Refugee Crisis and Divergences in Europe: The Russian Connection

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1 Working Paper No. 2016/10 Refugee Crisis and Divergences in Europe: The Russian Connection Hasan Selçuk Türkmen¹ August 2016 The author, 2016 ¹ PhD Student, Area Studies, Middle East Technical University (METU), Ankara

2 The Maastricht School of Management is a leading provider of management education with worldwide presence. Our mission is to enhance the management capacity of professionals and organizations in and for emerging economies and developing countries with the objective to substantially contribute to the development of these societies. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s). Publication does not imply endorsement by the School or its sponsors, of any of the views expressed.

3 Refugee Crisis and Divergences in Europe: The Russian Connection Hasan Selçuk Türkmen 1 Abstract This paper aims to provide an analysis of anti-refugee policies in Europe with a focus on Russian connection in this regard. Since the summer of 2015, refugees from Syria began to flow in very large numbers towards Europe. Concurrently, Russia began to develop a strictly anti-european discourse with reference to the refugee crisis. Hardline policies against refugees in Europe are prominently defended by Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orban, who in his recent visit to Moscow reassured his support to the Russian discourse. Either with or without an ostensible motif of supporting the Russian discourse, Italian prime minister Matteo Renzi, Greek prime minister Alexis Tsipras, and Polish prime minister Beata Szydło have been occasionally making remarks that harshly criticize refugee policies of the European Union. Divergent attitudes in Europe with regard to the refugee crisis necessarily coincides with the issues in Russian-European relations. Russian involvement, all in all, adds a new aspect to the refugee crisis, making its implications larger and more intricate. This paper focuses on this problematique and elaborates on it through discourse analysis of the statements of both Russian and European policymakers. Introduction Russia has traditionally struggled to locate itself vis-a-vis Europe. In an interview to an Italian newspaper last year, Putin told that [Russia has] never viewed Europe as a mistress, [it has] always proposed a serious relationship. 2 Russia has peculiarly managed to harbor anti- European and pro-european leanings at the same time in its own way. In any case, Europe has a significant place for Russian foreign policy, as Putin s remarks strive to imply. On the other side of the relationship, however, contrary to the common-sensical understanding, there is not one single Europe, not even one solid international organization when it comes to the EU, but divergent attitudes towards Russia within Europe. Ukrainian crisis, and the Russian annexation of Crimea in March 2014, created an impression for a while that there could be a single unyielding European attitude towards Russia, but it did not last long. High-scale international political developments, specifically Syrian civil war and the refugee crisis, had their share in creating divergences within Europe, but the events by themselves do not carry the whole responsibility. What seems to be underestimated in this context is Russian efforts for convincing Europe, first, in regard to its arguments vis-a-vis Ukrainian crisis and the EU sanctions, and secondly, its stance and later direct involvement in Syrian civil war. This paper focuses on these underestimated Russian efforts, which I find analytically useful to gather under the term discursive foreign policy. 1 PhD Student, Area Studies, Middle East Technical University (METU), Ankara. 2 Corriere Della Sera (June 7). Vladimir Putin, interview to the Italian newspaper Il Corriere della Sera. Available at: 1

4 Russia s Discursive Foreign Policy Though contemporary Russian foreign policy making has been widely characterized as the pike of realism and hard power, Russia has been employing sophisticated and avant-garde discursive means and public diplomacy in its foreign policy. Setting any normative positions aside, Russian foreign policy has been following a consistent trail within its own assumptions and arguments, in contrast to many accounts that portray Russia under Putin as an irrational and unpredictable world power, 3 especially within the contexts of the Ukrainian crisis and Syrian civil war. Russian military airstrikes in Syria began in September 2015, and unexpectedly for general international public opinion, received suprisingly little reaction from the US and European states. Russia was, after all, already being heavily sanctioned by the West for the annexation of Crimea and Putin was being harshly criticized for both his foreign and domestic policies. How could another bold foreign policy move by Russia go so smoothly, without much reaction, let alone without the introduction of further sanctions? But the events unfolded contrary to this common-sensical expectation, and this was possible with Russian public diplomacy. Russia could render its intervention in Syria sensible through sophisticated manipulations and propaganda with respect to the foreign policies of Western states toward Syria and to the refugee crisis. In political science and IR literatures, non-military uses of force and influence is a much-studied subject but it is also lacking clear definitive lines. What is diplomacy, soft power, public relations, propoganda, information war within the context of foreign policy making? Addressing which is which and where to draw the lines among these phenomena have always been murky. Yet, in this paper, I do conceptualize Russian efforts to manipulate the international public and elite opinion under the term discursive foreign policy, which, I argue, is all inclusive of the aforementioned types of undertakings. Russian propaganda generally analyzed for demonstrating its agressive motifs, 4 disregarding the convincing dimension. As Pomerantsev and Weiss argues, Kremlin has been applying to tactics of information war, yet these efforts especially target Russian-speaking communities outside Russia. Marlene Laruelle s analysis of the juncture between Russian soft power efforts and the increasing emphasis on the Russian world provides a useful conceptualization in this regard. However, as I argue in this paper, Russia s efforts targeting the Western audience, or Western elite and public opinion, differs from the efforts targeting the Russian-speaking audience, and therefore begs for a separate analysis. 3 Alexander Sergunin Explaining Russian Foreign Policy Behavior: Theory and Practice. Ibidem: Sttutgart, p. 13. See also, among many others: Michale McFaul The Myth of Putin s Strategic Genius. The New York Times, October Two very important works in this regard are: Peter Pomerantsev & Michael Weiss The Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin Weaponizes Information, Culture and Money. Institute of Modern Russia: New York; Marlene Laruelle The Russian World Russia s Soft Power and Geopolitical Imagination. Center on Global Interests: Washington. 2

5 In order to analyze the most effective episode of Russia s discursive foreign policy efforts, we should go back to the summer of This was the time when the terrorist organization ISIS was on the rise in Syria. The global coalition under the leadership of the US (officially abbreviated as GCCI, but never found recognition in popular usage) practically failed to be effective to counter ISIS or coordinate collective action vis-a-vis Syrian civil war. Russia, on the other hand, had been supporting the Assad government from the beginning, yet not making bold moves. That was mostly because Russia s international reputation had been going increasingly downwards especially since the annexation of Crimea in March What Russia needed was to restore its pre-annexation reputation in the eyes of the Western elite and public opinion. Syrian civil war and the ensuing refugee crisis provided a convenient opportunity in that respect and Russia made, and has been still making indeed, good instrumentalization of them. Divergences in Europe In March 2015, one year after Russia s annexation of Crimea, Italia s prime minister Matteo Renzi paid a working visit to Russia. 5 This visit was a breaking point in the newly defined relations between Russia and the EU after the annexation, as leaders of EU member states had been withholding any visits to Moscow then for a year. On the margins of this visit, however, Both Putin and Renzi stressed the importance of Russia-EU dialogue. Renzi extended a request of cooperation to Putin in regard to the rise of jihadist groups in Libya. 6 The trend settled by this visit was augmented by Putin s official visit to Italy in June The Russia-Italy raproachment was the beginning of Russia s discursive foreign policy vis-a-vis restoring its reputation after the annexation of Crimea, playing on the divergences in Europe and opening space for its upcoming new foreign policy moves. Before his visit to Italy, Putin gave an extensive interview to the Italian newspaper Il Corriere Della Sera. 8 The tone of Putin s long replies to the questions were that of an explanation in detail and attempt for convincing, rather than escalating the confrontation with Europe around the Ukrainian crisis. This rapproachment between Italy and Russia was received sceptically and criticized by the leaders of the EU countries on the grounds that Renzi s seeking stronger cooperation with Russia could weaken the efficiency EU sanctions. More strikingly, UK foreign secretary Phillip Hammond saw this rapproachment as Italy s falling prey to Putin s strategy for breaking the EU s stand in regard to the Ukrainian crisis. 9 5 Kremlin (March 5). Meeting with Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi. Available at: 6 Financial Times (March 5). Renzi appeals to Putin for Russian help to stabilise Libya. Available at: 7 Kremlin (June 10). Visit to Italy and the Vatican. Available at: 8 Corriere Della Sera (June 7). Vladimir Putin, interview to the Italian newspaper Il Corriere della Sera. Available at: 9 BBC (June 10). Russia's Putin tests EU unity with visit to Italy's Renzi. Available at: 3

6 Another divergence within EU was Greece. Greek prime minister Alexis Tsipras visited Moscow in April 2015, amid the contention that sprung from debt crisis between Greece and the EU. Tsipras was even more outright than Renzi in expressing his criticism of the EU sanctions on Russia. 10 Defying criticisms from the EU about his raproachment with Russia, Tsipras defined his visit as the beginning of a spring in the relations between the two countries. 11 Putin, on the other hand, stressed not only the economic and trade-based cooperation, but also religious and historical common grounds in order to attribute a peculiarity to Russia s relations with Greece. 12 In June 2015, Tsipras participated in St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. His Euro-scepticism was at its peak in his speech given there: In Europe, we had long been under the illusion that we were the center of the world, taking into consideration only those developments occurring just beyond the borders of our neighborhood to the other side of the Atlantic. The world s economic center of gravity, however, has shifted. New emerging powers are playing an increasingly important role economically and geopolitically. (...) Moreover, the Eurasian Union is potentially another source of new wealth production and economic power. 13 Hungary was another EU member state that Russia could maintain its cooperation in the face of EU sanctions. Putin paid a working visit to Hungary in February 2015, and as with Italy and Greece, he drove forward economic, trade-based, and energy-related areas of cooperation. 14 Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orban had already been making occasional remarks arguing that the EU sanctions on Russia are ineffective vis-a-vis Ukranian crisis and harmful for Hungary s economy. 15 Upon this background began Russia s effort to shift its focus from the Ukrainian crisis to Syrian civil war and the following refugee crisis. Having certain EU member states with himself on the criticism of EU policies toward Russia, Putin began to explicitly play on the divergences in Europe and tried to manipulate the EU public and elite opinion in regard to Syria. In July 2015, in an interview given to Swiss RTS television, Putin argued that Europe suffers from the imperialistic policies of the US. But I would really like to see Europe demonstrate some real independence and sovereignty and be capable of defending its national interests, the interests of its people and its nations. (...) I think that at the time, 10 The New York Times (April 8). Putin Meets with Alexis Tsipras of Greece, Raising Eyebrows in Europe. Available at: 11 Hellenic Republic Prime Ministry (April 9). Prime Minister s A. Tsipras statement during the joint press conference with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Available at: 12 Kremlin (April 8). Meeting with Prime Minister of Greece Alexis Tsipras. Available at: 13 Hellenic Republic Prime Ministry (June 19). Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras statement at the Economic Forum in St. Petersburg. Available at: 14 Kremlin (February 17). Press statement following Russian-Hungarian talks and answers to journalists questions. Available at: 15 The Telegraph (February 17). Vladimir Putin receives a warm welcome from Hungarian PM Viktor Orban. Available at: 4

7 France withdrew from NATO to preserve its sovereignty more than it is possible within the framework of a military bloc. It is not our business to analyse European nations foreign policy. But I think you ll agree that if we need to discuss intra-european affairs with European partners in Washington, it is not very interesting. 16 Putin s argument indeed found considerable repercussions and unignorable support from certain leaders of EU member states. Czech president Milos Zeman shared Putin s stance, as he stated in an interview to Blesk newspaper that the current wave of migration [to Europe] is rooted in the crazy [US] idea to launch an intervention in Iraq, which allegedly had weapons of mass destruction, but nothing was found. 17 Another support, expectedly, came from Renzi, with his statement that the West should not isolate Russia in solving international disputes. 18 Simultaneously, Russia began to appeal to the US for cooperation in regard to Syria, arguing that Western policies had been ineffective in combat against terrorism. 19 Another indication of the effectiveness of Russia s discursive foreign policy moves could be observed at the time in the willingness of certain EU member state delegations for visiting Crimea. 20 In the end of August 2015, refugee crisis in Europe began to peak. On the border between Greece and Macedonia, migrants attempted to cut the barbed wires defending the border while Macedonian police pushed back them with batons. Scores of Syrian refugees were found dead by suffocation in a lorry haulage while illegally traveling from Hungary to Austria. Within the EU member states, most remarkably Germany expressed a welcoming attitude towards the refugees and it therefore became the main destination for Syrian migrants. Germany s attitude deepened the divergences in Europe, as Macedonia, Poland, and Hungary sealed their borders, or accepted only a very limited number of refugees, and criticized Merkel for causing refugee calamities in Europe. 21 The refugee crisis was a breaking-point for international politics in a number of ways, but most significantly for Russia-EU relations and Western policies towards Syria. The 70 th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) meeting decisively marked this breaking-point. Putin was at the center of attention during the session, as most of the Western media observers covered its significance and implications. 22 Putin s address to UNGA was delicately balanced 16 Kremlin (July 27). Interview with Swiss media. Available at: 17 Russia Today (August 2). Migrant flow to Europe is result of US, EU military ops in Middle East Czech president. Available at: 18 Sputnik International (August 5). Italian Prime Minister Says West Must Not Isolate Russia. Available at: 19 The Moscow Times (August 10). Lavrov Says U.S. Should Cooperate with Syria Over Islamic State. Available at: 20 Sputnik International (August 16). Isolation, Huh? Italian, German Deputies Want to Visit Crimea. Available at: Russia Today (August 14). Polish lawmakers announce possible visit to Crimea. Available at: 21 Paul Hockenos (September 10). The Stunning Hypocrisy of Mitteleuropa Foreign Policy. 22 Among many others, see: BBC (September 29). Did Putin upstage Obama at UN Syria summit? Available at: CNN International (September 29). 5

8 between harsh criticism of the Western policies and convincing the Western elite and public opinion for cooperation with Russia vis-a-vis Syria. Putin s argument was based on Russia s longtime criticism of the Arab spring movements in the Middle East: It seems, however, that instead of learning from other people s mistakes, some prefer to repeat them and continue to export revolutions, only now these are democratic revolutions. (...) I m urged to ask those who created this situation: do you at least realize now what you ve done? But I m afraid that this question will remain unanswered, because they have never abandoned their policy, which is based on arrogance, exceptionalism and impunity. 23 Putin tied this argument to Western policies towards Syrian civil war. For a while, having a certain European public and elite opinion critical of Western stance and in one way or another supportive of Russia in regard to Syria, Russia had already been calling on the US for cooperation in Syria. Putin reiterated this offer in the interview he gave to Charlie Rose in September 2015, while he was in the US for UNGA, saying that [Russia has] cooperated with many countries and continue[s] to cooperate, including with the United States, but I think that this level of coordination is insufficient today, we need to work more closely with each other. 24 Simultaneously, Russia began airstrikes in Syria in support of the Assad government, 25 which created little reaction and no substantial sanctions against Russia in Europe. 26 Though in the US it produced a number of criticism in the beginning, 27 not long after the US stopped training new Syrian rebel groups. 28 Conclusion Russian discursive foreign policy efforts targeting Europe and the West in general did not win for Russia an outright cooperation or lifting of the sanctions. However, these efforts created a substantial public and elite opinion in Europe that supports, or at least understands and tolerates, Russian point of view. Russia through these efforts succeeded to influence its targeted audience in a number of points. First, by playing on the divergences in Europe, Russia got some European leaders on its side on the point that European sanctions on Russia would not help to solve the Ukrainian crisis but it would harm both Russian and European economies. Secondly, Russia tried to win European hearts and minds by accusing the US for making Europe suffer, as in the Vladimir Putin steals Barack Obama's thunder on the world stage. Available at: 23 Kremlin (September 28). 70th session of the UN General Assembly. Available at: See also the text provided by the United Nations, available at: 24 Kremlin (September 29). Interview to American TV channel CBS and PBS. Available at: 25 CNN International (October 1). Russia launches first airstrikes in Syria. Available at: 26 Benjamin Haddad & Hannah Thoburn (October 2). Putin Aims at Syria - and Strikes Europe. Foreign Policy. 27 CNN International (October 2). Obama: Russia heading for 'quagmire' in Syria. Available at: 28 BBC (October 9). US to abandon training new Syria rebel groups. Available at: 6

9 refugee crisis, through wrong foreign policy decisions vis-a-vis Syria. Thirdly, Russia prepared the grounds for its direct military action in Syria by boldly putting forward its own arguments with respect to Syria, harshly criticizing Western policies, but also appealing for a broader cooperation scenario that does not exclude Russia. 7

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