ALGERIA COUNTRY INFORMATION BULLETIN ALGERIA BULLETIN 2/ January Introduction

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1 COUNTRY INFORMATION BULLETIN ALGERIA ALGERIA BULLETIN 2/ January Introduction 1.1 This Bulletin has been produced by the Country Information and Policy Unit, Immigration and Nationality Directorate, Home Office. It does not contain any Home Office opinion or policy. This Bulletin provides a Country Report at Annex A that was prepared by the immigration authorities of the Netherlands in The Report is provided for background purposes for those involved in the asylum / human rights determination process. The Report is a source to the current Home Office Country Report on Algeria The Report has been publicly disclosed by the Netherlands authorities and can be accessed in its original Dutch version on the website of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs at (date last accessed 26 November 2003). It has been translated into English by a translation company under the terms of a contract with the Home Office. 2.3 Following is a summary of some of the information in the Report that is relevant to common asylum claims from Algerian citizens. Please consult the Report itself for further topics and fuller information. Enhanced information about the response to the Civil Concord initiative; the opportunity to respond to the amnesty is still available for ex-militants; they are released and rehabilitated after questioning. [paragraph 2.1] Information about current political parties. [paragraph 2.2.1] Information about administrative structures and the security forces. [paragraph 2.2.2] Review of the security situation. Armed groups - descriptions, areas and techniques of operation; levels of, and worst areas for, violence - urban/rural divide. [paragraphs ] Popular discontent due to socio-economic situation, effect on migration. [paragraph 2.5]

2 Government and non-government national groups, notably human rights groups. [paragraphs ] Relative freedom of printed media, especially private newspapers, but they are sometimes hampered or intimidated. [paragraph 3.3.1] Freedom of assembly and association. [paragraph 3.3.2] Judicial process - limited independence, lack of transparency. [paragraph 3.3.5] Prisons - overpopulated, conditions hard but comply with international standards; custody provisions (garde á vue). [paragraph 3.3.6] Torture by the security forces is banned by law; but still occurs, albeit not systemically nor to the same extent as in the nineties. Greatest risk for those suspected of participation in, or support for, armed groups. Rule generally observed for judges to report on behaviour of police officers towards those in custody. Human rights training given to police officers. Public prosecutors inspect detention centres. [paragraph 3.3.7] Military service - conscription - only a proportion are actually drafted; evaders are posted away from their home area during the first six months without any other punishment; amnesty measures. [paragraph 3.4.1] Involvement with FIS party not a ground for prosecution by the authorities. FIS has no past or present links with GIA or GSPC. [paragraph 3.4.2] Single women are able to support themselves without the help of a family if they can find a job. The NGO Femmes en Détresse offers small scale training courses. Urban/rural divide on lifestyle, kidnappings, rapes or forced marriages. [paragraph 3.4.6] Returned asylum seekers not at risk from authorities. [paragraph 3.4.7] There are no known cases of asylum-seekers deported from Europe who have become the victim of torture, maltreatment or inhumane treatment. [paragraph 4.4]

3 General Country Report Algeria December 2002 ANNEX A Directorate for Movement of People, Migration and Alien Affairs Department for Asylum and Migration Affairs January 31 st, 2003

4 Table of Contents Page 1 Introduction 4 2 Country Information Basic data Country and People History Form of Government The Legislative Power The Executive Power The Judiciary The Role of the Armed Forces in Politics Political Developments Riots in Kabylia Elections Security Situation Armed Islamist Movements Government Control over the Territory Social-Economic Situation 30 3 Human Rights Legal Context Conventions and Protocols National Legislation Monitoring International Nationally Governmental Nationally Non-Governmental Compliance and Violations Freedom of Speech The Right of Association and Assembly Freedom of Religion and Belief Freedom of Movement Judicial Process Arrests and Detentions Maltreatment and Torture Disappearances Extra-judicial Executions and Murders Capital Punishment The Position of Specific Groups Conscripts/Soldiers People involved in the former FIS People involved in Armed Islamist Movements Berbers Homosexuals Women 61

5 3.4.7 Returned Asylum-Seekers 63 4 Migration Reception of internally Displaced Persons Minors Activities of International Organisations Policy UNHCR Policy other Western Countries 67 5 Summary 68 I Bibliography 70

6 1 Introduction This general country report describes the current situation in Algeria insofar as it is of importance for the evaluation of the requests for asylum of people from Algeria and for decision-making about the return of rejected Algerian asylum-seekers. This country report is an updated version of an earlier general country report about the situation in Algeria (most recently updated on July 16, 2001). The general country report covers the period from July 2001 up to and including October This country report is partly based on information gathered from public sources. When drawing up the report, information from various organisations of the United Nations, various non-governmental organisations, specialist literature and media coverage was used. An overview of the public sources that were referred to is included in the bibliography. Furthermore, this general country report is based on evidence gathered in the field and reliable despatches from the Dutch representation in Algiers. The general country report frequently refers to public sources that were consulted. There were such sources are mentioned, the text is also often based on information gathered on a confidential basis. Chapter two focuses on the recent developments at the political, security and social-economic levels. This description is preceded by an historic overview of Algeria. It also includes a short passage about the geography and population of Algeria. Chapter three outlines the human rights situation in Algeria. After a description of legal guarantees and international conventions to which Algeria is a signatory, possibilities for monitoring are dealt with. Paragraph 3follows the actual description of the human rights situation. Moreover, chapter 3 sheds light on the position of specific groups. Chapter four deals with the reception of internally displaced persons, the policy of some other European countries with regard to asylum-seekers from Algeria and activities of international organisations, including the position of the UNHCR. Chapter five gives a general summary.

7 2 Country Information 2.1 Basic Data Country and People The People s Democratic Republic of Algeria is situated in Northern Africa on the Mediterranean Sea, and borders in the west on Morocco and the disputed Western Sahara, in the east on Libya and Tunisia and in the south on Mauritania, Mali and Niger. With a surface of 2,381,741 km² (approximately 70 times size of the Netherlands) Algeria is (after Sudan) the one but biggest country in Africa. The Atlas Mountains divide a narrow coastal strip with a Mediterranean climate from the Sahara, which covers about eighty percent of the country s surface and holds considerable petroleum and natural gas stocks. The majority of the population of 31.7 million 1 lives in the cities in the northern coastal area. The capital Algiers with its suburbs has approximately 4.2 million inhabitants. Other major cities, all situated in the northern coastal area, are in the west, Oran with 938,000 inhabitants and the cities situated in the east, Constantine and Annaba with 678,000 and 469,000 inhabitants 2 respectively. The natural population growth is estimated to be over 1.7% per year. In addition to the official language Arabic, the languages French and Berber (Tamazight) are spoken. Estimates of the number of speakers of Berber languages vary between 14 and 25%. Practically the entire Algerian population (99%) is Muslim. The other 1% is made up out of Jews and Christians, partly of foreign origin History In 1830, Algeria that had lived under over three centuries of Ottoman rule passed under French rule. In 1954, a popular uprising was incited that would later become the war of independence. After years of bloody battle this finally resulted in independence for Algeria in After proclaiming independence, the monopoly of power swiftly moved into the hands of the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), which had played a leading role in the fight for independence. The first president, Ahmed Ben Bella, the founder of the FLN, was pushed out by a non-violent coup in A Revolutionary Council consisting of 26 officers headed by the former Minister of Defence Boumedienne, who became the new president, took over power. In the ensuing years, a centralist and socialist economic order based on oil revenues led to a considerable improvement in welfare. According to some, that period was characterised by some sort of imposed 1 2 page 3. Estimate July Algeria in The World Factbook, CIA (2002). Estimates mid Algeria. Country Profile The Economist Intelligence Unit (2001),

8 social contract. The civil society thereby renounced its wish to organise itself in order to preserve national unity and in exchange for that received a wide range of provisions such as subsidised health care and housing and the most basic foodstuffs 3. After Boumedienne s death in 1978, Chadli Bendjedid took up office. He was an avowed opponent of the socialist policy of his predecessor. As a result, he left much more scope for private initiative and slowly but surely a market economy was introduced. In the second half of the eighties, falling oil prices led to a downturn in the economy. Consequently, a large number of the provisions the population could lay claim to thanks to the above-mentioned social contract were cancelled. Unemployment also rocketed. The economic reforms of the president turned out to come too late and to be too insignificant to turn the tide. The enormous sense of unrest among the population led to riots in Algiers at the end of 1988, which spread to other cities. The army harshly crushed the insurrection. The riots incited president Chadli Bendjedid to also implement a number of political changes in addition to economic measures. In 1989, a new constitution was adopted by referendum, which provided for a multi-party system. In 1990, the first free elections were held at local and provincial level. Owing to the great attention paid to the FLN on state television, a large number of parties boycotted this election. With 54.2% of the votes, the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) turned out to be the great winner. At these elections, people voted for this party to vent their social dissatisfaction and mainly in the working-class areas and the old city centres the party achieved very good election results. The FIS advocated a society based on the Islamic law (shari a). The local electoral victories of the FIS in various cities, including the capital Algiers, led to an islamisation of the street scene in those cities. For instance, many exchanged their western clothes for traditional garments. President Chadli promised the FIS to call for snap national elections. In December 1991 after a year of political violence, the first round of the parliamentary elections took place. On that occasion, the FIS won 47.5% of the votes cast, which yielded 188 of the 430 seats in Parliament and held out prospects of an absolute majority in the second round of the elections. In January 1992, the army took action to prevent that from happening. Parliament was dissolved and President Chadli was replaced by a fivemember Haut Conseil d Etat (HCE) headed by the new president Boudiaf, who belonged to the FLN. The second round of the elections was cancelled and the FIS was banned. The FIS leaders Abbas Madani and Ali Belhadj were arrested, tried and sentenced to twelve years imprisonment. Other FIS leaders fled abroad. Furthermore, a state of emergency was proclaimed which remains in place until today. The disbandment of the FIS and the ensuing measures such as internments in camps of FIS militants and the 3 John P. Entelis, Preface, in Luis Martinez, The Algerian civil war (London, 2000), page xi.

9 oppression of sympathisers resulted in radicalisation and fragmentation of the Islamic opposition. Six months after his appointment, president Boudiaf was killed in an assault. He was succeeded by FLN hardliner Ali Kafi who in turn was replaced by former general Liamine Zéroual in January The first parliamentary elections since 1991 were held again in Due to disagreement with the army leadership, Zéroual announced in 1998 to resign and to call presidential elections for the following year. On April 15, 1999 those elections were held. After all other six candidates withdrew from the elections on the day itself, the only remaining candidate Abdelaziz Bouteflika won the elections and became the new president of Algeria, an office he holds until today. In 1993, there were a few assaults on high-ranking government officials. Later on, the violence spread and was also directed at intellectuals and civilians. The following years were characterised by widespread violence, such as bomb attacks and massacres committed by Islamic militias, and the hard-handed response to that by the state organisations, which led to at least 100,000 deaths according to official figures. In August 1994, the majority of the FIS leaders, who were convicted in 1992, were released from prison and placed under house arrest. The peace agreement drawn up by a number of opposition parties (including the FIS) in 1995 in Rome at the socalled Sant Egidio consultation was rejected by the authorities and a few militant Islamic groups, so that it had no lasting effect. The plan for national reconciliation initiated by president Bouteflika in June 1999, the so-called Concorde Civile, was an attempt to put an end to the violence. The Concorde Civile was adopted by the population by referendum and gave militants of Islamic groups, who had not been guilty of bloodshed, time until January to report themselves to the authorities and to thus be considered for amnesty. People responsible for murder were not considered for amnesty. Just before the term of the Concorde Civile expired, a presidential decree was issued on January , which contrary to the spirit of the Concorde Civile provided for the release of some thousands of Islamic militants who had already been condemned and were serving their sentence, many of whom had been responsible for massacres. From that moment onwards, the amnesty programme was extended in practice to cover everybody who gave themselves up voluntarily to the authorities. Moreover, in practice the ultimate deadline that was initially set for reporting oneself to the authorities was not observed. Until today, exmilitants who report themselves to the authorities and give up their arms can count on amnesty. These people were, without being tried, released and rehabilitated after questioning. Numbers mentioned by observers run in to a few thousand. According to official reports of the Algerian Ministry for Religious Affairs, 600 former Islamic militants are now officially in public service as imam in a mosque again.

10 The Armée Islamique du Salut (AIS), which is often identified as the armed wing of the FIS, was the only sizeable group that wholeheartedly answered the call for participation in the Concorde Civile. The two other most important groups, the Groupes Islamiques Armés (GIA) and the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC) 4, stated that they would continue the fight 5. However, there are a substantial number of individuals who took this opportunity to turn their backs on the GIA or GSPC and to return to ordinary life. 2.2 Form of Government The Legislative Power Parliament and Senate Algeria has a bicameral system. The parliament or the Assemblée Populaire Nationale (APN) now consists of 389 seats and is directly elected for a term of five years. The last elections were held on May 30, After the elections, the distribution of seats in parliament is as follows: FLN seats, RND 47, MRN 43, MSP 38, PT 21, FNA 8, PRA A, MEN 1, Ennahda 1, independents 30. The senate or Conseil de la Nation (CN) has 144 members, one third of who are appointed by the president and the remaining two thirds are indirectly elected for a term of six years. Half of the senate needs to be substituted every three years. The last senate elections were held on December 30, The distribution of seats of the elected members is as follows: RND 74, FLN 15, FFS 4 and MSP 3 7. The party affiliation of the 48 members who are appointed by the president is not known. The parliament and senate only rarely take in a critical stance in respect of government. Bills proposed by the government are usually adopted without much of a discussion. Parliament has the power of initiative, however, that power is hardly ever used. Political Parties 8 Roughly three mainstreams can be distinguished in the political landscape in Algeria, namely the nationalists, the Islamists and the liberals. The nationalist mainstream, which mainly finds its support among the Algerian establishment, is represented in two large parties, the Front de Libération 4 For a description of the various armed groups, see paragraph of this country report. 5 For a wider description of the Concorde Civile and the reaction to it of the various groups, compare with the general country report Algeria dated July 16, For a description of the political parties, see further in this paragraph. 7 Website of the Conseil de Nation on 8 Compare International Crisis Group, Algérie. Assemblée Populaire Nationale: 18 mois de législature (February 8, 1999). International Crisis Group, Diminishing Returns: Algeria s 2002 legislative elections (Algiers/Brussels, June 24, 2002).

11 Nationale (FLN) and the Rassemblement National Démocratique (RND) and three smaller parties, the Front National Algérien (FNA), the Parti de Renouveau Algérien (PRA) and the Mouvement de l Entente Nationale (MEN). The Islamic mainstream, which advocates a society based on the Islamic law (shari a) can be found in three parties, namely the Mouvement de la Société pour la Paix (MSP), the Mouvement de Réforme Nationale (MRN) and the Ennahda party. The liberal mainstream is represented by the Parti des Travailleurs (PT), the Front de Forces Socialistes (FFS) and the Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Démocratie (RCD). The Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) headed by Ali Benflis is often seen as the embodiment of the struggle for independence of Algeria against France. For a long time, the FLN was the only political party in the country. After cancelling the elections in 1992, the FLN was in the opposition for a while. After the elections of 1997, the FLN entered the new government as a relatively small party. Thanks to the election results of May 30, 2002, the FLN has become the biggest party in parliament, which also has an absolute majority in parliament. Since the beginning of the nineties, the FLN has sided with the parties that are in favour of reconciliation with the FIS (the so-called réconciliateurs), contrary to the parties who advocate its eradication (the socalled éradicateurs). The Rassemblement National Démocratique (RND) is headed by Ahmed Ouyahia, who was Minister of Justice in the previous cabinet and who is at present the Minister of State and personal representative of the president. Right before the parliamentary elections of 1997, the RND, which is often depicted as a clone of the FLN, was composed of some technocrats who supported the programme of the then president Zéroual. Many consider the RND as being the party that is closest to the military elite in Algeria. The party became the biggest party in 1997 with 155 parliamentary seats. The elections of May 2002 signified a substantial loss for the party, which, according to some, is partly due to the unpopularity of party chairman Ouyahia. The major role played by the RND in the Concorde Civile is one of the reasons why it became clear that the RND is also part of the réconciliateurs. The Parti de Renouveau Algérien (PRA) was founded on November 15, 1989 and is presided over by Noureddine Boukrouh. The party advocates Algerian nationalism based on a modern and progressive form of Islam. The PRA is in favour of a free market economy 9. Very little is known about the Front National Algérien (FNA) and the Mouvement de l Entente Nationale (MEN). The FNA was set up just before the elections of May The Mouvement de la Société pour la Paix (MSP), which was called Hamas until 1997, is an Islamic party led by Cheikh Mahfoud Nahnah. In the 9 10 Rachid Benyoub, L Annuaire Politique de l Algérie 2002 (Algiers 2002), page 105. Composition de la nouvelle assemblée algérienne, Agence France-Presse, May 31, 2002.

12 previous cabinet term, the MSP participated in government and is again represented in it after the elections of May The MSP is known as a moderate party. The outcome of the election of May 2002 saw the party lose half its number of seats in comparison with the elections of The seats lost by the MSP have to a large extent accrued/ devolved to the MRN. The Mouvement de Réforme Nationale (MRN), also known by its Arabic name al-islah, was founded in 1998 and is headed by Cheikh Abdallah Djaballah. In addition to the local grassroots support of party leader Djaballah in Annaba and Constantine, MRN s rank and file consists of, amongst others, the former FIS-supporters; according to the party chairman this part makes up about a quarter of the total. According to many, the MRN is the party, which is ideologically closest to the former FIS. The Ennahda party, led by Lahbib Adami, also focuses on the former FIS supporters and claims to have a comparable number of former FIS members in its ranks 11. The Parti des Travailleurs (PT) is a Trotskyist party led by Louisa Hanoune. At the elections of May 2002, the number of votes doubled in comparison with the previous elections. Thanks to the Algerian electoral system, this meant a leap from four to 21 parliamentary seats. The PT is against all foreign interference in Algeria, including the activities of the IMF and association with the EU. Furthermore, the party opposes the privatisation of state-owned companies. Moreover, the party advocates the suspension of the state of emergency that has been effective since The Front de Forces Socialistes (FFS) and the Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Démocratie (RCD) both mainly find their grassroots support in the region Kabylia inhabited by Berbers. Both parties dedicate themselves to the Berber language and culture. The FFS, led by Hocine Aït-Ahmed who lives in voluntary exile in Switzerland, at the same time tries to go beyond the image of a Berber party by placing the social problems in a national context. Saïd Saadi heads the RCD. Between the parties there is a great mutual rivalry so that cooperation on common issues hardly gets off the ground. There is also a difference of opinion about the correct approach of the FIS. The FFS has declared itself in favour of dialogue, however, the RCD rejects this radically. The rift between both parties has even become bigger due to a different opinion with regard to participation in the local elections of October 10, International Crisis Group, Diminishing Returns: Algeria s 2002 legislative elections (Algiers/Brussels, June 24, 2002), page About the local elections, see paragraph of this country report under Local elections of October 10, 2002.

13 The thirty independent members of parliament form a heterogeneous group from varying backgrounds. What is remarkable is the relatively large share of people from the less densely populated regions in Algeria The Executive Power The President In addition to being the head of state, the president is also commander-inchief of the armed forces and responsible for national defence (Algeria does not have a separate Minister of Defence). The president is the chairman of the council of ministers and appoints the leader of the government. He is directly elected for a term of five years and can afterwards be re-elected once more for a term of five years. The current president Abdelaziz Bouteflika was elected on April 15, The Government The prime minister who is appointed by the president after the elections leads the government. Although legally speaking the council of ministers should be appointed by the prime minister, in practice this is done by the president. The government is accountable to parliament, which can dissolve government. The current government was appointed on June 17, The government is headed by prime minister Ali Benflis and has (including the prime minister) 38 ministers. The Minister of Home Affairs, Justice and Foreign Affairs are at present: Nouredine Zerhouni (unchanged in relation to the previous government), Mohammed Charfi (new) and Abdelaziz Belkhadem (unchanged in relation to the previous government) 13. Administrative Division 14 Algeria is divided into 48 provinces or departments (wilaya), which are governed by a provincial governor or préfect (wali). These provincial governors are appointed by the president and are linked to the ministry of Home Affairs. The name of each separate province is the same as the name of the capital of the province in question. Furthermore, each province has a so-called Assemblée Populaire de Wilaya (APW), which consists of 35 up to 55 members, who are directly elected every four years. A revision of the laws on municipalities and the wilayas is on the parliamentary agenda for the end of According to the current proposals, the power of the mentioned wali will increase in relation to the elected APW 15. Identity cards are issued by the provincial authorities after submission of the birth certificates of the person concerned, the father of the person concerned and the grandfather of the person concerned and a declaration of residence (certificat de residence, to be obtained from the municipality). The cards are ), 15 Liste nouveau gouvernement algérien, Agence France-Presse, June 17, Compare with Länderinformationsblatt Algerien, Bundesambt für Flüchtlinge (Givisiez, May chapter 9. Les walis auront plus de pouvoirs in newspaper El Watan, July 18, 2002.

14 entirely drawn up in Arabic, light green of colour and valid for ten years. Each citizen who is older than 18 must carry this card on their person at all times 16. The provinces are subdivided into 227 districts (daira) which are themselves also subdivided into 1541 municipalities (commune). The municipalities also have an elected body, the so-called Assemblées Populaires Communales (APC), which consist of 10 to 18 members who are also directly elected every four years. The most recent local elections (both for the APW and the APC) were held on October 10, The APCs elect a board with a chairperson, who are directly accountable to the ministry of Home Affairs. Each municipality has a Registry Office (état civil), where certificates for births, marriages and deaths are registered. Here, the person concerned or a relative of the person concerned can apply for an excerpt from the Registry. This excerpt is called Extrait de l acte de naissance, (excerpt from the Registry of Births or birth certificate). The Security Forces Various authorities are responsible for security and public order in Algeria. The officials of those agencies usually live in guarded and walled complexes to guarantee their safety. The army, the Armée Populaire Nationale (APN), which is used, among other things, for the fight against terrorism, consists of 124,000 men, approximately 75,000 of who are conscripts 18. The Direction Génerale de la Sûreté Nationale (DGSN) is the national police headquarters. The Sûreté Nationale (police) comes under the ministry of Home Affairs and consists of approximately 20,000 members. At provincial level, the provincial governor is in charge of the police. The police are responsible for tracing offences as well as maintaining public order in cities. The police are also deployed in the fight against terror. The DGSN also includes the riot police, which are known by the name Compagnies Nationales de Sécurité (CNS) and the criminal investigation department or Police Judiciaire (PJ), which is responsible for the judicial inquiries in criminal cases. The Gendarmerie Nationale has 60,000 members and is subject to the ministry of Defence. The gendarmerie (also called gendarme) is responsible for police matters in the countryside. The gendarmerie is also deployed in 16 UK Immigration & Nationality Directorate Country Assessment Algeria, IND Country Information and Policy Unit (April 2002), paragraph 5.A About elections, see paragraph of this country report. 18 Figures from The Military Balance , The International Institute for Strategic Studies (October 2001) pages

15 the fight against terror. The gendarmerie is particularly unpopular among the population of Kabylia. In 1988, the municipal police force (Police Communale) linked to the municipalities was introduced. In 1997, these forces were renamed municipal guards (Corps de Garde Communale). Nowadays, there are about 100,000 of them and they are mainly deployed in police matters at local level and in the protection of roadblocks and monuments in the cities. In the countryside, they are also in charge of the protection of the population. There are special anti-terror units (Groupes d Intervention Spéciaux, GIP), which consist of approximately 20,000 specially selected members from the police and gendarmerie. The members of these units, which operate relatively autonomously, are sometimes called ninjas because they are often masked. In addition, there is also the republican guard, which has 1,200 members. The main intelligence services are the Sécurité Militaire (SM) and the Direction du Renseignement et de la Sécurité (DRS). Since 1994, citizens have also been used as volunteers to protect their village or neighbourhood against attacks by armed factions. They are provided with weapons by the security forces and receive a modest salary. There are two types of civilian militias. The first are the legitimate defence groups (Groupes de Légitime Défence, GLD) also called self-defence groups (Groupes d Autodéfence) or patriots. They are mainly deployed in the surveillance and defence of remote areas in the fight against terrorism. In addition, there are private militias, such as the Organisation de Jeunes Algériens Libres (OJAL) and the Organisation de la Sauvegarde de la République Algérienne (OSRA), who voluntarily support the security forces in the elimination of Islamic terrorists. The total size of the different civilian militias amounts to about 100,000 persons The Judiciary Algeria has 214 Magistrate s Courts (Tribunal), which consist of four chambers that are respectively competent for civil cases, commercial cases, and social security cases and for summary offences. There are 48 Courts of Appeal (Cour d Appel), one for each province. Each Court consists of four chambers of three judges, namely a civil chamber, a criminal chamber, an administrative chamber and a so-called chamber of accusation. The Courts act as a professional body for the Magistrate s Courts and also have a function as a court for indictable offences. The chamber of accusation is the professional body for sentences passed by the magistrate during the hearing in a criminal case. Furthermore, there is a High Court (Cour Suprême) 19, where a judicial review can be lodged against the sentences of the Courts of Appeal. Judicial 19 Compétence territoriale des cours et tribunaux algériens on Lex Algeria

16 reviews can be lodged against sentences of administrative law by the Magistrate s Courts with the Council of State (Conseil d Etat) that has been in existence since The High Court and the Council of State look after the unity of jurisdiction in the entire country. If there is a dispute about the competence between the Council of State and the High Court, a Tribunal des Conflits that is especially set up for the purpose will decide which of these bodies is competent 20. In addition to that, there are three economic courts that are situated in the cities Algiers, Constantine and Oran. The anti-terror courts that were established at the end of 1992 were abolished in Since 1964, there are also military courts whose jurisdiction extends to the military and members of the gendarme. Only in a few exceptional cases mentioned in the law, such as espionage, can civilians be tried before military courts. Terrorist operations are investigated by the civil criminal courts. There are no known cases of military courts wrongfully trying cases of individuals that were suspected of political offences. The Conseil Constitutionnel (Constitutional Council) which consists of nine members, three of which are appointed by the president, two by parliament, two by the senate, one by the High Court and one by the Council of State, tests laws and treaties against the constitution. In addition to examining the laws and treaties for compatibility with the constitution, it is the Council s task to supervise referendums and the elections of the president and parliament, the outcomes of which are also announced by the Council The Role of the Armed Forces in Politics Against the backdrop of the above-mentioned formal state structure, the armed forces play an important role in Algerian politics. Furthermore, it is a matter of reciprocal protection between the military and political elites. This conservative factor of power is often referred to as Le pouvoir and is considered by many as the authority that controls the real power in Algeria. Le pouvoir consists of a number of older military men from the highest echelons of the army and intelligence services. The main man is considered to be the chief of defence staff, lieutenant-general Mohammed Lamari. The pouvoir is not a homogeneous group, but also has all sorts of internal blood groups and rivalries based for instance on the place of origin of the different people. In addition to the military power and political influence behind the scenes, this elite controls a large chunk of the economic power as well. Owing to the continued fight against armed Islamist movements, this group has a great deal of freedom to spend state revenues, for which they do not have to give account to the civil authorities. Due to this improper use of government situation July 11, 2002 Constitution, article 152. Rachid Benyoub, L Annuaire Politique de l Algérie 2002 (Algiers 2002), page 112.

17 funds, they have had the opportunity to increase their own welfare, a privilege that they will not want to relinquish. The prominent role played by the armed forces in Algerian politics is partly inherited from the war of independence against France. Owing to the lack of an existing civil elite, the army appointed itself as the guarantee for stability in Algeria, which was widely supported by the population. Throughout Algeria s history, the armed forces have stepped in at crucial moments, such as the election victory of the FIS in All presidents come from the military establishment or have risen to power thanks to their support. Since the start of the nineties, the legitimacy of the armed forces has begun to decrease in the eyes of the population. The reasons for this are, amongst others, the behaviour of the armed forces in the fight against the armed Islamic violence and the attempts made by the army command to secure its financial interests by maintaining the status quo. In addition, just after the appointment of Bouteflika as president various differences of opinion became apparent between him and the army leadership who had helped him to come to power during the elections of Bouteflika is trying to steer a more independent course, through, among other things, economic reforms that could considerably affect the privileges of the army leadership. The army leadership has tried to strengthen its grip on the president by appointing the retired Major General Larbi Belkheir to a position on the presidential staff. Incidentally, the president denies that the army leadership and he have drifted apart. Now, the armed forces are trying to improve their reputation among the population. For that purpose, the chief of defence staff Lamari held a press conference in July 2002 whereby he declared that the army truly wants to limit itself to its military task assigned to it by the constitution 22. Pursuant to article 25 of the constitution, this task is limited to safeguarding the national independence and national sovereignty and defending the territorial unity of the country. 2.3 Political Developments Riots in Kabylia On April 18, 2001, the annual march in commemoration of the so-called Berber Spring (Printemps Berbère) was held in Tizi Ouzou, the capital of the province of the same name, which is mainly inhabited by Berbers 23. At the time, the grammar school pupil Massinissa Guermah was detained. He was killed during his ensuing stay at the local gendarmerie station. 22 Agence France-Presse, July 2, In the Berber Spring in 1980, some students were killed in Tizi Ouzou during demonstrations for more rights for the Berber population.

18 This event led to an explosion of anger in the region populated by Berbers which was expressed in a series of protest marches aimed at the abuse of power by the authorities, social injustice and favouritism, which is often described in a single all-embracing word by the Algerian-Arabic hogra. Furthermore, the inhabitants of Kabylia stated that officers of the gendarmerie had increasingly harassed them in the months leading up to it 24. There was also a lot of dissatisfaction about the lack of drive demonstrated by the authorities in the area of employment and housing. The initially peaceful protest marches were brutally broken up by the riot police and gendarmerie. This reaction from the authorities unleashed a series of sometimes violent street riots in the region. In the following months, the social unrest was expressed in mass demonstrations in the areas outside of Kabylia as well 25. Protests were sparked in 40 out of the 48 provinces. In the period after April 2001, the authorities that fired live ammunition at unarmed demonstrators regularly harshly crushed the rebellion. This caused more than a hundred deaths and many casualties. After a speech by president Bouteflika on April 30, 2001, the degree of violence used by the security forces dropped. On June 14, a massive protest march was held in the capital Algiers at which eight people died after the march got out of hand 26. Consequently, the president announced on June 18, 2001 that all demonstrations in Algiers were banned till further notice. As a result, planned demonstrations on July 5, August 8 and October 5 of that year could not take place and the security forces prevented the demonstrators that had travelled to Algiers from Kabylia from entering the city. On June 11, 2001, a citizens movement (mouvement citoyen) of Berbers who had organised themselves in the structure of the traditional tribes (arouch, also known as archs or aârchs) presented a list of fifteen demands which have become famous as the demands of the El Kseur platform. The citizens movement mainly organised itself in two regional committees. The committee in Tizi Ouzou took on the name Co-ordination des Arouch, Dairas et Communes (CADC). The committee in the Béjaïa province bears the name Co-ordination Intercommunale de Béjaïa (CICB). The fifteen demands of the El Kseur platform include, among other things, the full withdrawal of the gendarmerie from Kabylia, compensation of the victims for the behaviour of the authorities during the protest marches, awarding the status of martyr to the victims, clarification about the offences committed by the public officers of the security forces during these events, drawing up a regional programme for the economic and social development de 26 de Human Rights Watch World Report Algeria., Human Rights Watch (2002), page 407. Rapport Algérie, La Répression du Printemps Noir. Avril 2001-Avril 2002, Ligue Algérienne Défence des Droits de l Ho mme (April 2002), page 2. Rapport Algérie, La Répression du Printemps Noir. Avril 2001-Avril 2002, Ligue Algérienne Défence des Droits de l Homme (April 2002), page 14.

19 of Kabylia and recognition of the Tamazight 27, the language of the Berber population, as an official language. Incidentally, this last demand, which is often presented by the media as the main demand of El Kseur, is only the eighth item on the list of fifteen demands 28. On May 2, 2001, the government set up an independent commission whose task it was to investigate the facts surrounding the events during the riots in April and May of that year. The commission, which was led by the respected lawyer Mohand Issad, presented an interim report in July of that year, which showed that officers of the gendarmerie and police had repeatedly used excessive or lethal violence. The definite report that was published in December 2001 expressed concern about the excessively great power held by the military authorities and made a complaint about the fact that further examination was hampered by a lack of cooperation from the different bodies 29. On October 3, 2001, prime minister Benflis talked to some representatives of the Berber population and stated that president Bouteflika would develop initiatives in the coming time to comply with their wishes. For instance, it was promised that the officers who were responsible for the death of the demonstrators would not escape punishment and constitutional reforms were promised which would give Tamazight a national status. In the meantime, Tamazight has been recognised as a national language 30 (but not as official language, which still raises questions about the use of it in an official context) in the constitution since April In addition, part of the gendarmerie units has been withdrawn from Kabylia 31. The gendarmerie officer who is suspected of involvement in and responsibility for the death of Massinissa Guermah appeared before the military judge on September 24, He is charged with causing death due to culpability and inattention in the performance of his job. The sitting of the case has been adjourned to an unspecified later date because the defence has indicated that it needs more time 32. The family of the victim has lodged a protest against the fact that the case was brought before a military judge. On September 8, 2002, the commander of the gendarmerie declared that there were individuals among his men who were not worthy of representing the force. That was the first reference from the gendarmerie itself to slips made by some officers. Furthermore, the commander announced that criminal proceedings would be instituted against people who have committed an offence Sometimes also called Amazigh. El Watan, June 11, Amnesty International Report Algeria, Amnesty International (2002). Newspaper El Watan, April 10, Newspaper El Watan, April 3 and 16, Newspaper El Watan, September 25, Newspaper El Watan and Agence France-Presse, September 8, 2002.

20 In March 2002, the talks between the authorities and the representatives of the Berber population were suspended. In July 2002, the Prime Minister Benflis called for a dialogue again thereby indicating that he was prepared to make concessions 34. The arouch reacted negatively to this. They stated that they were not convinced of the prime minister s sincerity 35. The arouch signalled that they did not recognise the representatives who talked to the authorities on behalf of the Berber population. Some délégués (leading men) of the CADC, who did enter into talks with the authorities, have been removed from the CADC 36. The arouch have declared that they will only be satisfied when all fifteen demands of the El Kseur platform have been fully met. At the end of March 2002, the authorities arrested a number of leading men of the Berber movement. Observers saw this as the authorities taking in a harder line vis-à-vis the movement now that the compromises offered were met with such indomitability of the arouch 37. Others interpreted the arrests as taking the leading men out of circulation during the election period. From the end of March 2002 onwards, the arrests and detentions of the leading men of the Berber movement have led to renewed protest by the population of Kabylia whereby young people often took to the streets throwing stones. On April 20, 2002, a year after the start of the riots, more than 100,000 people demonstrated in an anti-government demonstration in Tizi Ouzou. The government responded to the protests with new arrests. From time to time it also happened that demonstrations were impeded 38. On July 29, 2002, confrontations were provoked between security forces and demonstrators in different places in Kabylia after the security forces had started driving out sit-in actions that demanded the release of the délégués who had been remanded in custody since March On August 5, 2002, the president proclaimed in a decree that all people who had been detained since March 2002 for involvement in the demonstrations and who were still remanded in custody would be set free. People who had been convicted for the same facts were granted amnesty. That same day, the people concerned were released 40. Incidentally, the people who had been remanded in custody had still not been indicted officially. The parliamentary elections of May were practically completely boycotted in Kabylia on the initiative of the CADC and the CICB. On July 20, Agence France-Presse, July 29, 2002 and newspaper El Watan, July 30, Agence France-Presse, July 21, 2002 and newspaper El Watan, July 31, Newspaper Liberté, September 2, Country Report. Algeria, The Economist Intelligence Unit (May 2002), page 7. See for instance newspaper El Watan, April 11, Agence France-Presse, July 29, Newspaper El Watan and Agence France-Presse, August 5, See paragraph about this.

21 2002, the arouch stated that they would also boycott the local elections of October Elections Parliamentary Elections of May 30, 2002 In 1997, the first ever parliamentary elections were held in Algeria in which several political parties participated. As the parliament had served its term of five years, parliamentary elections were called again on May 30, Relatively soon after the announcement of the elections on February 20, 2002, the opposition called for a boycott of the elections. The CADC and CICB also paid heed to this call, which also made the RCD and FFS, two political parties with a large electorate in Kabylia, decide to boycott the elections and to call on their supporters not to go to the polls. Partly due to this boycott and the disinterest felt by a large part of the population, the official national turnout amounted to 47% of those entitled to vote 43. In the province with a predominantly Berber population, the turnout percentage was situated around 2%. Except for a five-headed ad hoc delegation of the European Parliament, there were no international observers present at the elections. In April 2002, president Bouteflika established a Commission for Monitoring the elections. After the elections, 187 complaints about irregularities were submitted to the Commission. 182 complaints were dismissed due to errors in the regular procedure; five complaints were accepted for consideration but were then turned down due to lack of evidence. There are known cases of people in Kabylia being prevented from voting by supporters of the election boycott. On May 31, 2002, the ministry of Home Affairs announced the outcome of the election. On June 3, the Constitutional Council presented modified figures without giving an explanation for the modifications. The outcome of the elections on the basis of the figures of June 3, 2002 is as follows: FLN 199 seats, RND 47 seats, MRN 43 seats, MSP 38 seats, independents 30 seats, PT 21 seats, FNA 8 seats and Ennahda, PRA and MEN with each one seat 44. After more than two weeks, on June 17, 2002, the president announced the new government. The government consists of a coalition of the FLN, RND 42 Agence France-Presse, July 20, For further descriptions of the local elections, see paragraph under Local Elections of October International Crisis Group, Diminishing Returns: Algeria s 2002 legislative elections (Algiers/Brussels, June 24, 2002), pages 1 and International Crisis Group, Diminishing Returns: Algeria s 2002 legislative elections (Algiers/Brussels, June 24, 2002), page 14. For a description of the different political parties, see paragraph