CONTEXT ANALYSIS AND HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE

Transcription

1 CONTEXT ANALYSIS AN HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs P.O. Box Jerusalem Phone: +972 (0) / Fax: +972 (0) ochaot@un.org Web:

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3 Table of Content Executive Summary Changes in the Context and the Humanitarian Consequences Reasons for the Humanitarian ecline Increased Israeli security and other access measures The Palestinian Authority fiscal crisis Rising internal insecurity The Immediate Humanitarian Imact of Israel s Intensified Policies and the PA Fiscal Crisis A shar rise in unemloyment and increased overty Vulnerable grous Coing with the Crisis at the Local Level Palestinian Authority Household coing mechanisms Private sector The Most Likely Scenario for Review of the Common Humanitarian Action Plan Summary CAP 2006 funding analysis Humanitarian resonse strategy uiding rinciles and criteria for adjusting humanitarian interventions Revised Strategic Priorities Revised Sector Resonse Plans Job creation and cash assistance Food security Agriculture Health Psychosocial suort and child rotection Water and sanitation Education Coordination services Revised Project Overview Breakdown by Aealing Agency Breakdown by Sector Aendix International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Persective... 31

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5 Executive Summary The humanitarian outlook for the occuied Palestinian territory (opt) looks extremely bleak and is redicted to worsen dramatically in the coming months. Faced with this situation, the United Nations and select non-governmental organisations have taken the unrecedented ste of revising their aeal for humanitarian assistance to Palestinians from $215 million to $385 million. This revised emergency Aeal is aimed at heling the most needy articularly children who make u half the Palestinian oulation. There is a need to extend basic health needs, deleted medical sulies, an increase food relief and create temorary jobs that are urgently needed. It cannot nor does it aim to relace the comrehensive range of services rovided by the Palestinian Authority (PA). Humanitarian assistance can lug some of the gas as they emerge to hel suort a continuation of services. It can cushion and slow a deeening of the humanitarian crisis, but it cannot revent it. This emergency revision is in resonse to the imact of the fiscal crisis facing the PA and its negative effect on the oulation. Following the Hamas victory in the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections in January, Israel halted the transfer of Palestinian Value Added Tax (VAT) and customs taxes it is obligated to ass over which comrise around half of the PA monthly budget. Western donor funding was also susended to the new PA ending its agreement to Quartet rinciles relating to non-violence, the recognition of Israel and an accetance of revious agreements. In addition, the banking sector, fearful of litigation, has effectively frozen PA and some rivate sector accounts. PA revenues have droed by 75% comared with 2005 and salaries to over 152,000 PA emloyees have not been aid since March. These civil service wages directly suort another one million eole, or more than 25% of the Palestinian oulation. Survey data indicates that after only two months of going without salaries, PA emloyees have grown oorer more quickly than the general oulation. P is estimated to fall by 27% by the end of 2006 and overty redicted to rise sharly. Around 70% of aza s otential workforce, for examle, will either be out of work or go without ay made u of the 40% currently unemloyed, the loss of PA salaries and further job cuts through the contraction of the economy and the loss of work in Israel. The lack of salaries and essential sulies will undermine the delivery of key services that served the bulk of the Palestinian oulation. The PA oerates 62% of rimary health clinics, all the major general hositals, 75% of rimary and secondary schools and rovides social and relief services to 45,000 families who are chronically unable to suort themselves. Israeli-Palestinian violence continues with a mounting death toll on both sides. A combination of ower struggles within and between security services comounded by the non-ayment of security sector salaries is leading to an increase in internal insecurity, civil disorder and factional violence. A rise in criminality and lawlessness will further undermine rivate investment and could jeoardise aid deliveries. The fiscal crisis comes hard on the heels of tighter restrictions on Palestinian movement that Israel notes are needed to rotect its citizens against militant attacks which have further fragmented the opt and hamered economic growth. UN attemts to deliver humanitarian assistance have also been interruted. Palestinians and their goods are no longer able to move freely within the West Bank and are banned from entering many areas such as the Jordan Valley. Imorts into aza from Israel are functioning at minimal levels and exorts in the ast two months have droed to just six trucks a day. 1 In late 2005 when the UN s Aeal for 2006 was launched requesting $215 million, the outlook aeared more ositive. To date, $71 million of that Aeal has been funded, or only about 36% of the 1 Between 1 Aril 29 May 2006 according to PalTrade. 1

6 total requested. This revised Aeal, builds further on the original key elements. It is founded on a coordinated aroach by articiating organisations and Palestinian counterarts to ensure the successful targeting and reaching of Palestinian eole most in need. Although UN agencies are aealing for funds, it is recognised that under the Fourth eneva Convention, Israel as the occuying ower, bears the legal resonsibility for the welfare of the Palestinian oulation. The Quartet noted in May 2006 that the PA must fulfill its resonsibilities with resect to basic human needs and rovision of services. Over the ast decade, the PA has fulfilled this role with the assistance of the international community. However, should the PA be unable to rovide basic services to the Palestinian oulation, it could result in a renewed emhasis on Israel s legal resonsibilities. Most of the new funding being sought is in the sectors of temorary jobs and cash assistance to the most vulnerable, medical sulies to PA institutions and food to the growing most at-risk grous identified by UNRWA and WFP. It will alleviate some of the worst effects of the deeening humanitarian crisis, but a lasting solution lies in a fully functioning PA and the easing of movement restrictions on Palestinians. CAP 2006 Financial Requirements - 31 May Focus on Additional Requirements er Sector Emergency Jobs / Cash Assistance (+ $ 73.5 million) Total CAP Revised Requirements $ 385 million + $ 170 million Health (+ $ 39.9 million) Food (+ $ 30.8 million) CAP Original Requirements $ 215 million CAP Funding Received $ 71 million (36%) Agriculture (+ $ 10.5 million) Coordination / Emergency Caacity (+ $ 6.4 million) Education (+ $ 4.2 million) Psychosocial Suort (+ $ 2.3 million) Water (+ $ 1.8 million) 2

7 1. Changes in the Context and the Humanitarian Consequences This revision to the Consolidated Aeal of 2006 is a consequence of the dramatic downturn in the humanitarian situation in the first half of 2006, and the exectation that this downturn is likely to be sustained for the remainder of the year. At the end of 2005 the rosects were more ubeat. A eriod of calm was announced in February by Palestinian militants. Israel had withdrawn settlers and military infrastructure from within the aza Stri and arts of the northern West Bank in Setember. And the aointment of James Wolfensohn as Quartet Envoy for isengagement had injected further economic imetus into the stagnating Palestinian economy. Although these initiatives had yet to bear fruit in terms of imrovements on the ground, the forecast aeared ositive and the 2006 Consolidated Aeal Process (CAP) was drafted with a more transitional and rehabilitative focus. The downturn in the humanitarian situation has been romted by the following key olitical, security and economic develoments: The victory of the Hamas arty in the PLC elections held in January 2006 resulted in the forming of a new government. 2 An intensification of Israeli security and other access measures in the opt since late 2005 making life for Palestinians significantly more difficult. Israel has stated that these tightened restrictions are imlemented to rotect its citizens from Palestinian militant attacks. The overnment of Israel (oi) refusal to ass on to the PA VAT and customs taxes worth roughly $60m er month, in contravention of the 1994 Paris Protocol. 3 The susension of suort to the PA by western donors, ending the PA s commitment to the rinciles of non-violence, recognition of Israel, and accetance of revious agreements and obligations, including the Roadma, which were laid down by the Quartet, consisting of the Euroean Union, UN, Russia and the United States, on 30 January. 4 A fiscal crisis in the Palestinian Authority (PA) ensued. This not only jeoardises access to essential services and PA salaries, but also undermines the investment of over $7 billion in aid to the PA since the Oslo Accords in A banking crisis ensued triggered by banks fear of litigation, effectively freezing PA accounts and resulting in a severe limitation of financial transactions involving both the PA and the rivate sector. The PA is oerating at roughly 25% of its regular budget. A rise in tensions between Fatah and Hamas, as well other factions, articularly following the deloyment of a Hamas-dominated 3000-strong armed force. The UN, concerned about the humanitarian risks osed by the worsening of the situation, released a reort in Aril outlining the otential imacts of the shift in Israel s and Western donors olicies towards the opt, many of which are now being realised. 5 UN agencies have been evaluating additional humanitarian needs and have clearly stated that while it is ossible to uscale humanitarian oerations, neither they nor NOs have the caacity or mandates to substitute for PA services. 2 On January , Palestinian legislative elections were held for the first time since The Hamas list, under the name Change and Reform, won 74 of the 132 seats in the PLC. The new legislative council met for the first time on 18 February and the new government took office on 28 March. 3 Transfers from Israel amount to aroximately $60 million er month and make u roughly 50% of PA revenues, while foreign aid and local revenues rovide the two main other sources. 4 On that date, the Quartet indicated that it was inevitable that future assistance to any new [Palestinian] government would be reviewed by donors against that government s commitment to these rinciles. Certain rograms under the jurisdiction of the Presidency, however, continued to receive funding from these sources. 5 UN, Assessment of the future humanitarian risks in the occuied Palestinian territory, 11 Aril

8 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs West Bank Closure and Access CAP Revised Emergency Aeal May 2006 Closures Ç Checkoint Ç Partial Checkoint ") Road Protection Fence Palestinian Areas MEITERRANEAN SEA aza Stri EYPT THE WEST BANK BARRIER: A comlex series of concrete walls, electronic fences, observation towers, trenches, atrol roads and razor wire, used to control Palestinian edestrian and vehicular CLOSURE: Road ate Earthmound Roadblock èèèèèèèèèè Earth Wall Trench Builtu ISRAEL West Bank JORAN A olicy of hysical barriers and ermit requirements used to control Palestinian edestrian and vehicular movement. Barrier route extracted from satellite imagery and verified with field observations - as of 15 May Planned Barrier route based on Israeli overnment ma (Ministry of efence/seam Zone Authority), 30 Aril S e a e a d West Bank Barrier Constructed Under Construction Planned Route Roads Prohibited or Restricted Palestinian vehicle use Regional or Main Other Road Israeli Settlements Settlement Evacuated Settlement Outost Settlement Municial Area Qalqiliya The designations emloyed and the resentation of material on this ma do not imly the exression of any oinion whatsoever on the art of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. èèèè è " ) Tubas Tulkarm Ç Ç " )" ) Ç Ç " ) " Nablus ) Ç " " " " " ) ) ) ) ) " Ç Ç ") Ç Salfit ") )" Ç ") ") ") Ç ") ") èèèèè E èèè è èèèèèèèè è èè èèè " ) " " " ) ) ) ") "" )) Ç Ramallah ") "" )) Ç Ç Ç Ç Ç ") Jerusalem ") ") " Ç Ç ) Ç Ç Ç Bethlehem " Ç " ) Ç ) Ç " ") ) Ç ") ") Hebron " ) " ) Ç " ") ") Ç " ) ") Ç Ç EE E E E E E EEE E E EE E EE E E E E E E EE E E E EEE E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E Jenin E èè E Kilometers United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Cartograhy: OCHA - opt - May Base data: PA MoP, July 2000, OCHA udate 2006 For comments contact <ochaot@un.org> or Tel (02) htt:// E èèèèè ") E Jericho ")

9 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Territorial fragmentation of the West Bank CAP Revised Emergency Aeal May 2006 LEEN TRISECTION BOUNARIES Jenin ENCLAVE BOUNARIES CONSTRUCTE AN PLANNE BARRIER 1949 ARMISTICE LINE (reen Line) Tulkarm Tubas MEITERRANEAN SEA Qalqiliya Nablus aza Stri West Bank S e a e a d Salfit ISRAEL Ramallah Jericho EYPT JORAN Jerusalem TERRITORIAL FRAMENTATION A combination of checkoints, hysical obstacles and a ermit system has effectively cut the West Bank into three distinct areas in addition to East Jerusalem. Within these areas further enclaves have been created also bordered by checkoints and roadblocks that has led to one Palestinian community being isolated from its neighbour. Hebron Bethlehem The Jordan Valley is ractically cut off to Palestinians from the rest of the West Bank. And, over the ast year, rogressively fewer Palestinians have been able to obtain ermits to visit closed areas land to the west of the West Bank Barrier. Kilometers The designations emloyed and the resentation of material on this ma do not imly the exression of any oinion whatsoever on the art of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Cartograhy: OCHA - opt - May Base data: PA MoP, July 2000, OCHA udate 2006 For comments contact <ochaot@un.org> or Tel (02) htt://

10 1.1. Reasons for the Humanitarian ecline Increased Israeli security and other access measures Internal and external closures Restrictions on Palestinian internal movement have increased. In the West Bank, the numbers of roadblocks and checkoints have increased from a low of 376 immediately rior to Israeli disengagement in Setember last year to 515 in mid-may OCHA observed as early as August last year that inter-regional movement was increasingly difficult for the vast majority of the West Bank oulation (Figure 1) as a combination of checkoints, hysical obstacles and a ermit system had effectively trisected the West Bank, leading to an increase in transortation costs. In 2006, OCHA has reorted that movement within regions has been further restricted with the creation of enclaves that has lead to the isolation of Palestinian communities. 7 Figure 1: Reasons for difficulties in accessing worklace for West Bank residents Inability to obtain ermit to move within the West Bank 58% Inability to obtain ermits to travel to Israel and East Jerusalem 66% High transortation costs 46% Physical obstacles within the West Bank 78% Physical obstacles reventing access to Israel and East Jerusalem 64% Increased travel time 46% Source: IUE Poll 10 (unublished data, May 2006) Access to basic services and markets is curtailed as a result of Israel s increased security and access restrictions. A oll conducted by the Institut universitaire d études du déveloement (IUE) of the University of eneva 8 in Aril/May this year just two months after PA salaries stoed found that almost one-third of resondents (31.4%) who did not access health services stated that this was due to closures and the West Bank Barrier. Israel continues to searate itself from the West Bank and aza Stri. This includes the severe limiting of access and ermits for Palestinians to work in Israel that, rior to the intifada, was a major source of income to Palestinians 9 (Figure 2). Figure 2: Erez crossing Average daily labour movement Jun 05 Jul 05 Aug 05 Se 05 Oct 05 Nov 05 ec 05 Jan 06 Feb 06 Mar 06 Ar 06 May Workers to Israel 3,588 1, ,200 1, ,698 1, Traders to Israel Source: Palestinian National Security Forces Karni crossing the rincial oint for goods entering and the only oints for goods exiting the aza Stri - has been subject to frequent closure throughout the first four months of Israel cites security concerns for the closure of the crossing which has led to Karni being closed for 44% of the year or a total of 59 days, as of 30 May. 11 The soradic oening of Karni throughout much of 2006, during March in articular, led to essential food commodities, including wheat flour, fruits and dairy roducts, being unavailable or in short suly. Even when Karni has been oen, successive closures have meant that imorts have been meeting daily requirements only and stockiles remain deleted. 6 UN, Thirteenth reort on the Imlementation of the Agreement on Movement and Access, 23 May OCHA, Territorial Fragmentation of the West Bank, May Since 2001, UN agencies in the opt have funded the IUE to conduct a oll on Palestinian ercetions of their living conditions. This data can be used to analyse changes in the situation over time and is one of the few sources of currently available information on the situation in External closure on the opt had been imosed between 16 ecember 2005 and mid-january A comrehensive external closure of the opt was instituted on 12 March, originally coinciding with the Jewish holiday of Purim..The closure for all workers and traders with valid ermits to enter Israel remained in lace in the West Bank until 8 May and is still enforced in the aza Stri 10 As of 26 May This does not include artial closure days, such as days with limited oening hours and/or days in which the crossing was only oen in one direction i.e. only for imorted goods. 4

11 The aza exort market has been devastated because of Karni s closure. The average daily number of truckloads of goods through Karni crossing was just six truckloads a day in the last two months. 12 The Palestine Economic eveloment Comany (PEC), for examle, that was established to use the former settlement greenhouses, has exorted less than 20% of its roduce since 1 January 2006 and estimates its losses to be more than $9 million. The Palestine Trade Centre (PalTrade) has estimated daily Palestinian exort losses at $600,000. The frequent closure of Karni is desite the 15 November Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA) which set a daily goal of 150 truckloads of exorted goods by The West Bank Barrier The construction of the Barrier in the West Bank has rogressed raidly. 13 On 30 Aril 2006, the Israeli Cabinet aroved a revised route of the Barrier that it has stated is designed to revent militant attacks on Israeli civilians. 14 Once comleted, the total length of the new Barrier will be 703km comared with 670km of the revious route, of which 362km have been comleted. 15 This route includes the sections around the Ma ale Adumim settlement and the Ar iel and Emmanuel fingers. Just 20% of the Barrier s route runs along the reen Line (1949 Armistice Line) the remainder lies inside the West Bank, u to 22 km at the oint around Ar iel settlement bloc. Contrary to the oi s statements that the Barrier will not result in changes in land ownershi or access to land divided by the Barrier, Palestinian movement through the Barrier has become more restricted, with new controls on eligibility for alications to access land in the closed areas between the reen Line and the Barrier and the unreliable oeration of the Barrier gates. 16 The viability of livelihoods based in the area between the reen Line and the Barrier is increasingly in question. According to the latest IUE oll, 5% of the West Bank oulation has been forced to move due to the imact of the Barrier. In 2006, the IF has continued to requisition land for new and exanded IF infrastructure such as checkoints and road barriers and for fences and buffer zones around Israeli settlements. 17 The latest oll conducted by the IUE found that one in four West Bank Palestinians are searated from their relatives by the Barrier (Figure 3). Figure 3: Imact of the Barrier on Palestinian livelihoods 40% 30% % 10% 0% Searation from relatives Searation from land Prevention of job access Cutting land from water ifficulty accessing basic services ifficulty marketing agricultural roduce ifficulty farming Increased the rice of inuts and transort ifficulty obtaining some food items Source: IUE Poll 10 (unublished data, May 2006) 12 Between 1 Aril 29 May 2006 according to PalTrade. 13 The Barrier consists of a combination of ditches, trenches, road barriers, razor wire, electronic fences and concrete walls. The Head of the Knesset Economics Committee estimated that the Barrier will cost $3.4 billion. For further analysis of the humanitarian imlications of the revised Barrier route, see OCHA Preliminary Analysis of the Humanitarian Imlication of Aril 2006 Barrier Projections, (June 2006, forthcoming). 14 The route of the Barrier was articularly changed in Qalqiliya and Salfit governorates resulting in creation of two fingers around the Ar iel bloc in the northern West Bank. By creating two fingers instead of one, the new Barrier route forms three territorially continuous areas between settlements dee inside the West Bank and Israel. The new route creates one new enclave with a Palestinian oulation of over 11,500. In addition, an area of West Bank land, home to 36,300 Palestinians, is now located between the two settlement fingers and with limited access in and out of the area. 15 As of 30 Aril 2006, 362km (51%) of the Barrier has been comleted, and 38 km (13%) is under construction. 16 OCHA, Humanitarian imact of the West Bank Barrier Udate No. 6 Crossing the Barrier Palestinian Access to Agricultural Land (January 2006). 17 ata obtained from Israeli military requisition orders reorted in the OCHA Weekly Briefing Notes. 5

12 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs West Bank Barrier CAP Revised Emergency Aeal May 2006 LEEN COMPLETE KM UNER CONSTRUCTION - 88 KM PLANNE KM* TOTAL BARRIER LENTH: 703 KM Jenin ROA PROTECTION - 25 KM* *Included in lanned Barrier length AREA LOCATE BETWEEN THE BARRIER AN THE REEN LINE Tulkarm Tubas MEITERRANEAN SEA Qalqiliya Nablus aza Stri West Bank S e a e a d Salfit ISRAEL Ramallah Jericho EYPT JORAN Jerusalem BARRIER ROUTE The Barrier s total length is 703 km, aroximately twice the length of the 1949 West Bank Armistice Line (reen Line) adjacent to Israel. 20% of the Barrier s length runs along the reen Line Bethlehem BARRIER AREA AREA AFFECTE 10.1% of the West Bank and East Jerusalem Hebron 142,130 acres or 57,518 hectares Barrier route extracted from satellite imagery and verified with field observations - as of 15 May Planned Barrier route based on Israeli overnment ma (Ministry of efence/seam Zone Authority), 30 Aril The designations emloyed and the resentation of material on this ma do not imly the exression of any oinion whatsoever on the art of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Kilometers United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Cartograhy: OCHA - opt - May Base data: PA MoP, July 2000, OCHA udate 2006 For comments contact <ochaot@un.org> or Tel (02) htt://

13 A rising threat to lives and roerty Casualties The hysical rotection of civilians and their roerty continued to deteriorate in In the first five months of 2006, 117 Palestinians were killed, including 21 children and four women, and 844 injured by Israeli forces and settlers. 18 This is comared to 223 Palestinian deaths and 1,339 injuries during 2005 (Figure 4). The number of Israeli deaths and injuries in 2006 has also increased comared to Three suicide bombings 19 in 2006 have killed 14 Israelis and internationals and injured 88 others. In the aza Stri, 53 Palestinian deaths and 130 injuries were the result of IF artillery shelling and missile strikes, 20 articularly in the northern areas which have often killed innocent civilians, including women and children. Between 28 March and 24 May, 259 homemade rockets were fired at targets inside Israel from the aza Stri. The IF has resonded with over 6,193 artillery shells and 45 air strikes, mostly targeting the northern aza Stri. In the West Bank, Palestinians have been killed and injured in articular in IF search and arrest oerations against Palestinian militants in the northern West Bank. Figure 4: Palestinian and Israeli casualties in 2005 and Palestinian deaths Israeli deaths Average 2005 Jan-06 Feb-06 Mar-06 Ar-06 May Palestinain injuries Israeli injuries Average 2005 Jan-06 Feb-06 Mar-06 Ar-06 May-06 Source: OCHA Weekly Briefing Notes Infrastructure and roerty Palestinian homes, buildings and other structures continue to be demolished and damaged by IF and Israeli authorities in 2006, articularly in the aza Stri. Increased IF artillery shelling and IAF missile strikes have demolished and artially damaged at least 18 structures in the aza Stri, January 23 May On 19 January, an attack in Tel Aviv injured 28 eole; on 17 Aril an attack in Tel Aviv killed seven Israelis and four internationals and injured 60 others; on 30 March an attack in a northern West Bank settlement killed four Israelis. 20 Israeli artillery shells killed eight Palestinians and injured 71 others and missile strikes killed 45 Palestinians and injured 59. Eight Israelis have been injured by homemade rockets fired from inside the aza Stri during 2006 including two IF soldiers. 6

14 articularly in the northern areas. 21 Infrastructure has also been destroyed and damaged including roads, bridges, a recreational stadium and the PA security comound in aza city. Citing the lack of roer building ermits, the Israeli authorities in the West Bank have continued to enforce the olicy of demolitions of Palestinian structures, demolishing 97 structures and leaving at least 127 eole homeless. Humanitarian access Humanitarian access, including access for ambulances and aid workers, worsened in 2006 throughout the opt. In the first four months of 2006, Palestinian Red Crescent Society (PRCS) reorted 57 access incidents at IF fixed and temorary checkoints in the West Bank, including ten denials of access, 22 mostly occurring in the northern West Bank. Figure 5: Humanitarian access (Setember 2005 Aril 2006) 100 ambulance access incidents humanitarian organisations access incidents Se-05 Oct-05 Nov-05 ec-05 Jan-06 Feb-06 Mar-06 Ar-06 Source: PRCS, UNRWA monthly reorts and ACIS forms. This year has also seen the deterioration in access for humanitarian organisations including the UN. In the West Bank, humanitarian organisations filed 289 access reorts in the first four months of Increasingly, UN staff in the West Bank are being asked to adhere to different checking rocedures, in articular entering Jerusalem, desite revious agreements with the Israeli authorities. Palestinian staff of UN agencies are increasingly being requested to be searated from international staff and undergo searate searches and assage rocedures, contrary to UN olicies. In addition, during eriods of closure, the movement of Palestinian staff is further restricted. UN ersonnel have also exerienced increasing movement restrictions into the aza Stri caused by changes in oi oerating rocedures. Since early 2006, national ersonnel have been required to move on foot through Erez crossing into the aza Stri, and in May a new search rocedure was instituted for blue UN Laissez Passer (UNLP) holders leaving in vehicles. Both of these measures are contrary to UN olicy and, as a result, national staff have not been able to leave the aza Stri for the last four months and international staff have faced increased difficulties in crossing. The frequent closure of Karni crossing in 2006 has hamered UN agencies oerations in the aza Stri. UN Agencies are finding it difficult to transort their relief sulies through the crossing oint. In addition, restrictions on the transit of commercial goods into the aza Stri are hamering the imlementation of UN rogrammes, reliant on urchasing imorted goods, such as UNP s labour intensive infrastructure rogrammes. The situation in the aza Stri became dire in March with, for 21 In ecember 2005, the IF declared large areas of the northern aza Stri a no-go area or an enlarged buffer zone and movement in and out of this area is restricted to residents and international organizations. The IF has also imosed a security area ranging from 150 to 500m wide in the aza Stri s northern and eastern borders. 22 This figure includes only delays in ambulance access of more than 30 minutes following the commitment given by the oi to Ms. Caroline Bertini in OCHA is tasked with monitoring these Bertini Commitments, see OCHA Humanitarian Udates for monthly monitoring of the imlementation by the oi of the Bertini Commitments. Since Setember 2005, the number of access incidents reorted by the PRCS has steadily increased. 7

15 examle, both UNRWA and WFP reorting roblems delivering food aid and wheat flour sulies. 23 In Aril, UNICEF was unable to deliver humanitarian sulies to the aza Stri including equiment for the Ministry of Education and vaccine equiment such as refrigerators and other medical sulies to the Ministry of Health The Palestinian Authority fiscal crisis PA VAT and customs transfers and donor ayments make u about 75% of the PA budget. The loss of these two income sources, together with banks refusal to transfer funds to the PA, have seriously undermined the functioning of the PA institutions, with severe humanitarian consequences Rising internal insecurity Within the opt, the non-ayment of 70,000 armed PA security ersonnel has led to a highly volatile situation and a rise in factionalism, illustrated by the deloyment in May of a 3000-strong armed force (the Executive Suort Force ) in the aza Stri, created by the Minister of the Interior but declared illegal by the President. Since the ublication of the CAP 2006, lawlessness and internal strife have intensified in the aza Stri. Since January 2006, there have been 85 family or factional feuding incidents, killing 35 adults and one child and injuring 169 adults and 24 children. There have also been 64 attacks against ublic institutions in the aza Stri which left 100 eole injured, six of them children. 24 The escalation of internal violence is, at least in art, the result of the non-ayment of security staff salaries. 25 It is estimated that twice as many security forces are emloyed in the aza Stri as the West Bank The Immediate Humanitarian Imact of Israel s Intensified Policies and the PA Fiscal Crisis A shar rise in unemloyment and increased overty According to a oll conducted in May 2006 by IUE, 70% of the oulation is living in overty, rising from 68% in 2005 and aroximately 30% before the intifada. 27 Poverty is exected to further increase this year. Currently, unemloyment stands at 31% but is exected by the World Bank to almost double by the end of Between the 4 th quarter of 2005 and the 1 st quarter of 2006, the unemloyment rate increased by six ercentage oints to 40% in the aza Stri. 29 Many PA civil servants in schools, hositals and ministries, are still emloyed and go to work desite not receiving wages for thee months. More than 152,000 eole are emloyed by the PA 30 but it is likely that many will sto working if salaries continue to go unaid, leading to a rise in unemloyment. Poverty amongst PA emloyees has risen noticeably from 37% in 2005 to 46% in Although overty among PA emloyees is lower than average across the Palestinian oulation, the increase in overty is much sharer than the general oulation and oints to a worsening trend. 23 ifficulties in rocessing goods through Karni have led WFP to imort some of its wheat sulies through Kerem Shalom and Sufa crossing. A related roblem is that UN Agencies are not able to get emty containers out of the aza Stri and are incurring demurrage charges. 24 ata comiled by OCHA from sources including UNRWA and the Al Mezan Center for Human Rights. 25 For examle, on 20 March, armed men, mainly belonging to al-aqsa Martyrs Brigades, briefly stormed a military hosital in southern aza and a ower lant and the Ministry of Finance in aza city, demanding unaid wages and jobs. 26 OCHA calculations based on PCBS and security force data. 27 IUE overty figures are used here because the Institute rovides the only overty data on the opt for 2006 that allows the comarison with revious years. The overty line in 2006 stands at $2.7 er erson er day, with hardshi cases living on $1.35 er erson er day or less. PCBS has ublished overty data for 2004 (PCBS, Poverty in Palestine, 2005) but lans to ublish data for 2005 in June this year. The re-intifada (1999) overty data is from PCBS and is roughly comarable to the IUE overty figures because both sources use income based overty definitions. Imortantly, the PCBS and IUE use the same overty line. 28 Unemloyment data is rovided by PCBS (Q1 2006), according to the relaxed definition, which includes those workers who have given u looking for work. Arguably, it is imortant to include the discouraged workers in the context of the opt because of the dearth of job oortunities available locally. The World Bank redicts that unemloyment (according to the ILO definition which excludes discouraged workers) will rise to 40% in 2006 and 47% in 2008, from 24% in 2005 (Economic Udate and Potential Outlook, 15 March, 2006). 29 PCBS LFS, according to the relaxed definition. 30 PA salaries are relied uon to a greater extent in the aza Stri, where 37% of emloyment is in the PA, and they constitute an imortant emloyment source for women (one third of PA emloyees are women while women make u 14% of the total labour force). 8

16 Figure 6: Poverty rates in the opt ( ) hardshi cases below overty line 39 Rate Nov-01 Nov-02 Jul-03 Feb-04 Nov-04 Jul-05 May-06 Source: IUE Polls 3-10 As of today, initial findings from UN monitoring of the imact of the PA fiscal crisis reveal that the nonayment of salaries makes it is difficult for PA emloyees to afford transortation to get to work. 31 Furthermore, the UN has observed that some women emloyees are no longer able to afford childcare, increasing the likelihood that they will sto working. Schools, hositals and clinics are facing roblems recruiting new staff because of salary non-ayment. Some universities, according to UN monitoring, have reorted a fall in student attendance this term because of growing levels of overty, leaving the institutions increasingly unable to meet running costs. With one-quarter of the Palestinian oulation relying on the PA salaries of the breadwinner, the nonayment of wages is already having a negative imact. The household deendency ratio jumed at the beginning of A azan household has come to suort, on average, one additional erson in the last three months, further stretching scarce household resources. 32 At the same time, the cost of living has increased by 3.2% in the last quarter. 33 The loss of salaries reverberates in the local economy and society, which is starved of cash. The latest IUE oll revealed that the feeling of security has fallen throughout the opt but most markedly in East Jerusalem. 34 The main reason for falling levels of security, identified by 45% of resondents (a dramatic rise from 25% in 2005), is the lack of socio-economic imrovement. Throughout the opt, oor socio-economic conditions are identified as the number one reason for insecurity over and above the Israeli military occuation. This is because, in relative terms, the economic squeeze felt by households due to the steady searation of Israel from the opt and the PA fiscal crisis has become more rominent. 35 Local banks are alying new restrictions on loans due to the reduced caacity of borrowers to reay. Private sector services have become unaffordable to many. 36 Patients, for examle, are relying more on already-stretched PA and UNRWA basic services. UNRWA has reorted a six-fold increase in alicants for its West Bank job creation rogramme. According to a recent oll by the IUE, the number of eole who cannot rely on income to obtain food has increased since last July from 14% to 17%. Food insecurity 37 is redicted to increase by 14% to 51% by June 2006 due to a combination of factors including the PA fiscal crisis, extended closures, 31 The first monthly UN Humanitarian Monitor reort for May will be available in mid-june. 32 PCBS, Labour Force Survey, Aril Between Q and Q1 2006, the deendency ratio by 0.5 and 0.9 of a ercentage oint in the West Bank and aza Stri resectively. 33 PCBS, Consumer Price Index, Q In the West Bank, 39% of resondents felt secure (a dro from 50% in 2005), in Jerusalem governorate, 44% felt secure (down from 65% in 2005) and in the aza Stri, 50% felt secure (a fall from 56% in 2005). 35 In 2005, the military occuation was the rincile reason for insecurity throughout the opt, mentioned by 52% of resondents. In 2006, 11% of resondents stated that it was a reason for their insecurity. The shift in the reason for insecurity from being military occuation to lack of socio-economic imrovement is most evident in the aza Stri. 36 Some western donors see the rivate sector as an alternative funding channel to create new services and rovide new jobs. This aroach may be misguided (OCHA, Humanitarian Udate, Aril 2006). 37 Food security exists when all eole at all times have hysical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and satisfy their food references and thus conduct a healthy and active life. (World Food Summit 1996) 9

17 market disrution, the exhaustion of coing strategies and the avian flu outbreak. 38 WFP field staff reort a dramatic increase in ressure at the distribution oint from eole wanting food. Half of resondents to the IUE oll who received assistance stated that the role of assistance in the household budget had increased in the ast six months Vulnerable grous Certain household tyes emerge as articularly vulnerable in the deteriorating humanitarian climate due to low incomes and insecure work. These households are vulnerable because they are less likely to ossess the resources to seek out alternative rivate services no longer rovided by the PA and consequently face higher food insecurity levels. Households whose breadwinner is a worker in Israel and lost his income as a result: Prior to this closure aroximately 7,218 workers and 7,671 traders from the West Bank had valid ermits to enter Israel and 4,979 workers and 510 traders in the aza Stri. Prior to the intifada, 150,000 Palestinian workers were emloyed in Israel. These households are threatened by the otential loss of livelihoods. Households suorted by a PA emloyee: Aroximately 25% of the Palestinian oulation deends on a breadwinner s PA salary (including 37% of all emloyed ersons in the aza Stri and 14% of all emloyed in the West Bank). These salaries are now under threat. Particularly vulnerable are those with low incomes and low skill levels, such as municial cleaners, guards and security ersonnel. Households with members who are social hardshis cases: These include households with members engaged in Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA) emergency job creation rogrammes and 45,000 who receive relief assistance from MoSA. These reciients risk losing a vital source of income. Social hardshi case households may also include members affected by chronic diseases. Their access to long-term treatments, including the treatment of cancer relies on Ministry of Health (MoH) services, which are jeoardised in the coming months. Households with high deendency ratios are also more vulnerable because they have heightened nutrition needs and oor income sources. Households with breadwinner deendent on etty trade and agriculture: These households are exected to suffer because of the liquidity crisis in the local economy and intensified Israeli closures. The vulnerable farming households include: i) farmers exorting goods from the aza Stri and aroximately 65,000 family farmers who cannot rocure agricultural inuts; ii) farmers in areas of high horticultural otential such as Tulkarm, Qalqilya and the Jordan Valley, including those who cannot afford agricultural inuts and, iii) farmers exeriencing the drought in Hebron. 39 Against this background, certain grous of women, young eole and children face secific vulnerabilities when seeking work and accessing services. Women The loss of the (often male) breadwinner s income has meant that women frequently seek out alternative income-generating oortunities. However, they often lack work skills and exerience and may be marginalized from access to resources and services. In addition, regnant women and lactating mothers are articularly vulnerable to food insecurity. Pregnant women with comlicated regnancies are also at risk of not receiving the medical care that they need. Young eole (18-24 years): Young eole are more affected by rising unemloyment with about 40% of youths aged years are without jobs in the opt. Particularly vulnerable are those without a university degree. 38 FAO/WFP Food Security Udate. For more details on the avian flu outbreak and humanitarian resonse, refer to the opt Interagency framework for Avian Flu and Pandemic Resonse (May 2006). This revised aeal does not include the resonse ackage to the needs generated by the Avian Flu outbreak, develoed searately by WHO, FAO, UNICEF, UNP, WFP and UNFPA. 39 Officials in Hebron s Ministry of Agriculture in March 2006 estimated that 80% of Hebron governorate is drought-stricken. On average, eastern and south-eastern arts of Hebron governorate have received 63% annual average rainfall in the hydrological season. 10

18 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Poverty and Emloyment in the occuied Palestinian territory CAP Revised Emergency Aeal May 2006 Poverty Hardshi Cases Aril 2006 (less than U$ 1.35/day/n) 24 % % % % North West Bank 32 % Emloyment North West Bank 73 % May 2006 Central West Bank 24 % Israel and the settlements 9% aza Stri 54 % South West Bank 36 % P.A. 22% Palestinian rivate sector 68% Palestinians under the Poverty line (less than U$ 2.70/day/n) 49 % % % % Central West Bank 49 % Israel and the settlements 15% Emloyment P.A. 25% Palestinian rivate sector 56% Emloyment aza Stri 79 % Emloyment South West Bank 75 % Israel and the settlements 8% aza Stri West Bank P.A. 43% Palestinian rivate sector 51% Israel 0% P.A. 29% Palestinian rivate sector 56% Israel Kilometers The designations emloyed and the resentation of material on this ma do not imly the exression of any oinion whatsoever on the art of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Cartograhy: OCHA-oPt - May Base data: IUE Poll 10, 2006, PA MoP, July 2000, OCHA udate 2006 For comments contact <ochaot@un.org> or Tel (02) htt://

19 Children: The number of children arrested or detained in Israel has increased from 319 in January to 371 in Aril Children from Ramallah and Nablus make u almost half the detained children. Children are exected to be at risk of school dro-out due to ressure to earn an income. Children sychologically harmed by the violence will be increasingly unlikely to receive the mental health services they need. Children under the age of five years are articularly vulnerable to food insecurity. Children with illnesses that receive MoH care will be vulnerable Coing with the Crisis at the Local Level Palestinian Authority The PA rovides core services used by the bulk of the oulation, including 75% of schools and 62% of rimary health clinics. UN field reorts oint to the onset of the crumbling of health, education and welfare systems and threats to ublic health emanating from the breakdown of utilities, such as water wells, storage and distribution networks, solid waste disosal and sewage services. 40 The PA s rovision of relief services to families that are chronically unable to suort themselves has come to a halt. Job creation rojects oerated by the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA) have stoed for the ast three months, with the result that the oorest sections of the oulation are derived of income. Monthly cash subsidies rovided by MoSA have not been received by social hardshi cases since February (aroximately 45,000 Palestinians families are suosed to receive monthly cash subsidies from MoSA). UN monitoring reveals that shortages in food are reorted in PA institutions such as risons and hositals due to funding shortfalls. For the same reason, shortages in fuel and cooking gas, including that sulies to hositals and Ministry of Health vehicles, have been reorted. In Hebron, Ministry of Health workers were unable to visit 74 rimary health care centres in May because etrol stations stoed roviding MoH vehicles with fuel. Hositals are facing shortages of drugs 41, including those treating chronic diseases, anaesthetics, intravenous infusions and other medical sulies. It is reorted that 77 essential drugs are already out of stock or will be within the next six months. Consequently, some hositals are economising by reducing the number of oerations erformed to the most urgent cases. Fewer atient referrals to Egyt and Israel have been made by one azan hosital due to the high cost incurred by the hosital Household coing mechanisms With the severe weakening of the PA, alternative coing mechanisms are being emloyed. For examle, some doctors are working in clinics closer to home to reduce transort costs. In the aza Stri, two health care workers shifts are being folded into one to cut the number of journeys made by staff to reduce transort costs. Households reort increasing reliance on negative coing strategies such as reducing exenditures, not aying bills and using savings (Figure 7). Households in dee overty reduce exenditures more than households of other socio-economic grous 85% of households in dee overty reduce exenditures as a coing strategy, comared to 55% of households above the overty line. PA emloyees reliance on coing mechanisms has increased to a greater extent than in the oulation generally articularly the non-ayment of bills and reducing exenditures. 40 For examle, the Palestinian Water Authority and municialities monitoring system will be undermined due to fiscal constraints. In addition, the Joint Water Committee involving Palestinian and Israeli officials has stoed meeting and as a result more water rojects are ut on hold, further weakening the Palestinian oulation s ability to access safe water in accetable quantities. 41 It is reorted that 77 essential drugs are already out of stock or will be within the next six months. 11

20 Figure 7: Reliance on coing mechanisms in the opt Overall oulation PA emloyees Overall oulation PA emloyees Reducing exenses 61% 52% 72% 69% Not aying bills 44% 33% 55% 60% Buying on credit 55% 50% 55% 60% Using ast savings 38% 34% 53% 51% Source: IUE Polls 9 and 10 (unublished data, July 2005 and May 2006) However, the ability of these mechanisms to buffer the worst effects of the crisis should not be overestimated. According to the recent IUE oll, 20% of resondents stated that these coing strategies had already been exhausted and a further 33% stated that they would soon be exhausted. The same oll found that since 2005, eole s ability to kee u financially has diminished. Many of those who said that they could kee u financially as long as it takes, are now saying that they can kee u for a few months only. Likewise, many of those who were barely managing in 2005 are now in a serious condition and do not know how to coe, a dro most evident in the aza Stri. 100% 80% Figure 8: istribution of available means to retrieve hardshi among levels of overty still available soon exhausted already exhausted 60% 40% 20% 0% hardshi cases below overty line above overty line Source: IUE Poll 10 (unublished data, May 2006) After at least five years of hardshi, household assets and caacities have, to a large extent, been drained. Credit from shos a vital form of household survival used to buy food and other essentials and articularly among those made unemloyed during the intifada 42 is being cut by shokeeers who no longer trust PA emloyees ability to reay. UN monitoring reveals that in the aza Stri, Palestinians are buying less over the counter medication because of its cost and are making hosital visits instead Private sector Since the election of Hamas and the withdrawal of donor funding from the PA, the rivate sector has emerged as a likely reciient of foreign aid. 43 However, the caacity of the rivate sector to relace the PA as a service rovider in any meaningful way is extremely limited. Only 12% of schools, 39% of hositals and 12% of rimary health clinics are run rivately. 44 Whether or not it is desirable to rely on the rivate sector as the major service rovider also remains questionable. Nevertheless, the rohibitively high cost of accessing rivate services uts them beyond the means of a oulation increasingly short of jobs and in need of financial hel. And many of those who reviously were able to afford rivate sector services are now resorting to government-run services, adding to the ressure on resources. Similarly, the caacity of the rivate sector to absorb those who lose work in the PA is limited. Most azan workers who lost emloyment in Israel have failed to find alternative work in the local economy. aza's local rivate sector which rovides 56% of all jobs is too small to absorb new workers. 42 OCHA, Humanitarian Udate, May OCHA, Humanitarian Udate, Aril ata from Ministry of Education, ; Health Care Providers and Beneficiaries Survey, (PCBS 2005). 12