioner/Respondent that all this element has been satisfied. E9. The lawyer has paid all filing fees owed to the Clerk of Court and all disciplinary costs to the Disciplinary Board. The committee has determined that the Petitioner/Respondent has provided clear and convincing evidence through testimony of the Petitioner/Respondent and the Petitioner/Respondent s Exhibit Gilmore 1, pages 26-27, that Petitioner/Respondent has paid all filing fees owed to the Clerk of Court. This matter appears to be uncontested and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel offered no contrary proof to the testimony of Petitioner/Respondent that all this element has been satisfied. The committee has determined that the Petitioner/Respondent has not provided 12

13 clear and convincing evidence that he has paid all disciplinary costs to the Disciplinary Board but rather has entered into a promissory note for such payment and has made payments in accordance with that promissory note. This matter appears uncontested and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel offered no contrary proof to the testimony of Petitioner/Respondent. E10. The lawyer has paid to the Disciplinary Board currently owed disciplinary administration and enforcement fees required under Section 8(A) of this rule and has filed the registration statement required under Section 8(c) of this rule. The committee has determined that the Petitioner/Respondent has provided clear and convincing evidence through testimony of the Petitioner/Respondent and the Petitioner/Respondent s Exhibit Gilmore 1, page 25 and page 35, that Petitioner/Respondent has paid to the Disciplinary Board currently owed disciplinary administration and enforcement fees required under Section 8 (A) of this rule and has filed the registration statement required under Section 8 (c) of this rule. These matters appear uncontested and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel offered no contrary proof to the testimony of Petitioner/Respondent that all these elements have been satisfied. E11. The lawyer shall obtain a certification from the Client Assistance Fund that no payments have been made by the Fund to any of the lawyer s clients. To the extent that Client Assistance Funds have been paid to qualifying clients, the lawyer shall obtain a certification from the Fund that the Fund has been reimbursed in its entirety, or alternatively, that a payment plan is in effect which will result in reimbursement to the Fund. The committee has determined that the Petitioner/Respondent has provided clear and convincing evidence through testimony of the Petitioner/Respondent and the Petitioner/Respondent s Exhibit Gilmore 1, pages 36-38, that Petitioner/Respondent has obtained a certification from the Client Assistance Fund that no payments have been made by the Fund to any of the Petitioner/Respondent s clients. Additionally, Petitioner/Respondent offered testimony that there were no funds due to any of Petitioner/Respondent s clients. These matters appear uncontested and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel offered no contrary proof to the testimony of Petitioner/Respondent that all these elements have been satisfied. RECOMMENDATION Based upon the above findings, the members of Hearing Committee No. 35 recommend that the Petitioner/Respondent be conditionally readmitted to the practice of law for a period of three (3) years only if all of the required conditions listed below are met: 1) He must satisfy the Judgment by Consent in the matter, Bank of America vs. #17,1865 Arthur Gilmore, Jr., 4 th JDC, Parish of Ouachita, as described in Exhibit Gilmore 1 at page

14 Committee Report, pp I. Standard of Review 2) He must satisfy the Consent Judgment in the matter, Bank of America vs. #2015-CV Arthur Gilmore, Monroe City Court, as described in Exhibit Gilmore 1 at page 10. 3) He must satisfy the Promissory Note with Confession of Judgment in favor of the Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Board in the principal sum of Three Thousand Nine Hundred Fifty-four Dollars and Five Cents ($3,954.05), as described in Exhibit Gilmore 1 at pages ) Petitioner/Respondent shall participate in a minimum of two (2) additional hours of Ethics as part of an approved continuing education course per year for three (3) years. 5) Any violation of any single term or condition of this conditional readmission to the practice of law shall result in a motion to revoke his conditional readmission with an expedited hearing to be conducted by the Disciplinary Board in a summary fashion as directed by the Disciplinary Board. DISCUSSION The powers and duties of the Disciplinary Board are defined in 2 of Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XIX. Rule XIX, 2(G)(2)(a) states that the Board is to perform appellate review functions, consisting of review of the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations of hearing committees with respect to formal charges and petitions for reinstatement, and prepare and forward to the court its own findings, if any, and recommendations. Inasmuch as the Board is serving in an appellate capacity, the standard of review applied to findings of fact is that of manifest error. Arceneaux v. Domingue, 365 So. 2d 1330 (La. 1978); Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So. 2d 840 (La. 1989). The Board conducts a de novo review of the hearing committee s application of the Rules of Professional Conduct. In re Hill, 90-DB-004, Recommendation of the Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Board (1/22/92). 14

15 II. Reinstatement Criteria and Discretional Conditions A suspended lawyer petitioning for readmission to the practice of law must satisfy the procedural requirements outlined in Rule XIX, 24(A-D). The lawyer must also satisfy all the criteria detailed in Rule XIX, 24(E), or present good and sufficient reason why he should nevertheless be reinstated to the practice of law. The petitioning lawyer has the burden of proving the satisfaction of each criterion by clear and convincing evidence. Rule XIX, 18(C). Further, even where the lawyer has met the burden of proof justifying reinstatement or readmission, the Court may impose conditions upon a lawyer s reinstatement or readmission. Rule XIX, 24(J). Rule XIX, 24, reads, in pertinent part: A. Generally. No lawyer may petition for readmission until five years after the effective date of disbarment. A lawyer who has been placed on interim suspension and is then disbarred for the same misconduct that was the ground for the interim suspension may petition for readmission at the expiration of five years from the time of the effective date of the interim suspension. B. Petition and Application. A petition for reinstatement or readmission must be under oath or affirmation under penalty of perjury and shall specify with particularity the manner in which the lawyer meets each of the criteria specified in paragraph E or, if not, why there is good and sufficient reason for reinstatement or readmission An application for reinstatement or readmission, also drafted under oath or affirmation under penalty of perjury, shall also be submitted by the lawyer. C. Service of Petition and Application. The lawyer shall file the petition and application with the disciplinary board and shall serve a copy of the petition and application (Parts I and II) on disciplinary counsel. D. Publication of Notice of Petition and Application. At the same time that a lawyer files a petition and application for reinstatement or readmission, the lawyer shall also publish a notice of the petition and application in the journal of the state bar and in a newspaper of general circulation in each judicial district in which the lawyer maintained an office for the practice of law when the lawyer was suspended or disbarred. The notice shall inform members of the bar and the public about the petition and application for reinstatement or readmission, and shall request that any individuals file notice of their opposition or concurrence with the board within thirty days. In addition, the lawyer shall notify the complainant(s) in the disciplinary proceeding that led to the lawyer s suspension or disbarment that the lawyer is applying for reinstatement or readmission, and shall inform each complainant that he or she has thirty days to raise objections to or to support the lawyer s petition and application. 15

16 E. Criteria for Reinstatement and Readmission. A lawyer may be reinstated or readmitted only if the lawyer meets each of the following criteria, and executes and files with the petition for reinstatement or readmission an application for reinstatement or readmission, a copy of which can be obtained from the board administrator, or, if not, presents good and sufficient reason why the lawyer should nevertheless be reinstated or readmitted: (1) The lawyer has fully complied with the terms and conditions of all prior disciplinary orders except to the extent that they are abated under Section 25. (2) The lawyer has not engaged nor attempted to engage in the unauthorized practice of law during the period of suspension or disbarment. (3) If the lawyer was suffering under a physical or mental disability or infirmity at the time of suspension or disbarment, including alcohol or other drug abuse, the disability or infirmity has been removed. Where alcohol or other drug abuse was a causative factor in the lawyer's misconduct, the lawyer shall not be reinstated or readmitted unless: (a) the lawyer has pursued appropriate rehabilitative treatment; (b) the lawyer has abstained from the use of alcohol or other drugs for at least one year; and (c) the lawyer is likely to continue to abstain from alcohol or other drugs. (4) The lawyer recognizes the wrongfulness and seriousness of the misconduct for which the lawyer was suspended or disbarred. (5) The lawyer has not engaged in any other professional misconduct since suspension or disbarment. (6) Notwithstanding the conduct for which the lawyer was disciplined, the lawyer has the requisite honesty and integrity to practice law. (7) The lawyer has kept informed about recent developments in the law and is competent to practice and has satisfied MCLE requirements for the year of reinstatement or readmission. (8) The lawyer has paid to the Louisiana State Bar Association currently owed bar dues. (9) The lawyer has paid all filing fees owed to the Clerk of Court and all disciplinary costs to the Disciplinary Board. (10) The lawyer has paid to the Disciplinary Board currently owed disciplinary administration and enforcement fees required under Section 8(A) of this rule and has filed the registration statement required under Section 8(C) of this rule. (11) The lawyer shall obtain a certification from the Client Assistance Fund that no payments have been made by the Fund to any of the lawyer s clients. To the extent that Client Assistance Funds have been paid to qualifying clients, the lawyer shall obtain a certification from the Fund that the Fund has been reimbursed in its entirety, or alternatively, that a payment plan is in effect which will result in reimbursement to the Fund. J. Conditions of Reinstatement or Readmission. The court may impose conditions on a lawyer's reinstatement or readmission. The conditions shall be imposed in cases where the lawyer has met the burden of proof justifying reinstatement or readmission, but the court reasonably believes that further 16

17 precautions should be taken to insure that the public will be protected upon the lawyer's return to practice. The court may impose any conditions that are reasonably related to the grounds for the lawyer's original suspension or disbarment, or to evidence presented at the hearing regarding the lawyer's failure to meet the criteria for reinstatement or readmission. The conditions may include any of the following: passing the bar examination as a condition to readmission following disbarment; limitation upon practice (to one area of law or through association with an experienced supervising lawyer); participation in continuing legal education courses; monitoring of the lawyer's practice (for compliance with trust account rules, accounting procedures, or office management procedures); abstention from the use of drugs or alcohol; active participation in Alcoholics Anonymous or other alcohol or drug rehabilitation program; monitoring of the lawyer's compliance with any other orders (such as abstinence from alcohol or drugs, or participation in alcohol or drug rehabilitation programs). If the monitoring lawyer determines that the reinstated or readmitted lawyer's compliance with any condition of reinstatement or readmission is unsatisfactory and that there exists a potential for harm to the public, the monitoring lawyer shall notify the court. III. Analysis of Rule XIX, 24 Criteria and Conditions The record demonstrates that Petitioner satisfied the prerequisites for reinstatement contained in Rule XIX, 24(A-D). The record also supports the committee s findings as to Petitioner s satisfaction of the criteria for reinstatement set forth in Rule XIX, 24(E), which are explained in detail in the committee s report quoted previously herein. Further, at the argument before the Board panel, the ODC did not contest that Petitioner has met the criteria or oppose readmission, assuming certain financial conditions are met prior to readmission and financial monitoring is required for some period after readmission. Petitioner, not unreasonably, has expressed concern that the wording of the committee s recommendation is confusing in that it could be interpreted to limit readmission to three years without any authority for doing so and does not clearly express details of recommended conditions such as whether all financial debts must be paid in full before readmission. Petitioner does not oppose the committee s recommended conditions for readmission if the conditions do not limit readmission to a three-year time period and if he is not required to completely satisfy the consent judgments referenced in the record and 17

18 pay off the full amount of the debt owed to the Board (now being paid pursuant to the promissory note, Ex. Gilmore 1-E) prior to readmission. Based on all of the above, the Board recommends that Petitioner be readmitted, subject to a probation period of three years, 7 certain financial requirements and monitoring conditions, and additional ethics training. As previously mentioned, Petitioner owes a balance to the Board for costs associated with the original disciplinary proceeding. In August 2017, Petitioner signed a promissory note (Ex. Gilmore 1-E) in favor of the Board which included a confession of judgment for the principal amount then due plus interest, costs, expenses and attorney s fees. Counsel for Petitioner represented at argument that Petitioner has consistently made monthly payments on the promissory note since August The Board recommends that Petitioner s readmission be subject to his continued full compliance with the terms of the promissory note. Additionally, the evidence shows that, on September 8, 2017, Petitioner entered into two consent judgments in favor of Bank of America in suits on open accounts, one judgment in the 4 th Judicial District Court for Ouachita Parish and the other in Monroe City Court. See Ex. Gilmore 1, p. 10. Counsel for Petitioner represented at argument that these judgments remain outstanding and that, due to his inability to practice law, Petitioner has not had the financial means to pay the judgments. He further stated that Bank of America has been foregoing collection efforts in anticipation that Petitioner will work out a payment plan if he is able to return to active practice. The Board recommends that Petitioner s readmission be subject to his presenting evidence that he has entered into a payment arrangement with Bank of America before being granted readmission and subject to his subsequent compliance with that payment plan after readmission. 7 It is noted that under Rule XIX, 10A(3), probation when imposed in connection with a sanction for misconduct should not exceed two years. However, the Court has not applied this time limit to probation upon reinstatement. See, e.g., In re Pardue, (La. 4/4/03), 845 So.2d 353; and In re Ferrouillet, (La. 2/22/02), 809 So.2d

19 The Board further recommends that, as a condition of readmission, in addition to completing the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education requirements for all lawyers, Petitioner be required to complete the LSBA Ethics School within one year of the effective date of readmission. Finally, ODC maintains that financial oversight of Petitioner should be implemented if he is readmitted. Considering Petitioner s disbarment was based on his committing bribery, the fact that he already has two civil judgments pending against him in suits on open accounts, and that uncontrolled personal debt could potentially make him susceptible to further misconduct, the Board believes that the financial oversight requirements detailed below would be reasonable and appropriate and recommends same. 8 RECOMMENDATION Considering all of the above, the Board adopts the factual findings of the committee with the clarifications and additions noted in footnotes 5 and 6 of this recommendation. The Board recommends that Petitioner be readmitted to the practice of law, subject to a three-year probation period and the following conditions: (1) Petitioner shall continue to comply with the requirements set forth in the promissory note in favor of the Board entered into in August (2) Prior to readmission, Petitioner shall present to the ODC a plan for payment of the 2017 consent judgments in favor of Bank of America (referenced in Ex. Gilmore 1 at page 10) 9 and proof of approval of the payment plan by Bank of America. After readmission, Petitioner shall continue to comply with all terms of the agreed payment plan until the judgments have been paid in full. Until the judgments are paid, Petitioner shall submit to the ODC biannually a detailed written report regarding the status of his compliance with the payment plan with an explanation of any late or missed payments occurring during the preceding six months. 8 Financial oversight conditions have been imposed by the Court in other cases. See, e.g., In re Moorman, (La. 3/2/18), 237 So.3d 492; In re Smith, (La. 3/8/13), 108 So.3d 1164; and In re Ferrouillet, (La. 2/22/02), 809 So.2d The consent judgments referenced are the two judgments in the proceedings listed as follows in Petitioner s application for readmission: (1) Bank of America vs #17,1865 Arthur Gilmore, Jr. [sic], 4 th JDC, Parish of Ouachita, and (2) Bank of America vs #2015-CV Arthur Gilmore [sic], Monroe City Court. 19

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