URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES AND NEIGHBOURHOOD SELECTION SOCIAL INCLUSION & SUSTAINABILITY (EVK4-CT UGIS)

Transcription

1 NATIONAL AND CITY CONTEXTS, URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES AND NEIGHBOURHOOD SELECTION THE GERMAN BACKGROUND REPORT BY JÜRGEN FRIEDRICHS A WORKING PAPER FOR UGIS URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES, URBAN GOVERNANCE, SOCIAL INCLUSION & SUSTAINABILITY (EVK4-CT UGIS) 2001 University of Cologne Research Institute for Sociology

2 TABLE OF CONTENTS (TO REVISE!) PART 1: THE NATIONAL CONTEXT Economic Conditions and Trends Demographic Trends Housing Trends The Specific Conditions in East Germany Social Housing... 9 PART 2: URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS PART 3: THE CITIES Cologne Hamburg Conclusions from Cologne and Hamburg Neighbourhood Data PART 4: NEIGHBOURHOODS AND PROGRAMS Cologne Hamburg PART 5: PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK REFERENCES

3 PART 1: THE NATIONAL CONTEXT To study the economic and demographic changes in Germany, it is necessary to differentiate between the former West Germany (in the following referred to as FRG), the former East Germany (GDR) and the unified Germany after 1990, referred to as "Germany". 1. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND TRENDS After decades of growth and prosperity, the German economy entered a phase of slow growth and increasing unemployment at the end of the 1980s. This decline was observed in all European countries, although in varying degree. With the reunification of Germany in 1990, the country entered a decade of mixed economic performance. The re-unification led to a short phase of economic growth in the years While other European countries had growth rates around 2.0 percent, the growth in the former FRG was 9.1 percent in 1991, in Germany 7.9 in Germany due to the tremendous demand from former East Germany achieved growth rates of 9.1 percent in 1991 (old FRG) and 7.9 percent in 1992 (Germany). It seemed that Germany could escape the economic problems other countries faced, but this optimistic view turned out to be false, since after 1993 the delayed economic decline became more apparent, and the GNP growth rate fell to 2.8 percent in The employment recession hit Germany, as well as the tremendous costs of the reunification: restructuring East Germany factories and companies, modernising schools, hospitals, roads and housing. Already in the years 1991/1992 the net transfer amounted to billion DM, increased to billion DM in 1993/94 and was 152 billion DM annually in the following years (IW 2000: 7). Until today, each German employee has to pay 5.5 percent of his wage or salary tax as "solidarity fee" for the five East German Laender. Thus, the problems of the former GDR had a negative impact on the already unstable German economy. More precisely, East German production plants had to be modernised, many of them had to be closed or were sold by the Treuhand often with federal subsidies - to companies (or conglomerates) from the western part of Germany, other European countries, Japan or the U.S. The restructuring of the entire East German economy required by the adaptation to a market economy turned out to be complicated by the fact that the initial hope to use the former GDR companies as a bridge for the East European market became unrealistic as those markets broke down at the same time the GDR was supposed to recover. The restructuring of the economy implied as well a reorganisation of each plant: Production lines had to be revised, many products were no longer competitive on a national or international market. Moreover, companies were overstaffed. The combined result of both conditions, product changes and overstaffing, was to cut jobs, which led to increasing unemployment a phenomenon not known in the socialist GDR. This created bitterness about the reunification among the residents of the GDR and in turn the impression among the West German residents that the East German residents are not grateful for the reunification and our sacrifices. 3

4 Hence, the economic change in Germany was characterised by the load of reunification and a continuation of the deindustrialization process in old-industrialised regions, such as the Ruhr area. The latter process was enforced all over Germany by the growing competition on the world market, a process commonly referred to by the term globalization. Since the German economy is heavily dependent upon exports (the export quota was 34.2 percent in 1999), large companies reacted to the adaptation challenge by laying-off blue collar workers and low qualification employees (e.g. in insurance and banking), while at the same time investing in new machinery, like computer-assisted production and services, thus process innovation, to increase their productivity. Table 1: Germany, Economic Indicators, 1980, 1985, 1990 and 1999 Indicator GNP (billion DM) GNP per capita Unemployed Germany Unemployment quota Unemployed FRG* Unemployment quota Unemployment quota Foreign-born (FRG) Public assistance*** Persons Expenditures in mio. DM) 1,472* 24000* ,938** ,602.2** 7.3** 1, ,036** 10,616,5** 3, , , ,516 15, 834 3, , , ,879 17,621 * Data refer to the former FRG. ** Data refer to *** Only continuous aid for persons outside institutions. Data refer to Sources: IW 2000: 23, 26; Statistisches Bundesamt 1993: 512; 2000a: 120, 122; 635; 1997: 478, 480; 2000b: 98. The major overall outcome was rising unemployment, as documented in Table 1. Rates were higher in East Germany: 12.3 percent in 1991, 19.3 percent in 1995 and 21.8 percent in 1998, resulting from the still prevalent divide between the economic conditions in the two parts of Germany. Irrespective of the financial transfer from West to East Germany, both the productivity and the investment in companies in the Eastern part of Germany were insufficient to alleviate the precarious economic conditions. Of all unemployed, 35 percent in 1999 were long-term unemployed (more than 12 months). The unemployment of the foreign-born is constantly above the rate of the "German" blue and white collar workers. This is mainly due to their lower qualification - and not to discrimination, as a detailed multivariate analysis of unemployment rates has shown (Diekmann, Engelhardt and Hartmann 1993). Thus, foreign-born are hit more severely by the urban economic transition from goods production to information production and services. These changes may be subsumed under the concept of "mismatch", denoting a growing discrepancy between the qualifications offered by part of the working force to the qualifications required by large and small companies. Indications of this mismatch were 4

5 documented for Germany already in the middle of the 1980s (Friedrichs 1985; Kasarda and Friedrichs 1985). The number of jobs fell from mio. in 1991 to in 1997, then rose to mio. in Over the same period, the number of unemployed increased from 2.60 mio. (in 1991) to 4.38 in 1997, thereafter fell to 3.89 in the year The growing unemployment and the bleak outlook on the labour market for persons with low qualifications led to increasing expenditures for public assistance. Since public assistance is paid from the City s budget (whereas unemployment aid comes from the Federal budget), these payments became a heavy financial burden for the German cities, expenditures often amounting to ten percent of the City s budget. The political reaction to this situation a structural crisis of the German economy and the welfare state - was mixed and controversial. Employers argued, the welfare state had to be dismantled, social security and unemployment payments to be reduced and wage and salary regulations to become more flexible. Flexibility in this context meant to give up a national agreement among the employees association and trade unions on a nation-wide level, and instead to allow for company-specific agreements. Trade unions did not agree to any of these demands and suggestions, instead they pursued the policy to secure existing jobs and thereby caring less to create new jobs for the unemployed. Neither the Dutch nor the Danish restructuring models were accepted, and by no means the North-American model of job creation by lowering wages. Even the 1998 created Coalition for Jobs, a committee of representatives from the government, the trade unions, employers union and academic counsellors did not succeed in achieving common suggestions for future employment. Finally, the debate in November 2000 about the reduction of annuities and pensions by an obligatory individual investment in an additional pension indicated the tremendous difficulties in Germany to restructure welfare provisions. Closely related to the rising number of unemployed is the increase in households and persons receiving public assistance. This is indicated as well by the data in Table 1. By December 1998, the number of persons receiving continuous public assistance was million persons alone, of these 666,000 were non-germans (the total number of recipients amounted to million). The rates of the two groups differed markedly: 3.0 percent of the Germans as opposed to 9.1 percent of the non-german inhabitants. Moreover, rates differed by age. It is in both groups that the age bracket of the under seven years old had the highest share: 8.6 percent of the total population (Statistisches Bundesamt 2000a: ). For the year 2001, the Expert Commission of the Federal Department of Economics estimates a growth of the GNP of 2.8 percent (after 3.0 in 2000) and a decline of unemployment from 9.8 in 2000 to 9.1 percent. However, as the Commission concludes, the number of overt and covert unemployed even in 2001 will amount to 5.18 million persons (Maier-Mannhart 2000). 5

6 2. DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS The population of Germany (and in the former FRG) has grown since 1950 (Table 2). This overall figure, however, has to be qualified. After the re-unification in 1990, West Germany experienced population growth, while East Germany lost population. To start with the latter area, the negative population balance in East Germany is due to both a negative natural balance, since birth rates dropped dramatically, and migration to West Germany, which was - and still is - due to better job opportunities. Table 2: Germany, Demographic Indicators, 1980, 1985, 1990 and 1999 Indicator Population: Germany FRG GDR Foreign-born* Percent foreign-born* Natural balance Migration balance Total balance Migration foreign-born* In-migration Out-migration Total Balance Number of households 78,275 61,538 16,737 4,453, ,811 79,365 63,254 16,111 5,241, ,256 81,661 66,156 15,505 6,931, ,938 82,163 66,946 15,217 7, ,795 * Data refer to the former FRG. ** Data refer to Sources: IW 2000: 14; Presse-und Informationsamt 1983: 19; Statistisches Bundesamt 1982: 66; 2000a: 44, 58, 63, 65, 67. The changes in West Germany are more complex to examine. Population growth in the FRG was only due to a positive migration balance, which in turn resulted from an in-migration of a) persons seeking political asylum, b) repatriates, first from Romania, then from Poland and Russia, c) from East Germany. The following figures document the first two processes: Persons seeking political asylum (Statistisches Bundesamt 2000a: 66): 1990 (FRG) 193, (GER) 322, (GER) 127, (GER) 95,113 Repatriates (Statistisches Bundesamt 2000a: 82): , , , ,916. 6

7 In 1985, the repatriates came predominantly from Poland. In 1990; almost half came from Poland, the other half from the former Soviet Union, and the following years almost entirely from the former Soviet Union. By 2000, the influx of both repatriates and persons seeking political asylum decreased. Already in 1998, the foreign-born migration balance was - for the first time - negative. More non-germans left the country than came into Germany. Given these trends, several population forecasts seem to have overestimated the population change. A forecast from 1992 (Bucher, Siedhoff and Stiens 1992) for 2015 estimated a net population increase of 5.5 million, of these 4.5 million foreign-born. An updated forecast (Bucher and Kocks 1999) for the period estimates East Germany to lose 1.7 percent, and West Germany to gain +1.7 percent (ibid.: 761). From 1998 to 2005, Germany is expected to have a net gain of 1,017,4 persons, (+1,625,6 persons in West and 608,2 in East Germany), and then from 2006 to 2015 a net gain of 404,5 inhabitants (+986,1 inhabitants in West and 581,6 in East Germany. The negative natural balance is supposed to increase, but to be compensated by a positive migration balance, which in turn is due to an influx of foreign-born. A different forecast, based on EUROSTAT calculations (Deutscher Bundestag 1998: 128, 138), in a mean variant (middle-sized migration and doubling of naturalisation), estimates for 2015 a slight population decrease to million inhabitants, of these million foreignborn. Bucher and Kocks (1999: ) even supply a population and household forecast for major German cities. From this forecast the data for Germany, Cologne and Hamburg are quoted below (Table 3): Table 3: Population and Household Projections for the Year 2015 Area Population Households West Germany East Germany Germany Cologne Region Hamburg 64,548,3 17,509,1 82,057,4 2,131,0 1,704,7 67,160,0 16,319,3 83,479,3 2,176,3 1,749,9 29,513,1 8,044,5 37,557,6 1,015,3 913,3 31,971,8 8,014,2 39,986,0 1,069,7 955,0 Thus, all forecasts assume a growing absolute number and share of the foreign-born in Germany. The majority of the foreign-born migrants will settle in the large agglomerations. It is apparent, that these changes may lead to greater social conflict over scarce resources, such as housing and jobs, in particular in the large cities. Furthermore, higher unemployment rates and higher expenditures for public assistance may occur in the large cities, further restraining their budget. 3. HOUSING TRENDS The total number of dwellings in Germany increased between 1990 and 1998 from 33,856,321 to 37,529,202 (or 26,839,344 to 30,046,567 for the FRG). Of these, 40.8 percent were owner-occupied, the remainder, still the majority, are renters. In the same period, the 7

8 dwelling space increased from 34.8 to 38.4 sq.m, in the former FRG from 36.4 to 39.3 sqm, in East Germany from 28.2 to 34.5 sqm (Statistisches Bundesamt 2000a: 230). Given the tremendous costs of the reunification and the bad conditions of the former GDR housing stock, this is a remarkable increase. Although the share of owners has increased over the last decades, compared to other European countries, Germany still is a nation of renters, since in 1998 only 40.8 percent of all dwellings were owner-occupied. The number of new and subsidized social housing dwellings in Germany fell from 120,986 in 1996 to 107,490 in 1997 to 82,759 in 1998 a loss of 31.6 percent in only three years (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2000: 227). These figures are of great importance for the problem of poverty, since a reduction in stock, which is not compensated by new construction, forces a city to allocate problem families to the existing stock by just serving the most deprived families. This may have the negative consequence to augment the level of deprivation in those few neighbourhoods which still have social housing dwellings where renter allocation is done by the city or a city-owned non-profit housing association. Including the stock of social housing dwellings, this stock decreased from almost four million in 1980 to 1.9 million in 1999 and is estimated to fall to one million by 2005 (Süddeutsche Zeitung, June 16, 2000). The quota of owners of dwellings or houses in the FRG increased from 39.3 percent in 1980 to 41.7 percent in 1993 and 43.1 percent in 1996 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2000: 232). Table 4: Housing Stock, 1990 and 1998 Area Dwellings FRG Former GDR Germany 26,839,344 7,016,977 33,856,321 30,046,567 7,482,635 37,529,202 Av. dwelling size (sqm) FRG Former GDR Germany Social housing dwellings* Germany 81,474 82,759 * New and subsidized. Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 1993: 266; 2000a: 230, THE SPECIFIC CONDITIONS IN EAST GERMANY Table 4 also indicates a dramatic increase in the quality of housing in East Germany. It should be noted, however, that housing conditions in East Germany differ markedly from those in West Germany. The former GDR government claimed at the VIII. meeting of the SED party in 1971 and again by a specific housing program in 1973 to solve the housing problem by the year This goal was by no means achieved (Flierl, 1991: 52; Scheumann and 8

9 Marcuse, 1991: ), mainly due to lack of funds and the bad condition of the existing stock of dwellings. According to an evaluation of the stock in 1988 that is, still for the GDR government percent (2,8 million dwellings) of the existing stock were classified as not usable, further 40.0 percent (700,000 dwellings) as badly damaged (cf. Friedrichs and Kahl 1991). This decay occurred due to two factors: non-investment since 1938 and again lacking investment after 1945 due to the low rents of DM 1.15 per square meter in the GDR period. Moreover, the GDR had not launched a program for modernisation of the old housing stock, predominantly for dwellings in buildings constructed before In West Germany, such a program existed from the early 1970s, and pertained both to modernisation financed or subsidised by the local government and private investment. The latter often induced gentrification processes and the conversion of rented dwellings into condominions, especially after Due to all forecasts mentioned above, the dwindling population base in East Germany will result in a loss of income tax and an over-supply of dwellings. The latter consequence can already be observed since 1999: The number of empty buildings is estimated to amount to one million (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, July 12, 2000) and in some large housing estates buildings are torn down. 5. SOCIAL HOUSING German social housing policy is based upon two principles: financing the object, i.e. the construction of dwellings, and subsidizing the subject. i.e. giving dwelling subisidies to the household based primarily on the income of the household and number of household members. Object financing implies that the responsible private or non-profit company has to adhere to certain construction standards, such as size of the dwelling, and limit the monthly rent. Thus, dwellings are rented below the cost of construction per sqm. Loans are typically given for 25 years, and as the installments are paid back, rents can be augmented by fixed percentages. After the entire loan has been paid back, the dwelling can be rented at free market prices. The logic underlying this principle is that rent increases will correspond to real increases in income of the households. This assumption held true up to the end of the 1980s, when real income increases were close to or below zero, whereas rents in social housing dwellings increased. In this situation, cities such as Hamburg had to re-subsidize the rents of social housing dwellings (from the city s budget) to avoid a larger number of households to get expulsed from the dwelling due to their reduced incomes. This situation had the additional consequence that private investment in the construction of social housing, e.g. by life insurance companies, was reduced, often in favor of investing in office buildings. Therefore, the existing social housing dwelling stock became an even more crucial variable in housing policy and the provision of housing in the submarket for low-income households. In 1990, the Federal government intervened in the housing market by a specific decision: The tax exemptions for non-profit housing associations were dropped. The companies had to put their dwellings on the free rental market, a process that was accelerated by the fact that the associations paid back their loans earlier than necessary, thus reducing the number of social housing dwellings available. Moreover, the new social housing construction did not make up for the losses. 9

10 Although the population of Germany increased only slowly during the decade, the number of households increased, creating an additional demand on the submarkets of social and private rented dwellings. In Table 5, the consequences of the mentioned processes are exemplified for the city of Cologne. Table 5: Social Housing in Cologne, Year Stock New construction Losses* , ,615 97,972 94,551 86,060 81,645 77,871 74,699 71, ,335 1,285 1,718 1,627 1,684 1,996 2,244 1,239 1,820 2,465 3,801 3,944 5,568 6,193 3,535 2,870 1,880 * Losses due to either repayment of social housing construction funds and dwellings then turned to the private market or to demolition of substandard dwellings. Sources: Stadt Köln, Statistisches Jahrbuch 1992/93: 91; 1994/95: 72, 1996/97:72; 1999: 70. The overall result of the above mentioned processes decline in new construction of social housing dwelling and too early turn of social housing dwellings to the private market was a decline in the supply of social housing dwellings vis-a-vis an increasing demand for such dwellings resulting from the influx of foreign-born, repatriats, a rising number of unemployed and households requiring public assistance. During the 1990s, growing poverty faced a declining social housing supply, and this situation has changed little since then. 10

11 PART 2: URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS After World War II, several urban development programs and acts were passed by the Federal Government. With respect to our subject, the most important was the Urban Development Act from It pertained to urban renewal in formally defined areas, most of them located close to the city-center with a high percentage of buildings from the turn of the late 1890s. Initially aimed at physical improvement, the goals were broadened toward less demolition in favor of more reconstruction, more care for the social structures, and residents participation in the renewal process. Since 1986 the goals of renewal were defined as a continuous task in the new law, the Building Act Book. Related to those aims of urban renewal is the presently major program, "The Social City" (cf. DIFU, 1999, 2000; It was announced in 1999 and launched in March It is a joint program of the Federal government, the Ministry for Transport and Urban Affairs, and the Laender. The full title, "Urban Districts with Specific Development Needs - The Social City", indicates the basic goals of the program: to alleviate distress and promote better living conditions in urban districts. For the program, in 157 German cities a total of 210 urban areas were selected. The budget for the years amounts to 1.5 billion DM. For the years 1999 and 2000 the Federal Government funded the program with 200 mio. DM (BMVBW, 2000). The program is linked to a program of the Ministry of Youth, aimed at development measures for the youth in distressed neighborhoods. The complex administrative structure of the program is displayed in Figure 1. Forty percent of the selected neighborhoods are located at the periphery of the cities, hence, the majority are new housing settlements from the 1960s to 1980s. The size of the areas ranges from 20 to 350 hectares, the mean being 100 hectares; the average number of residents is 8.300, one third has 100,000 or more residents (Löhr, 2001: 7). The most specific feature of the program is an integrated approach comprising urban development, qualification and employment opportunities, training of youth, improvement of "social infrastructure, activation of the indigenous initiatives, stabilising the social networks and solidarity among the residents, and further measures directed towards the families and youth in the areas. The broad goals of this program were outlined by the (at that time) responsible minister Klimmt; he listed a large number of aims the program is supposed to reach: - reducing urban planning deficits, - upgrading the housing stock, - renewal of social infrastructure, - improving the transport infrastructure, - supply of more open space, - improving the overall "ecological situation", - increasing security, - addressing institutions caring for the family and the youth, - encouraging participation of the residents, - improving local employment and jobs by mobilising regional economic funds. 11

12 He mentioned some more practical measures as well, such as establishing neighbourhood management offices, assistance for small company start-ups, meeting places for the youth, meeting places for the residents, especially for the elderly, and health care centres. A further aim of the program is to encourage the residents to participate in the programs in order to change from a "culture of dependence" to a "culture of self-determination" (Löhr, 2001: 6). Interestingly, the program text does not pertain to the types of social problems and their causes in any systematic way. Instead, as examples, the problems of three urban areas are mentioned, amongst them: - lack of jobs, - high shares of unemployed and persons receiving public assistance, - high share of single-headed households, - substandard dwellings, - crime and fear of crime, - high share of ethnic minority residents. The economic and social causes remain to be explored, as well as the outcomes of such conditions of distress. Furthermore, the causes have to be specified according to their aggregate level: regional, urban or neighbourhood. The program, the specific programs and measures in the single urban districts have to be evaluated. 12

13 Figure 1: Administrative Structure of the Program The Social City Source: 13

14 PART 3: THE CITIES 1. COLOGNE Cologne covers an area of 405 sq.km with 1,011,912 inhabitants (1998). The region ("KölnRegio") extends over 2,545 sq.km with 2,131,007 inhabitants (1997). The city is divided into 85 urban districts. To these all following data refer. Table 6: Selected Socio-Economic Indicators, Cologne, 1990 and 1999 Indicator Cologne Population Population below 18 years in % years and older in % German Foreign born in % Moves into area Moves out of area Mobility per 1,000 inhabitants Households Persons per household Area in sqkm Inhabitants per sqkm Social structure Recipients of public assistance (`95) in % of population 6.2 (`95) 6.7 Unemployed in % of years old Unemployed youth (under 20 / years of age) Communal elections Participation in % Housing 1998 Dwellings Average dwelling size in sqm Social housing dwellings (`87) in % of all dwellings 24.8 (`87) 14.0 Infrastructure Crafts enterprises (1999) Medical doctors Schools >elementary level ( 99) Sources: Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Stadt Köln 1990; 14

15 The population of Cologne has remained relatively stable: It was 1,004,356 in 1980, fell to 965,274 in 1985 and then rose to 1,014,910 in 1997, then fell slightly in 1998 (cf. Table 6). The positive population balance is the result of two opposite processes: From 1980 to 1998 the German population decreased by 7.7 percent, while the foreign-born population increased by 29.5 percent. Like all other German cities, the city's growth depends on the in-migration of young adults (18-34 years) to counterbalance the population loss due to the negative natural balance. The age composition is fairly similar to the Hamburg structure, but the percentage of foreignborn is slightly higher. Cologne also has slightly larger households than Hamburg. The functional specialisation of Cologne is insurance companies and arts. The latter comprises a large number of art galleries and several outstanding museums, of which the most recent opened in January In addition, over the last 15 years the city has attracted several large television companies, which in turn led to more TV-related economic activities, such as production companies, production studios and many smaller companies serving the television companies. The city has had less problems than Hamburg with respect to old industries, since the employment base is more mixed. Nonetheless, Cologne has experienced dramatic job losses in manufacturing, in particular between 1990 and 1998, when e.g. a cable company and a chemical factory had to close down. In the entire period under study, the number of manufacturing companies declined from 450 to 311. The changes are documented by the data in Table 7. Table 7: Employed* by Selected Industry Categories, Cologne, 1980, 1990, and 1998 Year Total Manufacturing Banking/Insurance Services , , , , ,759 82,275 35,109 38,639 38,467 89, , ,235 Change in % in % +25, , , , , , , * Only employed obliged to pay social security, excluding civil servants and self-employed. Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Stadt Köln 1990: 121; 1999: The secondary sector now accounts for only 24.8 percent of the total employment. In the 1990s, Cologne's economic structure has changed more than in all other major German cities: Losses in jobs in manufacturing were more than compensated by gains of jobs in services and high-tech industries. Nonetheless, there is a mismatch, i.e. a need of highly qualified labour vs. unemployed persons with low qualifications, amongst them a large share of foreign-born. This employment mismatch is indicated by the high rate of unemployed and - compared to Hamburg - a slightly higher rate of long-term unemployed of 39.3 percent in The problem of the city is to attract more young and more qualified persons. 15

16 In both cities the number of persons receiving public assistance and the number of unemployed has increased since While the shares of persons receiving public assistance are almost identical for the two cities, the unemployment rate is higher in Cologne than in Hamburg. The spatial distribution of recipients of public assistance in Cologne is shown in Figures 2 and 3. Between 1995 and 1999 (December), the number of poverty areas increased as well as the poverty shares in many areas. In addition, Cologne has more urban districts with high shares of recipients than Hamburg. The two most distressed areas are Chorweiler in the North and Meschenich in the South-West. The latter is a coherent set of high-rise buildings, which was labelled the worst residential area in Cologne already in

17 Figure 2 17

18 Figure 3 18

19 2. HAMBURG Hamburg is the second-largest city (after Berlin) in Germany. It is a city-state, i.e. one of the German Laender. The city stretches over a large area of 755 sq.km, of which 74 sq.km are harbour area. It is the core of a large, monocentric region, with the urban agglomeration (Hamburg plus six suburban counties) of million inhabitants in (If not otherwise stated, the following analyses are based on data in: Statistisches Landesamt Hamburg 2000: Tables 1, 27, 47, 49, 52, 53, 61, and 78.) Hamburg is divided into 104 urban districts ("Stadtteile") which are further subdivided into a total of 180 urban areas ("Ortsteile"). If available, data used in the following analyses refer to the smaller urban areas. Since 1970, the city experienced two phases of population change: The population figure dropped from 1,793,640 in 1970 continuously to 1,571,267 in 1986, and then rose again to 1,704,735 by December The share of the foreign-born population grew since 1970 from 3.9 percent to 9.0 percent in 1980 to 15.4 percent in In this year, the largest group of the total of 273,086 foreign-born were the Turks with 24.7 percent. It was only after 1994 that the negative population balance of the German population was compensated by the positive migration balance of the foreign-born. With respect to the household structure, the city had 49.1 percent 1-person households in 1999 (see Table 8). The city experienced not only a positive economic change, but also a population growth. Two phases can be distinguished: From 1970 to 1986 the city continuously lost inhabitants (1,793,640 down to 1,571,267), and then - again continuously - gained almost to the 1970 figure: the number of inhabitants was 1,704, 735 by Dec. 31st, Since 1970, the number of foreign-born has increased in every year. Between 1980 and 1999, their share of the population grew from 9.0 to 15.4 percent. Of the total of 273,086 foreign-born 24.7 percent are Turkish. The negative migration balance for the German population since 1994 is outweighed by the positive migration balance of the foreign-born population (except 1998, when also the latter balance was negative). Hamburg is a traditional port city with shipbuilding, the port and port-related trade as the major sources of employment. Since the 1970s, shipbuilding and port activities declined due to the strong competition of Rotterdam. But Hamburg gained a new specialisation: it had become the centre of print media and also hosted many advertising companies. It took years to adapt to this change by introducing a new system of harbour logistics, and to add new jobs in the flourishing print media industry, which became a second stronghold of Hamburg in the specialisation of large German cities. Irrespective of the severe loss of the entire shipbuilding industry, the city was and still is one of the richest cities in the European Union. Employment changes in Hamburg for the period from 1980 to 1998 are shown in Table 9. Due to these data, employment has fallen continuously over the period under study, mainly in manufacturing, but as well in other industry categories not listed in the table. These losses were not compensated by gains in the services, although their growth was extraordinary between 1990 and This picture, however, is somewhat misleading, since it is based on the statistics for employed obliged to pay social security. It is this statistic which is most widely used since it is available for all German cities. However, civil servants and self-employed are excluded, but it is the 19

20 group of self-employed that has grown considerably over the last decade. For Hamburg, comprehensive statistical data for all employment categories ( gainfully employed ) are available, based on the national Microcensus, a one-percent population sample. Table 8: Selected Socio-Economic Indicators, Hamburg, 1990 and 1998/1999 Indicator Hamburg Population Population below 18 years in % years and older in % German Foreign born in % Moves into area Moves out of area Mobility per 1,000 inhabitants Households (`97) Persons per household Area in sq.km Inhabitants per sq.km Social structure Recipients of public assistance in % of population Unemployed in % of years old Unemployed youth (under 20 / years of age) Communal elections Participation in % Housing Dwellings Average dwelling size in sq.m Social housing dwellings in % of all dwellings 17.8 Infrastructure Crafts enterprises (1999) Retail shops (1993) Medical doctors Schools >elementary level Transport Private cars (`00) Crime Number of crimes Sources: Statistisches Jahrbuch Hamburg, various vols.; personal information from the Hamburg Statistical Office. 20

21 Using these data, Hamburg has overall gains in employment: The total number of jobs fell from 827,700 in 1970 to 748,900 in 1980, rose to 754,000 in 1990 and then increased to 786,700 in (The turning point was the year 1986.) However, jobs in manufacturing declined from 292,900 in 1970 to 170,600 in 1999, a loss of 122,300 jobs. Between 1980 and 1998 the city experienced a total loss of 36,000 jobs (-4.7 percent), mainly due to heavy losses in manufacturing. Although the city gained 48.6 percent more jobs in services (in the strict sense), these gains did not make up for the losses. Only 23.7 percent of the total employed work in the secondary sector (manufacturing and construction) today. Unemployment quotas have gone down both for the German and the foreign-born population (in brackets) since 1997 from 11.7 (22.6) to 8.3 (16.9) percent in Table 9: Employed* by Selected Industry Categories, Hamburg, 1980, 1990, and 1998 Year Total Manufacturing Banking/Insurance Services , , , , , ,599 51,849 51,690 50, , , ,362 Change in % in % -18, , , , , , * Only employed obliged to pay social security, i.e. excluding civil servants and selfemployed. Source: Statistisches Landesamt Hamburg: Hamburger Statistisches Jahrbuch. Zeitreihen und Regionalvergleiche 2000/2001. Hamburg As in most large German cities, the transition had three negative consequences: a) a rising number of unemployed, b) a rising number of persons receiving public assistance, and c) an increase of the city s debt, which in turn required increased financial means to pay the interest rates for the credits taken from the financial market. The following figures document these processes: a) The number of unemployed increased until 1997, then fell from 11.7 percent to 8.3 percent in 2000 for the German, and from 22.6 to 16.9 percent for the foreign-born population. b) The number of persons receiving continuous public assistance increased from 17,560 in 1970 to 39,816 in 1980, to 104,627 in 1990, and to 144,426 in It should be noted, however, that the number fell after a peak of 159,681 in the year c) The city s debt increased almost steadily since Then, the debt was million DM, by 1980 it was million DM, by 1990 it amounted to million DM and rose to million DM in Interest payments made up for 10.3 percent of the entire budget. Hence, the city s budget is restrained in spite of the wealth of parts of its inhabitants. It should be noted, that the economic problems aggravated until the mid-1990s. Thereafter, the conditions clearly improved, as the data in Table 9 show. The positive change in Hamburg is underscored not only by a decrease in the number of persons receiving public assistance, 21

22 but also by a decrease in the number of long-term unemployed. From 1998 to 2000, their number fell from 32,440 to 24,909. The long-term unemployed made up for 35.4 percent of all unemployed. The severe economic transition may have been successful, but it has led to greater social polarisation, as Alisch and Dangschat (1998; Ch. 6) concluded from their Hamburg data of the mid-1990s. Given the more recent changes described above, it may thus be possible that social polarisation in Hamburg, will be reduced. The changes in the number of recipients of public assistance in Hamburg are shown in Figures 3 and 4. Data refer to 104 urban districts in Figure 3. For Figure 4, it was possible to break the data down to the level of 180 urban areas ( Ortsteile ). In contrast to Cologne, the share of recipients has declined in many urban districts, although not in the two areas included in our study, Heimfeld and Jenfeld. Most of the "poverty" areas are in the southern part of Hamburg, i.e. south of the river Elbe. The two 1999 districts with 20 percent and more recipients belong to St. Pauli and Altona-Altstadt. 22

23 Figure 4 23

24 Figure 5 24

25 3. CONCLUSIONS FROM COLOGNE AND HAMBURG NEIGHBOURHOOD DATA The indicators presented in the foregoing tables are representative of the type of data available in Germany for urban districts. However, these indicators, with the exception of those on unemployment and recipients of public assistance, do not reveal the problems that plague the inhabitants and have led the urban officials to define a given neighbourhood as "distressed", "deprived or comprising above city-average shares of "multi-problem families". Obviously, we need other, and, moreover, qualitative, data to describe and better understand such areas. Presumably, this gap between statistical data and information about the living conditions in such areas does exist in all areas under scrutiny in the UGIS project. If this assumption is valid, we have to look for other data in almost all of the deprived areas. More specifically, we have to include data and information from sources such as social workers or eventually conduct primary research in these areas. Otherwise, we may simply underestimate the problems the inhabitants envisage, and, suggest inadequate measures to alleviate the living conditions of residents in short, our advice would fall short of reality. The aggregate statistical data cannot account for the internal heterogeneity of the residents of deprived areas although such a differentiation clearly exists, be it on the basis of poverty coping strategies (as shown by Tobias and Boettner 1992) or with respect to attitudes towards deviant behaviour (Friedrichs and Blasius 2000). Since in-depth knowledge of the problems in neighbourhoods defined or labelled as deprived and adequate measures to combat the problems are strongly correlated, we depend upon detailed data on such areas, since otherwise, to reiterate, measures are bound to fail or to be inappropriate for the targeted groups in the area. The following descriptions of the deprived areas under study will supply more details on the forms of deprivation. 25

26 PART 4: NEIGHBOURHOODS AND PROGRAMS In both cities, two neighbourhoods were selected on the basis of their deprivation. I will first briefly characterise the areas, then discuss their change in the period, and finally describe the programs and measures for these areas. From the federal budget Soziale Stadt for the years 1999 and 2000 Cologne-Chorweiler received DM 403,000, Cologne-Kalk DM 5,891,000 DM and Hamburg-Heimfeld DM 800,000 (BMVBW, 2000). 1. COLOGNE In Cologne, Chorweiler and Kalk were selected for our study. Chorweiler is located at the northern fringe of Cologne. Built in the 1970s, it is characterised by a predominantly residential function, multi-story-buildings and high-rises. In Chorweiler high population density and a concentration of foreign-born and deprived groups are distinguishing marks. This planned settlement, intended to introduce a new form of residential area, trying to create urbanity by density (as the respective national program was titled), had problems right from the start on. Especially in the 1980s, many structural problems became obvious (cf. ILS, 2000: 203): selective out-moves by the better-off, vacant apartments, run-down buildings, deteriorated spaces and insufficient social and cultural facilities. Last but not least, Chorweiler and its inhabitants were suffering from an extremely bad image in the public opinion. Kalk is situated three km east of the Cologne downtown. It is a former working class area, heavily affected by deindustrialisation. The building structure is marked by buildings from the turn of the 20th century ( Gründerzeit ) and from the 1950s and 1960s. After the loss of its economical basis with the closure of major industrial enterprises, e.g. the Chemical Factory Kalk (CFK) in 1993 and a cable company ( Felten & Guillaume ), 19 percent of the area lay idle (80 hectares). Between 1990 and 1995 the area lost 10,000 jobs (ILS, 2000: 211). Moreover, social problems, such as high unemployment rates, vandalism and drug abuse were increasing. 26

27 Table 10: Selected Indicators for Cologne Chorweiler and Kalk, 1990 and 1999 Indicator Chorweiler Kalk Population below 18 years in % years and older in % German Foreign born in % Moves into area Moves out of area Mobility per 1,000 inhab Households Persons per household Area in sq.km Inhabitants per sq.km Social structure Recipients of public assistance in % of population Unemployed in % of years old Unemployed youth (under years of age) Communal elections Participation in % Housing Dwellings Average dwelling size in sq.m Social housing dwellings (`87) (`87) in % of all dwellings 89.1 (`87) (`87) 21.1 Infrastructure Crafts enterprises 12 (`95) 89 (`95) Retail shops Medical doctors Schools > elementary level Transport Private cars Sources: Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Stadt Köln 1990; personal information. As documented by the data in Table 10, both areas experienced population decline, an increase in the share of the older population, and an increase in the share of the foreign-born, adding to the already high shares of foreign-born. Furthermore, we find a high mobility in 27

28 both areas, which may be interpreted in the vain of early Chicago school sociologists (Burgess, amongst others) as an indicator of low social control. The economic situation is precarious in both areas. In Kalk, the unemployment rate even rose over the last decade. The housing conditions differ in the two areas. In Kalk, the percentage of social housing is significantly lower than in Chorweiler, which is due to the fact that Kalk is an old and grown area, while Chorweiler a newly constructed housing estate. In sum, for the indicators selected, both areas exhibit serious problems. These problems and the planning measures are listed in greater detail below. Chorweiler. Between 1987 and 1997 a program ("Ergänzungsprogramm Köln-Chorweiler") was set up, aiming to stabilise the neighborhood. Altogether, 63 measures, most of them typical instruments of urban renewal, were implemented, and 36 mio. DM invested. The most important measures were: - restyling of buildings and courtyards, - physical improvement of green spaces and playing fields, - improved attractiveness of sidewalks, cycle tracks and public squares, - modernising the underground train station, - reduction of traffic and of street spaces, - better access to buildings for disabled persons, - self-help facilities as a neighbourhood meeting place ("Anwohner-Café") and a bicycle-, wheelchair repair and sewing workshop, - a new building for craftsmen ("Handwerkerhof"), - modernization of the shopping-mall in cooperation with private investors. In 1995, an action concept was launched for the social stabilisation of the area. This concept included: - consultation about occupational career and qualification for foreign-born adolescent, - care of unemployed youth in youth facilities, - support of foreign-born girls in terms of occupational orientation and preparation, - events, cultural and group activities for children and juveniles, - co-ordination and support of the self-help facilities. An update of the action program, now called Chorweiler-Programm, for the years 2000 to 2004 includes a spatial extension of the area to the northern parts of Chorweiler, where an improvement is still necessary.(ils, 2000: 208). The most important goal remains the improvement of the living conditions of the youth. Therefore, a therapy centre for the adolescent with paedagogigal care and training opportunities is planned. Kalk. In order to stabilise the area in social and economic terms, an action concept ("Handlungskonzept Köln-Kalk") was proposed in The three most important aims were - reconstruction of the economic and employment basis with future-oriented jobs, - maintaining the stability and supplementation of the residential function, - intensification of the social-cultural networks. 28

29 The following actions were taken: - construction of 150 apartments and a new kindergarten with full-day care on an abandoned industrial site, - renovation of old industrial buildings, - reuse of industrial buildings as a theatre/museum ("Halle Kalk") and a design centre, - new building of a technology park ("Rechtsrheinisches TechnologieZentrum"), - a new institution for industry-wide training for 1,000 apprentices, - workshop for 145 disabled persons, - a building for trade and craftsmen ( Gewerbe- und Handwerkerhof ), - a pavilion for social work with juveniles, - physical improvement of the residential areas, - a new institution to activate self-help potential and improve communication between grassroots organizations, firms etc., - numerous social and cultural projects, e.g. for children, against violence and drug abuse, to maintain the industrial history. 2. HAMBURG When comparing Heimfeld to Jenfeld, it should be noted that the data for Heimfeld in Table 11 refer to a larger administrative area than the actual deprived area. In both areas, the foreign-born population increased by number and by its share as well. In contrast to the two Cologne neighborhoods, the share of the population below 18 years did not decrease. Judged on the basis of the indicators selected, Jenfeld seems to be the more distressed area, since it has a declining population, out-moves exceed the in-moves into the area, the percentage of unemployed is far above the city level and higher than in Heimfeld, and it is more densely settled. Furthermore, it has a higher share of social housing which may be one of the reasons for the higher mobility. Hamburg-Heimfeld The smaller area "Heimfeld-Nord" is part of the urban district Heimfeld. It is located in the South of Hamburg, Hamburg-Harburg. It is a former working class area, many of the blue collar workers having jobs in the Hamburg harbour. The major problems are the age structure, a high percentage of foreign-born (the majority of them Turks), and high rates of unemployed and recipients of public assistance. There are as well problems of alcohol and drug abuse, vandalism and fear of crime. Measures started in 1995 under the program "Poverty Defeat". This program was evaluated in The ongoing measures are part of the new Federal government program "Social City". 29