FEDERAL AND STATE COOPERATION: THE ROLE OF STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION FOLLOWING 9/11.

Transcription

1 FEDERAL AND STATE COOPERATION: THE ROLE OF STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION FOLLOWING 9/11 by Jake Campbell B.S., Johnson & Wales University, 2013 A thesis submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the University of Colorado at Colorado Springs in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Criminal Justice School of Public Affairs 2016

2 This thesis for the Master of Criminal Justice degree by Jake Tyler Campbell has been approved for the School of Public Affairs by Henriikka Weir, Chair Edin Mujkic Michael Landon-Murray Date ii

3 Abstract Campbell, Jake Tyler (Master of Criminal Justice) Federal and State Cooperation: The Role of State Law Enforcement in the Enforcement of Illegal Immigration Following 9/11 Thesis directed by Assistant Professor Henriikka Weir The relationship between federal and state law enforcement agencies, specifically in regards to illegal immigration enforcement, has become of increasing importance following 9/11. This study examines these relationships with regards to a specific focus on intelligence gathering and sharing and resource allocation. This study utilizes previous survey data on state law enforcement agencies throughout the United States, and their responses to specific questions about federal collaboration. It was hypothesized the states allocation of resources to, as well as level of involvement in, terrorism related intelligence gathering would increase their interaction with federal agencies, however the results of this study indicate that there are actually only weak relationships present. It was, however, found that there is a significant positive relationship present among the state agencies level of involvement in immigration investigations and the allocation of resources to terrorism related intelligence gathering and sharing. iii

4 Dedication To my amazing family Barb, Mike, John, Gina, and Vince, thank you. Through your support and consistent positive encouragement throughout this entire process, you have greatly assisted in helping me to achieve my goal. I dedicate this work to you. iv

5 Acknowledgments I would like to express my appreciation to my thesis chair, Dr. Henriikka Weir, for the consistent feedback and much needed encouragement to make this possible. I truly thank you for your help throughout this entire process. I would also like to thank the rest of my thesis committee, Dr. Edin Mujkic and Dr. Michael Landon-Murray, for their useful reviews and recommendations. Finally to my family, I cannot thank you all enough for all of the support and motivation you have given me over the last three years. v

6 Table of Contents CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION..1 II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE...4 Immigration Enforcement Programs Funding and Resources..10 Interagency Intelligence Sharing...12 III. DATA & ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUE 18 Data 18 Variables & Analytical Technique.19 IV. ANALYSIS RESULTS...24 Research Question & Hypothesis..24 Analysis.25 V. DISCUSSION...30 Considerations 30 Limitations.33 Policy Implications 35 Conclusion.36 REFERENCES..39 APPENDIX 44 vi

7 List of Tables Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics Independent & Control Variables Logistic Regression Model Border Patrol Logistic Regression Model Customs Logistic Regression Model FBI Logistic Regression Model Immigration Logistic Regression Model Agency Involvement...29 vii

8 1 Chapter 1 Introduction 1.1 Introduction It is no secret that the events of September 11, 2001 (9/11) have had a great impact on the design of America s homeland security policies. Recent history has shown terrorism is nothing new to the United States, as Americans have seen terrorist acts committed firsthand on several occasions throughout the country in the 1990 s leading up to 9/11. There was the first attack on the World Trade Center towers in 1993, in which six were killed and roughly 1000 others were injured (Foster & Cordner, 2004). That was followed by the Oklahoma City bombing, in which 168 were killed and over 500 others were injured. Finally, there was the pipe bomb explosion in Atlanta, which killed one and injured over 100 others (Foster & Cordner, 2004). However, it wasn t until the events of 9/11 took place, where nearly 3,000 individuals lost their lives, which truly brought terrorism to the forefront in the United States (Overberg, 2008). Following 9/11, it was made clear that counterterrorism and increased intelligence sharing would be made a top priority in the United States. Many different security threats were discussed and addressed as a result of 9/11, one of particular significance was the potential threat believed to be posed by illegal immigration (Coleman, 2007). Illegal immigration, like terrorism, is nothing America hadn t encountered in the past, but this time there appeared to be a specific intersection between illegal immigration and terrorism, and that intersect has had a tremendous impact on all levels of law enforcement throughout the United States (Kobach, 2006). Prior to 9/11, immigration enforcement was primarily a federal focus, with local and state police agencies only occasionally participating in federal immigration enforcement (Wishnie, 2004). The pre-9/11 federal attention was primarily focused on the investigation of illegal

9 2 immigrants committing crimes, conducting fraudulent activities, the smuggling or trafficking of illegal immigrants, and suspected illegal work violations (Seghetti, Vina, & Ester, 2005). It wasn t until after 9/11 that a shift of views and resources took place and the government became more focused on immigration issues as they related to terrorist and national security related interests (Seghetti et al., 2005). In 2002 the Department of Justice found that, in addition to the federal government, state police possess the inherent authority to enforce federal immigration laws both criminal and civil (Wishnie, 2004). Of course, this was at the same time that the Homeland Security Act of 2002 was created and America saw the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which consolidated operations of 22 already existing federal agencies (HSA, 2002). As a result of this major government reorganization, the Immigration and Naturalization Service was eliminated and replaced with US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). The significance of the creation of ICE is that the agency has been given a unique authority over both civil and criminal immigration matters so as to, ideally, better protect national security in the wake of 9/11 (Fact Sheet 6). 1.2 Scope of the Study Given the more specified scope of the current study, the literature reviewed in this study seeks to develop a conceptual basis for a singular area of a larger, ever changing law enforcement culture and their role in working with federal agencies. Being able to understand their overall role could provide insight in the overall state and federal relationship. To investigate the extent of the federal and state agency collaboration and the state agency involvement in illegal immigration enforcement, the present study utilizes the data that was originally collected by Foster and Cordner (2004) for the purpose of exploring the new roles and changing conditions that occurred as a result of the terrorist attacks on 9/11. The use of the data

10 3 from Foster and Cordner is beneficial for the purpose of this thesis as their previously collected data has opened the door to allow for this study to explore specific and relevant areas of their study in a deeper fashion. The primary goal of this study is to examine the specific levels of resource allocation to intelligence sharing among the different levels of agencies, and the impact that that amount of sharing has had on the interaction of state law enforcement with federal agencies in the enforcement of immigration. Further, this research aims to increase the understanding of the new roles and levels of interaction of state law enforcement with federal agencies in their enforcement of immigration law in the post-9/11 era. In examining these areas, homeland security policy makers will benefit from a better understanding of where current strengths and weaknesses may exist within federal and state law enforcement relationships. The above questions are explored through several multivariate ordinal regression models. The present study also aims to aid in the future policy implications regarding immigration and counterterrorism as it is important to better understand the relationship between all levels of law enforcement, so that the United States will be better prepared in the improvement of national security.

11 4 Chapter 2 Literature Review In this chapter, a review of the literature examines the current relevant factors associated with the role of state law enforcement on the enforcement of immigration in the post-9/11 environment. The enforcement of immigration laws is one of the greatest challenges faced by the federal government, and the assistance of state and local law enforcement agencies could mean the difference between success and failure in their enforcement (Kobach, 2005). This literature review will focus on key aspects of the growing relationship between federal and state law enforcement agencies by examining specifically established immigration enforcement programs, the funding and resources used for the enforcement of immigration laws, and interagency intelligence sharing among federal and state agencies. Following the events of 9/11, the United States saw the publication of the 9/11 Commission Report in Laid out in the report were numerous recommendations which were designed with the best interest of the United States in mind and to help to avoid any event like that of 9/11 from occurring again in the future. Among the numerous recommendations included in the report, there was one focused specifically on immigration law and its enforcement. The Commission acknowledged that there was a growing role for the state and local enforcement in the area of immigration enforcement and that there was a need for better cooperation among these agencies in the enforcement of immigration law to potentially identify terrorist suspects (9/11 Commission, 2004). The acknowledgement of room for a growing role and need for better cooperation among state and federal agencies likely arose from findings that assert that several of the 9/11 hijackers could have, and should have, been arrested on immigration violations prior to 9/11 due to encounters with state and local officers (Kobach, 2006). The first instance occurred in April of

12 when one ensuing hijacker was stopped for speeding by a local officer in Oklahoma. The Visa he was using had expired nearly a year earlier in June of 2000, but due to the limited sharing of information at the time, the officer was unaware of the immigration violation and therefore unable to detain him (Snell, 2004). The second instance is similar to the first in that the second to-be hijacker was pulled over not once but twice by local law enforcement in Florida. He was issued a ticket during the first encounter and only a warning during the second. He had overstayed his Visa by several months, but again local law enforcement had no way of being aware of that information at that time (Krikorian, 2004). The third instance came in August of Another eventual hijacker was pulled over for speeding, but again, unknown to the officer, the individual was in violation of immigration law as he stated his reasoning for being in the country was to attend ELS classes in California. He never attended any classes and was actually given the ticket across the country in Virginia (Kobach, 2006). Due to the fact the individual failed to fulfill his purpose for being in the country, he could have been detained had the officer known of the violation. The final incident began when the final eventual hijacker never changed his immigration status from tourist to student while in the US, as he began taking flight classes in Florida. This is a detainable and removable offense. He was stopped for speeding just two days before 9/11 on September 9 in Maryland and was issued a ticket (Collins, 2004). These incidents demonstrate the possibility for the intersection of law enforcement, immigration, and intelligence sharing. With that being the case, and due to the fact that there is relatively little scholarly research in this specific area, it raises the need of investigation into whether or not intelligence sharing as a result of terrorism has expanded state and local law enforcements role in national immigration enforcement.

13 6 As previously stated, the literature pertaining specifically to the role of state and local law enforcement agencies in immigration enforcement has been lacking. Much of the study in this area has tended to focus on the potential relationship between federal agencies and state level agencies in the post 9/11 era through a specific lens. The research has largely been focused on the shift of American policing from a community policing model, to more of a homeland security, intelligence led policing model (Ortiz, Hendricks, & Sugie, 2007; McGarrell, Freilich, & Chermak, 2007). The benefit to arise from these larger, specifically focused studies is that they often include data on intelligence gathering and information sharing as minor subsets of the overall intelligence sharing model. Included in some were data focusing specifically on immigration enforcement and the response of the law enforcement agencies (Ortiz et al., 2007). Of course, there are a larger group of factors that have been studied in past literature, but the specified scope of this research cannot include every possible factor. Instead, this literature review aims to focus on a singular, specified area. The following sections in this chapter will cover immigration enforcement programs in which federal and state/local agencies are engaged in to carry out law, the funding and resources being utilized to carry out immigration enforcement functions, and the status of interagency intelligence sharing among state and federal agencies. To examine what the past research has already discovered about the topic of the present study, the literature reviewed below was chosen specifically to explore the significance of the state and federal agencies in illegal immigration enforcement, as well as where funding and resources have tended to be distributed. 2.1 Immigration Enforcement Programs In 1996, a large piece of legislation was created focusing on federal immigration enforcement known as the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). An important provision to

14 7 come out of the INA, as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), was section 287(g), the acceptance of state services to carry out immigration enforcement (INA 287(g), 2000). As stated in section 287(g) (1), an officer or employee of the state whom is considered to be qualified by the Attorney General to carry out an equal function of an immigration officer in regards to the investigation, apprehension, or detention of illegal immigrants in the US is authorized to do so as long as it remains consistent with state and local law. Section 287(g) has grown and come into the public eye in the years following 9/11, as jurisdictions began entering into 287(g) partnerships with the federal government, most notably Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) (Capps, Rosenblum, Rodriguez, & Chishti, 2011). The first state to come to an agreement with the federal government to enforce the 287(g) program was the state of Florida in The reasoning for the agreement from the state of Florida was simple, the state felt they needed to address their shortcoming in their ability to combat terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11 (Dubina, 2005). Capps et al. (2011) conducted a thorough study in which several aspects of the 287(g) program were assessed. The program has seen great expansion since its creation in 1996, more so immediately following the events of 9/11, and law enforcement officers have been given the ability to perform a number of different tasks, although they differ in which tasks are being performed based on jurisdictional needs. In general, officers were given the ability to check DHS databases for information of immigration status, interview immigrants to obtain their status, enter data to be shared in ICE databases, issue ICE detainers, place immigration charges, make recommendations for immigration detention and bonds, and transfer noncitizens into ICE custody (Capps et al., 2011). Although the 287(g) program has allowed for state law enforcement to enforce various immigration laws, there is not yet any significant evidence that

15 8 shows their role has truly expanded. The findings of the study show that the program only accounted for about ten percent of all those identified by DHS for removal on immigration charges (Capps et al., 2011). Other findings from the study show that the program has had a two-pronged effect in regards to spending. The federal government is saving money by way of the state and local governments paying the salaries of those officers in the 287(g) program, however federal funds are being used for training, supervision, equipment, and access to the employed databases. With that being the case, congressional appropriations have increased by more than four times the amount from These appropriations do not include the cost for the detention and removal of individuals, nor the cost of courts to process them (Capps et al., 2011). Another notable finding is that ICE supervisors and program officers have addressed past problems and are now functioning together more smoothly and have somewhat increased coordination (Capps et al., 2011). The improved coordination has increased the usefulness of the ICE database known as ENFORCE, which operates under the larger program known as ICE ACCESS, and the database can be used to evaluate the program implementation on state agencies and ensure that it matches the national priorities (Capps et al., 2011). Although the study seemed to show progress in some areas of the 287(g) program, the Office of the Inspector General found there were still too many problems with the lack of oversight (Mann, 2011). In 2012, the Obama Administration announced plans to shut down certain aspects of the program, including street level enforcement (Sweeney, 2014). The most recent information on the ICE website shows that there are now only thirty-two active 287(g) jurisdictions, with all thirty-two only able to contribute through jail enforcement (Fact Sheet 1).

16 9 There are several other programs operating under the larger program of ICE ACCESS in which are designed to integrate state police with the efforts of federal immigration enforcement (Sweeney, 2014). One such program is the Criminal Apprehension Program (CAP). The CAP program is in place so that state and local law enforcement officials have the ability to notify federal immigration officials of identified criminal aliens (Seghetti, Vina, & Ester, 2005). Once notified, the immigration officials are to determine the immigrant s status and, if necessary, take them into custody (Seghetti et al., 2005). The identification and processing of criminal aliens takes place prior to their release from jail or prison, in which reduces the need for resources and lowers cost to the government while still achieving their desired goals (Fact Sheet 2). Another of the programs under ICE ACCESS is the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP), which replaced the Secure Communities (SC) program in 2014 (Fact Sheet 3). PEP is similar to the SC program in that it utilizes law enforcement at the state levels by entering an individual s fingerprints whom is arrested and booked for criminal violation and sending it ICE. At that point, ICE is then able to determine if the individual is priority for removal (Fact Sheet 3). The main difference of PEP from the SC program is that ICE is now required to only seek the transfer of an alien from law enforcement when the alien has been convicted under a specified crime listed in specific priority sections of the November, 2014 Policies for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants memorandum (Johnson, 2014). The decision was made to change to PEP so that necessary goals could still be achieved as they seemed to be in the past, but to do so in a way that better supported community policing and to sustain trust amount the community in working with local law enforcement (Johnson, 2014). Following the events of 9/11, perhaps the most notable attempt to engage law enforcement in aiding in immigration enforcement occurred when the Department of Justice

17 10 decided to put immigration violations information onto the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database (Harris, 2006). The NCIC has historically been a tool in which law enforcement officers have used to conduct routine tasks and to access information they need every day including arrest warrants, various reports, and criminal records. It was in 2002 and 2003 that the DOJ began including civil immigration violations into the NCIC database. The federal government came out and made it very clear that the inclusion of immigration information into the NCIC was done for one purpose, to fight terrorism and to apprehend terrorists (Harris, 2006). The NCIC saw an increase in the scope of records that were listed, including several new categories of immigrant offenders (Gladstein, Lai, Wagner, & Wishnie, 2005). One such category was the immigration violator file, which contains records on criminal aliens whom immigration authorities have deported and those with outstanding removal warrants (Fact Sheet 5). By the end of 2003, more than 300,000 names of noncitizens who were subject to deportation orders were added to the NCIC. Later, it was expanded to also include foreign students who had fallen out of status (Harris, 2006). Essentially, in only two years following 9/11, law enforcement officers had been given the ability to search the NCIC at any time and have immigration violations of individual s available right at their fingertips. 2.2 Funding and Resources As there are many programs in use, it is important to examine the amount of resources and funding available to state law enforcement agencies, as resources and funding play a major role in the usefulness of their overall support to the federal government in immigration enforcement and information sharing. Starting at the top, spending at the federal level in regards to immigration enforcement is at an all-time high. The most recent study published regarding government spending on immigration was done by Meissner, Kerwin, Chishti, & Bergeron

18 11 (2013). The findings showed that in 2012, the amount spent by the government on immigration enforcement agencies, including ICE and Customs and Border Patrol, was more than all of its other criminal law enforcement agencies combined. The amount spent by these immigration enforcement agencies reached nearly $18 billion, as opposed to roughly $14 billion by the others combined (Meissner et al., 2013). The budget of ICE alone reached nearly $6 billion. Roughly half of those expenses went towards enforcement and removal operations, which includes such programs as CAP and SC (now PEP) for the sharing of information between state law enforcement agencies and the federal government (Fact Sheet 4). However, even with a large amount of spending at the federal level, state and local law enforcement agencies have had a more strenuous time allocating funds specifically to immigration enforcement and information sharing (Wishnie, 2004). This is likely due to the wide range of enforcement priorities already under the state law enforcement umbrella. Law enforcement officials have expressed their discontent in diverting state and local police to the enforcement of immigration. Those officials have stated that it is an unfunded mandate that will divert resources from other local policing priorities (Wishnie, 2004). Waxman (2008) expressed similar findings in that state agencies lack the same level of resources and capabilities available to the federal government. The issues that arises is effectively coordinating these resources in pursuit of the national level agenda (Waxman, 2008). For example, one of the largest law enforcement agencies in the country, the New York Police Department (NYPD), is having budgetary issues in properly funding intelligence sharing programs. Mishkin (2013) has shown that only 2.3% of the proposed NYPD budget at the time was dedicated to intelligence and counterterrorism programs. This indicates that local legislators might be having a difficult time in properly prioritizing intelligence or counterterrorism programs throughout their

19 12 budgetary process as well (Mishkin, 2013). In addition to resources, having enough manpower to conduct intelligence sharing has been an issue as well. In a study conducted by Riley, Traverton, Wilson, and Davis (2005) they found that nearly all responding state agencies from around the country needed more manpower to dedicate to counterterrorism related activities. It is also important to recognize that cooperation from police in immigration enforcement is not mandated by any federal regulations, but rather is entirely voluntary (Kobach, 2006). Legislators have found that requiring state and local law enforcement to enforce these laws would violate the anti-commandeering doctrine (Booth, 2006). However, in 2003 there was the creation of the Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal and Alien Removal (CLEAR) Act and the Homeland Security Enforcement (HSE) Act that would walk the lines of coercing states into enforcing federal immigration laws (Booth, 2006). The acts were passed for the purpose of having a two-way effect regarding funding coming from the federal government. The first is that it aimed to dissuade state and local police from enacting policies that would in any way limit police officers in enforcing immigration laws. Those that would retain these types of policies would miss out on federal reimbursements for situations in which a detained person turned out to be an illegal immigrant (Harris, 2006). The other effect is the exact opposite, in that the acts recognize that if local and state police agree to get involved they will be facing complex issues, which in turn they will be given extra resource sand funds. Access to these extra funds and resources will be based solely off of their decision to permit immigration enforcement (Booth, 2006). 2.3 Interagency Intelligence Sharing While the events of 9/11 brought immigration enforcement to the forefront, they also exposed major weaknesses in the intelligence sharing apparatus. Following 9/11, much of the

20 13 findings seemed to point to the fact that a large amount of information regarding the eventual attack was available at various points in time, but due to the fact that sharing among most agencies was limited, the information was never put to proper use (Kobach, 2006). With that being the case, interagency cooperation and intelligence sharing has become a cornerstone in the new era of homeland security policing (Ortiz, Hendricks, & Sugie, 2007). Prior to 2001, Kelling & Moore (1988, 1991) made the assertion that policing was in the community era meaning that in order for the police to effectively perform their job they needed the assistance of the citizens. Following 9/11 however, Oliver (2005) made the assertion that law enforcement entered the era of homeland security, meaning there is a more focused concentration of resources on crime control and that the potential threats can be exposed through intelligence and information sharing. Through various amounts of training, the collection, processing, and analysis of information and intelligence has become a necessary aspect of policing in the current homeland security era (Oliver, 2005). Within the era of homeland security, McGarrell, Freilich, & Chermak (2007) explain that there has been a push toward intelligence led policing, which has been viewed as a police function targeted primarily at terrorism and homeland security. Overall, the current findings of studies done regarding the integration of intelligence and information sharing at the state and local police level show that there has been an increase. Jiao & Rhea (2007) found that roughly 76% of responding officers in their survey reported a positive level of increase in information sharing with other agencies since 9/11. They did note however that these greater demands of increased information sharing have been difficult to integrate into the police organizational process. Ortiz et al. (2007) published similar findings in that 79% of respondents of the agencies interviewed in their study reported increased cooperation among

21 14 their department and federal law enforcement agencies since 9/11. Additionally, in a study conducted by the Riley et al. in 2005 encompassing a wide range of state agencies, it was found that nearly all of the agencies surveyed reported increased interaction primarily with the FBI since The primary reasons listed for their interaction were to share intelligence on terrorist related threats or to provide assistance with investigations (Riley et al., 2005). The FBI was also cited as the agency in which local agencies communicated with the most in the study done by Ortiz et al. (2007), due in large part to Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF). FBI respondents of the study supported these findings and noted JTTFs as the primary communication bridge between local and federal law enforcement. Similarly, in the study done by the Riley et al. (2005) it was shown that almost all responding state agencies either liaised with or were a member of at least one terrorism-related task force since 2001, citing JTTFs as the primary task force at the federal level. However, similar to findings of Jiao & Rhea (2007) it was found that there was still much room for improvement in the level of information sharing between local and federal agencies. Nearly three-fourths of respondents asserted that there was room for improvement (Ortiz, Hendricks, & Sugie, 2007). The findings of these studies suggest that intelligence and information sharing has increased, but there is still much room for improvement. As the importance of local police seems to continue to grow, it is important for the federal government to continue to build relationships with those agencies so that they can become better overall and continue to mutually exchange important information (Harris, 2006). Additionally, in an attempt to facilitate the intelligence sharing process among all levels of law enforcement, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) committed a great deal of resources in developing intelligence fusion centers (Carter & Carter, 2009). Given the lapses in information sharing leading up to 9/11, it became clear that there was a need to create a two-way

22 15 sharing strategy between federal departments, such as the FBI, DHS, and the Department of Defense, and state and local law enforcement agencies (Carter & Carter, 2009). The exact listed goal of fusion centers is to blend relevant law enforcement and intelligence information analysis and coordinate security measures to reduce threats in their communities (US DHS, 2006). From 2004 to 2009 roughly $426 million dollars in DHS grant funding have been utilized by the states to aid in funding fusion centers (Regan & Monahan, 2014). Carter & Carter (2009) have noted however that if fusion centers are relying primarily on federal support to stay operational, sustainability will be tenuous. Those sentiments were mirrored by Eack (2008) who noted that while funding sources have varied widely in the operationalization of fusion centers, most states have leveraged DHS funds for equipment and analysts. A long term issue faced by these states may be the tapering off of funding, leaving insufficient funds for fusion centers to operate in the future (Eack, 2008). There have been mixed findings in regards to the effectiveness of fusion centers, and whether or not they have been able to bridge the gap of information sharing between federal and state agencies effectively. A study conducted by Graphia-Joyal (2010) in which four fusion centers were examined, showed that roughly 82% of respondents indicated that the fusion center presence has greatly improved the facilitation of information sharing among agencies, primarily by minimizing physical barriers. The collocation of personnel from multiple agencies has improved communication and coordination among agencies by minimizing physical proximity between personnel (Graphia-Joyal, 2010). In also examining the connection of law enforcement personnel to fusion centers, a study was conducted in South Carolina focusing on the law enforcement perspective. Cooney, Rojek, and Kaminsky (2011) found that over half of their respondents had used their states fusion center in that past year, as well as roughly 60% of

23 16 respondents reported that their state fusion center in general was very useful. These results are however challenged by Ratcliffe & Walden (2010) who conducted a similar study in the northeast US. Roughly half of the respondents indicated that they have not sent information to their fusion center in the past six months. Additionally, nearly 60% responded that they had not used information shared by the fusion center in the past six months either. Finally, respondents indicated that they perceive troopers and other police officers to be a more reliable source for information (49%) than the fusion center (21.6%) (Ratcliffe & Walden, 2010). Clearly, the effectiveness of fusion centers has produced some mixed results. 2.4 Summary This literature review has highlighted the vital components of the overarching goal of enhanced cooperation and coordination among the federal and state levels of immigration enforcement. As evident in this literature review, there has been a push in increase in the programs and funding of enforcing immigration, as well as a push for better coordination in the context of intelligence gathering and sharing. What is missing from the previous literature however is what role the amount of resources available is having on the enforcement of immigration, especially in regards to intelligence sharing. The purpose of current study looks to expand on what has previously been published in this area. In regards to the specific role of local and state law enforcement in immigration enforcement, this study will look beyond immigration enforcement programs and focus on the agencies involvement and interaction in overall immigration-related enforcement, as well as a focus on the allocation of specified resources following 9/11. There will also be a specific focus on intelligence sharing among these agencies, and how that contributes to involvement of the agencies in overall immigration enforcement, as well as the resources dedicated to them. More specifically, this study expects to

24 17 find that the increase in resources allocated to intelligence gathering, dissemination, and investigations among the various agencies will play a significant role in the state law enforcement s level of involvement in the enforcement of immigration, as well as the amount of interaction with overall federal enforcement agencies.

25 18 Chapter 3 Data and Analytical Technique This chapter will describe the data, variables, and research methods that will be used to explore the potential relationship between the amount of resources being allocated to intelligence gathering, sharing, and investigations and the state s law enforcement role in the enforcement of immigration. Given that the data used in this study were taken from a study conducted by Foster & Cordner (2004), a specific description will be included of information regarding sample size and other pertinent characteristics of the original data source. Then, included will be a description and explanation of this study s dependent variables, which will include the interaction of various federal agencies and immigration investigation involvement. Also, a description will be included of this study s independent variables, resource allocation and involvement in gathering. Also discussed, will be the control variables for this study. Finally, a description will be provided of the data analysis techniques in which were implemented to examine this study s hypotheses (please see Chapter 4). 3.1 Data The data used in this thesis were taken from the survey on the Impact of Terrorism on State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies and Criminal Justice Systems in the United States (Foster & Cordner, 2004). The survey instrument was sent out during the spring of 2004 to all state police, highway patrol agencies, and general purpose state bureaus of investigation from all 50 states, resulting in a total of 73 agencies. The total final response rate reported for state agencies and used in this study was 60 (82.2%). Of the survey responses received from the 60 agencies, a breakdown shows that 36 came from state police/highway patrol agencies and 24 came from state bureaus of investigation. This survey was also sent to local agencies throughout

26 19 the United States as well, but the response rate at that level was significantly lower at roughly 46 percent. Local level responses were not included in the analysis for this thesis because the primary focus is specifically on the state level agencies. The purpose of the original study in which the data were taken and used for this thesis was to explore the new roles of state law enforcement agencies and how changing conditions may have come following the events of 9/11. The authors of that study only scratched the surface of the potential explanatory value of specific responses regarding increased intelligence sharing and the role of immigration enforcement. The authors primarily only focused on the frequency with which there was an interaction among immigration enforcement and the state law enforcement role/involvement, and they did not examine a potential role played by level of intelligence sharing within these areas. As a result, this thesis focused analysis on responses to questions regarding the allocation of resources to intelligence sharing and related investigations and the responses to the role of the state in immigration enforcement through interaction with appropriate federal agencies. Their responses may be telling in regards to an increased collaborative change among the different levels of state and federal agencies in the enforcement of immigration in the wake of increased intelligence sharing, analysis, and gathering. 3.2 Variables & Analytical Technique Four of the five dependent variables (DVs) used in this analysis shared the same responses to their individual questions, and each was therefore operationalized in the same capacity. These four DVs were Border Patrol, Customs, FBI, and Immigration, and each of the responses to these variables were assigned values of 1 = N/A for that agency (coded as missing for the final analyses), 2 = Less Frequent, 3 = No Change, 4 = More Frequent, and 5 = Much More Frequent. In regards to these values given, frequency acknowledged the regularity with

27 20 which the state level agencies were interacting with each specified federal agency. The four questions used for each of the DV s were the same: What is your agency s level of interaction with Border Patrol/Customs/FBI/Immigration. The last of the dependent variables used was called Agency Involvement, which measured the state level agencies overall involvement in immigration-related investigations. The values assigned for this categorical DV were: 1= No Answer (coded as missing for the final analyses), 2 = Decrease, 3 = No Change, 4 = Increase, and 5 = Significant Increase. In regards to these values, the level of increase/decrease measured was the level of involvement the state agencies were having in immigration-related investigations and enforcement. The appendix lists the items used to construct the variable. In regards to independent variables (IVs), two were used for this thesis, titled Allocation and Gathering. The allocation variable was created through the combination of two individual items that measured the state agencies allocation of funds to intelligence gathering, analysis, and sharing and to terrorism-related investigations. Responses to the allocation variable were recoded from their original five-point scales into a two-point, dichotomous variable. The operationalized values assigned to allocation were 0 = Less Resources/No Change and 1 = More/Much More Resources. In regards to these values, the amount acknowledged the level of resources being allocated by the state agencies to the specified areas in each question. It must be noted that in the combination of the two aforementioned questions for the allocation variable, only the responses that were answered the same for each question were acknowledged and included in the analysis. Simply combining them and not accounting for this could have potentially produced skewed results. The appendix lists the items used to create the variable. The other IV used in the analysis was called Gathering, which measured the state agencies level of involvement in terrorism-related intelligence gathering, analysis, and

28 21 dissemination. Responses to the gathering variable were also recoded as a dichotomous variable. The operationalized values assigned to gathering were 0 = No/Little Involvement and 1 = Moderate/Great Amount of Involvement. It should also be mentioned that before selecting the final recoding for the gathering variable as demonstrated in Table 3.1 (with only 5% of all cases belonging to no / little involvement group), the original variable was broken down into three dichotomous dummy variables, which each included different combinations of responses in regards to each agency s level of involvement in terrorism related intelligence gathering, analysis, and dissemination. For example, one of the alternative recodings grouped all agencies who responded that their agency was the leader or there was a great amount of increase in involvement to category that was assigned a value of 1 to denote high amount of intelligence gathering while those who responded with moderate to no involvement were assigned the value of 0 to denote low or no intelligence gathering. The results remained the same despite of what binary variable combination was used. Thus, despite the small frequency of 0 responses for the chosen binary gathering variable, it was used as making most conceptual sense (i.e., those agencies who gathered any intelligence were coded as 1 and those who did not gather any intelligence were coded as 0 ). The appendix lists individual items used to create the variable. Two control variables (CVs) were also included in the analysis. The first was labeled Type, which indicated the type of state agency responding to the survey. The operationalized values assigned were 0 = State Police and 1 = Bureau of Investigation. The other control variable was titled Trooper Density, indicating the amount of troopers assigned to any given area. The operationalized values assigned for this variable were 0 = Unknown, 1 = High Density, 2 = Medium Density, and 3 = Low Density. Table 3.1 shows the frequency distributions of the IVs and CVs.

29 22 Finally, because the DVs for this study were categorical, an ordinal logistic regression modeling was utilized to examine the relationships between the state agencies interaction with different federal law-enforcement agencies and allocation of funds as well as gathering, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence information relating to illegal immigration. The impact of allocation of funds and intelligence gathering, analysis and dissemination on state agencies level of overall involvement in immigration-related investigations and enforcement was also investigated through ordinal logistic regression models. Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics Independent and Control Variables Variables Frequency N 60 (100%) Allocation Less/No Change (0) 16 (26.67%) More/Much More (1) 44 (73.33%) Gathering No/Little Involvement (0) 3 (5.00%) Moderate/Great Involvement (1) 57 (95.00%) Type State Police (0) 36 (60.00%) Bureau of Investigation (1) 24 (40.00%) Trooper Density Unknown (0) 25 (41.67%) High Density (1) 7 (11.67%) Medium Density (2) 14 (23.33%) Low Density (3) 14 (23.33%) 3.3 Summary This chapter discussed the characteristics of the original data and indicated how various items from the original data collection were utilized and reconstructed in the present study into DVs, IVs, and CVs. Although there were some limitations in the number of responses for each variable, especially due to N/A responses, the data pool from which the information was drawn is unique in that it reached state agencies from all throughout the United States. With such a

30 23 wide ranging sample, the recorded responses represent the entire nation and the combined role in overall immigration enforcement. Finally, the analytical methods that were used in the examination of the relationship between DVs and IVs were discussed. In order to fully test this study s hypotheses, both multivariate ordinal logistic regression and bivariate ordinal logistic regression models were performed, although only multivariate models were included and discussed in the final results. Ordinal logistic regression were utilized to measure how the IVs measuring information gathering and resource allocation impacted the dependent variables measuring the state agencies interactions with different federal level agencies (i.e., Border Patrol, FBI, and Customs) as well as state level overall involvement in immigration-related investigations and enforcement.

31 24 Chapter 4 Analysis Results The previous chapter discussed the data and analysis techniques, which were used for this study. The analyses produced some interesting results that this chapter will explore. The results of logistic regression are displayed in several separate tables, showcasing all relevant findings in regards to the relationships found between each of the dependent and independent variables. Also included in this chapter is a brief examination of the significance of the various analytical results in relation to the five hypotheses of this study. A more in depth interpretation of the results and what they mean will be included in the next chapter. 4.1 Research Questions & Hypothesis The research question for the present study was have the state law-enforcement agencies increased allocation of resources to terrorism-related intelligence gathering and sharing as well as state agencies level of involvement in terrorism-related intelligence gathering, analyses, and dissemination since 9/11 expanded their interaction with federal agencies and their involvement in immigration-related investigations? Given the aforementioned research question, there were five hypotheses established for the present study. The hypotheses for this study are since 9/11, the allocation of state-level law-enforcement resources, as well as the state agencies overall level of involvement in terrorism-related intelligence gathering, analyses, and dissemination have significantly increased: 1. The interaction among state-level law-enforcement agencies and Border Patrol 2. The interaction among state-level law-enforcement agencies and Customs 3. The interaction among state-level law-enforcement agencies and FBI 4. The interaction among state-level law-enforcement agencies and Immigration

32 25 5. The state-level law-enforcement agencies involvement in immigration-related investigations 4.2 Analysis To properly address this study s five hypothesis listed above, several multivariate ordinal logistic regression models were performed. Table 4.1 illustrates the ordinal logistic regression results for the first hypotheses, examining the relationship between the two IVs (i.e., Allocation and Gathering) and the first DV (i.e., Border Patrol) while controlling for the Type of state agency and Trooper Density in that jurisdiction. The low Z-values for both IVs (i.e., Allocation of resources to terrorism-related investigations, Z=1.13; and Gathering, analyses, and dissemination of terrorism-related intelligence, Z=0.69) revealed that increases in neither IV resulted in significant increases in interaction with Border Patrol. In other words, state level law-enforcement agencies amount of interaction with border patrol is not being influenced by the amount of resources being shared nor by the level of involvement in terrorism related intelligence gathering, analyses or dissemination. Table 4.1 Ordinal Logistic Regression Model Border Patrol Border Patrol Coef. Std. Err. Z CI Allocation Gathering Type Trooper Den. Note:*p Next, Table 4.2 illustrates the ordinal logistic regression results for the second -.692/ / / /.571 hypotheses, examining the relationship between the two IVs (i.e., Allocation and Gathering) and the second DV (i.e., Customs) while controlling for the Type of state agency and Trooper

33 26 Density in that jurisdiction. The relationship here is very similar to what was found with the first hypothesis regarding the state-level agencies interaction with Border Patrol. The non-significant Z-values for both IVs (i.e., Allocation of resources to terrorism-related investigations, Z=1.44; and Gathering, analyses, and dissemination of terrorism-related intelligence, Z=0.46) revealed that increases in neither IV resulted in significant increases in interaction with Customs. In other words, state level law-enforcement agencies amount of interaction with customs is not being influenced by the amount of resources being shared nor by the level of involvement in terrorism related intelligence gathering, analyses or dissemination. Table 4.2 Ordinal Logistic Regression Model Customs Customs Allocation Gathering Type Trooper Den. Note:*p.05 Coef. Std. Err. Z CI / / / /.847 The ordinal logistic regression results for the third hypotheses, examining the relationship between the two IVs (i.e., Allocation and Gathering) and the third DV (i.e., FBI), while controlling for the Type of state agency and Trooper Density in that jurisdiction, are displayed in Table 4.3. Unlike with the first two hypotheses regarding the state-level agencies interaction with Border Patrol and Customs, multivariate ordinal logistic regression model for the third DV, FBI, produced some significant results. A significant positive relationship was found between the FBI and the first IV (i.e., Allocation of resources to terrorism-related investigations, Z=2.15) but not with the second IV (i.e., Gathering, analyses, and dissemination of terrorism-related intelligence, Z=1.57). In other words, state level law-enforcement agencies amount of