PAKISTAN: Flooding worsens situation for people displaced by conflict in north-west

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1 PAKISTAN: Flooding worsens situation for people displaced by conflict in north-west A profile of the internal displacement situation 6 September, 2010 This Internal Displacement Country Profile is generated from the online IDP database of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC). It includes an overview and analysis of the internal displacement situation in the country prepared by IDMC. IDMC gathers and analyses data and information from a wide variety of sources. IDMC does not necessarily share the views expressed in the reports cited in this Profile. The Profile is also available online at

2 About the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, established in 1998 by the Norwegian Refugee Council, is the leading international body monitoring conflict-induced internal displacement worldwide. Through its work, the Centre contributes to improving national and international capacities to protect and assist the millions of people around the globe who have been displaced within their own country as a result of conflicts or human rights violations. At the request of the United Nations, the Geneva-based Centre runs an online database providing comprehensive information and analysis on internal displacement in some 50 countries. Based on its monitoring and data collection activities, the Centre advocates for durable solutions to the plight of the internally displaced in line with international standards. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre also carries out training activities to enhance the capacity of local actors to respond to the needs of internally displaced people. In its work, the Centre cooperates with and provides support to local and national civil society initiatives. For more information, visit the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre website and the database at Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre Norwegian Refugee Council Chemin de Balexert Geneva, Switzerland Tel.: idmc@nrc.ch 2

3 CONTENTS CONTENTS 3 OVERVIEW 5 FLOODING WORSENS SITUATION FOR PEOPLE DISPLACED BY CONFLICT IN NORTH-WEST 5 CAUSES AND BACKGROUND 13 GENERAL 13 CAUSES AND BACKGROUND 13 IDP FIGURES AND REGISTRATION 26 GENERAL 26 IDP FIGURES AND REGISTRATION 26 IDP POPULATION MOVEMENTS AND PATTERNS 28 IDP POPULATION MOVEMENTS AND PATTERNS 29 PHYSICAL SECURITY AND INTEGRITY 32 GENERAL 32 PHYSICAL SECURITY AND INTEGRITY 32 BASIC NECESSITIES OF LIFE 34 GENERAL 34 BASIC NECESSITIES OF LIFE 34 PROPERTY, LIVELIHOODS, EDUCATION AND OTHER ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 43 GENERAL 43 PROPERTY, LIVELIHOODS, EDUCATION AND OTHER ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 43 3

4 FAMILY LIFE, PARTICIPATION, ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND OTHER CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 49 GENERAL 49 FAMILY LIFE, PARTIIPATION, ACESS TO JUSTICE, DOCUMENTATION AND OTHER CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 49 PROTECTION OF SPECIAL CATEGORIES OF IDPS (AGE, GENDER, DIVERSITY) 52 GENERAL 52 PROTECTION OF SPECIAL CATEGORIES OF IDPS (AGE, GENDER, DIVERSITY) 52 DURABLE SOLUTIONS (RETURN, LOCAL INTEGRATION, SETTLEMENT ELSEWHERE IN THE COUNTRY) 57 GENERAL 57 DURABLE SOLUTIONS (RETURN, LOCAL INTEGRATION, SETTLEMENT ELSEWHERE IN THE COUNTRY)) 57 NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 68 GENERAL 68 NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 68 BALOCHISTAN 73 GENERAL 73 DISPLACEMENT IN BALOCHISTAN 73 LIST OF SOURCES USED 81 4

5 OVERVIEW Flooding worsens situation for people displaced by conflict in north-west Internal displacement in Pakistan s north-western Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber-Pukhtunkhwa (KP) has continued for at least six years, but reached a massive scale from 2008 to As of the end of July 2010, there were around two million internally displaced people (IDPs), 1.4 million of them registered by the government. The flooding has particularly affected populations which had been displaced by the conflict. This crisis has heightened their vulnerability and may force many to return to home areas despite ongoing insecurity there or resettle in major cities. The causes of displacement have included human rights abuses by militant groups, conflicts between tribal leaders and militant Islamic rivals, and sectarian clashes. But military operations by government forces, sometimes in cooperation with some militant groups, have been the principle cause. Men and women are equally represented; 60 per cent of IDPs are children. Some ethnic groups are disproportionally affected. Since the expansion of the insurgency and the government s counter-insurgency operations, short-distance displacements have become untenable. More IDPs have fled in fear of impending violence, and displacements have become more protracted. Moreover, as communities become ever more entangled in the conflict, local integration and return have increasingly become unsafe. More than 90 per cent of IDPs live in rented accommodation or with families where there is an acceptable level of privacy. Host communities have gradually become less able to support IDPs, and more IDPs have been forced to seek shelter in camps. Most IDPs registered between early 2009 and mid-2010 have received better food and medical care than was available before the displacement. But those who have not been registered have relied entirely on their own resources and those of hosts. Education in areas of displacement and return has continuously been interrupted by insecurity, destruction of school building and occupation of schools by people displaced by the conflict, or by the flooding which hit north-west Pakistan in August The response to the displacement crisis, led by the Pakistani army, has been considerable. But the interests of IDPs have been subordinated to counter-insurgency concerns: some communities have had to negotiate with security forces to form self-defence groups as a condition for their return, leaving them at extreme risk during displacement and upon return. Insecurity, refusal of access and funding shortages have stopped international agencies reaching all the people in need. Background Pakistan became an independent state as a result of the partition of British India in The separation from India was based on the idea that different ethnic Muslim groups, sharing one religion, should have their own country. But, despite efforts to unify Pakistan, different groups triggered armed conflict in a search for self-rule. Pakistan today includes four broadly distinct regions: Punjab in the north-east, Sindh in the south-east, Balochistan in the south-west and the 5

6 Pashtu-dominated north-west, divided into Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). This update focuses on displacement in north-west Pakistan, where conflict and human right abuses have generated displacement for at least six years (IRIN, August 2004; Dawn September 2004). FATA and KP have close and long-standing links with Afghanistan, including through ethnic and family ties. They have provided a safe haven for Afghan refugees; they were also a training ground for Afghan mujahideen in the 1980s and more recently a support base for the Taliban (NAF, April 2010). Grievances related to poverty, corruption, and lack of governance have led to violence in the regions, as have less visible factors such as family and land disputes and struggles for control of markets and trade (NAF, April 2010; Shuja, 2009). Growing support for Islamic parties promoting Sharia law was prompted by dissatisfaction with a corrupt bureaucracy and an inefficient judicial system, as well as the Taliban s triumph in Afghanistan in the late 1990s and the labour migration to the Gulf States which stimulated a conservative interpretation of Islam (NAF, April 2010). However it was the US-led invasion of Afghanistan and attacks on tribesmen in FATA which most significantly propelled clerics promoting jihad onto the national stage (Shuja, 2009). Militants established themselves as an alternative leadership to tribal elders, with the resulting conflicts leading to widespread displacement. The militants are rooted in Pashtun societies and follow local customs but are opposed to tribal structures and leaders whose understanding of customary law might hinder the establishment of Sharia law (The National, December 2009; LWJ, 2010). Tribesmen, believing that the militants would ensure law and reduce corruption, have, on occasion, invited them to replace their tribal leaders (Khan Mahsud, 2010), but militants have also used violence to enforce a strict code of conduct and dress, and have severely punished those who refuse to comply (Jamshed, 2006; Shah/Bukhari, 2007). The militants have committed a range of human rights abuses, particularly against working women, tribal leaders and government officials, landlords and shop owners, teachers and health workers and their families (DT, April 2006). Thousands of people, mainly Shia and Sikhs, have also fled due to economic extortion by militants (DT, April 2009; Zeenews, June 2009). Tens of thousands of people have been displaced by sectarian conflict (News, September 2008; NYT, July 2008). Affected sects included Shiite and Sunni groups and Deobandi and Barelvi Sunni activists (PSRU, April 2007; ICG, 2005; Khan, 2010). These groups share a history of clashes over control of land and water resources as well as important religious sites (PSRU, September 2008). Occasional clashes between tribal militias have also caused displacement (The Economist, December 2006). Tribal enmities have escalated into conflict (LWJ, 2010) amid ad hoc alliances between tribes, the army and Islamist militants. In 2007, insurgents broke up regional feudal structures, forcing most of the land-owning elite to flee (PIPS, 2007; Asia Times, February 2009; NYT, April 2009). The rate of displacement accelerated late in that year (AI, June 2010), when Pakistan s security forces launched operations to counter the perceived threat to national security, reinstate the feudal structure in KP and reestablish tribal governance (DT, May 2010; NAF, April 2010). The subsequent clashes between insurgents and security forces, and the government s economic blockade of tribal people living under Taliban control, displaced up to 4.5 million people between 2007 and 2010 (PHRP, February 2010; AI, June 2010; DT, May 2008; Dawn, November 2008; News, December 2009). In August 2010, the areas most affected by the ongoing flooding are precisely those where people displaced by conflict and human rights abuses have sought protection. The number of deaths in KP is ten times higher than any other province (Oneresponse, August 2010). While it is 6

7 still too early to know how the humanitarian and political challenges arising from the floods will be resolved, it is clear that conflict-induced IDPs are among the most vulnerable groups in floodaffected areas. Meanwhile, in Balochistan, the Pakistani government and Baloch tribal militants have been engaged in armed conflict over control of land and natural resources for several years: the army has carried out operations against six separatist guerrilla groups and the region has also witnessed Sunni-Shia sectarian violence and Taliban attacks against NATO supplies. Many of those displaced have been settlers encouraged to move to the province by the government. Little is known about the displacement of Baloch groups since the government has denied journalists and humanitarian workers access to large parts of the province. Displacement figures In July 2010, the government reported that 1.4 million internally displaced people (IDPs) remained (OCHA, July 2010), but humanitarian agencies had documented significant underregistration (WHO, April 2010; OCHA, March 2010; McRAM, June 2010; DT, July 2009). Until late 2008, few of the people displaced by conflict were registered, and there were few reliable estimates of their number. However, published estimates of between 910,000 and 1,430,000 IDPs between 2004 and 2008 give an idea of the scale of internal displacement even before official figures rocketed in March 2009 (AI, June 2010; PHRP, February 2010, pp.85-90). Since 2008, around seven million people have presented themselves as IDPs to the authorities, who have registered half of that number as internally displaced. Almost two million people returned to their places of origin in KP between February 2009 and mid-2010, according to government figures (PHRP, 2010; OCHA, July 2010). Returns to FATA began during the spring of 2010 but have been limited in number (UNHCR, April 2010). According to assessments undertaken by humanitarian agencies in 2010, the real number is 25% - 50% higher in some areas (WHO, April 2010; OCHA, March 2010; McRAM, 2010; DT, July 2009). This is mostly due to their lack of identification cards, the lack of registration facilities, or insecurity (UNHCR, January 2010; DT, July 2009; Dawn, November 2009; The News, December 2009). To qualify for registration, people also have to prove that they are residents of areas recognised by the security forces as being in the midst of ongoing conflict. In Balochistan, displacement is currently escalating. 40,000 of the Bugti people displaced by the counter-insurgency in 2005 had returned by 2009, according to the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, but 40,000 remained in desperate humanitarian conditions without outside assistance (Xinhua, March 2010; DT, January 2010; IDSA, October 2009; ICG, 2007). The government has reported that at least 100,000 settlers have fled Balochistan in 2010 due to nationalist violence (The News, July 2010; Gulfnews, July 2010). Patterns of displacement Men and women are equally represented among registered IDPs, and 96 per cent of assessed households are headed by men, suggesting that most internally displaced families have stayed together (Save the Children, July 2009). Children make up more than 60 per cent of their number (UNICEF, December 2009, p.2). Some groups are over-represented, for example Mehsud and Afridi tribes, Shias and Sikhs. Until late 2008 most people remained near their homes (New York Times, March 2006; Dawn, September 2004). However, as militants took control of larger areas of FATA and the counterinsurgency operations escalated, short-distance displacement became untenable. The army 7

8 required people to move away from the Afghan border to areas with a better state support and control capacity (Foreign Affairs, March 2010). Most IDPs thus fled further east to areas to which they had migrated seasonally, leaving large areas of the Pakistani side of the border depopulated. Displacement has also become more protracted as the parties to the conflict have extended their territorial disputes beyond specific areas, and as more communities have been drawn towards one side or another (IRIN, February 2010). The majority of IDPs have been displaced from rural areas to semi-urban or urban areas (FATA MICS, 2009, p.40). Obeying army or village council instructions, they have fled in groups, but have then lived among smaller groups where they have found an acceptable level of privacy. They have sought to avoid camps without adequate mechanisms to ensure purdah (privacy) for women, but as host communities have become saturated, more IDPs have been forced to seek shelter in the camps (The News, December 2009 and April 2010; DT, April 2010). The destruction by the August 2010 flooding of up to 40 per cent of the houses in reception areas has accelerated this trend (Reliefweb, August 2010) Repeated military operations have shown that the period between official warnings of imminent operations and actual fighting has been insufficient to allow communities to flee safely. This has prompted more people to flee preventively over the last year (AEI, August 2009; Dawn, August 2009), allowing those with the necessary resources to plan transport, housing and employment. However, poorer and more vulnerable people have been unable to leave in advance, and have fled only when absolutely necessary (IRIN, April 2010; The News, December 2009). Initiatives to strengthen early warning systems were promoted by tribal elders in 2010 (The News, August 2010). Protection issues facing IDPs Physical security and integrity The most insecure stages of displacement for Pakistani IDPs have been during their flight, due to the risk of army shelling, summary execution and insurgency-planted anti-personnel mines, and on their return to their place of origin. Human rights groups and the media have documented attacks on fleeing civilians, including army shelling and aerial bombardments (HRW, May 2009; al Jazeera, January 2010; Dawn, November 2009; IRIN, October 2009; Reuters, May 2009). Civilians have been killed by anti-personnel mines and by summary executions carried out by militants. The parties to the conflict have also restricted the movement of IDPs with curfews during the initial phases of displacement. They have imposed controls in the areas of displacement and even effectively confined communities in their home villages (FA, March 2010; IPS, June 2009; AI, October 2009). The government has generally succeeded in creating a relatively safe environment in areas of displacement. However, since most IDPs have escaped from areas under militant control, IDPs have frequently been suspected of being part of the insurgency, and the army has regularly searched for militants in camps, arresting IDPs who have later been released (Dawn, July 2010; DT, May 2009). IDPs have thus felt criminalized (DT, March 2010; The News, June 2010). The government has also forced some internally displaced communities to form self-defence militias to support the security forces, as a condition for their return. This has put IDPs at extreme risk (Globe, January 2010; PTI, January 2010; ET, May 2010). In April 2010, two suicide bombers blew themselves up at the Kacha Pukha camp, killing at least 42 IDPs who were queueing to collect food rations (IRIN, April 2010). Police commanders confirmed that the suicide bombers were targeting members of tribes whose leaders had agreed to form militias (LWJ, April 2010; DT, April 2010). 8

9 Access to basic needs Most IDPs have struggled to find employment and to pay for basic services (StC, July 2009). Monthly income per household drastically decreased as a result of displacement, and 67 per cent earned fewer than $12 per month in 2009, according to a UN study (CERINA, November 2009, p.26). Until late 2008, when systematic state and international assistance to conflict-induced IDPs began, only host communities provided food and shelter to the displaced (IRIN, August 2004; DT, August 2004; Nation, October 2009; WFP, February 2007). By 2010, however, their resources had become overstretched, and host families increasingly found themselves too poor to support themselves, let alone to help IDPs (CERINA, 2009; Nation, October 2009; DT, April 2010). Aid workers reported in August 2010 that families sheltering people displaced by conflict have also been hit by the flooding and may now need help themselves (AlertNet, August 2010). Food insecurity has progressively increased, with food prices doubling as a result of curfews, flooding, insecurity and the destruction of infrastructure (WFP, April 2010; FAO, August 2010). The government provided cash cards to each internally displaced household, and the World Food Programme (WFP), the International Committee of the Red Cross / Red Crescent (ICRC) and other agencies distributed food to up to 2.7 million IDPs throughout 2009 (WFP, November 2009; OCHA, May 2010; The News, April 2010 and February 2010). These measures significantly reduced malnutrition among children; however, it has been reported that access restrictions to some of the flood-affected areas in KP have led to starvation (DT, August 2010). The pressure on health care services in areas receiving IDPs was extremely high (McRAM, 2010). The Ministry of Health and the World Health Organization (WHO) have coordinated a response which provided services to up to 600,000 patients per month (WHO, May 2010). Restrictions on the movement of women have impeded their access and that of their children to health services (PHRP, February 2010; CERINA, 2009, p.45; IRIN, May 2009 and April 2010; ACT, June 2009), but immunisation rates of displaced children have still been higher than prior to their displacement, and there have been almost no epidemics (FATA MICS, 2009, p.35; CERINA, 2009 p.45; PHRP, 2010). The risk of water-borne diseases due to flooding had been controlled as of mid-august (ET, August 2010; NCRP, August 2010). Vulnerable groups Many women have been traumatised by their displacement experience (Kakar, 2009). They have been at greater risk of sexual violence including rape, and of being forced into prostitution by the loss of their livelihoods and support networks (AI, June 2010, p.40). Men face other challenges. Reports of arrests refer almost exclusively to internally displaced men. Displaced men also are the victims of most killings (IRIN, January 2010; The News, January 2010), and displaced men and boys are at higher risk of forced recruitment (CSUCS, 2009; CRIN, 2008). As restrictions on women s mobility make entire families dependent on male members, these threats have a heightened impact (PHRP, 2010; IRIN, December 2009). Pakistan s internally displaced children face a range of threats: apart from forced marriage, they face increased rates of domestic violence and sexual exploitation during displacement (IDMC, June 2010). Obstacles to durable solutions Returns have not always been voluntary (Dawn, February 2009), and they have not always coincided with the removal of militants or the end of military activity. Insecurity has been observed before, during and after return processes (Reuters, March 2010; Dawn, July 2009; IRIN, March 2010). Destruction of infrastructure and loss of property have also barred the return of many internally displaced households (OCHA, July 2010). 9

10 Months after returning to the Swat Valley and other areas of KP, returnees were still struggling to rebuild their lives and livelihoods, in particular female-headed households. Infrastructure was still in ruins, and health care facilities were inadequate (IRIN, December 2009 and January 2010; Dawn, July 2009). More recently, millions of acres of farmland and hundreds of thousands homes having been destroyed by the flood (Reliefweb, August 2010). Many IDPs had only just recently resumed farming activities when their land was destroyed by the floods (IRIN, August 2010). Efforts to make sustainable return or local integration feasible have been set back by from five to ten years, according to aid workers (AlertNet, August 2010). While half of 450 damaged schools had been repaired (CERINA, 2009; OCHA, October 2009), threats by militants against students, teachers and school managers, particularly affecting women and girls, have remained widespread (UNESCO, February 2010). In 2010, secondary schools were still not accessible to many children: in one area only 3.5 per cent of boys and no girls at all had enrolled. The flooding caused 1,000 schools to be converted into temporary camps, but they were intended to return to their original use by late August (DT, August, 2010). Although the government has promised greater investment in areas from which people were displaced, there have been few indications of effective remedies for people who have suffered human rights violations related to their displacement. Problems related to access to justice, reparations and information about the causes of violations are yet to be resolved (Cost of Conflict, 2009; The News, December 2009 and June, 2010). The interests of IDPs have also been given less priority than counter-insurgency concerns (FA, March 2010; ICG, 2009; DT, May 2010; Reuters, March 2010). Rather than promoting peacebuilding, the government has continued to encourage displaced communities to arm and fight militant insurgents (Dawn, April 2010; IRIN, May 2010). These developments will probably polarise Pashtun society even further and make a sustainable solution more difficult (ET, April 2010). The polarization of communities and the lack of access to livelihoods have combined to make it harder for IDPs to integrate locally. Tensions have grown between IDPs and host communities as the latter s resources have run out or been destroyed by flooding (IRIN, April 2010; Dawn, April 2010; AEI, May 2010; Alertnet, August 2010). Some tribal people have faced discrimination because of their rural background and low social standing (National, November 2009; AFP, October 2009), or because they hail from insurgency areas. If these tensions persist, IDPs risk losing not only immediate assistance, but also their most important source of seasonal work during times of peace. As a result of the flooding, it is likely that more IDPs will be forced to return to their home areas despite insecurity there. Resettlement in areas less affected by the conflict and the flood is an option for those families who might find jobs in Karachi, Islamabad or other places where there are considerable Pashtun communities. However, since electoral policies and quotas are partly defined along ethnic lines in Pakistan, the large-scale resettlement of Pashtun people in Sindh or Punjab may be blocked (The News, May 2010; IPS, June 2009). National and international responses Pakistan s government failed to respond to the conflict-induced displacement crisis between 2004 and But since then, in tandem with international agencies, it has provided support to a huge number of IDPs. Its achievements include the registration of more than half a million internally displaced households; the provision of food and non-food items to the majority of those households; of 10

11 national identity cards to almost 80,000 displaced women; of health care services to many of those residing in displacement-affected communities, and shelter for many of the most vulnerable IDPs in camps. Cash cards distributed to at least 320,000 households have been an efficient means of reaching IDPs outside camps (UNHCR, January 2010). More recently, the flooding has necessitated an even larger response, while itself presenting new problems: for example: damaged roads and bridges have made access a problem. Jalozai camp, for example, with a population of over 100,000 IDPs, was cut off for three days after a main bridge linking the camp was destroyed (Nation, August 2010). Local communities and relief charities have moved swiftly to help the victims (Reuters, August 2010;The Economist, August 2010). Although it receives foreign financial support and the advice of UNHCR, the government has actively managed the response to internal displacement (Dawn, January 2010; SSG 2010). While the UN Humanitarian Coordinator s office, Special Envoy s Office and OCHA have coordinated international agencies, other national authorities as well as international agencies have assumed sector-specific responsibilities (PHRP, 2010). However, the government has been driven above all by the army s concern to avoid collateral damage during operations against militants (Dawn, June 2009). Interest in the welfare of civilians has often been limited to considerations related to the long-term control of contested areas. The response is led by the Army s Special Support Group for IDP Management and the Provincial Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Settlement Authority (PaRRSA). The former ensures that humanitarian work is aligned with counter-insurgency objectives thereby reducing humanitarian space while the latter ensures that the projects implemented by international agencies coincide with national plans and priorities (National, February 2010; SSG, 2010). Since mid-2009, the government has increasingly focused on reconstruction and rehabilitation, with an emphasis on KP and particularly the Swat Valley. The Strategic Oversight Council, led by the prime minister with the support of the KP governor and the Special Support Group among others, will guide a long-term strategy based on a post-crisis needs assessment (PCNA) supported by a number of donor governments and the UN and finished in late 2009 (Dawn, November 2009). Numerous international agencies are involved in reconstruction. The World Bank and the government have established a fund of roughly $1 billion for post-conflict recovery in KP and FATA (ADB, 2009). The US and the UK have supported Pakistan s Ministry of Defense on reconstruction and recovery projects carried out by Pakistan-led civil-military teams there (USDoS, 2010). The international humanitarian response in Pakistan is led by the UN Humanitarian Coordinator and his UN country team, supported by a number of international agencies under the interagency cluster approach (PHRP, 2010). Achievements notwithstanding, there have been significant obstacles in ensuring a consistent and predictable response which would address the needs of all IDPs. First, there has been a lack of access. Despite having raised the issue on a number of occasions, humanitarian organisations have been denied access to the displacement-affected population regularly since 2004, because of the security concerns expressed by the government (OneWorld, March 2004; IRIN, 2004; RWB, 2009; IRIN, November 2009; AlertNet, January 2010). Deliberate attacks on humanitarian agencies in 2009 and 2010, which led to the death of 12 members of the UN staff in 2009, have stopped humanitarian agencies reaching IDPs. Threats against IDP camp areas have also impeded service delivery (UN, October 2009; Newsline, 2004; Seattle Times, 2010; DT, June 2010). 11

12 The security forces leadership of the response has been controversial. Humanitarians are divided over whether to engage and support government programmes or instead advocate for humanitarian principles. Some agencies emphasise that the army s resources, expertise and intelligence are necessary for reaching the IDPs (ICG, 2009). But others warn against tailoring the humanitarian response to criteria defined by military needs and objectives. As a result, aid agencies have drawn up guidelines to define their relationship with the armed forces, to protect their neutrality and enable them to reach civilians in need (Reuters, June 2010; DT, January 2010). While 71 per cent of funds requested in 2009 were met by donations, only 39 per cent of the $538 million requested in the revised Humanitarian Response Plan for 2010 was funded by the end of July (WP, February 2010; AlertNet, February 2010, UN, July 2010). Due to this shortfall, food distribution and education programmes have been halted and IDP camps handed over to national authorities (Dawn, April 2010). The added humanitarian needs emanating from recent flooding have posed new funding challenges to the UN. Less than 20% of the $459 million needed to cover the relief effort had been disbursed by mid-august 2010 (Reliefweb, August 2010; PIFERP, August 2010). 12

13 CAUSES AND BACKGROUND General Causes and Background 1.1 BACKGROUND Located in the northwestern part of the South Asian subcontinent, Pakistan became an independent state as a result of the partition of British India in The separation from India was based on the idea that different ethnic Muslim groups, sharing one religion, should have their own country. However, despite efforts to unify Pakistan around an Islamic national identity, different groups claimed self-rule and triggered armed conflict. For example, East Pakistani Bengali s claims for autonomy led to war between the India-supported Bengalis on the one side and Pakistani forces on the other during 1971, and led to the creation of Bangladesh. India- Pakistan antagonism also affected Kashmir, a mountainous area to the north, where the two countries have clashed directly and through proxies on several occasions (Haqqani 2005). Thousands of people residing near the frontlines have been forced to flee, most recently in The need for peace currently guides the relationship between the two nuclear nations, and most of the IDPs in Kashmir (Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Kashmir) have returned home by Apart from Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Kashmir, Pakistan can today be divided into four regions: Punjab in the northeast, Sind in the southeast, Baluchistan in the southwest and the Pashtudominated northwest split into Khyber-Pukhtunkhwa (KP - called North West Frontier Province until April 2010) and Federal Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The latter region comprises the main focus of this country profile. Northwest, which is host to more than one million Afghan refugees (UNHCR, 2010), is by far the most affected by internal displacement. Thousands of people have been displaced by human rights abuses committed by militants in the course of their efforts to implement their interpretation of Islamic morality in their area of influence. Polarization between religious groups, including between orthodox Deobandi and moderate Hanafis or between Sunni and Shias has been ongoing since the 1980s. But clashes have intensified in recent years, displacing up to 100,000 people (CSIS 2009). Millions, moreover, have been displaced by army operations against various Islamic insurgencies since Baluchistan has been the site of several Baloch insurrections demanding a greater share of the profits from natural resources exploited in their province, development investment and integration with other Baloch tribes who live in eastern Iran and southern Afghanistan (The Indian, Jan The insurrections have been met with tough counterinsurgent measures, most recently in 2005, when an estimated 84,000 people of Marri and Bugti origin were displaced after the shelling of rebel areas. Tribal feuds over access to resources compounded the situation. So did simmering tensions between Baluch nationalists and Sunni radicals, who are believed to be a threat to NATO supply routes and forces in Afghanistan. The first section will discuss the causes of displacement in different parts of the country, including the factors which create an environment conducive to displacement and the actions which trigger displacement. The conditions accompanying displacement for the different groups of IDP will be compared in the next section. Then the process of finding a durable solution will be explored for 13

14 each of the main groups. An overview of the national and international responses finalize the country profile. DISPLACEMENT IN NORTHWEST Internal displacements have been recurrent in north-west Pakistan over the past ten years (AI, April 2010; PHRP, Feb 2010; IRIN, July 2009), the period covered in this country profile. The contextual description is divided into three geographical regions: Lower FATA, Central FATA and Upper FATA/PATA-KP. An analysis of the causes of displacement and measures to prevent displacement thereafter follows. LOWER FATA (South and North Waziristan) South Waziristan and North Waziristan comprise about 11,200 square kilometers and around 800,000 inhabitants (PHRP, Feb 2010). Afghanistan s Paktika and Khost provinces are in the west, Kurram Agency is in the north and KP districts Dera Ismail Khan district, Tank, Lakki Marwat and Bannu are to the east. Balochistan s Zhob is in the south. The main inhabitants of this region are three Pashtun tribes, Wazir, Mehsud and Daur. Insurgent groups in South Waziristan include Baitullah Mehsud s Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) - Student Movement of Pakistan (NA, April 2010; PSRU, April 2007; PSRU, September 2008; NAF, April 2010). North Waziristan insurgents are dominated by the Afghan-led Haqqani network and Hafiz Gul Bahadur s tribally- based group (NAF, April 2010; AEI, 2009). Local divisions in Waziristan The tribespeople in Lower FATA have a long-standing relationship with Afghanistan through relatives and as a safe haven for refugees. The area also was a training ground for Afghan mujahideen in the 1980s and, more recently, a base of support for the Taliban (NAF, April 2010). The condemnation of the US-led invasion of Afghanistan is widespread in the area. Two thousand Ulema, for example, have issued fatwahs of jihad against US forces and the Karzai government (PSRU, April 2007). US drone strikes, 70 reported between January 2008 and March which according to most estimates have killed nearly 5,000, one-third civilians - have moreover caused fury among the local population and stimulated recruitment to militant groups (CSIS, 2009). A September 2007 UN report estimated that 80 percent of all suicide bombers in Afghanistan pass through training facilities in North and South Waziristan (UNAMA, September 2007). Internal cohesion is strong in Waziristan, but there are also four important local divisions. First, competition between Wazir and Mehsud tribes over long-term local domination has led to occasional clashes between tribally based militias (lashkars). In 2007 for example, a 4,000-man Marwat lashkar levelled a Bhattani town, killing 80 people (The Economist, Dec 2006). Tribal law and enmity help explain both how an honor code s tit-for-tat logic can escalate into local conflicts and generate displacement (LWJ, 2009), and how ad hoc alliances are formed among tribes, the army and Islamist militants. Second, tribal authorities have been challenged by Islamic militants who are rooted in Pashtun societies and follow riwaj (local customs), but are opposed to tribal structures. These militants believe that the maliks (tribal leaders) understanding of Pashtunwali, the customary law of the Pashtun people (The National, Dec 2009), is an obstacle to establishing a Sharia-based legal system in the area. Local governance structures centered on councils (jirga) have not brought benefits to many people, and they have unleashed grievances among certain groups. In South Waziristan, for example, tribal leaders (maliks) and their family members received the salaries of the hospital staff as bribes. Teachers were paid without working, and hospital administrators drove ambulances for personal use (NAF, April 2010). The resulting frustration was exploited by 14

15 Islamic leaders who allied with disaffected groups to boost their network. Local tribesmen believed that the militants would reduce corruption, which they did. But TTP also enforced a strict code of conduct, a dress code and other norms, and harshly punished those who did not follow them (CSIS, 2009; PSRU, Dec 2007; Belfercenter, 2008). Government officials were harassed and tribal leaders (maliks) and pro-government clerics were targeted and killed. These practices and the resultant insecurity forced hundreds of families to escape to adjacent areas (ICG, August 2009, p.9). Third, militants fostered an anti-shiite ideology and organized attacks against minority Shiite communities. This led to a polarization between some Shiite and Sunni constituencies and prompted Shiite families to flee (PSRU, April 2007). Fourth, there are important disagreements between some tribal leaders and some militant groups around whether to shelter Uzbek and other foreign militants and whether to attack Pakistani targets in addition to US/NATO forces in Afghanistan. Fearing for the wellbeing of their people, local commanders killed Uzbek militants from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in South Waziristan in January 2007 (Dawn, April 2007), reducing the risk of army attacks. But other commanders conducted attacks against Pakistani troops and directed suicide attacks in Pakistani cities (AI, April 2010; HRCP, 2009 and 2010). These attacks, combined with US pressure, have prompted army retaliations and large scale displacement. Counterinsurgency operations and collective punishments After both attacking and negotiating with the insurgency in 2002 and 2003 (Asia Times, July 2004), 70,000 troops entered the Wana area of South Waziristan in March 2004 (AI, April 2004; The Nation, Feb 2004; Newsline, April 2004). They used light and heavy artillery against the insurgents and demolished hundreds of houses as they searched for and castigated alleged collaborators among the civilian population. Estimates of displacements vary from a few thousand to at least 30,000 (IRIN, Sept 2004; IRIN Aug 2004; Dawn, Sept 2004; BBC May 2002; Daily Times, Aug 2004; Al Jazeera, March 2004). After heavy casualties, the government pursued a series of peace deals with the insurgents (Newsline, My 2004; NAF, April 2010; NAF, April 2010; Dawn, April 2004). But the agreements broke down (SAIR, May 2005; PSRU, April 2007), triggering collective economic sanctions which affected whole communities. Six thousand shops, as well as private hospitals and clinics, were closed. Wazir tribesmen were randomly arrested (SATP, 2004; Dawn, May 2004). Renewed military action that involved the imprecise use of air force jets and helicopter gunships forced thousands to flee. But injured people were stuck in the conflict-affected area due to a lack of transport and guarantees of safe passage (Dawn May 2004). During July 2004, up to 40,000 Afghan refugees who had resided in the area for decades were given just 72 hours to cross the border into Afghanistan, and 30,000 local tribesmen fled with them (AFP, July 2004; ISN September 2004; NYT, July 2004). Following a spate of bomb attacks countrywide, including of the army s general headquarters in Rawalpindi, the military launched another ground offensive in October together with the collaboration of rival Islamist militias. This triggered massive displacement from Mehsud-areas. In early 2005, more military operations were followed by another negotiated settlement (Dawn, Nov 2006; PSRU, April 2007). Meanwhile, several smaller operations in North Waziristan in March 2006 made security for civilians unsustainable (COE-DMHA March 2006 and April 2006), leading thousands of people to flee as helicopter gunships pounded suspected militant positions in and around Miran Shah, the capital (NYT, March 2006; RFE, March 2006; HRW, March 2006; The News, March 2007). The army entered into peace deals with Bahadur and other groups in September 2006 and then again in 2007 (The News, June 2009). But when militants reneged on the latest peace deal (NYT July 2007), fighting resumed near Mir Ali, the second largest town in North Waziristan October 2007 (BBC, Oct 2007; Al Jazeera, Oct 2007). The air force bombed militant hideouts, but also hit 15

16 the Ipi village bazaar and nearby villages. The media reported that as many as 80,000 people fled the area (IRIN, July 2009; Dawn, Aug 2007; Daily Times, Nov 2007), that electricity and telecommunication systems were damaged and that around 30 civilians were killed by stray bullets and shells. Operation Earthquake (Zalzala) commenced in South Waziristan in January 2008 as the army dropped leaflets urging people to leave before security forces bombed the area (VOA, Jan 2008; Daily Times, May 2008). According to a military-led investigation, 4,000 houses were destroyed, 72 civilians killed and 200,000 locals forcibly displaced. This caused significant animosity (Dawn, Jan 2008 and Nov 2008; PIPS, March 2008). The army collectively punished entire towns accused of harboring militants, using bulldozers and explosives to level petrol stations, a market, and even parts of a local hospital (Guardian, May 2008; Fair and Jones, Jan 2010). Villagers were forbidden to return home, even though their wheat was rotting in the fields (Guardian, May 2008). After six weeks, a peace agreement similar to previous ones was signed (Dawn, May 2008), and the army withdrew. But suicide bombings continued and again the agreement broke down (Dawn, Feb 2005; BBC Feb 2008l; NPR, May 2008). Following an economic blockade of Mehsud-areas in South Waziristan (Dawn, Nov 2009), Operation Rah-e-Nijat - Path to Salvation began in the Ladha subdivision in June 2009 with bombing and shelling of suspected militant hideouts in Mehsud areas (Dawn, Oct 2009 and Nov 2009; The News, Nov 2009). At least 45,000 people fled preemptively by August (ICG, June 2009; Dawn, Aug 2009; AEI, Aug 2009; BBC, Oct 2009). In October, army ground forces - supported by Islamist groups - entered the Agency and clashed with Mehsud s TTP insurgents (CLAWS, Dec 2009). Hundreds of thousands of people fled combat between TTP forces entrenched in civilian infrastructure and the Pakistani air force. But up to 80,000 people were unable to leave. Hindered by militants, hindered en route by the fighting or by roadblocks, or simply too poor to pay for transport (The News, Oct 2009; Dawn Oct 2009 and Nov 2009), they remained behind under extremely difficult circumstances (ICRC, Oct 2009; BBC, Oct 2009; IRIN, Oct 2009). The International Commission of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (ICRC) reported that local health clinics received and treated 20 new patients with battle-related injuries every day (Dawn, Nov 2009). Others were killed by bombs as they tried to flee (IRIN, Oct 2009). Though journalists and aid workers were barred from entering the region, those who escaped from Mehsud villages reported in January 2010 that services were almost non-existent for the estimated 15,000 people who remained trapped. Local markets were not functioning, provisions were dwindling (AlertNew, Jan 2010), and the deteriorating situation was exacerbated by curfews, which prevented food, medical and other supplies from reaching the area. Meanwhile, the offensive set off indiscriminate, retaliatory bomb attacks by the Taliban, which killed more than 300 (BBC, Oct 2009 and Nov 2009; GEO TV, Nov 2009). While negotiations in May 2010 seem to have reduced the chances of armed confrontation (The News, May 2010 and June 2010; Pakistan Conflict Monitor, April 2010), an escalation of the operation in North Waziristan is not unlikely (The News, April 2010 and June 2010; Asia Times, April 2010, Dawn, April 2010). In July 2010, security forces told Wazir tribal leaders that they had to repel insurgents from their territory if they wanted to avoid military action against them (The News, July 2010). The Wazir, in return, demanded their own agency and more financial support (The News, July 2010). CENTRAL FATA (Kurram, Orakzai and Khyber) Central FATA is 6,500 sq. km. in area, with a population of around 1,250,000 (Rashid Naeem, March 2008). It borders Afghanistan s Nangarhar and Paktia provinces to the west, Peshawar Kohat and Hangu to the east, Mohmand to the north and North Waziristan to the south. Kurram is 45% Shia, consisting mostly of the Turi tribe who live in Upper Kurram, whose capital is 16

17 Parachinar (PSRU - Chadran, Sept 2008). The main access to Parachinar passes through Orakzai Agency, dominated by the Orakzai tribe, which also has a small Shia minority. Named after the important Khyber Pass, Khyber Agency, dominated by Afridi tribe members, lies to the north of Kurram and Orakzai. Grievances due to economic depression, corruption, and bad governance have marked Central as well as Lower FATA (Rashid Naeem, March 2008). Violence is sometimes explained by these factors as well as by other less visible causes, including family and land disputes and struggles for control over markets and trade (CSIS 2009). But while these may be underlying factors, sectarian conflict, rather than tribal or political issues, is the main driver of displacement in Central FATA (NAF, April 2010; PSRU, Sept 2008; NAF, 2010). Sectarian differences In Kurram, disputes over land and water resources between Sunni and Shi a tribes have occurred since the 1930s (Imtiaz Ali, April 2008). But hostility spread across the region during the1980s as Sunni groups gained strength with the influx of Afghan Sunni refugees and were bolstered by the funding of anti-soviet, Sunni militants. A major sectarian fight broke out in Sada, Lower Kurram, in 1987, and again in 1997 before tribal elders and religious leaders calmed the situation (ICG, 2005). Recent conflict in Orakzai is mainly between Sunni and Shia over the ownership of the Mir Anwar Shah Shrine at Kalaya, which both communities venerate (Terrorism Monitor, March 2009). In October 2006, a seven-day battle erupted between the two sects after Sunni hardliners tried to prevent Shias from visiting the shrine. The shrine was reduced to rubble, but the issue of ownership remained unresolved. In the meantime, edicts issued by both sides prohibited members of the other denomination from using their roads, splitting the agency into Sunni and Shia enclaves. Displacement in Khyber is driven by sectarian differences between competing Deobandi and Barelvi Sunni sects, and by army operations to control those groups and to secure the main route from Peshawar to Jalalbad through the Khyber Pass (AI, 2010 p. 20; ICG, 2005; NAF, April 2010; LWJ 2009). The principle rival sects in the agency since 2006 have been Lashkar-e-Islam and Ansar-ul Islam, the former extending its influence to Peshawar (Daily Times, June 2008). Advocating for the poor and marginalized and against the corrupt maliks, sect leaders have mobilized militias whose human rights abuses have displaced civilians since 2004 (ICG, 2005; NAF, April 2010). These struggles and the alliances the tribes make to protect themselves and win control over resources are important to understanding local, limited, displacements. But the bigger and more recent displacements are better explained by how insurgents have transformed the violence in the region by rallying Sunni extremists and sabotaging jirgas convened to manage sectarian conflict (PSRU, Dec 2007), as well as by the actions of the security forces attempting to control their influence. Transformation and escalation of conflict In Kurram, Shia collaboration with Western forces against al-qaida and their supporters and their stance against fleeing Taliban polarized Shia and Sunni communities and provided TTP with an excuse to attack (PSRU, Sept 2008; PSRU, Sept 2008; IHT, Jan 2007; The News, Sept 2008). After sectarian violence broke out in April 2007, killing more than eighty civilians (Dawn, April 2007; Daily Times, April 2007; NYT, July 2008), TTP insurgents burned down villages and killed dozens of Shia civilians in lower Kurram (Dawn, Dec 2007). They also enforced a blockade of Parachinar, the Shia capital, leaving its 55,000 inhabitants without critical food and medical supplies. This was in contravention of the prohibition on starvation as a method of combat (The News, Sept 2008; The Nation, Oct 2009; NYT, July 2008; AI, 2010 p.74). According to government sources, some of the moderate Sunni families in Parachinar, who had helped Shiites, were also attacked and forced to flee (NYT, July 2008). By 2009, much of the Shia population of 17

18 Lower Kurram had escaped to Upper Kurram while much of the Sunni population in the Parachinar area had escaped to Lower Kurram (NAF, April 2010). Others sought protection in adjacent areas or in Peshawar. Although tribal leaders signed the Murree agreement, which provided for the repatriation of IDPs and the delivery of food and medical supplies to affected areas (GEO TV, Oct 2008; Dawn, Oct 2008), the agreement was not implemented (ET, June 2010). In November 2009, the army unleashed a series of strikes in various parts of the Kurram, killing dozens of insurgents. Locals reportedly began to flee the intensifying military action (Dawn, July 2009). A local army commander said the main road to Parachinar, which had been closed for nearly two years, had been reopened (NAF, Jan, Feb 2010). Persuaded by security forces, Sunni and Shia leaders agreed to mend sectarian relations. They also agreed that tribal militias (lashkars) should control the region (Dawn, Dec 2009). But violence resumed in January 2010 (Dawn, Jan 2010). In July 2010, the commentator R.A. Toori wrote that the poverty in Parachinar was still extreme, that the hospitals lacked medicines, that the roads were blocked and that there was little communication with the outside world (ET, July 2010). In Orakzai, despite the presence of the security forces, militants ran a de facto parallel administration and judiciary. In 2008, for instance, an insurgency-led jirga ordered all NGOs to leave the agency and banned girls schools. They made public displays of punishment to force obedience on the population (LWJ, July 2008; ET, May 2010). They further stirred up sectarian violence in neighbouring Kohat and Hangu districts (Terrorism Monitor, March 2009). They expelled Shi a from fertile land and forced them to pay jiziya (tax on non-muslims). And they also expelled Sikh families (DT, April 2009; Zee News, June 2009). Since that time, displacements have soared as a result of army operations (LWJ, July 2008; Asia Times, July 2008; AP, May 2010; Sify News, March 2010). Some 40,000 Orakzai IDPs were registered in Kohat by September 2009 (McRAM, Jan 2010), and another 40,000 fled bombing in December 2009 (The News, Dec 2009). Since March 2010, severe shelling has forced thousands of residents to move to safer places, although men stayed behind to look after their homes, and the elderly, disabled and those without money to pay for transport were unable to leave (Jamestown, June 2010; DT, June 2010; The News, Nov 2009; Antiwar, April 2010; Dawn, Oct 2009 and March 2010 and April 2010). Others fled after TTP destroyed government schools and health centers. But yet another group was prevented by the TTP, intent on using them as human shields, from fleeing (FP, April 2010; Dawn, April 2010; ET, April 2010, Daily Times, April 2010 and May 2010). People faced immense hardships due to food shortages: Reports told of ghost towns where starving children scrounged for food, and a large number of the residents of Mamozai town were on the verge of starvation (IRIN, April 2010; The News, April 2010; Dawn, April 2010). In June 2010, despite the military s announcement of a successful conclusion of the operation in Orakzai Agency, local officials said that more than half of the agency was still controlled by TTP (Daily News, June 2010; Dawn, June 2010; ToI, June 2010). Since mid-2007, the Pakistani military has conducted five operations in Khyber Agency designed to relieve pressure on Peshawar and secure NATO supplies through the Khyber Pass against insurgent attacks (LWJ June 2008 and Nov 2009 and Feb 2010; NYT, Feb 2010). Resulting clashes have caused large-scale civilian displacement and casualties: Between 56,000 and 100,000 people fled the Bara area of Khyber Agency in just the first two weeks of September 2009 (The News, Sept 2009; IRIN Sept 2009; OCHA Sept 2009). Displacements escalated again in November and then in April 2010 after the army gave the population the choice of either combating the insurgency or fleeing (Dawn, April 2010). The Pakistani security forces admitted to having killed around 60 civilians in a bombing in the Tirah district on April 10th, 2010 (BBC, April 2010; Al-Jazeera, April 2010; The News, April 2010; Dawn, April 2010). Rival sectarian groups, meanwhile, resorted to the bombing of public spaces, killing scores of innocent civilians (Dawn, June 2010; NYT, Feb 2010). Insurgents who fled army operations in Central FATA began 18

19 patrolling FR Peshawar, prompting people to flee preventively (ET, May 2010 and June 2010). Several villages in the outskirts of Peshawar were empty as of March 2010, accounting for an estimated 40,000 IDPs (ET, June 2010). UPPER FATA AND PATA-KP (Bajaur, Mohmand and Malakand Agency) Upper Fata - Bajaur Agency to the North and Mohmand Agency to the South - has a population of around one million. The area borders Afghanistan s Kunar province to the West, and Malakand division of KP to the east. Utman Khel and Tarkani, the latter associated with Islamist insurgents, are the two main tribes in Bajaur while Mohmand is also inhabited by the Mohmand, the Safi and their sub-tribes. Upper FATA also struggles with governance, limited infrastructure and a weak economy (NAF, 2010). The enveloping poverty as well as a lack of employment opportunities for young men is possibly contributing to militancy in the region (NAF, April 2010). Swat Valley: backdrop of a provincial Islamist revolt Most of the displacement-affected areas outside FATA are also inhabited by Pushtun and lie within the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas in Khyber-Pukhtunkhwa (KP), one of Pakistan s four federal units. The territory is marked by the PATA Regulation which resembles the FCR: There is a concentration of judicial authority, executive power and revenue control, and a tribebased jirga entrusted with settling civil and other disputes (ADB, 2009). PATA-KP, in contrast with FATA, have enjoyed some government services and institutions as well as economic development (ICG, 2006). Tourism has been an important source of income in the Swat district along with exports of timber, precious stones and silk and a cosmetics industry. However, unemployment and a lack of access to land caused frustration throughout the 1990s, and the population resented the corrupt bureaucracy and inefficient judicial system (NAF, April 2010). This dissatisfaction, combined with sympathy for the Taliban s triumph in Afghanistan and labour migration to the religiously conservative Gulf States, help explain a rise in the support for Islamist parties and the implementation of sharia law (Rashid, 2000). But it was the US-led invasion of Afghanistan and attacks on tribesmen in FATA which propelled jihadist clerics onto the national stage. Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) - Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Law spearheaded this trend (NAF - Khattak, April 2010; Nasir, May 2006). Founded in 1992 with a PATA-based leadership, TNSM s sought to enforce Sharia law, which it achieved on a local level in coalition with political parties as early as After the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, the movement recruited 10,000 volunteers from PATA and Upper FATA to fight U.S. forces in Afghanistan. This led to its ban (ICG, March 2009; NAF, April 2010; NYT, Oct 2007; BBC, April 2008). After a brief decline, the group experienced a revival in the aftermath of the October 2005 earthquake when militants assisted homeless and displaced people. By 2007, TNSM had used radio broadcasts of sermons to mobilize up to 4,500 volunteers in its armed wing and establish control over 70 percent of the Swat District (NYT, Feb 2009). TNSM called for quick justice, job creation and the redistribution of property. The promise of land distribution attracted many followers, especially among the poor, who started to seize land from the local khans (rulers and landowners). The khans then fled the area in as TNSM targeted them for trials and killings (Asia Times, Feb 2009; Daily Times, May 2010; NYT, April 2009; News Weekly, March 2000). TNSM enforced a complete ban on music shops and internet cafes. Schools, especially for girls, were closed, and health and education personnel who did not obey their rules, were threatened or killed (IPS, Nov 2007; Dawn, Jan 2009). Amnesty International has documented how threats announced on FM radio broadcasts forced lawyers, judges, civil servants, police officers and their families to preventively flee to avoid execution (AI, April 2010). Security forces operations to control TNSM 19

20 The army, seeking to neutralize TSNM, carried out aerial attacks in Matta sub-district in Swat Valley in late October 2007 (Dawn, Dec 2007; BBC, Dec 2007), launching an all-out ground offensive in November (Daily Star, Nov 2007; IPCS, Jan 2009). Civilians were ordered by the security forces to leave. Others fled to escape artillery shelling (IRIN, Oct 2007 and Nov 2007; PSRU, Dec 2007). A KP government report in February 2008 found that 300 people, including 80 Pakistani security personnel, had been killed in the battles with the militants over the last 12 month period, and that nearly 600,000 people were affected directly or indirectly by the militants abuses and by the military operations (Malakand Times, Feb 2008; Kashmir Herald, Dec 2007; Buneri, Nov 2007; Dawn Dec 2007; Daily Times, Feb 2008). To prevent further bloodshed, an agreement was signed with TNSM in May 2008 (Daily Times, May 2008). The gist of the pact was that in exchange for the implementation of Islamic law in Swat, the Taliban would cease attacks on security forces. However, TNSM, which in late 2007 had formed an alliance with TTP after the clashes at The Lal Masjid - Red Mosque in Islamabad, withdrew from the talks. Clashes resumed (Dawn, June 2008). After intense fighting, which displaced several hundred thousand people (ICG, 2009 p.3; The News, Jan 2009) (although only 14,000 IDPs were registered), the movement established de facto control in a region extending from Matta sub-division in upper Swat valley to Kabal sub-division near Mingora. Another ceasefire, almost identical to previous ones, was formalized in the Sharia Nizam-i-Adl Regulation - Order of Justice Act - announced in February 2009 (Nizam-e-Adl Regulation, 2009; Daily Times, Feb 2009; The News, April 2009; Dawn, April 2009). Shortly afterwards the militants expanded their territory into other districts. By mid-april they had taken over Buner, Lower Dir and Shangla, coming within 100km of the capital Islamabad (Dawn, April 2009; BBC, April 2009; NYT, April 2009; WP, April 2009). The army launched a counterattack in late April Local residents were told in advance to vacate their areas. But, as in previous military operations, the suddenness of the assault did not give civilians time to leave safely and the absence of government-provided transport compelled IDPs to travel far on foot (ICG, June 2009 p.2). Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of people were unable to flee because of military-imposed curfews, and attacks by heavy artillery, helicopter gunships and jet fighters as well as the threat of militants who planted landmines and used civilians as human shields (AJ, April 2009; Dawn, May 2009; Reuters, May 2009; HRW, May 2009). Others lacked resources to pay for transport, were too infirm, or simply unwilling to leave despite the risks of staying behind. Those trapped by the fighting faced power outages, shuttered hospitals, schools, banks and shops and severe shortages of food, medicine and water (HRW, May 2009). Between May and mid-july 2009, nearly 2.5 million people fled to Peshawar, Mardan, Swabi, Charsadda, Nowshera, and other Pakistani cities to live in camps, with relatives, or in rented houses. Although the military did not compile data on civilian casualties, scores of civilian deaths were reported, and much property was destroyed by Pakistani air attacks and artillery shelling (Guardian, May 2009; The News, May 2009; ICG, June 2009 p.9). Nearly 1,300 militants were killed, according to the army, and troops claimed they were in full control of Swat as of July 2009 (NAF, April 2010). But in spite of these assurances, several recent threats, as well as killings of community leaders and suicide bombings, suggest that Swat still simmers (Daily Times, May 2010). Though hundreds of thousands of IDPs started to return home, some were displaced again upon arrival in their home district (RFI, June 2010). In May 2010, a tribal jirga, supported by the army, forcibly displaced insurgents relatives to pressure the insurgents to surrender (Reuters, May 2010; Daily Times, June 2010). But by making families and relatives accountable for crimes committed by the TNSM, the jirga and army risked polarising society and radicalizing the fighters even further (Daily Times, May 2010). Human rights abuses and armed clashes in Bajaur and Mohmand TNSM s expansion in Bajaur and Mohmand unfolded in a similar manner (NAF, April 2010). Helped by the US invasion and more recently two failed US bombings of Damadola town in Bajaur in January 2006 and May 2008, which killed 80 and 20 civilians respectively, TNSM s 20

21 leadership exploited outrage (BBC, Oct 2006; Dawn, Oct 2006; Daily Times, May 2008; HRW, 2007). The militants in Bajaur, led by TNSM deputy Maulvi Faqir Muhammad, coopted jirgas and imposed Sharia law and order (TI, July 2008; Daily Times Nov 2007). In Mohmand, Omar Khalid s armed militants emerged as a major social force in By mid-2008, they had established their own courts and ended the tribal jirgas in Safi Tehsil. To counter the expansion, the security forces gave the tribal authorities an ultimatum: either expel the Taliban or leave themselves (Daily Times, May 2007 and Nov 2008). In October 2008, a jirga, in response, decided to form a lashkar in Salarzai tehsil of around 30,000 people. The lashkar torched houses of suspected militants and imposed a one million rupee fine on anyone found sheltering TNSM and their allies, generating tension between tribes who live in the area (CSM, Sept 2008; Dawn, July 2009). The army, nonetheless, decided to enter Bajaur in mid-2008 (NYT, Sept 2008; TI, Oct 2008; Daily Times, Feb 2006 and Oct 2008). IDPs fled to avoid being caught in the crossfire or left behind in devastated villages and farmlands (WSWS, Aug 2008). Reports of civilian deaths - including of women and children who died during flight - sparked protests among the IDPs (Daily Times, Oct 2008 and Nov 2008). Various ceasefires, followed by an army push for return, were rejected by the IDPs (Dawn, Sept 2008). But in February 2009, TNSM-ally Maulvi Faqir, arguing that IDP suffering was unsustainable, declared a unilateral cease-fire (The News, Feb 2009). Ninety-five civilians had been killed according to government sources, but the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan argued that the number was higher (The Australian, Oct 2008; NYT, Nov 2008). Half a million people were displaced. An assessment of the military operation in the two agencies found 5000 homes and hundreds of small businesses, as well as hospitals, clinics, schools, and vital water supplies, destroyed (WB/ADB, 2009; IRC, Oct 2009). The government declared victory and proceeded to sign a 28-point agreement with the leading tribes that required the tribes to lay down their arms and stop supporting the insurgents (Daily Times, March 2009). But TTP resumed its iron-fisted rule (Daily Times May 2009 and June 2009 and July 2009; The News, Jan 2010; Dawn, Oct 2009). The bombing continued, and militants and security forces alike took up positions in houses, schools, madrassas and mosques, making it impossible for locals to re-establish a sense of normalcy (Daily Times, Nov 2009; Dawn, Oct 2009). Despite appeals for the IDPs to return, displaced leaders announced that they would not leave the relief camps until the government enforced Sharia law in the agency (Daily Times, March 2009 and April 2009). In late January 2010, the security forces commenced another series of operations in Bajaur with the support of Salarzai Lashkar (Daily Times, Jan 2010 and March 2010; Dawn, Jan 2010). Again they declared the area safe for returns. But IDPs, who initially hoped calm would return quickly to Bajaur, remained skeptical as renewed fighting forced 4000 IDPs to flee by foot (IRIN, Feb 2010; Daily Times, June 2010; Dawn, Feb 2010). In Mohmand, different peace deals also failed (LWJ, May 2008). After armed men hijacked a convoy carrying supplies to international military forces in Afghanistan, the army launched an offensive in November 2008, displacing over 175,000 people (AI, 2010 p.55). In May 2009 a commander surrendered, allegedly because of humanitarian concerns for the IDPs (The News, May 2010). By September 2009, the army was claiming it had cleared 80 percent of Mohmand of insurgents, except in strongholds along the Afghan border. Early 2010 witnessed renewed fighting in Mohmand agency. And in June 2010, large numbers of tribesmen left their homes in the Baizai tehsil and began moving to safer places as helicopter gunships pounded militant positions in Matti, Suran Darra and Gora Parhi (Epaper, June 2010; The News, June 2010; Dawn, June 2010). 1.2 CAUSES OF DISPLACEMENT 21

22 Conflict and human right abuses have induced displacement in the northwestern border areas of FATA and PK for at least six years, but this trend has accelerated since Only some displacements are well documented. Local conflicts, for example, are difficult to understand and attract little interest. Contextual factors include cross-border effects from Afghanistan; clashes between (para)military and militant groups; sectarian violence defined along Sunni-Shia or Barelvi-Deobandi lines; clashes between Islamist militias and tribal lashkars and between rivaling lashkars; threats and assassination of civilian leaders (maliks, members of the political opposition, government officials); forced recruitment; extortion and destruction of commerce/livelihoods (mines, collective sanctions enacted by GoP, closure of shops as well as market bombings by militants) and destruction of social services (schools, health clinics). In Lower FATA, local conflicts between the tribal leadership and Islamic contenders have displaced an unknown number of people over the past ten years, as have human rights abuses committed in the name of Islamic morality. However, the main cause of displacement, accounting for at least 600,000 people, has been the security forces counter-insurgency operations. These are conducted in tandem with some Islamic groups against other Islamic insurgents, in particular TTP. The economic blockades of Mehsud areas and systematic destruction of Mehsud property that have accompanied such operations also have caused displacements, though the number is unknown (Dawn, May 2008 and Nov 2008; Daily Times, May 2008). An unknown number of people have fled within Central FATA to escape from sectarian clashes during this decade. Tens of thousands Shia escaped from Lower to Upper Kurram and tens of thousands of Sunni have fled from Upper to Lower Kurram since Thousands of people, mainly Shia and Sikhs, also fled from economic extorsion in the name of the Taliban. Hundreds of thousands have left Central FATA altogether, either because of the economic blockade of Shia Parachinar district, or more importantly, after sectarian violence become endemic with the arrival of militant insurgents and their subsequent targeting by Pakistan s army and air force. Human rights abuses committed by TNSM s followers enforcing a strict moral code led to displacement in Upper FATA and PATA-KP in the early 2000s. Working women, government officials, politicians, shop owners, teachers, health workers and their families were particularly hard hit. In 2007, TNSM broke up regional feudal structures, forcing most of the landowning elite to flee (WP, Jan 2008). Meanwhile, the TNSM used force to establish themselves as an alternative leadership to tribal elders in Upper FATA. The families and sympathizers of tribal leaders were displaced during this process. In late 2007, Pakistan s security forces responded by launching a series of operations intended to eliminate TNSM as a threat to national security, reinstate the feudal structure in KP and resurrect the tribal jirga as an institution (CTC Centinel, Jan 2008 and NAF, April 2010; Daily Times, May 2010). The clashes between insurgents and security forces displaced up to 4.5 million people between 2007 and PREVENTION OF DISPLACEMENT At least 1,565 civilians were killed in insurgent attacks alone in FATA and NWFP in 2009 (AI, 2010 p.7). This figure is in the same range as civilian killings in all of Afghanistan in Moreover, the fact that there were ten times more displaced people from just one area of Pakistan in just one month than in the whole of Afghanistan during several years suggests that the modalities of armed conflict are definitive. International Law obliges the state and other armed actors to take every necessary measure to avoid displacement. Principle 5 of the Guiding Principles on Forced Displacement (Guiding Principles - GP) states: all authorities and international actors shall ( ) prevent and avoid conditions that might lead to displacement of persons. (BI, 2008) 22

23 Amnesty International has documented how different militant groups human rights abuses, including indiscriminate bombings of markets, roads and other public spaces, directly led to the displacement of a high number of people protected by International Humanitarian Law (hors de combat) in FATA and PATA-KP (AI, 2010 p.41). This displacement was clearly in breach of the principle of distinction, which prohibits acts of violence against IDPs who do not participate in hostilities. Hundreds of members of the Awami National Party (ANP), for example, were targeted after some of its officials helped form lashkars (tribally-based self-defense groups) in PATA-KP in According to international humanitarian law, it is lawful to attack military objectives. But the displaced ANP activists were not legitimate military targets. Displacements, in this case, could have been avoided simply by upholding due process and prohibitions against extrajudicial killings. The formation of tribal lashkars and other self-defence groups has nevertheless been a central tenet of the Government of Pakistan s (GoP) prevention strategy in northwest Pakistan where the army, unwilling to fight for the US in FATA, is seen as an alien force (FA, March 2010; CLAWS, Dec 2009). The security forces have consistently exploited local divisions and negotiated with tribal leaders to coopt and control groups that challenge the writ of the State (IDMC correspondence with CLAWS, May 2010). In order to prevent major clashes and displacements, the security forces have urged tribal leaders in FATA to form tribal lashkars to control local insurgents and expel foreign fighters from their villages and towns. They have warned them of military operations if they fail to do so. In other words, they must organize lashkars or flee (Dawn, April 2010; The News, July 2010). Some tribes have obeyed the army. The Wazirs, for example, expelled the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan from South Waziristan in Salarzai Lashkar has been instrumental in the counter-insurgency strategy in Bajaur (NAF, April 2010; Raman, 2007; PSRU, April 2006), while others have formed lashkars on their own initiative only to become part of the insurgency themselves (The News, March 2010). From an international humanitarian legal perspective, the systematic formation of lashkars is problematic. This is because it blurs the distinction between combatant and non-combatant and involves civilians in counter-insurgency operations which unnecessarily put them at risk of being killed. In most cases, moreover, the tribes have been unable or unwilling to uphold their commitments, and the security forces, despite the lashkars, have end up talking directly with the militants or directly attacking them (LWJ, April 2008 and May 2008). Peace Agreements have been forged with local strongmen on a number of occasions both in FATA and in KP. Proponents say this has prevented displacements and further bloodshed (Dawn, April 2009). However, in a number of instances, the peace deals have failed. The security forces have then proceeded to collectively punish tribes. As observed by the analyst Haider Ali Hussein Mullick, the army relied on "out-terrorizing the terrorist up through the summer of 2008 (FP, July 2009). The Mehsud people in South Waziristan have been severely affected. In early 2004, the authorities closed 6000 shops, as well as private hospitals and clinics, and randomly arrested Wazir tribesmen to pressure insurgents to surrender (The News, March 2004 and July 2004; Rediff, April 2004; PSRU, April 2007; Dawn, May 2004; NYT, July 2004; IRN, Aug 2004; Dawn Sept 2004). In January 2008, the army arbitrarily displaced 200,000 people from Spinkai, systematically leveling the whole town, including homes, schools, shops, healthcare centres and parts of the hospital. It also prohibited the villagers from returning to their fields for the harvest (Daily Times, Nov 2007 and May 2008; Dawn, May 2008; Guardian, May 2008; Dawn, Nov 2008). In 2009, the army again imposed an economic blockage of Mehsud areas, forcing people to flee to access food (Dawn, Nov 2009). Even so, the community was collectively prohibited from using the main roads (Dawn, Oct 2009; The News, Nov 2009). According to the International Crisis Group, on 14 June 2009, the Political Agent of South Waziristan issued a general order of arrest for any Mehsud person. The order also called for confiscating any property belonging to a Mehsud in FATA and KP (WP, July 2009; OCHA, Oct 2009). As a result, people were prevented from fleeing. And thousands of Mehsud families were confined without food, medical and other supplies until January 2010 (Dawn, Nov 2009; Alertnet, Jan 2010). 23

24 Similar measures have been employed in other parts of FATA. On June , the political agent of Khyber tried to confiscate all the property of two Afridi tribes (Daily Times, Jan 2007). During 2008, in Mohmand Agency, the political agent reportedly attempted to prevent people from fleeing by declaring that he would arrest all family members of IDPs who did not return to their home areas (ICG, June 2009, p.9). Collective punishments to pressure insurgents have also been used recently against the Hamzoni tribe in North Waziristian, Amadzai Wazir tribe in South Waziristan in July 2010 and even in Swat, where the children and wives of insurgents were forcibly displaced in May 2010 (The News, July 2007; Reuters, May 2010; Daily Times, May 2010). In April 2010 in North Waziristan, wheat flour, a staple food, was unavailable. Local traders attributed the situation to a ban imposed by the administration on flour shipments into the agency. If this were true, it would constitute a breach of the ban on starvation as a method of combat. This ban is expressed in customary international humanitarian law rule 53, which applies to noninternational armed conflicts (The News, July 2010; Daily Times, April 2010). The targeting of civilians to sap the will of insurgents may in some cases have been successful. In 2008, rivaling Orakzai groups signed the Murree agreement in part to end the suffering of IDPs (GEO TV, Oct 2008; Dawn, Oct 2008 and May 2010). Concerned about IDP suffering, TNSM-ally Maulvi Faqir declared a unilateral cease-fire in late February 2009 (The News, Feb 2009; ABC News, Feb 2009). And Mohmand Commander Yar Said also alleged that the suffering at the relief camps had motivated him to stop fighting (The News, May 2010). But according to the International Crisis Group, the military s use of heavy force, its displacement of thousands of civilians, and its subsequent failure to protect people and allow humanitarian access to conflict zones has been counter-productive (ICG, June 2009 p.1-2). This analysis is echoed by CSIS which alleges that the use of force alienated the population and made local youth gravitate towards radical groups (CSIS 2009). The inability of the security forces to protect the population after military operations also makes it more problematic to argue that short-terms humanitarian costs are justified by long-term security gains (FP, July 2009; FA, March 2010). The Frontier Crimes Regulation s Chapter IV has commonly been invoked as a legal basis to justify collective punishments. But basic human rights and international humanitarian law put a limit on the reach of national legislation. Supported by customary international humanitarian law Rules 129 and 130, Guiding Principles 6 states that every human being shall have the right to be protected against arbitrary displacement from his or her home or place of habitual residence (BI, 2008; ICRC, Customary Law Database). This prohibition explicitly rules out displacement as a collective punishment (BI, 2008 p.34-36). Humanitarian law provisions, according to the authoritative ICRC, furthermore prohibit attacking civilian property, starving civilians as a method of warfare, destroying objects indispensable to their survival, and carrying out reprisals against civilians and civilian property since violations of these rules by parties to a conflict often cause civilians to flee their homes (ICRC, Oct 2009). Guiding Principles 7 obliges governments to ( ) ensure that all feasible alternatives are explored in order to avoid displacement altogether. Where no alternatives exist, all measures shall be taken to minimize displacement and its adverse effects. Apparent breaches of this provision have been documented by Amnesty International which has demonstrated that, during military confrontations, militant insurgents positioned themselves in civilian residential areas, significantly increasing the risk to civilian lives and property. In some instances, this amounted to taking IDPs hostage -- conduct explicitly prohibited by Guiding Principles 12.4 and international customary law, rule 96 (BI, 2008 p.58-61; ICRC, Customary Law Database). During operations in Bajaur in August 2008, and again in South Waziristan in October 2009, for example, the Taliban stopped people from fleeing incipient or ongoing fighting. The Taliban did this because they believed they would be less susceptible to attack if civilians remained. However, during its investigations, AI also found that in many cases the army took insufficient care to protect civilians and subjected them to indiscriminate or disproportionate force (AI, 2010 p 52). 24

25 Rather than involving the civilian population in the formation of contingency plans both to reduce the risk of displacement and the negative impact of displacement, the security forces have often acted unilaterally, taking both combatants and civilians by surprise. Vulnerable groups have been severely impacted. In April 2009, for example, the army seems to have avoided indiscriminate shelling of Mingora, the main town in the Swat valley. But other villages reported indiscriminate shelling. Similarly, during operations in Mohmand, the security forces failed to take precautions to avoid and minimize damage to the civilian population, and ensure that attacks were proportionate (AI, 2010 p.51-55). Basic services were disrupted to affected communities during the crisis, and civilian infrastructure, including schools, mosques, community halls and playgrounds were all damaged by bombing and shelling, according to a UN study (CERINA, 2009 p.32). For sources and citations, please consult IDMC's Pakistan library page 25

26 IDP FIGURES AND REGISTRATION General IDP Figures and Registration IDMC estimates that the number of IDPs late July 2010 is in the range of 1,470,000-2,000,000. In April and also in July 2010, the official figures were 1.4 million (UNOCHA, July 2010). But the number is probably higher. WHO reported 1,968,000 in April 2010 (WHO, April 2010). Indeed, under-registration would suggest that real numbers are 25-50% higher than the official figures (UNOCHA, March 2010). Up until late 2008, few conflict-induced IDPs were registered and there are few reliable estimates. Most calculations are based on the census of the area where displacement took place or inquiries by the press with local authorities from displacement-affected areas. Nonetheless, the following approximate figures have been obtained: 30-50,000 IDPs from Wana district in South Waziristan in early 2004; 80,000 from Mir Ali town in North Waziristan in October 2007; ,000 from Swat in late 2007, ,000 from the Darra Adamkhel area in South Wazirsitan in January 2008 (FATA Secretariat, April 2009; The News, Dec 2009), and ,000 people who sought protection from the fighting in Swat in These few examples amount to 910,000-1,430,000 IDPs between 2004 and 2008 and give a rough idea of the scale of internal displacement before the official figures skyrocketed in 2009 (IDMC, 2010). Source: IDMC In 2009, however, the flow of IDPs from Upper FATA and later PATA prompted the Government of Paskistan (GoP) to take action and a registration process was designed with the support of UNHCR. The Social Welfare Department (SWD) and Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees (CAR) carried out an initial registration of IDPs for host families and camps, respectively. The 26

27 National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) - a federal body responsible for issuing National Identity Cards (NICs) to Pakistani citizens - then verified the registry according to criteria established by the army (Special Support Group) in consultation with provincial and national authorities (The News, Dec 2009). To qualify for registration (and through that, humanitarian assistance), the displaced had to prove that they were residents of areas notified, by the security forces, as being in conflict. Registration was thus tied to geography and time rather than needs (NPR, Oct 2009). By late August 2009, of an estimated total population of million in Upper FATA and PATA- KP, NADRA verified 5,610,000 IDPs (748,000 families) (WB/ADB, Nov 2009). Of these less than half (43%) fulfilled the criteria (PHRP, Feb 2010; The Nation, July 2009). According to NADRA, 39% of the families registered multiple times and were thus cancelled, 6% were rejected because the head of the family could not prove his origin with a national identity card (NIC), and 5% were not from the notified areas (Daily Times, July 2009). In Lower FATA, the authorities registered 430,000 IDPs from 59,000 families by November 2009 (The News, Dec 2009), but 46% were declared ineligible. The most important reasons for declaring ineligibility were multiple registrations followed by lack of a NIC. People from the Wazir and Bitani tribes were initially not allowed to register, a decision modified months later (UNHCR, Jan 2010; The News, Dec 2009). NADRA claims that its verification process made one unified list possible and prevented scarce assistance from being distributed to non-eligible families (Dawn, June 2009; The Nation, July 2009). But some IDPs were not verified (UNOCHA, July 2010). According to the Regional Institute of Policy Research and Training, of the three million people who were displaced in KP, roughly 25 per cent remained unregistered by January A Multi-Cluster Rapid-Assessment Mechanism (McRAM) undertaken March 2010 in Kohat, showed that 57% of the IDPs there had not been registered (UNOCHA, March 2010). A door-to-door registration of IDPs outside camps in Hangu carried out by the Pakistani Red Crescent (PRC) in April 2010 counted 122,000 IDPs, 55% higher than the official figures at that time (UNHCR, Jan 2010; WHO, Jan 2010; ICM, Jan 2010). Lack of NICs made registration difficult. Since a NIC was required upon registration the authorities had difficulty reaching citizens they had not reached in the past, according to the International Crisis Group (ICG, June 2009 p.4). According to McRAM s assessment, 51% of the total and 85% of internally-displaced women did not have a computerised NIC (UNOCHA, March 2010). In the event that the male head of the household died or disappeared, women-headed households 4% of the total according to one assessment - thus faced problems (Save the Children, July 2009; Dawn, Jan 2010). The authorities, nevertheless, extended the provision of NICs to this group. More than 18,000 women in FATA and 65,000 in KP received their NIC from NADRA that way (PHRP, Feb 2010 p.6). Insufficient registration sites, combined with scarce information about the registration process, was another obstacle (The News, April 2010; Dawn, May 2009 and Oct 2009 and Dec 2009; GEO, Oct 2009). Infrastructure was not set up in many areas. Kohat and Hangu lacked registration facilities until late 2009 and there are still no facilities within FATA (Dawn, Oct 2009; IPS, Jan 2010; The News, Dec 2009). IDPs from Orakzai and Kurram living in Peshawar had to go to Kohat and Hangu to register until April IDPs outside the camps, almost 90% of the total, were initially only registered when they sought assistance or during door-to-door assessments. And the lack of separate counters for women discouraged registration for womenheaded households (The News, March 2010). Registration at the Jalozai camp was halted from November 2009 to February 2010 because of lack of space (The News, Dec 2009 and Feb 2010 and March 2010). Security, moreover, has been a significant challenge in some areas. In one instance, Orakzai IDPs blocked the main road to protest against mismanagement, but locals forced them to open 27

28 the road at gunpoint (The News, April 2010). Risk of sectarian violence in Kohat during the annual 60-day Moharam religious gatherings prompted the Kohat administration to not accept new IDPs (WHO, Jan 2010; ICM, Jan 2010). Threats to public officials that were attributed to Islamic insurgents have on occasion brought a halt to registration (AI, 2010 p.42), and a suicide attack at Kacha Pakha camp in Kohat prompted closure and later procedural adjustments to ensure security for the IDPs and for public officials (UNOCHA, April 2010). Political interests can sometimes influence the data. The inability to assist all the IDPs, combined with public resentment over army operations, may sometimes induce local political administrations into minimizing the figures. For example, a week after a military operation started in Orakzai in November 2009; only 7,700 people were displaced according to the local government. However, independent sources insisted that the real numbers exceeded 70,000 (Dawn, Dec 2009; The News, Dec 2009). On the other hand, NGOs, agencies and local authorities may also have incentives to exaggerate the number of IDPs so as to attract more funding and assistance (Dawn, May 2009 and Jan 2010). Sources: PHRP, AI, OCHA, UNHCR, IDMC Area of Origin Total Accumulated IDP population July 2010 Population displacements South Waziristan 430, , ,000 More than 300,000 North Waziristan 361,000 More than 80,000 Unknown Kurram 448, , ,000 More than 100,000 Orakzai 225, , ,000 More than 200,000 FR Peshawar 54,000 40,000 Up to 40,000 Khyber 547,000 70, ,000 Up to 80,000 Mohmand 530, , ,000 Up to 200,000 Bajaur 949, , ,000 At least 150,000 Swat 1,811, , ,000 Up to 360,000 (Jan 2010) 2,100,000-2,600,000 Lower Dir 1,039,000 Buner 768,000 Upper Dir 777,000 Thousands Unknown Shangla 620,000 Thousands Unknown North-west 4,200,000-5,200,000 More than 1,400,000 TOTAL 7,500,000 Balochistan 6.6 million Up to 300,000 40, ,000 Azad K. 1.5 million Thousands Less than 5,000 40,000 Gilgit-Baltistan 2.8 million 25,000 More than 18 million 4,600,000-5,600,000 1,470,000-2,000,000 TOTAL IDP POPULATION MOVEMENTS AND PATTERNS 28

29 IDP Population Movements and Patterns Where people go and for how long is decided by incentives which push or pull them to go in one direction and hold them from going elsewhere. External factors such as humanitarian assistance, military roadblocks and insurgent threats play important roles. So do family deliberations, risk strategies, social networks and personal calculations related to wins and losses. This section lays out some of the issues. Demographic data from the areas where displacement took place suggest a gender balance before displacement. The average family size is for the purpose of this profile 8.5 persons in FATA, 7.5 in KP (FATA MICS, 2009; CSIS, 2009 p.17). A Save the Children (StC) assessment from KP found that 70% of IDPs were living in joint households of up to 5 to 6 families, and 30% were living in a nuclear setup. Ninety-six percent of households were male-headed and 4% female-headed, suggesting that the best part of IDP families stayed together (StC, July 2009 ; CERINA, 2009 p.53). Sixty-seven percent and 75% respectively of the general population in FATA and KP are 19 years or younger (FATA MICS, 2009). In absolute terms, displaced children are in the majority, representing more than 60% of the total according to UNICEF (UNICEF, May 2009 and Dec 2009 p.2). But there is no clear overrepresentation of any gender or age group among the IDPs, although anecdotal evidence suggests fewer elderly IDPs, perhaps because they were unable or unwilling to leave their homes. Only 5.5% of FATA s population lived in urban areas before recent displacements (FATA MICS, 2009). The relative urban/rural divide among IDPs is uncertain, but it is safe to assume that the majority of IDPs hail from rural areas and are displaced to semi-urban or urban areas. Available data indicate that displacement caused by ethnic and sectarian violence in Central FATA forced family groups to move within the region to areas controlled by their own tribe or religious denomination. Over time, communal polarization forced whole communities to move, creating (semi) permanent segregated communities. The displacements of Shia communities from Lower to Upper Kurram and Sunni communities from Upper to Lower Kurram are examples of this. Those who fled army operations in South and North Waziristan in also sought protection in nearby villages or FATA agencies (AI, April 2004; The News, Dec 2009; IPS, Jan 2010). However, as militant insurgents took control of larger areas of FATA and the security forces escalated their counter-insurgency operations, displacement from one tribal agency to another became untenable. The army required people to move away from the Afghan border to areas with a better state presence and control capacity. Most IDPs thus fled into adjacent districts to the east and to larger cities further away, leaving large swaths of the Pakistani side of the Afghan-Pakistan border depopulated. Source: UNOCHA, May

30 Displacements have become more protracted as warring parties extended their territorial dispute beyond specific areas and more communities were impacted by the armed conflict s polarizing effect. Few of the displaced Mehsud that reached Karachi after fleeing South Waziristan in 2004 and 2008 or Tank and Dera Ismail Khan in 2009 have gone back, and displacements in Central FATA as well as Mohmand linger. Growing tensions between different displaced groups and between displaced groups and host communities make local integration unrealistic in some places. But the trend is not uniform. A UN April 2010 survey shows that half of the Peshawar IDPs had been displaced for less than one year (UNOCHA, July 2010). People displaced from Khyber to Peshawar city in late 2009, later returned to Khyber or moved elsewhere. Indeed only 2% of the households surveyed by the UN were from that Agency (IRIN, Sept 2009). While the magnitude of the 2009 displacements from KP was huge, the displacements were brief; within four months two-thirds had returned home (FA, March 2010; Daily Times, Aug 2008; IRIN, Oct 2009). So although access to work and some basic services pull IDPs to urban areas and lead to urbanization, the power of these opportunities to keep Pashtun IDPs from going home is not yet clear. The majority of IDPs left in larger groups after getting instructions from the army or the village jirga (IDMC Interviews with IDP leaders in Hangu, July 2010). But they generally preferred to remain in smaller groups where privacy is acceptable rather than in camps, hujras and school buildings which lack mechanisms to ensure purdah (honor) for women and girls (The News, Dec 2009; The News, April 2010). The freedom of movement, as contemplated in Guiding Principle 14.2, is de facto restricted unless adequate measures are taken by camp managers. Nevertheless, camps are an important alternative when all other options are exhausted. In January 2008, when the army set up relief camps at Kari Wam in the Frontier Region of Tank, for 30

31 example, those who could not afford to rent a place, resettle with relatives farther away or find some other alternative, went to army-run camps (Dawn, Jan 2008 and May 2008 and Nov 2009; Daily Times, May 2008). While less than 2% of Kurram and Orakzai IDPs stayed in camps in Hangu and Kohat as of April 2010, more recent influxes indicate that host communities have become saturated and more IDPs are being forced to seek shelter in camps. Some particular areas and ethnic groups are overrepresented among displaced people. The Mehsud from Lower FATA and Afridi tribes and Shias from Central FATA are some examples. Repeated military operations demonstrate that the time-span between official warnings of imminent operations and actual fighting is insufficient to allow people to flee safely. This has led more people to flee preventively since mid Different than reactive displacement, preventive displacement tends to split families. Women and children flee while it is still safe, while men stay behind until the situation gets direr (IDMC interview with IDP leaders, Orakzai June 2010). Preventive displacements also allow people to plan everything from transport and rental rates to education and employment opportunities, and are preferred by those who have resources. According to media reports, only the poorest and most vulnerable are unable to leave preventively: they will only take the risk of fleeing when they absolutely have to. The most vulnerable people thus do not have the benefit of planning their displacement or fleeing in a relatively safe manner (IRIN, April 2010; Dawn, April 2010; The News, Dec 2009). Assistance in KP during 2009 and 2010 pulled IDPs towards some areas. Fleeing to adjacent districts to the east has some advantages since many FATA residents have migrated to one of these areas before in search of seasonal work: 13% of all South Waziristan families did so in 2006 (FATA MICS, 2009). Some FATA residents even have relatives who live in those areas permanently, thus making it easier for them to find shelter and work during displacement (IPS, Jan 2010). But not everyone benefits from these advantages. Kurram Shia IDPs, for example, have found that sectarian tensions are also present in adjacent Hanku (IRIN, Feb 2010), and have chosen to go to Peshawar. As of June 2010, 30% of all the IDP households in Peshawar originated in Kurram (NYT, July 2008). Criminalization and the stigma of some tribes from Lower FATA, particularly the Mehsud, have meant that it is increasingly difficult to find accommodation in the neighboring districts. Many people from these tribes resettled in Karachi to avoid tensions with the local population (IRIN, Oct 2009 and Nov 2009; The Nation, Oct 2009; Dawn, Nov 2009). Mehsud people have also been displaced on several occasions, and have begun to seek alternatives further away. This may prove more sustainable in the long term (IRIN, Nov 2009; AlertNet, Jan 2010; ET, June 2010; PHRP, Feb 2010 p.90). However, those who sought protection further away have faced obstacles. Fearing the impact on their security, a deterioration of inter-provincial relations and economic stresses, as well as demographic and cultural alterations, the other three provinces opposed the mass influx of IDPs in 2009 (The News, May 2010). While some politicians defended the right of IDPs to move freely within Pakistan, nationalist parties, above all in Sindh, called for blocking IDPs (Dawn, Aug 2008; IPS, June 2009). They assumed that Pashtu IDPs would only travel to other provinces if they had friends and relatives who could provide shelter and basic support. Hence they were concerned that large groups would stay, become part of a growing Pashtu minority and alter the ethnic balance. As a result, restrictions were put on IDPs who wanted to move away from the region, particularly to Punjab (Dawn, June 2009). Camps were set up near the main roads in Sindh and IDPs were forced to register, thus enabling the security forces to control the population (FA, March 2010; Dawn, May 2009). The right to freedom of movement and freedom in choosing one s residence as put forward by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 12(1) and reiterated in GP15 was thus arguably forfeited on grounds related to national security and public order (BI, 2008 p ). 31

32 PHYSICAL SECURITY AND INTEGRITY General Physical Security and Integrity 4. PHYSICAL SECURITY AND INTEGRITY Internal forced displacement has its origin in violence or threats which generate a perception of insecurity. This section looks at security issues for IDPs during displacement, i.e. from the moment a person is compelled to leave his home due to armed conflict or human rights violations. Since IDPs share a conflict-effected space with other civilians, they risk being caught up in explosions near roads and public spaces in areas targeted by insurgents or by US drones. This profile focuses on threats which particularly are related to their displacement. The most insecure moments of displacement for Pakistani IDPs are at the outset and oftentimes at the end if the IDPs attempt to return to their place of origin. The Pakistani government, with some exceptions, is in general terms capable of creating a relatively safe environment for IDPs in their areas of refuge. But the route can be very dangerous. During the Swat operation of early 2009, Human Rights Watch (HRW) and ICG documented attacks on fleeing civilians that included army shelling and aerial bombardments. Civilians, moreover, were summarily executed by the insurgency or arbitrarily affected by antipersonnel mines (HRW, May 2008; The News, May 2009; ICG, June 2009 p.9; Daily Times, April 2010; Dawn, Oct 2009; BBC, Nov 2009; Reuters, May 2009). Military operations in South Waziristan showed the same pattern of extreme risk for IDPs. In one incident, 12 members of a fleeing family were killed by a bomb (IRIN, Oct 2009; Dawn, Nov 2009). Attacks on IDPs hors de combat are prohibited by international customary law and Geneva Convention IV, and execution is explicitly prohibited in Guiding Principle 10.2 (BI, 2008 p.45-52). The insurgency, the security forces and political leaders have restricted the movement of IDPs with curfews during the initial phases of displacement. They have imposed control mechanisms in places of displacement and even resorted to de facto confinement of larger groups (AlertNet, Jan 2010; FA, March 2010; IPS, June 2009). The insurgency-driven blockage of Shia Muslims in Kurram had disproportionally high humanitarian costs in comparison to any reasonable military gains (AI, Oct 2009). It is unclear, however, if confinements have always been the result of a deliberate strategy or just bad planning. In April 2009, instead of designing measures which would allow people to stay in their own villages or facilitating safe areas which would enable short-distance displacements (ICG, June 2009 p.4), the army compelled people from Swat, Shangla, Buner, Lower Dir and Malakand Agency to settle in comparatively peaceful districts of Peshawar, Mardan, Nowshera and Charsadda (MsF, Jan 2010; PHRP, Feb 2010 p.21-22; FA, March 2010). But many people were unable to flee to safety due to hostilities, the imposition of curfews, and checkpoints (CERINA, 2009 p.21). The head of the government's relief operation stated in May 2009 that up to 200,000 civilians were trapped by the fighting; Amnesty International estimated 700,000 (Reuters, May 2009; NYT, May 2009). Only after several days of fighting did the authorities relax the curfew briefly to allow thousands of people to flee, often on foot (ICG, June 2009 p. 3, Dawn, May 2009). While it is doubtful that the authorities fulfilled their commitment to provide transport that would allow civilians to move to safer areas, the resulting confinement effect was probably not premeditated. 32

33 The risk of random attacks is significantly reduced upon the IDPs arrival at their place of refuge. But since most IDPs escape from insurgency controlled areas, they faced the suspicion of belonging to the enemy. The army assumed that combatants were hiding among the IDPs, and vented that suspicion publicly, urging local residents to be wary (NYT, May 2009). During the anti- TNSM operations of late 2007, the police searched for militants in camps and in the places where displaced families were staying- a pattern which was repeated in and a number of Taliban were apprehended (Dawn, July 2010; SSG, 2009; Daily Times, May 2009). The search for insurgents generated tension with IDP communities. These organized demonstrations to halt what they perceived as harassment. But the protests were brusquely brought to an end by police, spurring further discontent and providing an opportunity for Islamist parties, in opposition since 2008, to denounce state abuses (Daily Times, March 2009). TTP-associated Mehsud IDPs from South Waziristan were not allowed to live in camps which authorities said were too dangerous. Instead they had to register with host families who would then be considered complicit in any eventual crime committed by the IDPs (AI, Oct 2009; AI, April 2010; IRIN, Nov 2009; ICG, Oct 2009). Some of the host residents of Dera Ismail Khan and Tank, where most Mehsuds sought protection, soon adopted the same position. Petty crime and more serious acts of terror, including included a Peshawar market bomb which killed at least 100 people on October 28, 2009, were rumored to be the responsibility of the IDPs (ICRC, Customary Law Database). As a result, IDPs were excluded from accessing basic services and felt criminalized (IRN, Oct 2009; AFP, Oct 2009). Peace and security are chief priorities for the IDPs, but the capacities of law enforcement agencies is undermined by insurgent attacks affecting lives, equipment, buildings and morale (CERINA, 2009 p.43). Shia families displaced from Orakzai Agency to Hangu district in 2009 said they felt unprotected living alongside Sunni IDPs and hid in their homes to remain anonymous (Reuters, Feb 2010; IRIN, April 2010). By 2010 the tension increased as new waves of displaced people from Orakzai and Kurram approached Kohat. Host community leaders were warned by local authorities to watch out for bombers among the displaced, and this generated fear among the local population. On April 17th, 2010, two suicide bombers, dressed in burkas, detonated just minutes apart at the Kacha Pukha camp for internally-displaced people, killing at least 42 IDPs who were queuing to collect food rations. This was a violation of GP10 which prohibits attacks against IDP camps (IRIN, April 2010; BI, 2008 p.120). Local police commanders confirmed that the suicide bombers targeted members of the Mani Khel and Baramad Khel tribes, whose leaders had agreed to form lashkars to support the security forces in their war against the Taliban (LWJ, April 2010; Daily Times, April 2010). While returning IDPs face the risk of retaliatory attacks in areas where militant networks remain active, systematic negotiation with the leadership of IDP communities to form lashkars as a condition for return put people at extreme risk. An IDP from the Orakzai-Kurram border reported in January 2010 that when people of Tanday Kalay village agreed to collaborate with the security forces, militants destroyed the homes of jirga elders and forced 165 families to flee to save the lives of women and children (Globe.Net, Jan 2010). After Mehsud leaders succumbed to government pressure to form a lashkar upon their return home, a pamphlet directed at the tribal leadership warned the members of the Mehsud tribe from South Waziristan not to return (PTI, Jan 2010; ET, May 2010; Dawn, April 2010). The formation of lashkars will be more thoroughly discussed under durable solutions. 33

34 BASIC NECESSITIES OF LIFE General Basic Necessities of Life 5.1 BASIC NECESSITIES OF LIFE The Universal Declaration of Human Rights - as well as other human rights instruments - states that all people have the right to a standard of living adequate for their health and wellbeing. This includes the right to food, housing, clothing and medical care. The Guiding Principle 18 sets a minimum standard for the provision of basic necessities for internally-displaced people. This section examines the extent to which IDPs effectively enjoy an adequate standard of living as measured by their access to the abovementioned commodities. Different IDP groups in Pakistan have different needs. Even those who come from the same community may not share the same needs and views. After fleeing marginalized rural areas to more populated areas with better public services, some IDPs enjoy better access to these services than they did in the places they came from. The nature of some goods, such as water from a public well, is non-discriminatory: IDPs access these services to the same extent as the resident population (ET, June 2010). On a general basis though, based on CERINA, we can observe that around 10% of displacement-effected households are concerned about their access to food and up to 11% from Bajaur are worried about the availability of health services. Water, shelter and clothes seem to be less pressing issues (CERINA, Nov 2009 p. 26). But there are great differences among IDPs, depending on their resources and their places or origin. 34

35 Source: CERINA 2009 FATA IDPs who lack means to escape to safer areas outside FATA and who, moreover, lack the resources to flee until it is absolutely necessary, have presumably less access to most of these basic services. Anecdotal evidence suggests they suffer from severe malnutrition, resulting from scarcities of food and clean water, as well as high rates of mortality due to the absence of medical services (Dawn, Oct 2009 and Nov 2009; AlertNet, Jan 2010). In adjacent hosting areas, IDPs rely primarily on their own savings and their own labor. A study undertaken by Save the Children (StC) in early 2009 showed that the median Buner IDP household savings stood at 648$ - sufficient to cover minimum needs for some time. This is in stark contrast to the situation of many of those who fled Orakzai in 2010 who struggled to pay for basic services at arrival (StC, July 2009; OT, 2009). The second reliable source of support for IDPs comes from host families. Within FATA, almost 2% of the most vulnerable groups, such as widows, the destitute and orphans, receive zaka(alms giving, one of the Five Pillars of Islam) on a regular basis. This is an important social safety net (FATA MICS, 2009 p.42). Melmastia (hospitality) is also a central tenet of Pashtunwali. It includes giftgiving and the feeding of strangers and is of such importance, according to Haefi, that the Pashtun very rarely require the services of the national government. In cases of crisis, one can turn to kinship and, if necessary, the larger cultural group (LWJ, 2009; CFR, Dec 2009; The National, Dec 2009). Until late 2008, when systematic state and international assistance to conflict-induced IDPs began (WFP, Feb 2007; Dawn, Jan 2008), host communities provided food and shelter to the displaced (IRIN, Aug 2004 and Sept 2004; Daily Times, Aug 2004). 35

36 Source: CERINA 2009 By mid-2010, however, coping strategies became over-stretched (CERINA, 2009 p.46). Living conditions for both host families and IDPs outside the camps had deteriorated to the point of being worse than conditions in official camps, according to the UN (PHRP, 2010). Private space, sanitation and food were particularly limited (CERINA, 2009 p.23). CERINA found that displacement, moreover, had eroded the social fabric and led to deteriorating family relations and inefficient safety nets (ICRC, 2009; ICRC, Sept 2009). Third, state assistance policies and complementary international agency services can also be vital. After registration, verification, distribution of food and non-food items, interestingly, the GoP provided cash cards to each IDP household (The Nation, June 2009 and July 2009; IPS, Jan 2010; UNHCR, Jan 2010). By early 2010, 309,000 households of Upper FATA and PATA-KP had activated 25,000 rupee cards (US$ 275), and 11,000 families from Central FATA and 20,000 families from Lower FATA had received cash cards worth 5,000 rupees (US$ 55) (Dawn, Nov 2009; SSG, 2009; UNHCR, Jan 2010; Dawn, Dec 2009; The News, Dec 2009). 5.2 FOOD AND WATER The IDPs, the families who remained in the crisis areas, as well as the host families all reported reduced food stocks as a result of the displacement crisis (CERINA, 2009 p.52). The food insecurity in Upper FATA and PATA-KP, for example, rose from 28% in early 2009 to 40% a year later. Women and children were particularly impacted due to unequal food distribution practices. Four out of 36

37 every five households surveyed by CERINA said that they could get along for less than two weeks without assistance (CERINA, 2009 p.41). Food prices, meanwhile, increased. Curfews, high transportation costs, insecurity and destroyed agricultural infrastructure all contributed to inflation. Wheat prices - already higher in FATA than in the rest of the country - more than doubled from 2007 to 2009, according to a World Food Program (WFP) market price study. For Pakistan s vulnerable households, that on an average spend 70% of their income on food, rising unemployment and economic recession further reduced food availability (UNIAM, July 2008; WFP, Dec 2008 and May 2009). In response, the World Food Program distributed monthly household rations to up to 2.7 million IDPs throughout 2009, with an increased focus on returnees at the end of the year (WFP, Nov 2009; The News, Feb 2010; UN News, March 2010; UNOCHA, May 2010). ICRC distributed food to 51% of all the IDPs from Kurram and Orakzai agencies from December 2009 (The News, April 2010). The Pakistani army reported in late 2009 that it had ensured a sufficient supply of clean water and had distributed 6,600 tons of rations and relief goods to IDPs of Waziristan. Significant efforts, notwithstanding, many IDPs were still in urgent need of food and water. While registered IDPs received food, unregistered IDPs relied on other sources: Analyst Farhat Taj pointed out that registered IDP families shared their food with unregistered relatives, diminishing their personal rations. The IDPs protested on a number of occasions against corruption, discrimination between different groups of IDPs, and insufficient food rations (News, Sept 2009 and March 2010; Daily Times, April 2010; AI, 2010 p.77; Reuters, April 2010; Dawn, June 2009 and July 2009). 37

38 Difficulties, notwithstanding, the prevalence of malnutrition and severe malnutrition among internally displaced children in camps in 2009 was 7.8% and 2.3% respectively, higher than the prevalence among resident households, but relatively low by international standards. This means that many IDPs in KP were accessing the right to food (UNICEF, May 2009; FATA MICS, 2009 p.25). Overall nutritional indicators within FATA, as measured in 2006, were consistently worse, particularly among boys (FATA MICS, 2009 p. 25). Given that a cross-section of FATA residents fled during , these data suggest that IDPs are better off than they were before displacement, plausibly because of the positive impact of humanitarian aid (PHRP, Feb 2010 p. 64; IRIN, April 2010). Coverage has been better outside FATA than within FATA which is inaccessible to international actors. Within FATA, state food supplies have been marginal. 38

39 Moreover, collective sanctions have compounded the difficulties for displacement-impacted communities in accessing food (SSG, 2009). In April 2010, traders in North Waziristan reported that flour was in short supply and unavailable in many places due to an economic blockade on flour transportation to the agency. Displaced families living in the agency, which had fled their fields in South Waziristan, relied wholly on the food given by others (Daily Times, April 2010). 5.3 HEALTH AND SANITATION Pre crisis base line conditions in the Swat and Buner districts and Bajaur agency indicated that the health system was struggling to deliver adequate services to the population (CERINA, 2009 p.45; CAMAJ, Oct 2009; WFP, Feb 2007). But things got worse with the crises. Efforts to immunise 350,000 children against polio in Pakistan s Swat Valley were put on hold during the displacements in late 2007 (IRIN, Oct 2007). The Asian Development Bank Post-Conflict Needs Assessment calculated the damage to health facilities in Malakand Division and in Upper FATA at 29% and 16% respectively (WB/ADB, 2009 p.37). While many communities depended on surface water before displacement, 20% of the displacement-impacted communities lost access to clean water due to destruction of wells (PHRP, 2010 p.80), insecurity (BBC, Dec 2009; Daily Times, Feb 2010) and the displacement of health specialists to neighboring districts (USAID, Sept 2008; CFR, Aug 2008). ICRC and Medecins Sans Frontiers (MsF) reported that civilians wounded in fighting, including IDPs fleeing battle-impacted areas, faced an extreme risk of death as they tried to reach medical facilities (Reuters, June 2009). The pressure on existing health services in IDP reception areas was also noteworthy. In April 2010, an assessment in Hangu district found that the number of women in child bearing age rose by 40%, there were more than 8,000 persons per doctor and availability of essential drugs insufficient to cater for the IDPs (ICM, Jan 2010). As a result, medical care for displaced people in host areas remained deficient (IRIN, Dec 2009). Restrictions on free movement of women negatively affected their access to health services, as well as their children s health (CERINA, 2009 p.45; IRIN, May 2009 and Dec 2009; ACT, June 2009). While access to IDPs right to medical care and attention is an established right in customary international humanitarian law Rule 110 (BI, 2008 p.89-91), it is clear that a high proportion of internally displaced people did not access adequate health services in camps, outside camps, in FATA near areas of displacement or outside FATA further away. That said, discrimination against IDPs has not been documented, nor is it clear that access to health is worse than prior to displacement. In 2007, for instance, before the most dramatic displacement crisis, infant, child and maternal mortality rates remained 10-20% higher in FATA when compared to other parts of the country, particularly was the mortality rate 39

40 for young boys very high (FATA MICS, 2009 p.32-33; IRIN, Dec 2009). While immunization coverage in Hangu and KP stood at 45-50% after displacement, only 36% of the children aged 1-2 years were fully immunized in FATA before the major displacements took place. Antenatal consultations were five times higher among the total IDP population than that among the general population in FATA in 2007 (IRIN, Dec 2009; FATA MICS, 2009 p.35). With high numbers of people living in overcrowded camps, buildings and homes, poor sanitation and soaring temperatures there is a real prospect of epidemics. The Islamabad-based NGO Network for Consumer Protection claimed formula milk had been distributed in camps which could further put children at risk of diarrhea (IRIN, Sept 2009). But the risk of epidemics has largely been managed; few cases have been registered among the IDP population as a whole (PHRP, Feb 2010 p.16). For the IDPs and displacement affected communities in Upper FATA and PATA- KP, there are no overall statistical data on morbidity; acute respiratory tract infections is the leading cause of morbidity followed by acute diarrhea in children less than 5 years age (MoH/WHO, Jan 2010 and June 2010). The Pakistani Health Authorities with the support of the World Health Organization and other health actors, coordinated some 500 health facilities, in the IDP camps, receiving around 600,000 patient consultations per month in the displacement affected areas (MoH/WHO, June 2010). To relieve the pressure on civilian facilities, army field hospitals have also provided medical assistance, attending 123,000 patients by November 2009 (SSG, 2009). 5.4 APPROPRIATE CLOTHING Whereas appropriate clothing is essential to survival (Protocol II, 1977), CERINA suggests that IDPs access necessary clothing. Needs however, vary with the seasons. IDMC s Still at Risk documents how children developed heat rashes and other skin problems due to extreme heat and absence of adequate clothing during the harsh winters can be fatal (IDMC, June 2010). UN agencies have responded to those needs through the distribution of winterization packages (quilts, blankets, warm clothing, pillows) (IRIN, Dec 2009; OCHA, March 2010; UN News, March 2010). Other items necessary for a household seem more pressing. By March 2010, 449,000 IDP households had received non-food kits which contained tents, blankets, buckets and other utensils (IPS, jan 2010; UNHCR, Jan 2010; OCHA, Jan 2010). 5.5 SHELTER AND HOUSING 23,000 houses were destroyed during the crisis in Bajaur, Mohmand, Swat, Buner and Dir; one out of every twenty houses overall and as high as one for every eight houses in Bajaur (ADB, 2009 p.54; IRIN, Jan 2010). The provincial government of KP established 34 IDP camps in nine districts (Peshawar, 40

41 Charsadda, Nowshera, Lower Dir, Upper Dir, Mardan, Swabi, Buner, and Malakand) (PHRP, Feb 2010 p. 29, 58), accommodating displaced communities from distinct home areas (ICG, June 2009 p.2). Accommodation has not always been adequate, in part resulting from bad planning and in part from the protracted situations in Mohmand and Bajaur, and because of the importance of seclusion for women. Indeed, the dishonor associated with camp life prompted TNSM to threaten to burn a camp set up by Red Crescent late-2007 and a Mohmand-commander to declare a ceasefire in 2009 (IRIN, Nov 2007; The News, May 2010; Dawn, Nov 2009)! As of May 2010, IDPs from Bajaur, Mohmand and Khyber agencies account for 94% of the camp population, but as IDPs trickled homewards, camps closed down (OCHA, July 2010). By July 2010, 95% of the IDP camp population lived in Jalazai camp. During the flood in August 2010, damaged roads and bridges have made access a problem. Access to the Jalozai camp, for example, with a population of over 100,000 IDPs, was cut off for three days after a main bridge linking the camp was destroyed (The Nation, August 2010). More than 85% of the IDPs in KP stayed in school buildings, mosques, private homes and other sites where (ICG, June 2009 p.2), according to UNHCR, people were already living in crowded conditions, with several families living in one compound (IPS, Jan 2010). Because both hosts and IDPs practice a degree of gender segregation, adequate provision of shelter is especially challenging. Women, girls and infants who lack secluded areas for example, are often forced to remain inside, sometimes in scorching heat (ICG, June 2009 p.5). Source: UNOCHA Pakistan Humanitarian Update 15, may

42 IDPs from Central and Lower FATA rely almost entirely on private housing arrangements. By April 2010, the sole relief camp in Hangu district accommodated less than 4,000 people, and no other accommodation was facilitated to the hundreds of families who arrived on a daily basis (Dawn, Dec 2009 and April 2010; OCHA, March 2010). Barely 0.1 percent out of the up to 200,000 IDPs from South Waziristan in January 2008 was sheltered by the army (ICG, June 2009; IPS, Jan 2010). With increased demand, private accommodation became expensive. In Swat late 2007, rent skyrocketed during the military operations against TNSM (IRIN, Nov 2007). In Kohat, 90 percent of IDP families rented accommodation, generally paying 60 US$ (5,000 rupees) for one room, according to an UN-led assessment (McRAM) (The News, Dec 2009). In Tank and Dera Ismail Khan the prices quintupled in six months (IRIN, April 2010; The News, April 2010). While before displacement, 30% of the FATA population lived four or more persons per room (FATA MICS, 2009 p.32), seven crowded into one room after displacement (OCHA, March 2010; ET, June 2010). Host communities provide shelter to the vast majority; the IDPs live in rented housing or private homes if they can. But while camps are undignified in the opinion of some (OWSA, Feb 209; The News, Feb 2010), Farhat Taj observed in April 2010 that more people were considering moving to the camps because they could not afford the high rents or did not wish to become a burden on their relatives who are also poor (Daily Times, April 2010). The UN also expects a population movement from host families to the camps during 2010 provided that the host communities are already exhausted and the IDPs paying rents to the host families are running out of resources (PHRP, Feb 2010). The 36,000 tents that UNHCR has distributed among verified displaced families from South Waziristan may come very handy. Rental subsidies or alternative solutions might also be necessary for the IDPs to access shelter (UNHCR, Jan 2010). 42

43 PROPERTY, LIVELIHOODS, EDUCATION AND OTHER ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS General Property, LIvelihoods, Education and other Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 6.1 LAND AND PROPERTY Different tribes commonly own the land in the areas of origin. The land ownership system - based on occupancy without written documents - is quite complex and often leads to conflicts among the tribes. Indeed, UN/GoP Early Recovery Priority Interventionsurvey demonstrated how disputes related to various entitlements to land and water were the most common source of conflict in these areas before the main waves of displacement took place (CERINA, 2009 p.54, 63). Source: CERINA 2009, p.63 Internal displacement, moreover, has affected the regulating role of local authorities in at least four ways. First, the influx of large numbers of people from other areas has fuelled competition over scarce resources, leading to an overall increase in poverty. Second, due to the mixing of populations following displacement, local authorities have had to manage the conflict of interests between different tribes for which customary tradition (pashtunwali) offers limited guidance. Third, IDPs having lost most of their resources cannot compensate wronged families where there has been conflict as in the past, leading in some situations to revenge rather than resolution between IDPs and their hosts. Finally, militants have to a certain degree replaced the traditional leaders trained to uphold customary law, leading to decisions that disrespect both communal urges for restitution and international human rights. Asset transfer from the displaced population to other civilians or members of the armed groups is common in armed conflict and is why the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement addresses both protection and restitution of land entitlements (BI, 2008 p ). The case of the Swat Valley is instructive. Asia Times Syed Saleem Shahzad and other reporters observed how TNSM investigated claims of feudal lords wrongdoings and punished a number of khans, prompting others to flee. The subsequent re-distribution of land previously held by the rural elites won TNSM support among poor people (Asia Times, Feb 2009; NYT, April 2009 and Aug 2009). Yet, the media reported in 2010 that the incipient redistribution of land-holdings had been reversed after the army intervened in 2009 and the Khans returned (Daily Times, May 2010). This is one example of how the property of IDPs has been protected. 43

44 The illegal and temporary land reform in the Swat Valley is a good example of how property issues were a motor for change in northwest Pakistan. But there are other examples in which there was no resolution for the original landowners. Well over 350,000 houses with complementary land have been abandoned by displaced families over the past two years (ADB, Nov 2009; CERINA, 2009). Many of the houses were destroyed by shelling and bombing; in the worst cases, civilian property was made the object of reprisals. Other properties were taken over by insurgents and rival sects motivated by economic gain: Shia and Sikh communities in Orakzai, Central FATA, were in 2008 and 2009 forced to pay up to 15 million rupees (1650 US$) in taxes or abandon their properties (Dawn, Jan 2009; The Guardian, May 2009; ICG, June 2009 p.2). In contrast, in Lower FATA, where land is abundant, land grabbing is not a major concern (FATA MICS, 2009). The IDPs are entitled to access their property again, or if that is impossible, receive compensation. GoP with the support of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the World Bank (WB) and donor governments, have estimated the cost of rebuilding and restitution in Upper FATA and PATA-KP. But that process is yet to happen. Other property issues relevant for IDPs include how widowed women can inherit land and become landowners. Sharia law, unlike Pashtunwali, grants women inheritance and property rights and could be the better alternative for displaced women who seek to improve their livelihoods (The Economist, March 2006). 6.2 EDUCATION It is a vital prerequisite for combating poverty, empowering women and controlling population growth. In the case of displacement, where children are removed from a relatively safe and familiar environment, education can protect children from forced recruitment, exploitative labor and sexual exploitation (UNESCO, 2010; FATA MICS, 2009 p.37). Schools and other buildings dedicated to education are protected by international humanitarian law and students and teachers may not be attacked unless they take part in hostilities (UNESCO, 2010). But school grounds in northwest Pakistan have arguably become part of the battle field. On July , some 300 people, mostly students, were killed when security forces stormed Islamabad's Red Mosque and an adjacent school, where scholars and students had been campaigning to enforce Sharia law (IRIN, Oct 2007 and Dec 2007). The US bombed madrasahs suspected of hosting al-qaeda associates in Damadola town in Bajaur in January 2006 and May 2008, killing 80 and 20 civilians respectively, and in Miran Shah killing 23 (Dawn, Oct 2006; AI, Nov 2006; NYT, Sept 2008; The News, Oct 2006). Similarly, militants have been notoriously opposed to the public education system, particularly for girls. All girls schools in Bajaur were either destroyed or closed by mid In North and South Waziristan, 180 girls schools were shut down. In Orakzai Agency, Shia schools have been the direct target of sectarian attacks (Ansari, 2009). Schools have also been converted into bases for both the army and the insurgency. UNESCO s Education under Attack documents a number of cases in Waziristan, Orakzai and KP where boys were trained and recruited from religious schools to become suicide bombers. Returning families often see their children s schools occupied by soldiers (UNESCO, Feb 2010; CRIN, Feb 2008; CSUCS, 2009). According to the Department of Education, 950,000 students, roughly one-third of them girls, were enrolled in the public school system in Malakand Division, Bajaur and Muhmand before the displacement crisis. This was almost matched by those enrolled in madrassahs (CERINA, 2009 p.32). In FATA, less than one third of children aged six to ten attended school before displacement (FATA MICS, 2009 p.31-32; AI, 2010 p.10; GoP, 2006). With this dire panorama as a backdrop, the displacement crisis affected education in many ways. But two issues are of particular importance. 44

45 The first concerns the damage to educational infrastructure. Due to the mass influx of IDPs, 4,830 schools were converted into emergency shelters. Once vacated, these schools required repairs to make them usable for students (PHRP, Feb 2010 p.29). In the five affected KP districts, about 8% of school facilities, moreover, were damaged by the belligerents (WB/ADB, 2009; AFP, April 2010; The News, Jan 2010). Fifty-six percent were damaged by the insurgency - which often informed the teacher by a letter and bombed the schools at night - and 44% were damaged by shelling or bombing during operations by the security forces or during floods (CERINA, 2009 p.32). In Waziristan, 100 schools were burnt down by the insurgency in 2007 and 2008 (Times, Dec 2008). In absolute terms, boys and girl schools were equally affected. But, in relative terms, girl schools were the worst hit. Boys schools Girls schools Total schools attacked fully damaged partially damaged Source: WB/ADB: 2009; CERINA 2009 The second issue involves insecurity and reduced mobility, including threats by militants against students, teachers and school management, particularly affecting women and girls (The Independent, Jan 2010; IRIN, Jan 2010; TI, Jan 2009). Concerned for the security of their daughters and the cost of the mandatory burqa, parents started to withdraw their children from school during the Swat-clashes in late 2007 (IRIN, Oct 2007). The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) reported that the number of girls enrolled in schools in Swat had fallen from 120,000 in 2005 to 40,000 in 2008 (PHRP, 2010 p.21). The Pakistan daily, The News, reported in January 2009 the Taliban s readiness to enforce a complete ban on female education in the Swat district affecting some 40,000 girls. But a TNSM spokesperson denied this, stating that all children should be given religious and then scientific and technological education (The News, Jan 2009; Gulf News, Jan 2009). Nonetheless, at least ten schools which did not comply with the ban were destroyed (Dawn, April 2009; Dawn, April 2009; al Jazeera, April 2009). Teachers were forced to flee the area and parents to pull their daughters out of school. Two-thirds of IDP parents, queried in a UN survey, stated that schools were not safe enough for their daughters (CERINA, 2009 p.32; PHRP, 2010 p.21). As a result, despite having repaired more than half of the damaged schools (UNOCHA, Oct 2009), secondary school enrolment in Mohmand Agency was down to an alarming 3.5 percent for boys and 0 percent for girls by 2010 (NAF, April 2010). Pakistani authorities thus failed to guarantee children their right to education in the most severely affected areas. Likewise, insurgents failed to comply with their obligation under Additional Protocol II 4.3(a) to provide children an education, including religious and moral education, in keeping with the wishes of their parents (Protocol II cited in UNESCO 2010 p.38) Of even greater concern and in contravention of Guiding Principle 23.2 and Guiding Principle is the failure, with few exceptions, to ensure better education to more displaced children in camps and outside camps after the immediate lifesaving operation has finished and in areas where the fighting has ceased (IRIN, March 2010; BI, 2008). National and local authorities, as well as NGOs and UN Agencies, struggled to secure en environment which would enable displaced children to attend school on a regular basis. While we lack data on net school enrolment for displaced children outside camps, 16,000 displaced children in camps attended school in March This is at most 20% of the total number of internally displaced children who lived in camps at that time (UNOCHA, March 2010). UNICEF, 45

46 moreover, warned in April 2010 that it could be forced to shut down the camp schools because it was running out of cash (VOA, April 2010). IDP camp education was also more gender unequal than in the home areas before displacement, and there were concerns about educational quality (Daily Times, April 2010). Girls made up only 5% of the children in a middle school in a Peshawar-camp, for example (CERINA, 2009 p.38). But, given that the IDPs who reside in camps are the least resourceful of the IDPs, the enrolment among that particularly vulnerable segment of the population might have been even lower and even more gender unequal before displacement. School attendance for displaced children outside camps and for some host family children has probably been even lower as a result of several factors. These include the occupation of schools buildings, the interruption of the school year by displacement, the excessive burden placed on existing public and private schools, and school-related expenses (CERINA, 2009 p.38; PHRP, 2010 p.57). IDMC s Still at Risk (IDMC, 2010) points out that returnee children face many of the same obstacles. Coverage for internally-displaced children from Waziristan may be less than 2% (SSG, 2009). The International Crisis Group believes that internally-displaced children who do not attend school may be recruited to study at madrasahs by militants and, through this mechanism, get involved in insurgent activity (ICG, June 2009 p.5-7; IRIN, March 2010). 6.3 WORK AND LIVELIHOOD OPPORTUNITIES AND COPING STRATEGIES Agriculture is the backbone of the economy in both KP and FATA. Over 80% of the displacementaffected population is dependent on agriculture as its main source of livelihood. In FATA, agriculture is the primary occupation of nearly 100 percent of the population, and is mostly below subsistence level (CERINA 2009 p.31; FATA MICS 2009 p.17, 42-45). Livestock farming, a responsibility of women, is also a major source of livelihood (WB/ADB, 2009; PHRP, 2010 p.28, 43). But one-third of the animals covered by a Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) assessment were lost. This was because abandoned animals died or were slaughtered by fighters or sold at 10-20% of their market value. Abandoned crops also were lost and seeds remained unplanted as the displacements dragged on (MoFA/WFP, Feb 2008; PHRP, 2010 p.46). Since landholdings are small, people in displacement-affected areas also complement their income with non-farm activities, particularly in KP and Upper FATA. These activities include tourism, manufacturing, trading, mining, construction, handicrafts, shopkeeping, carpentry and daily labour (CERINA, 2009 p.46). But the crisis also affected these livelihood sources. Damage to the manufacturing sector and loss of equipment as well as disruption of trade was reported, and markets were dysfunctional even in areas where the worst fighting had ended (ACT, April 2010; IRIN, Dec 2009; AI, 2010 p.11). As a result, an assessment in Swat conducted in August 2009 revealed that 82% of the households in displacement affected areas were more vulnerable than before the displacement which took place four months earlier. The average income had fallen 75%, and half the households were heavily indebted (PHRP, 2010 p.63). Debt is also a major concern among displaced families from Central FATA (IDMC interviews with IDPs in Hangu, June 2010). Despite the IDPs coping skills the IDPs lost many of the resources they had before the crisis. Twenty-eight percent of internally-displaced family heads were unemployed at the moment of registration, according to NADRA. Fifteen percent were associated with agriculture; 10% worked as private servants; 9% owned a private business, and 5% were in government service whereas 21% were unclassified (WB/ADB, 2009). In other words, almost two-thirds were unemployed or day laborers while many worked on others lands or as street sellers. Monthly income per displaced household drastically decreased. CERINA found that while 76% of the households earned more than 6000 (66 US$) before the crisis, only 18% earned more than that after displacement. Sixty-seven percent earned less than 1000 (US$ 11) per month. 46

47 Source: CERINA, 2009 p.24 According to a Save the Children assessment in Swat, households experienced a 73% reduction in income, and 35% of the surveyed families had contracted new loans to cover their debts (PHRP, 2010 p.63). The effect of the displacement crisis has thus forced marginalized families to take difficult decisions to survive. Belligerents often seek to recruit boys and young men as fighters. Northwest Pakistan is no exception. Insurgents offer of money, weapons and power may seduce young men surrounded by unemployment and hopelessness, and cause parents real anxiety (Daily Times, June 2009; ICG, June 2009 p.11). Some parents have anticipated this dire situation and resettled to larger towns and cities in search of work (IRIN, Nov 2009 and May 2010). Around 36% of FATA households receive remittances from other parts of Pakistan. Seasonal migration is common in mountainous areas such as FATA partly for labour reasons and partly as a means of escaping extreme temperatures. In some areas, one in every eight families migrates on a yearly basis (FATA MICS, 2009 p.45). The armed conflict propelled this figure to one in 47

48 every two households during 2009 and Forced migration regularly causes families to split: One or more of the family s men will not return home but continue working in their new environment, thus providing an important, added source of income. Recent massive displacements in may lead to new employment opportunities for more people from FATA and thus increase the potential for remittances. But if the tension between IDPs and host communities in areas like Karachi Tank, Kohat, Hangu and Peshawar continues and escalates, people from FATA may find it harder to get work away from home. 48

49 FAMILY LIFE, PARTICIPATION, ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND OTHER CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS General Family Life, Partiipation, Acess to Justice, Documentation and other Civil and Political Rights 7.1 DOCUMENTATION AND CITIZENSHIP The International Convention on the Rights of the Child (see also CCPR 24.2) states that every child has the right to a name, nationality and protection of his/her identity. Birth registration is an important means of protecting these rights, but only 1% of children below 5 years of age have their births registered in displacement-affected FATA (FATA MICS, 2009 p.40), in contrast to 29.5% nationally (The News, June 2010). The National Identity Card (NIC) is the most important basis for citizens to secure their entitlements in Pakistan. Pakistan, moreover, is a displacement-affected country where having a NIC actually allows displaced households to access assistance. NADRA only verified internally-displaced families which had NICs. So by definition, at least one person in each registered household has a NIC. During the crisis a number of IDPs lost their NICs, property documents, business licenses and birth certificates (CERINA, 2009 p.44). In compliance with Guiding Principle 20.2 the GoP facilitated the issuance of new NIC and replaced lost ones, particularly for female heads of households. Eighty-three thousand women got their NICs for the first time during the first semester of 2009 (The Nation, June 2009). Many of them displaced, but women in host areas also benefitted. 7.2 VOTING AND PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS Important family, inheritance, property and criminal law cases in FATA and PATA are discussed in the jirga, where the decisions are final and thus do not provide the accused due process of law (Wazir, 2009). The code which governs the jirga s decision-making process is called Pashtunwali, the customary law of the Pashtun people (Haring, 2009; The National, Dec 2009). The jirga is generally efficient in dispensing justice within a tribe but struggles with decision-making where several tribes are involved, as is often the case during displacement. Verdicts, moreover, tend to favor men with political or economic clout rather than vulnerable segments of the population (CSIS, 2009; AI, July 2002). Women, for example, are not represented in jirgas and have little opportunity to influence 49

50 crucial aspects of their lives. Amnesty International argues that the jirga system also violates Article 15 of the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, which requires Pakistan to accord to women equality with men before the law (AI, April 2010 p.120). Women were banned from voting in Central FATA during the elections in 2008 (ICG, Nov 2009; Daily Times, Feb 2008). Religious jurisprudence and Pashtunwali still coexist. But Sharia now takes precedence in many parts of FATA and KP (Fayyaz, April 2007; Frontier Post, April 2010). The analyst Shah Bukhari points out that when the adult franchise was introduced in FATA in 1996, the power and authority of the tribal elders eroded immediately (Syed and Bukhari, Dec 2007). Religion -based politics, in contrast, flourished. Eighty-two percent of people elected to parliament in 2002 were mullahs linked to Islamist parties (CSIS, 2009; Daily Times, Feb 2008; WP, May 2004; PIPS, Dec 2007). This seems to have changed in the 2008 elections and 2010 bi-elections in KP however (The News, Jan 2010; The National, Jan 2010). During the ongoing displacement, tribal structures are backed by the security forces and other national and international actors. These actors seem to believe that the only alternatives in the northwest are maliks or clerics, pashtunwali or sharia, and, in choosing between the two, prefer the tribal despite its record. Tribal jirgas among displaced tribal leaders are thus regularly convened in displacement areas to discuss security-related issues and conditions for return. Women are generally not consulted. In IDP camps, however, women s committees are also formed. UNHCR community worker Shingha Bahadur believes that community mobilization and capacity building in IDP camps, where IDPs have been treated as actors rather than recipients, have contributed to improving the delivery and management of services in KP and won a certain level of acceptance among women and other less powerful groups (FMR, March 2010). Displaced leaders, however, have not always felt comfortable with the way humanitarian agencies have attempted to re-organize their communities (IDMC interviews with IDP leaders, June 2010). Clientelist political practices are common in Pakistan. Service-giving and servicetaking reinforce reciprocities (khedmat) and have a strong influence in bringing people to power through electoral politics. Displacements can be an opportunity for ambitious politicians to extent services to displaced communities and boost their electoral possibilities. Displacements can be an opportunity for ambitious politicians to extent services to displaced communities and boost his electoral possibilities. The Director of Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), argues that the fact that the majority of IDPs find security and shelter with families in hosting areas suggest that the clientelist workings of the political system still are alive (IDMC correspondence with CLAWS, April 2010). 50

51 7.3 ACCESS TO JUSTICE There are strong links between establishing democratic governance, reducing poverty and securing access to justice (UNDP, 2004). While some groups of IDPs take part in the traditional mechanisms of justice, we lack data which reveal just how the traditional justice mechanisms have changed during displacement. It is further unclear whether IDPs access formal justice system during displacement. IDPs perceive a degree of persecution by security forces seeking to bring insurgents to justice. This was manifested in Jalozai camp in June 2010 when IDPs protested against police raids and late night arrests of hundreds of people, most of whom later where proved to be innocent civilians and released (The News, June 2010). On another occasion, six Orakzai IDPs were arrested. The IDPs said the police had mistreated them and kept them in illegal detention to cover up the misdeeds of the camp authorities (The News, April 2010). Some displaced families, traveling to the homes of relatives in Kohat, were reportedly harassed at the Ustarzai police station on the Hangu highway in Kohat because they did not possess identity cards (Dawn, Dec 2009). While there is limited data on land grabbing and other displacement specific issues, by and large the government has been unable to repair victims from tribal areas for human rights abuses committed against them. But there are important exceptions. In June 2010, for example, 101 families from Orakzai received 3,500 US$ in compensation for having lost a family member during terrorist attacks or during counterinsurgency operations (The News, June 2010). Families of 53 IDPs who died in the suicide attack at Kacha Pakha IDPcamp in Kohat this year, received 2,320 US$ each in compensation (Epaper, June 2010). 51

52 PROTECTION OF SPECIAL CATEGORIES OF IDPS (AGE, GENDER, DIVERSITY) General Protection of Special Categories of IDPs (Age, Gender, Diversity) 8.1 GENDER: WOMEN AND MEN Displacement affects different groups differently, and actors need to take those differences into account. CERINA s assessment of men and women from displacement- affected communities in Upper FATA and PATA-KP revealed that women s most frequently-mentioned concern was how to get money/work. For men, it was security, followed by money/employment. Men were also more concerned about children s education than women (CERINA, 2009 p.59). The table that follows reveals some other concerns of displaced men and women with regards to basic needs, ID cards and registration, forced return, freedom of movement, landmines, access to justice and other issues. The most striking results are not the differences between men and women, but how similar their concerns are. Source: CERINA, 2009 p.60 The Pakistan Humanitarian Response Plan (PHRP) points out that Pakistan is a gender unequal society. It ranks among the five lowest countries in the world for women s economic participation and educational attainment, and ranks only marginally higher for health. Seclusion (purdah) is the single most important constraint in women s access to basic rights, according to PHRP, and even more so during displacement (PHRP, Feb 2010 p.16-18). The academic Palwasha 52

53 Kakar adds that the crowded conditions during displacement have changed social relations. She observes that, even if the context has changed, purdah still represents honor. Just as melmastia (hospitality) has become limited to close social networks, she says, displaced women s physical space has become smaller. This is despite the fact that their networks are potentially larger (Kakar, 2009). These changes can help explain the findings of CERINA s assessment that many displaced families eagerly sought marriage for their female members among the men of the host area to avoid the stigma that unmarried women face when they travel (CERINA, 2009 p.59; see also SIGI Gender Index). AI argues that forcibly-displaced women are strongly affected by the trauma of displacement. They are also at greater risk of being subjected to sexual violence, including rape, or being forced into prostitution by the destruction of their livelihoods and support networks. Employing the guidelines on forced displacement, the human rights organization concludes that displacement in northwest Pakistan has exacerbated existing inequalities between men and women, particularly outside the camps (AI, June 2010 p ). Kakar, however, asserts that the impact of seclusion is much harsher and thus more damaging in camps than in host-community settings where women tend to live with family members (Kakar, 2009). Her claim is backed up by relief workers. In D I Khan, Mehsud tribeswomen were so infuriated by the sense that they had lost their modesty in the camps that they declined to register for food rations: Purdah was more important to them than eating two meals a day (The National, Dec 2009; IPS, Jan 2010). Women affected by the flooding early August 2010 interviewed by IRIN News said that they would rather die than live in a camp (IRIN, Aug 2010). Displacement affects women differently. Some displaced women lack recognition before the law and the autonomy to participate in economic life and access basic services (RI, Dec 2009; ACT, June 2009; IRIN, May 2009 and April 2010; ET, April 2010). Insecurity, curfews and a lack of female medics hinder proper care for displaced pregnant women (Dawn, Aug 2009). Displaced Mehsud women have been arbitrarily detained (ICG, 2009; Dawn, Dec 2009). Working women, according to the government's National Commission on the Status of Women, lost their jobs (IRIN, March 2010; Dawn July 2009). At the same time, however, young displaced women from Khyber Agency, interviewed by The Express Tribune, said that displacement provided opportunities for the future. This was because social networks during displacement were close-knit and services easily at hand ET, June 2010). Men face other challenges. Both tribal codes and technologically-modern nations establish gender as a distinguishing trait of who can be killed or not. For example, US drone attack victims in North Waziristan are counted as combatants if they are men or boys above the age of 13; civilians if they are women or girls (CFR, July 2010; NAF, July 2010). Pashtunwali allows for the killing of men in various situations. But it prohibits the killing of women (afghanan.net). In 53

54 displacement situations, media reports on arrests almost exclusively refer to internally-displaced men (The News, April 2010; The News, June 2010). Most cases of killings are also of displaced men. Men, moreover stay behind within FATA thus facing the highest risk of being impacted by clashes, but there is very limited data documenting their current living conditions. Displaced men and boys are also at higher risk of being forcibly recruited than women and girls. Since there are restrictions on women s mobility, entire families are dependent on men and boys (IRIN, Dec 2009 and Jan 2010; The News, Jan 2010). PHRP (2010 p.18) mentions that displaced men often need to provide for greatly increased numbers of dependents during displacement. This increases their hardship. 8.2 AGE: BOYS AND GIRLS Article 38 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) declares that ( ) States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure protection and care of children who are affected by an armed conflict (CRC, 1989). Guiding Principle 4 and Guiding Principle 13 reinforce this principle in the case of internallydisplaced children (BI, 2008 p.61). Legal obligations, notwithstanding, IDMC s report Still at Risk reveals that Pakistan s internally-displaced children have become increasingly vulnerable to threats to their enjoyment of rights (IDMC, June 2010). Children have been directly implicated in the conflict through forced recruitment and attacks on schools. These attacks are sometimes the product of their religious denomination or ethnic belonging (CSM, Sept 2009). ICG has documented how children in South Waziristan were detained as collective punishment was meted out (ICG, June 2009 p.5). These human rights abuses can, in and of themselves, be causes of displacement. The most vulnerable of all displaced children were those who were unable to leave FATA and stayed near their home areas where there was a risk of injury and death from shelling and food and water were scarce (UNICEF, Aug 2009; Reuters, June 2009; Dawn, April 2010 and Oct 2009); The News, Oct 2009 and March 2010 and April 2010). But most displaced children left FATA for some time. Ninety percent of the estimated 2 million displaced children who left the tribal areas between August 2008 and April 2010 lived with host families or in rented accommodation, mostly with relatives. While only a few children were able to go to school, they were often able to live relatively normal lives. Around 1,000 children were estimated to have been separated from their families during the displacement crisis (UNICEF, June 2009; IDMC, June 2010 p.17). A Save the Children assessment in Buner district in early 2009 found that there were orphans and/or unaccompanied children in 3.4 percent of the households living in displacement-affected areas (StC, July 2009). 54

55 The hardships of displacement have also been felt by children. In FATA, where individual rights are to a certain extent subordinate to the collective interest, 17.1% of children 5-14 years of age work as child laborers. Most of these work in agriculture or in the home with their parents consent (FATA MICS, 2009 p.40; see also State of Pakistan s Children 2009). More data is needed to know how the depletion of resources and reduced living standards among displaced and host families are impacting children. But IDMC has documented how, in violation of Article 32 of the Convention of the Right of the Child (CRC), children faced increased risk of forced labor during displacement (IDMC, 2010 p.4-5). When men from displaced families are killed, for example, their eldest boys often have to assume greater responsibilities in the family. This was especially true because women and girls are restricted from participating in public life (IRIN, Dec 2009 and Jan 2010; The News, Jan 2010). Although FATA-boys suffered more from malnutrition before displacement, all children, but particularly girls, changed their diet during displacement. This also put them at risk of malnutrition (CERINA, 2009 p.42). Forced marriage was also a concern for displaced girls, and the IDMC found evidence that children faced increased rates of domestic violence and sexual exploitation during displacement (CERINA, 2009 p.59; IDMC 2010 p.4). ICG and analyst Syed I. Ashraf believe that poverty pushes displaced children towards militant and even insurgent groups. This is especially true of unemployed boys from FATA enraged by army strikes. Insurgent fighters reportedly receive a tempting monthly salary of US$200. This is much more than can be earned in most other occupations (Daily Times, July 2009; ICG, 2009; Dawn May 2009), and IDP camps are allegedly visited by religious charities for recruitment purposes. Even so, a correlation between displacement and recruitment is difficult to prove (IDMC correspondence with Bill Roggio, Long War Journal). This is because militants have a wide influence, both in areas affected by displacement and in communities unaffected by displacement. A study among 12 Peshawar schools revealed that 80% of students were aware of the motivations behind suicide bombings and 8% showed a readiness to carry out suicide attacks themselves. This study, however, also points out that the magic brew of militancy consists of disorientation resulting from a feeling of uprootedness combined with indoctrination (Dawn, May 2009). Displaced children s mental health is a concern. By definition, internally-displaced children have experienced traumatic events the same events that led to their displacement in the first place. But very few have access to psychological care (Reuters, Sept 2009 and May 2010; Earth Times, Nov 2009). According to CERINA s assessment, more than 80% of the parents of internally- displaced children from Upper FATA /PATA-KP observed that their children s behavior had changed because of recent experiences (CERINA, 2009 p.39). Over 270 childfriendly spaces in camps and other displacement-affected places have been supported by NGOs and UN agencies. These have benefitted almost 100,000 children (OCHA, March 2010). Handicap International visited a number of them, 55

56 but found that children with disabilities did not take part in the activities (HI, May 2009). 8.3 DISABILITY: SOCIAL, PHYSICAL AND MENTALLY DISABLED Disability, in the context of displacement, is a function of social relations and the environment. Limitations on the daily life of disabled people are most commonly related to walking; distinguishing people and objects; hearing, speaking or communicating; eating or drinking; and socializing. In other words, disability is more than a medical description. When a person is displaced he frequently loses the social network that makes his disability manageable. He must then reestablish it in the reception area or find himself at a serious disadvantage. Disability and displacement are thus intimately linked. This is demonstrated in the case of people who were hit by shrapnel, lost limbs after stepping on land mines, or who suffer disabling emotional trauma after witnessing massacres (CNN, March 2010). Limited data exist on those with disabilities. Handicap International (HI) documented in early 2009 how the rapid IDP registration process allowed the maximum number of IDPs to access relief. But, if no data was collected on the numbers or location of vulnerable individuals, it was impossible to address vulnerability in a systematic way (HI, May 2009). Thus IDPs with chronic or disabling illnesses and other disabilities were rarely able to access the support they needed. This was in contravention of Guiding Principle 19 provisions which establish the right to receive assistance according to special needs (IRIN, July 2010). Access to health services was, according to HI, a significant challenge for IDPs with disabilities. In April 2010, the media reported that injured IDPs in camps in Hangu and Korat were unable to get wheelchairs and medicines that they urgently needed at the camp health units (Daily Times, April 2010). Agence France-Presse and Reuters reported on how thousands of civilians who had lost limbs struggled to recover and integrate (Reuters, Aug 2009; AFP, Feb 2010). 56

57 DURABLE SOLUTIONS (RETURN, LOCAL INTEGRATION, SETTLEMENT ELSEWHERE IN THE COUNTRY) General Durable Solutions (Return, Local Integration, Settlement Elsewhere in the Country)) 9.1 DOCUMENTED RETURNS There are reports of returns e.g. to Swat in 2007 (Dawn, Dec 2007), but the first reliable estimates and figures on the return processes are for those who registered as IDPs between September 2008 and July For this group, an important number of returns have been documented, particularly for those who fled fighting in PATA-KP in May 2009 (Dawn, July 2009; Daily Times, July 2009; UNOCHA - Pakistan Humanitarian Updates). By July of that year, after declaring the areas safe, the GoP started implementing a return plan that had been agreed upon with the UNHCR. According to official figures, by the end of October, more than 1.7 million people had returned to their places of origin in Swat and Buner districts (PHRP, 2010 p.15). The government provided transport to some families. But other families arranged their own transport. Many IDPs faced hardship during the journey and delays at checkpoints. Upon their arrival home, basic services were scarce (Islamic Relief, July 2009; Dawn, July 2010). Returns to Upper FATA have also been documented: Authorities said that 220,000 IDPs from Bajaur had returned by May 2009 and that other groups started returning in April 2010 (ICG 2009 p.3; Daily Times, May 2009). IDPs from Mohmand were unconvinced by the security guarantees and waited until April 2010 to start returning. But by May 2010, 25,000 families from Mohmand had returned (The News, March 2010; UNHCR, April 2010). There is limited data on return processes for conflict-induced IDPs anywhere in northwest Pakistan before July And for Central and Lower FATA, returns have been limited in scope for the IDPs registered during 2009 and 2010 (OCHA, March 2010; MCRAM, April 2010). Kurram IDPs however, backed by security forces, seemed to plan for return in June 2010 (ET, June 2010). This was despite insecurity in their home areas. Orakzai IDPs have negotiated potential returnscenarios with local authorities for some time. Fourteen thousand of them returned home before September 2009 (WHO, Jan 2010). Members of the Satory Khel tribe agreed to return in May 2010 only to be displaced anew by fighting or threats from insurgent groups (ET, April 2010 and May 2010; Dawn, May 2010). Further returns were put on hold in agreement with international agencies in June 2010 (OCHA, July 2010). Although the authorities started the registration of IDPs willing to return to South Waziristan, international humanitarian actors were reluctant to endorse the return plans because they were unable to verify if the 57

58 returns actually would be voluntary, informed, safe and dignified -- conditions required by international guidelines and the Returns Policy Framework agreed upon by UN agencies and the Fata Secretariat in June 2010 (OCHA, July 2010). Source: OCHA Concentration of returned/idps families - FATA and KP Feb-May

59 59

60 9.2 PROSPECTS FOR AND OBSTACLES TO RETURN, LOCAL SETTLEMENT AND SETTLEMENT ELSEWHERE In the Guiding Principles, developed further in the revised Framework on Durable Solutions (IASC, 2010), situation in which an internally-displaced person has overcome insecurity, discrimination and other obstacles emanating from the displacement, is referred to as a durable solution. A longer process is oftentimes required to reach a durable solution. But some concrete events, like a peace agreement or property restitution, can be major leaps towards such a solution. The Guiding Principles differentiate between a durable solution for IDPs in areas of initial or secondary displacement, which can be achieved through integration in host communities, and a durable solution in the place of origin, which is referred to as return. According to the Guiding Principles, IDPs, as citizens, shall be able to freely choose how to seek improvements in their life situation and are entitled to GoP support in this pursuit. Return Voluntary return is often regarded as the preferable solution by IDPs and authorities alike (BI, 2008 p.126). Competent authorities are responsible for creating the conditions so that IDPs can return to their places of habitual residence voluntarily, in safety and with dignity as soon as the reasons for their displacement cease to exist and responsible for facilitating the reintegration of returned IDPs, as stated in Guiding Principle 28.1 and reinforced in 29.1 (BI, 2008 p.127). The IDPs are entitled to take active part in this process (28.2). These principles have been outlined in the joint UN - GoP s Return Policy Framework (UNHCR, July 2010; OCHA, July 2010). The most successful return process took place in Malakand Division in mid-2009 as sketched out above. But many return processes have been confusing and have not always respected these principles, and have instead been marked by counter-insurgency interests. First, there has been a lack of information. Mobile phone coverage is limited in FATA, restricting the flow of information. In most cases little is known about the conditions in return areas. In some cases, such as after displacements in Wana district in South Waziristan in 2004 and Malakand Division and Upper FATA in 2009, early recovery and damage assessments were carried out (WB/ADB, 2009; The News, March 2004). But access restrictions in most of FATA prevented independent actors from assessing the security situation on the ground (OCHA, July 2010). IDPs own security assessment has often differed from the security forces. In the case of Bajaur, for example, the government announced a temporary ceasefire in September 2008 and encouraged IDPs to go home. But tens of thousands of IDPs refused to return out of fear that fighting 60

61 would continue (BBC, Sept 2008; Daily Times, Aug 2008 and Oct 2008 and April 2010; The News, April 2010). Second, return processes have not always been voluntary. In March 2009, a survey in Jalozai camp revealed that 85% of those displaced from the Mohmand Agency did not want to return (OCHA, April 2010). But the political administration insisted that Mohmand IDPs go home anyway. According to the International Crisis Group, it even threatened the IDPs with imprisonment if they did not (ICG, 2009 p.9; Daily Times, March 2009). Tribal reporter Zulfiqar Ali wrote in February 2009 that many Bajaur IDPs had been forced to return, including to conflict-hit areas where no reconstruction had taken place and extremists continued to operate freely (Dawn, Feb 2009). Third, while removing the cause of displacement is often a precondition for a durable solution, returns have not always coincided with the removal of militant structures or military activity. Insecurity has both been perceived and observed before, during and after return processes (IDMC correspondence with OCHA, June 2010; Dawn, Feb 2009). TNSM and other norm-enforcers willing to use force, continued to instill fear in Swat Valley in 2010, targeting the same groups as prior to the main displacement waves in (Reuters, March 2010; Dawn, July 2009; IRIN March 2010). Displaced Mehsud were continuously encouraged to return to their home areas even though mines had not been removed. And they were encouraged to return even though displaced leaders felt there was reason to fear both the army and militant insurgents (BBC, Nov 2009; The News, Nov 2009). In Orakzai areas of incipient return, a spokesperson for Tehrik-e- Taliban Pakistan (TTP) warned the IDPs in early 2010 not to return home. As long as security forces were present in the area, he said, there would be war (The News, May 2010; ET, April 2010; Daily Times, June 2010). Fourth, the destruction of infrastructure and loss of property were the factors which most concerned IDP households from Upper and Central FATA living in Peshawar in 2010 (OCHA, July 2010). The main obstacles to return, in their opinion, were insecurity (35%) followed by property destruction (26%), damage to services and infrastructure (13%), unemployment (17%) and inadequate assistance during return (9%). Source: UNOCHA: Pakistan Humanitarian Brief 18, July

62 Return in conditions of human dignity is intimately related to whether the returnees can achieve an adequate standard of living and access to employment. These are two indicators of a durable solution (UN GA, Dec 2009). The FATA Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey documented incidents 2006 and 2007 in which public infrastructure was blasted. This included the blasting of schools and health facilities (FATA MICS, 2009 p.9; FATA Secr, 2009 p.3). More recent fighting has worsened the situation (Dawn, July 2009; ICG, 2009 p.12; IMC, July 2009). Analysis by the daily, The National, - echoed by other media outlets -- was that one year after returning home, Swat residents still struggled to rebuild their lives and livelihoods. Female-headed households fared particularly badly (IRIN, Dec 2009; Dawn, July 2009; IRIN, Jan 2010 and March 2010). Infrastructure was still in ruins, and healthcare facilities were rendered useless after militants stole all the equipment (The National, Feb 2010, Reuters, March 2010). Parachinar in Upper Kurram is today almost without doctors, nurses and teachers (NYT, July 2008). The authorities should facilitate unimpeded access to humanitarian and development actors that assist IDPs in achieving a durable solution although this has often not been the case. Fifth, the material and human cost of the ongoing conflict has been calculated on several occasions and Pakistani authorities time and again have promised increased investments in displacement-affected FATA. But there are few indications that effective remedies for displacement-related violations -- including access to justice, reparations and information about the causes of violations have been achieved (Dawn, Sept 2004). Displaced families from the Darra Adamkhel area in South Wazirsitan, for example, were promised reparation for the damages caused during Operation Earthquake (Zalzala) in early But 62