IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA RESPONDENT'S ANSWER BRIEF ON THE MERITS

Transcription

1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA DANA SHEWBRIDGE, Petitioner, Case No. SC vs. STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent. / RESPONDENT'S ANSWER BRIEF ON THE MERITS ROBERT A. BUTTERWORTH Attorney General ROBERT E. BODNAR, JR. Assistant Attorney General Florida Bar No KELLIE NIELAN, BUREAU CHIEF Florida Bar No Seabreeze Boulevard Suite 500 Daytona Beach, Florida Telephone: (386) Facsimile: (386)

2 TABLE OF CONTENTS Counsel for Respondent TABLE OF CONTENTS...ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES... iii SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT... 1 ARGUMENT THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD PROPERLY DENIED PETITIONER S MOTION SEEKING CREDIT FOR JAIL TIME SERVED UPON THE ISSUANCE OF A DETAINER... 2 CONCLUSION... 9 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE...10 CERTIFICATE OF FONT ii

3 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES CITED: Bryant v. State, 787 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)... 3,5 Gethers v. State, 798 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)... 3,4,7 State v. Jett, 626 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1993)... 7 Orozco v. United States Immigation and Naturalization Services, 911 F.2d 539 (11th Cir. 1990)... 4 Penny v. State, 778 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)... 3,5 Price v. State, 598 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)... 4 Shewbridge v. State, 27 Fla. L. Weekly D413 (Fla. 5th DCA Feb. 15, 2002). 2,3 T.R. v. State, 677 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 1996)... 7 OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED: Section (1), Florida Statutes (1999)... 6,7 iii

4 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT A criminal defendant is not entitled to credit for time served while subject to an out-of-county detainer. The issuance of a detainer acts solely as a request for information once the defendant s case is disposed of or the defendant is released on bond. Where a detainer is issued seeking information only, a defendant should not be credited for jail time served from the date of its issuance. Computation for jail credit should only start upon the execution of an out-of-county warrant or upon the issuance of a detainer which, in addition to seeking information, acts to lengthen the defendant s period of incarceration. 1

5 ARGUMENT THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED PETITIONER S MOTION SEEKING CREDIT FOR JAIL TIME SERVED UPON THE ISSUANCE OF A DETAINER. Petitioner complains that both the trial court and the Fifth District Court of Appeal erred in declining to grant him credit for jail time spent while subject to a detainer. Specifically, Petitioner alleges that he was entitled to credit for any time spent on unrelated charges in the Leon County jail while he also was the subject of a Brevard County detainer. The Fifth District Court of Appeal held that a criminal defendant is not entitled to credit for jail time served while subject to an out-of-county detainer and has certified conflict between the district courts of appeal. Shewbridge v. State, 27 Fla. L. Weekly D413 (Fla. 5th DCA Feb. 15, 2002). The facts of the instant cause reflect that a Brevard County detainer was placed on Petitioner while he was being held in the Leon County jail on unrelated criminal charges. (R. 12, 20-21, 156, ). Petitioner subsequently was arrested on the Brevard County warrant on March 14, (R. 12, 16, 21-22, 162, ). Since the Leon County criminal case, however, actually had held Petitioner in custody up to the 2

6 date of his arrest, Petitioner was not entitled to credit for the time spent in jail prior to his being served with the Brevard County warrant. (R , 167). In essence, the question confronted by the Fifth District Court of Appeal is whether the issuance of a detainer of communication, one which seeks information only between jurisdictions, or a detainer of consequence, one in which an out-of-county warrant is executed or one that does some other act to prolong the defendant s incarceration, starts the calculation for credit for jail time served. In Gethers v. State, 798 So. 2d 829, 830 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) 1, the Fourth District Court of Appeal likewise has certified conflict on this issue with the First District Court of Appeal in Penny v. State, 778 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) and with the Second District Court of Appeal in Bryant v. State, 787 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). Unlike the decisions in Penny and Bryant, the Fifth District Court of Appeal has adopted the reasoning advanced in Gethers and has found that only upon the issuance of a particular type of detainer which acts to prolong a defendant s stay in custody on out-of-county charges (a 1 The decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Gethers is currently pending before this Court in case SC

7 detainer of consequence ) does the computation of jail credit begin. Shewbridge, 27 Fla. L. Weekly at D413. Since the detainer that had been transmitted in the instant cause had not lengthened Petitioner s incarceration, the Fifth District Court of Appeal necessarily concluded that the computation for jail credit did not begin with its issuance. Id. In Gethers, the Fourth District Court of Appeal explained that the filing of a detainer and the service of an arrest warrant are legally distinct actions. Gethers, 798 So. 2d at 832. Indeed, in any particular case, the State may issue a detainer, serve an arrest warrant or both. Id. [T]he filing of a detainer is an informal process advising prison officials that a prisoner is wanted on other pending charges and requesting notification prior to the prisoner s release. Id. (citing Price v. State, 598 So. 2d 215, 217 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)); see also, Orozco v. United States Immigation and Naturalization Services, 911 F.2d 539, 542 n. 2 (11th Cir. 1990). Rather than requiring the immediate presence of the prisoner, a detainer merely puts the officials of the institution in which the prisoner is incarcerated on notice that the prisoner is wanted in another jurisdiction for trial upon his release from prison. Gethers, 798 So. 2d at 832. Further action must be taken by the receiving State in order 4

8 to obtain the prisoner. Id. (emphasis supplied). Accordingly, the filing of a detainer seeking information only does not have the same result as the service of an arrest warrant. Some other action must be taken by out-of-county authorities to secure a defendant s detention. The execution of an out-of-county warrant is such an action. The decisions of the First and Second District Courts of Appeal, however, are in direct contrast to this reasoning. In Penny, the First District Court of Appeal held the issuance of an out-of-county warrant triggers the calculation of jail credit for out-of-county charges. Penny, 778 So. 2d at 307. The Court stated that the fact that the warrant was not formally executed nor transmitted in a detainer from an outof-county authority had no bearing on a defendant s right to receive jail credit from the date that the warrant was issued. Id. In Bryant, the defendant was incarcerated in Escambia County when a detainer was issued from another jurisdiction. Bryant, 787 So. 2d at 69. When the defendant appeared in the other county to answer to charges committed there, he sought credit for jail time served from the date that the detainer had been issued. Id. The Second District Court of Appeal agreed with the ruling in Penny, finding that the defendant 5

9 was entitled to credit for jail time served while in Escambia County from the date that the out-of-county detainer had been issued. Id. at 70. The Court held that the fact that the defendant had not officially been arrested on the out-ofcounty warrant had no bearing on his right to receive jail credit while under the detainer. Id. These decisions expand the meaning of a detainer by automatically incorporating the issuance of an arrest warrant into the meaning of the term. As reflected in Penny and Bryant, the computation of jail credit begins immediately upon the issuance of a detainer, regardless of whether the detainer actually contributes to the length of a defendant s confinement. This logic necessarily is flawed. Notably, the reasoning advanced by the First and Second District Courts of Appeal does not make any distinction as to the types of detainers that can be issued. In so doing, these Courts presume that out-of-county authorities intend something more than a simple exchange of information. Moreover, they presuppose that these same authorities will act upon the detainer once it is issued. In practical effect, therefore, the decisions of the First and Second Districts work to subsume the power of other jurisdictions, without the authority to do so. 6

10 Therefore, the State requests that this Court hold there is a distinction between a detainer of communication, one which seeks information only between jurisdictions, and a detainer of consequence, one in which an out-of-county warrant is executed or one that does some other act to prolong the incarceration of a defendant. This Court should then find that the computation for jail time credit only should start where a detainer of consequence has been issued. Petitioner s further argument that the language of Section (1), Florida Statutes (1999) entitles him to credit for time spent while subject to an out-of-county detainer similarly is misguided. Section (1) provides in relevant part: A sentence of imprisonment shall not begin to run before the date it is imposed, but the court imposing the sentence shall allow a defendant credit for all of the time she or he spent in the county jail before sentence. Gethers, 798 So. 2d at 831 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)(emphasis supplied). As previously noted by this Court, [i]t is a well settled rule of statutory construction that unambiguous language is not subject to judicial construction, however wise it may seem to alter the plain language. State v. Jett, 626 So. 2d 691, 693 (Fla. 1993). Where the plain language of a statute is unambiguous, there is no need for judicial 7

11 interpretation. T.R. v. State, 677 So. 2d 270, 271 (Fla. 1996). An analysis of the language in this statute demonstrates that it is indeed clear and unambiguous. As the Fourth District Court of Appeal stated: The statute refers to the county jail, not any county jail. This choice of article suggests a narrow reading of the statute; it contemplates the typical situation where a defendant spends time in jail awaiting final resolution of a case in the county where the charges are pending. The statute was not written to accommodate the mobile, prolific offender whose criminal transgressions span the state. Gethers, 798 So. 2d at 831. In the instant cause, it was Petitioner s Leon County criminal case, not the Brevard County detainer, that actually held him in custody until he was served with an arrest warrant. (R. 12, 16, 20-22, 156, ). Petitioner, therefore, was not entitled to credit for time spent in the Leon County jail prior to his being served with the Brevard County arrest warrant. (R. 167). To do otherwise would allow Petitioner and future defendants to have a windfall of jail credit awarded to them for their action of committing crimes across the State. 8

12 CONCLUSION WHEREFORE, based on the above and foregoing arguments and authorities cited therein, the State of Florida respectfully submits that the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal should be UPHELD and the judgment and sentence imposed by the trial court should be AFFIRMED. 9

13 Respectfully submitted, ROBERT A. BUTTERWORTH Attorney General ROBERT E. BODNAR, JR. Assistant Attorney General Florida Bar No KELLIE NIELAN, BUREAU CHIEF Florida Bar No Seabreeze Boulevard Suite 500 Daytona Beach, FL Telephone: (386) Facsimile: (386) Counsel for Respondent CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished by U.S. Mail to: BARBARA DAVIS, ASSISTANT PUBLIC DEFENDER, SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT,

14 Orange Avenue, Suite A, Daytona Beach, FL 32114, this day of April, CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE In accordance with the Florida Supreme Court Administrative Order, issued on July 13, 1998, I hereby certify that the instant brief has been prepared with 12 point Courier New type. ROBERT E. BODNAR, JR. Assistant Attorney General 11