NATURAL DISASTERS, LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE CHOCOLATE CITY

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1 NATURAL DISASTERS, LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE CHOCOLATE CITY Davia S. Cox Laura A. Reese Department of Political Science and Global Urban Studies Program Michigan State University East Lansing, MI This paper has been prepared for presentation at the annual meeting, American Society for Public Administration, Washington DC, March The authors would like to thank Professor Gary Sands for critical and conceptual assistance.

2 NATURAL DISASTERS, LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE CHOCOLATE CITY This paper constitutes a follow-up to an article written during the late fall of 2005 and published in Economic Development Quarterly last August (Reese, 2006). The original paper focused on the economic development impacts of natural as opposed to economic disasters. In other words it explored the political and policy ramifications of the sudden versus slow economic death of cities. More specifically, the slow economic death of Detroit was used as the rhetorical opposite of the sudden death of New Orleans in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. Using examples from a prior evaluation of the Economic Adjustment Program (EAP) implemented by the Economic Development Administration (EDA) in the Department of Commerce, the article made the case that many of the approaches and responses to sudden natural disasters might be applied effectively to areas experiencing more chronic economic decay. The original commentary focused on several central questions: What is the impact of slow versus sudden economic death? Do responses to the two types of disasters differ? Has EDA been successful in promoting economic development in the wake of natural disasters? What aspects of EAP are particularly successful and could be expanded to a program that focuses on chronic rather than sudden and severe disasters? What types of local responses and relationships appear critical to successful economic development efforts following a disaster? What types of intergovernmental responses and relationships appear most effective? Are there potential long-term economic development benefits from a natural disaster? This paper touches on only some of these questions. Rather, the primary focus is to revisit the recommendations and observations presented in the first article with the benefit of an additional year of post-katrina experience in New Orleans. Below is a summary quote from the earlier analysis: Both Detroit and pre-hurricane New Orleans suffer from significant economic distress. Media and other reporting in the wake of Katrina rightly emphasized the exceptionally stressed economic conditions of New Orleans and its poorest 2

3 residents prior to the hurricane; Detroit s problems are generally more severe. In short, on August 28, 2005, the day before hurricane Katrina, both Detroit and New Orleans represented cities that were experiencing slow economic death. Many residents, particularly residents of color, were in poverty, public infrastructure was old and decaying, and the school systems suffered constant criticism regarding quality. Little was being done in any concerted way at federal and state levels to address these issues regardless of the reasons (lack of political will, racism, limited state resources, lack of foresight, etc.). Then, within days, national attention was focused on New Orleans. While it is clearly too soon to know whether the actual response will be effective, the experience in East Grand Forks, albeit on a smaller scale, points to the elements of a successful emergency response in the wake of a disaster that can ultimately lead to long term economic improvements (Reese, 2006: 224). With the benefit of hindsight, observations made over a year ago were overly optimistic. There may be very little difference between slow and sudden economic death in some cases, and that the operative difference between the nature of the economic recovery may well lie in the issue of race. PROGNOSTICATIONS ABOUT REDEVELOPMENT: SUDDEN VERSUS SLOW DEATH The following discussion provides a brief synopsis of the central lessons or critical points identified in the original paper. Those lessons appeared to lend hope that the response to sudden natural disasters in the case of New Orleans would contribute to economic re-growth and could be applied to more chronic urban decline, such as was present in New Orleans prior to the hurricane and has characterized the slow economic death of cities such as Detroit. The lessons for economic rebuilding after disasters were drawn from the case of East Grand Forks, MN, in the wake of a spring 1997 flood that decimated the entire downtown and, indeed, most of the rest of the city. The paper concluded about the successful rebuilding of this city: While there may well be some bias in their opinions, local officials in East Grand Forks feel that their city is the poster child for flood recovery. They could not have achieved the present level of redevelopment, absent state and federal funding and relationships, nor without the participation of city residents and their willingness to be patient and focus on long-term needs. A complex mix of state, 3

4 federal, and foundation support was used in the recovery; many local, regional, state, and federal entities along with local residents and business owners cooperated in recovery efforts; and a once struggling city and downtown have been significantly revitalized in a manner desired and planned for by local officials but that was unattainable from a local financial standpoint (Reese, 2006: 224). In short, it was concluded that commitment, cooperation, creativity, inclusivity and flexibility helped to create a redevelopment framework that generated substantial improvements in a remarkably short time. A variety of forces converged to make the East Grand Forks case a success. It was hypothesized that these forces would again play themselves out in New Orleans, ultimately making a recovery from the massive natural disaster more likely there than Detroit s efforts to recover from a chronic economic one. These forces included: media attention, a sense of urgency coupled with a long range vision of goals and success, concentrated federal, state, and foundation financial assistance, a renewed focus on the public sector, and an increased sense of community hope and investment in social capital. The following sections survey what has happened in relationship to these issues in New Orleans. Media Attention One significant difference between natural and economic disasters is the media attention attendant to the former as opposed to the latter. While there have been many websites, books, and individual media reports on the demise of Detroit, this has not come close to the level of media attention focused on New Orleans after Katrina. Not only did the scope of the disaster receive sustained national attention, the underlying issues of race, poverty, governmental capacities, and commitments (or lack thereof) to public infrastructure were also raised. The extensive media play on Katrina and the apparent macabre public fascination with disasters appeared to create a long-term focus on the widespread needs of a city in the wake of a disaster but also on a broader understanding of underlying economic inequities and public discussion 4

5 about what it might take to address these needs. Sustained media attention to the chronic economic distress of central cities and their residents, even with its sensationalism, was expected to sustain the public attention, understanding and commitment necessary to affect long-range solutions. It was expected that this public focus would support the rebuilding of New Orleans in a fashion that would possibly address the long-term issues of race and poverty. And, it was argued that such media attention to cities such as Detroit, with its chronic economic crisis, might provide the impetus for sustained redevelopment efforts there as well. Sense of Urgency/Long-range Vision Natural disasters provide unique opportunities for both the nature of policy response and the processes used. More specifically, they foster a sense of urgency it is necessary to respond to the disaster immediately and with large scale measures to change the business as usual model, opening the door to creative, long range processes and solutions. Thus, the crisis could allow for new and more open planning processes to occur, leading to creative problem solving on a large scale supported by a large influx of funding from a variety of actors and levels of government. Such process opportunities are much as Etzioni described mixed scanning, where limited problems and places receive broad-based yet focused attention (1967). For cities such as Detroit, such a process might bring together a number of internal and external actors that have been divided by years of racism, isolation, and mutual hostility and suspicion. Second, it could focus the talents, resources, and skills of a variety of actors on solving the city s economic crisis in a short period of time. Inclusive long-range planning processes could lead to large scale, creative solutions that might actually have the potential for solving the city s intractable economic, social and service problems. 5

6 It is also true that disasters on the scale of New Orleans provide the opportunity for sweeping clearance (or urban renewal for the more cynical) that is almost impossible to attain under conditions of slow economic deterioration. The types of emergency responses and options available in cities spatially wiped out by disasters won t work in Detroit and urban renewal was never desirable both because of its impact on the social fabric of the neighborhoods it renewed and generally unaesthetic outcomes. Yet, thinking about the types of large scale or nontraditional economic development options opened by a natural disaster might be expected to lead to more innovative solutions to slow economic death. Federal, State, and Foundation Assistance It seems obvious that focused federal and state investment is essential to rebuilding the economy in places that have suffered natural disasters. However, it appeared that FEMA, as currently organized, was not the best model to address longer-term redevelopment. Indeed, organizational elements of EDA programs were posited as a potential model for development funding in the wake of Katrina. For example, EDA is a decentralized federal agency, divided into six regions, each with substantial discretion in awarding grants. This decentralization allows for more region-specific responses and the potential for federal personnel more familiar with local circumstances, cultures and actors to be involved in program implementation. This fundamentally changes the intergovernmental relationship, permitting more flexible, creative, and complex interactions between federal and local actors, with local officials pursuing their interests and interacting with federal officials through bargaining and strategic actions. One of the major reasons for the successful redevelopment of other cities following natural disasters was the participation, in both time and money, of local and regional foundations. Not only can foundations bring additional resources to the table, they also support 6

7 activities essential to recovery efforts, not necessarily eligible for federal or state funds. Foundation or other private or quasi-public resources alone are not sufficient for recovery; they may best provide essential gap financing to address critical community needs not covered by state and federal programs, or they may support planning processes and consensus building that might not be eligible for state or federal funds. Focus on the Public Sector The importance of public investment in buildings, services, and other infrastructure in sustaining civic pride, emphasizing that community is important and worth investing in and being a part of, should not be underestimated. Much of what needs to be rebuilt in New Orleans is public infrastructure (based on the very visible lesson learned about the consequences of lack of such investment), and public buildings and sites. Public investment isn t just about largess, pork and waste. It s about pride in a community and its people. What does the lack of public investment and decayed infrastructure say about cities like Detroit, its people, and its economic future? What does it say to businesses considering investment in the city or residents considering whether to move in? A lack of civic pride affects external development opportunities and devastates the psyche of a city s residents. Thus, it constitutes a spiritual as well as an economic disaster. Of course, that s what the floods did to New Orleans. But the promise of public investment and public attention does an incalculable amount to recreate pride in community and hope for the future. This is perhaps the greatest difference between what happens after a sudden natural disaster and in the midst of slow economic decline. Community Hope and Social Capital In evaluating EDA emergency economic funding, local officials, business owners and residents repeatedly indicated that one of the critical outcomes of federal support was that it 7

8 provided a sense of hope for the community a sense that those outside the area were willing to help; that over time, conditions in the community would get better; and that, ultimately, the area could recover from the disaster. This sense of hope leads residents to stay in the community rather than moving on, encourages business owners to reinvest rather than close up shop, provides new businesses with the confidence to locate in the community, and stems social decline reflected in divorces, bankruptcies, suicides, and other stress-related health problems. It is not hard to make the case that there is a significant lack of hope surrounding the current and future economic conditions of cities such as Detroit. Slow, painful decline has occurred for years, with only intermittent upswings. What would a sense of real hope provide for Detroit and its residents and other cities experiencing chronic economic decline? It was expected that New Orleans would benefit from an infusion of public investment and attention in terms of hope and community solidarity. There is another aspect to the issue of hope that differentiates a natural disaster from chronic economic decline. If a hurricane causes flooding that wipes out the economy of New Orleans, it is an act of god. While some have blamed the poor of New Orleans for not leaving more promptly or more willingly it is difficult to say that their behavior caused the hurricane or its devastation. Along the same lines, absent a Congress willing to invest substantially in flood protection for the city, it is difficult to blame local officials for the flooding that occurred subsequent to the hurricane. But, with chronic economic disasters, who is to blame? It is so easy to blame the victims and, in turn, for the victims to blame themselves. An urgent, focused, and visible response from multiple levels of government and public and private actors to the economic disasters in cities such as Detroit might change the balance of blame and spark a sense of hope critical to self-help. 8

9 It was expected that such as visible and focused response would take place in New Orleans over the long term. THE BENEFITS OF HINDSIGHT AND THE IMPORTANCE OF RACE It seems clear now that the forgoing attributes of successful responses to natural disasters did not necessarily play out in a positive manner for New Orleans. The next section revisits each topic to provide an updated view. Media Attention Media attention was integral to highlighting many issues that faced the Gulf Region after Hurricane Katrina, and probably the most important, raised soon after the hurricane, was race and the effect of race in people s perceptions of federal, state and local responses to the hurricane. Perceptions of who suffered most, and what should be done through local economic and planning development processes, were greatly impacted by the media accounts of events in the region. The media offered two complementary, but distinctly different, portrayals of Hurricane Katrina and its effects on the Gulf Coast region. First and foremost, Hurricane Katrina was a natural disaster, unavoidable, perhaps exacerbated by slow human response. In almost all accounts, the hurricane was viewed as one of, if not the most, devastating natural disaster to ever hit an American city. Based on this story a natural outpouring of sympathy and aid to the region could be expected, including support for government efforts to help bolster local efforts to reestablish New Orleans as an economically viable port city. The second media story painted a very different picture of the disaster, one nightly news watchers are familiar with; floodwaters trapping people on rooftops, children separated from their parents, highways open on both sides in order to facilitate evacuation of the city, residents 9

10 congregating on overpasses to avoid the flood waters. One scene, however, made an indelible imprint on the American psyche the New Orleans Superdome. This image, accompanied by the deteriorating situation in the nearby Convention Center, showed Americans outside the region a different picture of this natural disaster, the disproportionate effects of the hurricane on blacks within the city. Huddy and Feldman use polling data to explore the differences in black and white perceptions of the disaster and the effect that the media had on shaping public opinion (2006). For example, a Newsweek magazine poll found that only 31% of white Americans compared to 65% of black Americans thought the government response was slow because many of the victims where African-American (Washington Post, 2005). The authors draw on findings from the American Racial Opinion Survey, a three-panel national telephone survey conducted by the Stony Brook University Center for Survey Research, to explore several aspects of the disaster that affected public perceptions: reactions to hurricane victims, adequacy of government assistance, and responsibility and blame. While there is substantial agreement among backs (94%) and whites (81%) that most of those who stayed behind in the city after the hurricane were poor, there is a discrepancy in how these individuals are viewed. Seventy percent of blacks felt very sympathetic to (mostly black) individuals left behind after the hurricane compared to only 42% of whites. The authors conclude that whites seemed to express stronger sympathy for those who evacuated the storm than those that were unable to do so. Grusky and Rho tested the dirty little secret hypothesis, and uncovered additional information regarding differences in how people used media reports to assess the situation after the hurricane. According to this hypothesis, poverty and inequality in the United States are typically hidden from the public, creating apathy and ignorance (Grusky and Rho, 2006). The 10

11 authors test a typology of attitudes using the Maxwell Poll conducted in both 2004 and again in 2005, an optimum opportunity to assess the dirty little secret hypothesis by gauging opinions about the poverty and inequality exposed by the hurricane. Several pre-existing poverty ideologies were explored based on awareness and attitudes about personal versus governmental responsibility. They find that media coverage and exposure had no effect on deniers, individuals who tend to deny that there is a poverty problem in the US. However, those holding the realist ideology, that poverty and inequality exist but it is not the responsibility of the state to act, grew from 6 to 11% from one poll to the next. They conclude that media coverage of the hurricane did little to elevate public awareness of poverty and inequality. Other scholars explored the potential public opinion effects of Katrina coverage, focusing on the meritocracy and color-blind ideologies of racial difference. The color-blind ideology posits that individual characteristics determine inequality, some inequality is natural, and race is not central in causing inequities. Meritocracy ideology operates on the premise that everyone at birth is given an equal chance and equal opportunity to succeed in life; hard work is what determines success. Both of these ideologies fail to take into account differences between races in their assessments of equal opportunity as well as the many structural impediments built into the system that suppress privilege of subordinate groups (Sweeney 2006). In the wake of Kanye West s criticism of President Bush during a live fundraiser in September of 2005, support for the color blind approach remained robust; survey respondents stated that they did not understand how race had anything to do with a natural disaster. In explaining how Hurricane Katrina affected people, many mentioned that they wished black people would stop bringing race into this discussion. Again, the media focus on the disparate impacts of the hurricane based on race and poverty did not appear to significantly affect pre-existing attitudes. 11

12 It is possible that any long-term impacts of the media on public opinion were mitigated by the mixed messages portrayed. While the plight of the urban poor was starkly highlighted, a second dimension of media attention resulted in a preoccupation with violence (or supposed violence) in the aftermath of the storm. This second dimension is demonstrated by a societal acceptance of the use of underclass to describe and classify African-American urban poor. The Associated Press produced many images in the wake of the storm using underclass to describe lower class urban poor in the captions of pictures of the post-storm foraging for food. Blacks were depicted as looters and whites as finders, or blacks as victims of the storm, whites as survivors. In addition, initial reports from the Superdome described rape and murder as the status quo; however, later police and governmental reports showed little to no support for these initial news stories. Young (2006) concludes that in order to move the discourse on race and issues of urban inequality to one that is more productive, a concerted effort must be made to repudiate underclass notions of blacks as helpless and violent. The media, in their reporting of Hurricane Katrina, for the most part defaulted to depicting storm survivors in terms of race and thus portrayed blacks unequally and consequently shaped public opinion of hurricane victims. Media attention to this event points to significant race-related challenges in implementing recovery efforts in the region (Huddy, 2006). Very few redevelopment needs are race-neutral: rebuilding the many low-income housing developments destroyed by the hurricane, providing aid to the large proportions of minorities displaced by the storm, targeting support to black owned businesses, and long-term planning efforts to accommodate differential needs for services in the rebuilt city. As more people return to New Orleans and begin to participate in the political process, any lasting improvements in race relations and poverty will be effected by public opinion of those inside and outside the planning process. The theme of race, as highlighted by 12

13 the media, continues to be a major challenge to local economic development and planning efforts being undertaken in the city of New Orleans. Economic Redevelopment Processes: Urgency, Long Range Planning Economic redevelopment policies and processes for the city of New Orleans had been under scrutiny long before the storm hit. Much of the debate post-katrina has focused on redevelopment of the Lower Ninth Ward. To understand the great disparity in socioeconomic status of residents of New Orleans, a discussion of how the city was settled is useful. Development in the city followed the trajectory of many gulf or port cities. Higher ground along the river was settled first, while later development consisted of single and double shotgun homes built on low ground (formerly cypress swamps) to accommodate the influx of immigrants in the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries (Reichard, 2006). The juxtaposition of opulence (in the cities Garden District, Esplanade, Metairie and Gentilly areas, for example) and poverty (as many of the public housing sites located in the lower Ninth Ward have been characterized) of the Seventh, Eighth and Ninth wards highlighted the socioeconomic inequalities present in New Orleans prior to the storm. Post World War II much of the remaining low land was developed into middle-class, suburban housing with little attention given to the need for correctly reinforced foundations or levees. The result of the levee breaks for many areas was cataclysmic, worsened by their inability to slough off water for weeks after the storm. Both middle-class suburban neighborhoods and inner-city public housing built on low land were effected (Reichard, 2006). From the start of the redevelopment process, planning has been uncoordinated. At the state level, Governor Kathleen Blanco set up the Louisiana Recovery Authority to guide planning and redevelopment in the parishes effected by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. But, New Orleans also implemented its own local planning vehicle, the Bring New Orleans Back 13

14 Commission (BNOBC), spearheaded by Mayor Ray Nagin. The Commission brought in professional planners and developers to envision what needed to occur in the city. The planning group, Wallace Roberts & Todd, provided a visual agenda for New Orleans. The plan, although ultimately not adopted by the council, was characterized by large amounts of green space, particularly in low-lying areas. The planning process resulted in the creation of neighborhood groups that, with the failure of a plan to coalesce around, began to create their own neighborhood planning mechanisms. Although neighborhood action committees were intended to be integral to the BNOBC planning process, many of the most devastated areas had few returning residents, effectively decreasing the ability of low-income residents to defend their former neighborhoods from elimination in the planning process. The BNOBC dissolved soon after the re-election of Mayor Nagin, suggesting that its creation may well have been primarily political window-dressing. Current local planning processes consist of each neighborhood planning organization creating a plan that will then be combined into thirteen district plans, sutured together by the master planners of the city and presented to the planning commission for adoption and inclusion in the city s master plan (Reichard, 2006). As of January 2007, there has been no master planning document issued or adopted by the city, although a riverfront redevelopment plan is in its final draft and may be implemented soon. The American Planning Association (APA) also noted problems with the city s master planning efforts. According to the team assembled at the request of the City Planning Commission in October of 2005, the master plan lacks a clear, concise and prominent message to inspire the community. The APA team also noted that zoning ordinances adopted in the 1970s are ill-suited to regulating many aspects of post-katrina redevelopment (Lewis 2005). Pressure to rebuild quickly undercuts land-use and preservation policies in the master plan. 14

15 Another article in Planning notes that developers in New Orleans are heavily influential in zoning in the city and can get a green light on projects that otherwise don t fit with land use polices by appealing directly to city council (Eckdish- Knack 2006). Another complication for redevelopment processes in New Orleans is the number of renters who resided in the city before the storm hit. Billions of dollars in housing aid flowed into New Orleans during 2006; however, most of the money was earmarked for homeowners (New York Times, 2006). The Brookings Institute report, Katrina Index: Tracking Variables of Post- Katrina Recovery, notes that rents in the New Orleans region have risen thirty-nine percent in the past year (Liu, 2006). Before the hurricane, it would not have been unusual to find a two-story, three bedroom house in Gentilly renting for less than a thousand dollars a month. Residents are just returning to Gentilly and it lacks a strong neighborhood planning organization lobbying for its redevelopment. In other parts of New Orleans, a renter would be lucky to find a half refurbished duplex in Mid-City for the same price. This unit would come with no major appliances or air-conditioning (New York Times, 2006). The Brookings Institute reports that nearly 48,000 rental units were destroyed by the hurricane. Thus, in addition to affordability, scarcity also hampers the ability of renters to return. In response to the potential demolition of apartment buildings abandoned or damaged by the storm, the Louisiana Recovery Authority has set aside $859 million to help landlords retain and improve their properties. As of September 2006 this program had not been completely implemented. Homeowners also have problems of their own; the $7.5 billion program authorized by the President to help homeowners repair or replace their homes the Road Home program has been beset by many problems. Nearly 79,000 people applied for program support, but as of November 2006, only 1,721 have been told how much grant money they would receive (New 15

16 York Times, 2006). Delays in implementation stem in part from the inability of federal officials to coordinate homeowner s insurance policies. Like many other documents destroyed by the storm, missing insurance records have been problematic for those applying for federal funds. Regardless of these issues, homeowners are clearly better off, particularly those with flood insurance and savings. Renters with no means to ownership and lower incomes find it hard to navigate the few grant programs available to them. Residents of public housing, in particular, have had a very difficult time making their voices heard. In June 2006, the Department of Housing and Urban Development announced plans to demolish four of New Orleans largest low income housing sites. Crime rates, drug abuse, single-parent households, and low employment rates have characterized these areas for some time and many planners at various levels of government hoped that eliminating them would reduce crime and poverty in the city. Recent reports of new crime waves throughout New Orleans seem to belie the idea that simply destroying buildings can eliminate crime. Scholars note the importance of involving many actors in any redevelopment project. Olshansky (2006) conceives three possible futures for New Orleans. One future would entail a complete transformation of the city with restoration of wetlands, elevation of homes to decrease risk of flood damage, reconstructed neighborhoods with opportunities for lower-income housing, better evacuation plans, and an energized and coherent environment for planning. A second, less-optimal future could have four possible cities, separate, but unequal: a tourist city, consisting of waterfront entertainment and the French Quarter, a downtown corporate city, a city of mostly middle-class homeowners rebuilding in places they previously inhabited, and a city where low-income renters and public housing dwellers leave permanently, buildings remain 16

17 vacant for years, and businesses fail. In the long run, this fourth city would severely undermine the other three. State and Federal Assistance Programs Federal and state actors have been, and will continue to be, integral to viable redevelopment in the Gulf Region. The amount of federal dollars spent to rebuild and aid New Orleans in the aftermath of the storm has been unprecedented. In addition, the state of Louisiana has contributed resources to the redevelopment of New Orleans. Congress, the President, and the state of Louisiana have introduced the following programs and initiatives since Katrina: In December 2005 and again in June 2006, Congress approved emergency supplemental appropriations providing $11.5 billion and $5.2 billion in Community Development Block Grant assistance for hurricane relief. Just over ten billion of this money was given to the state of Louisiana (Research Works, 2006). In total, the White House and Congress have approved $109 billion in funding for the entire Gulf Coast region. This provides support for all five states impacted by hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma. Thirty-five billion of the $109 billion supports longer-term rebuilding efforts and includes $18.2 billion in state and local infrastructure repairs and $16.7 billion in CDBG funds (including the $8.8 billion for Louisiana) for homeowner and apartment owner repairs (Liu, 2006). Congress and the White House have tripled the availability of Low-Income Housing Tax Credits in the Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005 to give the private sector resources to build affordable housing. The Gulf Opportunity Zone Act also provides $8 billion dollars in tax relief for businesses heavily impacted by the hurricanes and tax incentives to produce new developments in the parishes along the coast. In Louisiana, the Road Home Program has been supplemented by CDBG funds ($10.4 billion) and state funds ($6.3 billion) appropriated by the federal government to provide aid to homeowners. One and a half billion dollars have been targeted for the refurbishment of rental housing in the New Orleans area. Louisiana made the historic decision to merge levee protection and coastal restoration activities under a single governmental entity (Liu 2006). Months after the hurricane the state of Louisiana took ownership of 107 of the 117 schools in the New Orleans school district placing them under the jurisdiction of the state s Recovery School District. This step was taken to strengthen the failing school district and improve delivery of educational services to city residents. In addition, the Economic Development Administration (EDA) has also been helping the recovery effort. Prior to the hurricane s landfall the EDA identified $4 million in funding to 17

18 assist economic priorities (Testimony of Sandy K. Baruah before the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, 2005). Once the scope of the damage became evident, the EDA reprogrammed an additional $4.3 million dollars to recovery efforts (US Department of Commerce, 2006). The Department of Commerce, which houses the EDA, also has other offices under its purview that have aided economic recovery efforts. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration received a supplemental request from the President to develop market-based strategies for fisheries management, mapping assistance with debris removal and oyster bed rehabilitation, and the development of multi-hazard-risk maps to assist redevelopment efforts along the coast (Speech prepared for Sandy K. Baruah for the 2006 Governor s Conference on Economic Development in Baton Rouge, Louisiana). The Department s International Trade Administration has launched a contracting center to provide information to outside businesses wanting to relocate to the area. Finally, the Minority Business Administration has worked with 1,500 businesses in the area assisting displaced firms with relocation and procurement needs. Overall, it appears that significant federal and state resources have been designated to or invested in the redevelopment of New Orleans. However, gross numbers of programs and dollars do not speak to the quality or effectiveness of program implementation. Nonprofit and Foundation Assistance In addition to the various funding and programmatic opportunities and initiatives developed by the state of Louisiana and the federal government, nonprofit organizations and foundations have also been involved in the redevelopment process. According to the Aspen Institute s President and CEO Walter Issacson, hundreds of soup kitchens and churches stepped in to fill the service gap after the storm. Tony Pipa, a guest lecturer at the Kennedy School of 18

19 Government at Harvard University, noted several ways the nonprofit sector helped during the crisis. However, because few outside foundations were involved during the crisis (with the exception of the American Red Cross and humanitarian groups like Oxfam America and the Mercy Corps), Pipa suggests that such organizations create crisis contingency plans in order to aid those in need. While nonprofit organizations may not have a large role in redevelopment efforts, the ability of these groups to adapt and provide services to individuals should not be overlooked. Public Sector, Public Investment and Public Infrastructure Public infrastructure and restoration of public services are essential to redevelopment after a natural disaster. In New Orleans the damage to local schools, hospitals, and other public buildings and disruption to services, public safety in particular, have deterred residents from moving back to the city and indeed appear to be causing some returnees to decide to leave again (Bewan, 2007). In planning redevelopment strategies for future natural disasters, focus should be on stabilizing and reinforcing not only the physical structures of schools, courts and hospitals, but also on evacuation and maintenance planning for these entities. Many service challenges increased exponentially because of their poor quality prior to the storm. The pre-katrina public school system had gone through 10 superintendents in 10 years. The city operated fifty-five of Louisiana s seventy-eight failing schools under the federal No Child Left Behind Act (Eisinger, 2006). The Brookings Institute reported that only 21% of public schools in the city had reopened ten months after the storm. A labyrinth of state, city-run, and charter schools has sprung up, each with its own rules, regulations and start dates. Creating further challenges, many students are separated by hundreds of miles from parents or guardians that support them, contributing to a rise in school violence (Nossiter, 2006b). 19

20 The court system has faired no better. Physical evidence has been washed away by the storm or sat in post-flood water until it was rendered unusable. Many defendants are still awaiting trial while their lawyers struggle to defend clients with evidence that is damaged and without witnesses to help defend claims (Drew, 2006). In addition, a severe shortage of public defenders compounds the problem of bringing individuals to trial (Burns and Thomas, 2006). Police services have also suffered. The New Orleans Police Department was charged during the storm with continuing public safety, conducting search and rescue operations, and maintaining public order a task made more difficult by the high number of residents that did not evacuate (Burns and Thomas, 2006). State and local officials did not sound the evacuation alarm until Sunday August 28 th ; the first-ever mandatory evacuation of the city. And, by this point, evacuation was nearly impossible to enforce. In all, approximately 480,000 people evacuated while 100,000 stayed in the city (Burns and Thomas, 2006). Limited communication capacity, damaged vehicles, and blocked roadways left New Orleans an island in the midst of floodwaters. Federal and state units, such as the National and Coast Guards, stepped in, often helping rescue New Orleans police officers. More recently a surge of violence has taken over the city. In 2006 there were 161 homicides; as of January 2007, 18 homicides had taken place within city limits. About two thirds of the deaths have thus far gone unsolved. Neighborhood silence has contributed to the lack of convictions. Because many homicides take place in parts of the city where violence was already rampant, many residents fear retaliation if they speak out against perpetrators (Nossiter and Drew, 2007). Hospitals encountered many of the same problems that police and other public service units faced during and after the storm. However, hospitals posed special problems since patients, 20

21 particularly those who were immobile, required special transportation and evacuation services. Some patients become agitated and medication schedules and life support needs were threatened (Grey and Hebert, 2006). Prioritizing who should be moved and, more importantly, who can be moved during a natural disaster is an important component for future planning. Some hospitals evacuated patients, some did not, and as reports of generator failure reached the public, the horrifying conditions in which doctors and nurses attempted to care for their charges incited the public and led to many patient deaths (Grey and Hebert, 2006; Brinkley, 2006). Community Hope and Social Capital: Population and Demographic Shifts The inability of New Orleans to attract newcomers to the city before the storm is well documented as the city struggled with serious economic and social problems. In the 1960 s the population peaked at more than 600,000; in August just before the storm there were approximately 462,000 residents. After the hurricane, thousands of Hispanics moved to the city to help with reconstruction. These newcomers might stay and change the fundamental character of the city, altering the African-American, white Cajun character of the city. The most current population estimates were published in January The Louisiana Health and Population Survey, conducted by the Louisiana Recovery Authority (aided by the U.S. Census Bureau, the Centers for Disease Control and Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals), took surveys of the counties most affected by the storm (St. Tammany, Orleans, Jefferson, Plaquemines, and St. Bernard parishes). Orleans parish lost most of its population; currently there are 191,139 people, down from 444,515 in Most notably, blacks in particular have been slow to return to Orleans parish. Pre-Katrina, blacks in Orleans parish totaled 302,041; now the number stands at 89,891. It is important to note that Orleans parish has the same boundaries as the incorporated city of New Orleans. Thus, the current population of New Orleans is much less black than 21

22 before, though blacks in Orleans parish still make up an estimated 47 percent of the total population. St. Bernard parish, which lies southwest of New Orleans, had a pre-katrina population of 66,441, with whites making up the majority of the population. Post-Katrina, the population survey estimates the white population at 22,148 persons and blacks at 1,857. Jefferson parish, which lies to the west of the city, had a pre-katrina population of 449,288, but is currently at 434,666. Whites make up 61.2 percent of the current population, estimated at 266,168 people, and blacks have an estimated count of 112,401 or 25.9 percent. In all jurisdictions, except for St. Bernard parish, the Hispanic population has increased. As a whole, the entire New Orleans metropolitan area has a population less than half of pre-katrina levels, and black population levels have decreased consistently. One of the major issues complicating the rebuilding process in New Orleans was the fact that mayoral elections were scheduled to occur very soon after the disaster (originally in February of 2006). This election was integral to the rebuilding process since it effectively determined who would lead the city during reconstruction. The first round of elections was rescheduled to April At the time of the election, approximately two thirds of city residents were out of state. Many faced serious obstacles in returning to the city to vote. Satellite voting stations were opened in nine parishes to allow displaced New Orleans residents an opportunity to cast votes. ACORN and the NAACP organized busses to transport out-of-state voters to these stations on April 10 th, and the polls stayed open until April 15 th. Incumbent mayor Ray Nagin faced a record 21 challengers in the primary campaign. After the primary election, Nagin faced Mitch Landrieu in a runoff election. Landrieu was at the time, the lieutenant governor of Louisiana and son of New Orleans s last white mayor, Moon Landrieu. With the city s black majority reduced after the storm, it was thought that 22

23 Landrieu would have a strong chance of beating Nagin. It was also well known that Landrieu s family has a history of supporting civil right s initiatives, whereas the black majority of New Orleans often saw Nagin as having white, Republican, middle-class and business-focused support. In the 2002 election, many white, middle-class voters were integral to Nagin s win. The results of the run-off election had Nagin winning 38% to Landrieu s 29%; Nagin won 289 of the city s 442 precincts, and won overwhelmingly in districts with a black majority. Nagin had managed to turn his Chocolate City remarks after the storm into support for re-election in black districts despite losing much of his strong 2002 white voter support. Many post-election pundits attributed Nagin s success to the competition between the other challengers for votes in the primaries, lack of a strong, well-funded black challenger, and Landrieu s inability or unwillingness to launch strong attacks on Nagin during debates. DISCUSSION Several summary observations can be made about the economic recovery so far in New Orleans. First, it is clear that pre-and post-katrina population levels are drastically different, with whites and middle-class homeowners able to move back and begin rebuilding much faster than the poor who fled the city in the aftermath of the storm. Past socioeconomic disparities are difficult to eliminate even given a strong desire to create a harmonious future for the city (Eisinger, 2006). Even acknowledging that there have been some successes, federal, state, and local policymaking and implementation to support rebuilding have been fraught with problems. Public services, highly problematic prior to the hurricane, do not appear to have improved. Indeed, with respect to housing quality, public safety, and education, continuing challenges at times appear staggering. While portions of the tourist industry have rebounded, the recovery is neither broad 23

24 nor deep and threatens to turn the city into a Venice-like situation where the focus is on visitors, to the detriment of local residents. And, standing in the way of long-term development, questions continue to be raised about the efficacy of rebuilt flood protection. For the most part, plans to limit development to less flood prone areas have floundered in the wake of resident desires to rebuild, the challenges of agreeing to and implementing land use plans, and political issues associated with the confluence of space and race in neighborhoods most vulnerable to flooding. Media attention to the disaster in New Orleans was intensive and has continued, albeit at a lesser level, to the present. The New York Times, in particular, has provided continued reports and assessments of the recovery. Yet, neither the immediate or lasting coverage has done much to effect public opinion over the long term; attitudes about race and persistent poverty in US cities have not fundamentally changed. There has been no apparent increase in support for or willingness to implement long-term efforts to enhance quality of life in cities with persistent poverty and declining economic fortunes. If media reports are unable to change opinions about victims of an act of God, what chance do they have of changing attitudes toward problems emanating from man-made economic disasters? What then seem to be significant differences in the response and outcomes in East Grand Forks as compared to New Orleans? It is far too soon to come to definitive conclusions, but several issues are worth considering. First, very simply, is the issue of the magnitude of the disaster. While the East Grand Forks flood was relatively similar in scope in that it destroyed much of the city, population size, the number of homes and businesses damaged, and sheer geographical scale are radically different. So to the nature of the disaster and potential future flooding problems. The smaller size of East Grand Forks allowed for a concentrated public and 24

25 private response, targeting of resources, and eased planning efforts; a smaller, more homogeneous population reduced conflict and competition over goals and facilitated communitywide planning efforts. Research on downtown redevelopment has consistently indicated that efforts are more successful when intensively targeted to relatively compact areas of the downtown (Sands, 2007). Extending this to the redevelopment of cities after disasters, it makes sense that efforts were more successful in a shorter period of time in the more compact area of East Grand Forks. The broad expanse of need in New Orleans makes the development process daunting at best and likely to take years. Second, most analysts would agree that the recovery in New Orleans has been hampered by governmental failure at all levels. While political rhetoric and persuasion obviously colors perceptions of the causes and extent of the governmental failure, it seems clear that something went seriously wrong. The disaster in East Grand Forks elicited immediate state and federal intervention, in part by FEMA, but also by a variety of other agencies. Longer run, the Economic Development Administration had a significant role in supporting flood mitigation solutions as well as rebuilding. Financial and technical support emanated from a variety of sources and all levels of government in a coordinated manner. This type of governmental response has been painfully absent in New Orleans. But, where does the primary failure lie and why is this case so different, other than the scale issue just noted? Again, there are a variety of possible explanations, the veracity of which will have to be explored over time. Some of these might include the following: The political leadership of federal, state, and local officials involved are different not only in party but in ideology. It is possible that poor relationships in the past have challenged the abilities of the different levels to coordinate. Obviously some have pointed to a general failure of leadership and will at the presidential level. Local government capacities in New Orleans were limited prior to the hurricane. The city was experiencing many problems associated with the presence of extensive and 25