Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2007

Transcription

1 Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2007 Briefing paper A Project of the Center on International Cooperation at New York University With the support of the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the International Peace Academy

2 Center on International Cooperation at New York University Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2007 The Center on International Cooperation s (CIC) Annual Review of Global Peace Operations is the most comprehensive report of its kind, examining more than forty UN and non-un peacekeeping missions in 2006, including those in the Darfur region of Sudan, Afghanistan, Haiti, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Timor-Leste. Its purpose is to inform policymakers, members of the media, academics and peacekeepers in the field as the international community debates the growing role of peace operations around the world. The report draws on data previously unavailable outside the United Nations. CIC prepared the Review with the support of the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the International Peace Academy was the most testing year for peace operations since the 1990s. The crises in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Ti m o r-leste and the Darfur region of Sudan demanded the deployment of a new wave of peacekeepers. Simultaneously, the need to translate hard-won stability into lasting peace has required the continued presence of larg e international forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia, Côte d Ivoire, the Western Balkans and elsewhere. The UN, having seen its deployments grow by over 500 percent from 2000 to 2005 faced a further leap: by 31 December 2006, it had 80,368 troops, military observers and police in the field 10,000 more than a year earlier, surpassing its previous peak of 77,000 during the Bosnian war. Meanwhile, the total number of peacekeepers deployed by regional o rganizations, in net decline since 1999, has also entered a phase of rapid growth. In the twelve months to 30 September 2006, the number of troops deployed by NATO, the African Union and the an Union rose by 28 percent from 52,700 to 68,000. This was primarily driven by the expansion of NATO s mission in A f g h a n i s t a n, but the EU also sent troops into the Democratic Republic of Congo. Peacekeeping of course is not only about the deployment of troops and police to provide security. Thousands of civilians 4,976 in UN operations alone have been working around the world to consolidate peace. Elections in Liberia in late 2005 and in Haiti and Troop Deployment by Organization: UN NATO CEMAC AU CIS ECOWAS EU Other (MNFs and ad hoc) 01 Center on International Cooperation: Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2007

3 Top Twenty Largest Peace Operations: 31 October generated significant new forces - and often demonstrated an unexpectedly high degree of flexibility in how they were deployed and commanded. These processes were rarely smooth, and the results were often far from perfect. But nor were they negligible: After considerable debate among its members in late 2005, troops under NATO command in Afghanistan expanded from 12,000 to 32,600 as the year progressed - its largest single deployment since the Kosovo crisis, in the most challenging operational environment it has yet experienced; In May, Australia was able to mount an effective rapid intervention in Timor-Leste to halt spiralling violence - by the year s end, the UN had deployed nearly 1,100 police to help maintain stability; DRC in 2006 put democratic governments in power, marking the end of fraught transitional periods and the shift to a new phase of consolidation. Countless humanitarian, human rights and development specialists were tending to the socio-economic dimensions of complex peace operations. Many have questioned how long this level of activity can be sustained. The 2006 edition of the Annual Review of Global Peace Operations argued that UN operations were under acute and worsening strain, and its editors warned that one more large mission might take the organization past the point of overstretch. As the year progressed, similar warnings proliferated: in October, the UN s Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations gave a press conference reflecting on the risk of overstretch arising from the enormous technical and administrative problems confronting his department. Comparable doubts were voiced in public by NATO officers and politicians, and among many major an troop-contributing countries. The AU warned that it might be forced to withdraw its force from Darfur if funding and logistics support was not guaranteed, leading to calls for more predictable financial arrangements. UN Operations Non-UN Operations Despite these concerns, 2006 was not a catastrophic year for peacekeeping. In some ways, it was a surprisingly successful one. Under mounting pressure, both the UN and other major platforms In the third quarter of the year, an contributors deployed over 3,000 troops to Lebanon in the space of two months - providing the core of a UN force that would reach 11,563 by December and would draw significantly on a new generation of UN troop contributors including China, Indonesia and Turkey; In Africa, the UN was able to maintain over 50,000 personnel in its large-scale missions in Côte d Ivoire, DRC, Liberia and South Sudan. These deployment levels were upheld in spite of increased demands on its resources elsewhere and major military operations and political tensions in the run-up to elections in DRC; In addition to these high-profile and large-scale deployments, a variety of international organizations successfully carried out a series of smaller operations: the AU deployed 1,137 troops and police to the Comoros to oversee elections in May; the EU and members of ASEAN completed their eighteen month monitoring mission in the Indonesian province of Aceh; and the UN devised a similar monitoring team for Nepal. The nature of these missions often raised difficult questions. Why was a new operation required in Timor-Leste less than five months after UN troops had left the country in December 2005? How long should the UN maintain its presence in situations where progress towards lasting peace has halted? Is NATO s presence in Afghanistan peacekeeping, or a war-fighting mission against the Taliban? But whatever the complex successes and difficulties of peacekeeping in 2006, one huge challenge went glaringly unresolved: Darfur. Throughout the year, AU forces continued to operate in an increasingly hostile environment in the region, while the UN s efforts to insert troops - initiated in January - failed to translate into a new force on the ground. The year after the 2005 World Summit endorsed the Responsibility to Protect, the Darfur crisis cast doubt over the international community's ability to operationalize this emerging norm.

4 Military Contributions to UN Missions by Region: Diversified Contributions and Deployments This briefing paper summarizes the evolution of peace operations through 2006, and highlights five sets of developments in this period: Key organizations involved in peace operations diversified their geographical priorities, as the UN expanded its engagement in the Middle East; NATO s focus increasingly shifted from the Balkans to Afghanistan; and the EU mounted a military operation in DRC and supported the AU in Darfur; The range of countries making significant personnel contributions to both UN and non-un peace operations has expanded to meet new demand, with established contributors being supplemented by forces from and ; International organizations especially but not exclusively the UN have demonstrated an increased flexibility in the structures and types of their deployments, leading to a new generation of hybrid m i s s i o n s ; Peace operations are encountering increasing political and violent resistance from states and non-state actors, while new deployments are frequently complicated by the limited flexibility of troop contributors and organizations over the use of force in hostile t h e a t e r s ; Africa South Asia South America and the Pacific Middle East North America While peace operations help maintain security in many countries and regions, political processes must also be sustained. Concerns are growing over the international community s capacity to foster lasting peace and democracy in post-conflict societies. Where peacekeepers deploy The first major shift of 2006 was the geographical diversification of the military deployments of the leading deployers of peacekeepers in 2006: the UN, EU and NATO all expanded their commitments during this period, while the AU looked to balance its presence in Darfur with other regional operations. UN: balancing Africa and the Middle East In September 2005, the UN maintained 82 percent (51,400) of its troops and military observers in Africa, and only 5 percent (3,200) in the Middle East. But the Lebanese crisis changed this. By September 2006, it had 6,400 soldiers in the Middle East and the number for the UN Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was mandated to reach 15,000. During the year the UN significantly increased its presence in the Middle East even as there was no reduction in its obligations in Africa. If UN peacekeeping faced major challenges in the Middle East, this was not offset by a reduction of its obligations across A f r i c a exacerbating the strain it faced. Africa continued to represent 75 percent of the UN s global deployments at the end of October, relative to 14 percent in the Middle East. In the year ending September 2006, UN military presence on the continent grew from 51,400 to 54,500, concentrated in its four large-scale missions in DRC, Sudan, Côte d Ivoire, and Liberia. The UN did reduce its role elsewhere by withdrawing troops from Sierra Leone in December 2005 and drawing down its mission in Burundi through But if the UN were to fulfill all its current mandates including those for Lebanon and Darfur African missions would still account for threequarters of its military commitments. N ATO: moving to broader Middle East? In September 2005, NATO oversaw missions of 17,200 troops in Kosovo and 12,400 in Afghanistan. A year later, the former force had shrunk slightly, while the latter had grown to 20,000. In October 2006, NATO took command of 12,600 US troops in A f g h a n i s t a n. Nonetheless, it still faces constraints in the Middle East, demonstrated by the rejection of proposals that it should deploy to Lebanon. EU: turning to Africa? The EU s diversification was smaller in scale and focused on A f r i c a. In the third quarter of 2005, it fielded 6,700 troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but none outside, although it had civilian missions in Africa and Asia and had intervened in the DRC in Center on International Cooperation: Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2007

5 In June, at the invitation of the UN Secretary-General, the EU deployed its second peace operation to the Democratic Republic of Congo to ensure stability during that country s historic elections. AU: deploying beyond Darf u r? In March 2006, the AU launched a short-term but successful combined military and police mission of 1,137 to support the elections in the Comoros. Other than that it remained focused primarily on its operation in Darfur. The proposed deployment of an 8,000-strong AU/IGAD peace operation to Somalia would significantly increase the number of troops deployed under A U command. Despite their rapid growth, the combined military deployments of the UN, NATO, the EU and the AU in September 2006 only represented 70 percent of the US-led and UN-mandated multi-national force in Iraq. Where peacekeepers come from The second major shift in peace operations in 2006 concerned the supply of troops. As the graphics on pages 5 and 6 of this paper show, two regions - South Asia and Africa - remained the primary suppliers of troops to the UN. But through 2006, forces from other areas came to play an increasingly important part in UN operations, and clear disparities emerged between the make-up of UN forces in Africa and those deployed in the Middle East and elsewhere. While the enhanced UNIFIL attracted troops from several an countries, troops in African missions remained predominantly Central Top Twenty Military Contributors to UN and Non-UN Peace Operations: October and South Asian and African. Meanwhile, the majority of forces deployed by regional organizations came from and Africa, but 2006 also saw the United States resume a significant direct role in N ATO operations. Taking each region in turn: South Asia In September 2005, 46 percent (28,547) of UN military personnel were from Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Nepal. A year later, the four countries still accounted for 43 percent (31,128) of the UN s forces. None were contributors to non-un missions. A f r i c a As UN deployments in Africa grew, the continent remained the second largest regional contributor to UN operations, providing 26 percent (18,594) of its military personnel. The AU maintained over 7,000 military personnel and police in Darfur and deployed a shortterm mission of 1,137 military and police personnel to Comoros. Overall, African troops come from a relatively small number of states - Nigeria, South Africa, Rwanda, Senegal, Ghana and Kenya provide the bulk of both UN and AU forces. E u r o p e 2006 was particularly significant for an deployments, as the region made its first large-scale contribution to the UN since Bosnia through the reinforcement of UNIFIL - while simultaneously providing the bulk of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Similar to those of Africa, an deployments have been driven by a core group of states. Six nations, France, Germany, I t a l y, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom, supplied half or more of the forces. The EU and NATO also continued to maintain more than 20,000 troops in the Balkans, while the EU deployed a smaller force to DRC to back up the UN. The UN had its first large-scale increase in an troop contributions since the Bosnian war. ans made up 70 percent of the expanding force in Lebanon. By September 2006, and the Pacific supplied 3,100 UN peacekeepers. If this contribution was only a tenth of South Asia s, it was nonetheless twice the figure of a year before. It was also set to grow further as China and Indonesia pledged up to 1,000 troops each to UNIFIL. Even before the Lebanon deployment, China had more than doubled its UN commitments from 700 troops and military observers in September 2005 to 1,500 by June UN Contributions Non-UN Contributions US The US decision to transfer 12,600 troops to ISAF in October 2006 represented a significant shift as US practice since 2001 had been to continued on page 7 Center on International Cooperation: Annual Review of Global Peace Operations

6 Data on UN Operations Origin of UN Military Personnel by Region: 31 October 2006 South America 8.7% North America 0.1% Deployment of UN Military Personnel by Region: 31 October % South America 9.2% 14.3% Africa 25.7% Middle East 14.0% Middle East 4.1% South Asia 42.9% and the Pacific 4.3% and the Pacific 0.0% South Asia 0.1% Africa 75.3% Region Troops/MilObs % of Total Region Troops/MilObs % of Total Africa 18, % Africa 54, % and the Pacific 3, % and the Pacific 31 - South Asia 31, % South Asia % Middle East 2, % Middle East 10, % 10, % 1, % South America 6, % South America 6, % North America % North America - - Total 72,488 Total 72,488 Origin of UN Military Personnel in the Middle East by Region: 31 October 2006 Origin of UN Military Personnel in Africa by Region: 31 October 2006 North America 0.1% South America 0.1% Africa 6.3% and the Pacific 4.6% South Asia 9.0% 2.8% Middle East 4.0% South America 3.6% North America 0.1% Africa 32.9% 79.9% Region Troops/MilObs % of Total Africa % and the Pacific % South Asia % Middle East - - 8, % South America 8 0.1% North America % South Asia 52.2% and the Pacific 4.4% Region Troops/MilObs % of Total Africa 17, % and the Pacific 2, % South Asia 28, % Middle East 2, % 1, % South America 1, % North America % Total 10,147 Total 54, Center on International Cooperation: Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2007

7 Data on Non-UN Operations Deployment of Non-UN Military Personnel by Organization: 30 September 2006 Commonwealth of Independent States 5% African Union 8% Central African Economic and Monetary Community 1% Deployment of Non-UN Military Personnel by Region: 30 September 2006 Africa 16% Coalitions/ Ad hoc 9% 35% and the Pacific 2% an Union 11% North Atlantic Treaty Organization 66% Middle East 3% South Asia 44% Organization Troops/MilObs % of Total Region Troops/MilObs % of Total North Atlantic Treaty Organization 48, % an Union 8, % Coalitions/Ad hoc 6, % African Union 6, % Commonwealth of Independent States Central African Economic and Monetary Community Total 74,270 3, % % Deployment of Non-UN Troops in Africa by Organization: 30 September 2006 Africa 12, % and the Pacific 1, % South Asia 32, % Middle East 1, % 26, % South America - - North America - - Total 74,270 Deployment of Non-UN Troops in by Organization: 30 September 2006 an Union 21% Coalitions/Ad hoc 29% Commonwealth of Independent States 15% Central African Economic and Monetary Community 6% an Union 23% North Atlantic Treaty Organization - - an Union 2, % Coalitions/Ad hoc 3, % African Union 5, % Commonwealth of Independent States - - Central African Economic and Monetary Community % Total 11,5310 African Union 44% Organization Troops % of Total North Atlantic Treaty Organization 62% Organization Troops % of Total North Atlantic Treaty Organization 16, % an Union 5, % Coalitions/Ad hoc - - African Union - - Commonwealth of Independent States 3, % Central African Economic and Monetary Community - - Total 26,032 Center on International Cooperation: Annual Review of Global Peace Operations

8 reduce the number of troops in NATO missions. It remains to be seen whether Afghanistan will act as a precedent for further A m e r i c a n deployments through NATO and other formal multilateral structures. Australasia and Canada At the request of the Timorese government, Australia and New Zealand launched Operation Astute to deal with the violence that erupted during April and May At its height, Operation Astute s strength was about 1,300 military and police personnel, supplemented by a significant naval deployment. Meanwhile, 2,000 Canadian troops confronted resurgent Taliban forces and assisted in reconstruction efforts in southern Afghanistan as part of NATO s ISAF operation. Hybrid Operations As military deployment patterns altered through 2006, there was an increasing reliance on hybrid operations that mixed and matched capacities from different organizations to generate combined responses to crises. This trend took different forms in DRC, Darfur, Timor-Leste, and Lebanon. The UN found itself at the nexus of new institutional arrangements with both the AU and the EU, suggesting that it may be more adaptable than its critics maintain. The UN also developed new command and control structures to allow it to respond to the unique challenges of Darfur and Lebanon. Sudan: logistics and financing In Sudan, the UN, NATO and EU joined forces in a complex peacekeeping framework to support the AU peacekeeping force in D a r f u r. In 2006, the AU mission, AMIS, received strategic airlift from N ATO, while the EU provided additional lift, police advice and, c r u c i a l l y, funding. EU personnel worked in a cell within the A U command structure. Meanwhile the UN, which already has a major multidimensional operation deployed in support of Sudan s northsouth peace agreement (UNMIS), spent much of the year planning support to the AU through its own assistance cell. By the end of the y e a r, a UN package of police and military advisers, and some light hardware, had begun to be deployed through a tripartite mechanisms agreed among the UN, AU and Government of Sudan. By early 2007, the AU and UN were moving towards a joint command structure for D a r f u r, to allow the eventual deployment of a hybrid operation. There is an increasing reliance on hybrid operations that mix and match capacities from different organizations into common r e s p o n s e s. Lebanon: force generation and command In Lebanon, the rapid mobilization of an troops for UNIFIL was negotiated through the an Council in Brussels and those deployed relied on their own logistical arrangements rather than on the The Role of Police UN Police deployments grew by 29 percent, from 6,200 to 7,900, in the year ending 30 September With Security Council resolutions for Ti m o r-leste and Darfur, the theoretical requirement was for 12,000 personnel. More than 50 percent of police actually deployed were in three non-african missions: Ti m o r-leste, Kosovo, and Haiti. But there has been a significant growth, from 2,300 to 3,800, in the use of police in African missions. These were concentrated with UN military formations in Côte d Ivoire, the DRC, Liberia, and Sudan. C o n v e r s e l y, there were no UN police in the broader Middle East, except for three in Afghanistan. Unlike the military, the sources of police personnel are more diverse, with Africa,, and South A s i a providing roughly a quarter each. In the case of non-un missions, the AU expanded its presence in Darfur to 1,425 (including 234 female officers) while the EU reduced its police presence in the Balkans to fewer than 200. UN and Non-UN Police Deployments to Regions: 31 October 2006 and the Pacific 12% 21% South America 16% Middle East 1% Africa 50% Region Police % of Total Africa 5, % and the Pacific 1, % South Asia - - Middle East % 2, % South America 1, % North America - - Total 10, Center on International Cooperation: Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2007

9 UN. an countries also provided a Maritime Task Force the biggest naval contingent in the UN s history. These processes involved new command structures. A Strategic Military Cell in New York, staffed by officers from UNIFIL s troop contributors, was developed to manage the enhanced force but it was controversial with those who felt it undermined the UN s established structures. DRC and Ti m o r-leste: deterrence and policing In DRC, the UN and the EU deployed troops separately but in coordination. The EU s force was deployed at the UN s request, to deter potential spoilers during the presidential and parliamentary elections. The two forces carried out joint operations in Kinshasa to ensure s t a b i l i t y. In Ti m o r-leste, a balance was struck between the A u s t r a l i a n - led military forces and the UN, with the former providing military deterrence while the latter took on policing. The Challenge of Consent and Caveats As peace operations expanded through 2006, so did the level of resistance to them by state and non-state actors: The most acute challenge of consent in 2006 came from a state: the Sudanese government s protracted rejection of the transfer from the A U to the UN in Darfur. A Security Council resolution expanded the mandate of the UN s mission in Sudan to include Darfur but invited K h a r t o u m s consent before deployment. Khartoum s refusal to acquiesce was a serious political challenge to the UN; In Afghanistan, NATO faced a serious manpower challenge as several troop contributors placed caveats forbidding their troops from engaging in active combat. This was compounded by the domestic sensitivities to ISAF s mandate to confront the Taliban alongside USled Operation Enduring Freedom resulting in capacity problems for the mission; In DRC, peacekeepers faced the challenge of dissatisfaction with the results of transitional political processes or elections. Operations to protect civilians resulted in substantial casualties on both sides and peacekeeping sometimes seemed to blur into war- f i g h t i n g ; Concerns over the level of resistance to peace operations hampered their planning and mandates. When the UN Secretariat requested EU support in the DRC, debates among potential contributors ran on for three months. When large numbers of troops were required to reinforce UNIFIL, they were ready for rapid deployment but the likelihood that Hezbollah or Israel might oppose the move generated a tough debate over their rules of engagement. As peace operations expanded through 2006, so did the level of resistance to them. The Challenge of Peace Consolidation UN Police Contributions by Region: 31 October The international community also needs to sharpen its understanding of how to consolidate hard-won stability and translate it into lasting peace. Far too many countries coming out of conflict slide back into war within five years. The multidimensional presence of military, police and civilians in the early days of a peace process presents a critical window of opportunity to prevent that from happening and to lay the foundations for self-sustaining peace. F o r t u n a t e l y, large missions remained in Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo and Liberia through 2006, helping to consolidate transitions. The UN has a long-term presence in Sudan to push governments in the north and south to live up to commitments they made in a comprehensive peace agreement. Operations in the DRC and Côte d Ivoire have provided a measure of security while working politically with other actors to try to make peace irreversible in those volatile societies. The successful peace processes and elections in Aceh prove that even a handful of outside monitors can make a difference, although small non-un monitoring missions were badly shaken by crises in Hebron and Sri Lanka in Center on International Cooperation: Annual Review of Global Peace Operations

10 Commentary 1: The AU and Peace Operations It has become conventional wisdom that the key to tackling conflict and crises in Africa lies in building the capacity of A f r i c a n institutions, especially that of the African Union. The A U s experience in Darfur demonstrates that the job is far from done and highlights the human cost of failure. Despite the relative political consensus and the unanimous decisions of the A U s Peace and Security Council on the Darfur crisis, its operation there the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) ultimately fell short of expectations. Quite apart from flaws in the peace process, the AU was hampered by acute logistical challenges and the lack of an effective and predictable financial mechanism. In building their conflict management capacities, therefore, the A U and sub-regional organizations the pillars of the AU need to address issues of finance and logistics. Capacity building to date has concentrated on training; a more holistic approach will be required. Operationalizing the African Standby Force will be a necessary step; and the establishment of reliable and predictable funding mechanisms to support future AU operations a sine qua non of ultimate success. The EU s African Peace Facility provides an interesting model; so too does access to UN assessed contributions. The latter is unpopular with the UN s largest donors, but perhaps irrationally: proper and timely financing to AMIS could have forestalled the need, now at hand, to deploy a UN mission to Darfur which will inevitably be more expensive than the AU option. Darfur also illuminated the challenge of coordinating a broad range of external actors. The operation brought together all four of the major organizations involved in peace operations in 2006 AU, EU, N ATO and the UN. External support to the AU was not always well coordinated; cooperation was frequently ad hoc; and the lack of a unified diplomatic mechanism to complement financial and technical assistance to the AU exposed fault lines in the international system, frequently exploited by the government of Sudan. The decision in principle to mount a three-phase hybrid operation for Darfur marks an important milestone in AU-UN cooperation. But if the AU is to become a viable option for conflict management in Sudan and beyond, both organizations will have to build on lessons learned to date, and move past ad hoc cooperation towards joint planning, financing and support capacities for peacekeeping in Africa. If the recently mooted AU-led peace operation to Somalia is to be credible and effective, an inclusive political process, and secure financing, logistics and a clear exit strategy should be at the center of planning for the mission. The impasse over the deployment of UN troops to Darfur demonstrates the crucial need for a unified effort by the permanent members of the Security Council; otherwise international norms such as the Responsibility to Protect will ring hollow. DR. ALHAJI M. SARJOH BAH, Series Coordinator, Annual Review of Global Peace Operations, Center on International Cooperation, New York University Commentary 2: Consolidating Peace Tense elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo last October marked the end of a fraught three-year transitional period that was nevertheless more successful than anyone dared hope when it began. And though it is too soon to pass final judgment, the January 2007 peace agreement between newly-elected President Joseph Kabila and dissident general Laurent Nkunda may mean the UN peace operation and Congolese armed forces have turned a corner in the long struggle to pacify the east. Similar good news coming out of Liberia and Haiti was offset by renewed violence in Timor-Leste. Recent experience in these and other societies poised between violent conflict and sustainable peace offer a number of lessons. First, consolidating peace after extended internal war typically requires action in three areas: transitional governance (including economic governance); transitional security; and transitional justice. The multidimensional presence of military, police and civilians in the early stages of a peace process presents a window of opportunity that must be seized to lay the foundations for self-sustaining peace. While there is no formula for prioritizing within each of these areas, none can be neglected without jeopardizing progress in the others. Second, if the desired end is sustainable peace, the means to that end must be participatory and deliberative. Peace agreements are struck by the parties to a conflict; effective implementation of those agreements requires reaching out to broader constituencies. The Loya Jirga in Afghanistan is a positive example, even if that success has been overshadowed by the deteriorating security situation. Similar efforts to institute the Darfur-Darfur dialogue may provide for broader commitment to the peace process there than the Darfur Peace Agreement signed by the government of Sudan and only one rebel faction. Third, the role of peace operations ranges from active patron, informed by international standards of legitimacy, to passive observer, deferring at every step to local ownership. Where on that spectrum an operation should fall and when to move from one point to another is a central challenge. The strategy for dealing with strong governments, like in Sudan, must differ from that for weak transitional governments, like in Haiti. And the balance may shift over time as local leaders gain legitimacy, as in Liberia, or lose authority, as in Timor-Leste. Over the next year, the DRC is destined to be the UN s greatest peace consolidation challenge. Will the transitional period be followed by more inclusive political processes, in which the central government is respected and in turn respects a loyal opposition? Will it be possible to build effective governing institutions at the local level? Will the east be secure enough to make deeper security sector reform possible? Is this the moment to launch serious efforts to bring justice for the past while promoting the rule of law to combat impunity in the future? The challenges are daunting and ample reason for sustained multidimensional engagement. PROFESSOR IAN JOHNSTONE, Volume Editor, Annual Review of Global Peace Operations, CIC Associate Professor of International Law, The Fletcher School, Tufts University 09 Center on International Cooperation: Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2007

11 Commentary 3: The Flexible UN 2006 was a year of ugly set-backs and some glimmers of hope for peacekeeping. There were demands for peacekeepers in Lebanon and Somalia trouble-spots that took bloody tolls on foreign forces in the past. In Afghanistan and Timor-Leste, the international community had to send reinforcements to countries that had previously seemed to be moving towards stability. And as UN and non-un deployments expanded rapidly, many peacekeepers found themselves operating in environments such as Lebanon and Darfur where the political basis for lasting peace was at best fragile, and at worst deteriorating. In such times, the primary test for the UN and other organizations involved in peace operations remains not whether it can bring us to heaven but if it can (in the well-worn phrase) save us from hell. Can peacekeeping forces be raised and deployed fast enough to halt conflicts, then sustained in the field? This a more basic test than those often set for peace operations, such as constructing liberal states. The criticism that peacekeeping can freeze rather than resolve conflicts is justified. But even freezing violence can be a huge challenge, be it in Iraq or Darfur - and without some minimum of security, political progress is itself likely to prove minimal. On the simple terms of this test, 2006 was a better year for peace operations than might have been expected. Reflecting on data from 2005 a year ago, we raised concerns about the UN s slow progress in deploying troops it had taken nearly a year to get its mission in Sudan up to half-strength. But in 2006, the UN was able to bring all its operations in Africa to near full strength, while taking on new tasks in Lebanon and Timor-Leste. In spite of frequent warnings of overstretch, the UN managed to deliver operationally. This was because, contrary to conventional wisdom, it was flexible. In Africa, it shifted forces from Liberia to a troubled Côte d Ivoire, and from Burundi to the Democratic Republic of Congo. In Lebanon, the UN accepted that an forces would make their own logistical arrangements to get on the ground. If some saw this as a privileged mission, it demonstrated that the UN can provide political cover for innovative operational mechanisms as it has also done in Timor-Leste by deploying its police alongside the Australian-led multinational force. If these deployments required complicated political negotiations, so too did the expansion of NATO s presence in Afghanistan and the EU s decision to send a mission to reinforce the UN in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Indeed, the UN demonstrated a comparative advantage in being able to combine forces from around the world to handle crises in both Africa and the Middle East. In Lebanon it brought together a set of troop contributors who had otherwise played only a limited role in the expansion of UN operations since 1999: not only an states, but China, Indonesia and Turkey. This does not mean that the UN is ready or able to take on extremely robust missions such as NATO s in Afghanistan. But it has allowed the Security Council to respond effectively to a series of concurrent crises except one. The exception is, of course, Darfur. In spite of the huge amount of attention paid to the crisis by the UN Security Council and Secretariat and sufficient pledges of personnel 2006 saw painfully slow progress towards a transition from the African Union to the UN. The political obstacles are well known. But it remains tragic that in a year in which the international community did unexpectedly well in getting peacekeepers to where they were needed, the UN still lacks a substantial presence where it is needed most of all. DR. BRUCE JONES, Series Editor, Annual Review of Global Peace Operations and Co-Director, CIC. RICHARD GOWA N, Program Coordinator, International Security Institutions,C I C Project Staff Volume Editor and Lead Scholar Ian Johnstone i a n. j o h n s t o n n y u. e d u Series Editor and Co-director of CIC Bruce Jones b r u c e. j o n e n y u. e d u Series Coordinator Alhaji M.S. Bah s a r j o h. b a n y u. e d u Research Officer Benjamin C. To r t o l a n i ben.cic@nyu.edu About Us The Center on International Cooperation (CIC) at New Yo r k University works to enhance international responses to humanitarian crises and global security threats through applied research and direct engagement with multilateral institutions and the wider policy community. It has an international reputation for agenda-setting work on post-conflict peacebuilding, global peace operations, and UN reform. CIC reached its tenth anniversary in 2006, during a period of intense debate about the future of multilateral institutions. CIC s research and policy-development programs help policy-makers develop strategies for managing emerging and recurrent threats and to identify opportunities for institutional reform. Staff members have been directly involved in a series of highprofile initiatives to improve the performance of the multilateral system including the IAEA s Special Event on the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, and the reform process leading to the 2005 UN Wo r l d Summit. Its research contributed to one of the major innovations agreed at the Summit: the creation of a UN Peacebuilding Commission. We also provide direct research and policy support to UN missions and other actors in the field. Our Afghanistan Reconstruction Program advised the government and the UN mission on the drafting and negotiation of the Afghanistan Compact; and the Post-Conflict Peacebuilding program supports Ti m o r- L e s t e s reconstruction strategy. Center on International Cooperation New York University 418 Lafayette Street, Suite 543 New York, NY Tel Fax c i c. i n f n y u. e d u Program Coordinator Richard Gowan richard.gowan@nyu.edu Research Officer Tania Belisle-Leclerc belisle-leclerc@un.org Center on International Cooperation: Annual Review of Global Peace Operations

12 Through its in-depth analysis and data on UN and non-un peace operations, the Annual Review enhances our understanding of the crucial need for cooperation and c o m p l e m e n t a r i t y, and will no doubt remain an invaluable reference tool for all involved in the often elusive search for peace. - SAID DJINNIT, Commissioner for Peace and Security, the African Union This is an indispensable source for scholars and policymakers alike. It joins up-to-date assessments of the latest peacekeeping missions with thoughtful evaluations of developments in the scholarly literature. Rarely, if ever before, have inside expertise and outside analysis of peacekeeping been so well combined. The Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2007 was launched on 27 February It was published by Lynne Rienner and can be ordered at This briefing paper was prepared on the basis of the Review by Professor Ian Johnstone (Volume Editor and Lead Scholar), Dr. Bruce D. Jones (Series Editor), Dr. Alhaji M.S. Bah (Series Coordinator) and Richard Gowan (Program Coordinator, International Security Institutions). The Annual Review of Global Peace Operations is a product of the Center on International Cooperation (CIC) International Security Institutions program. CIC is an independent institution housed at New York University ( - MICHAEL DOYLE, Harold Brown Professor of International Affairs, Law, and Political Science, Columbia University The last year has seen a series of important developments in international peacekeeping across continents and institutional frameworks. This volume gives an unparalleled overview of how a broad range of operations have evolved and presents key trends that should enlighten the political and strategic debates about how to meet the surge in size and scope of multilateral peacekeeping. - ESPEN BARTH EIDE, State Secretary for Defense, Government of Norway With UN peacekeeping again on a growing trend, this valuable compendium of factual information and analysis is an essential tool for any policy-maker or researcher working in the field. It also helps to lay to rest many myths about the UN and its supposed lack of relevance to our times. The project was undertaken at the request of and with support of the Best Practices Section of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. ( Additional support for the project was provided by the International Peace Academy ( The project s Advisory Board is composed of Lakhdar Brahimi, Jayantha Dhanapala, Rosario Green, Funmi Olonisakin, John Ruggie, Sir Rupert Smith and Stephen J. Stedman. The project was made possible by our funders, the United Kingdom s Global Conflict Prevention Pool, the Government of Canada, the Government of Norway, the Government of Germany and the Government of Sweden. - LORD HANNAY OF CHISWICK, formerly Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations and member of the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change The R e v i e w succeeds admirably in providing an overview of current trends in peace operations. As such, it is a very useful resource that will help students, analysts and practitioners understand what roles peace operations can (and cannot) contribute to international peace and security. International Affairs, September 2006 The project partners would like to thank the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute for providing the project with data on non-un peace operations ( Additional data on non-un missions was collected by the International Institute for Strategic Studies ( CIC is solely responsible for the content of the Review and this briefing paper. Any errors of fact, interpretation or judgment are those of CIC alone. Cover photo Getty Images/Joe Raedle