Healing MONUSCO s Image Community perceptions of the UN peacekeeping mission in LRA- affected areas of the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Transcription

1 Healing MONUSCO s Image Community perceptions of the UN peacekeeping mission in LRA- affected areas of the Democratic Republic of Congo July 2014

2 Table of Contents Methodology I. Executive Summary.. 3 II. LRA violence and MONUSCO s response in northeastern Congo 4 Graph: Trends in LRA violence.. 6 Map: LRA attacks and MONUSCO bases.. 8 III. Community perceptions of security and MONUSCO.. 9 Map: Returnees from the LRA..14 IV. Conclusion. 15 Annex I: Summary of community perceptions of the LRA and MONUSCO 16 About 17 Healing MONUSCO s Image 1

3 Methodology This brief is the outcome of collaboration by Solidarity and Integral Assistance to Destitute People (SAIPED) and The Resolve LRA Crisis Initiative. SAIPED conducted the primary re- search for the brief in December 2013 and Jan- uary 2014, including a survey administrated in five towns in Haut- Uele district in the Demo- cratic Republic of Congo's Orientale Province. Survey administrators conducted the inter- views in a secure environment and recorded interviewees responses in a way that protected their identity and personal information. In total, 347 individuals 217 men and 130 women participated. Civil society partners were con- sulted on the structure and content of the re- search methodology. The assessment included both open- ended and multiple- choice questions. ted the survey to be more context- specific and representative of the communities surveyed. For the purposes of this paper, the Stimson Center s definition of perceptions will be used. Perceptions are defined as individuals and communities feelings, expectations, under- standings and interpretations of events, con- texts and dynamics. 1 United Nations Organization Stabilization Mis- sion in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) peacekeeping forces are deployed in every town in which the survey was adminis- tered. Community participants were asked a range of questions about their perceptions of security in their community, MONUSCO s civil- ian protection efforts, returnees from the Lord s Resistance Army (LRA), and Come Home defec- tion programming including radio programs and flyers. This report takes into account the subjective nature of the information collected and possible ambiguities resulting from the interpretation of these questions by the com- munity participants, the administrators of the survey, and the authors. This report builds upon research addressing community perceptions of security and of peacekeeping operations. It aims to contribute to the growing body of research on understand- ing community perceptions of safety in conflict- affected areas. It does not aim to give recom- mendations to peacekeeping operations, but seeks to help clarify community sentiment to- wards MONUSCO s activities in areas affected by LRA violence. Because the findings focus specifically on LRA- affected communities in northeastern Democratic Republic of Congo (Congo), they are not reflective of larger subna- tional or national patterns. This scope permit- 1 Giffen, Alison, Community Perceptions as a Priority in Protection and Peacekeeping, Stimson Center, October Healing MONUSCO s Image 2

4 I. Executive Summary The LRA has been active in northeastern Congo since at least 2005, primarily in Orientale Prov- ince s Haut- Uele district. The group has inten- tionally and systematically targeted civilians there, abducting over 2,400 people and killing more than 2,200 others. Levels of violence have fluctuated considerably, peaking from , steadily decreasing from , and then increasing again in early An estimat- ed 113,000 people remain displaced by the LRA in Orientale Province, down from over 320,000 in early The 347 participants in the survey conducted for this research highlighted the numerous ways in which the LRA continues to threaten communities in Haut- Uele district. Though most participants felt somewhat safe within their communities, a significant majority reported that LRA activity had limited their access to their fields within the past year and that it was not safe to travel to other communities. The Congolese government and military has been unable and unwilling to provide protec- tion to civilians in Haut- Uele district, an isolated area long marginalized by officials in distant Kinshasa. Since 2005, MONUSCO has been de- ployed to Haut- Uele to help fill the gap in pro- tecting civilians, strengthening the Congolese state, and promoting defections from the LRA. However, MONUSCO s implementation of its mandate in Haut- Uele has been hampered by a lack of resources, the difficulty of responding to highly mobile and resilient LRA groups, and the LRA s low priority within the mission. MONUSCO peacekeepers have had long- term deployments in all five towns surveyed for the report. A majority of participants in each town expressed significant frustration with MONUSCO s civilian protection efforts. Partici- pants felt MONUSCO s patrols did not make them safe, and recommended that the mission increase their frequency and effectiveness, par- ticularly in areas outside town centers. A signif- icant majority also noted that MONUSCO did not respond quickly to reports of LRA attacks and some urged the mission to take a more aggres- sive role in pursuing LRA forces in the bush. In addition to civilian protection, MONUSCO has been active in Come Home campaigns that use leaflets, FM radio messages, and other tools to urge LRA members to defect. Most participants understood and supported the goal of these efforts, and expressed a willingness to help facilitate defections from the LRA. However, some participants questioned the efficacy of Come Home defection campaigns to date, noting that they have resulted in few defections from the LRA. Many participants in the survey also stated that MONUSCO personnel do not adequately consult or share information with community members. Their responses demonstrate a high degree of frustration with MONUSCO s perceived failure to respond effectively to the crisis. Though some participants expressed little faith in MONUSCO s ability to improve its relationship with the community, many participants clearly desire to have a more open dialogue with MONUSCO and to have their views integrated into how the mission responds to the conflict. As one community respondent stated: Before really protecting or securing civil- ians, it is good to have a real dialogue with them, collaborate with them, and come near to them. Then MONUSCO would be able to ameliorate the quality of their work. Community perceptions of MONUSCO have long been disconnected from how national and in- ternational actors plan and evaluate the mis- sion s civilian protection and defections initia- tives in LRA- affected areas. As LRA violence in Haut- Uele continues into its seventh year, greater attention to community perceptions may help the mission achieve more success in keeping civilians safe and helping LRA members return home. Healing MONUSCO s Image 3

5 II. LRA violence and MONUSCO s response in northeastern Congo The LRA has been active in Congo s Haut Uele district for nearly a decade, committing atroci- ties against civilians and sparking a slow- burning humanitarian crisis. Since 2008, the group has committed more than 1,000 attacks in Haut- Uele, abducting over 2,400 people and killing more than 2,200 others. 2 Neither the Congolese government nor MONUSCO have been able to provide consistent protection to communities at risk of violence, forcing many to rely on self- protection strategies to mitigate their vulnerability to the rebel group. A. The evolution of the LRA in Congo Led by Joseph Kony, the Lord s Resistance Army originated in northern Uganda and was primari- ly operational there and in southern Sudan from the late 1980s until Beginning in Sep- tember 2005, the rebel group slowly shifted its bases to Garamba National Park (Garamba), located in Haut- Uele district along the border with South Sudan. The bulk of the group, including Kony, remained in the park for the duration of the Juba peace talks with the Ugandan government, which last- ed from mid through November The LRA limited attacks on civilians until March 2008, when it resumed large- scale abduction raids in neighboring Central African Republic (CAR). Kony ordered similar raids in Haut- Uele beginning in September. In December 2008, Ugandan troops, supported by the United States, launched Operation Lightning Thunder, an assault on the LRA s bases in Garamba. The poorly planned opera- tion failed to apprehend the LRA s top leader- 2 LRA Crisis Tracker database, accessed on June 28, For an overview of the history of LRA activity from the late 1980s to 2005 in northern Uganda and South Sudan, see Schomerus, Mareike, The Lord s Re- sistance Army in Sudan: A History and Overview, Small Arms Survey, September See also, Be- hind the Violence: Causes, Consequences and the Search for Solutions to the War in Northern Uganda, Refugee Law Project, February ship. In retaliation the group killed more than 865 civilians and abducted at least 160 children in northeastern Congo and South Sudan over the next six weeks. 4 Following the attacks, the LRA fragmented and scattered across the vast and dense terrain stretching across the border between Congo and the CAR. The LRA continued to conduct large- scale at- tacks against Congolese communities after the initial massacres, conducting frequent raids in Haut- Uele district and neighboring Bas- Uele district from The attacks triggered massive civilian displacements and a humani- tarian crisis. LRA violence in Congo began to reduce in Janu- ary 2011, in part because defections from the LRA and military operations conducted by the Ugandan military diminished the group s fighting capacity. Kony also made strategic deci- sions to reduce massacres and large abductions raids, which were drawing unwanted interna- tional attention, and ordered most senior LRA commanders into the CAR and the Sudanese- controlled Kafia Kingi enclave, which borders eastern CAR. As LRA killings and long- term abductions in Congo dropped between 2011 and 2013, it be- came increasingly difficult to distinguish LRA activity from that of poachers, rogue troops from the Congolese military (FARDC), and ban- dits. However, the group still abducted nearly 650 people in over 500 attacks over those three years. 5 Garamba also remained a strategic foot- hold for the LRA, as groups there sent supplies looted from surrounding communities and ivo- ry from poached elephants to LRA officers in the CAR and Kafia Kingi. In September 2013 South Sudanese troops de- ployed with the African Union s counter- LRA Regional Taskforce destroyed several suspected 4 The Christmas Massacres: LRA Attacks on Civilians in Northern Congo, Human Rights Watch, February LRA Crisis Tracker database, accessed on June 12, Healing MONUSCO s Image 4

6 LRA bases in Garamba. In the following months, LRA attacks and abductions decreased dramati- cally in Congolese communities south and east of the park. However, LRA violence in communities west of Garamba began to rise significantly in early There were more LRA attacks and abduc- tions in Congo from February June 2014 than in any five- month period since January May This surge in violence has raised con- cerns about renewed civilian displacement and underscored that, though diminished, the LRA remains a potent and destabilizing force. B. MONUSCO s role in LRA- affected areas The UN Security Council established the United Nations Organization in the Democratic Repub- lic of Congo (MONUC), in 1999, to monitor the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agree- ment. 7 In 2010, MONUC was re- named the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mis- sion in Congo (MONUSCO). 8 The mission s mandate, renewed and altered each year, has encompassed a broad range of tasks, including protection of civilians, support- ing national elections, strengthening state insti- tutions and rule of law, and supporting the FARDC. In recent years, the mission has concen- trated on stabilizing eastern Congo s North and South Kivu provinces. In March 2013, the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of an additional 3,069 peacekeepers to eastern Congo, forming an Intervention Brigade tasked with neutralizing armed groups that the FARDC and existing MONUSCO troops were unable to disarm. 9 6 LRA Crisis Tracker database, accessed on June 28, Congo signed the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement with five regional states (Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Ugan- da, and Zimbabwe) in July Throughout this report, references to MONUSCO may be assumed to refer to MONUC as well when discussing time periods before the change in name. 9 Tanzanian troops arrive in eastern DR Congo as part of UN intervention brigade, UN News Centre, 10 May MONUSCO first engaged the LRA in Haut- Uele in January 2006, when a Guatemalan Special Forc- es unit led an ill- fated assault on LRA com- mander Vincent Otti s group in Garamba, result- ing in the death of eight Guatemalan troops. The mission s presence in Haut- Uele district re- mained small however, and by late 2008 there were still fewer than 300 peacekeepers sta- tioned there. When LRA attacks began to esca- late in September 2008, they were largely una- ble to protect civilians or even prevent bold attacks on Dungu, the town hosting the mis- sion s headquarters in Haut- Uele. As LRA violence continued in 2009, the mission gradually strengthened its presence in Haut- Uele, deploying a total of troops. The bulk of the peacekeepers there are from a Mo- roccan battalion based out of the Ituri Brigade headquarters in Bunia, complemented by a contingent of Guatemalan Special Forces. There is also an engineering unit that does public works, including much- needed rehabilitation of roads between major towns. In addition to their base in Dungu, Moroccan troops are deployed to several Company Oper- ating Bases (COB) and Temporary Operating Bases (TOB) in Haut- Uele. 10 MONUSCO also has a presence in the neighboring district of Bas- Uele. The mission assists the Congolese military with logistical support and participates in joint operations and patrols. MONUSCO also has civilian personnel deployed in Haut- Uele, responsible for tasks such as civil- military relations; human rights monitoring; Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration (DDRRR); and child protection. The Civil Affairs unit acts as a liaison and representative between the mission and community members. It coordinates the mission s strategy on civilian protection and manages the implementation of protection tools designed to prevent violence and respond to deliberate attacks against civilians. The Civil 10 For the survey cited throughout this report, Congo- lese civilians were interviewed in five communities with a MONUSCO presence: Duru (COB), Dungu (COB), Faradje (COB), Niangara (TOB), and Bangadi (TOB). The community of Ango (COB) in neighboring Bas- Uele district was not included in this survey. Healing MONUSCO s Image 5

7 Trends in LRA violence, Haute- Uele district (January 2011 June 2014) Affairs section gathers information from its Community Liaison Assistants (CLA), based in communities with COBs or TOBs. Civil Affairs personnel also hold meetings with Congolese civil society and run early warning protection programs such as the Community Alert Network. In addition to their role as inter- locutors between the community and the MONUSCO peacekeepers, the CLAs accompany patrols, and relay security information within their hierarchy as well as to peacekeepers pre- sent in their area of operation. MONUSCO s DDRRR section, also based in Dun- gu, encourages LRA combatants to surrender through initiatives like FM radio broadcasts and leaflet distributions. 11 MONUSCO and the Con- golese army also have established assembly points in Haut- Uele at which LRA members can defect. Leaflets and radio programming publi- 11 Cakaj, Ledio and Lancaster, Phil, Loosening Kony s Grip: Effective Defection Strategies for Today s LRA, The Resolve, July cize these designated locations, which are occa- sionally patrolled by peacekeepers. 12 Despite these efforts, MONUSCO has come un- der strong criticism by both local populations and international organizations for its per- ceived shortcomings in protecting civilians from LRA attacks and facilitating LRA defections. 13 The mission s response to the LRA has been limited by several factors. Both the Congolese government and MONUSCO leadership are pri- marily concerned with addressing the crisis in eastern Congo, which poses a far greater threat to the country s stability than the LRA. LRA- affected communities, remote and marginalized, have little representation in the country s polit- ical and economic elite, and Congolese govern- ment and military officials have periodically downplayed the LRA threat. LRA- affected areas have become even less of a priority as violence 12 Peace Can Be: President Obama s Chance to Help End LRA Atrocities in 2012, The Resolve, February See Civil society: It s time for MONUSCO to protect civilians from the LRA, The Resolve, February See also, Trail of Death: LRA Atrocities in Northeast- ern Congo, Human Rights Watch, March Healing MONUSCO s Image 6

8 by the group has waned relative to its peak. With attention focused on eastern Congo, peacekeepers in Haut- Uele face little pressure from their superiors to pursue LRA groups adept at moving in the deep forest. In addition, the mission has less than 1,000 troops to patrol LRA- affected areas in Haut- Uele, equal in area to half of France, and they lack the airlift and training needed to pursue LRA groups. C. Local Protection Mechanisms Communities in LRA- affected areas of Congo are primarily agrarian, living in scattered settle- ments interspersed with dense forests. With the Congolese government and MONUSCO peace- keepers unable to consistently protect civilians from LRA attacks, these communities have em- ployed several self- protection methods in re- sponse to LRA violence. Voluntary displacement is one of the most common self- protection mechanisms employed in LRA- affected areas. At the height of the vio- lence, over 320,000 persons in Orientale Prov- ince actively left their communities to seek ref- uge in South Sudan, the CAR, or within Con- go. 14 Many internally displaced persons moved to larger towns with a stronger presence of security forces, staying with host families or in camps. Displacement in many areas has been fluid, with people often returning to their homes for short periods of time to plant or har- vest crops or to engage in hunting and fishing livelihoods. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humani- tarian Affairs (OCHA) reported a 64.8% de- crease in civilian displacement in LRA- affected areas of Haut- Uele and Bas- Uele districts be- tween March 2013 and March This drop is due in part to improved security in some are- as of the Ueles, but also includes persons who have integrated into host communities and may still desire to return to their places of origin should security improve further. Informal and formal information- sharing net- works are also critical self- protection strategies. LRA violence fluctuates considerably at the local level, and civilians gather information about security threats from a range of sources, including travellers, traders, hunters, and fish- ermen. Following the violent Christmas massacres in 2008, communities in the Ueles began to use the Catholic Church s High Frequency (HF) radios to share security information and warn neigh- boring communities of LRA attacks. This infor- mal cross- border network of HF radios grew to include HF radios operated by other religious groups, hospitals, and local businessmen. 16 MONUSCO Civil Affairs, several local associa- tions, and international organizations have rein- forced these pre- existing networks and expand- ed their reach to additional LRA- affected areas. Communities also took more direct action in response to the surge in LRA violence in late 2008 and early 2009, with many forming self- defense groups. In the CAR and South Sudan these groups were tolerated, but in Congo, the FARDC suppressed them, sometimes violently. 17 In recent years, self- defense groups have peri- odically formed for short periods of time in various Congolese communities, often in re- sponse to a localized surge in LRA attacks. When active, these groups operate primarily with homemade guns, bows and arrows, and spears, and work closely with local hunters and fishermen who often come into close contact with the LRA. 14 LRA Regional Update (January March 2013), OCHA, May OCHA reported approximately 320,000 displaced persons in LRA- affected areas of Congo in March 2013, compared to 113,000 in March See LRA Regional Update (January March 2013), OCHA, May 2013, and LRA Regional Update (January March 2014), OCHA, April Peace Can Be, The Resolve, February Ibid. Healing MONUSCO s Image 7

9 LRA attacks (January 2013 June 2014) and MONUSCO bases in Haute- Uele district Healing MONUSCO s Image 8

10 III. Community perceptions of security and MONUSCO The five surveyed communities in Haut- Uele district responded to questions about their atti- tudes towards security in the area as well as MONUSCO s civilian protection work and Come Home defection programming. Despite the re- duction in LRA attacks in recent years, they reported that insecurity restricts their move- ments and livelihood activities, such as trade, cultivation, hunting, and fishing. In conjunction with questions about community safety, participants were asked about their un- derstanding of MONUSCO s mandate and role in Haut- Uele. They were asked a range of ques- tions concerning perceptions of MONUSCO s response time to LRA attacks, community pa- trols, and the relationship between the FARDC and MONUSCO. The responses demonstrated a sense of frustration with the persistence of LRA violence in their communities and the perceived inadequacy of the mission s response. The intention of MONUSCO s Come Home defec- tions initiatives were, for the most part, under- stood. However, some participants questioned the efficacy of these programs, commenting on how few people had left the LRA despite the high saturation of messages delivered to LRA groups via FM radio and flyers. The majority of participants reported being more willing to welcome Congolese returnees from the LRA than returnees from the CAR, South Sudan, and especially Uganda. However, many participants spoke of the importance of accepting all return- ees, not only because they consider it the right thing to do, but because it reduces the number of LRA in the bush and therefore the group s capacity to commit violence. One of the most common themes in participant responses was a frustration at MONUSCO s per- ceived failure to consult and build trust with community members. Significant numbers of respondents declined to give recommendations for how MONUSCO could improve its work, stating that they had little confidence the mis- sion would take their views into consideration. As one community respondent stated, Even if we say something, MONUSCO will never change. A. Community perceptions of security Community participants were asked about their perceptions of security, perpetrators of violence, self- protection measures, and security actors, as well as the steps they have taken to limit their vulnerability to threats. These perceptions ap- ply specifically to the communities surveyed in Haut- Uele district and are not representative of broader sub- national and national trends in Congo. The majority of people surveyed expressed feeling somewhat safe in their communities and identified the LRA as the highest- priority threat. Communities expressed feeling very threatened by the LRA, especially those in close proximity to Garamba. 18 Although many of the individuals surveyed acknowledged the recent reduction in LRA attacks, they continue to believe that the LRA lies at the base of our insecurity. Com- munity members predominantly feared abduc- tions and lootings incidents they observed occurring more frequently outside town pe- ripheries. Several participants described how fear of the LRA has paralyzed their communities. The LRA has created an environment of insecu- rity that enables groups of bandits and poachers to operate more easily. Participants also viewed the Mbororo, semi- nomadic herders, as a signif- icant threat to safety. 19 Mbororo fluidly traverse the porous border between Congo and the CAR, and have periodically clashed over land use with communities dependent on agriculture. 20 Participants in closer proximity to the border with the CAR, as well as those in one of the dis- trict s commercial centers perceived the Mbororo as a major threat, while two communi- ties closer to Garamba did not identify the Mbororo as a contributor to general insecurity. 18 Attacks on communities in close proximity to Ga- ramba have decreased since December 2013 when participants were surveyed. LRA Crisis Tracker da- tabase, accessed on June 28, No Mbororo community members were among the survey participants. 20 For more, see Peace Can Be, The Resolve, Febru- ary Healing MONUSCO s Image 9

11 The Stimson Center defines self- protection as activities that conflict- affected communities undertake with the intention of countering, mitigating, deterring or avoiding a threat (re- gardless of whether those measures are suc- cessful). 21 Nearly all of the respondents replied that the decisions they make daily (e.g. traveling to their fields and conducting commerce in neighboring towns) carry risks, forcing them to adapt their lifestyles to account for these factors. For instance, most participants stated it is only somewhat safe for their children to go to school. Despite these fears, many participants reported traveling outside the recognized safe zones in order to support their families. Many participants rely on small- scale agricul- tural production, as few alternative livelihood opportunities currently exist. Participants were asked whether security concerns limited access to their fields in the past 12 months, and in four of the five communities nearly all participants responded affirmatively. Many reported that they have mitigated the risk of attack by travel- ing and cultivating their fields in groups. In Dungu only two- thirds of participants respond- ed that access to their fields had been limited. Dungu may be an outlier because it hosts the largest peacekeeping presence in the district, acts as the district s commercial hub, and has not been directly attacked since In order to help them devise and implement self- protection strategies, civilians require in- formation about LRA activity. A vast majority of respondents in all communities reported being very informed or somewhat informed about when and where LRA attacks occur. Participant responses indicate that local, informal infor- mation sharing networks that include travelers and community leaders were the most im- portant sources of information about LRA activ- ity. FM and HF radios were also cited as im- portant information sources. The majority of community participants stated that they prefer to report security incidents to state security forces and community leaders 21 Gorur, Aditi, Community Self Protection Strate- gies: How Peacekeepers Can Help or Harm, Stimson Center, Issue No. 1, August rather than MONUSCO. Many of these same participants also preferred to travel with a FARDC escort over a MONUSCO escort, even though many lamented the FARDC s limited resources. It is difficult to determine the moti- vations behind participants decisions to report security incidents to the FARDC and community leaders rather than UN peacekeepers. This pref- erence could reflect community confidence in local structures, as well as a mistrust of MONUSCO s ability to protect civilians. B. MONUSCO's civilian protection efforts The majority of participants were aware of MONUSCO s role in maintaining security, but responses indicate confusion as to the full scope of MONUSCO s responsibilities and how the mission was tasked with implementing them. One participant responded, For me, MONUSCO is considered to be a referee between people because they are neutral. To varying degrees, communities expressed disillusionment with MONUSCO s role in civilian protection and in bringing an end to the LRA conflict. Dissatisfaction was frequently accom- panied by concern that MONUSCO was giving assistance to the LRA or had ulterior motives for their deployments in LRA- affected areas, such as a desire to profit from the insecurity. A group of women from a community that ex- pressed a particularly high degree of mistrust for the mission stated: We see them, but we don t know why they are here in our area. [We ask] that MONUSCO inform the community, and explain to the population why they are here, to do what, and explain what are their projects. Especially that they heal their image in front of the population, because for us they bring despair, they are against our safety, they protect the LRA against us, [for] what good do they live among us? It s better that they leave, and leave us in peace. Participant responses indicate that community expectations of MONUSCO are not aligned with the mission s internal assessments of its capaci- ty to implement its mandate. It is likely that Healing MONUSCO s Image 10

12 these unmet expectations have influenced the relationship between MONUSCO and local populations. Participants were asked a series of questions about MONUSCO patrols, which are aimed in part at protecting civilians from armed groups such as the LRA. Peacekeepers conduct patrols on foot and in vehicles, either by road or in the bush. A majority of the participants identified such patrols as one of the most important civil- ian protection measures MONUSCO can take. Even though they viewed patrols as an im- portant aspect of protection work, the majority of participants responded that MONUSCO pa- trols were infrequent and ineffective. Partici- pants stated that peacekeepers rarely patrolled near farm fields, along roads connecting com- munities, or within town. In one community close to Garamba, participants stated, We see them walk in our midst without protecting the population. Participants spoke of irregular patrols and how the inconsistency made them feel unsafe, a sentiment that likely contributed to negative perceptions of the peacekeepers. About two- thirds of all participants answered that it was not at all safe to travel to other communities. In two of the communities, both of which are more geographically and commer- cially isolated than the other three communities surveyed, over three- quarters of the partici- pants answered it was not at all safe to travel to other communities. The frequency and efficacy of MONUSCO s pa- trols are constrained by a number of factors. Poor road conditions and the mission s limited logistics capacity make reaching dispersed communities and settlements very difficult. Peacekeepers may also underestimate the value civilians see in certain types of patrols, particu- larly if relations between the community and the mission are strained. 22 Many participants also expressed a lack of con- fidence in MONUSCO s ability to rapidly re- spond to potential security threats, stressing that MONUSCO responded not at all quickly to 22 Author interview with former UN Civil Affairs official, April LRA sightings or attacks. In all five communities, participants shared similar attitudes towards MONUSCO s response time they go to the site of the incident without following the LRA. Some community members seemed aware of the recent approval of the Intervention Brigade deployed in North Kivu and asked that peace- keepers in LRA- affected areas adopt a similar, more aggressive stance towards LRA forces. One community member, whose response was echoed by several participants in all five com- munities, recommended that [MONUSCO] change their style of fighting and shoot the en- emy directly. These comments indicate a frus- tration with MONUSCO s status quo and a desire for MONUSCO to more actively pursue the LRA. Community members did state that the FARDC conducts patrols with MONUSCO and that they often follow up on security- related information together. Participants perceived the relation- ship between the FARDC and MONUSCO to be lukewarm and they repeatedly called for rein- forcement of the FARDC s capacity to repel LRA forces. C. Information sharing and consultation Participants commented on the lack of infor- mation sharing and consultation between MONUSCO and some members of the communi- ty. Almost none of the participants listed MONUSCO as a source of information about LRA activity in Congo. Many requested that MONUSCO hold more meetings with community leaders both within and on the periphery of town. As one participant stated: MONUSCO doesn t consult all those neighborhoods along the peripheries, but only those in the center of town where it finds civil society, public administration, and local leaders. Several other participants expressed feeling undervalued by the mission, and asked that peacekeepers in their community recognize the value and importance of everyone and speak with everyone in the community. They asked that MONUSCO be more inclusive and be Healing MONUSCO s Image 11

13 interested in everyone, not just the local author- ities. Community members were quite vocal in re- sponse to questions regarding their relationship with MONUSCO. A community that has had par- ticularly tenuous relations with the mission recommended that: MONUSCO should heal their image amongst the population, because the way they currently work, the population does not see the impact of their interven- tions. No protection, no collaboration, no dialogue, especially because MONUSCO does not include the community in all ac- tivities that concern them. The dialogue between peacekeepers and com- munity members is likely hindered by a number of factors. Linguistic and cultural differences may serve as a barrier to day- to- day interac- tions with community members. Peacekeepers also rotate out of communities frequently, limit- ing the amount of time they have to build trust. In some cases, peacekeepers may not see exten- sive dialogue with community members as part of their core responsibilities. Frustration stemming from poor information sharing and divergent perceptions of MONUSCO s role in civilian protection appears to have exacerbated negative rumors about the mission within all five communities. For exam- ple, some participants stated that MONUSCO troops resupplied the LRA with firearms or returned LRA defectors to their groups in the bush. Though no evidence was given to support these claims, their prevalence is a testament to the high degree of mistrust some community members feel towards the mission. D. MONUSCO s defection initiatives Some participants expressed similar negative perceptions of MONUSCO s Come Home defec- tions programs. Though most were aware of the mission s efforts to encourage LRA defections, a significant minority believed MONUSCO returns LRA members that surrender to the bush. This sentiment was particularly strong in one com- munity that has had several failed attempts by members of the LRA to surrender. 23 Some participants responded that they felt marginalized by MONUSCO and unwelcome at community meetings with DDRRR personnel. One respondent stated, MONUSCO respects the orders of their authorities and not what you decide together. These individuals recom- mended that groups such as the village elders, mothers committee, and youth groups also be included. In addition, many questioned the ef- fectiveness of Come Home programs because of the perceived low rate of returnees from the LRA. There was a general understanding amongst participants that the Come Home flyers are intended to encourage combatants to surrender. Several participants referenced Congolese re- turnees who had reported to the community that the flyers are reaching the LRA. However, some participants expressed the belief that the Come Home leaflets were ineffective, citing continued LRA attacks and low numbers of re- turnees. One community, close to the CAR bor- der, argued that the flyers could not be effective since the LRA burn them in the bush. 24 Despite these frustrations, many participants recom- mended the inclusion of more Congolese lan- guages on the flyers, an increase in the number of flyer drops, and closer collaboration between DDRRR personnel and hunters and fishermen the individuals who encounter the LRA most frequently. In general, participants understood the purpose of the Come Home FM radio messages, though some questioned their efficacy. Although the majority of Congolese do not understand Luo the dominant language within the LRA most participants said they understood the messages intention. A minority of respondents expressed 23 In this community, the MONUSCO DDRRR unit ran a program intended to receive LRA members who had expressed a desire to surrender through letters and contact with community members; none surren- dered during the duration of the program. 24 Response to the questions: What is your personal assessment of the impact of these leaflets on encour- aging members of the LRA to surrender? Why do you feel this way? Healing MONUSCO s Image 12

14 feeling uncomfortable because they do not un- derstand the language. Several community members stated that they would like to be more involved in the FM radio defection initiatives. Participants in all five communities asked that the defection messages, like the flyers, be broadcast more often in Congolese languages. 25 E. Community Perceptions of Defectors The majority of participants responded that their community had received at least 1-2 re- turnees from the LRA over the past few years and that the overwhelming majority were Con- golese. A very marginal number of participants responded that Ugandans, Central Africans, and Sudanese had returned from the LRA to their communities. When asked why people leave the LRA, the majority of respondents stated that individuals escape because of inhumane living conditions and because they are tired of living in the bush. The participants were also asked about how they would feel if Congolese, Sudanese, Central African, or Ugandan LRA members surrendered to their communities. 26 Respondents were par- ticularly enthusiastic about welcoming Congo- lese and slightly less so for Sudanese and Cen- tral Africans. More people expressed reserva- tions and uncertainty about how they would react if they were to encounter a Ugandan LRA escapee, though over half of respondents stated they would welcome a Ugandan. Participants responded more positively when asked how and why they would accept Congo- lese returnees. The vocabulary used to describe 25 Participants were asked several questions related to programs encouraging LRA members to defect to designated assembly points in Haut- Uele, but the authors chose to omit this data from the report due to the difficulty of interpreting the responses. A re- cent survey of LRA- affected areas does indicate, however, that some communities are amenable to such initiatives. Come Out and Live Among Us: How Zande communities can influence combatants to surrender from the LRA, Discover the Journey, De- cember The participants were not asked about their na- tionality, but it can be safely assumed that a vast majority, if not all, were Congolese. formerly abducted persons from Congo invoked the innocence of the Congolese and a shared nationality and ethnicity. Participants used terms such as Zande, Congolese, and, in par- ticular, my brothers to describe why they would accept these individuals. Community respondents used similar language to express their sentiments towards accepting returnees of Central African, Sudanese, and Ugandan nationality. In all five surveyed com- munities, participants specified that they would accept these returnees because they are hu- man beings. A majority of the participants also responded that they saw facilitating non- Congolese defec- tions from the LRA as a pragmatic approach towards reducing LRA violence and keeping their communities safer by decreasing the number of LRA in the bush. As one community member stated, We are called to help them to come out because if they come out it s one less danger for our community. The participants responses indicate that famili- al, ethnic, and nationalistic bonds influenced the degree of acceptance participants were willing to extend to returnees. Participants spoke more informally about their Congolese compatriots and about a sense of responsibility to one s fellow countrymen/women. Participants spoke of accepting foreign returnees in more formal, pragmatic terms and often invoked religion and a sense of duty to universal mankind. Overall, community members said they would prefer to turn over returnees to the FARDC and local authorities. Several participants expressed that because many returnees were trained as combatants, the FARDC would be the best equipped to respond. Healing MONUSCO s Image 13

15 Returnees from the LRA in Haut- Uele district (January 2011 June 2014) Note: Only shows returnees who spent at least one month in LRA captivity. Healing MONUSCO s Image 14

16 IV. Conclusion LRA violence has had a profound impact on all five communities surveyed, with many of the participants experiencing the abduction or kill- ing of friends and family members, limited mo- bility, and restricted livelihood options. Though LRA atrocities in Haut- Uele have reduced from their peak, fear and insecurity continue to over- shadow the daily lives of these communities. As LRA violence in Haut- Uele enters its seventh year, MONUSCO faces strong skepticism from affected communities about its ability and will- ingness to implement its mandate. Greater attention to the perceptions and recommenda- tions of the people it is tasked to assist may help the mission achieve more success in keeping civilians safe and helping LRA members return home. Healing MONUSCO s Image 15

17 Annex 1. Summary of Community Perceptions of the LRA and MONUSCO Insecurity in LRA- affected areas The majority of participants responded that they feel somewhat safe within their com- munities but not at all safe traveling to and from surrounding communities. The majority of respondents identified the LRA and the Mbororo as their greatest se- curity threats and said they feel very threat- ened or somewhat threatened by the LRA. Approximately one- fourth of respondents felt their children were not at all safe when they attended school. A majority of respondents reported feeling very informed or somewhat informed about levels of LRA activity. Travelers and com- munity leaders were consistently noted as the primary sources of information. A majority of respondents answered that the FARDC is the most reliable security force because it responds most rapidly to security incidents, despite being un- derequipped. In four of the communities surveyed, nearly 100% of respondents reported limited ac- cess to their fields over the past 12 months due to security threats. The majority identi- fied collaborating on group fields and trav- eling to the fields together as precautionary measures they took to minimize the risk of attack. MONUSCO s civilian protection work The majority of respondents understood MONUSCO s mandate and described MONUSCO as a UN force charged with main- taining stability in Congo. A significant majority of respondents re- plied that MONUSCO troops did not respond quickly to LRA attacks. A significant majority of respondents stated that MONUSCO infrequently patrolled near their fields, within town, or along roads to surrounding communities. The majority of respondents stated that MONUSCO had done very little to protect them both within and outside of town and around two- third of the participants re- sponded that community patrols did not make them feel safe. The majority of respondents stated that MONUSCO did not adequately consult with local partners about civilian protection, and that they neglected to consult with women, youth, traditional community leaders, and local leaders who do not live in the center of town. Nearly 100% of respondents noted that MONUSCO provided the FARDC with logis- tical support and conducted mixed patrols, but asked that MONUSCO work more close- ly and effectively with the FARDC. Nearly 100% of respondents stated that MONUSCO does not share information with the community. A majority of respondents asked that MONUSCO improve communica- tion with community members regarding LRA movements. The majority of respondents asked that MONUSCO adopt a more aggressive stance towards the LRA. MONUSCO s DDRRR initiatives The majority of community members re- sponded that they would help potential Congolese defectors from the LRA surren- der, stating that they were brothers. Many respondents stated that they would welcome Ugandan escapees from the LRA because they are human beings and be- cause it would help end the war; however, several respondents feared defection might be used as a ruse leading to an attack. The majority of respondents have heard or seen Come Home outreach - via FM radio and flyers - and understood its intention. Nearly 100% of respondents stated that they were not consulted on MONUSCO s Come Home projects. A small majority of these respondents per- sonally believed the Come Home messages, particularly flyers, to be not effective. Re- spondents believe the Come Home radio messages to be slightly more effective than the Come Home flyers. Healing MONUSCO s Image 16

18 About Published July 2014 by SAIPED and The Resolve LRA Crisis Initiative Partners SAIPED is a Congolese non- profit organization based in Dungu, Democratic Republic of Congo. SAIPED s principal mission is to promote ac- tions for peace and socioeconomic development for rural communities in Democratic Republic of Congo without discrimination. It has con- ducted mobile cinema projects, community- based defection initiatives, and the formation of local protection committees in LRA- affected areas of Haut- Uele district. The Resolve LRA Crisis Initiative is a research and advocacy non- profit focused on LRA- affected areas. It seeks to articulate and mobi- lize US and international policymakers around a clear vision for improving the effectiveness of efforts to protect civilians from LRA attacks, apprehend top LRA commanders, and encour- age defections from the LRA. Cover Photo MONUSCO peacekeepers conducting foot patrol, MONUSCO/Sylvain Liechti. Research and Writing Team Reverend Father Ernest Sugule is the founder and coordinator of SAIPED. He conducts critical advocacy regarding the violence perpetrated by the LRA in his home region of northeastern Congo. He is a well- known author, speaker, and advocate, and has spoken before the European Parliament and the UN about the impact of the LRA in central Africa. He is a highly respected civil society leader and also produces quarterly reports charting the number of LRA attacks, killings, and abductions in a regional newsletter titled Voice of Peace. He holds a masters de- gree in psychology from the United States In- ternational University in Nairobi, Kenya. Margaux Fitoussi is an independent researcher whose focus is on armed groups. She has spent the last three years working almost exclusively on the LRA in Congo, the CAR, and South Sudan, as well as in the United States. She graduated with High Distinction from UC Berkeley in Paul Ronan (@pauldronan) is a co- founder of The Resolve, and currently serves as the organi- zation s Director. He travels frequently to Uganda and LRA- affected areas of the CAR, Con- go, and South Sudan. Design Kenneth Transier (@ktransier) is a Project Man- ager for The Resolve. He is also the primary cartographer and designer for the LRA Crisis Tracker s periodic security briefs. Healing MONUSCO s Image 17