ANTHROPOLOGY 103 HONS CHALLENGES THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE GIBE DAM IN ETHIOPIA

Transcription

1 ANTHROPOLOGY 103 HONS CHALLENGES THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE GIBE DAM IN ETHIOPIA 21 Authors enrolled in 103H Corresponding author: Monique Borgerhoff Mulder Department of Anthropology UC Davis, CA June 2015 Construction of the Gibe III dam, situated on the Omo river and approximately 300km south west of Ethiopia s capital Addis Ababa began in July 2006 (Figure 1). Now nearly 10 years on, it is near completion. The government says it will provide much needed power to help develop the country s economy. The dam will also support vast commercial irrigated plantations that are forcing the local communities from their land by disrupting the river s annual downstream flood, both in southern Ethiopia and in Kenya s Lake Turkana basin. The Lower Omo Valley is home to over 200,000 people, 5 national parks and is designated a United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage site, in recognition of its archaeological and geological importance. International scholars, including hydrologists, economists and conservation biologists, predict that the Gibe III and the associated plantations will have catastrophic effects for the communities that depend on the Omo River, as well as for the fragile ecology of this very arid area, with serious implications for relations between Ethiopia and Kenya. Here we focus on some of the complex issues arising from the controversy over continued funding and implementation of this project. After exploring the current situation in the Lower Omo Valley (a), we address the general challenges associated with river dams (b), the specific economic benefits promised by the Ethiopian government (c), human rights abuses (d), the campaigns that have been mounted against the Gibe III dam (e), and the role of funders (f). We end by addressing some more general issues of how to feed and power the world without externalizing costs on the powerless and the environment (g), and some suggestions about what should be done now (h). As of 19 January, 2015, the reservoir behind the Omo Gibe III Dam has begun to fill (Figure 2), and will be full in an estimated 3 years. All in all half a million people practicing flood-recession agriculture and pastoralism, who are entirely dependent on the Omo river s natural flood cycle, are at risk (Jones 2013). World Heritage Site status appears to provide little protection to water rights, and human communities are being displaced. In conjunction with associated irrigation projects, the water level in Lake Turkana is predicted to drop 20 meters (Vidal 2014), resulting in significant changes in the size and salinity of the lake, and further human displacement. In a report presented by the State Party of Kenya on 1 February, 2015, it was stated that the Ethiopia-Kenya Joint Ministerial Commission is working on a Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) to assess the dam s impact, explore potential solutions to mitigate environmental changes, and ensure that the dam brings no negative effects to the area. This is to be completed December However, on 16 May 2015 the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), one of the major organizations working to monitor the Gibe III dam, visited Kenyan authorities and determined that while the dam project is now 90% completed, the SEA is still not under way (UNESCO 2015). Dams in general have both costs and benefits; the majority of the costs tend to be incurred by local people while most of the benefits accrue to outsiders. Dam construction requires the displacement of peoples from floodplains above the site, leading to the destruction of homes and arable land (Jackson 2000). Sites of cultural, historical, and religious significance may be destroyed to make way for dams and reservoirs. Downstream farmers who have adapted to mitigate the costs of seasonal floods no longer experience the benefits associated with them (Cernea 2004). The presence of dams can disrupt and prevent the spawning of migratory fish species,

2 often of economic importance to local communities (Duggan 2015). Finally, the formation of large, still bodies of water can serve as a breeding ground for mosquitoes, which increases the prevalence of malaria in at-risk communities (Keiser et al 2005). Furthermore, while dams do offer multiple positive economic benefits such as control of water supply, flood control, potential for irrigation, increased navigability and reliable electrical supply, many of these disproportionately benefit large-scale investors or are distributed within the country as a whole (Jackson 2000). Many of these issues are emerging in the Lower Omo. There are additional problems specific to Gibe III project. One concern is that cutting off inflows from the Omo River into Lake Turkana will lower the lake s water level, potentially causing the lake to split into two smaller ones (Vidal 2014). The reduction in the lake s water volume will also lead to increased salinity and a subsequent decrease in biodiversity (Avery 2012). As means to counteract some of the ecological impacts, controlled ecological flows and floods are proposed, but these are unlikely to mimic natural processes (Avery 2012). Malaria is also significant health risk in Ethiopia. A study in a nearby area suggest that construction of the Gilge-Gibe dam increased malarial infection in local children by 43%, assuming the relationship between malaria and the dam construction is causal (Yewhalaw et al 2009). The Ethiopian government has defended the Gibe III dam project and the development of the Omo Valley, positing huge consequential economic benefits. Of the commercial plantations supported by dam construction in Omo, the sugar plantations run by Ethiopian Sugar Corporation has received most attention (Moore and Mousseau 2013). The Ethiopian Investment Agency (2012) asserted that Ethiopia would make an attractive location for investment in sugar due to its conditions conducive to growing sugar, abundant, hard-working, inexpensive and easily trainable labour force, and tax exemptions. The report further claims that as sugar cultivation in Ethiopia averages 9-11 tons per hectare per month (versus 6-8 tons in other countries), and the average wage per each worker would be USD, Ethiopia is a prime country for investment in sugar. In addition to sugar, there is also potential for growing oil palm, jatropha, cotton, and maize cash crops. Accordingly plots of land are being leased to outside companies. To further incentivize investments, the former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi promised 150,000 hectares along with six factories devoted to sugar processing (Moore and Mousseau 2013). The sugar plantations will supply sugar for biofuels, primarily in the EU (Hodbod 2013), while the electricity generated by the Gibe II dam will be exported to other countries such as Kenya (Vidal 2015), adding an estimated $407 million to its annual revenue. This revenue will help pay off the $572 million government investment in the project, redress Ethiopia's frequent and costly brown outs resulting from high energy demand and low production (Pottinger 2011), and bring electricity to Ethiopia s rural areas where currently only 23% of the population has access the electrical grid (World Bank 2015). These postulated economic gains are problematic, and raise issues of transparency and ecological rationality. Regarding transparency, there has been no openly-agreed on environmental and social impact assessment study. A governmental commitment to full assessment prior to construction in 2006 was ignored, and the document finally produced in 2008 has been criticized for being shoddy, containing too many assumptions and having poor baseline knowledge (International Rivers 2011). Regarding ecological rationality, the claim that the dam will allow for increased biofuel production may be correct, but there is increasing concern that in the long run biofuels increase global carbon emissions; this is because agricultural land converted to biofuel production must be replaced by new deforestation (Norden 2013). Human rights is another issue of concern. The Omo Valley has been a site for the oppression of indigenous people for several decades. In the 1960 s and 1970 s national parks were established in the area, with no provision for indigenous management of the parks resources. The government has repeatedly forced the pastoralists into a more sedentary lifestyle (Survival International 2012). In the 1980 s large sections of the

3 Omo communities territory were turned into state lands and used for farming. This farmland was then sold to foreign companies and governments for cash crop and biofuel production. The Gibe III will capitalize on these cash crop opportunities at the expense of native communities. All 200,000 people in the valley would need to be resettled, including all 8 different ethnic groups (the Mursi, Bodi, Kwegu (Muguji), Karo, Hamer, Suri, Nyangatom and Daasanach) (Human Rights Watch 2012); in Kenya too there will be drastic repercussions for the several hundred thousand pastoralists in the Lake Turkana basin. The Ethiopian government has promised their resettled groups schools, housing, irrigation, and food aid, but there is little evidence the government is upholding these commitments. Furthermore the 150,000 full- and part-time jobs promised by the government are likely to consist primarily of underpaid seasonal labor in the sugar plantations (Oakland Institute 2013). These human rights violations might have political consequences for the relationship between Kenya and Ethiopia. Kenya s northern lands are unstable due both to the Somalian refugee crisis and the April attacks by al-shabaab in Garissa (Bremmer 2015). Ethiopia is also sensitive to political instability, in part as result of ISIS s massacre of Ethiopian Christians in the same month (Tejas 2015). While relations between Kenya and Ethiopia are generally positive, the Gibe III dam is likely to exert social and ecological strains on already insecure nations, strains that could galvanize further uncertainty, catalyzing conflicts, and increasing membership in extremist organizations (Leno 2015). For all these reasons the Gibe III project has not gone without opposition, but the Ethiopian government has done its best to silence any critics, using oppressive tactics such as beatings, arbitrary detention and arrest, fear tactics, rape, and murder (Survival International 2012). Anything other than outright support for the project is met with intimidation and violence (Human Rights Watch 2012). Trials are held in which the defense does not speak a common language with the prosecution, giving them little opportunity to defend themselves, let alone understand the accusations against them. Because of the language barrier, and general illiteracy in the Lower Omo, communities have little information or awareness about developments that affect them directly. Furthermore, as we will see below, the Ethiopian government has passed policy prohibiting outside organizations from coming to aid Omo communities. Numerous organizations including USAID and local aid providers claim to have assessed the degree of human rights abuse in Ethiopia, but few official conclusive reports have been made public (Survival International 2015). For example, USAID denied any abuses in Ethiopia, but also acknowledged that their investigation was neither in-depth nor representative (Weller 2014). These paradoxical claims underscore the lack of transparency in analyzing the future effects of Gibe III, and the reliance of organizations like USAID on scant, inconsistent, or biased information to determine the necessity of aid. But these organizations are not alone at fault. As noted above, the Ethiopian government has silenced challenges to the dam. For example in in 2009, the Ethiopian legislature decreed that any charity or NGO which receives more than 10% of its funding from foreign sources (implicating virtually every charity in Ethiopia) cannot promote human and democratic rights (Survival International 2015). Furthermore, when Human Rights Watch an independent monitor of human rights reported violations, two government organizations (USAID from the United States and DFID from the UK) claimed these reports were unsubstantiated. This may reflect a conflict between morality and interests for profit, due to American and UK investments in the area (Oakland Institute 2013a). Local groups are also being threatened and prevented from taking action against the construction of Gibe III. For example the Southern Region Justice Bureau revoked the licenses of 41 local community associations, accusing them of not co-operating with government policy (Survival International 2015). While the government attempts to prevent local organizations from speaking out against harmful projects, groups like Survival International retaliate by advocating a letter writing campaign, demanding that the Ethiopian prime minister reconsider the dam s construction.

4 The non-profit International Rivers also encourages two way communication, demanding honest and open dialogue with affected peoples in the Lower Omo River Basin, those who live around Lake Turkana, and the Kenyan government (Fong 2014). International Rivers recommend halting the project until all the potential negative impacts are made public and the local people have the opportunity to give their opinions. Specifically, they propoose Ethiopia delay completion of the Gibe III and commercial irrigation plantations until a legitimate region-wide environmental and socio-economic impact analysis has been completed and publicly released (Fong 2014). The recommendation continues to go unheeded. Even the UN Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination has become involved. In 2011, they requested the release of information concerning how construction may be negatively impacting the livelihoods of people dependent upon the Lower Omo. The committee insisted knowing the measures being taken to consult with potential victims about the dam s construction. However, as of November of 2013, the committee has received no response (Human Rights Watch 2015) But there is hope for real research. Groups such as the Oakland Institute have provided the public with direct evidence of human rights abuses by consulting with various local leaders (Oakland Institute 2015) and by reporting on government-backed physical violence, including killings and imprisonment for obscure crimes (Oakland Institute 2013b). There are also reports of government tactics of pitting one ethnic group against another in order to thwart cooperation amongst the opposition (Oakland Institute 2013b). Therefore, campaigns intent on protecting the potential victims of the dam need to expose any governmental corruption supporting the dam, circulate first-hand accounts from local affected people, and establish greater accountability and protection of their human rights. Currently only China s Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) is providing direct financial support for the US$1.8 billion project (Human Rights Watch 2014). Although the World Bank withdrew from directly funding the project on account of poor publicity, it still funds power transmission lines from the dam, loaning a substantial US$684 million. This backdoor approach is missed by the public (Bosshard 2012). Originally the World Bank had planned to connect Ethiopia s electrical grid with Kenya s, create power-sharing between the two countries, reduce energy costs, promote sustainable and renewable power generation [and] better protect the region s environment...eventually benefiting 212 million people in five countries." (Rudolph 2012). The World Bank cannot uphold its mission statement of Working for a World Free of Poverty simply by ignoring the source of the power (World Bank Group 2015). China s Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) is even more guilty of disregarding their own policy, Integrity Leads to Prosperity, by directly funding the project (Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 2015). The ICBC also adopted the Equator Principles and the Green Credit Policy, which are a set of guidelines and advice that make financial institutions more conscious of social and environmental effects of their actions (Aizawa 2011). Both the ICBC and World Bank s actions blatantly contradict their own initiatives and policies. While it is now too late for either funder to back out entirely, one way to help ease the losses of the local people would be to pay reparations. However, seeing how the project funding continued despite public outcry and company policies, it seems unlikely to happen unless an outside agency makes them accountable for their actions. Debacles like this cannot be considered in isolation. Our planet is increasingly full, feeding the world in the future will prove to be the crucible of mankind that will either ensure our continued survival or spell out our doom. Does the world need the Lower Omo food, biofuels and electricity? We suggest that rather than taking more land from nature and people we think more seriously about modifying our western diet. Thirty six percent of the world s crops grown today go to feeding livestock (Foley 2014). This huge chunk of food could instead go to feeding millions of hungry people around the world. Shifting our diet to one consisting of more vegetables

5 and less meat could greatly reduce the pressure on the world s food supply (Foley 2014). A newer and more innovative idea is the concept of eating insects as food. Many cultures around the Earth have eaten insects for eons. The efficiency with which insects can convert feed to biomass, their ability to multiply rapidly, and their availability to all cultures make them a great option for feeding 9 billion hungry mouths (Alford 2014). Feeding the world is not only about producing more food, but focusing resources on fairer redistribution (Godfray et al 2010). However, world hunger is still an epidemic because of wealth disparities that prevent people from being able to afford food or the land to grow food. Thus, the politics surrounding economic systems appears to be a primary contributor to world hunger today. In Ethiopia, one of the greatest detriments to the economic system is Ethiopia s reliance on loans from the World Bank. Ethiopia is classified as a low income country (World Bank 2015), meaning that Ethiopia can borrow from the International Development Association (IDA). The IDA offers loans to developing countries at a minimum rate in order to support projects that will help stimulate the economy. However, despite its apparent purpose, the IDA continues to cripple Ethiopia s economy, forcing Ethiopia to degrade its environment and the homes of hundreds of thousands of Ethiopians in order to compensate for the failing economy. Because the IDA primarily directs loans for funding land development and infrastructure-focused projects, countries like Ethiopia have been forced to industrialize agriculture without any independent market growth. This decoupling of industrialization and market growth can be traced back to the historically poor advice given by the representative banks of the IDA to the Ethiopian government encouraging the funding of unnecessary infrastructure projects instead of supporting stimulation of the private sector (Berg and Batchelder 1985). We contend that it is Ethiopia s growing reliance on loans from the IDA that is ultimately behind the flooding of the Lower Omo basin. The dam is filling (Figures 3 and 4). While the Omo Gibe III dam may provide Ethiopia and neighboring countries with a reliable source of electricity, steps must be taken now to prevent the marginalization of the people affected by its construction. International Rivers strongly advises that Ethiopia halt the project, and heed the advice of international experts to create an integrated water-resources management plan for the Lower Omo (International Rivers 2015). This plan should consider the environmental and socio-economic impacts of all developments in the region. The government must engage in an honest and open dialogue with all the people affected by this project, from the Lower Omo River Basin to those who live around Lake Turkana, and with the Kenyan government (Fong 2013). On 29 May 2015, the World Heritage Committee (WHC), heading the monitoring of the dam, drafted a decision reaffirming the significant negative environmental impacts of the dam. The decision advocates for further discussion between the State Parties of Ethiopia and Kenya, requesting that these governments submit a Strategic Environmental Assessment by 2016 before further expansion of the dam and the Kuraz Sugar Scheme project. The IUCN and WHC advocated for preventing further development of the proposed Gibe IV and V dam projects as well as other projects such as oil exploration, until an SEA has been produced by the state authorities. Following the meeting between IUCN and the Kenyan authorities in May, Kenya and Ethiopia joined the United National Environment Programme s (UNEP) Sustainable Development of Lake Turkana and its River Basins project. The World Heritage Committee will hold their 39 th session from 28 June-8 July 2015, during which the Omo Dam projects will be discussed and conservation goals will be further established. The world s eyes should be on these meetings. [see the on-line version for what happened].

6 Bibliography "Access to Electricity (% of Population)." Access to Electricity (% of Population). The World Bank, n.d. Web. 05 June Aizawa, Motoko (2011) China s Green Credit Policy: Building Sustainability in the Financial Sector, 24 February Accessed 06 June Alford, Justine. (2014) "Will We All Be Eating Insects In 50 Years." IFLScience. IFLScience, 28 Aug Accessed 7 Jun Avery, Sean (2012). Lake Turkana & the Lower Omo: Hydrologic Impacts of Major Dam & Irrigation Development Report. African Studies Centre 1. Berg, E. and A. Batchelder (1985). "Structural Adjustment Lending: A Critical View. CPD discussion paper no , World Bank. January Bosshard, Peter (2012) "World Bank to Fund Gibe III Dam through the Backdoor?", 22 May Accessed 04 June Bremmer, Ian. "Why Kenya Is So Vulnerable to Terror Attacks." Time. Time, 10 Apr Web. 06 June 2015 Cernea, Michael M (2015). "Social Impacts and Social Risks in Hydropower Programs: Preemtive Planning and Counter-risk Measures." Oct Accessed 3 June Dugan, Patrick J. et al. (2010) Fish Migration, Dams, and Loss of Ecosystem Services in the Mekong Basin. Ambio The Ecologist. (2015) Ethiopia: Stealing the Omo valley, destroying its ancient peoples. ancient_peoples.html Ethiopian Investment Agency. Investment Profile for Sugar Cane Plantation and Processing in Ethiopia. Rep. N.p.: Ethiopian Investment Agency, July Web. 2 Jun FAO (2002). Report of the World Food Summit: five years later. Rome, June Foley, Jonathan (2014). "Feeding 9 Billion." National Geographic 17: Fong, Catherine. "A Cascade of Development on the Omo River." (n.d.): n. pag. 27 Jan Web. 3 June < Godfray, H.C.J., et al. (2010). Food Security: The Challenge of Feeding 9 Billion People. Science 327: Hodbod, Jennifer E. The Impacts of Biofuel Expansion on the Resilience of Social-Ecological Systems in Ethiopia. Thesis. University of East Anglia, N.p.: U of East Anglia, University of East Anglia, July Web. 2 June 2015.

7 Human Rights Watch (2012) "Human Rights Violations in the Context of Industrial Development of the Lower Omo Valley." "What Will Happen If Hunger Comes?" : Summary. Accessed 31 May Human Rights Watch (2014) "Ethiopia: Land, Water Grabs Devastate Communities." 19 Feb Accessed 04 June Human Rights Watch (2015): "Ethiopia: Omo Sugar Plantations." Human Rights Watch. Accessed 2 June Industrial and Commercial Bank of China. Accessed 3 June International Rivers (2015) "The Scramble for Water, Land and Oil in the Lower Omo Valley." 25 Jan Web. 04 June < International Rivers (2011). "Ethiopia's Gibe III Dam: Sowing Hunger and Conflict." 26 Jan Web. 05 June Jackson, Sukhan, and Adrian Sleigh (2000). "Resettlement for China's Three Gorges Dam: Socio-economic Impact and Institutional Tensions." Communist and Post-Communist Studies Jones, Alison M. "General Characteristics of the Omo River Basin." No Water No Life. N.p., Jan Web. 3 June < Keiser et al (2005). Effect of irrigation and large dams on the burden of malaria on a global and regional scale. American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene 72: Leno, Abraham. "Kenya Must Respect the Human Rights of Somali Refugees." Al Jazeera English. N.p., 6 June Web. 06 June Moore, Melissa and Frederic Mousseau, eds. "Ignoring Abuse in Ethiopia." Understanding Land Investment Deals in Africa (2013): n. pag. Oakland Institute. July Web. 2 June Noorden, Richard Van. "EU Debates U-turn on Biofuels Policy." Nature (2013): Web. 4 June Oakland Institute (2013a). "Ignoring Abuse in Ethiopia." Oakland Institute, Accessed 2 June Oakland Institute (2013b). "Omo: Local Tribes Under Threat." Oakland Institute. Accessed 2 June Oakland Institute (2015). We say the land is not yours: Breaking the silence against forced displacement in Ethiopia. Oakland Institute April Rudolph, Michael (2012) "World Bank Agrees to Fund Project Related to Controversial Gibe III Dam." Mongabay. 26 Sept Accessed 04 June Survival International (2012). Survival Uncovers Shocking Human Rights Abuses in Ethiopa. 22 Feb Web. 31 May 2015.

8 Survival International (2015) "Omo Valley Tribes." Survival International Charitable Trust. Accessed 2 June Tejas, Aditya. "Thousands Rally In Ethiopia Against ISIS Killing Of Ethiopian Christians In Libya." International Business Times. International Business Times, 22 Apr Web. 06 June UNESCO (2015) State of Conservation of Properties Inscribed on the World Heritage List. Rep. no. 39. Paris: n.p., th Session of the Committee. United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, 29 May Web. June 2015 Vidal, John. "Ethiopia Dam Will Turn Lake Turkana into 'endless Battlefield', Locals Warn." The Guardian. The Guardian, 13 Jan Web. 2 June Vidal, John (2014). "Ethiopian Dam's Ecological and Human Fallout Could Echo Aral Sea Disaster." 5 Mar Accessed 31 May Weller, Dennis. Letter to Sophie Grig. 17 Jan Survival International. Accessed 2 June World Bank Group. Accessed 04 June World Bank (2015) "Country and Lending Groups." Accessed 03 June Yewhalaw et al (2009) Malaria and water resource development: the case of Gilgel-Gibe hydroelectric dam in Ethiopia. Malaria Journal 8.

9 Figure 1. Location of Gibe III dam in Ethiopia (Google maps)

10 Figure 2 Satellite imagery (A) January and (B) January showing the reservoir filling behind the Omo Gibe Dam (earthexplorer.usgs.org) A B.

11 Figure 3. Image below showing Lower Omo Valley before and after dam construction from Originally from but since links were inaccessible, this image was found as a secondary link on

12 Figure 4 Arial views of Gibe Dam (Googe Earth) 2015.