UNITED STATES & DARFUR

Transcription

1 UNITED STATES & DARFUR A Policy report for the US concerning Darfur Nadia Claudine Boegli University College Maastricht

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3 This report aims at providing an overview of all aspects involved in the ongoing Genocide in Darfur. It discusses the role the United States are playing so far and entails recommendations on how this role should develop in order to end the mass slaughtering. The report constitutes the Bachelor Thesis or Capstone of Nadia Boegli, who has been a student at the University College Maastricht (Class of 2008/9). 3

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5 Index Introduction p Chapter: p. 11 Different Forms of Intervention 2. Chapter: p. 19 State Sovereignty & the Responsibility to Protect 3. Chapter: p. 25 The Failure to Stop Genocide in Rwanda & the Lessons Learned 4. Chapter: p. 33 Yet again: The Genocide in Darfur Conclusion p. 41 Bibliography p. 44 5

6 Introduction The United States has a moral obligation any time you see a humanitarian catastrophe. We are the most powerful nation, we have the most stake in creating an order in the world that is stable and in which people have hope and opportunity. And when you see a genocide in Darfur that is a stain on all of us, that is a stain on our souls 1 President elect Barrack Obama, an active promoter of the Save Darfur Coalition, must now prove that he is able to maintain his morals and stand behind the promises made. As the first African American President he will be challenged not to look back in ten years from now and yet again promise Never [to stand by genocide] again, like many of his predecessors did. Obama, as the new President of the United States, will have to end a genocide that his predecessor G.W. Bush was incapable to stop. Over the past six years the largest region in Africa; Sudan has been the battlefield for the greatest humanitarian catastrophe of the 21 st century. The population of Darfur, a small part in Western Sudan, has been afflicted by genocide. Darfur used to be an independent sultanate in the North Western region of Sudan. During times of colonization where Great Britain governed the Southern part of Sudan, while Egypt ruled over the Northern part of Sudan, the largest country of the African continent was divided into two main ethnicities the Arabs in the North and the Africans in the South. In the early 20 th century Darfur was incorporated into the Sudanese region and when Great Britain left the colony, North, South and Darfur were combined to one country that was to be governed by Khartoum. Due to the earlier division of the region into three parts and the emergence of Khartoum as a conglomerate of power and wealth mistrust started to gain overhand, which led to the creation of rebel forces as the SLA (Sudanese Liberation Army) 2 that were driven by the desire to stop the government s attempt to Islamize Sudan, reestablish a political environment of mutual acceptance and respect between diverse ethnic groups. However, the NIF (National Islamic 1 Interview by Savedarfur Coalition with Barrack Obama On Darfur. Retrieved January 5 th, 2009 from 2 SLA must be distinguished from SPLA: While the SPLA plays a role in the North-South conflict, the SLA was formed later and resulted out of unsuccessful peace negotiations between Khartoum and the SPLA. The People in Darfur realized that these peace negotiations would not lead the government to change its destructive policies towards Darfur. (Cheadle, D & Prendergast, J. Not on our Watch, p. 117) 6

7 Front- government) felt an obligation to stop every possible threat to their power due to the use of Janjaweed militia as their instrument to kill the blacks. 3 After the death of about 400`000 women, men and children, the displacement of around 2.5 million people and the rape of innumerable women, only one country, the United States has given these actions the correct name: Genocide. Despite the Bush administration s efforts to call Darfur the first genocide of the 21 st century and the UN s willingness to define the conflict in Darfur as the world s greatest humanitarian crisis, not much has changed since the beginning of the bloodshed in The intention underlying this report is to illustrate the different forms of intervention that could stop the ongoing genocide in Darfur and to make recommendations on how the United States should act in order to keep up their past promises to not again become a bystander to genocide. So far the United States claim to have made use of economic sanctions that involved targeting individuals that have been identified as perpetrators of gross human rights violations, yet also Sudanese oil companies, which are run by the Sudanese government face economic sanctions by the United States. Furthermore military sanctions entailed arms embargos, which prohibited UN members to transfer and sell weapons to Sudan, however several countries have violated such resolutions. Also diplomatic means have been exploited by the United States and the UN, both parties have encouraged the rebel groups and Khartoum to negotiate peace agreements in order to protect innocent civilians and stop the violent conflict. Nevertheless, each side has disrespected such agreements. 4 The only form of intervention that has not taken place so far is a Security Council Chapter VII humanitarian intervention that would not demand any consent by the Sudanese government and would involve active military force to end the violence. The problem with humanitarian intervention, however, is the interference with a state s sovereignty that is prohibited under International law and therefore UN members are reluctant to invoke Chapter VII. According to the ICISS (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty) every country has the responsibility to protect its own citizens; if a country is unable or unwilling to do so, then the international community (or the UN member states) must fulfill this obligation by intervention. The responsibility to protect report entails that 3 BBC Interview with a Janjaweed defector Ali Retrieved January 5 th 2009 from 4 US Department of State Fact Sheet. US Response to the situation in Darfur. 7

8 when a certain country is unable or unwilling and constitutes an extreme case, other countries must make use of humanitarian intervention to protect the citizens of the failing country. Genocide would certainly qualify as an extreme case and does call for humanitarian intervention. 5 The question underlying this report is how should the United States deal with Darfur? In order to answer such a normative question it is necessary to have a closer look at the obstacles that the United States must handle when deciding on a policy concerning Darfur. How these obstacles can be overcome and what means of conflict solution are available to the US, are significant aspects to bear in mind in the decision-making process. The structure of the report at hand incorporates four chapters and a conclusion. Chapter one clarifies the forms of intervention that are possible in the case of Darfur; diplomacy, sanctions and humanitarian intervention. Chapter two contains a discussion of the responsibility to protect report and how the concept of state sovereignty has transformed over time. Chapter three encompasses three reasons why the United States failed to save Rwanda in 1994, and the positive and negative lessons taught. The last Chapter finally deals with the situation in Darfur and the conflict s history, it also includes policies that have been adopted by the United States and recommendations on what should be done to stop the mass slaughtering. The conclusion completes the report. 5 ICISS The Responsibility to Protect. 8

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10 CHAPTER I The different forms of Intervention 10

11 1. Different Forms of Intervention Considering the fact that the United States already defined the conflict in Darfur as genocide in 2004, one year after the outbreak of killings, and the responsibility to protect debate, the questions remains why there has been no successful solution so far. One of the reasons for this seems to be the problem of finding an actual form of intervention that will be acceptable for all parties. In other words, the UN and especially the United States must agree upon a form of intervention that helps the Darfur civilian population adequately and does not threaten to cause too many casualties. Contemplating that one of the themes of American Foreign policy relies on the principle of morality and idealism, where human rights violations should be anticipated and democracy should be spread throughout all countries to create and maintain peace, the United States as the police force of the world should be willing to help the SPLA (Sudan People s Liberation Army) to achieve their goal of creating a democratic state in Sudan that respects and protects the ethnic diversity within the population. In order to analyze the different forms of intervention that could be applicable to the case of Darfur, one needs to acknowledge that any policy of intervention should only be adopted if prevention of a conflict or/ and gross human rights violations has failed. By recognizing early warnings of genocide, as it was for instance the case in Rwanda in 1991 when Hutu extremists in the Northwestern part of Rwanda launched the first military attacks 6, national governments should be able to use preventive measures of conflict resolution in order to halt the emerging conflict. The primary responsibility for conflict prevention rests with national Governments, with civil society playing an important role. The main role of the United Nations and the international community is to support national efforts for conflict prevention and assist in building national capacity in this field 7 However if the national government is unable to prevent an armed conflict from emerging then the Responsibility to Protect report suggests that also the UN members need to support the national government as much as possible either through development assistance, support 6 Grünfeld, F. & Huijboom, A The Failure to Prevent the Genocide in Rwanda: the Role of Bystanders. Transnational Publishers: Leiden. pp (hereinafter Grünfeld, F & Hujiboom, A. 2007) 7 UN Secretary General 2001.Prevention of Armed Conflict. 11

12 to maintain good governance etc. 8 In the case of Rwanda, both the national government and the members of the UN have failed to prevent the genocide of What are the measure that can be taken by the UN and national governments in cases where prevention has failed? Three main measures are mentioned in international law: economic/ military sanctions, political sanctions and humanitarian intervention, which all need to be authorized by the UN Security Council. In general one can say that humanitarian intervention should be the last step in protecting individuals, because it constitutes an inference of national sovereignty. According to Prof. Fred Grünfeld humanitarian intervention is to be defined as the use of military force to interfere with the sovereignty of another state, without having received consent by the respective state, in order to achieve an end to human suffering. 9 Two other instruments used by the members of the UN or individual governments; Economic/Military sanctions and political sanctions seem to have the intention to change the behavior or [policy] of a government or to affect the activities of political factions in a country where effective central authority as broken down. 10 Consequently this part of the policy recommendation will focus on diplomacy, economic sanctions and military interventions as forms of intervention. Diplomacy Political and diplomatic means can either be seen in terms of negotiations concerning Peace Agreements, such as the Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which was signed in 2005 and was based on the intention to end the 21 year long civil war in the region. Or Political and diplomatic means can also be connected to sanctions on a political level. 11 Sanctions on a political level could be the following: restrictions on diplomatic representation, on traveling, suspension of membership and the refusal to accept a country s membership to a certain organization. In the case of Sudan, a combination of diplomatic negotiations in the form of peace agreements and political sanctions would probably be needed. One could for instance restrict government officials and their families from traveling 8 ICISS Responsibility to Protect Part Grünfeld, F Humanitarian Intervention and the Politics of Decision-Making. 10 ibid. 11 Dagne, T Sudan: Humanitarian Crisis, Peace Talks, Terrorism, and U.S Policy. Congressional Library. 12

13 past. 12 However, there have already been several attempts to establish peace through By Nadia C. Boegli 2009 to international destinations, which according to the ICISS has been proven successful in the negotiations, such as several cease-fire agreements between the Sudanese government and the rebel groups SLA and JEM (Sudan Liberation Army and the Justice and Equality Movement). Mostly the Sudanese government only agreed to negotiate with the rebels because of the considerable international pressure. The negotiations took place under the supervision of Chad s President who was assisted by the African Union, the United States and the UN played a pivotal role in enabling the negotiation talks. 13 Economic/ Military Sanctions According to the Responsibility to Protect report there are various forms of sanctions available to pressure a country to change its behavior. Economic sanctions are mainly focusing on financial sanctions that mostly target the foreign assets of a country, rebel groups of terrorist organizations. In some cases also individuals might be sanctioned which will also include the individual s family members. 14 Furthermore restrictions on income generating activities appear to be a common measure used by the UN or individual countries to pressure targets. Assuming that target countries are mostly underdeveloped or developing countries whose population depends on income generating activities such as the harvesting of natural resources it seems as if such measures would hurt those who are suffering enough already. On the other side, the harvesting of natural resources such as oil and diamonds are mostly the cause of conflict, which would suggest that restricting access to such areas could be the starting point of conflict resolution. Also other economic restrictions that, for instance, focus on access to petroleum, which is needed for military operations runs the risk of harming the whole population instead of only the perpetrators, have been popular in recent years. 15 In the case of Darfur, the United States has issued several economic sanctions especially targeting individuals that are involved in the gross human rights violations, yet also Sudanese oil companies, which are run by the questionable Sudanese government. Some of 12 ICISS The Responsibility to Protect. Part Dagne, T ICISS The Responsibility to Protect. Part Ibid. 13

14 these sanctions haven taken place in May 2007, which, for criticizers seems to be too little, too late. 16 Military sanctions entail arms embargos, which are mainly used by the Security Council and the members of the UN to stop the arms supply to individuals, states and groups, which threaten to generate conflict. Also ending military cooperation can be regarded as military sanction. Here the example of China s involvement in Sudan illustrates how it should not be done: China buys two-thirds of Sudan's oil and sells it weapons and military aircraft, but has been criticized for not using its influence to do more to stop the crisis in Sudan's Darfur region. Instead of halting this cooperation China continues to maintain their relations to Sudan, even though they could influence the government in a way that would allow for hope concerning peace in Darfur. 17 Also arm embargos issued by the Security Council in several resolutions, such as Resolution 1841, which was adopted in October 2008, have not been very successful, since countries such as China, Russia and Iran are still providing arms despite the Arms Embargo Resolutions that passed. 18 Military/ humanitarian intervention Unlike peacekeeping operations, humanitarian intervention does not require the consent of the receiving country, yet constitutes a clear external inference, which according to international law requires authorization given by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII. 19 However, in some cases military intervention has taken place in the name of humanitarian intentions without the consent of the Security Council. Even though such kind of interventions are legally prohibited and opposed, they are sometimes necessary to prevent or halt gross human rights violations. Nevertheless, in order to acquire a form of intervention that is regarded as credible in the international sphere, humanitarian interventions should generally be authorized by a third party: the UN Security Council: Associated Press, May 29 th Bush announces new Economic Sanctions on Sudan to halt Darfur Crisis Associated Press, Report: China, Sudan to boost Cooperation Charbonneau, L Iran, Russia supplying arms to Sudan: rights group Grünfeld, F Humanitarian Intervention and the Politics of Decision-Making. 20 Ibid. 14

15 While international law regards humanitarian interventions as being based on the question how is a state legally allowed to interfere with another state s sovereignty, the responsibility to protect approach questions what is the best way to end human suffering? 21 In the spirit of Responsibility to Protect, military intervention should be the last step in the attempt to achieve peace. Only when measures based on negotiating, economic, political and military sanctions have been exploited; the UN or individuals countries may resort to the usage of actual military force. The report illuminates that only in extreme cases the responsibility to react can trigger the utilization of such force. In order to recognize whether a certain conflict is regarded as an extreme case that would allow military force according to the responsibility to react, early warnings need to be taken into account. Early warnings in the case of Darfur would be the fact that the United States has initiated their own inquiry in the form of field research that allows the government to view the conflict in a certain light: here genocide. The United States has been engaged in researching from the very beginning of the crisis in Darfur and due to the findings of this research came to the conclusion that genocide is indeed taking place in Darfur. 22 As Grünfeld mentions these results are usually presented to the decision makers, which then come to a decision and translate early warnings into actions. 23 The Responsibility to React identifies six criteria that have to be met before a military force can even be regarded as justified: right authority, just cause, right intention, last resort, proportional means and reasonable prospects. 24 The right authority in this case seems to be the UN Security Council, Ramesh Thakur argues on behalf of the ICISS that there is no need to find alternative authorities that should be dealing with military intervention, yet that it is necessary to make it [the Security Council] work better than it has. 25 Consequently if military intervention is demanded, the Security Council s authorization should be requested before beginning an intervention. Nevertheless the question remains in how far this is effective, if the permanent members of the Security Council threaten to inhibit the resolutions. China, for instance, has been a major obstacle in 21 ibid. 22 Lecture by Fred Grünfeld, December 9 th 2008 in Maastricht. 23 Grünfeld, F Humanitarian Intervention and the Politics of Decision-Making. 24 ICISS The Responsibility to Protect. Part Thakur, R Intervention, Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect: Experiences form ICISS. Security Dialogue Vol. 33, No. 3, pp

16 the negotiations concerning Darfur, especially by averting a Security Council invasion. 26 Considering the veto power of China concerning a humanitarian intervention in Darfur, it might be more effective if individual governments, such as the United States, would intervene in order to protect the remaining population 26 PBS Frontline. On our Watch Retrieved October 15 th, 2008 from 16

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18 CHAPTER I I State Sovereignty & the Responsibility to Protect 18

19 2. State Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect One argument that has always been used against humanitarian interventions is that it would constitute an infringement of the principle of sovereignty. 27 However, in order to analyze this argument, one should first establish a definition of sovereignty. In 1648 the Peace of Westphalia created the state as known today. The state became the most important institution in International affairs that was based on three principles: first, states had to be fixed to a specific territory; second, church and state must be separated, which leaves on secular authority, third there is no authority above the state, so the state had legal jurisdiction over its territory and population and is therefore regarded as sovereign. 28 The concept of "state sovereignty" allows a country to "organize... according to its own preferences and [gives it] the right to participate in international relations on an equal level with other sovereign states. 29 International law incorporates the principle of sovereignty not only in the Charter of the United Nations that entails reference to state sovereignty, Art.2 All members shall refrain from threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state 30, yet also other legal treaties address the significance of sovereignty. Generally one can say that according to international law the principle of sovereignty constitutes the right of a state to be autonomous and thus no state, groups of states, or other actors have the right to intervene in the domestic affairs of another state. Bearing in mind the concept of sovereignty, international law has established the principle of non-intervention, according to which no state is allowed to interfere with the domestic affairs of another. However, there are exceptions to this principle as for instance under the UN Charter. Chapter VII of the UN Charter gives the Security Council the authority to take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. 31 However when regarding the UN Charter one can still identify the underlying question behind humanitarian interventions, which is In what way is a state allowed to intervene? 32 As mentioned, this notion has changed in recent years, 27 Haar, B Peace or Human Rights? The Dilemma or humanitarian interventions. pp Brownlie, I Principles of International Law. Chapter 4, pp Haar, B p UN Charter, Art UN Charter, Chapter VII, Art Grünfeld, F Humanitarian Intervention and the Politics of Decision-Making. 19

20 especially after humanitarian disasters such as the Holocaust in the early 40s, Cambodia in the mid 70s, Rwanda in the early 90s, Bosnia also in the early 90s and today Darfur. After the creation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 it became apparent that state sovereignty does not only entail rights, yet also duties that need to be carried out by the state to protect its own population. A general opinion emerged that if the basic obligations, such as the protection of civilians, cannot be met by a certain state then she cannot rely on an absolute principle of sovereignty any more. In other words, if a state is unable to protect its civilians, it should no longer be regarded as fully sovereign, because she lost her capacity to rule, majesty is diffused and stewardship is shared with other institutions [such as the UN]. 33 So it seems as if sovereignty is neither stable and static, nor unlimited, yet depends on obligations carried out by the state. Also the process of globalization and the unfolding interdependence in today s global structure appears to be a significant force in converting sovereignty as a right into sovereignty as a duty. Considering the fact that due to media coverage the public opinion becomes more and more informed about ongoing gross human rights violations around the globe, also called the CNN effect, Western governments are under pressure to do something to end the abuses in order to represent and satisfy their voters. 34 When taking into consideration the public voice in the United States concerning the crisis in Darfur, which seems to be loudly calling for intervention as apparent online, in projects such as Enough by the Center for American Progress, it is highly questionable why the United States has not yet been able to convince the members of the UN Security Council to adopt a strategy of humanitarian intervention. The former presidential Candidates; Hilary Clinton, John McCain and Barrack Obama, decided to present a joint statement regarding the crisis in Darfur, which entails: After more than five years of genocide, the Sudanese government and its proxies continue to commit atrocities against civilians in Darfur. This is unacceptable to the American people and to the world community If peace and security for the people of Sudan are not in place when one of us is inaugurated as President on January 20, 2009, we pledge that the next Administration will pursue these goals with unstinting resolve Kratochwil Onuf holds the view that sovereignty derives from three notions: majesty, the capacity to rule and the stewardship, the idea of acting of behalf of, and for the benefits of, others. (Lyon & Mastanduno, 1993). 34 Papp, D., Johnson, l., Endicott, J American Foreign Policy: History, Politics and Policy. Pearson: United States. Chapter 14, p Enough. Presidential Candidates joint statement. Retrieved November 17, 2008 from 20

21 Now that Barrack Obama has been elected as the next President of the United States, it is necessary that the US lives up to her promises regarding the protections of Sudanese men, women and children. The limitations to sovereignty are also obvious when examining the UN Charter. Having discussed Art. 2 of the UN Charter, the treaty further clarifies that all members must fulfill their obligations identified in the Charter, the resulting treaties and agreements, in order to ensure their entitlement to all benefits and rights attached to the membership. 36 This illustrates the conditions attached to state sovereignty, since member states can only act in a way that is permitted under the UN Charter and/ or the treaties and agreements that are a part of the broader aim of the Charter. 37 Already in 1992, former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali reported to the UN Security Council that it is time for governments to understand that sovereignty is not absolute, but is based on the necessity to find a balance between the needs for good internal governance and the requirements of an even more interdependent world. 38 Thus, the best way for governments to avoid international interventions and interference with their sovereign rights as a state is to meet their obligations to other states and the own population. Keeping in mind the mentioned obligations of a state towards other states and its citizens, one might wonder what the consequences of non-fulfillment of state obligations will entail? What are the repercussions if a state disrespects its citizens rights or is unable to protect its citizens? The genocide in Darfur constitutes an example for a governments being unwilling or unable to protect all citizens within the country, since the Sudanese government has been repeatedly sanctioned due Security Council Resolutions such as 1564, which entails the intention to consider sanctions to obtain Sudan s full compliance with security, disarmament obligations on Darfur. 39 The proposed questions are answered in the report The Responsibility to Protect by the ICISS (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty), which is based on a victim perspective, hence focuses on the people who need help first. 36 The UN Charter Lyons& Mastanduno. International Intervention, State Sovereignty and the future of International Society. International Social Science Journal. UNESCO. Vol. XIV, NO. 4, 1993, p S/24111, An Agenda for Peace, 17 June 1992, p. 5. Retrieved from Lyons& Mastanduno. International Intervention, State Sovereignty and the future of International Society. International Social Science Journal. UNESCO. Vol. XIV, NO. 4, 1993, p Security Council Resolution

22 The Report acknowledges that the responsibility to act depends on the state itself, meaning that the report still puts emphasis on state sovereignty as a state being responsible for domestic affairs. Nevertheless, the report acknowledges that in certain cases where a state is either unable or unwilling to fulfill the responsibility, or even is the perpetrator, action to protect the population also becomes the responsibility of other states. 40 Thus the report suggests in its basic principle: (a) State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself. (b) Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect. 41 As several authors have identified, one can assume that the approach of the report relies on the idea of sovereignty as responsibility, as mentioned earlier this entails that the principle of sovereignty generally carries responsibilities for which governments must be held accountable. 42 Having defined sovereignty as responsibility, three aspects become significant: first, it assures that state authorities must be regarded as responsible for protecting their citizens lives and freedoms. Second, states are not only responsible for their own population but also, due to the membership of the UN, for protection of citizens around the world. Third, agents of state are responsible for their actions [ ] they are accountable for their acts of commission and omission. 43 Thus, would- be perpetrators of mass atrocities should fear the growth of universal justice, as a result of which they will ultimately have nowhere to run, no place to hide. 44 Applying the mentioned definition of sovereignty and the claims of the Commission s report to Darfur, where the government is supporting the Janjaweed, also called devils on horseback, who are responsible for killing of approximately Non- Arabic children, women and men, it seems as if one can no longer trust the Sudanese government to end the crisis. 45 Since the Sudanese government is supporting the Janjaweed, it seems as if it is not 40 Thakur, R Intervention, Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect: Experiences form ICISS. Security Dialogue Vol. 33, No. 3, p ICISS The Responsibility to Protect. Basis Principles, p. XI. 42 Bellamy, A. & Williams, P The Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur. SAGE Publications Vol. 36 (1): p Thakur, R Intervention, Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect: Experiences form ICISS. Security Dialogue Vol. 33, No. 3, p Ibid. 45 Feinstein, L Darfur and Beyond: What is needed to Prevent Mass Atrocities. CSR No. 22, pp

23 willing to stop the ongoing atrocities and protect its citizens from being slaughtered, displaced and raped. According to the Responsibility to Protect report, this situation would not only qualify for International Intervention, but actually calls for the United States and the UN to disregard Sudan s sovereignty and take responsibility to protect the Sudanese population. In other words, since the atrocities committed in Darfur are supported by the government, it is clear that Khartoum is unwilling to end the ongoing conflict, which does not only allow the US to intervene, yet calls for external intervention based on the ICISS. Bearing in mind that the conflict has been named genocide by the United States, the case is sufficiently extreme according to the ICISS and therefore should be ended due to a humanitarian intervention. 23

24 CHAPTER III The Failure to Stop Genocide in Rwanda: the Lessons Learned 24

25 3. The Failures to Stop Genocide in Rwanda: the Lessons Learned This chapter will deal with the US failure to stop the Genocide in Rwanda and the lessons that have been learned in hindsight when comparing Rwanda to Darfur. The first part of the chapter will focus on the information the United States had concerning the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and why they, despite all the information, decided to adopt a nonintervention policy. The second part will be devoted to a comparison to Darfur and whether the US has learned form its failure in Rwanda. When one attempts to find an explanation for the US failure to stop the genocide in Rwanda in the early 90s, Gayle Smith s statement: Conscious whispers, while interests shouts aloud seems illuminative. 46 Before answering why the US failed to intervene it is firstly necessary to analyze the information that was available. Several events illustrate that the United States did have enough information about the growing tensions in Rwanda: first, Prudence Bushnell (Deputy Assistant Secretary of State of African Affairs) visited Rwanda in March 1994, two weeks before the shoot down of the presidential plane, to discuss with President Habyarimana her growing concerns about an escalation of violence and the distribution of arms in the region. 47 Second, Monique Mujawamariya, a human rights activists who was in Rwanda at that time, acknowledged that the shoot down of the presidential plane would become a justification for the Hutu rebels to slaughter the Tutsi population. Her assumption turned out to be genuine when Kigali s roads became the battlefield of armed Hutu extremists against Tutsi women, men and children. 48 During the mass slaughter of 1994, committed by the Hutu, Tutsi, Tutsi supporters and Hutu opponents were killed. Despite the fact that the number of atrocities committed in Rwanda happened to be greater than one could have ever expected, the United States and the International Community did nothing to stop the gross human rights violations. President Clinton at that time announced I think this is about all we can do, at this time when we have troops in Korea, 46 Smith, G Ten Years after Rwanda: Has anything changed? 47 Ferroggiaro, W The National Security Archive. 48 Power, S A Problem from Hell. America and the Age of Genocide. p

26 commitments in Bosnia if we can achieve a peace agreement, and also when we are working very hard to try to put the UN agreement in Haiti back on track, which was broken. 49 Furthermore, already in 1993 the CIA had come across information that entailed a tremendous arm transfer from Poland to Rwanda via Belgium, which for a country that was supposed to be in Peace negotiations (Arusha Peace Agreement) should have appeared suspicious. 50 Additionally, three months before the outbreak of the genocide the CIA passed an analysis over to the State Department that stated that if the violence would restart the one had to expect one- half people dying. 51 Prof. Fred Grünfeld further mentions that there had also been hate propaganda campaigns in newspapers and the radio, which can be regarded as early warning signs. For instance, Kangura a newspaper that was supported and financed by the most powerful officials in the government and the military, published an article called Appeal to the Conscience of the Hutu it entailed the ten commandments in which the Tutsi population was described as the enemy whose pollution had to be avoided in order to maintain Hutu purity. 52 The International Community and the United States knew all of these measures and still nobody saw the need to prevent. Despite knowing what was going on in Rwanda what were the reasons for the US non-intervention policy? When analyzing the US decision of nonintervention in Rwanda in 1994, one can identify three main reasons that led to the US foreign policy during this humanitarian crisis: first, the UN itself was reluctant to intervene and did not pressure the US to do so as had been done before, as for instance, in Somalia. Second, there was no US national interest at stake in the genocide in Central Africa. Third, the US was reluctant to intervene, because they feared another Somalia. In my view, history and, thus, the failure in Somalia played the largest role in deciding for a non-intervention policy and will therefore be the primary reason to be explained, yet also the lacking UN pressure and the fact that no national interest was at stake, will be illustrated. As a response to the international pressure, the United States under President Clinton decided to intervene in the Somali civil war in 1992/ The Intervention became a public tragedy when news-stations such as CNN reported how American soldiers were being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. The death of American citizens resulted in vast public reaction, which ultimately demanded US decision-makers to pull out of Somalia, and promise 49 Clinton, W Grünfeld, F. Huijboom, A p Organization of African Unity. Rwanda: the Preventable Genocide. Chapter 9, p Grünfeld, F & Huijboom, A p

27 keep. 57 Considering the statement given before that the US will no longer risk the lives of By Nadia C. Boegli 2009 that no idealist cause was important enough to loose Americans in a country that was of no national interest. 53 The US government urged Prudence Bushnell to get our folks out 54 because Nothing that the US could achieve in Somalia is worth the death of even one more soldier. 55 While the UN was very persistent in pressuring the United States to intervene in Somalia, the UN itself was rather reluctant in doing so during the genocide in Rwanda. Romeo Dellaire, who was the commander of the peacekeeping forces in Rwanda, informed the UN in the genocide fax about the atrocities in Rwanda. He stated that Hutu extremists were able to kill up to 1000 Tutsi in 20 minutes. 56 The UN, nevertheless, did not see the necessity to consider the mass slaughter of the Tutsi population as genocide and therefore did not seek for humanitarian intervention. This decision reveals that intervention was dependent on semantics, whether the killings in Rwanda were named genocide or not. Also the UN was influence by the Somalia moment, since they had been accused massively for the loss of American soldiers. During the negotiations concerning the intervention in Rwanda the Somalia shadow was still omnipresent in the UN headquarters, which seemed to re-determine that UN peacekeepers should only be deployed when there was a peace to American citizens in countries that are of no national interest, one can recognize that national interests became a dependent variable in determining foreign policies. Besides that the United States wanted Rwanda to maintain the Arusha Peace Agreement, which should guarantee a stable and peaceful Rwandan government, the US had not interests and no relations with the region in Central Africa. A pivotal reason for this indifference is the fact that Rwanda does not provide any, for the US, valuable resources. Also the US was solely interested in economic development in the region, which seemed to be satisfying under President Habyarimana, and therefore did not trigger any concerns about his discrimination policies towards Tutsi. 58 US attitude in other words: Look if something happens in Rwanda- Burundi, 53 Papp, J., Johnson, L.K. & Endicott, J.E American Foreign Policy. pp (hereinafter: Papp, J. 2005) 54 Power, S p Papp, J p Power, S p Barnett, M Eyewitness to a Genocide. The United Nations and Rwanda. pp Special Report by USIP, US Human Rights Policy towards Africa. 27

28 we don t care. Take it off the list, US national interest is not involved and we can t put all these silly humanitarian issues on the lists just make it go away. 59 Bearing in mind the tragedy of Rwanda, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon once stated: As we attempt to learn the lessons of the genocide in Rwanda, two messages should be paramount. First, never forget. Second, never stop working to prevent another genocide. Our thoughts go to the victims -- the more than 800,000 innocent people who lost their lives with terrifying speed. Our thoughts go to the survivors. Their resilience continues to inspire us. It is the responsibility of us all to support them in rebuilding their lives. How different it would have been, had we, the international community, acted properly at the proper time." 60 Contemplating the tremendous effects that US foreign policy and the UN decisions had on Rwanda, what are the lessons that have been learned when comparing the decisions in 1994 to the ones ten years later concerning Darfur? It appears as if one lesson that has been learned by the United States is the imperative to take some of the early warning signs seriously 61 and to strive for the prevention of genocide. However, this lesson has been mainly rhetorical. Even though the US did identify the conflict in Darfur as genocide, which had not been the case in Rwanda, where the debate about semantics remained the main burden of decision-making, there has not been much progress in stopping the mass slaughter of innocent Sudanese citizens since The US has adopted three main policies towards Darfur, which are: a rapid deployment of the robust UN/African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), which aimed to result in the protection of civilians; an immediate cease-fire and protection of and improved access for humanitarian workers; and a political settlement for the Darfur crisis. The leadership of the USA also played a pivotal role in securing the passages of several Security Council resolutions to deploy multinational UN forces to Sudan; authorize a UN-AU hybrid force; and the United States supported the full implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement in 2006 between the Sudanese government and the rebel groups SLA and JEM. 62 All these policies have been adopted throughout the last years, nevertheless the conflict is still continuing. Another lessons that Rwanda seems to teach is rather pessimistic; the fact that countries are unwilling to intervene out of moral, humanitarian reasons. The United States did neither have political nor geopolitical interest in Rwanda and an intervention on solely moral grounds seemed unconvincing for the one military power that would have had the means to. 59 Wood, J PBS Interview. 60 Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon Bush, G.W Retrieved from 62 The U.S department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs. The United States response to the Darfur Crisis

29 When looking towards Darfur and the response of the United States and the members of the UN, the questions arises whether the same will happen as fourteen years ago. Bearing in mind that the US has labeled the crisis in Darfur genocide in 2004, the US government has not been able to convince the Security Council members to do the same and launch a humanitarian intervention. Can this be linked with the lack of US interest in the region? When reviewing various opinions concerning the US engagement, one is confronted with the perception that hypocrisy is an aspect of US policy towards Darfur; one the hand it is being claimed that genocide is taking place and that there should be more international involvement, on the other hand the US government is not willing to deploy US troops for this international involvement. 63 Various articles mention that the reasons for US reluctance to pressure the Sudanese government any further is the fear of interfering with the North- South peace Agreement that had been implemented in In particular the Security Council stresses that it is still a very fragile agreement that can erupt if mistrust between the parties reemerges. 64 Other sources entail that the reluctance is linked to the importance of the intelligence relationship between the United States and Khartoum, which appears to be important in the war against terror. Apparently the US and Khartoum are sharing critical information about al-qaeda and other Islamic extremists. 65 It seems as if the moral interest is again not great enough to actively intervene in an ongoing genocide. According to Gerald Caplan, the author of Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide, another lesson that the Rwandan tragedy has thought, especially to the public, is that President Clinton and former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan were lying when they pledged to be uninformed of what was going on in Rwanda during Later investigations and protocols of UN officials have shown that Annan and Clinton justified their inaction with the excuse of unawareness. Nevertheless, the truth about their actual knowledge made it impossible to ignore another genocide. Nowadays, through Media coverage and the work of Non-Profit organizations and NGOs, the public is very well informed about what is happening 63 Frei, M BBC news. Bush Defends US record on Darfur. 64 Security Council Sudan Peace Agreement on Track, but level of trust between parties low. Foundation for durable Peace remains fragile, Security Council told Abramowitz, M U.S. Promises on Darfur Don't Match Actions. for Washington Post. 66 Caplan, G From Rwanda to Darfur: Lessons learned? 29

30 in Darfur, which does not allow for governmental indifference. When regarding the great public movements to stop genocide in Darfur in the United States, once can conclude that the US government has learned from Rwanda that the public opinion does not only deserve the truth, yet also seems to be willing to support governmental decisions that would end the mass slaughter and protect Sudanese Civilians. Also the fact that the three presidential candidates John McCain, Hillary Clinton and Barrack Obama have not only expressed their concerns regarding the genocide in Darfur, yet have also agreed to a standing united, in which all candidates stress their will to end the genocide in Darfur, illuminates the general American inclination to save Darfur. 67 Concluding, one can say that the genocide in Rwanda has taught three major lessons; first, that it is necessary to call a spade a spade ; second, that the US mostly only intervenes when national interests are at stake and third, that using an excuse of imprudens 68 is not desirable. Also the promise never again has been one of the popular slogans of countries all around the world, yet especially by the United States, to never again allow innocent people being slaughtered on our watch imprudence is Latin for: not knowing something; ignorance. 30

31 31

32 CHAPTER IV YET AGAIN: the Genocide in Darfur 32

33 4. Yet Again: The Genocide in Darfur Tell the people what is happening here. Tell them we will all die. Tell them we need help! This is the statement of a victim of the Darfur crisis, Halima, who lost three of her five children when the Janjaweed came to burn down her village. 69 Several times it was promised never again and yet it is happening again: the world is again bystander to genocide. In order to end the conflict in Darfur, it is firstly necessary to understand the background of, what the UN calls, the world s greatest humanitarian crisis. This chapter will entail three parts; first an extensive overview of the history behind the conflict; second an analysis of what is or has been done by the United States to stop the ongoing genocide and third recommendations of what should be done especially by the US to end the mass slaughter. The Republic of Sudan is the largest country in Africa with a population of approximately 28 million people comprised of several ethnic groups, speaking around 400 languages. 70 Despite the great amount of ethnicities, 50% of the Sudanese population identify themselves as African, while 40% describe themselves as Arabs. This form of division already emerged during Colonization ( ) when the Republic of Sudan was divided into the North, ruled by Egypt and the South that was under British control. The two colonial powers governed their parts in different ways, which originated in two regions based on different cultural and religious characteristics. 71 On the one side, the Egypt promoted a spread of Islamic values in the Northern part of the region, while Great Britain, on the other side, established a policy for the Southern part that would aim to reduce Islamic influence by Encouraging Christian missionaries to work and promote the English language. 72 In later years Great Britain decided to expand their control by annexing a Northern independent region called Darfur to their colonial territory. After the Second World War Great Britain started to withdraw from the Republic of Sudan and reconnected the Arabic North with the African South. Power was handed to the Northern part, which led to a quick replacement of British officials in the South by Northern officials. Based on the fact that Darfur was less developed than the rest of Sudan, especially than the South, and that Darfur felt rather 69 Farrow, M Youngs, T Sudan: Conflict in Darfur. Research Paper 04/51. House of Commons Library. p Cheadle, D & Prendergast; J Not on our Watch. The Mission to End Genocide in Darfur and Beyond. p Ibid. 33

34 suspicious towards any kind of regime in Khartoum, which was also the case for the South and the West that did not trust an authority in Khartoum either, one can recognize the beginning of tensions in the Republic of Sudan. Thus just before Sudan s independence in 1955, the battle lines were drawn and southerners rioted and rebelled. 73 Two years after Sudan had achieved independence, the national army took over power in Sudan due to use of force and the regime tried to Islamize the South through violence. Southern forces formed a rebel group, which was highly supported by the population in the South, to withstand the Northern aggression. The tension between the governmental forces and the rebel groups turned into a bloody civil war between the two fronts. 74 Even though the military regime was overthrown in 1964, the new leadership was unable to gain Southern trust and the civil war continued. During the cold war, the former USSR became Khartoum s main supporter, Moscow provided the North Sudan with weapons until the early 70s. In the early 70s the relationship to the USSR declined, the United States and Western Europe became more important. Due to this new relationship to the non-communist part of the world, the population of Sudan finally had a ray of hope that the civil war will come to an end. This hope was intensified when in 1972 the two parties agreed to ratify the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement, which laid down new rules of shared power between the two opposed parties. 75 Nevertheless the agreement remained a ray of hope, since it was not able to end the power and wealth consolidation in Khartoum, which is viewed as being the root cause of the civil war. In the years following Addis Ababa Islamist influence spread in the government and when oil was discovered in the Southern part of Sudan, the feeling of greed became stronger in the North. This greed led the North to strive for greater economical power due to the spread of Northern military troops to places where oil had been encountered. The government wanted to replace every Southern troop with Northern soldiers in order to monopolize, maximize and secure oil profits. The South felt neglected and discriminated and began to revolt against the anew spread of Northern Islamic influence. In order to end the revolt and protect the oil the Northern troops were obliged to attack the Southern troops, which were forced to seek 73 Ibid, p Ibid. pp Dagne, T Sudan: Humanitarian Crisis, Peace Talks, Terrorism, and US. Policy. Congressional Research Service. CRS. 34

35 refugee in neighboring countries where the refugees formed the opposition party SPLA (Southern People s Liberation Army). 76 The actions undertaken by the Sudanese government in the early 80s signaled more mistrust to the opposition rebel group SPLA, since the government turned its back on the [peace] treaty and Khartoum re-emerged as consolidation of power. The Islamic government decided to declare Arabic as the official language for whole Sudan and Sharia law as the legal system that should by accepted throughout the region. 77 Through all these transformations towards a more and more Islamic country in which even non-muslims were prosecuted according to Islamic law, the South s mistrust in the government became even greater, which consequently led to further support for SPLA. The SPLA at this time wanted to fight for the establishment of a democratic state in which the rich diversity of Sudanese citizens would be respected and promoted. When the NIF (National Islamic Front) government started to pursue a course of radical Islamization though arbitrary detention against everyone that was regarded as a threat to the government, the intensification of the civil war between the rebels and the NIF was guaranteed. From 1987 to 1996 the Sudanese government started to intervene in local Darfuran conflicts between non-arab farmers and Arab nomads. Khartoum saw a chance to expand its Arabic power by eradicating more and more non-arab citizens, allowing Arab militias to kill hundreds of Massaleit and Fur, who were non-arab and the ruling group in Darfur at that time. Based on the Fur s assumption that Khartoum tried to destroy the Darfuran economy and drive them from their land 78, most non-arab groups organized themselves militarily and formed the SLA (Sudan Liberation Army) that would attempt to fight the Arab militias. The further intensification of Khartoum s violence against non-arabs and the fact that the citizens [in Darfur] realized that peace talks between the government and the SPLA would not change the NIF s destructive policy towards them led to the first attacks by the SLA. 79 In 2003 the rebel groups SLA and JEM (Justice and Equality Movement) launched several attacks against regions containing military devices of the NIF government. The regions that were attacked had been areas in which the NIF was storing their aircraft weapons and other 76 Cheadle, D & Prendergast; J Not on our Watch. The Mission to End Genocide in Darfur and Beyond. pp Ibid. 78 Ibid, pp Ibid, p

36 highly developed weaponry. 80 The SLA and the JEM declare that the Sudanese government is discriminating against black Africans that are Muslim, as the government as well, yet not Arabs. The tension between Arabs and non-arabs (also called Africans) can be traced back to the early 30s and every running government in Khartoum has been neglecting African ethnic groups in Darfur. 81 The conflict reached its critical point when Arab militia, consisting of outlaws and bandits (also called the Janjaweed), which are created and supported by the NIF government, started to punish the rebel groups and their constituencies for attacking the weaponry of the government. The Janjaweed are assisted by the Sudanese Army and have the task to destroy villages inhabited by the rebel ethic groups such as the Massalit, Zaghawa and the Fur. In interviews with Janjaweed groups it becomes clear that their mission is to enter the villages after they had been carpet bombed by the Sudanese military aircaft, in order to enflame every single hut, kill, rape and displace the inhabitants. The militia works according to the slogan kill the slaves, Kill the slaves! 82 Even though all parties had signed a ceasefire agreement in 2004, the situation only improved superficially, since the slaughtering of civilians still continues. Also the May 2006 peace settlement between the government and one of the rebel groups did not end the violence. 83 According to Human Rights Watch the results of the conflict have been shocking; of a population around 6 million people living in Darfur about 2.5 million people have been displaced and now live in refugee camps within Darfur, while have fled to neighboring countries such as Chad; to have been killed and innumerable women have been raped by the militia and the Sudanese Army. 84 Considering the facts about the Sudanese genocide the question of what is being done by the major powers appears to be striking and demands answers. The Involvement of the United States in ending the Slaughtering Due to longstanding moralistic tendencies in American foreign policy and the emergence of [specific groups that have shown their interest in ending mass slaughtering] one may speak 80 Khidir Haroum Ahmed, Darfur Conflict: Its History, Nature and Development. SudaNews, Embassy of the Republic of the Sudan. 81 Dagne, T Sudan: Humanitarian Crisis, Peace Talks, Terrorism, and US. Policy. Congressional Research Service. CRS. 82 Movie. The Devil came on Horseback Belloni, R The Tragedy of Darfur and the Limits of the Responsibility to Protect. Ethnopolitics Vol. 5 No. 4, Human Rights Watch Q & A: Crisis in Darfur. 36

37 of a long period of time in which Americans have been expressing concerns about genocide and mass atrocities. 85 Also the famous quote by President Bush Not on my watch, stated in regard to the 2001 National Security Council memorandum, describing the Clinton administration s failure to lead a global effort to end the Rwandan genocide of 1994, illustrates the general American apprehensiveness towards genocide and mass slaughtering. In addition to that the Bush administration approved the ICISS report the responsibility to protect and espoused the adoption by the UN during the World Summit negotiations in All these undertakings by the United States prove the overall interest and willingness to end humanitarian crises, yet fail to illustrate what actually has been done by US so far. After acknowledging their failure to prepare a rebuilding mission in Iraq after 2003, the US administration issued a National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-44) in 2005 with the intention to improve the government s ability to conduct such missions that aim to stabilize and reconstruct, which also entails an ability to prevent atrocities. The directive is based on the intention to plan and implement U.S. government reconstruction and stabilization missions in states and regions at risk of, or in transition from conflict or civil strife. 87 Furthermore willingness and readiness was announced by the 2006 Defense Department Quadrennial Defense Review to enlarge US support for UN peacekeeping operations in such areas that fit into the Defense Department s expertise. 88 Even though these directives and announcements have signified a transformation of policies, there has not been actual practical progress. For instance, there have been several problems concerning the implementation of NSPD-44. A successful implementation of these directives could have been a major step forward in keeping up G.W. Bush s promise not on my watch, because they would have allowed the administration to establish a UN peacekeeping operation in Darfur with American soldiers, and to take the lead in ending the genocide. Besides the mentioned attempt to change US foreign policy on general terms, there have also been specific actions by the US to punish the Sudanese government for their action and inaction regarding the ongoing genocide in Darfur. According to the US government, the United States have supported the authorization of a United Nations-African Union hybrid peacekeeping mission to protect civilians and have demanded all conflicting parties to uphold 85 Feinstein, L Darfur and Beyond. p Ibid. 87 US Department of Defense. Retrieved December 2008 from 88 Feinstein, L Darfur and Beyond. pp

38 a ceasefire agreement. Also the full implementation of the North-South Peace Agreement is regarded as essential to end the ongoing atrocities and is highly supported by the Bush administration, because it should pave the way for free and fair national elections in late Additionally the United States claim to have stimulated China, whose relations to Sudan are very important due to oil resources in the Southern part of the country, to make use of its relationship to guide Khartoum into a peaceful political settlement of the dispute. 90 After several pitfalls in achieving an end to the slaughtering, the US has made use of political and economic sanctions in order to pressure Khartoum: On May 29, 2007, responding to Sudanese President Bashir s continued refusal to honor his commitments to end the violence in Darfur, President Bush ordered the U.S. Department of the Treasury to block the assets of three Sudanese individuals and one company involved in the violence and to sanction 30 companies owned or controlled by the Government of Sudan. This list currently includes seven individuals and more than 160 companies. 91 The issued sanctions entail restrictions of exports to and imports form Sudan, freezing of capital flow against the government and the prohibition of US arms being transferred or sold to Sudan. Despite all these sanctions and negotiations, the Darfuran genocide has lately entered its sixth year of existence. Six years have passed during which innocent human beings have been brutally killed, raped and displaced. Six years of suffering without any visible ending. In order to end the genocide in Darfur the Obama- Biden administration should address the following issues and implement commensurate policies. The US must continue to support the steps taken so far: Secure increased funding to the hybrid AU-UN force by financial aid in order to ensure the success of such a force, US should also be willing to deploy US troops to the UN mandate, despite the engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is unacceptable that the United States has identified the conflict in Darfur as genocide, yet is unwilling to send in its own troops. As long as the US is no role-model other countries will be reluctant to deploy soldiers, thus the US must act as a leading force. Engage Sudan s allies further (Russia, China, Arab states): if sanctions against Sudan appear to be insufficient in pressuring Khartoum, the US should also adopt more 89 US Department of State Fact Sheet. US Response to the situation in Darfur. 90 Ibid. 91 Ibid. 38

39 forceful measures towards Sudan s allies in order to pressure them to use their influence to end the genocide. The United States needs to be clearer in pressuring China, since China, due to its economic relationship with Sudan and its oil interests, plays a significant role in influencing Khartoum. Here also the expansion of the arms embargo needs to be addressed, since the main allies of Sudan are still engaged in arms trade with the government. The US must adopt a stronger position against those countries. Continue to support the International Criminal Court investigations: government officials such as Sudanese President Al- Bashir and his sub worker must be held accountable for their action and inaction to stop the genocide. In order to prosecute everyone that should be held accountable for the murder and rape of hundred thousands, the US must be willing to supply relevant facts and information that could be necessary to the collection of evidence. Here the CIA could play a pivotal role in finding those facts. Seek Chapter VII resolution: Bearing in mind the Responsibility to Protect report by the ICISS, one can acknowledge that Khartoum had the chance to end the genocide, but they were unable and unwilling. Thus the UN and the US should work together to protect the civilians and achieve justice for the victims. Also the United States must further pressure the member states of the UN to adopt a Chapter VII resolution that does not need the acceptance of Sudan. All other measures have been exploited; humanitarian intervention is the only instrument to end the genocide that has not taken place yet. In order to convince China and Russia to play along, the US must pressure them economically through embargos and sanctions. China and Russia should be address publicly- that should build pressure within the countries itself (population vs. government). If the persuasion fails, then the US needs to be prepared to act in a Kosovo manner In 1999, Serbia was involved in the ethnic cleansing of Albanians in Kosovo. Russia announced its intention to veto a UNSC resolution authorizing force to stop the killing. Under NATO auspices, the United States and Europe engaged in a military campaign of bombing Serbian targets until Slobodan Milosevic stopped the carnage. (Richard S. Williamson 2007). 39

40 Conclusion Six years of murder, rape and displacement have taken place in the North Western region of Sudan on our watch. It is time that the most powerful country lives up to her promises that have been made especially after Rwanda in It was once said never again and yet again genocide is happening on our doorstep. Even though the Bush administration was the only official body to define the conflict in Darfur as genocide, the United States has not been able to lead an effective mission that would stop the mass slaughtering. The difficulty to do so has several reasons; the principle of state sovereignty is one, which places a burden on potential desires to intervene, because international law prohibits interferences with the affairs of other states. However, the ICISS responsibility to protect report, which is not only supported by the United States, yet has also been adopted by the UN in 2005, illustrates a transformation of sovereignty as right to sovereignty as responsibility and stresses that if a state is unable or unwilling to protect the own citizens then other countries must do so. Regarding the ways of prevention it is obvious that the United States have been willing to fund AU-UN peacekeepers and have invoked several economic and military sanctions against the Khartoum regime, however American officials have been hesitant to send their own troops as peacekeepers or in a humanitarian intervention. This reluctance seems rather ineffective, since the United States is in fact the most powerful country at the moment and therefore could serve as the leading nation in such a mission, where other countries would follow the American example. After the failure to stop genocide in Rwanda in 1994, President Clinton apologized to the Rwandan people and regretted his administration s decision not to have prevented nor intervened. The lessons that were taught by this tragedy are mainly visible nowadays. The US has acknowledged the necessity to call a spade a spade and that imprudens is neither desirable nor useful in a highly informed environment. Respecting the great public pressure and the President elect, who is an active supporter of the Save Darfur movement all over the United States, the US as the most powerful nation, [with] the most stake in creating an order in the world that is stable and in which people have hope and opportunity 93 should not only continue the sanctions that have already been invoked, yet also seek a Chapter VII resolution. 93 Interview by Savedarfur Coalition with Barrack Obama

41 Thus, the United States should adopt a Darfur policy that seeks humanitarian intervention under Chapter VII of the UN, yet the nation should also be prepared to act on their own, in a Kosovo manner, for the sake of protecting the Darfuran people. 41

42 42

43 Bibliography Literature: Barnett, M Eyewitness to a Genocide. The United Nations and Rwanda. Cornell University Press: NY Brownlie, I Principles of International Law. Chapter 4, pp Oxford University Press: Oxford Cheadle, D & Prendergast; J Not on our Watch. The Mission to End Genocide in Darfur and Beyond. Hyperion: USA. Grünfeld, F. & Huijboom, A The Failure to Prevent the Genocide in Rwanda: the Role of Bystanders. Transnational Publishers: Leiden. Haar, B Peace or Human Rights? The Dilemma or humanitarian interventions. Clingendael Institute of international Relations: The Hague, Netherlands. Papp, D., Johnson, l., Endicott, J American Foreign Policy: History, Politics and Policy. Pearson: United States. Chapter 14. Power, S A Problem from Hell. America and the Age of Genocide. p Harper Collins Publishers: New York. Documents: Bellamy, A. & Williams, P The Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur. SAGE Publications Vol. 36 (1): p Belloni, R The Tragedy of Darfur and the Limits of the Responsibility to Protect. Ethnopolitics Vol. 5 No. 4,

44 Feinstein, L Darfur and Beyond: What is needed to Prevent Mass Atrocities. Council Special Report. No. 22. Council of Foreign Relations, New York. Grünfeld, F Humanitarian Intervention and the Politics of Decision-Making. ICISS report The Responsibility to Protect. Downloaded from Lyons& Mastanduno. International Intervention, State Sovereignty and the future of International Society. International Social Science Journal. UNESCO. Vol. XIV, NO. 4, Thakur, R Intervention, Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect: Experience form ICISS. Security Dialogue Vol. 33, No. 3, pp Youngs, T Sudan: Conflict in Darfur. Research Paper 04/51. House of Commons Library. Online Documents and websites: Abramowitz, M U.S. Promises on Darfur Don't Match Actions. Retrieved December 2008 form Associated Press, May 29 th Bush announces new Economic Sanctions on Sudan to halt Darfur Crisis. Retrieved November 2008 from Associated Press, Report: China, Sudan to boost Cooperation. Retrieved November 2008 from 44

45 Caplan, G From Rwanda to Darfur: Lessons learned? Retrieved November 2008 from Charbonneau, L Iran, Russia supplying arms to Sudan: rights group. Retrieved November 2008 from Clinton, W Administration of William J. Clinton 1994 / June. bulk.resource.org/gpo.gov/papers/1994/1994_vol1_1047.pdf Dagne, T Sudan: Humanitarian Crisis, Peace Talks, Terrorism, and U.S Policy. Congressional Library. Retrieved December 2008 from Enough. Presidential Candidates joint statement. Retrieved November 17, 2008 from Ferroggiaro, W The National Security Archive. Retrieved November 2008 from Frei, M BBC news. Bush Defends US record on Darfur. Retrieved November 2008 From Farrow, M Mia Farrow's exclusive dispatch: I am a witness to Darfur's suffering. Retrieved December 2008 from Human Rights Watch Q & A: Crisis in Darfur. Retrieved December 2008 from Khidir Haroum Ahmed, Darfur Conflict: Its History, Nature and Development SudaNews, Embassy of the Republic of the Sudan. Retrieved December 2008 from 45

46 Liang-Fenton, D Special Report by USIP. US Human Rights Policy towards Africa. Retrieved November 2008 form Organization of African Unity. Rwanda: the Preventable Genocide. Chapter 9, p.5. Retrieved November 2008 from Office of Stability Operations Capabilities. USG Civilian Capabilities. Retrieved January 2009 from usgcapabilities/index.html Security Council Sudan Peace Agreement on track, but level of trust between parties low, foundation for durable peace remains fragile Retrieved November 2008 from Smith, G Ten Years after Rwanda: Has anything changed? Retrieved November 2008 from UN Secretary General 2001.Prevention of Armed Conflict. Retrieved December 2008 from UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon statement. Retrieved November 2008 from US Department of State Fact Sheet. US Response to the situation in Darfur. Retrieved December 25 th 2008 from Williamson, R.S Options for US policy on Darfur. Retrieved January 2009 from 46

47 Media: BBC Interview with a Janjaweed defector Ali Retrieved January 5 th 2009 from Movie. The Devil came on Horseback. By Annie Sundberg Obama, B On Darfur. Interview by Savedarfur.org. Retrieved January 5 th, 2009 from PBS Frontline. Interview with James Wood The Triumph of Evil. Retrieved November 2008 from PBS Frontline. On our Watch Retrieved October 15 th, 2008 from Lectures: Lecture by Fred Grünfeld, December 9 th 2008 in Maastricht... 47

48 48

49 I would like to thank everyone, who supported me during my studies at the University College Maastricht. I am especially grateful that Professor Fred Grünfeld, agreed to be my Capstone advisor and helped me develop this last piece of work as a UCM student. 49

50 Nadia Claudine Boegli January