1300 MOUNT KEMBLE AVENUE P.O. BOX 2075 MORRISTOWN, NEW JERSEY (973) FACSIMILE (973) December 8, 2016

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1 ATTORNEYS AT LAW KATHLEEN CHET7A Di~eci dial: (973) MOUNT KEMBLE AVENUE P.O. BOX 2075 MORRISTOWN, NEW JERSEY (973) FACSIMILE (973) December 8, 2016 VIA NYSCEF AND HAND DELIVERY Honorable Martin M. Shulman, J.S.C. Supreme Court of the State of New York 60 Centre Street New York, New York RE: Joseph Maetke v. ABB, Inc. as successor in interest to ITE Circuit Breakers, INC., et al; NYCAL Index No /2014 Vincent S. Rossi v. ABB, Inc. as successor in interest to ITE Circuit Breakers, INC., et al; NYCAL Index No /2014 Frank A. Vaccaro v. ABB, Inc. as successor in interest to ITE Circuit Breakers, INC., et al; NYCAL Index No /2014 Dear Justice Shulman: Defendant Eaton Corporation, as successor-in-interest to Cutler-Hammer, Ina ("Eaton"), hereby makes the following motions in limine in the three consolidated cases listed above: (1) to admit plaintiffs' proofs of claims and any other documents filed in connection with claims made to bankruptcy trusts; (2) to preclude plaintiffs' expert witnesses from offering specific causation testimony at trial; (3) to preclude plaintiffs from eliciting testimony concerning the positions, opinions, and/or statements of various regulatory and advisory agencies concerning exposure to asbestos to prove causation; and (4) to preclude lay witness testimony regarding the composition or asbestos content of any component associated with an Eaton product. In addition, Eaton hereby joins in any and all non-adverse motions in limine filed or to be filed by co-defendants whether or not those co-defendants remain at the time of trial. Eaton reserves the right to move for other in limine relief by oral application before and during the trial of this case

2 Hon. Martin Shulman Page~2 MCELROY, DEUTSCH, MULVANEY &CARPENTER, LLP 1. Eaton moves to admit Plaintiffs' proofs of claims and any other document filed in connection with claims made to bankruptcy trusts. Eaton moves to admit plaintiffs' proofs of claims into evidence. Proofs of claims forms are party admissions; as such, they should be admitted as evidence for the jury to consider with regard to the fault of all bankrupt entities. Because proofs of claims forms are filed by plaintiffs' counsel on behalf of individual plaintiffs, they should be "admissible against a party provided that the statements had been made by the attorney while acting in his authorized capacity." See Bellino v. Bellino Construction Co.. Inc. 75 A.D.2d 630, 427 N.Y.S.2d 303 (2nd Dept 1980); see also Payne v. New Hyde Park Dodge, 163 A.D.2d 285, 557 N.Y.S.2d 152 (2nd Dept 1990) (attorney's verification of bill of particulars considered judicial admission); DiCamillo v. Citv of New York, 245 A.D.2d 332, 665 N.Y.S.2d 97 (2nd Dept 1997); Richardson, Evidence 253, at 220 [Prince 10`hed], (verification is expressly authorized by statute); see, CPLR 3020[d][3]; Matter of Giambra v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles of State of N.Y., 46 N.Y.2d. 743, 413 N.Y.S.2d 643, 386 N.E.2d 251 (1978). In the Maetke matter, plainriffs' counsel has filed five (5) claims with bankruptcy trusts, alleging that Joseph Maetke was exposed to asbestos from certain products manufactured, sold, or supplied by the bankrupt entities. In the Rossi matter, plaintiffs' counsel has filed fourteen (14) claims with bankruptcy trusts, alleging that Vincent Rossi was exposed to asbestos from certain products manufactured, sold, or supplied by the b2nkrupt entities. Similarly, in the Vaccaro matter, plaintiffs' counsel has filed twenty-nine (29) claims with bankruptcy trusts, alleging that Frank Vaccaro was exposed to asbestos from certain products manufactured, sold, or supplied by the bankrupt entities. On such claim forms, plaintiffs' counsel is typically listed as the "Claimant Representative." According to several trust procedures, claimants' attorneys may file claims only after they verify that the claimant himself has authorized the filing. This indicates that plaintiffs' counsel acts as an agent of the plaintiff when filing claims with various bankruptcy trusts. Plaintiffs' counseps submissions to bankruptcy trusts are relevant and necessary evidence in this matter, as they reveal the entities and products alleged to have caused plaintiffs' diseases.. As Judge Heitler noted in Carmodv v. Amchem Products, Inc., et al. (2014 NY Slip Op 31801(U)), "[t]he POC's often provide specific factual details regarding a claimants employment, exposure and medical history." She added that "POC disclosures enable all NYCAL defendants to learn whether the factual representations being made in a given action are consistent with, and as complete as, those representations being made to the bankruptcy trust. These representations `may contain product identification, [a~ claimants work history and exposure to asbestos, causation and apportionment of fault."' Carmodv citing Drabczvk v. Amchem Products, Index No. 1583/2005 (Sup. Ct. Erie Co. Jan. 18, 2008, Lane, J). Eaton would be severely prejudiced in the defense of this action if the Court declines to permit the admission of these documents.

3 Hon. Martin Shulman Page ~ 3 MCELROY, DEUTSCH, MULVANEY &CARPENTER, LLP 2. Eaton moves to preclude Plaintiffs' expert witnesses from offering specifc causation testimony at trial. Joseph Maetke In the Maetke matter, Plaintiff s served expert reports from Dr. James Strauchen' (dated May 29, 2015) and Dr. Sanford Ratner (dated January 13, 2015). Vincent Rossi In the Rossi matter, Piaintiffls served expert reports from Dr. James Strauchen (dated January 20, 2015) and Dr. Sanford Ratner (dated Januazy 13, 2015). Frank Vaccaro In the Vaccaro matter, Plaintiffls served expert reports from Dr. James Strauchen (dated December 23, 2014) and Dr. Sanford Ratner (dated January 13, 2015). Plaintiffs' experts do not offer any discussion, analysis or opinion specific to Eaton. None of these reports mention alleged exposure to any Eaton product or conclude that these plaintiffs' alleged exposure to asbestos from a product manufactured or supplied by Eaton was a substantial contributing cause of his disease. None of the experts addresses the issue of whether asbestos fibers in fact were emitted from the Eaton products with which plaintiffs allegedly worked. Further, none of these experts are qualified to give such an opinion. Indeed, plaintiff has submitted no expert proofs demonstrating that asbestos fibers were released from Eaton products and that these plaintiffs were, in fact, exposed to those fibers. Without such evidence, plaintiffs' medical experts cannot testify that any Eaton product was a substantial contributing factor in the causation of Mr. Maetke's, Mr. Rossi's, or Mr. Vaccaro's disease. See Parker v. Mobil Oil Corn., 7 N.Y3d 434, 450 (2006) ("It is well-established that an opinion on causation should set forth a plaintiff's exposure to a toxin, that the toxin is capable of causing the particular illness (general causation) and that plaintiff was exposed to sufficient levels of the toxin to cause the illness (specific causation)." Ibid. Plaintiffs' experts are not qualified to render expert opinions regarding fiber release from and exposure levels to any Eaton product. Expert testimony is unreliable and thus inadmissible where the person offered to provide such testimony is not qualified to render an expert opinion. In determining whether to allow expert testimony at time of trial the court must ensure that "the expert [providing the testimony] [is] possessed of the requisite skill, training, education, knowledge or experience from which it can be assumed that the information imparted or the opinion rendered is reliable." Matott v. Ward, 48 N.Y.2d 455, 459, 399 N.E.2d 532, 534. Although formal education is not necessary, an expert may not merely rely on a review of the literature as a basis for his opinion, rather, he must be qualified through "[1]ong observation and actual experience." Price by Price v. New York City Hous. Auth., 92 N.Y.2d 553, 559, 706 As the Court is aware, sadly, Dr. Strauchen has passed away. We reserve our rights to seek further relief once plaintiff discloses substituted experts.

4 Hon. Martin Shulman Page~4 MCELROY, DEUTSCH, MULVANEY &CARPENTER, LLP N.E.2d 1167, 1170 (N.Y. 1998); Gushlaw v. Roll, 735 N.Y.S.2d 667, 290 A.D.2d 667 (3d Dept. 2002). The scope of the expert's testimony must be limited to his or her area of expertise. "Thus, for example, a medical expert is not qualified as a ballistics expert, and a metallurgist may not testify on dynamics and forces." Smith v. M.V. Woods Constr. Co., 764 N.Y.S.2d 749, 751, 309 A.D.2d 1155, 1157 (4th Dept. 2003) (citations omitted). Furthermore, plaintiffs have not disclosed any experts in the field of industrial hygiene. Therefore, none of plaintiffs' experts has tested any Eaton product. Moreover, none of the disclosed experts relies on testing performed by any qualified expert to support their causation opinions. Mere unsupported assumptions regarding Mr. Maetke's, Mr. Rossi's, or Mr. Vaccaro's alleged exposures are prohibited and are inadmissible at trial. Acknowledging that precise quantification of a plaintiff's exposure is often difficult to establish, the Parker Court nonetheless recognized that there are valid scientific methods and tools available that permit an expert to express an exposure opinion or assessment that is reliably and scientifically based. The Court noted that exposure levels can be measured "through the use of mathematical modeling by taking a plaintiffs work history into account to estimate the exposure to a toxin," or by a "[c]omparison to the exposure levels of subjects of other studies... provided that the expert made a specific comparison sufficient to show bow the plaintiff's exposure level related to those of the other subjects[,]" or some other method "generally accepted as reliable in the scientific community." Id. at 449, 824 N.Y.5.2d at (emphasis supplied). Although plaintiffs in the New York asbestos litigation have repeatedly argued that Parker does not and cannot apply in asbestos cases because quantification of the plaintiff's historical exposures is not possible, earlier this year the Court of Appeals expressly rejected the "impossibility" argument and reaffirmed that in a toxic exposure case a plaintiff is required to demonstrate through reliable scientific methodologies that the exposure was at a level sufficient to cause disease. Although it is sometimes difficult, if not impossible, to quantify a plaintiff's past exposure to a substance, we have not dispensed with the requirement that a causation expert in a toxic tort case show, through generally accepted methodologies, that plaintiff was exposed to a sufficient amount of a toxin to have caused his injuries. *+* Although it is "not always necessary for a plaintiff to quantify exposure levels precisely (id.), we have never "dispensed with a plaintiffs burden to establish sufficient exposure to a substance to cause the claimed adverse health effect (Cornell v 360 W. 51st Realty, LLC, 22 NY3d 762, 784, 986 N.Y.S.2d 389, 9 N.E.3d 884 X2014]). "At a minimum,...there must be evidence from which the factfinder can conclude that the plaintiff was exposed to levels of th[e] agent that are known to cause the kind of harm that the

5 Hon. Martin Shulman Page ~ 5 plaintiff claims to have suffered" (id., quoting Wright v Willamette Indus., Inc., 91 Fad 1105, 1107 [8th Cir 1996]). Not only is it necessary for a causation expert to establish that the plaintiff was exposed to sufficient levels of a toxin to have caused his injuries, but the expert also must do so through methods "found to be generally accepted as reliable in the scientific community" (Parker, 7 NY3d at 449). Sean R. v. BMW of North America LLC, 26 N.Y.3d 801, 812, , 28 N.Y.S3d 656, 662, 660 (2016) (affirming preclusion of plaintiff's causation experts' opinions for failure to demonstrate reliable scientific support for conclusions regarding level of exposure to gasoline vapor); see also Cornell v. 360 W. 51st St. Realtv LLC, 22 N.Y.3d 762, 784, 986 N.Y.S.2d 389, (2014) (dismissing plaintiff's claim that she sustained personal injuries as a result of exposure to dampness and mold in her apartment for failure to "show the necessary specific causation" and noting that that the plaintiff's expert had not only failed to identify the specific disease-causing agent to which the plaintiff had been exposed, he likewise "made no effort to quantify her level of exposwe..." ). Parker and its progeny likewise make clear that an expert's causation opinion that is based on nothing more than the plaintiff's statements concerning the circumstances of the alleged exposure, such as a report of "visible dust," is insufficient as a matter of law to establish specific causation. For these reasons, plaintiffs' medical experts should be precluded from offering any opinions concerning asbestos emission from Eaton's products, and, hence, any opinion regazding specific causation. 3. Eaton moves to preclude plaintiffs from eliciting testimony concerning the positions, opinion, and/or statements of various regulatory and advisory agencies concerning exposure to asbestos to prove causation. Eaton anticipates that plaintiffs and their experts, in order to satisfy their burden of proof as to causation, will attempt to elicit testimony concerning positions, opinions, and/or statements of various regulatory and advisory agencies, e.g., OSHA, NIOSH, EPA, World Health Organization, or the IARC, concerning exposure to asbestos. Specifically, Plaintiffs may attempt to elicit testimony from their witnesses that such regulatory agencies take the position that there is "no safe level" of exposure to asbestos and/or that "al[ fiber types" cause mesothelioma. The existence of a regulation regarding exposure to a substance, however, is not sufficient to show that exposure to that substance at or above a certain level caused a specific plaintiff's injury. In addition, as the Court of Appeals has held, standards promulgated by regulatory agencies as protective measures are inadequate to demonstrate legal causation. Pazker v. Mobil Oil Coro., 7 N.Y3d 434, 450 (2006) (holding Yhat "standards promulgated by regulatory agencies as protective measures aze inadequate to demonstrate legal causation"). As such, references to regulatory pronouncements regarding asbestos dangers (e.g. "no safe levels" or "all fiber types"

6 Hon. Martin Shulman Page ~ 6 MCELROY, DEUTSCH, MULVANEY &CARPENTER, LLP cause mesothelioma) should be excluded because they are irrelevant to any issue for which plaintiffs bear the burden of proof and are unfairly prejudicial, misleading and confusing. Regulatory pronouncements are inadmissible because they are promulgated in accordance with a regulatory authority's obligation to ensure safety. Such agencies inherently en on the side of safety, and take a conservative approach, because that is their mandate. Illustrating this fact, the United States Supreme Court has observed that, OSHA is not required to support its finding that a significant risk exists with anything approaching scientific certainty. Although the Agency's findings must be supported by substantial evidence, 29 U.S.C. 655(fl, 6(b)(5) specifically allows the Secretary to regulate on the basis of the "best available evidence." As several Courts of Appeals have held, this provision requires a reviewing court to give OSHA some leeway where its findings must be made on the frontiers of scientific knowledge. (citations omitted) Thus, so long as they are supported by a body of reputable scientific thought, the Agency is free to use conservative assumptions in interpreting the data with respect to carcinogens, risking error on the side of over protection rather than under protection. Indus. Union Dent AFL-CIO v Am. Petroleum Ins.t, 448 U.S. 607, 656, 100 S. Ct. 2844, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1010 (1980); 51 F.R , 22646, June 20, A good example of a regulatory authority's position is OSHA's model for low dose asbestos exposure. The OSHA model is an extrapolation of high dose data, and has been found to overstate the risk of lung cancer by a factor of up to 24 times. See Lash, et al. A Meta- Analysis of the Relation Behveen Cumulative Exposure to Asbestos and Relative Risk of Lung Cancer, Occupational and Environmental Medicine 1997; 54: , 262. ("Our esrimates for potency, are 24-fold lower than OSHA's under the fixed effect model and fourfold lower under the random effects model."); Camus, Do Risk Assessments Justify Banndng Chrysotile or Not?, The Health Effects of Chrysotile Asbestos, Can. Mineral., Spec. Pub. 5 pp , 231 (2001) ("In a study of female residents of chrysotile mining towns, the EPA's exposure-response model overestimated at least by 15 fold the excess risk of lung cancer. For mesothelioma, the discrepancy seems much larger."). Moreover, many of the statements and regulations, upon which Plaintiffs counsel may seek to rely are based on old research, which have been largely discredited, although the agencies have yet to incorporate new scientific findings in the regulations.2 Z For instance, the current EPA risk assessment methodology is based on research conducted in the mid-1980's. It has been demonstrated to dramatically overstate the risk of exposure to chrysotile asbestos. Anew proposed risk assessment methodology was proposed by scientists under contract to EPA in October A Science Advisory Board was convened to explore the implementation of this methodology. See e.g.,

7 Hon. Martin Shulman Page~7 In addition, many of the organizations that are the sources of pronouncements on the safety of asbestos products are political, not scientific in nature, and are inadmissible hearsay. There is no exception for this type of hearsay. The same is true for testimony to the effect that different governments may have "banned" asbestos. As a result, plaintiffs' counsel should be prohibited from introducing any such evidence. Regulatory and advisory agencies are responsible for protecting the general public from the potential future adverse effects of toxic substances. See generally Ethvl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976). When issuing pronouncements on toxic substances, regulatory and advisory agencies such as the EPA or OSHA are engaging in prospective overprotective risk assessment. These agencies utilize a "weight of the evidence" or "risk model assessmenp' to assess the toxicity of various substances and suggest or make prophylactic rules governing human exposure. Allen v. Pennsylvania Eng'g Com., 102 F.3d 194, 198 (5th Cir. 1996). "This methodology results from the preventive perspective that the agencies adopt in order to reduce public exposure to harmful substances." Id. Courts have found asbestos exposure standards adopted by some regulatory agencies to be inapplicable because those approaches utilize a threshold of proof much lower than that required to prove causation in tort law. Sutera v. Perrier Gm. Of Am. Inc., 665 (D. Mass. 1997). In re Garlock Sealing Technologies LLC, 504 B.R. 71, (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2014) (internal citations omitted)(emphasis added); see also Allen, 102 F.3d at 198 ("The agencies' threshold of proof is reasonably lower that that appropriate in tort law, which `traditionally makes[s] more particularized inquiries into cause and effect and requires a plaintiff to prove `that it is more likely than not that another individual has caused him or her harm."'); Silharath v. Sanoz Pharms Corp, 131 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1371 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (same). Regulatory agencies are not required to support their causal findings with a high degree of confidence or scientific certainty. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Causation in Government Regulation and Toxic Torts, 76 Wash. U.L.Q. 1307, 1308 (Winter 1998). In fact, "it remains the duty of the [regulatory agency] to act...even in circumstances where existing methodology or research is deficient." Society of Plastics Industry, Inc. v. OSHA 509 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir. 1975). Ultimately, a regulatory agency must act "in part on factual issues but largely on choices of policy, on an assessment of risks [and] on predictions dealing with matters on the frontiers of scientific knowledge..." Ethyl Corgi, 541 F.2d at 23 quoting Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1974). By contrast, in a tort case the court or jury must find that it is more probable than not that 1) the allegedly toxic substance in question can, generally, cause the type of disease involved and 2) exposure to the defendant's specific product did in facc, cause the particular individuaps disease. See Parker 7 N.Y3d at 448 ("an opinion based on causation should set forth a plaintiff's exposure to a toxin, that the toxin is capable of causing the particular illness (general causation) and that plaintiff was exposed to sufficient levels of the toxin to cause ca3f683ae57a85256ce9006a32d0/77cff6439cooabf ] F/$File/EPA-SAB Response+~ Z-z pdf.

8 Hon. Martin Shulman Page~8 the illness (specific causation)"); Glastetter, 252 F.3d 986 at 991 (8th Cir. 2001) ("The FDA's 1994 decision that Parlodel can cause strokes is unreliable proof of medical causation in the present case because the FDA employs a reduced standard (vis-a-vis tort liability) for gauging causation when it decides to rescind drug approval."). As a result, regulatory agencies are not engaged in making cause and effect conclusions, let alone specific causation determinations, and their pronouncements and regulations accordingly, should not and cannot be construed for those purposes and turned into causation opinions put forth by plaintiffs' experts and presented to the jury. In the present case, Plaintiffs will likely attempt to introduce position statements of regulatory agencies such as OSHA, NIOSH, EPA, and other government regulations regarding asbestos as evidence that any level of asbestos and all types of asbestos even very small amounts--can cause disease. Like those government regulations at issue in Pazker and Sutera, however, regulations relating to asbestos exposure are similarly aspirational and designed to err on the side of less potential exposure in order to remove as many potential hazards from the environment as possible. Regulatory position statements regarding asbestos are based on the unproven extrapolation that if higher levels are highly toxic, then smaller levels are less toxic, but toxic nonetheless. See, e.g., In re Garlock, 504 B.R. at ("Dr. Carl Brodkin and Dr. Laura Welch both testified that any documented occupational exposure to chrysotile regardless of how minimal was sufficient to attribute it as a cause of mesothelioma... A fundamental flaw in their analyses is that the studies on which they rely all involve people in very high exposure settings... [and they] then apply the findings from such high-dose occupations to lowdose applications without an adequate basis."). This position is based on the assumption of toxicity at lower levels when there is no actual proof of the same. Therefore, these aspirational regulation positions concerning asbestos are not proof of causation and should not be presented to thejury. Finally, any minimal probative value in referencing these governmental regulations is substantially outweighed by the danger of misleading the jury and confusing issues related to causation and plaintiffs' burden of proof. A substantial danger exists that a jury will confuse the statements attributable to regulatory or advisory agencies with plaintiffs' causation burden of proof. As these statements are cloaked in the aura of "official government statements" and Eaton is unable to cross-examine the individuals who made those statements there is a substantial prejudice to Eaton as there is a significant risk that the jury will give undue emphasis to such statements. For these reasons, Eaton respectfully requests that this Court grant this Motion in Limine and preclude Plaintiffs' counsel from making reference to regulations, public statements, or publications promulgated by regulatory agencies and non-governmental organizations such as OSHA, EPA, WHO, WTO, or others. 4. This Court should preclude each plaintiff's testimony that he was exposed to asbestos from an Eaton product because he is not competent to testify regarding the composition or content of any component associated with an Eaton product.

9 Hon. Martin Shulman Page~9 Any testimony from Mr. Maetke, Mr. Rossi, or Mr. Vaccaro regarding the alleged asbestos content of any component associated with an Eaton product or the asbestos content of any purported dust emitted from any product is sheer speculation and is inadmissible under wellsettled law. Because these plaintiffs do not possess any first-hand knowledge regarding the content or composition of any component associated with any Eaton product they may have encountered, they are not a competent witnesses to testify about the alleged asbestos content of those products. During the relevant time period, 1960s to 1980s, Cutler-Hammer sold electrical panels used in various applications. Some of the panels contained no insulating or backer boazds, but rather were made only of steel. Cutler-Hemmer documents demonstrate that the panel materials consisted of asbestos ebony as well as ohmstone and monson slate. The monson slate panels used in some Cutler-Hammer electrical panels between the ] 920s and the 1970s did not contain asbestos. The documents further indicate that the material that comprised the molded phenolic components inside Cutler-Hammer panels and other electrical equipment, were not all asbestoscontaining. Indeed, a letter dated April 23, 1976, from one of Cutler-Hammer's suppliers of molding compounds establishes that most of the molded compounds sold to Cutler-Hammer by that supplier -- four out of the six types -- did not contain any asbestos. Indeed, the First Department has held in circumstances nearly identical to those presented in this case that such testimony is incompetent and, without more, is insufficient as a matter of law to establish a prima facie case. In Perdicaro v. A.O. Smith, 52 A.D.3d 300, 301, 860 N.Y.S.2d 506, 507 (1st Dept. 2008), the First Department reversed the trial court's denial of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Treadwell, finding that the plaintiff's evidence "was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact whether he was exposed to asbestos-based insulation at any given time ay' the Con Edison powerhouses at which he claimed to have worked when the defendant's workers were insulating equipment. The Court reasoned that the plaintiff admittedly lacked training in insulating work, and offered no factual support that would reasonably suggest that the insulation he saw in use at the time he was purportedly present at the Con Ed powerhouses was asbestos-based; the evidence indicated that insulation utilized at these powerhouses often contained fire/heat-resistant components other than asbestos. Although the record indicated Treadwell had ordered asbestos-content paper, glass-cloth and millboard in connection with Con Edison's Arthur Kill contract, there was no testimony from plaintiff worker that he ever observed the use of such materials at the Arthur Kill construction site. It would be purely speculation to assume that such insulating materials were used during his sporadic and limited presence at the Arthur Kill powerhouse. Because Mr. Maetke, Mr. Rossi, and Mr. Vaccaro demonstrably lack any first-hand knowledge regarding the content or composition of the components they associated with Eaton products, they are not competent to testify that the Eaton products were asbestos-containing or that any purported dust emitted from any such product contained asbestos. Mr. Maetke, Mr. Rossi, and Mr. Vaccaro are obviously not industrial hygiene experts and none of these plaintiffs has training in the science of industrial hygiene or product testing or the recognition of asbestos.

10 Hon. Martin Shulman Page (10 Although Mr. Maetke, Mr. Rossi, and Mr. Vaccaro may be competent to testify that they worked with Eaton products, including their observations regarding the products (ems., size, shape, and color), their wholly uninformed and unsupported beliefs regarding the alleged asbestos content of products' components are nothing more than inadmissible speculation and conjecture. The testimony should be precluded. Finally, Eaton hereby joins in any and all non-adverse motions in limine filed or to be filed by co-defendants whether or not those co-defendants remain at the time of trial. Eaton reserves the right to move for other in limine relief by oral application before and during the trial of this case. Dated: Morristown, New Jersey December 8, 2016 Respectfully submitted, ~~ R~~ Kathleen Chetta cc: All counsel via NYSCEF