ORIGINAL LOUISIANA ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD IN RE: KERI GLENN ARMSTRONG NUMBER: 13-DB-062 RECOMMENDATION TO THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT

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1 ORIGINAL LOUISIANA ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD 13-DB-062 2/10/2015 IN RE: KERI GLENN ARMSTRONG NUMBER: 13-DB-062 RECOMMENDATION TO THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT INTRODUCTION This attorney disciplinary matter arises out of formal charges consisting of two counts filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel ( ODC ) against Keri Glenn Armstrong ( Respondent ), bar roll number ODC alleges that Respondent violated the following Rules of Professional Conduct: Rule 1.3 (failing to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client); Rule 1.4(a)(3) (failing to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter); Rule 1.15(a) (failing to keep safe the property of clients and third person) 1 ; Rule 1.5(f)(5) (failing to return the unearned portion of a fixed fee); Rule 8.1 (failing to cooperate with the Office of Disciplinary Counsel in a disciplinary investigation); Rule 8.4(a) (violating or attempting to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct); Rule 8.4(b) (committing a criminal act); and Rule 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation). 2 After Respondent failed to answer the formal charges, they were deemed admitted, and the Hearing Committee recommended disbarment. For the reasons stated below, the Board 1 It appears that the use of Rule 1.5(d) is a typographical error. Rule 1.5(d) prohibits an attorney from charging or collecting any fee in a domestic relations matter contingent upon securing the divorce; or charging a contingency fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case. As the text of the formal charges states, failing to keep safe the property of clients and third persons the Board believes the correct charge is Rule 1.15(a) (safekeeping of client or third persons property). See Formal Charges, 13-DB-062 p. 5. As such the Board revised Rule 1.5(d) to read Rule 1.15(a). 2 See the attached Appendix for the text of the Rules.

2 adopts the factual findings of the Hearing Committee. The Board also adopts the Committee s legal conclusions and recommends that Respondent be disbarred from the practice of law. PROCEDURAL HISTORY ODC filed formal charges against Respondent on November 4, By letter dated November 6, 2013, the formal charges were sent via certified mail to Respondent s primary and secondary registration addresses as well as another known address. 3 All three mailings were returned unsigned. Respondent failed to file an answer to the charges within the time period allowed by Louisiana Supreme Court Rules XIX, 11(E)(3). 4 Accordingly, ODC filed a motion to have the formal charges deemed admitted on July 2, The Hearing Committee Chair signed an order declaring the formal charges deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence on July 28, Respondent was granted twenty days in which to file a motion to recall the order, which she failed to do. ODC filed its written argument on sanctions, with supporting exhibits, on August 18, The hearing committee issued its report on September 24, Respondent s primary registration address is 300 Washington St., Suite 308, Monroe, LA Respondent s secondary registration address is 210 Austin Oaks Circle, West Monroe, LA The other known address is 41 Magness Creek Dr., Cabot, AR This rule states: The respondent shall file a written answer with the Board and serve a copy on disciplinary counsel within twenty (20) days after service of the formal charges, unless the time is extended by the chair of the hearing committee. In the event, Respondent fails to answer within the prescribed time, or the time as extended, the factual allegations contained within the formal charges shall be deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence. Disciplinary Counsel shall file a motion with the chair of the hearing committee to which the matter is assigned requesting that the factual allegations be deemed proven with proof of service of the formal charges upon the respondent. The order signed by the hearing committee chair shall be served upon respondent as provided by Section 13C. Within twenty (20) days of the mailing of the order of the hearing committee chair deeming the factual allegations contained in the formal charges proven, the respondent may move the hearing committee chair to recall the order thus issued upon demonstration of good cause why imposition of the order would be improper or would result in a miscarriage of justice. 2

3 recommending that Respondent be disbarred from the practice of law. 5 ODC filed a response to the recommendation on October 13, 2014 stating that it had no objection to the Committee s report. Oral argument of this matter was heard on November 13, 2014, before Board Panel B. 6 Deputy Disciplinary Counsel Tammy P. Northrup appeared on behalf of ODC. Respondent failed to appear. FORMAL CHARGES The formal charges read, in pertinent part: I. Matter No The Office of Disciplinary Counsel ("ODC") received the Complaint in ODC file Number from Complainant, Danielle Magee, on February 11, Complainant hired Respondent on July 11, 2011, to file a Chapter 13 bankruptcy on her behalf. When Complainant hired Respondent, she informed Respondent that she owed the state of New York back taxes and that she had student loans. According to Complainant, Respondent instructed her to first file all back taxes before the bankruptcy was filed and that the student loan issue would need to be settled in an adversarial proceeding. Complainant paid $2, in two installments of $1, each toward the adversarial proceeding. Complainant also paid $ toward the Chapter 13 bankruptcy and agreed to pay an additional $2, through the Chapter 13 proceeding. Complainant paid six $ monthly installments during the Chapter 13 proceeding then requested an appointment with Respondent. During the appointment, Respondent advised Complainant to convert her Chapter 13 bankruptcy to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy because the back taxes were old enough to be discharged in bankruptcy. Respondent informed Complainant that she would charge her $ for the legal work and she would deduct it from the $2, already paid for the adversarial proceeding. Complainant followed Respondent's advice and converted the bankruptcy. Complainant states she received a discharge in her Chapter 7 bankruptcy on August 2, 2012, but after she received the discharge, she began receiving notices from New York indicating she owed back taxes. When Complainant inquired about this to Respondent, Respondent initially told 5 Hearing Committee No. 17 is composed of Donald William Weir, Jr., (Committee Chair), Gregory Holland Batte (Lawyer Member) and Clifton C. Pate, Jr., (Public Member). 6 Board Panel B is composed of R. Steven Tew (Chairman), Carrie Leblanc Jones (Lawyer Member), and R. Lewis Smith, Jr. (Public Member). 3

4 Complainant that New York just had not yet received the discharge. Eventually, Respondent reported to Complainant that because she had not filed the back taxes two years before the discharge, the back taxes were not dischargeable in bankruptcy. Complainant stated that she was never informed of this requirement and converted the bankruptcy and filed the back taxes based on Respondent's advice. During the Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding, Complainant had arranged to pay her student loans through a payment plan so she informed Respondent that she no longer wished to pursue the adversary proceeding. During October 2012, Complainant contacted Respondent's office and requested that the remaining $1, from her deposit for the adversary proceeding be returned to her. Complainant states that she contacted Respondent's office numerous times both via phone and but Respondent has refused to return the funds to her. After the instant Complaint was filed, a copy of said Complaint was sent to Respondent at her primary registered address as provided by Respondent to the Louisiana State Bar Association pursuant to Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XIX. Because this office did not receive a written response from Respondent, a copy of the Complaint was also sent to Respondent's secondary address as registered with the Louisiana State Bar Association pursuant to Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XIX on May 14, On June 3, 2013, the notice of complaint sent to Respondent's secondary address was returned to the ODC with a notation marked on the envelope as follows: Unclaimed. Thereafter, on June 13, 2013, the ODC requested the Ouachita Parish Sheriffs Office to serve Respondent at her secondary registered address with the complaint, subpoena for her sworn statement and subpoena duces tecum requesting her client files and all financial records pertaining to Complainant's file. The Ouachita Parish Sheriff s Office provided a return indicating Respondent did not live at the address as the house was vacant. On June 26, 2013, the ODC received correspondence from Respondent's former employer indicating Respondent no longer worked for the firm and returned the package containing the complaint initially sent to Respondent at her primary registered address. Said correspondence explained that the package had been forwarded to their Shreveport office because the firm's Monroe office had been closed. This correspondence also explained that Respondent had left the firm on the last day of January, and no one at the firm had a forwarding address for her. II. Matter No The Office of Disciplinary Counsel received the instant complaint from Kevin R. Molloy on July 31, In the Complaint, Complainant alleges that Respondent formerly worked for his law firm, Simon, Fitzgerald, Cooke, Reed & Welch. Specifically, Respondent operated the firm's Monroe office. The Monroe office closed in January 2013, and Respondent's last day at work was January 31, After Respondent left employment with the firm, Complainant's firm learned that Respondent was taking clients' money paid to the firm for court costs and/or fees 4

5 and using those funds for her own personal use rather than depositing the funds in the appropriate firm account. In the Chapter 13 bankruptcy captioned as Margie P. Leverette, bearing Case Number , United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Louisiana, Monroe Division, Respondent took money orders in the amounts of $ and $ from the debtor. These money orders were never received by the Trustee, and the debtor's case was dismissed for lack of payment. Ms. Leverette informed the firm that she had given the money to Respondent, and the firm's investigation into this matter revealed that Respondent's name had been substituted as the payee on the money orders. Further, Respondent endorsed and cashed the money orders. Respondent also represented Anthony S. Profit in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case captioned as Anthony S. Profit, bearing Case Number United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Louisiana, Monroe Division. Mr. Profit's bankruptcy was also dismissed for failure to make payments to the Chapter 13 Trustee. Mr. Profit informed the firm that he had given Respondent a $ money order. The firm's investigation into the matter revealed that the money order was made payable to Respondent, Respondent endorsed the money order, cashed the money order, and the funds were never deposited into the firm's trust account. Complainant also attached a report from the firm's office manager as part of the complaint. Said report indicates that Respondent converted an additional $6, in ten other files. On August 5, 2013, the ODC sent by certified mail copies of Mr. Molloy's complaint to Respondent's primary and secondary registered addresses as provided by Respondent to the Louisiana State Bar Association pursuant to Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XIX. Said notices were returned to the ODC by the USPS with the following notation: Return to Sender. Thereafter, on September 9, 2013, the ODC issued a subpoena compelling the attendance of Respondent to the offices of the ODC to provide her sworn statement on October 3, On September 10, 2014, the ODC sent correspondence to the Ouachita Parish Sheriff s Office requesting that Respondent be served with the subpoena at her secondary registered address. On September 23, 2013, the ODC received the return from the Ouachita Parish Sheriff s Office indicating that the secondary address which Respondent has registered with the Louisiana State Bar Association is the location of a vacant house. Thus, the Ouachita Parish Sheriff's Office was unable to serve Respondent. 5

6 THE HEARING COMMITTEE REPORT As stated above, the formal charges in this matter were deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing evidence by order of the Committee Chair. Accordingly, no formal hearing was held. Based on its review of the argument and documentary evidence submitted on the issue of sanctions, the Committee found that the deemed admitted formal charges and evidence in the record was sufficient to conclude that Respondent violated the Rules as charged. The Committee found that Respondent violated duties owed to her clients and to the legal profession. The Committee found her actions to be intentional. The Committee found the following aggravating factors: dishonest and selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct and multiple offenses. The Committee declined to find any mitigating factors. The Committee determined that disbarment was the baseline sanction as indicated in ABA Standard 4.41 and Standard The Committee also referenced several disbarment cases involving conversion of client funds. In re Bernstein, (La.10/16/07), 966 So. 2d 537; In re Kelly, (La. 6/5/98), 713 So. 2d 458; Louisiana State Bar Association v. Hinrichs, 468 So. 2d (La. 1986); In re Denhollem, (La. 6/6/03), 849 So. 2d 488. The Committee found no reason to deviate from the baseline sanction of disbarment as the appropriate sanction for Respondent. In addition, the Committee recommended that Respondent be charged with all costs and expenses of these disciplinary proceedings. I. The Standard of Review ANALYSIS The powers and duties of the Disciplinary Board are defined in Section 2 of the Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XIX, Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement. Subsection (G)(2)(a) 6

7 states that the Board is to perform appellate review functions, consisting of the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations of hearing committees with respect to formal charges and prepare and forward to the court its own findings, if any, and recommendations. Inasmuch as the Board is serving in an appellate capacity, the standard of review applied to findings of fact is that of manifest error. Arceneaux v. Domingue, 365 So. 2d 1330 (La. 1978); Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So. 2d 840 (La. 1989). The Board conducts a de novo review of the hearing committee s application of the Rules of Professional Conduct. In re Hill, 90-DB-004. A. The Manifest Error Inquiry The factual findings of the Committee do not appear to be manifestly erroneous. The findings of the Committee are supported by the documentary evidence in the record. B. De Novo Review In cases in which the lawyer does not answer the formal charges, the factual allegations of those charges are deemed admitted. Supreme Court Rule XIX, 11(E)(3). Thus, the ODC bears no additional burden to prove the factual allegations contained in the formal charges after those charges have been deemed admitted. However, the language of 11(E)(3) does not encompass legal conclusions that flow from the factual allegations. If the legal conclusion the ODC seeks to prove (i.e., a violation of a specific rule) is not readily apparent from the deemed admitted facts, additional evidence may need to be submitted in order to prove the legal conclusions that flow from the admitted factual allegations. In re Donnan, (La. 1/10/03), 838 So. 2d 715. As the Rule violations were readily apparent from the deemed-admitted facts in this matter, the burden of proof has been carried and no additional evidence was required. In re Donnan, (La.1/10/03); 838 So. 2d 715. Accordingly, the Board adopts the Committee s 7

8 findings of fact and law and concludes that Respondent violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as charged - Rule 1.3, Rule 1.4(a)(3), Rule 1.5(f)(5), Rule 1.15(a), Rule 8.1 and Rule 8.4(a)(b)(c). Each Rule is addressed below: Rule 1.3 and 1.4: Rule 1.3 states that a lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client. Rule 1.4 requires that a lawyer maintain adequate communication with his clients. On multiple occasions, in violation of Rule 1.3, Respondent failed to forward client funds in her possession to Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Trustees for payment to the client s creditors, causing several matters to be dismissed. ODC Exhibit 10. Respondent also failed to communicate with her clients regarding the status of their bankruptcy proceedings. Her conduct demonstrates a failure to communicate and a lack of diligence. Therefore, the record supports a finding that Respondent violated Rule 1.3 and Rule 1.4. Rule 1.5(f): Rule 1.5(f)(5) states that when the client pays a lawyer a fixed or advance fee and a fee dispute arises between the lawyer and the client, the lawyer shall immediately refund to the client any unearned portion of such fee. Ms. Magee requested a $1, refund from Respondent on multiple occasions but never received the funds from Respondent. 7 Accordingly, the record supports a finding that Respondent violated Rule 1.5(f). Rule 1.15(a): Rule 1.15(a) mandates that a lawyer hold the property of clients separate from the lawyer s own property. On multiple occasions, Respondent cashed checks written by her clients to Respondent s law firm for court costs and fees and used those funds for her own personal use rather than depositing the funds in the appropriate firm account. ODC Exhibit 10. Accordingly, the record supports the Committee s conclusion that Respondent violated Rule 1.15(a). 7 Ms. Magee was eventually refunded $1,400 by Respondent s former employer, Simon, Fitzgerald, Cooke, Reed and Welch. See 4/2/14 Transcript of Sworn Statement of Danielle Magee, p

9 Rule 8.1(c): Rule 8.1(c) states that a lawyer, in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not fail to cooperate with the Office of Disciplinary Counsel. Respondent failed to answer the formal charges filed in this matter and has failed to participate in this disciplinary matter altogether. Therefore, the record supports a finding that Respondent violated Rule 8.1(c). Rule 8.4(a)(b)(c): Rule 8.4(a) states that it is professional misconduct to violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 8.4(b) states that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to commit a criminal act. Rule 8.4(c) states that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation. In Count I, Respondent failed to refund a $1,400 unearned fee to Ms. Magee. In Count II, Respondent misappropriated $6, in client funds which belonged to clients in some instances and to her former law firm in others. Thus, Respondent exercised control over funds that are rightfully owed to her former law firm and/or to her former clients. This constitutes conversion, which is a criminal act. This conduct also involves dishonesty, which violates Rule 8.4(c). Respondent also collected fees from clients but failed to forward the funds to the appropriate Chapter 13 bankruptcy trustees. This conduct, again, involves dishonesty and deceit. Therefore, the record supports a finding that Respondent violated Rule 8.4(a)(b) and (c). II. THE APPROPRIATE SANCTION A. Rule XIX, 10(C) Factors Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XIX, 10(C) states that when imposing a sanction after a finding of lawyer misconduct, the Court or Board shall consider the following factors: 1. whether the lawyer has violated a duty owed to a client, to the public, to the legal system, or to the profession; 2. whether the lawyer acted intentionally, knowingly, or negligently; 9

10 3. the amount of actual or potential injury caused by the lawyer s misconduct; and 4. the existence of any aggravating or mitigating factors. Here, Respondent clearly violated duties owed to her clients, the public, the legal system, and the profession. She acted intentionally and knowingly, and her misconduct resulted in actual injury. First, Respondent violated a duty owed to her clients by failing to diligently provide legal services and by intentionally converting client funds. Respondent also violated a duty to the public, legal profession and system by intentionally engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on her fitness to practice law. With respect to aggravating and mitigating factors, the following aggravating factors are supported by the record: (1) dishonest or selfish motive; (2) a pattern of misconduct; (3) multiple offenses; (4) bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to cooperate with rules or orders of the disciplinary process; (5) refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct; and (6) indifference to making restitution. The sole mitigating factor is the absence of a prior disciplinary record. B. The ABA Standards and Case Law The ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (herein Standard ), Standard 4.41(b) suggests disbarment is appropriate when: (b) a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client. Standard 4.11 permits disbarment when a lawyer knowingly converts client property and causes injury or potential injury to a client. Standard 4.61 permits disbarment when a lawyer knowingly deceives a client with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another, and causes serious injury or potential serious injury to a client. Standard 5.11suggests disbarment when: 10

11 (a) a lawyer engages in serious criminal conduct a necessary element of which includes intentional interference with the administration of justice, false swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, extortion, misappropriation, or theft; or the sale, distribution or importation of controlled substances; or the intentional killing of another; or an attempt or conspiracy or solicitation of another to commit any of these offenses; or (b) a lawyer engages in any other intentional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice. In accepting fees from her clients and failing to place the funds in the law firm s account and/or failing to forward them to the appropriate bankruptcy trustee, Respondent intentionally converted funds from numerous sources causing injury to multiple clients. She knowingly failed to perform services for her clients and engaged in a clear pattern of conversion with respect to client funds. Therefore, disbarment is the appropriate baseline sanction. In further support of disbarment, the Court stated in LSBA v. Hinrichs 8 that a typical case of disbarment for converting client funds involved one or more of the following elements: the lawyer acts in bad faith and intends a result inconsistent with his client's interest; the lawyer commits forgery or other fraudulent acts in connection with the violation; the magnitude or the duration of the deprivation is extensive; the magnitude of the damage or risk of damage, expense and inconvenience caused the client is great; the lawyer either fails to make full restitution or does so tardily after extended pressure of disciplinary or legal proceedings. 9 The Court has found that similar misconduct warranted disbarment. In re James S. Denhollem, the Court disbarred Mr. Denhollum for converting client funds (La. 6/6/03), 849 So. 2d 488. Over a ten-month period, Mr. Denhollem misappropriated $17, from his law firm s clients. He endorsed seven checks payable to the law firm on behalf of its (La. 3/31/86), 486 So.2d Hinrichs at

12 clients and converted the funds to his own use. When confronted by one of the law firm s partners, he voluntarily ceased engaging in the practice of law and made full restitution to the clients whose funds were converted. The Court found that Mr. Denhollem acted in bad faith and intended a result inconsistent with his clients interests, thereby causing actual damage to the clients and to the law firm. The Court noted that, although restitution had been made, the aggravating factors of dishonest motive, pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses and substantial experience in the practice of law warranted disbarment. Like Mr. Denhollem, Respondent misappropriated funds from her law firm s clients. The deemed admitted facts indicate that Respondent converted these client funds, which has caused significant harm, and failed to make any restitution of those funds. Ms. Armstrong s whereabouts are unknown and neither the ODC nor her former law firm is able to locate her. It is unlikely that her former employer will ever be refunded the $6, identified as client funds misappropriated by Respondent. The deemed admitted facts of this matter, ABA Standards and relevant case law point to disbarment as the appropriate sanction. CONCLUSION The Board adopts the deemed admitted factual findings of the Committee. Likewise, the Board adopts the Committee s conclusions pertaining to the Rules of Professional Conduct and the recommended sanction of disbarment. In addition, the Board recommends that Respondent be required to pay restitution to her former employer and any former clients not yet compensated for their losses, as well as pay all costs and expenses of the disciplinary proceeding. 12

13 RECOMMENDATION The Board recommends that Respondent, Keri Glenn Armstrong, be disbarred from the practice of la\v. The Board further recommends that Ms. Armstrong be ordered to pay restitution to her former law firm Simon, Fitzgerald, Cooke, Reed & Welch as well as any former clients who have not yet been compensated for their losses. The Board also recommends that Respondent be assessed with the costs and expenses of this proceeding. LOUISIANA ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD Carl A. Butler George L. Crain, Jr. Anderson 0. Dotson, III Carrie L. Jones Edwin G. Preis, Jr. Dominick Scandurro, Jr. Evans C. Spiceland, Jr. R. Steven Tew BY: R. Lewis Smith, Jr.; FOR THE ADJUDI VE COMMITTEE 13

14 APPENDIX RULE 1.3 DILIGENCE A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client. RULE 1.4 COMMUNICATION (a) A lawyer shall: (3) Keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter. RULE 1.5 FEES (d) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect: (1) Any fee in a domestic relations matter, the payment or amount of which is contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony or support, or property settlement in lieu thereof; or (2) A contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case. (f) Payment of fees in advance of services shall be subject to the following rules: (5) When the client pays the lawyer a fixed fee, a minimum fee or a fee drawn from an advanced deposit, and a fee dispute arises between the lawyer and the client, either during the course of the representation or at the termination of the representation, the lawyer shall immediately refund to the client the unearned portion of such fee, if any. If the lawyer and the client disagree on the unearned portion of such fee, the lawyer shall immediately refund to the client the amount, if any, that they agree has not been earned, and the lawyer shall deposit into a trust account an amount representing the portion reasonably in dispute. The lawyer shall hold such disputed funds in trust until the dispute is resolved, but the lawyer shall not do so to coerce the client into accepting the lawyer s contentions. As to any fee dispute, the lawyer should suggest a means for prompt resolution such as mediation or arbitration, including arbitration with the Louisiana State Bar Association Fee Dispute Program. 14

15 RULE 1.15 SAFEKEEPING PROPERTY (in pertinent part) (a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer s possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer s own property. Except as provided in (g) and the IOLTA Rules below, funds shall be kept in one or more separate interest-bearing client trust accounts maintained in a bank or savings and loan association: 1) authorized by federal or state law to do business in Louisiana, the deposits of which are insured by an agency of the federal government; 2) in the state where the lawyer s primary office is situated, if not within Louisiana; or 3) elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person. No earnings on a client trust account may be made available to or utilized by a lawyer or law firm. Other property shall be identified as such and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of such account funds and other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of five years after termination of the representation. RULE 8.1 BAR ADMISSION AND DISCIPLINARY MATTERS An applicant for admission to the bar, or a lawyer in connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not: (a) Knowingly make a false statement of material fact; (b) Fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority, except that this rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6; or (c) Fail to cooperate with the Office of Disciplinary Counsel in its investigation of any matter before it except for an openly expressed claim of a constitutional privilege. RULE 8.4 MISCONDUCT It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (a) Violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another; (b) Commit a criminal act especially one that reflects adversely on the lawyer s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; (c) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; 15