Revising Solution of Cyprus Problem

Transcription

1 Research Report Revising Solution of Cyprus Problem Muhammad Bilal Khan Published by Institute of Peace and Diplomatic Studies, Islamabad, Pakistan 1

2 About the Author Muhammad Bilal Khan is a young multi-disciplinary scholar who has been credited with Masters Degrees in Economics (GC University Lahore, Pakistan) and International Relations (Malmo University, Sweden), Graduate Degree course-work in discipline of European Studies (Malmo University Sweden and Roskilde University Denmark) and Human Rights 60 ETCS (IMER, Malmo University Sweden). By his profession and experience, Muhammad Bilal Khan is a social science researcher, teacher, columnist and human right activist. He has almost seven years international exposure of living and working among different nationalities in central European and Nordic Countries. Before joining IPD, Mr.Bilal served as Assistant Researcher in SFI, Denmark. He is fluent in English, Urdu, and Punjabi and even knows basic of German, Danish and Swedish. 2

3 Preface Revising Solution of the Cyprus Problem is a peace-building effort, which intends to keep up a correspondence with ongoing peace process in Cyprus, and to visualize reality; is ongoing reunification approach adopted by United Nations, leaders of both communities and stakeholders as per actual needs of the circumstances prevailing in Cyprus and Eastern Mediterranean region for lasting and sustainable peace? The stated purpose of this research paper is to positively contribute toward creative social and academic debate that ends with support for finding the long-tem peace and the exact type of Cyprus solution. Research tactics to present arguments and to craft a diligent analysis of approaches for solving the Cyprus Problem over times, can be best considered to pursue the history of the problem and to explore broader societal issues deeply rooted in the contemporary wishes of deeply divided communities, the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots. 1960s federal solution proposed by ex-colonial power, Great Britain and guarantor powers, Turkey and Greek had already proven a failed experiment; consequents were the ethnic violence, arm outbreaks, atrocities and finally partition of the Island in Ideal of united Cyprus or reunification as possible future solution basing upon any federal agreement has always brought greater disenchantments among international brokers as both the communities have been rejecting any ideal of reunification over and over again since 1974: firstly, Greek-Cypriots resoundingly rejected federal solution proposed by UN Annan Plan in 2004 because it treated Cypriots as two distinct groups; secondly, UN facilitated rounds of talks of between leaders of both communities over reunification, have persistently been facing failure because of disagreement over rotating presidency or necessary involvement of guarantor states. Ongoing peace process in Cyprus again redesigns a reunification model, by which United Nation along with United States are active participators making leaders of both communities and guarantor powers compromise upon any possible federal solution. This research paper articulates primary arguments to contradict with reunification approach, by exploring broader societal issues that are directly and indirectly linked with history of problem in different time periods, that arguments also explain how the ideal of united Cyprus is considered mere an imposition on both communities. First judgment explains there was always negligence of common identity as Cypriot, both communities were extremely organized along intra-ethnic lines and most importantly necessary conditions for the successful implementation of 1960 s power-sharing consociational setup were also missing therefore infant state of united Cyprus collapsed. Second judgment constrains facts that how every effort to reunite both communities has failed. This is argued a bi-communal, bi-zonal cooperation and inter-ethnic communication are considered as agents that might lead communities toward reunification but unfortunately, social setup of divided Cyprus has extremely been lacking these agents since 1974, finding facts therefore withstand with ideal of continuation of the partition because it ends violence which has previously plagued Island. Displaced Greek refugees and their property loss 3

4 eventually made the partition worst that has also remained a key issue and chief negotiation chip in every negotiation effort for solving the problem. Turkish-Cypriot side TRNC (Turkish Republic Northern State) under control of Turkey s army is self-declared independent state; a de facto state only recognized by Turkey and has been declared illegally occupied territory in many United Nations resolutions. If continuation of the partition is proposed then without addressing the issue of property loss belonging to Greek- Cypriot refugees, international recognition of TRNC cannot be achieved. In the debate towards finding the exact solution either continuation of the partition or reunification, where various facets reflecting aspirations of both communities and factual outcomes derives from failures of reunification efforts turn in favor of continuation of the partition as best future solution there certain factors likely support ideal of reunification most significantly peaceful cross boarder movement since 2002, inter-ethnic communication aiming to promote reunification among people of both sides which are promoted by international mediators, civil society organizations and European Union leaving some hopes that living together will also work out in the future. In quest of finding the exact solution to support unbiased pragmatism and personifying exact dynamics which lead both communities toward negotiation process, third judgment in this research paper poses, that are mere hide and seek between both communities which embezzles between hopes and fears and bring them on table to find their desired settlement. The study in this research paper find that saying Yes to UN Annan in 2004 by Turkish-Cypriots was an outcome derives from their hopes to join worthy membership of the European Union while majority of Greek-Cypriots rejected this reunification plan by saying No because they feared accepting Turkish-Cypriots as separate identity might lead them toward the establishment of separate state. Likewise, this is further argued, ongoing negotiation talks over reunification aiming to build peace in the Eastern Mediterranean region is an outcome drawn from increasingly active gas politic; stakeholders in gas field project Israel, United States, Greek-Cyprus, Turkish Cyprus and Turkey aim to sustain Israeli gas pipeline project by reuniting both sides of Cyprus Island. Regardless to ongoing negotiation efforts, the study premises fears; negotiation talks over reunification aiming to achieve gas objectives will prove a failure because necessary elements a bi-zonal, bi-communal cooperation, inter-ethnic communication and confidence between leader of both communities upon key issues are not still complying with ideal of reunification. Besides, two important stakeholders Israel and Turkey are persistently annexing tension on Palestinian issue due to Israel s offensive strikes on innocent civilian of Gaza in July 2014; consequently, all confidence building efforts between Israel and Turkey initiated by United States also seem a failure. Therefore the study finally concludes circumstances prevailing within Cyprus Island on both sides and in the Eastern Mediterranean region don t favor reunification. Since, factual outcomes of research fall in favor of continuation of the partition as best possible solution to prolong peace, so in conclusion it also provides with solution how TRNC should attain international recognition, their long cherished dream. 4

5 Introduction Island of divided Cypriots has been a hotspot of ethno national conflicts in Eastern Mediterranean politics. Historically, situation of ethnic violence in Cyprus has phased in severe political rifts and inscrutable armed combats over time that resulted in mass killings and territorial disintegration. Consequently, a numerous approaches have also been applied ranging from 1960 s power-sharing constitution, the partition of Island on the basis of two different ethnic identities The Greek and The Turkish Cypriot to (United Nations) UN Annan Plan, which stabbed to establish federal state. As such, systematic analysis of Cyprus Problem reveals, any attempt to settle problem over time, has never been regarded as an ultimate solution, which fulfill the desires of both communities and help them to make compromises. Flaws of power-sharing constitution denote a failed practice of consociationalism, and later on, pro-greek approaches enosis instigated armed crises resulting in mass killing and territorial disintegration. Rejection of UN Annan Plan by the Greek Cypriots designates, they don t want to limit their former hegemony and authoritarian majority in decision making; hence, formula of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federal state seems clumsy as possible future solution. On the other hand, prospect of preserving partition has proven no major violence since 1974; it therefore provides arguments to support takism Turkish nationalism as an applicable future solution to form a separate state 1. Self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) has not gained international recognition yet. It is de facto state, worth nothing. Whereas Greek Cyprus is an internationally recognized territory, and now a member state of the European Union (EU); enjoying all freedoms with the EU Bloc, higher per-capita income and better standard of living in comparison with its northern counterpart. Greek Cyprus claims Northern Cyprus as an occupied territory invaded by Turkish army, and considers reunification basing upon single identity and by complete removal of Turkish army, is the only solution 2. Cyprus was accepted into the EU as a whole, although the EU legislation is suspended in the territory occupied by Turkey, until a final settlement of the Cyprus problem. Turkish-Cypriot side is frustrated to join unification with the EU but even generally neglect reunification with Greek-Cypriot side. Since 1957, Turkey has been affirming the agenda of Cyprus Problem as an important stake of its foreign policy; Turkish advocacy for the solution of Cyprus problem most often turned in support of weaker federation, cooperation with confederation, or the two states formula. This research paper seeks to examine each of three major approaches applied to settle problem over time, and will attempt to determine the best possible future solution 1 Murat Metin, Hakki The Cyprus Issue: A Documentary History (London: I.B.Tauris Press, 2009), Ibid 39. 5

6 for Cyprus: whether this is more likely to be along the lines of federation (reunification), or the continuation of the partition power-sharing constitution is considered for this academic paper as failed attempt at consociational democracy, by looking into the situation of 1960s, and determining that power-sharing arrangements were significantly lacking conditions, necessary for the successful implementation of consociational democracy in Cyprus. Second, in this paper we will look into the issue of partition, by examining arguments presented by Kaufman and Kumar in favor of partition, as a mean to end ethnic violence, and also look how the partition was implemented in Cyprus and how it has charged over years, by keeping conflict at cove. The Annan Plan proposed a federal solution based upon group distinction, and dealt Cypriots as two different ethnic entities, which had already caused antipathy in Greek-Cypriot side. It will therefore be argued here that because of the failed experiment of consociationalism, the necessary elements to reunite both communities in a federation, are also absent in Cyprus. As a part of discussion, while tracing the failure of rounds of talks facilitated by the UN between 2008 and 2012 for reunification, it will be analyzed that a very slim outcome also has also being expected from the revived UN-facilitated talk (held in February 2014 in which a Joint Declaration was signed) between leaders of both sides, who are seeking to find federal type solution in future. Assuming International recognition and return of lands proposed in Annan Plan are preconditions for TRNC to join accession with the EU, and Cyprus Problem is also one of crucial component of Turkey-EU accession process. Since, there is significant absence of common identity as Cypriot on both sides, and any attempt at federal solution may cause a greater risk in future, it will therefore be finally concluded that establishment of a rather smaller Turkish- Cypriot state by substantial land return, is the most appropriate solution at this stage. History of Cyprus Problem Cyprus has a very strategic position in the Eastern Mediterranean; a possible bridge that links The East with The West. In history, most nations from Europe who wanted to conquer Africa or Asia had to step over Cyprus and most nations who wanted to conquer European countries, they again stubbed on Cyprus. Cyprus was a part of Ottoman Empire, and therefore Turkish community constitutes 18 percent of the total population. 80 percent are Greek-Cypriots with clear cut majority, maintaining their distinguished cultural and constituent identity, and rests are some minorities, including Armenians. At the decline of Ottoman Empire, Cyprus went under the control of British colonial rule in During colonial period, particularly, in the Second World War when Turkey decided to stand by Germany, consequently, Greek Cypriots were overwhelmingly supported by Greece and Great Britain to push back Turkish community. As such, fundamental discrimination and nepotism on the basis of divided ethnic identities, pragmatically witnessed the rise of Greek and Turkish nationalism in Cyprus: Greek-Cypriots struggled for enosis, the union of Cyprus with Greece; Turkish-Cypriots demanded taksim ; partition of the island 4. 3 Keefe, Eugene, and Solsten, Historical Setting. In Cyprus: A Country Study, (Washington: American University Press, 1993), Yiannis Papadakis, Nicos Peristianis, and Gisela Welz, Pollis 1979, in, Divided Cyprus: Modernity, History, and an Island in Conflict (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2006), 2. 6

7 During freedom struggle, the enosis had taken form of an armed mutiny led by EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) in As a counterweight, Turkish-Cypriots also developed an armed group TMT (Turkish Resistance Organization) in 1957, The conflicting aims of two major armed ethnic groups and British policies of heightening division, for instance by enrolling Turkish-Cypriots as supplementary policemen against EOKA uprising, led to violent interethnic confrontation 5. British colonial rule ended in 1960, and an independent Republic of Cyprus was declared on the basis of 1960 s powersharing constitution (arranged by guarantor states; Turkey, Greece and Great Britain) reflecting the contrasting interests of both communities; nevertheless, declared independence did not even assure the aspirations of either community. Consequently, respective aims of enosis and taksim were pursued, resulting in interethnic violence in The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was called to maintain peace in 1964, and that peace struggle had almost brought interethnic crises to a halt till The situation was worst again in 1974 when the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios launched a campaign of his pro-union manifesto by an armed faction of EOKA B, prompted Turkish military intervention to save Turkish community on 15 July, Dan Lindlay, Historical, Tactical, and Strategic Lessons from the Partition of Cyprus, (2007): CyprusPartition.pdf 6 Salem 1992; Laipson 1993; in Keefe and Solsten, Historical Setting In Cyprus: A Country Study, (Washington: American University Press, 1993), Tartter, Jean R, National Security. In Cyprus: A Country Study, (Washington: American University Press, 1993), Turkish military invasion (as guarantor state) divided the island into Greek Cyprus (Southern part of the Island), and Turkish Cyprus (Northern part of Island). Greek Cypriots fled to south and Turkish Cypriots moved to north. Since then, the Greek-Cypriot-controlled territory has remained the only internationally recognized state in Cyprus, while the self-declared TRNC, established in 1983 consisted 37% of Island s territory has not gained international recognition yet, and declared as occupied territory in many UN resolutions. Population and Property exchange among others are the main issues occurred due to territorial disintegration. Besides, movements of people from Anatolia and other parts of Turkey to the north have since been induced to alter the demographic balance 8. Since then, the largest effort to solve the Cyprus Problem was Annan Plan, a negotiated UN brokered constitutional arrangement to establish federal form of a bi-zonal and bi-communal state. The 76% of Greek-Cypriot voted against the plan, while 65% of Turkish-Cypriot accepted it on Turkish side in culminated referenda held on both sides in That attempt also failed like previous because Greek- Cypriot majority rejected it reciprocating to the rejection of 1960 s power-sharing constitution by Turkish-Cypriots 9. Failure of 1960 s Power-Sharing Constitution (A Failed Practice of Consociational Democracy) Power-sharing often seems an appropriate solution to settle ethnic conflicts: the former antagonists have to work together, make 8 Ibid Greek-Cypriots Vote for No, Greek News,April 26, accessed by 20 May

8 decision by consensus, the ultimate goals being to turn opponents into partners, survival of democracy by lessening violent activism. This concept of conflict regulation called consociational democracy a form of government (involving guaranteed group representation), develops on the basis of reconciling societal fragmentation along ethnic and religious lines in deeply divided society 10. This concept can only work under certain favorable conditions. Lijphart 11 identifies four key characteristics to the establishment of democratic consociational power-sharing: 1. Government by grand coalition elites of each pillar come together to rule in the interests of society because they recognize the danger of non cooperation. 2. Mutual veto each group has the opportunity to block political decisions using its veto rights, the aim being to foster consensus-building and compromise. 3. Proportional representation representation is based on population. If one pillar accounts for 30% of the overall society, then they occupy 30% of the positions on the police force, in civil service, and in other national and civic segments of society. 4. Segmental autonomy creates a sense of individuality and allows for different culturally-based community laws. 10 Brendan O Leary, Debating consociational politics: Normative and explanatory arguments, in From Power Sharing to Democracy: Post Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies, ed. Side Noel (Montreal: McGill-Qaueen s Press, 2005),43 11 Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration, (New Heaven: Yale University Press,1977),p s power-sharing constitution of Cyprus incarnated all the principles and key characteristics of consociational democracy. The presidential democratic system; the president, a Geek-Cypriot and the vice president a Turkish-Cypriot (with veto power) were to be elected by their respective communities and were to share prerogative and executive powers. A 50 members House of Representatives was composed of 35 Greek- and 15 Turkish- Cypriots with a ratio of (70:30) elected by their respective communities with separate legislative power of 2/3 majority. According to agreed constitution, the president and vice president could use their veto power against the legislation passed in house of representatives in the areas of defense and foreign policies, but not for the legislation passed in communal chambers. The principles of grand coalition and proportionality were further strengthened by the provisions that cabinet of ministers were to be the proportion of 70:30, while public services, army, police were to have 70:30, 60:40, 70:30 ratios respectively. Proportionality and segmental autonomy in judicial system were also achieved as: Constitutional Court was composed of (Greek Cypriot, Turkish Cypriot and neutral president); High Court (neutral president, having two votes, two Greek Cypriot judges and one Turkish Cypriot judge); and Communal Courts (judges from that community). Measures for autonomy included separately elected communal chambers as well as provisions for separate municipalities in the five main towns, reflecting the separation of the ethnic populations in urban areas Information is expanded from Dan Lindley, The Republic of Cyprus Road to European Union Accession: Missed Opportunities to Promote a Cyprus Solution, Hellenic Studies, 11, No. 1 (Spring 2003)50 cypruseuarticle.htm 8

9 Having observed the 1960 s power-sharing structure of the Republic of Cyprus, it seems key characteristics of consociational democracies as identified by Lijphart, were established; besides, agnostic flow of divided ethnics communities were privileged with all-encompassing constitutional cooperation to magnify interests of communities for governmental stability, survival of democracy and societal unity. However, the state of affairs arranged by constitution could last only three years, due to unceasing disagreement, budding deadlock, and mounting bitterness between the communities 13. Key characteristics of consociational democracy might be paralyzed, it is therefore necessary to examine favorable conditions, which might have guaranteed success of consociational state and see whether these conditions were present in Cyprus. Lijphart has changed the specification of these conditions somewhat over time. In the following, Michael Kerr 14 summarizes Lijphart s most prominent favorable conditions. The first favorable condition is that of segmental isolation of ethnic communities, which Lijphart defines in term of territorial segment to help different ethnic communities, live territorially segregated, and it is possible to combine consociational democracy with territorial arrangements to allow more regional selfrule for each community. The second favorable condition is a multiple balance of power, where the domination of a single clear cut majority is nullified either by a relative equilibrium between groups or the existence of two practically equal segments. Thirdly, overarching loyalties to the state is 13 Sumatra Bose, Contested Lands: Israel-Palestine, Kashmir, Bosnia, Cyprus and Sri Lanka (London: Harvard University Press, 2007), Michael Kerr, Imposing Power-Sharing: Conflict and Coexistence in Northern Ireland and Lebanon, (Dublin: Irish Academy Press, 2006), very important; incongruent and separate communities share feeling of belonging to one nation/region, and are held together by common loyalties; besides, presence of external threats are also common to all communities. Forth favorable condition is socioeconomic equality across all the communities. Indeed, the smaller the economic and social differences between the groups, the better the conditions for consociationalism 15. Fifth is a modest multiparty system with segmental parties, which ensures that each group is represented by several political parties or movements. Sixth, the existence of cross cutting cleavages is important, whereby the population is characterized by cleavages which cut across ethno-national/linguistic lines, preventing the creation of homogeneous groups, it is to some extent reduce load on national policy. The seventh is a tradition of elite accommodation, whereby the political leadership of each group is able to win internal support for compromises and agreements. The eighth favorable condition is that of comprehensive participation: all relevant communities are represented at the negotiating table and in the powersharing system itself. It is essential that the settled consociational structure should be arranged by the communities themselves and not forced upon them by external powers. This will rally round the assurance of the last favorable condition: that the consociational solution is not questioned by any side, and all parties to the powersharing arrangement are interested in maintaining the settled status quo. We shall now turn to the 1960 s situation 15 Nicola Solomonides, One State Or Two? The Search for a Solution To the Cyprus Problem, International Public Policy Review,14, no 1, (September 2008), 64 vol4-1/solomonides.pdf accessed May 14, 2014, also seen in Schneckener, Making Power-Sharing Work: Lessons from Successes and Failures in Ethnic Conflict Regulation. (2002):

10 of Cyprus to examine, whether these conditions were there. Firstly, regarding segmental isolation, the communities lived in segregated neighborhoods, the population, to a large extent, was mixed 16. Secondly, there was no relative equilibrium in balance of power between two communities, rather clear domination of the Greek-Cypriot. Thirdly, most notably, there was no overarching loyalty upon national interests, which could have united both the communities, nor the sense of commonness was developed, and their Cypriot identity hardly ever existed. Undeniably, the Cypriots were not a single people with differing tendencies but, rather, two different peoples...greeks and Turks on Cyprus thought of themselves as Greeks and Turks, not as Cypriots 17. Fourthly, the space of socioeconomic inequalities 16 Dan, Historical, Tactical, and Strategic Lessons from the Partition of Cyprus, (2007): Nicola Solomonides, One State Or Two? The Search for a Solution To the Cyprus Problem, 65 Also seen in Coughlin, in Gai, Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-Ethnic States. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 224. was also mammoth: Turkish minority was already deprived in comparison to the Greek majority, and this gap intensified further after independence. Fifthly, there was no multi-party system in Cyprus but rather national fronts existed in each camp, marginalizing any internal potentially for more moderate position. Sixthly, cross-cutting cleavages were reinforced by the constitution, which separated the population into two electorates, and bicommunal parties did not exist at all. Seventhly, comprehensive participation was significantly missed in the negotiating process. The guarantor powers (Turkey, Greece and Great Britain) established a solution, while the two ethnic groups in question were only partly and indirectly involved in negotiations. As the powersharing constitution was written and tabled by international mediators, it was largely viewed, especially by the Greek-Cypriots, as having been forced upon them Chaim Kufmann, Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars, International Security (Vol. 20, No. 4, Spring 1996), 187, edu/itc/sipa/u6800/readings-sm/kaufmann_ PossibleImpossibleSolns.pdf 10

11 According to Lijphart, consociationalism cannot be imposed against the wishes of one or more segments in a plural society and, in particular, against the resistance of a majority segment 19. Eighth condition is concerned with respecting the status quo, but Greek-Cypriots were reluctant to give up their previous hegemonic role in decision making at all levels, while Turkish- Cypriots on their side largely supported taksim for the establishment of separate Turkish state. Power-sharing arrangements in 1960 s constitution were seen insufficient to safeguard separate ethnic identities of both communities. Consequently, agnostic aims led both communities toward the establishment of nation-state model. Lastly, elites role in 1960 s situation was also depressing: leaders of both communities did not try to develop sense of commonness, nor even they showed a spirit of moderation to come with a compromise s situation of Cyprus was visibly lacked favorable conditions, rather more precisely, former rivals had not been prepared for the responsibilities and compromises, would be levied upon them by consociational setup, and results were the collapse of constitution and armed outbreak 20. cannot. His theory of partition based upon the hypotheses that, in ethnic war hyper nationalist rhetoric actions and outsized actual atrocities refuse political appeals for cross-cutting identities; indeed reinstating civil politics in multi-ethnic states traumatized by war is impossible because the war itself destroys the possibilities for ethnic cooperation 22. Furthermore, population living in segregated neighborhood creates security dilemmas due to acceleration of rhetoric and violent actions posing a real threat to the lives and properties of others. The Turkish Cypriot minority feared the Greek Cypriot majority, while the Greek Cypriots feared nearby Turkey. Such security dilemmas intensify violence and can cause atrocities at large, and de-escalation is not possible unless the groups are demographically separated, as separation reduces both inducements and chances for further combat 23. Richard Patrick s authoritative account on the Cyprus conflict in reveals, overwhelming majority of Turk Cypriot refugees moved only after Turk-Cypriots had been killed, abducted or harassed by Greek Cypriots within their village, quarter, or in the local vicinity 24. Partition as An End to Ethnic Conflict Ethnic clashes and violent activism having roots in divided struggle for independence, then sustentation of antagonist aims, reinforcement of abhorrence over time, and most significantly, how could different people killing one another come together to form a government or a common society? According to Kaufman 21, they 19 Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies,(1977), 160; also Read Coughlan, Cyprus: From Corporate Autonomy to the Search for Territorial Federalism, in Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-Ethnic States,ed Yash Gai (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), Bose, Contested Lands Kaufmann, Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars. (1996), Ibid Ibid 24 Richard A. Patrick, Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict, , (Waterloo: University of Waterloo Press, 1976),

12 Turning back to the Kaufman s view about peace solution in Cyprus, he does not refute the possible existence of international peace enforcement forces but he argues peace remains until the forces are there. In the end, as long as either side fears, even sporadically, that it will be attacked by the other, past atrocities and old hatreds can easily be aroused again 25. Following the collapse of the constitution in December 1963 (administrative amendments made by Greek-Cypriot President), the government machinery of the Republic of Cyprus was generally operated by Greek-Cypriots. The Turkish- Cypriots were limited to the decision affecting administration of their own communities. During inter-communal riots between 1963 and 64, more than a quarter of Turkish-Cypriot population became refugees and more than half of them were kept armed enclaves. Killings of Turkish- Cypriots are figured about 1600, while killings of Greek-Cypriots were recorded nominal 26. As such, inter-communal violence led Turkish community toward physical and geographic separation from Greek-Cypriots for the safety and security and in 1963, Green Line dividing both communities was established in the capital City Nicosia by UN peace keeping forces but they could control situation only for three years, and remained a failure to make a compromise between two communities. In 1974, President Archbishop Makarios s pro-greek campaign to join union with Greece, and escalating violence prompted Turkish military invasion of northern part of the island. Self-declare state of Northern Cyprus was reinforced by Turkey. Following the Green Line, Greek- Cypriots moved from north to south and Turkish-Cypriots moved toward north. Overall 2000 people were reported missing; majority of them were Greek- Cypriots and could not be recovered ever Kaufmann, Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars. (1996): Patrick, Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict,

13 Partition brought ethnic violations to an end, which had previously plagued Island. Since 1974, ethnic atrocities have not occurred except some nominal incidents were recorded in border-crossing areas. In fact, during partition, population and property exchange eventually made the situation worst. Majority of the Greek- Cypriots, who have migrated toward south, still claims their lands, they have left in north 28. Comparatively, situation in northern side was satisfactory because Turkish military had occupied more area than the ratio of Turkish-Cypriots population. Kaufman therefore suggests, the presence of UN troops in Cyprus, unless the final settlement is reached. If settlement of partition was achieved by the establishment of UN population and property exchange commission, it would be desired situation. Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus became de facto state because it was one sided victory of the Turkish army, who invaded Cyprus to protect Turkish community restoration of peace was not the objective of ethnic war. Unilateral Declaration of Northern Cyprus presented by Turkey in UN was rejected and declared legally invalid in For years after partition, many observers have favored Kaufman s view of partition, as best solution to alter ethnic violation. The failure of 1960 s constitution, hardened identities over time, and most significantly long standing struggle of Turkish-Cypriots for persevering status of partition, how could they be united to share future? Indeed, partition further ingrained differences and even institutionalized them 30. Some opponents of partition like Varshney and Papakis 31 suggest, interethnic 27 Nancy Crawshaw, Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece,( Unwin Hyman, June 1978),395; Polyvios G. Polyviou, Cyprus: the tragedy and the challenge,(washington DC: American Hellenic Institute, 1975) 203, Kaufmann,, Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars, Lindlay Historical, Tactical, and Strategic Lessons from the Partition of Cyprus, (2007), Farid Mirbagheri, Historical Dictionary of Cyprus, (Scarecrow Press October 1, 2009) Radha Kumar, The Troubled History of Partition, Foreign Affairs (January/February 1997), Ashutosh Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society: India and Beyond, World Politics 53 (April 2001),

14 bi-communal movements and institutional communications for economic and social cooperation between communities are agents, can play a vital role to diminish ethnic differences and hyper nationalist tensions in the long run, shared future may be expected 32. Unluckily, in case of Cyprus, communities were organized along intra-ethnic lines and interethnic communications were weak, or even absent. Dissolving the partition or opening up the border might lift up ethnic violence again. In 1990 s, energetic bi-communal movements for change emerged on both sides to learn from history, and to seek shared future by bi-communal cooperation, but had very limited effects at large because of the damage, done by history. Biased presentation of history, on both sides, 32 embarks totally opposite claims; the official construction of past, and even the national history of freedom struggle and heroism being taught in their schools and portrayed in their National Museums, ending up with totally opposite stories (for Greek- Cypriots, Turkish are invaders, and have illegally occupied their lands, while Turkish-Cypriots proclaim themselves, the victims of Greek-hegemony, and for them Turks are the heroes who liberated them from the aggression of Greek-Cypriots) 33. Destruction of culture is another factor, hindering interethnic communication. As according to Greek-Cyprus claim, the Christian culture is being destroyed in de facto state of Northern Cyprus; since 1974, at least 55 churches have been converted 33 Yiannis Papadakis, Disclosure and Censorship in Divided Cyprus: Toward an Anthropology of Ethnic Autism in Papadakis et al, Divided Cyprus: 6. 14

15 into mosques and another 50 churches and monasteries have been converted into stables, stores, hostels, or museums, or have been demolished 34. According to the government spokesman, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, this has been done to keep the buildings from falling into ruin 35. In April 2003, with the opening up of check points with the support of UN and the European Union, a substantial number of people from both communities crossed borders, and no major violence was recorded 36. Cross-border movement opportunities were initiated to remove differences, and to expect positive result of Annan Plan before the accession of Cyprus in the EU. However, it could only leave hopes not a reality; as Greek-Cypriot majority turned down the formula of federal solution and rejected status of Turkish- Cypriots as separate entity, improvised in Annan Plan. Annan Plan: 1960 Revisited? Since the European Union had opened up enlargement process for accession of Cyprus, solution of Cyprus problem was also the manifesting agenda in negotiation process the EU never wanted to import this headache. Considering the presence of two different identities for the better safeguard to the rights and security of minority group, the Annan Plan was devised, which provided a federal solution. 34 Lindlay, Historical, Tactical, and Strategic Lessons from the Partition of Cyprus, Ibid. 36 About 40% of Greek-Cypriots say they have never crossed, about 50% say they have crossed once or a few times in the past but no longer, and about 10% still cross over. By comparison, about 30% of Turkish-Cypriots have never crossed, about 25% have crossed once or a few times in the past but no longer, and about 45% still cross over. The UN in Cyprus: An Inter-Communal Survey of Public Opinion byunficyp, cfm?a_id=2170 This plan was presented by Kofi Annan (Former Secretary General of UNO) by the subsequent support of the EU; First version was circulated in November 2002, and later on, tested in a culminated referendum held on both sides in April 2004, just a week before the accession of Cyprus in the EU. Assuming the population transfer and territorially separated ethnic communities, Annan Plan proposed a loosely federal union in which the constituent territorial units would have maximum autonomy, and the limited joint institutions at the federal level would operate on the basis of consociational norms: decision making by simple majority 1/4 and 2/4 for special matters; equal members in house of representative 24+24=48; 7:3 ratio in ministries; 7:3 ratio in civil services, 6:4 ratio in military; and equal ratio in police where maximum Turkish-Cypriots would be appointed in south; equal ratio of Supreme Court Judges with three external non-cypriots Judges, can resolve dead lock with government only in some cases; and indirect taxes to flow in Turkish-Cypriots side until inequalities was eliminated. Further, the United Cyprus Republic would consist of a Greek-Cypriot constituent state over 72% of the island s territory and a Turkish-Cypriot constituent state over the other 28%. The constituent states would have jurisdiction over all matters except foreign policy, EU affairs, and central bank functions, which would be the province of the federal government 37. The Annan Plan was result of years of efforts by international community, and yet could not unite Cypriots for a common future. In examination result of referenda, sheer sizes of No votes from 37 Information is expanded from Lindley, The Republic of Cyprus Road to European Union Accession : 2003, 50 15

16 Greek-Cypriot side raised the fundamental questions. Supporters of some form of federalism or decentralization of the government power most often assert that it strengthens national unity and consensus, endorses security, protects citizens against encroachment by the state, limits ethnic conflict, and safeguards individual and communal liberty 38. However in case of Cyprus, there was a debate over proposed Swiss-style con-federal system because it had many facets, including the similarities with the problematic consociational setup of 1960 constitution. The basic fundamental argument against federal solution asserts devolution of autonomy in an ethnically separated state seems not an adequate solution, and it is most often difficult to bring divided group on a peaceful agreement majority favors federalism (one unit preferring single identity) while minority tends to favor confederation (two units maintaining their separate identity) 39. As a confederation with various specified provisions, the Annan Plan treats the Cypriots as two distinct communities. This may be necessary and convenient, but it has already caused antipathy by the Greek side. Considering the terms of the plan discriminatory, the Greek Cypriots resoundingly rejected the plan in a referendum held in April 2004 with the no side getting almost 76% of the vote. The Turkish Cypriots voted in favor by almost 65% Kumar, The Troubled History of Partition, Ronald Watts, Federalism, Federal Political System,and Federation, Annual Review of Political Science, 1, No. 1, 1998, (1998): The UN in Cyprus: An Inter-Communal Survey of Public Opinion by UNFICYP, cfm?a_id=2170 can also be seen in Greek-Cypriots Vote for No, Greek News (April ) accessed by 20 th May 2014 Referendum Results Cypriot Community Turkish- Greek- Cypriot Community Yes No Turnout 64.90% 35.09% 87% 24.17% 75.83% 88% The situation is difficult for various reasons. Turning back to Lijphart argument; to think of reunification without a common vision, and with the problems mentioned before means that it is natural that the above constitutional terms would be controversial. One important factor, which could lay the establishment of successful federation among territorially divided ethnic communities, is the presence of cross-cutting cleavages and bi-communal cooperation. Unfortunately, in Cyprus, there are no cross-cutting cleavages, but two homogeneous groups. Disagreements over issues can potentially destabilize the system because they may lead to the dissatisfaction of the minority group. Then, how to provide safeguards to the rights and existence of minority group identity, whether by declaring them a separate group (community) of the same state or recognizing them territorial wise separate ethnic entity. Such a fundamental issue was pragmatically ignored by Greek-Cypriots; they feared, by accepting Turkish-Cypriots a separate identity as improvised in Annan Plan, might lead Turkish-Cypriots toward the establishment of sovereign state in future 41. Admittedly, Annan Plan was result of coefforts done by the UN and the EU, aiming 41 Thomas Fleiner, Walter Kälin, Wolf Linder, Cheryl Saunders Federalism, Decentralization and Conflict Management in Multicultural Societies Politorbis Nº 32 (1/2003), 9. assets/files/resources%20alumni%20website/ Federalism%20Dec%20and%20Conflict.pdf 16

17 at solution of Cyprus problem before the accession of Cyprus in the EU. However, nothing special arrangements and efforts were made by both communities, most notably from Greek-Cypriots side, which might be regarded cooperative and mutual to come to a compromising solution. Hence, proposed federal solution implements 1960 constitution in a roundabout way rewinding the same wheel without addressing fundamental issues. Some other key issues related to population transfer and property exchange might also complicate the desired solution. As mentioned earlier, more than people were displaced from both sides, first in 1963 violence, and again in 1974 Turkish invasion. Annan Plan reduces size of Turkish-Cyprus territory from 37% to 28% and allowed only 2/3 of displaced Greek-Cypriots to come back in Turkish-Cypriots side, if they want. 42 How to deal with issues related to places and lands already occupied, and what to do with the people who don t want to return, even it is also not clearly mentioned in compensation scheme. How the property will be evaluated, if compensation board starts working. Even if compensation board works smoothly, however its flaws will definitely create resentment; compromises upon them will definitely leave pains as many compromises as many pains. 43. The Situation After Referendum Since the accession of Cyprus in the EU in 2004, the perspectives of Cyprus Problem have considerably been changing in Turkish-Cypriot side from a nationalist front to the possible unification with economically prosperous European region. 42 Dan Lindlay, Historical, Tactical, and Strategic Lessons from the Partition of Cyprus, Ibid In 2004, Turkish-Cypriot community has also been granted status of observer state by the Council of European Union for casting their majority votes in favor of Annan Plan. However, the EU- financed civil society projects for Turkish-Cypriots to stabilize economy by free trade, promote education, develop infrastructure and maintain peace process by bi-communal cooperation are most often debated in Greek-Cyprus and European spheres, raising the same fundamental issues over and over again: Turkeys support for nationalist movement in TRNC; property issues; offer to use Greek-Cyprus port and facilities provided by Greek-Cyprus for free trade with the EU which is internationally recognized territory, rejected by Turkish- Cypriot side 44. At the same time, if the EU opens up negotiation process with Turkey for accession into the EU, there is always a sufficient threat remained, Greek-Cyprus being member state of the EU will use its veto against Turkey 45. In years after rejection of Annan Plan, numerous negotiation talks have been initiated by the UN and the European Union to bring leadership of both the communities on compromises but have failed. Cyprus problem is observed to be headache, and even now most of the international observers have had interested in solving the dispute, rather dissolving it. On the one side, Turkish-Cypriots are increasingly frustrated to join worthy unification with the EU without admitting conditions levied upon them by Greek-Cyprus. On the other side, Greek-Cypriots seek solution (reunification) only by complete removal of Turkish army, single identity, single 44 Also see International Crises Group in Cyprus Cyprus: Reunification or Partition, Europe Report No. 201 Sep 30, media/files/europe/201_cyprus reunification_ or_partition 45 Ibid. 17

18 citizenship, omission of Turkish settlers, and getting hold of property they lost in Where the solution gets stand still to maintain peace, different opinions and different options but all tend to compromises and sacrifices, for which both the communities are not prepare yet. From 2008 to 2012, subsequent negotiation talks and meetings were initiated by the leaders of both sides (Muhammad Ali Talat, Turkish-Cypriots leader and Demetris Christofias, the President of Greek- Cyprus), the EU and UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan. The most notably in 2008, both leaders agreed to settle issues related to single sovereignty, single citizenship, a weaker confederation, opening up of borders and most importantly initiation of direct talk to achieve all those objectives. Along with this, a Special Advisor from United Nation, Alexander Downer was also appointed to observe if both the parties qualified the situation for settlement objectives of reunification. The negotiation process was failed for following reason; Christofias expected rotating presidency for United Cyprus State before the actual talks took place, while Talat claimed for the necessary intervention of Guarantor Powers, Turkey and Greece 46. Again in 2009, negotiation process was damaged when the issue of land occupied in Turkish- Cypriot side raised in European Court of Justice by displaced Greek-Cypriot refugees 47. After Annan plan, no major effort was made talks were initiated but most often turned into delay, cancelation or failure. As discussed before, Lijphart s view of power-sharing and Kaufman 46 Vincent Morell, Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive, Congress Research Services, (Report Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress (January 5, 2011): Ibid arguments of preserving partition; without addressing the fundamental key questions deeply rooted in the dispute, nothing can be agreed. In 2011, UN called for joint committee of all parties involved in Cyprus Problem to decide, whether they want reunification of Cyprus or not but that round also failed like previous. On March, 2011, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon reported, The negotiations cannot be an open-ended process, nor can we afford interminable talks for the sake of talks 48. On 21 April 2012, he further stated, International observers qualified the situation as the collapse of reunification talks, last chance for Cyprus reunification lost. UN-led rounds of talks have failed and the failure of UN Cyprus campaign for reunification 49. On 27 April 2012, Special Advisor of the Secretary-General Alexander Downer said If the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Leaders cannot agree with each other on a model for a united Cyprus, then United Nations cannot make them 50. New ongoing negotiation A little something new is hopefully envisaged from a recently revived UN-facilitated talk on finding Cyprus settlement in February According to the reports analysis of International Crises Group working in Cyprus 51, recent talk derives something new, a different from 48 Last chance for Cyprus reunification lost as UN calls off conference, Todayzaman, April 22, 2012, 49 Transcript of Remarks by Special Advisor of the Secretary-General Alexander Downer following his meeting with the Secretary-General. Ledra Palace Hotel, Nicosia 27 April id=5213&tt=graphic&lang=l1 50 Ibid 51 International Crises Group in Cyprus,, Divided Cyprus: Coming to Terms on an Imperfect Reality, Europe Report No 229 March, , crisisgroup.org/~/media/files/europe/turkeycyprus/cyprus/229-divided-cyprus-coming-toterms-on-an-imperfect-reality.pdf 18

19 that of previously held negotiation rounds between 2008 and Turkey/Cyprus Project Director, Hugh Pope (working for International Crises Group) analyzes that apart from his predecessors, Greek-Cyprus President has made clear that he is seeking a light federal structure for any new republic, with constituent entities controlling their own borders and citizens having no contact with the central federation government in their daily lives 52.In return, Turkish-Cypriot side has also spelled out possible implementation of proposed conditions of single identify and single citizenship in any expected federal solution. Even both sides of island are now ready to involve serious participation of Greek and Turkey in resolving dispute. Years after negotiation, Turkey has also shown a soft corner toward Europe on the issue of Cyprus and spent much effort to push forward recently held talk. Indeed, there is special interest of USA and Israel in increasingly active world of Eastern Mediterranean energy politics. According to Executive Summary of Europe No , an American company, Noble Energy, is the chief operator working in exploring gas and oil in Eastern Mediterranean sea, successfully have found a huge commercial deposit of gas in Israeli water and there is significant potential in offshore Cyprus too. The most economical way to bring that gas in market is through pipeline to Turkey. This pipeline has also to pass through Cyprus s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Hugh Pope, A Little Something New: Cyprus Talk Begin, In Pursuit of Peace Blog, February 11, 2014, 53 See also International Crises Group in Cyprus,, Aphrodite s Gift: Can Cypriot Gas Power a New Dialogue? Europe Report N 216 April 2, 2012, europe/turkey-cyprus/cyprus/216-aphroditesgift-can-cypriot-gas-power-a-new-dialogue.pdf 54 In 2010, Greek-Cyprus claimed its rights of EEZ and started drilling in there. Since then Turkey has repeatedly threatened to not allow the Republic of Greek Cyprus to proceed with pursuing claims to a disputed area between Greek and Turkish-Cypriots, which Greek-Cyprus will never allow to happen until the final settlement of Cyprus problem is reached. In a sense, US-led UN-facilitated talk on Cypriot dispute is a way around to facilitate Israeli business objectives. Energy-starving Turkey is also open to pipeline offers from Israel and Cyprus to cope with its growing energy demand. In a meeting initiated by United States President Barack Obama, held in Washington in May, 2013, Israeli officials, local officials in Greek Cyprus and representatives of the TRNC, they have all agreed on one reality: The natural gas to be produced from this region will get its utmost feasibility by a pipeline that will pass through Turkey. According to briefing of Turkey s Energy Minister Taner Yıldız on Turkish energy policies regarding oil and gas reserves of Mediterranean region, Turkey does not say well, you are obliged to pass through our territories, so let s talk over this. It adopts a very realistic approach; it s open to any sort of projects with the accomplishment of political stability in the region. He further stated, Turkey appears to be the best route for these countries to flow their products to world markets, he is doing his best to show that Turkey is not in a position to abuse its geographical advantage in its potential talks with its neighbors 55. Though all parties seem agreed upon gas project however, Greek Cyprus demands rights to drill and explore oil & gas in hydrocarbon deposits in waters south of the island. It has also warned international oil companies not to conduct exploration and production activities in disputed zones except some few miles of Aphrodite gas field. 55 Serkan Demirtaş, Turkey open to pipeline offers from Cyprus, Israel, Iraq Hurriyet Daily News, May, , com/turkey-open-to-pipeline-offers-from-cyprusisrael-iraq.aspx?pageid=238&nid=47650&newsc atid=

20 EEZ and to retain ghost resort of Varosha in Famagusta area under the control of Turkish military (a partial of Cyprus dispute) which may delays talks on any expected settlement. How the settlement is reached among them and how they turn to discharge demands of each other? Nothing has been publicized yet. Eventfully, it is off course a gift for both sides of Cyprus to come to a dialogue for any possible settlement. Perhaps, a prosperous future is waiting. The solution of one Cyprus problem will solve the problems of Eastern Mediterranean region; Turkey EU accession chapter will get progress, Turkish-Cypriots will enter into EU bloc and Turkey-Israeli tensions will also get solved. However, most of the observers are expecting a very slim outcome; technically talk will restart tactical issues, and any settlement will depend upon to what extent differences in ethnic cleavages are materialized. This is also true that the Cyprus problem has transformed from dangerous security risks to unresolved political disputes. Considering Oil & Gas dialogues as an opportune and a right time to lead talks over the settlement of the whole Cyprus Problem is also correct. However, the most important thing is that Turkey wants breakthrough now and so does the United States. United States role to bring all parties toward peace settlement in the Mediterranean region is insurance to Israeli business objectives and Turkish energy interest. As US President Barack Obama has appointed a special envoy for energy issues Carlos Pascual to hold meeting in May 2013 in Washington and to drive positive outcomes from talks. The next meeting was expected in October of the same year but delayed and was held in February 2014 in which a Joint Declaration was signed by leaders of both sides. US Ambassador in Cyprus has been delivering messages on both sides of Nicosia to carry on talks and to hold meeting again. Along with this, he has made purposeful efforts to build public support by working with NGOs and civil society to build conditions for peace. Recently on May 21, 2014, US Vice President Joe Biden has also arrived in Cyprus to accelerate talks on negotiations over the joint declaration and to settle disputes as soon as possible. He has also offered financial incentives for EEZ and Famagusta areas which are considered a negotiation chip to push forward any kind of expected settlement over the whole Cyprus problem or energy politics 56. Turkey and Israel both are member state of NATO and have also signed various agreements of economic cooperation before 2010 however, both states annexed tension since Ankara objected to an Israeli attack on Gaza in early 2009 that killed 1,430 Palestinians; tensions further spiked up when Israeli commandos killed eight Turks and a Turkish-American on the ship Mavi Marmara as it tried to bring aid to Gaza as part of an international fleet in Regarding confidence building between Israel and Turkey, US role is also vital; President Obama brokered reconciliation to build confidence between Israel and Turkey upon Middle East politics during his visit to Israel in March 2013, and he urged Israeli Prime Minister to apologize to Turkey on Mavi Marmara issue. Later on, US Foreign Secretary John Kerry continually visited 56 Eleni Meleagrou, Realpolitik Arrives in Cyprus, War on the Rocks, May 21, 2014, 57 Fadia Hukara, Why the tension between Israel and Turkey has escalated, CNN Edition, September 9, 2011, meast/09/09/turkey.israel.qa/

21 Israel and Turkey to maintain confidence between both the countries on Palestinian issue, Cyprus problem and Mediterranean energy politics 58. Regardless to all efforts primed by US to build confidence between Israel and Turkey, the gas pipeline dream and Israeli gas exports to Turkey yet again crux on Palestinian issue; the diplomatic relation between Israel and Turkey has obviously taken turn for the worst since Israel has launched a brutal military operation against Gaza in July 2014 which has resulted in massacres of more than 2000 Palestinians; majority of whom are innocent children and women 59. Recently elected Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan has repeatedly been passing strong rhetoric against Israel s deadly attacks on Gaza are offensive and wrong. Besides, he also criticizes US for offensive statements by insisting Israel is exercising its right to self-defense. There is much anger among Muslim of Turkey against Israeli strategic standpoint in Gaza and Erdogan in no way wants to continue any economics and diplomatic relation with Israel unless Palestinian issue gets resolved 60. According to a report 61 (referred in Avi Bar-Eli s article) published by Institute for National Security Studies, which is affiliated with Tel Aviv University; undeniably, Turkey is suffering from energy shortage and its domestic gas consumption is 45.3 billion cm in 2014 and 39 billion cm gas 58 Eleni Realpolitik Arrives in Cyprus 59 Tension Between Turkey and US Escalates over Gaza Offensive, Today s Zaman July 20, tension-between-turkey-us-escalates-over-gazaoffensive_ html 60 Ibid 61 In Avi Bar-Eli, Pipe Dream? Israeli gas exports to Turkey hinge on Palestinian issue; new report warns against counting on Ankara as a customer for Leviathan gas any time soon, Hareetz, Jul. 28, premium is being imported from Nigeria, Algeria, Russia, Iran and Azerbaijan. The present Annual gas bill is one fifth of Turkish budget deficit. Due to its growing energy demand, Turkish domestic gas consumption will reach up to 60 billion cm in Israeli Leviathan offshore and Aphrodite s gas field has 16% more potential than estimated and can supply 600 billion cm gas to Turkey per year through pipeline project; off curse it is a option for Turkey to become energy hub in Mediterranean region because it is the best close customer of Israeli gas in the region. But the report also suggests, as long as tensions between Israel and the Palestinian escalate, and no diplomatic solution is originated to solve the conflict, and as long as Israel upholds its aggressive policy toward Hamas, the tension between Jerusalem and Ankara will persist, even though a formula for the resolution of the Marmara issue has been found and even if gas pipeline project is the great Turkish national interest in which Turkey along with Northern Cyprus, Greek Cyprus and Israel are the partners however Anti-Israeli Turkish President Erdogan will not seek step forward to make any gas agreement in the short-run 62. Turkey-Cyprus-EU triangle is older chapter of Cyprus problem than Eastern Mediterranean gas politics. Tracing the tendency of materialization in the history of Cyprus problem; an example from mid- 2013, when Greek-Cyprus refloated an old proposed plan that if Turkey return ghost resort of Varosha to its original owners, most of whom are Greek-Cypriots. In return, as hinted by President of European Commission, the EU might free up some Turkey-EU s negotiation chapters related to 62 Avi Bar-Eli, Pipe Dream? Israeli gas exports to Turkey hinge on Palestinian issue; new report warns against counting on Ankara as a customer for Leviathan gas any time soon. 21

22 accession process, EU might allow Turkish- Cypriots a tax free trade in the EU bloc, and Greek-Cyprus might partially legalize Turkish-Cyprus airport (known as Ercan or Timbiou). A Turkish official analyzed the offer as insufficient and nothing materialized 63. On 25 th July 2014, during a negotiation talk organized by the United Nation at the airport area controlled by UN in Nicosia, leaders of both communities, Turkish- Cypriot leader Dervis Eroglu and Greek- Cypriots President Nicos Anastasiades have failed to maintain confidence building measures (CBMs) 64 presented by both sides, and could not be agreed almost on anything. According to observers, further talks over the settlement of core issues like single citizenship, federal solution, power and property seems to go in deep freeze for this summer. The only thing upon which both the leaders could have agreed; they would meet again on September 2, Before this meeting, UN Secretary General s Special Envoy in Cyprus, Lisa Buttenheim has been trying her best to move forward delayed reunification talks, and has also been meeting with leader of both sides, Turk and Greece representatives to make all parties compromise upon Joint Declaration signed in February 2014 and still showing greater hopes that ongoing reunification talks will draw out some positive outcomes 66. However, observers 63 Hugh, A Little Something New: Cyprus Talk Begin 64 Greek-Cypriot side and Turkish-Cypriot side submitted 15 and 17 documents respectively showing their confidence and solution upon the core issue likewise property, territory, federal power and single identity etc. 65 Stefanos Evripidou, Talks in deep freeze for summer, the Cyprus Mail, July 25, 2014, cyprus-mail.com/2014/07/25/talks-in-deepfreeze-for-summer/ 66 George Psyllides UN working on ideas to move Cyprus process forward (update: UNFICYP mandate renewed), CyprusMail, July 30, are expecting not so resolute outcomes; for instance, last talk fell prey to failure because Erogla wanted to include those 31 documents submitted by Muhammad Ali Talat during negotiation rounds and also proposed an idea opening a checkpoint in Lefka on the foothills of the Troodos mountain range, a long-cherished demand of Turkish Cypriot residents in the area. The Greek-Cypriot Anastasiades was temperate to the idea and recommended, as long as the two sides could also have the same opinion on another checkpoint, which would prove very useful to Greek Cypriots, proposing one at Athienou village in the Larnaca district. Eroglu replied this would be very difficult to achieve. Contrarily, Anastasiades rejected to include and negotiate over 31 documents submitted during from both side 67. All besides, In the recent circumstances, Turkey s anti-israeli standpoint on Palestinian cause will no longer take turn to safeguard Israeli economic objectives in the Eastern Mediterranean region, in short-run. Historically, talks were arranged for the sake of the talks, nothing were agreed to conceive the solutions of key issues first. Solution of most issues often turned into unilateral actions and decisions. If Greek- Cyprus seeks a federal solution now, then Annan Plan might be best solution that at least fulfill the aspirations of minority group and somehow compensate the property loss of displaced Greek-Cypriots. Greek Cyprus demands to keep hold of rights to drill and explore oil & gas in EEZ and complete removal of Turkish-Cypriots and Turkish army from ghost resorts is only a negotiation chip in energy dialogue, when all concerning parties will turn toward the settlement of the whole Cyprus 67 Stefanos Evripidou, Talks in Deep Freeze for Summer. 22

23 problem and design any form of reunited Cyprus then at least fundamental issues concerning property loss and identity will come to pass again. Supposing, even If possible outcomes of ongoing talks are not slim, and rather settlement is even expected to be sure however, any sort of settlement will levy a greater opportunity costs on both communities of the Island. Though US has even offered financial incentives to settle negotiation over EEZ and ghost resort to achieve its energy objectives but nothing has been explained regarding issue of property loss of displaced refugees, and how the Turkish-Cypriots will be satisfied when they will have to depart from lands and properties, which they have enjoyed since 1974, and how the incentive will be paid to Greek-Cypriots, if some or many Turkish-Cypriots deny to return occupied properties. In such a state of affairs, Turkish- Cypriots may observe as reunification is being imposed upon them. Therefore, every possible issue should be addressed before taking every step toward reunification. Conclusion As mentioned before, the Cyprus Problem is a headache for international community because talks goal a federal solution and debate over settlement of key issues have never been new. But strategically and tactically, the problem has been shrinking with time. On the one side, partition has brought ethnic conflicts and violence between communities to an end. On the other hand, since 2003, peaceful crossborder movements of people leaving only some hopes that dissolving partition, and living together, will work out. However, why take the risk when several factors suggest serious jeopardy in reunification; settlement among leaders upon energy politics or the whole Cyprus problem may not guarantee that people of both sides do also agree upon that settlement.; in February 2014, some observers coincided with the opinions and options of international brokers that settlement upon reunification should be brought to reality. But with the lapse of just five months, the circumstances of Eastern Mediterranean politics are now totally oppose to any agreement among Israel, Turkey and Cyprus on gas pipeline project. Efforts which were primed by US to build confidence between Israel and Turkey, all seem to have gone in disappointments. This is ethnic clout and no one might guarantee that Israel should not have committed offensive attacks on Gaza. If Israeli-Palestinian conflict can beat negotiation talks on Cyprus reunification in the middle, it may even also happen after the settlement upon gas politics or the whole Cyprus Problem. History hassles, there is always negligence of common identity as Cypriot, on both sides. When communal identities stamp out common identity, then customary solution is not to tie them in federal agreement; or any solution based on group distinction will more likely egg on communal violence and risks a replay of the disastrous 1960 constitution. Furthermore, withstanding Kaufman arguments, Partition entrenches differences and off course most importantly, Turkish-Cypriots have been preserving their aspirations to achieve status of independence (the international recognition of TRNC) since last 30 years. During this period, bi-communal, social and economic cooperation has rarely existed between divided communities. To expect, settlement over unconfident energy politics will also lead toward the settlement of the whole Cyprus problem, is merely an illusion. If not so but it will take a quite longer time to build confidence between 23

24 two communities and prepare them for a shared future. Factual outcomes of history embark, a few reasons but more risk involve in hurrying to dissolve partition. Off course, no one is proposing reunification, although it seems to be the demand by the hawks on the Greek-Cypriot side. On Turkish-Cypriot side, they want settlement just for the sake of international recognition and their frustration to join EU bloc. Since the EU has announced implementation of additional protocol containing 35 negotiation chapters necessary for the accession of Turkey into the EU. Now Cyprus problem seems not a big hurdle in Turkey-EU accession process. But Turkey has already lost interest in fulfilling Copenhagen criteria and additional protocol. Probably, Turkey will become member state of the EU in future however; this time is also far away. In recent dialogue over Cyprus settlement, Turkey s interest seemed to sustain its energy sectors that interest has also gone in risk since Israel has launched military strikes in Gaza strips. Territory of TRNC is already a part of the EU. Assuming that TRNC achieves international recognition then it automatically becomes an independent member state of the EU. Hence, better is to devise such a plan of the Cyprus settlement that helps TRNC to get international recognition. After when peace come to reality in Palestine, leaders of two independent Cypriot states along with Turkey, Israel and other international brokers may turn toward the settlement on energy politics. Two possible ladders may help TRNC to get international recognition and to join the EU. First step is to hand over all of the land wished-for in Annan Plan and perhaps more to displaced Greek-Cypriots. Consequently, there will be resentments when a large mass of displaced Greek-Cypriots return to their lands and properties, while the same number of Turkish-Cypriots moves out from their homes and land occupied. It is also possible; whether a non-compensation scheme will place them into enclaves or perhaps international community devise a system of compensation for both groups. However, a system of compensation is likely to cause more pain than gain with every decision. Instead, a related component of this agreement would be dropping of all court cases related to property lost by all sides from 1963 through After the proposed land return, both sides have to accept their losses and move on. In this process, Turkey should play an unbiased role and all-encompassing supports, particularly; a steady demilitarization of Turkish forces by altering them with maximum deployment of the UN peacekeeping forces is suggested. UN forces will remain on the Island until internationally recognized boarders are redrawn. Second step is, in exchange of land return and peaceful accomplishment of this process, the international community will agree to recognize TRNC as an independent sovereign state. By fulfilling these preconditions of substantial land return and international recognition, TRNC will enter into the EU. On the contrary, if reunification is devised then this solution is more opportunists at this stage. Admittedly, it will levy the same conditions of land return, complete removal of Turkish army and perhaps, omission of Turkish settlers too. Compromising upon them contains dangerous security risks and communal violence. Besides, talks and actual implementation of promises upon peaceful reunification will take 24

25 longer time and no one can assure that peaceful settlement will be achieved. If Turkish-Cypriots have no option regarding conditions mentioned above then the best realistic solution for the Cyprus problem is, they should opt and sacrifice (return occupied lands and properties that belong to displaced Greek-Cypriots) to achieve their long cherished status, international recognition of TRNC. 25

26 Bibliography Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration, (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1977) Arend, Lijphart, Constitutional Design for Divided Societies. Journal of Democracy 15, no.2 (April 2004). Bose, Sumantra. Contested Lands: Israel- Palestine, Kashmir, Bosnia, Cyprus and Sri Lanka London: Harvard University Press, Demirtaş Serkan, Energy-hungry Turkey Open to Pipeline Offers Hurriyet Daily News, May27, turkey-offers-cyprus-israel-iraq-pipelines. aspx?pageid=238&nid=47650&newscat ID=348 Avi Bar-Eli, Pipe Dream? Israeli gas exports to Turkey hinge on Palestinian issue; new report warns against counting on Ankara as a customer for Leviathan gas any time soon, Hareetz, Jul. 28, haaretz.com/business/.premium Mirbagher Farid. Historical Dictionary of Cyprus. Maryland; Rowamam and Liitlefield Publishing Group, Fleiner, Kälin, Linder and Saunders, Federalism, Decentralization and Conflict Management in Multicultural Societies. Available at org/wbiep/decentralization/library1/ federalism.pdf Gai, Yash, Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-Ethnic States, New York: Cambridge University Press, Psyllides George, UN working on ideas to move Cyprus process forward (update: UNFICYP mandate renewed), CyprusMail, July 30, Hukara Fadia, Why the tension between Israel and Turkey has escalated, CNN Edition, September 9, cnn.com/2011/world/meast/09/09/ turkey.israel.qa/ Kaufmann, Chaim. Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars. International Security 20, (Vol. 20, No. 4, Spring 1996). U6800/readings-sm/Kaufmann_ PossibleImpossibleSolns.pdf Kaufmann, Chaim. When All Else Fails: Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the Twentieth Century. International Security 23, no.3 (Fall 1998): Kumar, Radha. The Troubled History of Partition. Foreign Affairs (January/ February 1997): Keefe, Eugene K., and Solsten, Historical Setting. In Cyprus: A Country Study. 4th edition. edited by Frederica M. Bunge. Washington: American University Press, Laipson, Elven. Government and Politics. In Cyprus: A Country Study. 4th edition. edited by Frederica M. Bunge, Washington: American University Press

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28 Imperfect Reality, Europe Report N 229, 14 Mar Aphrodite s Gift: Can Cypriot Gas Power a New Dialogue?, Europe Report N 216, 2 Apr Cyprus: Six Steps toward a Settlement, Europe Briefing N 61, 22 Feb Cyprus: Reunification or Partition?, Europe Report N 201, 30 Sep 2009 UNFICYP missions/unficyp/ Transcript of Remarks by Special Advisor., UNFICYP, April 27, unficyp.org/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=5214 The UN in Cyprus: An Inter-Communal Survey of Public Opinion by UNFICYP, nqcontent.cfm?a_id=2170 An Inter-Communal Survey of Public Opinion by UNFICYP, Survey.htm United Nations News Center: Stefanos Evripidou, Talks in deep freeze for summer, the Cyprus Mail, July 25, 2014, talks-in-deep-freeze-for-summer/ Greek-Cypriots Vote for No, Greek News (April ) Last chance for Cyprus reunification lost as UN calls off conference, Todayzaman, April 22, 2012, Sunday todayszaman.com/news lastchance-for-cyprus-reunification-lost-as-uncalls-off-conference.html accessed by 20 th May

29 Institute of Peace and Diplomatic Studies (IPD) Building Bridges Through Informed Dialogue Institute of Peace and Diplomatic Studies (IPD) is an independent, non-governmental and not-for-profit think tank that aims to provide strength to global peace through dialogue and diplomacy by sharing knowledge, research, analysis and policy development in the areas of, peace-diplomacy, peace-building, conflict resolution, conflict transformation and conflict management. The main objective is to provide neutral space to stakeholders to share ideas, exchange views, experiences, understanding of the issues through innovative research and practices worldwide. IPD aims at connecting diverse groups and disciplines including experts, researchers, academicians, non-government organizations from across the globe working in conflict zones with the sole purpose of creating sustainable peace in countries and communities facing traditional and nontraditional security threats. Contact us: H# 533, St# 33, I-8/2, P.O Box # 1239, Islamabad Pakistan Tel : Fax : ipd.pakistan@gmail.com; Website: 29