REFUGEE COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA

Transcription

1 REFUGEE COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA (WCOWORAT C OINA.C.T.) PARRAMATTAROAD CAKPERDOVW NSW2050 LOCKED BAG 15, CAMPERDOWN P.O. NSW2050 TELEPHONE: (02) FAX: (02) THE SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF THE HUMANITARIAN PROGRAM: Views from the Community Sector February 1998 TABXJK OFCWI^l^ 1. Executive Summary 2 2. Resettlement as a Durable Solution 5 3. Australia's Refugee and Humanitarian Program: Introduction 3.2. Program Planning 3.3. Program Composition 3.4. Program Implementation 3.5. Settlement 3.6. Community Education 4. Regional Programs: South East and South Asia 4.2. Middle East 4.3. Europe 4.4. Africa 4.5. Latin America and the Cambbean 5. Vulnerable Groups List of Recommendations Contributing Organisations and Individuals RCOA represents over 50 non-government organisations working with and for refugees in Austalia and around the world.

2 Refugee Council of Australia 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: In the wider Australian community there is considerable ambivalence about immigration. There are some who argue that it brings many benefits to Australia, not the least of these being the stimulation of economic growth and the enrichment of society. Others argue strenuously against it, also using economic and social arguments and often adding environmental issues too. Fortunately refugees are rarely targeted in this debate, though it can be argued that the distinction between refugees and migrants is poorly understood. While Australia has no obligations under international law to resettle victims of persecution and conflict 1, we have a proud tradition of having done so and by and large, there is considerable community support for this to continue. For some in our community, specifically those who have experienced persecution first hand, Australia's commitment to resettle refugees is more than an academic debate. It has provided a new life for them and offers in turn, the prospect of providing a similar haven for their compatriots and relatives who are still suffering in countries of origin and first asylum. There is no ambiguity in the support shown by Australia's refugee communities and those who work with them to the Refugee and Special Humanitarian Program (RSHP) which forms a valuable component of Australia's total response to assisting refugees. They are totally behind the program and have a strong desire to see it operate as efficiently and expeditiously as possible, recognising all too well the consequences of any failings. This report seeks to reflect these community views. It was prepared after extensive consultation with refugee communities, humanitarian workers and support agencies. The information contained herein about the operation of the program was largely provided by them and is reproduced both as accurately as possible and in good faith. Similarly the suggestions for program numbers were discussed with the communities and endeavour to balance their aspirations with the capacity of agencies to provide essential post-arrival services. The report is divided into five substantive sections. The first (Section 2) is theoretical in nature and seeks to set the scene for that which follows. It examines the role of resettlement as one of the "durable solutions" as well as the currency of this role. Section 3 is a more substantive section and looks at the operation of Australia's Refugee and Special Humanitarian Program (hereafter "humanitarian program "). It combines recommendations relating to the planning and composition of the program with feedback As opposed to the obligations Australia has as a signatory to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol to provide protection for asylum seekers determined to be refugees. 2

3 agar fe /i^.. 'niilm _ air&n j He_ - M -m r- ''"' 'w Humanitarian Program from the community about various aspects of its operation. The issues raised here are not those specific to any particular entrant group but those which appeared from the frequency with which they were raised to point to the existence of more systemic problems in areas such as access to posts, processing times and documentation. Section 3 also examines what happens to people who have entered under the Refugee and Special Humanitarian Program (hereafter "humanitarian entrants") after their arrival. After briefly examining the term "settlement" it presents the concerns expressed to RCOA by community groups and workers about access to the services so essential for people who have been deeply traumatised by their past experiences and who arrive in Australia with few supports and resources. The section concludes with some reflections on community education and the importance of educating the wider Australian public about who humanitarian entrants are and why they have come to Australia, especially in the light of the current rise of xenophobia. Section 4 reflects on developments around the world that have produced and/or are likely to produce refugees. On a country by country basis it also presents the information provided to the Council by communities. The main focus is on the difficulties being experienced by their compatriots in the country(ies) of first asylum and in gaining access to the determination process. Settlement issues of particular concern to their community are also raised. The final substantive section (Section 5) argues that within the humanitarian program provision should be made for especially vulnerable entrants, including Women at Risk. Further, it reflects on the operation of the humanitarian program in relation to such entrants. In addition to the specific recommendations contained within the report (and reiterated in Section 6), the Refugee Council wishes to recommend the following with respect to the Refugee and Special Humanitarian Program: i. That its planning and implementation remain distinct from that of the general migration program; ii. iii. That 12,000 places be allocated o t the offshore humanitarian program. That the program consist of: 5,000 places for Refugees; 4,000 places for Special Humanitarian entrants; 3,000 places for Special Assistance Category entrants. iv. That an additional 3,000 places be allocated as a contingency reserve to enable the program to respond to any emergencies that develop during the year and to absorb any overflow in the numbers of onshore entrants; v. That the breakdown of the Offshore Program be in accordance with Table 1.

4 Refugee Council of Australia TABLE 1. Proposed Composition of the Refugee and Special Humanitarian Program Country of Origin #RSHP #SAC South and SE Asia Burma Cambodia India 100 Indonesia 150 Laos 50 Pakistan Sri Lanka Tibet 50 Other 100 Middle East Afghanistan 800 Iran 600 Iraq 1,200 Turkey 250 Other 150 Europe ,250 3,000 ^ Former USSR Former Yugoslavia 2, ,650 2,300 4,950 Africa RSHP 2,500 Sudanese SAC , ,700 Latin America 100 Too SUBTOTAL 9,000 * ,000 Contingency Reserve 3,000 TOTAL with least 500 places from the Refugee Program allocated to Women at Risk entrants.

5 Humanitarian Program 2. RESETTLEMENT AS A DURABLE SOLUTION 2.1. The Broader Context Geo-politics in the second half of the 20th Century has been characterised by two competing and often conflicting trends. On the one hand we have seen the collapse of colonial empires and the move by individual states and/or groups within states to assert their sovereignty and recapture their identity. On the other hand we have seen a steady progression towards globalisation, ie the establishment of regional agreements and trading blocs that break down national boundaries and extend the ability of people to communicate, acquire knowledge, compare options and make choices. Amongst the many results of globalisation have been: more and more people are becoming aware of the outside world due to greater access to radio and television ; an increasing rural-urban drift, particularly in developing countries; a growing middle class with a commensurate increase in aspirations; and increased freedom of movement of people within and between countries and regions;...which in turn have led to significant changes in international patterns of migration. It is recognised that the majority of people who have capitalised on these changed migration practices have done so in search of economic betterment, either legitimately or through criminal activities (such as drug trafficking, people smuggling or organised crime). Others have grasped the opportunity to flee persecution, civil war and natural disasters. This increase in population movement has presented many challenges for the states to which people move - be they the more affluent states of the North or the developing nations that have hosted many of those displaced by natural or man-made calamities. As the number of people on the move has increased, so too have tensions within many receiving states. In a wave that began with the developed nations, we have seen more and more countries exhibit xenophobic tendencies, be these the erection of barriers to entry or overt expressions of hostility to foreigners. Caught amidst this general trend are those people whose very future depends on their ability to seek protection outside their country of origin, in particular those to whom the international community has recognised a responsibility, namely those considered to meet

6 Refugee Council of Australia the definition of a refugee as contained in international law2: Any person who awing to a well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his / her nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself / herself of the protection of that country. The willingness of states to accept their obligations to refugees is being significantly eroded. At the same time the ability of the United Nations agency charged with protecting refugees, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), to turn the tide is increasingly being called into question. There is little doubt that as we approach the new millennium, the international protection regime for refugees is facing its greatest challenge in 50 years, with many taking the view that the domestic concerns of states are winning out against their international responsibilities. All that follows should, therefore, be seen within this broader context...however it should also be viewed from the perspective that there are choices a state can make...either to be engulfed by the erosion of international protection, or to take a stance both domestically and internationally to preserve the values that underpinned the creation of post-war international humanitarian law Durable Solutions for Refugees UNHCR has long advocated that there are three options, or "durable solutions", for those found to be refugees. The first, and most preferable, is voluntary repatriation to the country of origin once the conditions that caused the flight have altered sufficiently to enable safe return. If repatriation is not an option, the next preferred solution is integration into the country of first asylum. In many instances, the country of first asylum is near the country of origin and it is likely that there may be cultural, linguistic, religious and geographic similarities with the refugees' home country so as to ease integration. Where neither of the other durable solutions is a practical option, the third durable solution, resettlement, is considered. The reality of contemporary geopolitics is such, however, that the solutions are rarely so neat as the theoretical construct would suggest. What happens on the ground is often far more complex, being confused by a myriad of factors including the size of the exodus, the relationship between the state of origin and the host state and international political pressures. Sometimes less than durable solutions are resorted to, such as temporary protection and the creation of safe havens. The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, hereafter "the Convention".

7 Humanitarian Program. In addition, attitudes towards the durable solutions can change markedly over time, also for many reasons. For example, at the time of the exodus from Indochina, resettlement was hailed as the best option. Hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese found new homes in the West, not so much in response to their needs but more to satisfy Cold War political objectives. As time went on, and it became more and more apparent that economic betterment rather than political freedom was the catalyst for people to leave, cynicism grew. Resettlement was seen as a destabilising factor and support for it within UNHCR and in the international community waned; the pendulum has, however, swung again and there is a concerted effort to restore resettlement to its place in the trinity of durable solutions Resettlement as a Durable Solution In the 1997 update of its Resettlement Handbook, UNHCR is at pains to stress in the opening statement that/ while resettlement is often presented as the third durable solution, it should not be regarded as the least valuable or needed amongst them. In certain instances resettlement may offer the only means to preserve human rights and to guarantee protection when refugees are faced with threats which seriously jeopardise their continued stay in a country of refuge, in particular: threat of refoulemenf '; threat of expulsion to a country from where a refugee may be refouled or where his/her life or freedom may be threatened; threat to physical security; threat of arbitrary detention. In addition, resettlement continues to be vital for a core caseload of refugees with compelling needs. Emergency resettlement is pursued on behalf of refugees being subjected to life-threatening protection or medical problems which cannot be resolved through local intervention. Resettlement is also advocated by UNHCR for refugees: "who after a protracted stay in a country of asylum, do not have the possibility to establish themselves in a manner consistent with their cultural, social, religious or educational backgrounds. They may have educational or vocational qualifications and a demonstrated potential to attain selfsufficiency but are not allowed access to formal employment because of their refugee status. In this regard, quality of asylum, including the socioeconomic prospects, in the country of first refuge should play a key role in the assessment of refugee needs. Resettlement should thus be promoted when 7 Forced repatriation to the country of origin.

8 Refugee Council of Australia it is evident that the individual refugee will not be able to return home in the foreseeable future, is not able to integrate locally, and moreover, is assessed to have an integration opportunity in a second country of safe asylum. There should be a positive prognosis for integration upon resettlement, thus serving the "best interests " of the individual and the program." 4 In October 1997 the 48th Session of the Executive Committee of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees reaffirmed the importance of resettlement as a durable solution in its "Note on International Protection" and encouraged governments not already doing so, to allocate places for resettlement of refugees. Given the aforementioned erosion in the protection environment, UNHCR will have to work hard to make this a reality. Unlike the obligation that signatory states have to provide protection to asylum seekers determined to be refugees, countries have no legal obligation to provide resettlement places. It is a voluntary gesture driven by many factors, not the least of which being a commitment to international burden sharing and a recognition of the benefits a country derives from its humanitarian entrants. This being said, the need to find countries willing to accept refugees remains. In 1997 UNHCR found resettlement places for some 30,250 Convention refugees and others of concern to UNHCR but was unable to find places for all those designated for resettlement. Of those who were resettled, 34 % were from Africa, 41 % from the Middle East, 20 % from Former Yugoslavia and 6% from South East Asia. In addition, many thousands of refugees and persons of concern to UNHCR were resettled through national humanitarian and family reunion programs. UNHCR estimate that the resettlement needs for 1998 will be similar to those of As one of only ten countries5 to have a resettlement program, and as a country which, to its credit, has consistently had one of the highest per capita resettlement intakes, Australia will be expected by its citizens and by the international community to assist UNHCR by continuing to provide places for a significant proportion of this caseload. Resettlement : an Instrument of Protection and a Durable Solution. UNHCR EC/46/SC/CRP May p4. The ten resettlement countries are as follows : Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Sweden and the USA.

9 Humanitarian Program 3. AUSTRALIA'S REFUGEE AND HUMANITARIAN PROGRAM 3.1. INTRODUCTION As one of a very few countries of world that has an active immigration program, it is appropriate that Australia allocates a part of this program to assist refugees and others deemed in need of resettlement for humanitarian reasons. In so doing, it is important to acknowledge that resettlement is but one response a country can make to assisting refugees around the world. The reality is that only a very small percentage of the world's refugees (<2 %) are ever considered for resettlement so if Australia is to make a real contribution to assisting the world's refugees in the full spirit of burden sharing, it must also engage in other activities, in particular: addressing the root causes of population movements through participation in bilateral and international dialogue; contributing to international peace keeping initiatives; providing development assistance to countries hosting large numbers of refugees and supporting the programs of inter-governmental and non-governmental agencies working with refugees; and offering asylum to those who meet the internationally accepted definition of a refugee. As a signatory to the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, Australia has an obligation to protect such refugees from being sent back to their country of origin. Historically Australia has had an excellent record in assisting refugees. The challenge for Australia is to maintain this commitment and in so doing, to ensure that the national response is balanced, ie that each of the areas is being addressed in a measured way and the activities in one are consistent with those in the others. If we are able to achieve this, it will enhance Australia's reputation as a responsible member of the international community RECENT TRENDS In the last five program years the number of visas issued to refugees and humanitarian entrants outside Australia has been as follows:

10 Refugee Council of Australia Offshore Humanitarian Visas Granted6 Category (planned) Refugee 4,300 3,990 4,640 3,334 4,000 SHP7 2, ,500 2,583 2,855 SAC8_ 5,800 5,550 6,910 3,735 3,145 TOTAL , ,652 10,000 When preparing this submission the Refugee Council consulted extensively with refugee community groups and with workers from mainstream and ethno-specific services. They expressed strong views to us about recent developments in relation to the size and composition of the program. Many of these will be elaborated in the following sections, however, some go the very heart of the program. They are as follows: The program is viewed as an essential part of Australia's response to assisting the world's refugees. As such, priority within the program should be given to Convention refugees. It is stressed, however, that each of the other two categories play distinct and important roles in assisting people with genuine needs for resettlement. Achieving a balance is therefore considered essential. There is consensus that too few visas are issued to humanitarian entrants offshore. The perceived need greatly exceeds the number of places available and there is strong support for an increase of at least 2,000 in the number of visas allocated each year. There is still considerable unease about the numerical linking of the onshore and offshore components of the program, though to a certain extent this had been lessened in the current financial year as a consequence of the flow on of unused places from the onshore to offshore program. While it is recognised that reunion with family members if effected through the humanitarian program results in exemption for the entrants from the two year waiting period for benefits and in additional entitlements for services, there is still concern about erosion in the offshore numbers. Support continues for a separate Humanitarian Family Reunion component. Figures from Population Flows : Immigration Aspects. DIMA. January Special Humanitarian Program. 10 Special Assistance Category.

11 Humanitarian Program 3.3. PROGRAM PLANNING Ahumanitarian resettlement program performs a very different function to any other form of migration. Those it targets should be some of the most vulnerable people on earth, people for whom no other viable option exists and for some, it can literally be a case of life and death. It can thus be argued that there are certain key elements of an effective humanitarian program. We should be seeking to ensure that the program is balanced, responsible and responsive program that reflects the dynamic nature of world events. And most importantly, there needs to be sufficient transparency in the operation of the program so that all can be confident that it is achieving the desired result. In this context, RCOA will reflect below on issues considered relevant to program planning Flexibility : It is acknowledged that it is important for both the Department of Immigration and for community based service providers to have some concept of the size and composition of the humanitarian intake in advance of the program year so as to be able to plan activities and services. On the other hand, it is also recognised that crises can emerge with little or no warning. At the time of writing, allied countries are on the verge of mounting another offensive against Sadaam Hussein in Iraq. If this happens, there is the potential for massive population displacement that will have both immediate and long term implications for the resettlement program. We are also seeing the unravelling of the economies of the "Asian Tigers". As will be discussed later, this too could have significant implications for both the offshore and onshore programs. Not only could nationals of these countries be displaced but we could also see the expulsion of asylum seekers, temporary residents and guest workers, some of whom will be unable to return to their countries of origin because of a well founded fear of persecution. These are not the only potential flash points. We have Cambodia heading for an election, increasing tensions in Serbia, a fragile peace in Bosnia, ongoing tensions in a number of African states and a rapidly deteriorating situation in Algeria and, to a lesser extent, Egypt. responsible humanitarian program has to be able to balance the need to make preparations for new arrivals with the ability to respond appropriately to emergency situations once they occur. The Refugee Council recommends that figures allocated to posts under the Refugee and Special Humanitarian components of the humanitarian program are indicative not prescriptive, thereby giving the flexibility that is necessary to respond to crisis situations as they emerge. 11

12 Refugee Council of Australia Contingency Planning: It is conceivable that one or more of the above mentioned situations may result in a need for a substantial number of additional resettlement places such as cannot be accommodated in the program without significantly impacting on other areas of need. In the recent past such a need was met by a process of "borrowing" and "paying back ". The Refugee Council has long held the view that in order to be able to respond to crises and to requests for assistance from UNHCR, the humanitarian program must not only be flexible in composition, as argued above, it must also contain a contingency provision that will allow additional places to be added to the program. The introduction of a contingency reserve would remove the need to tamper with the following year's program in the event of an emergency. Furthermore, the Refugee Council believes there is another important use for a contingency reserve. While, as will discussed later, we do not agree with the numerical linking of the onshore and offshore programs, we recognise that this is the current reality. Our concerns about the linkage would be lessened if any overflow (ie visas issued in excess of the 2,000 allocation) from the onshore program could come out of the contingency reserve and thus not directly detract from visa allocations to posts. The Refugee Council recommends that the Refugee and Special Humanitarian Program include a contingency reserve of 3,000, some or all of which can be drawn on should an emergency arise during the course of the program year and / or if the number of onshore visas granted exceeds 2, Multi-year Planning: As previously argued, it is important that the Refugee and Special Humanitarian Program be responsive to emerging developments around the world. It is thus not possible to determine exactly how many should or will come from any given group too far in advance. On the other hand, service providers and other support agencies would better be able to assist their clients if they were able to develop strategic plans for more than 12 months in advance.9 The Refugee Council contends that it is possible to balance the need for a flexible approach and service agencies' needs to plan programs and staffing levels by adopting a multi-year plan for the humanitarian program that is linked to overall numbers and priority groups rather than the specific details of program composition. Such an approach has been used successfully by other resettlement countries. The Refugee Council recommends that consideration be given to the introduction of multi-year planning for the Refugee and Special Humanitarian Program. c -f 9 This is especially important in the context of the law preventing the grant of benefits Ss& migrants (ie non-humanitarian entrants) for two years after arrival. This has been the cause of problems for many migrants and they are turning to community services for assistance. 12

13 Humanitarian Program Consultation: For a refugee resettlement program to function efficiently, it is necessary that all key players work in unison at all stages. In other words there has to be collaboration between UNHCR, other intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), in particular the International Organisation for Migration, the Government and non-government organisations (NGOs) in countries of first asylum and in Australia. The Refugee Council welcomes the apparent ongoing commitment from UNHCR to annual tripartite regional consultations which bring together international agencies, government representatives and NGOs from Australia and New Zealand for dialogue on refugee resettlement. As positive as such meetings are, it is argued that by themselves, they do not constitute adequate consultation. Cooperation would be enhanced by: strengthening consultation in countries of first asylum: the links between the Australian Post and IGOs and NGOs operating in that country vary significantly from post to post. In some instances there are constructive links, however, in others, there is a communication breakdown. As will be argued below, the only way for a resettlement program to identify the most vulnerable amongst the caseload is for the post to work closely with those working at the grass-roots level. Further, if a complete picture of the resettlement needs from a particular country is to be developed, all key players need to be consulted. It is heartening to note that Migration Officers are now systematically making contact with community representatives before taking up their post. The challenge that is yet to be met is how to make the best use of these links once the Officer is ensconced; intercessional working groups: in addition to the regional consultation, there would be great value if less formal periodic (eg quarterly ) meetings could be organised for interested agencies in Australia 'to discuss developments around the world and monitor the operation of the program. These meetings would greatly assist sectoral cooperation in relation to program planning and service delivery; enhanced information dissemination: a frequently expressed concern of community groups and settlement services is their inability to get demographic information about entrants eg age, sex, educational background, health status etc. Such information is considered essential for the planning of services. In the past, information notes were produced by the Department of Immigration on a limited number of entrant groups and these were considered very helpful. Even this limited service appears to have ceased. While the DIMA monthly statistics on the program give some information, they do not give any indication as to nationality or ethnicity of entrants, nor do they give the additional breakdown required by service providers. Provision of more detailed demographic information is considered important. The Refugee Council recommends that: development of a close working relationship with IGOs and NGOs in countries of first asylum should be identified as an important 13

14 Refugee Council of Australia part of the role of Migration Officers; there be opportunities to discuss the progress of the resettlement program during the course of the year either at the quarterly DIMA-NGO-IGO consultations or at a separate meeting arranged for this purpose; DIMA prepare more detailed demographic information on entrant groups to enable service providers to target services appropriately The Legislative Framework: Thus far this section has set forth principles relating to the operation of the existing structure. This does not mean that there is no value in reflecting on whether the framework currently in place is the best possible to achieve our collective goals for refugee protection. The legislative framework for both refugee status determination and the humanitarian resettlement program is currently found in the Migration Act (1958). Whether or not this is the best possible place for it has periodically been the subject of debate. A former UNHCR representative to Australia put forward a strong argument for the creation of a "Refugee Act" on the basis that migration and protection are fundamentally different principles with different underlying premises and different objectives. At the time, the idea sparked interest but found little political favour. Recently it has re-emerged in another context. On 31 December 1997 the Legislative Review Advisory Committee submitted to the Canadian Minister for Citizenship and Immigration the report of a study they had been commissioned to undertake. They were tasked with advising the Minister on the best future direction for Canadian immigration laws in the light of present challenges and emerging trends. After extensive consultation and research, it recommended a radical revision of the legislative framework, most significantly the creation of a separate Protection Act that would cover both resettlement and onshore determination. The Committee's report, "Not Just Numbers: a Canadian Framework for Future Immigration", analyses in detail why they arrived at this conclusion and operational issues pertaining to their recommendation, including the creation of a specialist protection agency. While recognising that Canada and Australia share many immigration concerns, it is also acknowledged that there are many unique factors that Canada has to contend with, not least its proximity to the United States. RCOA is therefore not suggesting that the findings of the Canadian review are directly applicable to Australia. We contend, however, that there is much to reflect on in the Canadian report. The Refugee Council recommends that the recently released Canadian report: "Not Just Numbers", be carefully analysed and be the subject of dialogue between relevant government departments, academics and NGOs. 14

15 Humanitarian Program 3.4. PROGRAM COMPOSITION The Composition of the Humanitarian Intake: Since 1991 the Refugee and Special Humanitarian Program has been divided into three components, each of which performs a particular function. The three components are: i. the Refugee Program: this component covers people classified as refugees under the terms of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol (and in many cases identified by UNHCR as requiring resettlement) who are granted Class 200 Visas, as well as In-country Rescue Cases (Class 201 Visas) and Women at Risk (Class 204 Visas). These people are arguably the most vulnerable amongst the caseload because they have been identified as having serious, and in some cases immediate protection needs; ii. iii. the Special Humanitarian Program (SHP): people who are outside their country of origin and have been identified as having experienced, or fear, gross discrimination amounting to a substantial violation of their human rights may be granted a Class 202 Visa. People entering under this program have to have demonstrated a connection to Australia. In most cases this is through a family connection or through having previously lived or studied here; the Special Assistance Category: this was introduced in 1991 for groups with close family or community links to Australia who are in particularly vulnerable situations overseas and who do not meet the criteria for the other categories. Entrants come under Visa Classes 208 to 217. This category has been used to allocate places to particular groups who are considered to be in danger because of unrest or civil conflict, because of severe discrimination or who have been displaced. As each SAC is allocated, specific criteria are drawn up and these always include prior links to Australia. The Refugee component of the program is motivated by the recognition that a balanced response to the world's refugee problems requires that provision of resettlement places for Convention refugees be part of Australia's response. Furthermore, as one of the few countries of the world with an active immigration program, there is an expectation that Australia allocate places for humanitarian entrants as well as migrants. In other words, the refugee program enables Australia to play its part as a responsible member of the international community. Both the Special Humanitarian Program and the Special Assistance Categories are driven not so much by an international imperative but by the desire of community groups and individuals in Australia to make a tangible contribution towards assisting members of their communities in difficult circumstances overseas. This high level of community support enables Australia to admit many more humanitarian entrants, at less public cost, than it otherwise would be able to. RCOA reiterates its position that it is necessary to ensure that there is balance in the program such that no one component of the humanitarian intake dominates the others. Further, RCOA argues that it is appropriate 15

16 Refugee Council of Australia that the highest priority for entry be given to Convention refugees and therefore a significant proportion of the program should be allocated to them The Special Assistance Category: Since their introduction in 1991 the Special Assistance Category (SAC) has been the subject of a mixed response. Many communities have seen it as a godsend in so much as it has provided a mechanism by which they can assist relatives and friends in dangerous situations where no other avenues existed. Other communities have wanted a SAC and have not been given one, thus feeling resentful and discriminated against. And for the decision makers, the SACs have presented many challenges in terms of balancing competing desires against needs and capacities. This being said, it would be a great pity to discard the SACs entirely simply because the implementation of this component of the program has been beset with problems. It is essential that we do not lose sight of their raison d'etre and that which is possibly their greatest asset, namely that through the SACs it is possible to assist people in need of resettlement who fall outside the narrow criteria of the other program areas, in particular people who are still within their countries of origin. RCOA has long advocated that if the SACs are to be optimally effective and transparent, they should operate within certain fundamental principles: the decision to create a new SAC must be based on a clearly identified humanitarian need which fits within the overall objectives of the humanitarian program; each new SAC must have a clearly defined target and precise selection criteria; the relevant community must be closely involved in the development of selection criteria; and the community must be in a position to provide active post-arrival support to proposers and SAC entrants. The Refugee Council recommends with respect to the Special Assistance Category that: SACs remain as part of the humanitarian program; prior to the establishment of a SAC program, detailed consultations be conducted with the relevant community ; the community be involved in the determination of the size and selection criteria of the SAC; 16

17 Humanitarian Program every effort be made to balance "supply and demand ", so as to ensure that the number of people who fit the criteria is approximately the same number who can be accommodated by the SAC over the anticipated life of the program; if practicable, a group within the particular community be identified and resourced to act as lead agency 10 for the community 's SAC so that the program can be managed in a holistic way; in the absence of a lead agency or unified community structure, efforts be made to establish substitutes. This could be by way of peer support through linking fledgling groups to non-ethno-specific agencies or established ethnic groups The Relationship Between the Onshore and Offshore Programs: The Refugee Council has long held the view that the onshore and offshore refugee programs should be maintained as separate programs and in no way combined or linked. It is argued that the two programs result from different motivations: the onshore program is in response to Australia's international obligations as a signatory to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. To fail to give protection to those who are determined to be refugees would be a breach of these obligations; the offshore program is driven by Australia's long held commitment to assist UNHCR find durable solutions for those for whom no other option exists. It is also acknowledged that the humanitarian program provides a tangible way for communities in Australia to assist members of their community in distress overseas. There is no legal requirement under the Convention that Australia have an offshore program but there is recognition that in providing resettlement places, Australia is playing its part as a good international citizen. This is a very valuable commodity and it makes Australia respected within the United Nations framework. Further, it is argued that it is not possible to predetermine the number of people to whom Australia will grant refugee status in any given year as this is dependent upon the number of applications made, applicants processed and the nature of the claims they present. Furthermore, affixing a number in advance: could be interpreted as introducing a quota which runs contrary to Australia's obligations under international law; will, if the number of onshore visas granted exceeds the number of places allocated and as happened in , result in people in countries of first asylum missing out on places ; 10 The suggestion that there be a lead agency should not preclude the involvement of other community agencies or groups, nor should it imply centralisation in one city or region. 17

18 Refugee Council of Australia could create a "pull factor", with people in countries of first asylum seeing that their chances are better if they apply for asylum in Australia rather than wait for one of the diminished number of places available to people applying offshore; and has already led to signs of tensions between onshore applicants and relatives of offshore applicants. The Refugee Council echoes the widely expressed view that people granted refugee status in Australia not be counted in the Offshore Program figures for the coming year but that an account of the number of Onshore visas granted be presented to Parliament at the end of the program year Humanitarian Family Reunion: Being reunited with family members is one of the key settlement indices (see Section 3) and the failure to effect family reunion can greatly impair an entrant's ability to function in other areas. For instance, if a person is constantly preoccupied about the safety of a loved one, they are unable to concentrate on learning English or finding a job. Often they do not want to make decisions, such as where to live, without being able to consult with their loved one. It is as if their life is in a state of limbo. The nature of the refugee experience is such that separation from close family members is commonplace. Recent provisions have enabled immediate family members (spouse and children), included on the original application, to be visaed and to travel to Australia more expeditiously than was previously the case. This is very welcome. This does not, however, address the family reunion needs of all humanitarian entrants. It is not uncommon for a refugee to feel very strong bonds to someone beyond the immediate family, either because of the link was culturally defined (eg in some cultures aunts and uncles have a close and defined role which differs to that we understand in western culture) or because most or all of the immediate family members have been killed in the conflict. Currently the only provision for non-immediate family members to travel to Australia is under the family reunion program. The combination of reduction in numbers, capping and points tests meant that for most, the prospects of using this program are negligible. If it is possible to get a visa for a family member, the two year wait for benefits becomes a hurdle, with no prospect for exemptions because even though the sponsors may be struggling, their circumstances have not changed. The inability to be reunited with family is causing considerable anguish amongst humanitarian entrants, in particular for those with elderly parents. The Refugee Council stresses the importance of family reunion in the settlement process and reiterates our view that there should be a designated component of the family reunion program to accommodate sponsors who have entered under a humanitarian program, so as to allow more flexible application of selection criteria and possible waiving, on an as needs basis, of benefit restrictions. 18

19 Humanitarian Program Onshore Humanitarian Provisions: There is a widespread recognition by asylum countries that a significant number of applicants have compelling reasons for not returning to their country of origin yet do not fit the Convention Definition. To accommodate such people, many countries have an alternative status (Exceptional Leave to Remain in the United Kingdom, Refugee B Status in many European states). In Australia the only way to get such status is to exhaust all administrative appeals and then make an appeal to the Minister that he exercise his non-compellable discretionary powers and substitute a more favourable decision than the rejection previously received. The Minister did this in 13 cases in the first half of the financial year. The absence of such alternative status in Australia has been a major concern of the Council. The current system demands that people with compelling reasons not to return to their country of origin for non-convention reasons to go through a lengthy and expensive process in order to get the rejection that is the necessary legal trigger for their real claims to be considered by the Minister. This is detrimental to: those with humanitarian claims as they have to wait many months, and in some cases years, before their case is considered against appropriate criteria; refugees, the processing of whose claims is delayed by the number of non- Convention claims in the pipeline; and the refugee determination process, which is made more cumbersome by the inclusion of non-convention claims. RCOA believes that it is time to reassess the issue of humanitarian status and develop mechanisms whereby those with compelling grounds to stay in Australia on non- Convention grounds can be referred for consideration at an earlier stage in the process. We also question whether the reliance on Ministerial discretion is necessarily the most appropriate or efficient way of considering such cases, recognising the multiplicity of demands for the Minister's attention. Ideally, we believe that an onshore humanitarian visa class should be reintroduced. The Refugee Council questions the equity of a system that provides a separate entry class for humanitarian claimants outside Australia but places many obstacles in the path of people with similar claims who apply within Australia. Further, it calls on the Government to investigate ways to introduce an administrative process for assessing onshore humanitarian claims. The Refugee Council is currently conducting research into this issue and will present the findings to the Minister when this is complete. 19

20 Refugee Council of Australia Temporary Protection: There have been many occasions when Australia has granted temporary protection to people who are in Australia when a crisis situation develops in their country of origin. It is an appropriate response for people who are unable to return in the short term but could well be able to once the crisis is resolved. It has been used in the past for people from Lebanon, Sri Lanka and the Former Yugoslavia, and more contentiously for people from China present in Australia at the time of the Tienanmen massacre. It could well provide an option for some of the Chinese who are being targeted in the current unrest in Indonesia. It is the Refugee Council's view that temporary protection has a role so long as this is clearly defined and is not preventing people from seeking a more permanent solutions when this is the desired result. It also has to be seen as "temporary " and should the situation in the country of origin become prolonged, the matter must be re-evaluated and done so in a way that is fair and equitable. RCOA has reservations about the most recent measures in this regard. The expiry in 1997 of the temporary visa classes created for Sri Lankans and people from Former Yugoslavia required a decision to be made by government as to the fate of these people. The result was the creation of new temporary visa classes as announced by the Minister for Immigration in June The new visa classes not only covered the people from Sri Lanka and Former Yugoslavia but also people from Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon and China, all of whom had to have arrived lawfully in Australia on or before specified dates. Eligible people were granted visas that allow them to remain in Australia and have access to permission to work and Medicare, subject to their passing health and character checks. After having completed 10 years in Australia, holders of these new visas will be eligible to apply for permanent residence. While these new provisions go some of the way towards regularising the status of people from Former Yugoslavia and Sri Lanka who have held temporary visas for a number of years, the Refugee Council has a number of reservations about the new program: the new arrangements are, in effect, an amnesty for many (though not all) who will be able to take advantage of them: people who have been illegal in the community for a number of years; by making such an offer, the Government makes it very difficult for reputable advisers to tell their clients that it is important that they return to their countries once they have exhausted avenues to stay in Australia. People excluded this time will doubtless think "if they have this 'amnesty' they may do it again - and next time I might be lucky"; the new class is discriminatory in two ways: by setting a cut off date after which people who are ineligible to apply, it discriminates against those who came one day/week/month later and who 20

21 Humanitarian Program under the terms of the announcement, will not be able to benefit. This is particularly problematic for many of those from Former Yugoslavia and Sri Lanka who have hitherto been given temporary visas but will now have to leave, even though in some cases the conditions have not improved markedly in the areas from which they came; it discriminates against other groups who, it can be argued, come from countries where there are far greater humanitarian problems: countries such as Algeria, Burma, Afghanistan, Somalia and the Sudan. It also fails to make allowance for the East Timorese who are arguably the most traumatised of the groups of asylum seekers we have in Australia at present; in the announcement about the introduction of the new visa class it was stated that it was intended for people who "have remained in Australia on humanitarian grounds". While this is the case for many who will benefit, for approximately half (ie the 3981 nationals of China anticipated to be eligible) this is not the case. While some Chinese nationals were covered by humanitarian (class 815) visas in the past, RCOA believes that they are not the people who will benefit from the new visas. Those who will benefit are failed applicants for non-humanitarian visas (816 and 818 visa classes). Furthermore, if the failed Chinese applicants for the 816 and 818 visas are given an opportunity to stay, we query why the other national groups who also applied for these visas and were refused have been excluded. the new visa class also has some downsides for those who qualify. These people will have to have been in the country for ten years before they can study at a tertiary institution (without paying overseas student fees) or be reunited with anyone other than their (existing) spouse or dependent children. Then, once they receive permanent residence, they have to wait a further two years before they are eligible to receive social security benefits. Therefore, if the visa holder is young and fit, has a job, is accompanied by family and has no inclination to study, he/she will be fine - but if this is not the case, it will be a long wait for necessary support. The Refugee Council has long advocated that there is a need to regularise temporary humanitarian visas after a specified period. RCOA believes that four years is long enough to establish whether a conflict is likely to be prolonged and long enough for people from that country to remain in limbo. It is our view that those who hold temporary visas should be allowed to apply for permanent residence after four years - not ten as is suggested. It is also the Council's view that people who have been illegally in the community for long periods should not be rewarded with group amnesties. It would be far more equitable, and much easier to explain to an increasingly sceptical public, if there were to be ways in which such people could regularise their status on an "as needs " basis - something which takes into account the personal circumstances of the individual, both in Australia and the country from which they came. This could be achieved through the reinstatement of an onshore humanitarian category for people who do not fit the narrow refugee definition but have compelling reasons to stay in Australia. 21

22 Refugee Council of Australia The Refugee Council recommends that, as a general principle, people who have been in possession of temporary protection visas for four years or more be able to apply for permanent residence should they so wish PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION Whereas that which has gone before relates principally to the philosophy and structure of the humanitarian program, this section examines its implementation. The recommendations are therefore directed towards the agency that carries this responsibility, the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (DIMA). As will become apparent, there is a strong vested interest in the community to ensure that the humanitarian program operates as efficiently and expeditiously as possible and there is deep concern that perceived failings are addressed. The issues presented below are those that emerged during RCOA's consultations with the community and in response to questions concerning the implementation of Australia's Refugee and Special Humanitarian Program. Every effort has been made to reproduce accurately these community concerns and they are presented in good faith. The recommendations, similarly, are those that come from community workers when asked to reflect on how the problems they were encountering could best be resolved The Selection Process: i. Reliance on UNHCR Referrals As previously stated, the refugee component of the humanitarian program is intended to accommodate Convention refugees for whom resettlement has been determined to be the best, and sometimes only, durable solution. There has always been a heavy reliance on UNHCR referrals to fill the places in this program, something which reflects the valued contribution by Australia to UNHCR in this regard. In past submissions RCOA has expressed doubt about whether UNHCR was in fact best placed to identify those most in need of resettlement, with UNHCR itself admitting serious deficiencies in its own operation in a 1995 review. RCOA welcomes the substantial work done by UNHCR to address these problems, including the revision and publication of its Resettlement Handbook. This does not, however, mean that we accept UNHCR as the sole referral agency for the program. The administrative reforms within UNHCR do not address the deficiencies in staffing levels. Nor do they address the fact that many genuine refugees are unable to get UNHCR documentation and/or endorsement of their resettlement claims. In some parts of the world it is considered too dangerous to approach UNHCR because to do so would alert those allied to the government in the country of origin, for instance the community view is that the UNHCR office in Amman is under Iraqi surveillance. For other refugees there are insurmountable barriers to their travelling to a UNHCR office. 22

23 Humanitarian Program Even access to a UNHCR office does not guarantee effective support. On 25 February 1998 RCOA received a letter from which the followng is an extract: "I am a Rwandan refugee living in exile. I, as a great number of refugees living in Tanzania do not know my rights as a refugee. I would like to ask from you a refugee rights book in order to help me in fighting for my rights ". On face value this is a very reasonable request until one looks at the address on the letter. This man's address is care of UNHCR, the very agency who should be ensuring that he is aware of his rights as a refugee. And then there are refugees who would benefit from resettlement but who come from a group for whom UNHCR has made a blanket determination that resettlement is not needed. Afghans and West Papuans are cases in point. RCOA reiterates its belief that it is essential for migration officers to establish close links to the people who are working at the grass roots level in refugee camps and urban communities where refugees live. These people could be working for non-government agencies, as UNHCR field staff or for other international agencies. They are far better placed than a desk-bound resettlement officer to identify the most vulnerable amongst the general refugee population. It is argued that migration officers should actively seek participation in the interagencies that are common countries of first asylum and which bring together workers from the various sectors. These are the best places to explain the program and to develop links to the people who can be of greatest assistance to the migration officer in both identifying the caseload and managing the program (eg by informing refugees what the program can - and cannot - do for them). The Refugee Council cautions about too heavy dependence on UNHCR referrals for the refugee component of the program, arguing that it is important for migration officers to develop a wide network of contacts amongst grass roots workers in the countries of first asylum. ii. Other UN Treaties The foundation of international refugee law is the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the Convention) and its 1967 Protocol. This does not mean, however, that it is the only international treaty with relevance to refugees. Amongst those with relevance are: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the various Geneva Conventions relating to the treatment of civilians in time of war, 23

24 Refugee Council of Australia the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment (CAT), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CROC). The Conclusions of the 48th Session of the Executive Committee of UNHCR in 1997 made particular reference to the importance of CAT and CROC for the protection and welfare of refugees and set out a clear link between CAT and the principle of nonrefoulement. Domestically such links are already taken into account with the public interest provisions that underpin the discretionary powers vested in the Minister for Immigration. It is argued that they should also be considered by migration officers when assessing resettlement claims. The Refugee Council recommends that guidelines be drawn up for migration officers on the applicability of relevant international humanitarian law and that they receive training in their application. iii. Family Unity As will be discussed later, the ability to be reunited with close family members is seen as critical to one's settlement prospects. During consultations, many family reunion issues were raised, most falling outside the scope of this submission. Some, however, have direct relevance when considering selection of humanitarian entrants. For example, it was reported that there have been a number of instances where migration officials have recommended that where a family group contains elderly parents, the younger members travel first, establish themselves in Australia and then bring the parents later. Workers report that they know of many cases, among various entrant groups, where this has happened with dire results. Whereas when the family comes together the parents seem to be able to adjust reasonably well to their new life, those who come later experience great difficulty. It is not uncommon for these older people to feel excluded from the family - the family have moved on without them and they have lost their place. They see themselves as a burden, expressing humiliation and deep frustration and efforts to engage them in the wider community, eg through English classes, often fail. Many cases of breakdown of previously stable families were reported and even cases where the elderly people return to the country of origin because they feel they are a burden on their families. It is recommended that where a family unit includes elderly dependent parents that, unless circumstances prevent it, every effort is made to ensure that the family is resettled as a single unit. Another issue raised was that of reunion with an orphan/special needs relative. In such cases there is a requirement that the sponsor be settled in Australia which is usually interpreted as meaning residence for a period of 2 years. It is argued that the period is arbitrary and can cause hardship in cases where the sponsor is a humanitarian entrant. It is recommended that in cases of sponsorship of an orphan or special need relative of a humanitarian entrant that the policy be applied with 24

25 Humanitarian Program appropriate flexibility so that the two year wait can be waved in cases of hardship. v. Documentation Concern was widely expressed that DIMA is still insisting that applicants produce documentation (eg a marriage or birth certificate, phone bills etc) where such things are either non existent within the person's culture or the nature of the flight is such that a person could not reasonably be expected to have/obtain them. This leads to a number of problems. In some instances, the fear that the absence of documents will result in rejection has compelled applicants to have documents forged. While this may achieve the desired result ie selection for the program - it leaves them exposed to having their visas cancelled on the grounds of fraud. On the other hand, if more realistic standards applied, the need for such potentially devastating deceits would be reduced. This issue affects people from many source countries, in particular those from the Middle East (including Afghanistan) where there is both a tradition of and ready access to forged documents. It is also reported as problematic for Somalis who have married while in Kenya. These marriages are typically carried out by a marriage celebrant, are undocumented and have no status under Kenyan law. Proof is thus impossible to obtain. The Refugee Council recommends that DIMA, in close consultation with the community sector, examines both the policy and practice in relation to documentation requirements and puts in place procedures that will ensure that those who have good reasons why they cannot provide the required documentation, either because it never existed or cannot be obtained, are not disadvantaged in their applications. v. Cultural Issues In several of RCOA's consultations the view was expressed that migration officers are not correctly interpreting the law in relation to recognition of prior marriage and espousal. A pertinent example of this, and one that is causing much distress at present, is the failure to recognise the "marriage contract" that is used in many Islamic communities to inextricably bind two people. This contract is undocumented and, in many cases, unconsummated, but is seen as binding under Islamic law. Someone bound under a marriage contract will feel married, even though they are unable to provide any proof of cohabitation and/or co-dependency. The failure to recognise this obligation has led to many problems, particularly among the men who have newly arrived from the Middle East. It is reported that some of these entrants have become very depressed and resentful towards Australia because their efforts to convince DIMA about their relationship have proved fruitless. This has an obvious impact on their ability to settle in Australia. In some cases they feel obliged take dramatic steps to "prove their relationship ", such as travelling to the Middle East to try to get the partner pregnant. In such cases the woman (and child) is then left for a considerable period in a state of limbo and without adequate support. 25

26 Refugee Council of Australia Linked to this is another issue raised by community workers and one that is of particular relevance in Sydney where rental costs are so high - the fact that many men from the Middle East are overstaying in On Arrival Accommodation (OAA) because they do not want to move elsewhere until their spouse arrives. This is in large part because they want to save the prized bond assistance until they can select a new home with their partner. The Refugee Council recommends that there be an examination of the community concerns in relation to cultural interpretation and that all steps are taken to ensure correct application of the law Procedures at Posts: significant proportion of the complaints about the operation of the overseas humanitarian program relate to the fact that the staffing levels in overseas posts are grossly inadequate and consequently the posts are unable to handle the caseload efficiently and expeditiously. It has been reported that Canadian migration posts handling programs comparable in size to those of their equivalent Australian posts have four to five times the staffing levels. Meanwhile the Australian posts are literally becoming buried under applications and it is little wonder that: there are extensive delays in processing; program targets are not met; inquiries to the posts are not answered; documents are lost; inconsistent decisions are made; etc It is the Council's position that if the Humanitarian program is to have credibility and perform its intended function, ie provide a durable solution to those in need of resettlement, sufficient resources must be allocated to its operation to enable efficient, equitable and timely processing of applications. The above concerns, and other issues that came from community consultations about procedures at posts, are elaborated on below. i. Processing Delays Acommon issue of concern within the community is the processing periods in many migration posts and the views on lengthy delays are not just subjective. Figures released by DIMA" indicate that: the average processing time for refugee (class 200) visas granted in the period May-October 1997 was 57 weeks, over 1 year, with cases in New Delhi averaging 106 weeks, Beirut 96 weeks and Athens 85 weeks; Monthly Summary: December Offshore Program Delivery: Humanitaria n Program. DIMA. 26

27 Humanitarian Program the average processing time for special humanitarian (class 202) in the same period was 94 weeks, with Ankara, Moscow and the Hague taking in the order of three years; and possibly of greatest concern, the average processing time for Women at Risk (class 214) visas is 61 weeks, with Beirut averaging 105 weeks and Islamabad 96 weeks12. Arefugee resettlement program is, by definition, targeting people with no other options and in most cases, living in difficult and sometimes dangerous circumstances. If that program is to be credible, it must be able to respond in a timely fashion. It is considered that the current processing times for humanitarian visas are unacceptable, especially where the applicant is at risk in the country of first asylum, and recommend that every effort be made to reduce processing times. u. Program Management The introduction of program management in overseas posts was welcomed by the community as it resulted in a regular flow of entrants throughout the year so that there was no longer a flood of entrants who had been visaed at the end of the program year. This in turn greatly enhanced the ability of agencies to provide the necessary support for new arrivals and to plan their programs for the year. It is regrettable therefore that so important an advance seems to have been derailed in the program year. Figures issued by the Department of Immigration at the end of December13 show pro rata processing rates at the following important posts as being: For Refugee Visas: For SHP Visas: Belgrade 58 % 44 % Cairo 47 % 64 % Islamabad 35 % 15% Nairobi 61% 64 % Vienna 55 % 22 % AU Posts 60% 48 % DIMA has given undertakings that the situation has not gone un-noticed and that they are confident of reaching program targets by the end of the year. While this is heartening, the community is concerned about the implications of what happened in the first 6 months of 12 For a program that is targeting women in immediate danger, these delays are not acceptable. This matter will be expanded on later in the submission. 13 Monthly Summary: December Offshore Program Delivery: Humanitarian Program. DIMA. 27

28 Refugee Council of Australia this year. Such a significant departure from pro rata visa issuing will result in the bulk of arrivals being in the second half of the year, thus placing settlement services under unnecessary strain. Compounding this was the delay in allocating the program figures for Former Yugoslavia for Given that it was anticipated that approximately half of the RSHP entrants would come from this group, the uncertainty about the allocation made it difficult for service providers to make plans for the year and allocate resources. The Refugee Council supports the policy of program management and is concerned that it is not operating as is should in the current program year. The Council thus recommends that there be careful analysis of the program management problems encountered during and that steps be taken to ensure that they are not replicated in iii. Inquiries to Posts Legal representatives, community workers and relatives report that their efforts to get information from posts about their client's/relative's case are often fruitless or frustrating. Frequently, inquiries are not answered, sometimes the reply takes several months and sometimes the information provided in the replies is incorrect. This is of particular concern to legal representatives and advisers as it has significant implications for their ability to serve their clients. Understandably/ the most frequent complaints are about the busy posts of Nairobi, Cairo, Belgrade and Moscow but the problem is by no means confined to these posts. The Refugee Council recommends that there be an examination of procedures at posts for handling inquiries with a view to streamlining procedures and addressing community concerns. iv. Document Handling Cases were reported to the Council of posts losing documents, denying documents were lodged and failing to append relevant information to files, all of which are clearly in breach of the Department's own guidelines. These administrative inefficiencies, undoubtably caused by inadequate staffing levels and poor internal procedures, cause many problems for applicants. RCOA was told, for instance, of cases processed in Nairobi, where the applicants had advised the post that they had changed their address but the files were not updated and correspondence was sent to the old address. In at least one case a refugee missed out on coming to Australia because the visa had expired before the person eventually received advice of visa grant. In addition, during the recent round of RCOA consultations, one MRC reported instances of a post giving entrants the wrong visa class (ie a class 309 instead of a class 202 or 100). In each instance the post admitted the mistake and told the entrant to correct the situation after arrival. This however, took time and considerable advocacy and had the potential to deny the entrants benefits to which they were entitled. 28

29 Humanitarian Program The Refugee Council recommends that there be an audit of procedures for document handling at migration posts to identify problem areas and maximise efficiency. v. Rejection Notification It would appear that when people are not selected for the humanitarian program, it is common that the letter of rejection gives no detailed explanation for rejection, indicating only that the reason for their rejection is that they do not meet the program criteria. It is reported that in a number of instances such letters are causing confusion, frustration and distress as the individual(s) involved have been recommended for resettlement by UNHCR and have close family ties to Australia (thereby suggesting that resettlement in Australia would be preferable to resettlement in another country). In other words, it would appear that the reason for rejection was less to do with their failing to meet the criteria and more to do with the quotas having been filled. In other cases the letter is a pro forma, the theory behind which is that the officer will simply tick that which is relevant to the case. There are times, however, when not even this simple procedure is done accurately. For instance male applicants are advised they do not meet the criteria for the Women at Risk category - which is in fact true - but irrelevant as that was not the category for which they applied. Community workers are appealing to DIMA to ensure that letters sent to rejected applicants are not simply standard letters but give an accurate indication of the reasons for rejection, reflect program constraints and, in the case of UNHCR referrals, also give options to the applicant. Concern has also been raised about the nature of letters sent to African applicants. With many coming from what is essentially an oral culture, the receipt of a legalistic letter in a language they do not understand (English) can cause confusion and dismay. The Refugee Council stresses the significance to the applicant (and his / her proposers) of communications from the migration post and recommends that all letters of rejection are accurate in content, are accessible to the applicant (ie be written in simple language and, where translation is not feasible, in the applicant 's language) and contain all relevant information, including options for applying for more appropriate categories. vi. Multiple Applications The absence of any review mechanism, coupled with seemingly inconsistent decision making and inadequate explanation in the letter of rejection, appears to have resulted in repeat applications becoming the norm rather than the exception. Community workers argue that they are unable to counsel clients not to lodge application after application because there are sufficient instances of an applicant being accepted after the 4th, 8th or even 12th attempt to suggest that there is point in trying. They are also quick to point out 29

30 Refugee Council of Australia that they know of many instances where seemingly identical cases receive diametrically opposed decisions. This even happens where two parts of the same family, who have had identical experiences, apply separately. Many thus view the application process as something of a lottery - if you are lucky enough to have your application considered on a day when the migration officer is feeling generous - or has been told to increase his/her quota - or is new to the post... you might just be lucky - so why not try? And if you fail this time, try again... and again. The posts are thus so swamped with applications that they are unable to do them justice and the cycle begins again. The Refugee Council recommends that, in the absence of a review mechanism for offshore applications, there be regular auditing of procedures at overseas posts to ensure consistency of decision making. vii. Locally Engaged Staff On each occasion the Refugee Council seeks input into this submission, community representatives and workers raise the issue of the competency and honesty of locally engaged staff at migration posts. Stories are told of staff selling forms, asking for baksheesh to speed processing (or to find forms that have been "lost"), giving advice they are not qualified to give, being rude and racist, and various other claims of unacceptable behaviour. Islamabad, Tehran, Belgrade and Bonn are often singled out for mention but workers are quick to point out that the problems are not confined to these posts. The devolution of decision making to locally engaged staff in many posts compounds this problem. This has implications for both the humanitarian entrants and the staff and is a practice RCOA strongly opposes. On the one hand it opens the way for the less scrupulous local staff to exploit applicants. On the other hand, it exposes ethical staff to considerable pressure to accept bribes, in particular in cultures where people are accustomed to having to "pay extra" for service. RCOA recognises DIMA's dilemma in relation to investigating claims of inappropriate activities at posts and accepts that concrete evidence is very difficult to obtain. This can be for many reasons, including a reluctance of individuals involved to complain, as they fear that to do so will either jeopardise the visa they have, their chances of getting a visa or the chances of their family being visaed. The Refugee Council reiterates its recommendation that senior staff at migration posts make every effort to ensure application of best practice by locally engaged staff 14 and to stamp out instances of corruption, racism or other unacceptable behaviour. viii. Interpreters In Australia we have come to expect, and respect, the high standard of professionalism from the interpreters used in administrative decision making. Given the significance of the interview RSHP applicants undergo, it is reasonable to expect a comparable level of professionalism from the interpreters engaged overseas. It appears that this is not always the case. There are reports of: 14 Reference is made here to DIMA's proposed Client Service Charter. 30

31 Humanitarian Program interpreters expressing negative opinions about the character/credibility of the applicant to the interviewer; interpreters refusing to interpret certain claims made by the applicant on the grounds that these things "would not have happened in (their country of origin); interpreters from the opposing religious/ethnic background being employed; male interpreters being used for a female applicant with claims of sexual violence; applicants being afraid to disclose information of a sensitive nature, eg about their sexual orientation, to an interpreter because of fear of disclosure to the community common to the applicant and interpreter; applicants being asked to provide their own interpreters; etc. Each of the above will prevent a proper assessment of the applicant's bona fides and credibility and will influence on the ability of the migration officer to make a fair and unbiased decision. The Refugee Council recommends that community concerns about the use of interpreters in overseas posts be examined and every effort be made to ensure that applicants are in no way disadvantaged by the choice of interpreter. ix. Access to Posts The issue of access to posts comes up frequently and on many levels. On the most practical level is the issue of physically getting to the post for interviews. This is a huge problem in Africa, where processing for the entire continent of 52 countries is conducted out of only two posts: Nairobi and Cairo (or three if one were to count Athens that handles the Sudanese SAC). This creates enormous logistical issues for entrants who have to travel long distances (often at considerable personal risk and prohibitive cost) to attend interviews. It also effectively precludes consideration of UNHCR referrals from West African states such as Liberia and Sierra Leone and other areas such as the Great Lakes and Angola. Difficulties in getting to the post is by no means confined to Africa. In many countries of first asylum refugees are restricted in their movements and face serious sanctions, even repatriation, if they are picked up by local authorities. Kurdish refugees in Turkey, for instance, have to travel illegally to Ankara for interviews, fearing all the time that they will be detected and detained. It is considered too risky to stay overnight, so many have to make the return journey, that can be as much as 10 hours in each direction, without a break. Once applicants arrive at the post the problems are by no means over. A new series of hurdles is placed before them which can include: 31 having to deal with opportunistic locals who extort money to allow passage/access to the post;

32 Refugee Council of Australia not being able to get access to information about application procedures in a language the refugee can understand; having to wait in long queues, and sometimes having done so, being turned away because the office is only open for a limited period each day; and then being confronted with far from appropriate behaviour from local staff at the post (as discussed above). Another disturbing issue that is consistently raised is that if an Anglo-Australian visits a migration post, they have no difficulty in gaining access and speaking with senior migration officials but if the person requiring information or wanting to speak to officials is a NESB Australian citizen, they have great difficulty in gaining access to the post let alone securing an appointment. This can only be interpreted as blatant racism and is totally unacceptable. The Refugee Council is deeply concerned about the persistence of reports such as those outlined above and recommends that urgent action be taken to ensure that there are no impediments to access to migration posts created by staff of or people attached to the posts. x. Referral to CRSS Groups Groups that are part of the Community Refugee Settlement Scheme (CRSS) play an extremely important role in assisting some of the most vulnerable of the refugee and humanitarian entrants, in particular those with traumatic pasts who have few or no links in Australia. Assessing and determining eligibility for CRSS placement is typically the responsibility of the migration officer in the overseas post. Rarely are entrants referred post arrival, although this provision exists. Workers report concern that they encounter entrants who fit all CRSS eligibility criteria but have neither been referred nor advised that should they need this support, it is possible to seek it after arrival. There have even been reported cases where this has happened to Women at Risk entrants, arguably the most vulnerable section of the caseload. It is recommended that a review be undertaken of CRSS referral procedures to ensure their proper application. It is further recommended that if a person meets the eligibility criteria but for one reason or another is not referred, they be given information about post-arrival placements. xl Safety Nets While there is an anticipation that humanitarian program proposers will provide all postarrival support the entrant needs, the reality is that in some (many?) cases, this does not happen. Community workers report that they frequently encounter entrants where either 32

33 Humanitarian Program there was no effective relationship with the proposer or after arrival the relationship with the proposer broke down. What concerns these workers is that in most cases the people they meet had received little or no advice from the migration post about to whom they could turn in such circumstances. The fact that they wander into a Migrant Resource Centre or other agency is fortuitous and begs the question, how many other entrants are there who have no support and do not know where to find it. Workers also report that when such entrants do seek support, it is often after they get themselves into real trouble eg. locking themselves into a rental agreement they cannot afford. Had there been contact at an earlier stage, many of the dramas that humanitarian workers spend so much time trying to resolve, could have been avoided in the first place. It is recommended that al humanitarian entrants, irrespective of visa class, be advised about the safety nets that exist (OAA/ CRSS) and be given details of who to contact should they not be receiving support from their proposer. It is further recommended that Migrant Resource Centres and similar agencies be given the details of SHP and SAC entrants destined for their areas subject to the individuals involved having given permission that this information be disclosed Application Advice As previously stated, being able to assist family and community members still in dangerous and/or difficult circumstances overseas becomes something of an obsession for many humanitarian entrants and their inability to effect this reunion can significantly impair their own settlement. Proposing under the humanitarian program is seen as a way of achieving their desired result but the application process and implementation of the program are often quite a mystery for people who themselves are recent arrivals and have little understanding of bureaucratic processes. RCOA has long been concerned that there is too little advice and support provided for humanitarian proposers about the application process. This has particular significance because in many cases, it is the proposer who is preparing the application on behalf of the applicant due to the requirement that it be in English. There are many undesirable consequences of this including: poor representation of compelling claims due to ignorance of the exact nature of information required ; repeated applications for people who are not eligible due to a lack of understanding of criteria; proposers being very distressed about delays when processing is within the normal range for the migration post concerned; migration officers having to deal with poorly prepared applications and with repeated inquiries from anxious relatives; 33

34 Refugee Council of Australia proposers falling prey to unscrupulous agents who charge vast sums of money with along inflated promises of success. The Refugee Council recommends that steps be taken to improve the availability of advice to proposers about the application process SETTLEMENT What is Settlement? For many refugees, the offer of a resettlement place may seem the answer to all their dreams. So it may be, but for many it is also the beginning of a very challenging chapter of their lives during which they must adapt to a new and unfamiliar country and at the same time come to terms with past trauma and grief for all that is lost. The enormity of this challenge cannot be underestimated, neither can the importance of timely and appropriate support services designed to ease their transition into Australian life. The question of what constitutes settlement is a complex and vexed one and one that is currently exercising Departmental staff and advisory groups. Some argue that settlement can be achieved in 6 months, others argue that it is a process that takes a lifetime. Depending on what index one were to chose, both could well be true - even in the one individual. If indices such as employment and secure accommodation are analysed, a refugee may be "settled" within 6 months of arrival. On the other hand, the same person may spend many years preoccupied with endeavouring to be reunited with surviving family members and many more years grieving for those who died. After conducting a survey of government and non-government agencies in the ten resettlement countries 15, UNHCR concluded that the principal ingredients for successful integration are as follows: employment/income language support of persons from a similar background support of, and reunification with, close family members good settlement services good physical and mental health access to education appropriate housing. Of equal relevance it was concluded that the major constraints to settlement, grouped in order of priority, are as follows: lack of employment racism/discrimination delays in family reunification 15 Broad Survey on the Integration of Resettled Refugees. UNHCR. May

35 Humanitarian Program inability to speak the language of the new country qualifications and experience not recognised lack of resources dedicated to integration programs lack of suitable housing. As part of deliberations on the National Integrated Settlement Strategy (NISS) during 1997, Australian Commonwealth and State/Territory officials grappled with this issue from another direction. Rather than focusing on indices they sought priorities and formulated the following national priorities for action within the NISS framework. These are: * English language training access to the labour market settlement information access to housing translating and interpreting services enhancing support provided by sponsors a more integrated approach to meeting needs meeting the settlement related needs of the ethnic aged. It is not suggested that either approach is definitive, nor that this is a matter that should not be explored further. They are suggested primarily as a framework from which to view the following section. Before progressing with an examination of community perceptions of settlement, however, it is relevant to reflect that one of the areas not sufficiently explored is how refugees themselves interpret "settlement". What does the term mean to the individual? Do their priorities change over time? Informal conversations with refugees would suggest that in the initial period after arrival, their priorities are very tangible: a home, a job, the ability to communicate in English and reunion with family members; as time goes by, their priorities change and they also have the space to begin to process the grief and loss that is a fundamental part of the refugee experience and to begin exploring issues such as creating a bi-cultural identity. The realisation that settlement is a dynamic process and that not all refugees have the same needs and progress in the same way towards "settlement ", should underpin our thinking on the issue, should guide future research and can be used to explain the apparent inconsistencies in the responses by refugee communities to questions about the settlement process and their needs at any given time within it Current Settlement Issues. Leaving aside theoretical constructs, this section endeavours to present community perceptions about settlement service. As in the previous section on Program Implementation, an attempt has been made below to render as faithfully as possible the responses from community workers and refugees, this time in response to queries about what they considered were the major issues confronting newly arrived refugees in Australia and those working with them. 35

36 Refugee Council of Australia \. Information about Arrivals : The process whereby a refugee is granted a visa, travels to Australia and undergoes initial settlement is complex and can involve many agencies (including the migration posts, the International Organisation for Migration, DIMA's settlement section, community agencies and Migrant Resource Centres). For the progression from refugee to permanent resident to run smoothly, it is vital that there be optimal cooperation between agencies and a timely exchange of all relevant information. From the community perspective, there is still scope for improvement in this arrangement, in particular in relation to information provision about the timing and needs of new arrivals. Failure to give adequate notice impacts on the ability of agencies to ensure quality and timely on-arrival services. Improvements are called for in information dissemination, especially between those overseas (both the posts and the International Organisation of Migration [IOM]) and DIMA settlement workers and in turn between DIMA and community agencies. Proposers are also disadvantaged by not knowing in advance when entrants are to arrive. Most proposers cannot afford to rent accommodation in advance so on many occasions no provisions are made for the entrants. This is a particular problem when a large family group arrives and they are unable to stay temporarily with the proposers. It is argued by community workers that this problem would be alleviated if there was better communication between IOM and the proposers so that they know the exact date of arrival. It is also argued that there should be provision for short term (approximately 1 week) accommodation arrangements for SHP entrants in OAA, where proposers are unable to arrange accommodation in advance for one reason or another.16 ii. Initial Settlement Support : It is noted that a major thrust of DIMA's Integrated Humanitarian Settlement Strategy (IHSS) is to put in place mechanisms whereby the needs of newly arrived refugees and humanitarian entrants can be identified and met. This strategy acknowledges that the sooner any problems are dealt with, the more successful settlement will be. This has obvious benefits for the entrant and also for the community at large. Early intervention prevents the accumulation and intensification of problems which then become more difficult and expensive to address at a later stage. RCOA welcomes the objectives of early intervention and the involvement of health services in its implementation. We have discovered during our consultative process for this submission, however, that community workers consider that the early intervention initiatives will only scratch the surface when it comes to addressing the real needs of humanitarian entrants if insufficient resources are devoted to follow up services. They also articulate a number of concerns about the change process. These are presented below. 16 There appears to be limited knowledge in sections of the community about availability of OAA to SHP entrants and there is the misguided fear that should the need for assistance be exposed, the applicants may not be visaed or may lose their visa. 36

37 Humanitar ian Program The view was expressed that, since the move away from migrant hostels to the use of On Arrival Accommodation (OAA), DIMA Settlement Support Officers (SSOs) have played an important role in providing information and orientation to newly arrived refugees. They have worked in close collaboration with workers (more latterly the specialist humanitarian workers) from Migrant Resource Centres and other agencies who have provided longer term assistance and casework. The recent trend whereby DIMA has been retreating from the provision of this intensive post-arrival support, and the consequent devolution via contract to local agencies, has not been warmly embraced for a number of reasons including: in a seeming paradox/ community workers are saying that when refugees arrive, they appear to place great store in the fact that the person with whom they have their initial contact is someone from the government. They feel that this person is trustworthy and will give them correct information. It is also reported that it has an important psychological component: ie the refugee feels that by being met by someone from the government, Australia is officially welcoming them to their new home. The significance of this for refugees cannot be underestimated ; there is uncertainty about how orientation services will be coordinated, and how links will be made with support agencies, if there is more than one agency contracted to carry them out in a particular area; there is a fear that more and more of the work currently undertaken by SSOs will fall to the humanitarian workers, thus impacting on their ability to undertake efficient case management. Community concerns need to be addressed if DIMA is to move away from hands on involvement in initial settlement so that the new service model will meet entrant needs, avoid confusion and duplication and not overburden humanitarian workers. iii. Enhancing Support for/from Proposers: It is recognised that Australia's capacity to assist humanitarian entrants is significantly increased if the Government does not have sole responsibility for the provision of postarrival support. Both the SHP and SAC programs are premised on the proposer providing ahigh level of assistance, thereby freeing Government resources to assist refugees. Alesson that is very familiar to any organisation that makes use of volunteers, and one that to its credit DIMA is recognising, is that optimal benefit can only be derived from volunteers if resources are directed towards their training, supervision and support. RCOA welcome initiatives that provide information to humanitarian proposers and link them to ethno-specific and mainstream resources. The task with which they are entrusted, ie the support of vulnerable new arrivals, is too important to trust that such vital linkages can be made by chance. It is only through the dedication of resources to proposers that DIMA can responsibly devolve responsibility to them. They, in turn, will achieve far greater satisfaction, being more confident that they know what is required of them and how best they can assist the entrant(s). 37

38 Refugee Council of Australia iv. Accommodation: Finding secure affordable accommodation after the initial period in OAA is very important for refugees but has become a major challenge for those who chose to settle in Sydney where access to the private rental market is difficult and waiting period for public housing in most areas runs to many years. Workers report that some entrants, when faced with this "Catch 22", agree to be housed in some of the least desirable accommodation offered by the Department of Housing, including the so called "no-go estates " where social problems are endemic and the housing adjacent to the army base at Ingleburn, in ear shot of the firing range. The fact that there is no prioritisation of humanitarian entrants for public housing, and the failure to recognise the impact inappropriate housing can have on traumatised people, has resulted in entrants finding themselves in public housing where they could well be retraumatised. DIMA has a responsibility to ensure that the issue is taken up in Commonwealth-State consultations. For those who are unable to get public housing, they have to negotiate the private rental market. Some entrants are assisted to enter rental accommodation through support from the Rental Assistance Scheme (RAS). This can cover bond, some rent and service connection and for those who have received no/little other financial support other than Centrelink benefits, can be extremely important. The problem encountered with RAS, however, is that there is considerable discretion vested in the officer of the state housing authority as to whether and how much assistance is given, which in turn results in significant differences (both between and with offices) as to what level of support the refugee receives. This is an inequitable situation that requires attention. v. Material Assistance: It is not just a challenge for refugees and all other humanitarian entrants to find accommodation, they also have to work out how to furnish it. This is reported to be the major issue facing refugees as they move from OAA into their own accommodation. It is also a source of tension between refugees who receive CRSS support (where material assistance is provided ) and OAA entrants and has implications for other settlement areas, for example, if a person is sleeping on the floor with insufficient bedding, it will impact on his/her health. While there is an oft held view that the mainstream charities such as St Vincent de Paul and the Smith Family are a viable source of household items, the reality is that this is often not the case. These agencies have far more demands than they are able to service, especially in those geographic areas where new entrants tend to live. And if they can help, what they provide must be supplemented, especially in the area of whitegoods. Workers report that, in attempting to do this, entrants are becoming entrapped by schemes that seemingly offer a way to obtain basic furniture and whitegoods, either: the "special offers" made by stores that advertise on a "buy now pay later" basis. These are fine if the person has the ability to complete the payment within the interest free period, but if this is not done, the purchaser can run up substantial interest bills. Apparently a number of new arrivals have not understood the nature of these agreements and have found themselves in serious difficulties ; and/or 38

39 Humanitarian Program. through loans: because newly arrived refugees do not have a credit rating, they have to turn to "alternative" sources to borrow money. Often this is someone within their community, sometimes the proposer 17. Cases have been reported where the relationship has broken down and the entrant has been trapped by debts they are unable to service/repay. It is noted that an additional budgetary allocation has been made by the Department of Immigration for this area but there is deep concern that the money allocated will not even begin to meet the need. For example, the Society of St Vincent de Paul in NSW has been allocated $70,000 by DIMA for this financial year. They estimate that this will cover them for a maximum of 3 months, after which refugees will have to revert to the previous ad hoc and far from satisfactory arrangements. It would thus appear that, while welcome, the additional funding in this area is insufficient to meet needs and that more attention should be give to finding ways to assist entrants secure necessities and protect them from falling victim to schemes/offers that cripple them financially. vi. Translating and Interpreting Issues: It is acknowledged that in comparison to other resettlement countries, Australia offers enviable access to language services. This does not, however, mean that there is not scope for improvement, in particular in relation to: waiting times for the Telephone Interpreting Service: the fact that there are often extensive delays (in excess of 15 minutes waiting "on hold ") and line drop-outs means that service providers, particularly those dealing with urgent cases, have become very frustrated. They acknowledge that the service is fundamental to their ability to do their job but these problems are costing them valuable time and are affecting significantly on their ability to service their clients; access to on-site interpreters: humanitarian workers report that the requirement that they make an appointment two weeks in advance for an on-site interpreter is unrealistic given the nature of their job - in particular where it relates to seeing entrants soon after arrival. Also the intensive nature of case management in the initial post-arrival period is such that limitations to access hours and advance booking requirements inhibit the workers' abilities to assist their clients. vii. Community Refugee Settlement Scheme (CRSS): It is undisputed that CRSS groups form a valuable component of Australia's response to refugee settlement. By using community volunteers in this way, intensive assistance can be provided for some of the most vulnerable entrants at a fraction of the cost that it would be if paid workers were employed. It also has many benefits for the groups, with 17 It was also reported that there have been cases where the relat i onship between the proposer and the entrant has broken down and the proposer then retrospectively bills the entrant for accommodation, food, use of phone... 39

40 Refugee Council of Australia members gaining a great deal of satisfaction from their work and enjoyment from interacting with the entrants. And for the entrants, having links to a CRSS group can facilitate contacts with the wider community. It would seem that the CRSS scheme offers benefits for all concerned: the Government, the groups and most importantly the entrants, and in most cases this is how it works. Unfortunately, however, there are a minority of groups who, through omission or commission, fail to perform their duties. There are reports of some individuals who have used the Scheme to set up a support "industry", accepting large numbers of entrants, pocketing the payments and offering minimal assistance. They then supplement this by offering additional "services" to the entrants such as selling them sponsorship forms that can be obtained for free over the counter. Of a more serious nature was an allegations made to RCOA that a Woman at Risk entrant in NSW had been allocated to a group known to be headed by a man who was the subject of an apprehended violence order and who had been the subject of complaints. RCOA welcomes the recent initiatives to enhance training for CRSS groups and to establish closer links between CRSS groups and community agencies such as MRCs. We argue most strongly, however, that these must be supplemented by: ensuring that all entrants allocated to CRSS groups understand the exact role of the group and what their rights are in relation to the group; establishing a set of performance indicators and monitoring to ensure all are met; ensuring greater financial accountability from groups; undertaking much more careful screening of all group registration, including conducting character checks; members prior to making registration conditional on participation in training sessions; investigating all complaints made against CRSS groups (or any member thereof ) and deregistering any group found to be in serious breach of their responsibilities towards the entrants. It is recognised that all of these have resource implications, however it is argued that the task delegated to CRSS groups is so important, and the consequences of failure so great, that a commitment should be made to endure that the Scheme is maximally effective. viii. Counselling: The additional injection of funding for torture and trauma services is widely welcomed in the community and there is considerable interest to see whether this alleviates many of the long held concerns about issues such as waiting lists, accessibility and outreach. It is noted, however, that the torture and trauma services in each state employ varying models, and in some cases these are very clinical models. The view has been expressed that in some cultures, this model is not appropriate and that it is important to ensure 40

41 Humanitarian Program, either that the main service provider offers a flexible service or that alternative support programs are supported. ix. Benefits : During consultations a number of cases were drawn to RCOA's attention of refugees, in particular women, coming to Australia and then marrying someone still resident overseas. Despite the fact that the spouse is not in the country, and in many instances is a financial drain rather than a support, the person in Australia is considered to be "married " and goes onto a partner allowance, and at the same time loses access to the sole parents' pension and the extra benefits for the children... in other words the person receives approximately half of the benefits they previously received. There have also been cases reported of women who did not advise Centrelink of their change of circumstances, seeing it as irrelevant as the spouse did not reside with them. When Centrelink has discovered the circumstances, the women have been called upon to repay prohibitive sums. While each known case has been successfully resolved through arbitration, the restrictive interpretation by Centrelink of "married " is seen as causing much distress and suffering Consultation. As previously stated, success of settlement programs rests, in large part, with the quality of information exchange between the key players. This is not only in relation to entrant profiles and arrival times but extends also to the full spectrum of post-arrival issues. Regular dialogue between workers is vital, so too is consultation between those charged with program planning and policy development and those working "at the coal face". If case management and case coordination are to be effective, the mechanisms whereby systemic problems identified by workers at the local level are channelled to those who can address the problems, have to be clearly defined and effective. The Refugee Council thus recommends in relation to settlement that: consideration be given to providing greater information about the profiles and needs of new entrant groups to assist those responsible for providing settlement support; IOM consider ways of ensuring that proposers are given as much advance notice as possible of arrival details; the concerns of community workers in relation to early intervention be noted and, wherever possible, addressed; resources are devoted to ensuring that proposers are fully aware of their obligations towards entrants and about how best they can provide all necessary support; through Commonwealth-State consultations, the unique needs of humanitarian entrants for secure affordable accommodat i on is 41

42 Refugee Council of Australia repeatedly emphasised until such time as measures are taken to ensure that they are either recognised as a priority group or their needs are met through individual assessment; there be an ongoing commitment to providing support to meet the material needs of entrants and that innovative proposals to do this are given careful consideration; the concerns of community workers in relation to access to interpreters are recognised and steps taken to ensure that wherever possible they can be addressed; the measures as outlined in the submission are adopted to ensure the maximum efficiency and accountability of the Community Refugee Settlement Scheme; recognition be given to the need to offer alternative forms of support to torture and trauma survivors; community concerns in relation to access to benefits be investigated and discussed with CentreUnk. with the increased emphasis on devolution, steps are taken to ensure effective and meaningful consultation between workers at the various levels and from the various sectors COMMUNITY EDUCATION In part because of the activities of the Independent Member for Oxiey and in part because of the changes which society is undergoing, there has been an increase in the level of intolerance in the last few years. In a way not in evidence for several decades, there is a level of legitimacy in sections of community for racist remarks and actions and, regrettably, the tide does not appear to be turning. While there are many ways of viewing this phenomenon, RCOA's principal concern is about the effect this is having on humanitarian entrants who are making it clear to us that it is affecting their lives. By definition, refugees have been forced to leave their counties because of persecution. For them watching what may be the genesis of a society which condones the type of actions that caused their flight has been very frightening ; after all, not so long ago Sarajevo was a vibrant, multicultural city and not too long before that, Kabul was a city in which women played an active role academia, commerce and government. For refugees the race debate has had a deeper meaning. How far will things go before a halt is called? Will a halt be called? Will they once again be forced to uproot in order to protect themselves and their families? Australia has actively solicited these refugees to come to Australia. We have offered sanctuary and the opportunity for them to rebuild their lives away from oppression and violence. We thus have an obligation to ensure that the promise is honoured, and that 42

43 Humanitarian Program everything possible is done to ensure that their lives in Australia are free from harassment and bigotry. The need to educate the wider community about who ref ugees are and why they have come to this country has thus taken on a new and more immediate dimension. Education of the community is also necessary to ensure the maintenance of support for the humanitarian program. While anti-immigration groups have by and large quarantined the refugee program from their lobbying, the general community tends not to make this distinction. Justifying the continuance of the program to an electorate concerned about economic matters requires clear communication of the reasons why a humanitarian program is important and how it can benefit Australia and Australians. In 1995 RCOA prepared for the Department of Immigration a report which outlined a strategy to enhance the awareness of the general public about the humanitarian program. Certain recommendations from that report have been adopted however there has, as yet, been no sustained and concerted effort in this area. It is noted, however, that the Minister has made a commitment to community education and the Council looks forward to participating in the implementation of this initiative. The Refugee Council stresses the importance of educating the wider community about who refugees are and why they have come to Australia so as to promote a supportive climate for those who have entered and ensure the maintenance of support for the program in the future.

44 Refugee Council of Australia 4. REGIONAL PROGRAMS: 4.1. SOUTH EAST AND SOUTH ASIA: The "Asian Economic Crisis " The so called "Asian Tigers", until recently hailed as miracles of economic development, are rapidly losing their claws. Unsecured investment and unsupported expansion have caused economies in the region to fall like dominoes in the last 12 months, taking with them Korea, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia and leaving others teetering. The International Monetary Fund has stepped in with rescue packages which may or may not achieve the desired result and financial markets and businesses around the world wait with bated breath to see how deep and how far the crisis will extend. Leaving aside the significant economic impact the crisis will in all probability have on Australia, both in terms of trade and tourism, the collapse of Asian economies could result in population movements of significance to Australia. Already there are reports of a significant increase in the number of inquiries from ethnic Chinese in Indonesia about migration to Australia. If China's economy gets into difficulties, this will impact on Hong Kong which in turn will have significant implications for movement to Australia, given the number of visa holders and close family connections. It is not just in relation to the general migration program that we need to play careful head to developments in South East Asia. It is possible that there could also be significant implications for the humanitarian program if things continue to unravel at the rate at which they are currently doing so. Groups who may need to be considered in relation to Australia's onshore and offshore programs as well as for other forms of support include: those who are being scapegoated for the economic crisis: already we have seen outbreaks of violence targeted at ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, with police and troops doing little to provide effective protection. Those with money and connections are likely to be able to access migration programs but if conditions deteriorate further in Indonesia and elsewhere, we could start to see an increase in the number of asylum seekers from the region; political opponents and economic reformers: if regimes begin to use force to hold on the power and crush dissent, those calling for reforms could find themselves in need of protection ; guest workers and illegals: there are tens of thousands of people scattered throughout South East Asia who do not have permanent status in the country in which they are living. As things deteriorate in the region, these people are likely 44

45 Humanitarian Program to lose their jobs and face expulsion. Many, like the Philippina maids, have no barriers (other than economic hardship) to their returning to their country of origin. Others, however, may be unwilling or unable to return. Included in this groups are the thousands of guest workers from countries such as Iraq, Iran and Kuwait who could have serious protection reasons not to return and will need resettlement elsewhere; asylum seekers and refugees: few countries in the region are signatories to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol and thus their obligations towards refugees are fewer than those of a signatory state such as Australia. Advocates hold concerns about what will happen to large ref ugee communities in the region, in particular the Burmese in Thailand and the Acehenese in Malaysia, should their protection be withdrawn. There are also significant numbers of asylum seekers from the Middle East, Africa and elsewhere scattered throughout the Asia. If they are expelled they too need protection from refoulement. The Refugee Council recognises that the Australian Government currently is monitoring closely the evolving financial crisis in South East Asia and recommends that this should include careful consideration of human rights and protection issues. Further, if is recommended that should the need arise, the contingency reserve (as recommended by RCOA) be drawn upon to provide resettlement places for those for whom a permanent solution is required and that consideration be given to temporary protection options for those whose need is considered transitory Bangladesh In past submissions RCOA has asked that attention be given to the ethnic minorities from Bangladesh, some 50,000 of whom have been in exile in India for many years. Coming mainly from the Chittagong Hill Tracts and comprising peoples from 12 distinct groups, they collectively identify as the Jummas. Most are Buddhists, with some Christians, Hindus and Animists. Their language, religion and culture are distinctly different to that of the majority Bengalese and they have long been persecuted by them, both because of these differences and because hill tracts which are the traditional lands of the Jumma are less habited than the lowlands and are rich in resources such as timber. For those in exile the conditions were very poor. They are not recognised as refugees by the Indian Government and UNHCR has had limited access to the camps. Food supplies to the camps have been periodically suspended and there has been a high incidence of malnutrition and disease. Over the years there have been a number of repatriation attempts based upon bilateral agreements between India and Bangladesh. Most have floundered due to lack of any provision for international monitoring. An agreement brokered late in 1997 is considered to have greater prospects for success and RCOA's interlocutors are guardedly optimistic. The problems faced by the Jumma people are, however, unlikely to go away over night. 45

46 Refugee Council of Australia The Refugee Council recommends that the Australian Government support bilateral and multilateral initiatives aimed at ensuring the Government of Bangladesh adheres to its undertakings concerning the repatriation of the Jumma people and stresses that the human rights situation in the Chittagong Hill Tracts needs ongoing monitoring Bougainville The so called "Sandhne Affair" that saw the former Government of Papua New Guinea endeavouring to use mercenaries to crush the secessionist rebels on the island of Bougainville ironically brought about the negotiated solution that all had hoped for and few had considered possible. By bringing down the government and changing the dynamics, the Sandline Affair meant that talks were able to progress. The early weeks of 1998 saw what everyone hopes will be a new era of peace for our troubled neighbour. The Refugee Council welcomes the peace agreement in Bougainville and urges the Australian Government to provide necessary support for the maintenance of peace on the island, including support for the displaced populat i on and those who return from the Solomon Islands Burma The United Nations, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the Department of Foreign Affairs reports substantiate that Burma continues to be ruled by a highly authoritarian military regime. During 1997 the events in Burma have clearly demonstrated that the ruling junta (formerly known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council, or SLORC, and now the State Peace and Development Council, or SPDC) aims to maintain military control of the country. SPDC attempts to placate the international community have resulted in cosmetic changes only, with no real benefit to the people of Burma. Persistent abuses by SPDC including forced labour, forced relocation, its wholesale denial of basic political rights and blatant manipulation of the national convention, leave no other conclusion than to continue to judge Burma as a serious violator of international human rights standards. Despite another year of condemnation by the UN General Assembly and UNHCR, the SPDC has failed to address these concerns or reform its behaviour. The Burmese community in Australia considers that Australia has an important role to play in assisting Burmese refugees and others who are victims of human rights abuses in the following areas: a) The Special Assistance Categories for Burmese: The Burmese community considers that insufficient places have been allocated in the Special Assistance Category for Burmese ex Thailand (visa class 213) given the scale of the need both before the economic difficulties in Thailand and more particularly now as 46

47 Humanitarian Program their effects are being felt. There is a great fear that the threatened large scale expulsions will be carried out without appropriate human rights monitoring. In the meantime, expected negotiations between the Burmese major ethnic groups and SLORC/SPDC have not taken place and many of those displaced in eastern Burma have been forced to flee to border areas. More than 2,000 refugees are waiting at the Thai Ministry of Interior (MOI) camps and the various UNHCR camps. The Burmese Community in Australia requests an increase in the quota for Convention refugees, in particular the students who have participated in the political movements. In addition, the community argue that: UNHCR representation for Burmese "people of concern" is very weak and that the office should strengthen its role and increase rather than decrease its various assistance programs for Burmese refugees; the treatment of political prisoners at the various Thai detention centres should be carefully monitored. Some of the political prisoners are kept in these detention centres for more two years without sentencing; un-monitored repatriation, such as that of 11,000 people last December, should be stopped. UNHCR should maintain its role in monitoring pre- and post-repatriation; the so-called "safe camps" are over crowded and the conditions are very poor ; With this in mind they contend that an allocation of 50 places to the SAC ex Thailand does not constitute an appropriate response to the perceived need. Further, they argue that assistance should not be limited to those who have participated in the 1988 uprising but should include ethnic minorities (especially Karen and Mon), war widows and Women at Risk. While recognising the difficulties encountered in the implementation of the other Burmese SAC, that for Burmese ex Burma (class 211), the community regret very much that no places were allocated to this program during the current program year. They argue that, in consultation with the community, it is possible to find ways for this program to operate and to target those in genuine need. b) Burmese Refugees in Bangladesh and India: There has been considerable progress towards resolving the situation of the Rohingyas who fled from Burma to Bangladesh through a program of monitored repatriation. There are, however, other groups for whom durable solutions are more illusive. Unlike the Rohingyas, ethnic Rakhine refugees and students are unable to repatriate at present and have little security in the countries of first asylum. It is argued that UNHCR has an important role to play though: recognising the ethnic Rakhine and students as refugees and ensuring they receive both protection and support in the countries of first asylum; 47

48 Refugee Council of Australia finding resettlement places for those for whom no other durable solution can be found. Further, the community contend that Australia has an important role to play in promoting the former and assisting with the latter. The Refugee Council recommends that 200 places be allocated for humanitarian entrants from Burma, to be broken down as follows: 125 for the class 213 SAC (Burmese ex Thailand); 25 for the class 211 SAC (Burmese ex Burma); and 50 for Burmese refugees from elsewhere in the region. It is further recommended that should there be a significant deterioration of the conditions for Burmese in Thailand due to the economic crisis, the situation be reassessed and necessary provision be made from the contingency reserve Cambodia During the weekend of 5-6 July 1997, forces loyal to Cambodia's Second Prime Minister Hun Sen (from the Cambodian People's Party - CPP) launched violent and sustained attacks against forces loyal to First Prime Minister Prince Norodom Ranariddh (from the FUNCINPEC Party), in Phnom Penh and surrounding areas. The forces loyal to Prince Ranariddh were quickly defeated and hundreds were arrested and detained in the immediate aftermath of the fighting. Amnesty International estimate that of these, some 40 were extrajudicially executed. Senior government ministers moved quickly to help restore a semblance of normality. Soon after the return of Foreign Minister Ung Huot (FUNCINPEC) from an international mission on 14 July, it was announced that he would be willing to replace Prince Ranariddh. This was confirmed in a controversial vote in the National Assembly on 6 August. Cambodian authorities have argued that the events of 5-6 July did not constitute a coup d 'etat, and that there has been no change of government, merely a change of First Prime Minister. ASEAN, however, deferred Cambodia's entry into the association and the UN General Assembly decided in September to leave the Cambodian seat at the UN vacant until after the elections scheduled for July In addition, concern has been expressed that the sincerity of the Cambodian government's undertakings to investigate the alleged human rights abuses that took place in July and that despite the "business as usual" message the government is seeking to convey, fighting between forces loyal to CPP and FUNCINPEC continues in rural areas, in particular in the north and west. 48

49 Humanitarian Program This fighting led to the exodus of some 62,000 refugees, some 75 % of whom are being supported in camps in Thailand's Trat Province and most of the remainder in Huay Cherng in Surin Province. In addition, 1,000 Cambodian refugees are scattered in Bangkok, Aranyaprathet and Surin. As this submission was being prepared. Thai authorities were considering relocating the Cambodians in Trat to camps further inland. This was because artillery shells from the fighting inside Cambodia have strayed into Thailand in December and January and fears were held for the security of the refugees. As at the end of January, some 3,400 Cambodians had been repatriated from Surin and a further 126 from Bangkok. UNHCR is providing support to returnees and is planning quick impact projects for the regions to which they are returning. Large scale returns will, of course, be out of the question while fighting continues and there is the ever present threat of new outflows. The need to stabilise the situation in the coming months is critical as the return of the exiles and their participation in the scheduled elections will give legitimacy to the vote. As in the past, the majority of people fleeing Cambodia were not considered a resettlement caseload, with repatriation being seen as the best option. Screening is, however, being undertaken by UNHCR of small numbers of people with political profiles. Resettlement places will be needed for those determined to be Convention refugees. Of greater concern to the Khmer community in Australia is the fate of their compatriots inside Cambodia. The prevailing view is that the SAC program was terminated prematurely and that there is a continuing need for humanitarian resettlement that cannot be filled through other migration programs. The community recognises that not all those who are experiencing difficulties in Cambodia can be assisted but argue that a carefully targeted program would be of great benefit. Community leaders and workers have indicated a willingness to work with DIMA on the design of a SAC that would alleviate the problems experienced in the past. They see that such a program requires clearly defined and narrow selection criteria, designed to target those most in need of protection. In addition to the requirement that there be a link to Australia, they consider that the program should target: human rights campaigners and political activists whose activities have brought them to the attention of the authorities and have led to harassment, discrimination or denial of their rights; people in areas where there is ongoing conflict who have no viable internal relocation options; people who are internally displaced or are otherwise homeless and thus are very vulnerable to rebel activity; and people who have returned from border camps who have been unable to re-establish aviable existence in Cambodia. 49

50 Refugee Council of Australia In addition, it is noted that there is a comparatively high overstay rate (1.6%) for Cambodians who come to Australia on visitor's or other visas. Community members report that this is, in large part, due to family members pressuring people to remain here until there is greater clarity about the situation in Cambodia. It is argued that there is merit in granting temporary visas to Cambodians currently in Australia which will last until such time as the elections have been held and have been determined to be free and fair. The Refugee Council supports the reintroduction of a Special Assistance Category for Cambodia and believes that 150 places should be allocated to this. RCOA also considers that careful consideration should be given to UNHCR requests for resettlement places for Cambodian refugees (up to 50 places) and to the granting of temporary protection (until the results of the election are known) to regularise the status of Cambodians overstayers Hong Kong The transfer of sovereignty over the territory of Hong Kong from Britain to China on 1st July 1997 went ahead with great fanfare. Since then Asia watchers have been keeping a close eye on developments, both in terms of the evolving nature of the administration of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) as it is now known and the impact of the current Asian economic crisis. Soon after the transfer there was a worrying period while the authority of the Provincial Legislature was challenged in the Court of Appeal. If the Court had found in favour of the applicant, all laws in the territory would have been declared unenforceable and it is probable that a state of emergency would have been declared. The Legislature, however, weathered its first major storm and the following months have been significantly calmer. There is still an underlying air of uncertainty and the real test of the new administration's ability to deal with dissent will be in June 1998 on the anniversary of the Tienanmen Square massacre. In a study18 of the implications for human rights observance in the territory of the creation of the HKSAR, the Refugee Council identified a number of groups who could be made more vulnerable by the transfer of power. These included: Chinese dissidents: whereas most of the high profile Chinese dissidents who flee China to Hong Kong are rapidly resettled elsewhere, there remain several hundred low level but none-the-less vulnerable dissidents who, for various reasons, have remained in Hong Kong. In many cases they will not be eligible to reside legally in the territory. Resettlement options are being sought; Activists: Article 23 of the HKSAR Basic Law makes it an offence to engage in acts of treason, sedition and subversion. It remains to be seen what will constitute treason et al and what penalties will be imposed on those convicted. It could well 18 RCOA Report on Visit to Hong Kong and Vietnam. December

51 Humanitarian Program be the case that anyone who criticises the government (either of the territory or the central government in Beijing) may be in trouble. Such people could come from all spectra of society; including those involved in: the political domain; the union movement; human rights groups; churches; women's group's; aged care, disability and other services; etc; in fact, anyone advocating for improvements in structures/services/conditions. In addition, there is the small residual population of Vietnamese refugees and asylum seekers: at the end of December 1997 the caseload of screened-in Vietnamese for whom UNHCR was seeking resettlement places stood at 1,213 individuals (some 24 % of whom are children aged between 0-16), a small number of whom are under consideration by Australia. The screened-in group are arguably amongst the most difficult of all groups for whom UNHCR is charged with finding a durable solution. They have been repeatedly rejected by resettlement countries for very good reasons. This withstanding, the HKSAR Government has made it clear that there is no future for these people in Hong Kong. If Australia is not in a position to offer resettlement places, it has a role to assist UNHCR in negotiations about the fate of this group (eg on the issue of cessation) and with other potential countries of destination, including Vietnam; while over 92,000 screened-out asylum seekers have returned to Vietnam, there are still several hundred who have not been able to get re-entry permits. Given that the major repatriation hurdle has been overcome and what we are dealing with now is a small number of complex cases, new solutions need to be considered. It is argued that Australia should consider resettlement under the Special Humanitarian Program for those in this group who are unable to be returned, have no future in Hong Kong and have close family ties to Australia. The Refugee Council therefore recommends in relation to Hong Kong that the Government of Australia : continue to monitor the human rights situation in Hong Kong and be prepared to take necessary action if there is a deterioration in the situation such as to occasion HKSAR citizens needing protection; supports an ongoing role for UNHCR in monitoring the welfare of screened-in refugees until a durable solution can be found; reconsider for resettlement any cases that have links to Australia that have previously been rejected on grounds other than serious criminal activity ; 51

52 Refugee Council of Australia encourage the Government of Vietnam to devote additional resources to providing clearances for the Vietnamese who remain in Hong Kong; urge the administration of the SAR to regularise the status of any Vietnamese who remain; give consideration to assisting those in the residual population who have links to Australia through the provision of humanitarian resettlement; support a role for UNHCR in monitoring the residual screened-out population India Two regions of India are of particular concern to the Refugee Council because of their poor human rights record: a) Kashmir: Kashmir has been an independent state for most of its history and had internal autonomy under the British prior to partition in Since 1947, 63% of the area has been occupied by India and the other 37 % by Pakistan (with this area known as Azad or Free Kashmir). At the time of the partition, Prime Minister Nehru made a commitment on behalf of the Indian Government to respect the wishes of the Kashmir people for self determination. This was further formalised by United Nations resolutions of 21 April 1948, 13 August, and 5 January The failure of India to respect these promises, together with territorial aspirations over the part of Kashmir ceded to Pakistan, have resulted in periodic and often serious unrest, including three Indo Pakistan Wars (1947, 1965 and 1971). The Indian Government signing of the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment was welcomed by human rights activists. However, its decision not to accept Articles 20, 21, and 22 of the Convention means effectively that the UN Human Rights Commission will not be able to investigate allegations of torture in India. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) prison visits to Jammu and Kashmir, between July 1996 and April 1997 demonstrated some government transparency on human rights problems. However, researchers for international human rights organisations like Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) were not permitted to visit Jammu and Kashmir. Astate human rights commission was established in Jammu and Kashmir by act of the state legislature on May 30. Its powers to investigate independently alleged human rights violations committed by members of the security forces are strictly limited. Credible 52

53 Humanitarian Program human rights activists state that the Jammu and Kashmir commission has not yet demonstrated effective, independent protection of human rights in the state. Furthermore the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) has directed that all deaths in military encounters be immediately investigated by an independent agency, but members of the security forces are rarely held accountable for these killings. The NHRC itself may inquire into alleged human rights abuses by security forces in Jammu and Kashmir, but does not have the statutory power to investigate such allegations if it is not satisfied with the responses to its inquiries. Between 1985 and 1989 there was an uprising by the Muslim population of Kashmir culminating in the boycott of election in Since then there have been frequent military crackdowns on militants and an intensification of military activity. Government forces continue to commit serious violations of humanitarian law in the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir. Between 350,000 and 400,000 army and paramilitary forces are deployed in Jammu and Kashmir. The Muslim majority population in the Kashmir Valley suffers from the repressive tactics of the security forces. Under the Jammu and Kashmir Disturbed Areas Act, and the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act, both passed in July 1990, security forces personnel have extraordinary powers, including authority to shoot suspected law breakers and those disturbing the peace, and to destroy structures suspected of harbouring militants or arms. Despite international criticism of the Indian Government's human rights violations in Kashmir and its adoption of a "transparent policy", records complied by local and regional rights advocates suggest that torture continues and that neither abusive security forces nor their superiors have been challenged about their procedures or punished for their actions. Security forces committed an estimated extrajudicial killings of suspected militants in Jammu and Kashmir, during According to press reports and anecdotal accounts, those killed typically had been detained by security forces, and their bodies, bearing multiple bullet wounds and often marks of torture, were returned to relatives or were otherwise discovered the same day or a few days later. According to the US Human Rights Report 1997, during the period January 1, 1990 to June 30, 1997, only ten members of the security forces were tried and sentenced to 10 or more years imprisonment for violations of human rights in Jammu and Kashmir. According to the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, 1997, "on no occasion had information been made public regarding instances of action taken against security force personnel in Jammu and Kashmir for acts of torture." Human rights groups estimate that over people have been killed this decade, with another wounded and imprisoned without trial. Hundreds of school, hospitals and places of worship have been destroyed by fire or bombs, including the libraries at Srinigar's Mazratbal Mosque. Over $1 billion worth of livestock and crops has been destroyed and forests cleared, with native species being hunted to the point of extinction. Since 1990 there has been a ban on the provision of relief or medical aid and on entry by foreign journalists and aid workers. The distinctive physical characteristics of the Kashmiris (there is a strong Middle Eastern influence in their physiognomy) mean that they are clearly identifiable. This significantly limits any prospects for relocation within India for any who wish to escape the fighting in Kashmir. 53

54 Refugee Council of Australia The Kashmir community in Australia is still very small but they have links to other organisations such as Islamic Women's Welfare and the Ecumenical Migration Centre. These links are considered important in enhancing their ability to support any humanitarian entrants selected to come to Australia, especially in relation to assisting with practical settlement support and assisting with cultural and social adjustment. b) The Punjab: For the past decade Amnesty International has documented serious human rights violations in the Indian state of Punjab. In addition, the organisation has documented continuing reports of "disappearances", political killings, unacknowledged detentions, torture and deaths in custody in Urgent Actions and other documents. Since the 1992 elections there has been a significant improvement in the human rights situation in the state of Punjab. Serious abuses of the early 1990s were acknowledged and condemned by the Supreme Court, however it is apparent that state repression has not ceased. Furthermore, victims of human rights violations continue to be frustrated in their attempts to bring complaints before the judiciary and the officially sanctioned human rights complaints mechanisms, such as the newly formed National Human Rights Commission. Prisoners in the Punjab are often kept in secret detention for weeks and sometimes months, a practice which facilitates torture and "disappearances ". According to Amnesty International's information, none of the perpetrators of such grave human rights violations have ever been brought to justice. Furthermore, in July 1995 Amnesty International wrote to the Chief Minister of Punjab requesting the government investigate the fate or whereabouts of hundreds of people who have "disappeared" between 1991 to 1993, but to date there has been no response. There is also strong evidence that the Punjab police operate on a "hit list" basis. Large sums of money are promised as a reward for the capture or death of people described as wanted "terrorists". In this regard it is relevant to note that the definition of "terrorist activity" under relevant legislation is so vague that it encompasses peaceful expression of political or other conscientiously held views. The activities of Punjab police are not confined to the Punjab. Human rights groups have documented cases in which Punjabi police have engaged in under-cover operations resulting in human rights violations in West Bengal, Delhi and Maharashtra, without seeking permission of the state's authorities or giving them prior information about their actions. It is considered unrealistic, therefore, to consider that a person who has come to the attention of the authorities in the Punjab has an internal flight option. It is notable in this regard that there have been reports of police in towns outside the Punjab being asked to monitor their Sikh population for irregular activities, especially the movements of new residents who may be wanted elsewhere. The Refugee Council therefore recommends that 100 places be allocated for the resettlement of refugees from India, with particular attention to be given to applications from people from Kashmir and the Punjab who have been the target of human rights abuse. 54

55 Humanitarian Program Indonesia At the time of writing events in Indonesia are unfolding at such a rapid pace that to make any accurate predictions would be sheer speculation. The collapse of the economy has unleashed a complex array of events, both on the economic and social front, and as ever in Indonesia, these have been complicated by the particular brand politics that sees Soeharto on the verge of his seventh term in office. While the negotiations, and renegotiations, continue with the International Monetary Fund to try to shore up the economy, people in the streets have reacted by attacking those they blame for the spiralling food and commodity prices. Reports of riots and attacks on Chinese owned property have become an almost daily occurrence. What is less clear, however, is the extent to which Indonesian law enforcement bodies can provide a level of protection to the merchants being targeted by the mobs. The fear amongst the ethnic Chinese merchants of Java and Sulawesi is understandable. Already there has been a dramatic increase in the number of inquiries to the Australian Embassy in Jakarta about business migration to Australia. It is also possible/probable that others will seek humanitarian protection. At the moment however, there are more questions than answers. These include: are people actively preparing to leave or are they simply checking their options? how large will the exodus be? to what extent will those who leave be able to do so through regular temporary (eg visitor) and permanent (ie migration) channels? if people leave irregularly in any numbers, where will they go? if people go elsewhere in the region, eg to Singapore and Malaysia, what type of reception will they get? Will some need to be considered for resettlement? if people come directly to Australia, will they arrive by boat or plane? if large numbers of boats arrive, how will we accommodate these people given the current policy of mandatory detention? will our refugee status determination procedures be able to cope with large numbers of new arrivals? If not, what sort of adjustments will need to be made? do those fleeing the violence in Indonesia need a permanent solution or will some form of temporary protection meet their needs? The list could go on, and while the questions are easy to come up with, events will need to unfold further before we know how best to answer them. And while attention is focused on the economic crisis, it is important that we do not lose sight of the ongoing problems in regional Indonesia, in particular Aceh, East Timor and Irian Jaya. In each of these provinces human rights abuses persist, resulting in much 55

56 Refugee Council of Australia suffering and fear. RCOA remains concerned both about what is happening within these provinces and for those who have fled : the already fragile support of the Malaysian Government for Acehenese refugees may be withdrawn because of their own economic problems; while Papua New Guinea is moving to regularise the status of West Papuan refugees, not all are benefiting from this process ; and the East Timorese awaiting determination of their status in Australia continue to live in a state of limbo that is taking an immense toll on the asylum seekers psychologically and physically and is impacting on the whole Timorese community. In recognition of the current state of uncertainty in relation to Indonesia, the Refugee Council recommends that: there be a base allocation of 150 places for RSHP entrants from Indonesia, including Irian Jaya; should there be a large scale outflow of people determined to be in need of permanent resettlement, additional places be allocated from the contingency reserve; should large numbers of people come directly to Australia, there be consideration of whether temporary protection would best suit their needs while not undermining their rights to seek asylum Laos In comparison to the other Indochinese states, there has been little focus on developments within the country since the end of the war and on the needs of those displaced by it. While the tripartite agreement between Thailand, Laos and UNHCR saw the return of the vast majority of Lao refugees, there are still people from Laos in Thailand who resist repatriation. Most are Hmong and they have left Ban Napho Camp to eke out a precarious, and illegal, existence elsewhere. It is understandable that while the main repatriation program was in operation that resettlement was discouraged. Now that it is only a small, residual and intractable group that remains, it can be argued that the matter should be reconsidered. Members of the Hmong community in Australia who have relatives still in Thailand are deeply concerned about their fate and seek DIMA's assistance. The other principal concern of the Lao community is family reunion. With relatives unable to meet selection criteria for the Family Reunion Program, the community here is very distressed and frustrated (see Section 3.4). 56

57 Humanitarian Program The Refugee Council recommends that 50 places be available for resettlement of refugees from Laos Pakistan The Pakistan Muslim League Government of Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif, which came to power in February with a massive parliamentary majority, passed a constitutional amendment in April that removed the President's power to dismiss the Government and dissolve parliament "in his discretion". As a result, the popularly-elected government has greater power than any of its predecessors since the return of formal democracy in Furthermore the Government's human rights record remains poor, with serious problems regarding police abuse, religious discrimination and serious human rights violations. Political developments such as the above mentioned, have an impact on that which is arguably Pakistan's most vulnerable community, the Ahmadis. Persecution of the Ahmadis began in 1974 when then Prime Minister, Zulfigar Ali Bhutto, introduced a parliamentary amendment that declared Ahmadi Muslims "not Muslims for the purpose of law and constitution". Although Ahmadi Muslims do not accept Mohammed as the last prophet of Islam, they regard themselves as Muslims and observe many Islamic practices. In 1984 another Pakistan leader. General Zia-ul Haq, promulgated Ordinance XX which added two sections to the Pakistan Penal Code. A broad range of religious and semireligious acts, routinely performed by any Muslim, were rendered criminal when performed by an Ahmadi Muslim. For example, the traditional Islamic greeting "Assalamo Alaikum " ("peace be with you"), when uttered by an Ahmadi Muslim, became acriminal offence. It is not an offence when uttered by other citizens of Pakistan, be they Christians, Hindu or Muslim. The punishment for this "offence" is a minimum of three years of jail, plus a fine, with no defined maximum. In 1986, Section 295-C (the infamous Blasphemy law), was added to the Pakistan Penal Code, providing for the death penalty for anyone convicted of "blaspheming" the Prophet Mohammad. Other sections of the Penal Code have also caused problems for the group, particularly the provision that forbids Ahmadis from "directly or indirectly" posing as Muslims. Hence, mullahs, armed with these vague laws, have brought charges against Ahmadis for using the standard Muslim greeting form, of even praising God in writing and naming their children Mohammad. These changes created the legal framework for the practical persecution of the more than four million Ahmadi Muslims living in Pakistan. Extremist clerics preach arson and murder with impunity. Over the last 20 years, Ahmadi Muslims have been subjected to discriminatory treatment, harassment, terror, torture, imprisonment, arson, looting and murder. In many cases, the law-enforcing authorities themselves, openly abetted and condoned these gross violations of rights. Ahmadis continue to suffer from a variety of problems, including being the targets of religious intolerance, the closing down of several of their mosques and violation of their places of worship, being barred from burial in Muslim graveyards, denial of freedom of faith, speech, and assembly, restrictions on their press, a social boycott, false charges against a community or an individual and alleged official support of extremist elements 57

58 Refugee Council of Australia who act against the Ahmadi community. Backed by mobs of 100 to 200 people, the mullahs purposefully stride down the streets of the Ahmadi capital of Rabwah uttering diatribes against Ahmadis and their founder, a situation that often leads to violence and serious injuries. Police are generally on hand during these marches, the Ahmadis claim, but as a rule do not intervene to prevent trouble. Government authorities afford religious minorities less legal protection than is afforded to Muslim citizens. Members of religious minorities are subject to violence and harassment, and police at times refuse to prevent such actions or to charge those who commit them. Bails are being denied to Ahmadis in lower courts and occasionally in higher courts; the blasphemy clause is being added and upheld at various levels. Long term imprisonments are being awarded on fake charges against innocent Ahmadis. It is noteworthy that more than 95 % of murders in Ahmadiyya cases have not been arrested even if their identity is known, and the government has still to present a case of murder of an Ahmadi to Anti- Terrorist special courts. Ahmadis suffer from harassment and discrimination and have limited chances for advancement into management levels in government service. Even the rumour that someone may be an Ahmadi or have Ahmadi relatives can stifle opportunities for employment or promotion. Ahmadi students are subject to abuse by their non-ahmadi classmates, and the quality of teachers assigned to the schools by the Government is poor. Young Ahmadis and their parents also complain of difficulty in gaining admittance to good colleges, forcing many children to go abroad for higher education. On the international scene, however, a large number of human rights organisations have denounced these systematic violations and condemned the Pakistan government. This has been to no avail. The laws are still in place and the persecution persists. The Ahmadi community in Australia is extremely grateful for the opportunity created by the establishment of the Special Assistance Category for Ahmadis to assist the most vulnerable of their country folk. The community express their appreciation both to the Government for making this possible and to the Australian mission in Pakistan, with which the Ahmadi leaders in Radwah have developed good relations. The latter is seen as being of particular benefit in cooperatively working to curb the activities of migration agents in Pakistan who have been endeavouring to capitalise on the Ahmadi's misfortune. The people who have arrived thus far under the SAC, 10 families and 10 individuals, are considered appropriate targets for this program. The community has been supporting the new arrivals and is actively planning for the future. The Refugee Council recommends that for Pakistan the resettlement program consists of : a Special Assistance Category for Ahmadis of 50 places; 50 places for RSHP entrants, selected on a case by case basis, dependent on need for protection. 58

59 Humanitarian Program Sri Lanka The long running campaign by the Singhalese dominated Sri Lankan government to deal a decisive military blow to the ethnic secessionist aspirations of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) continued in 1997 and the possibility of the conflict drawing to a close remain as remote as ever. Government forces spent most of the year trying desperately to hold on to the military gains made by their push into the Tamil dominated Jaffna Peninsula. There is no sign, however, of the Government being able to protect civilians in this area from human rights abuses perpetrated by either their own forces or by LTTE insurgents exacting revenge for what they see as the betrayal of the Tamil nation by the failure of ethnic Tamils to resist government occupation. The number of internally displaced remains distressingly high with most estimates suggesting that between 350,000 and 480,000 have being forced to flee their homes in the past 2 years alone. Some of the internally displaced have found their way to official camps or "welfare centres " where they are supported by the Government and NGOs. The majority set up where they can and receive minimal aid. In such places disease and malnutrition are on the increase. For many Tamils fleeing LTTE controlled areas, displacement has meant placement in the harsh environment of so-called transit camps where they are forced to await security clearance. The 14 year long civil war in Sri Lanka shares with so many other conflicts around the world the tendency to level or reduce individuals to their ethnicity alone. Nobody in Sri Lanka can escape the "us and them" vortex which ensures that civilians risk becoming "legitimate " targets of war or being under constant suspicion by sheer virtue of their membership of an ethnic group. Tamils in Colombo are viewed with extreme suspicion by the Singhalese majority and face a high degree of persecution regardless of their political persuasion. Innocent Tamils in Colombo are often victims of revenge killings following LTTE attacks. Most ominously, however, even remaining neutral in the conflict has become a dangerous act in itself as neutrality is seen as aiding the enemy. During 1997, both the Government and the LTTE perpetrated countless human rights abuses against the civilian population ostensibly because of links to the opposition. The LTTE have been severely criticised by both Amnesty International and the US State Department for their "use of excessive force in war". The latter reported that "during the course of the year, the LTTE engaged in the killing of noncombatants, hostage-taking, hijackings, torture, and bombing of civilian targets ". While Singhalese and Muslims were the principal victims of these LTTE attacks, many Tamils who refused to side with such terror tactics were also targeted. Government forces have been also known to bomb civilian areas suspected of harbouring members of the Tamil Tigers. Thousands of innocent Tamils were victims of Government security force operations in Under its Prevention of Terrorism Act, the Government detained more than 1600 Tamils without charge or trial. Such arbitrary detentions normally followed any attacks by the Tamil Tigers although those arrested rarely had substantiated links with the terrorist group. There are credible reports of the torture and beating of detainees by Government security forces. 59

60 Refugee Council of Australia Extrajudicial killings and disappearances have become a common feature of Sri Lanka's political landscape. The US State Department reported that since April 1995 more than 700 persons have been killed extrajudicially or "disappeared" at the hands of Government security forces. The LTTE regularly resorted to assassinations of political opponents and suspected informants with armed gunmen or bombing the preferred method. University professors, members of non-violent Tamil opposition parties, and human rights monitors have all in the past been victims of such LTTE terror tactics. Tamils living in LTTE controlled areas are subject to authoritarian rule with harsh and swift punishment being handed out to those who do not conform to the party line. Ethnic and religious minority groups are subject to harsh persecution. Both sides in the Sri Lankan conflict view a military solution as the only viable solution to the problem. Given this and the type of guerilla campaign which the LTTE conducts, the war is unlikely to end in the foreseeable future. Thousands of non-ltte Tamils will thus risk continued persecution from both sides of the conflict. For many of these resettlement is the only viable option. The introduction in 1995 of the Special Assistance Category for Sri Lanka was seen as a positive step on behalf of the Australian Government to assist Sri Lankans affected by the civil conflict and it has received much support within the Sri Lankan community. It is noted, however, that the location of the post in Columbo poses many obstacles for Tamils because either: they have to travel to Columbo to get to the post and if they are found in possession of documents that indicate or can be interpreted as indicating their intention to apply to leave the country, they face detention and it is possible that the documents will be destroyed; or if in Columbo, it is likely that they have fled in haste and have no way of returning to the North or East to retrieve the documents required by the Post. In addition, the fact that many of those employed at the Columbo Post are Singhalese is the cause of concern to the Tamil community in Australia and it is believed that these people are "tacitly placing hurdles (before Tamils) which refugees are unable to surmount". For those in Southern India, getting to the Migration Post in New Delhi is also seen as a problem both because of the distance and cost involved. It is argued by the community that the problem of access to the Posts could be lessened if migration officers were to travel periodically to the Tamil homeland (both to areas controlled by LTTE and the Government) and to Chennai and Madurai in Tamil Nadu. It is further argued that, in addition to the SAC, people who are outside Sri Lanka be considered under the Refugee and Special Humanitarian components of the program. The Refugee Council recommends with respect to Sri Lanka that: there be a Special Assistance Category of 150 places; 60

61 Humanitarian Program there be a Global Humanitarian allocation of 150 places; that problems in gaining access to posts as identified by community be investigated with a view to finding remedies. the Tibet For almost 50 years China has ruled the Himalayan province of Tibet with a heavy hand, eroding the traditional culture, social structures and religion and engaging in acts of violence against the people. The situation in Tibet continues to deteriorate as the Chinese government intensifies its repression. Recent Chinese policies demonstrate more clearly than ever their intention to resolve the issue of Tibet by force, intimidation and popular transfer. Today there are over 130,000 Tibetans in exile, including 12,000 new refugees who have fled despite extremely difficult circumstances, crossing the border and then travelling through Nepal. Many have congregated around the town of Daramsala in northern India because of the presence there of their spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama. Others live elsewhere in India, Nepal and Bhutan. While the Indian Government has allowed the Tibetan refugees to reside in India, it has done nothing to regularise their status, despite the exile for many now being measured in decades. As their status is not acknowledged, they are not eligible for government support. As a result, the UN agencies are also unable to assist their settlement in India. Many individuals and families, in particular new arrivals and female heads of households, remain in difficult situations despite community efforts to assist them. Resettlement of such vulnerable cases is considered the desired solution. Particularly if these refugees are forced to return to Tibet, they would face persecution, including risk of life. According to a recent report released by the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), on 22 December 1997: "the situation is highlighted by an intensive political re-education drive in the monasteries, together -with the wide spread use of torture and other forms of violence. In November 1997, communist party leaders declared "total war " on the Dalai Lama and indicated that the re-education campaign -would be extended to schools and villages." In view of the escalation of Chinese repression in Tibet, Tibetans continue to escape to India and Nepal. There are over 7,000 Tibetans living outside the Indian sub-continent, including about 200 Tibetans in Australia. Around 2,500 live in Switzerland, 600 in Canada and 3,500 in the USA, of whom 1,000 migrated there in Tibetan groups in Australia are very grateful to the Australian government for its consideration to allow ten Tibetans to resettle in Australia under the Special Humanitarian 61

62 Refugee Council of Australia Program for the past two years. Applications were forwarded by the Tibetan Administration in Exile to the Australian High Commission in India in January Community support has been rallied to assist those who will arrive this program year and there is a strong desire that the program be continued. The Refugee Council recommends that the recently established practice of allocating 50 places for the resettlement of Tibetan refugees nominated by the Tibetan Government in Exile be continued Vietnam The termination of the Special Assistance Category for Vietnam, coming as it does after the end of the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA), signals the end of a major chapter in refugee resettlement both for this region and the world. Much has been said about the CPA, both lauding it as a model for international cooperation and condemning it for undermining confidence in resettlement as a durable solution. There is arguably truth in both interpretations and the one certain fact is that there were many lessons to learn from the international community's response to the Vietnamese exodus. While Vietnam is yet to achieve the level of democratic participation and openness that would be considered desirable, major political, economic and social advances have been made this decade. It is no longer possible to mount a case for the maintenance of a resettlement program for Vietnamese ex Vietnam, though as was argued in the section on Hong Kong, there are some individuals with particular needs who should be considered for resettlement on a case by case basis. So too should consideration be given to people who have fled recently and/or are yet to flee and who can demonstrate a well founded fear of persecution on Convention grounds. With new arrivals dwindling to a trickle, the Vietnamese community in Australia is moving into the next phase. No longer is there the intense focus on orientation and information provision as there was (though there is an ongoing need in this area), rather the issues confronting the community are those that confront the more established communities and require different types of services to deal with them. Community workers within the Vietnamese community report that more and more of their time is spent dealing with complex problems such as family breakdown, domestic violence, drug abuse and problem gambling. These issues require both more time and different skills than simply assisting someone to fil in forms. In allocating grants, DIMA should ensure that the level of grant and the selection process reflects the complex nature of the case management that will be required of the worker. Further, DIMA should ensure that workplans reflect the time consuming and intensive nature of the work that will be required and the need for the worker to be appropriately trained and resourced. Anumber of other issues arose during consultations with the Vietnamese community. These were: various concerns about services for elderly Vietnamese: in some instances these related to the uneven geographic spread of social and cultural centres, in others 62

63 Humanitarian Program they related to access to services. In the latter case, it was reported that it is not infrequent that Vietnamese families discourage elderly relatives from interacting independently outside the family unit, in some cases because the older person is seen as necessary for child minding and caring for the home. No matter what the cause, the isolation of older people is seen as one of the major social issues confronting the community; while it would appear that there is work to be done to improve access to services by elderly Vietnamese, the community is still very concerned about being able to effect family reunion. The impact of visa capping for aged relatives has been felt acutely, in particular because of their cultural obligations. If a Vietnamese person fails to support their relatives, especially parents and other older relatives, they are looked down on, and sometimes ostracised, by others in the community. Many Vietnamese have been unable to settle properly in Australia because of deep concern about the welfare of relatives in Vietnam and the financial drain of sending money back to Vietnam. It is argued too that the absence of grandparents to give guidance has contributed o t the much higher level of family breakdown that is being experienced by Vietnamese families in Australia in comparison to the norm in Vietnam; community workers are concerned too about the increase in problems that have their root in gambling. They report a marked rise in cases of separation, domestic violence and child abuse, with one worker speaking of watching "death by a thousand cuts". Melbourne's Crown Casino has some 65 % of its patrons at gaming tables being of Asian origin, whereas the Asian community in Melbourne represents some 3 % of the total population, with Vietnamese accounting for about %. In both Sydney and Melbourne the casinos are actively soliciting patrons from the Vietnamese community, and they are not just targeting the wealthier sections of the community but are even going so far as to send spruikers into public housing developments. There are as yet far too few resources being devoted to this social problem. Melbourne agencies report that their efforts to obtain funding for ethno-specific support services from the Casino Trust have thus far been fruitless and thus the DIMA funded community workers are having to try as best they can to provide support for both the problem gambler and his/her family in this very complex area; the distribution of support services for the Vietnamese community is another area that workers feel needs to be addressed. In Melbourne in particular, where there is alarge Vietnamese community, the bulk of the resources are placed in the central and western regions, leaving the vast south eastern region, with a Vietnamese population of some 20,000, being served by only one generic worker. It is argued that there needs to be more careful demographic analysis prior to allocation of DIMA grants; another issue relating to the DIMA grant programs raised by the community is the frequent turnover of DIMA grant consultants. This too was raised strongly by Melbourne workers. They argued that they place considerable importance on being able to develop a relationship of mutual trust with their consultant and when it is not there, they feel unsupported and like they are "groping in the dark"; 63

64 Refugee Council of Australia a flow on from the above is the view expressed by workers that they do not feel that they are presented with sufficient opportunities to have input into discussions on policy matters. The request was made that DIMA consultants brief workers about how to access the various government and non-government mechanisms so that they can feel that they are part of a wider community process; access to information technology was also raised. While the Minor MAPS program has gone a long way towards ensuring that community workers can embrace modern technology, there are still many workers who do not have access to and the internet. They are thus unable to reap the benefits that such access brings in relation to consultation and having up to date information readily available. In relation to Vietnam, the Refugee Council recommends that, in addition to measures previously outlined that focus on the residual CPA caseload: consideration be given to resettlement of Vietnamese Convention refugees on a case by case basis; consideration be given to the settlement concerns raised by the community.

65 Humanitarian Program 4.2. THE MIDDLE EAST: Afghanistan In 1997 Afghanistan continued to experience civil war and political instability and there was no central government, no constitution, no rule of law and no independent judiciary. The country remains splintered into areas held by rival factions: the Pashtun-dominated ultra-conservative Islamic movement, the Taliban controls some two thirds of the country, including the capital Kabul; General Abdul Rashid Dostam, an ethnic Uzbek, controls several north-central provinces, having driven out his rival Uzbek commander. General Abdul Malik; the Hezb-i-Wahdat faction led by Usted Karim Khalili, composed of the Shi'a Hazara ethnic minority, controls Bamiyan and parts of eight surrounding provinces in the mountainous centre of the country; and former President Burhanuddin Rabbani and his military commander, Ahmed Shah Masood, both Tajiks, control only three north eastern provinces. In addition, they hold strategic positions within rocket range of Kabul and thus are seen as a significant threat to the Taliban. At year's end, there was a rough military stalemate following the failure of the Taliban to take Mazar-i-Sharif, the last major city remaining outside of their control, on two separate occasions. The Taliban, however, remained the country's primary military force. Despite considerable effort, a UN Special Mission to Afghanistan, headed by Norbert Holl, was unable to secure a ceasefire among the factions. The UN Secretary General's Special Envoy, Lakhdar Brahimi endeavoured to use regional pressure to broker peace and he too has thus far made little progress. In October the Taliban changed the name of the country to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, with Mullah Omar as head of state. Together with the Taliban's inner Shura (Council), located in the southern city of Kandahar, Omar exercises control over the Taliban controlled areas where strict and oppressive order is imposed and stiff punishments for "crimes" prevail. According the 1998 US State Department Report : "The overall human rights situation is poor. Serious human rights violations continued to occur and citizens were precluded from changing their government peacefully. Political killings, torture, rape, arbitrary detention, looting, abductions and kidnappings for ransom were committed by armed units, local commanders, and rogue individuals. Prison conditions were poor. Various factions infringed on citizens' privacy rights. Summary justice was common. The Taliban's Islamic courts and religious police, the Department to Propagate Virtue and Eliminate Vice, enforced their extreme interpretation of Islamic punishments, such as public executions for adultery or murder and amputations of one hand and one foot for theft. For other 65

66 Refugee Council of Australia infractions, Taliban militiamen often decided right or wrong and meted out punishments such as heatings on the spot. Civil war conditions and the unfettered actions of competing factions effectively limited the freedoms of speech, press, assembly, association, religion, and movement." Violence against women remained a problem, although the imposition of Taliban control in rural areas resulted in reduced incidents of rape, kidnapping, and forced marriage. The US State Department Report continues: "There was widespread discrimination against women and girls, and the condition of women and girls in Herat and Kabul, poor to begin with, worsened significantly after the Taliban captured these cities in 1995 and The Taliban imposed strict dress codes and prohibited women from working outside the home except in limited circumstances in the health care field. Girls generally were prohibited from attending school in Kabul and other urban areas ". Furthermore, both Taliban and anti-taliban forces were responsible for the indiscriminate bombardment of civilian areas. Taliban forces fired rockets and shelled Mazar-i-Sharif, reportedly causing hundreds of casualties. Dostam's forces bombed Kabul in January, and Masood's forces continue to bombard Kabul, though probably with less effect. In December 1997 a team of United Nations human rights investigators undertook a mission to Afghanistan. They confirmed reports of mass slaughter of combatants in a Taliban offensive in May 1997 and Uzbeck civilians, the latter at the hands of the mostly Pashtun Taliban, concluding that the death toll in this action could be as high as 4,000. The years of conflict and violence have left hundreds of thousands of Afghans as internally displaced persons, and more than 2.4 million live outside the country as refugees. Despite the continued fighting and the presence of some 10 million landmines, some 84,400 returned during 1997, mostly to tribal areas. Widespread return at this juncture cannot be realistically considered. Afghan refugees in Pakistan continue to face many difficulties, not least because of Pakistan's sympathy for the Taliban. Urban professional Afghans and women without male support have a particularly difficult time and children are unable to attend school if their parents are unable to pay. Given the ongoing violence in Afghanistan and the deteriorating situation in Pakistan the Afghan community in Australia express confusion and frustration over: the failure by UNHCR to recognise people fleeing the current violence as refugees and to issue them with identity documents; the failure by UNHCR to acknowledge that, while for the majority of Afghan refugees resettlement may not be an option, there are significant numbers for whom resettlement will afford a level of protection not possible in Pakistan; the apparent acceptance by the Australian Government of UNHCR assessment of resettlement needs; and 66

67 Humanitarian Program the numerical reduction in the resettlement program for Afghan refugees and SHP entrants, despite the increasing severity of the situation in the country of origin. In addition, the community raised a number of issues in relation to access by Afghan refugees in Pakistan to the determination process: for many Afghans it is extremely difficult to get to Islamabad to visit the migration post, most significantly because of the bribes they have pay in order to travel. It was argued that officers should conduct periodic missions to Peshawar; if they can get to Islamabad, Afghans then find it difficult to get to the post, having to run the gauntlet of locals extorting money and the embassy guards; if, having negotiated the other hurdles, they get inside the post, there is then the issue of dealing with the local staff who, like many Pakistanis, are reported to be very unsympathetic towards Afghans and who refuse to provide any information or support, even to Afghan born Australian citizens. It was reported that it is not uncommon for applicants to ask their relatives in Australia to call Pakistan19 to inquire about their case because they are unable to get any information locally; it was suggested that greater use should be made of the notice board outside the post, particularly if information could be provided in Pashtu and Dari ; and expressed concern about the extensive processing delays for Afghans in Pakistan, India and Iran. In relation to settlement issues for Afghan entrants, the community asked that the following be noted: many Afghan entrants are people with tertiary qualifications and who held responsible positions in Afghanistan prior to their flight. The difficulties many experience in having their qualifications recognised in Australia is causing much pain and has had significant consequences for the relationships within families; generational differences are seen as another cause of stress within Afghans families. While this is common to many entrant groups, it is taxing the minds of community leaders who see the differential rates of adaptation to Australian society and the pressures this causes as something the community is ill equipped to deal with at present; the lack of facilities was a common theme in consultations. It was argued that if the community were to have a community centre many of the problems would be addressed as such a centre could provide: 19 When this was reported to RCOA, the question was asked as to whether it was necessary to go to the expense of calling Pakistan and whether the informat i on could be obtained from Canberra. The response was mat DIMA in Canberra have been very helpful but are unable to follow up on all inquiries. 67

68 Refugee Council of Australia aplace for people to worship (the mosques are dominated by the Arabic and Turkish communities); aplace for people to socialise - this is seen as especially important for the elderly members of the community; aplace where members of the community can practice their culture and traditions so that these can be kept vibrant and passed on to the children. the cessation of the (NSW EAC) grant for the female community worker in Sydney has left a gap for which a culturally appropriate solution has not been found. This is of particular significance for Afghan women who are experiencing health and domestic problems. Furthermore, there is an issue that RCOA would like to have noted. In response to the difficulties in countries of first asylum, many Afghans have attempted to find sanctuary in the West. In some cases these people have has their hopes for protection dashed by the interpretation of the Convention definition of a refugee employed by a number of European states, most significantly Germany and France. Such countries limit their protection obligations to victims of state agent persecution, and as Afghanistan has no central government, people are not being persecuted by the state and therefore are not considered to be refugees. This interpretation, which is not shared by Australia, could well mean that genuine refugees are either forced back to Afghanistan or have to go underground in Europe. Neither are viable options, particularly for women. It is argued that Australia could assist some of these people who have links to Australia under the Special Humanitarian Program. In recognition of the severity of the situation that currently exists in Afghanistan and the duration of this conflict, the Refugee Council recommends that 800 places be allocated for humanitarian entrants from Afghanistan, with at least 10% of this number to be devoted to Women at Risk entrants, Iraq At the time of writing the United States and its allies are on the verge of mounting an armed offensive against Iraq in retaliation for Saddam Hussein's refusal to grant access o t UN weapons inspectors. The world waits with bated breath to see if UN Secretary General Kofi Annan can persuade Iraq to accept a compromise. By the time people read this, we will know whether his diplomacy has succeeded or whether the region will be plunged once again into war. The last Gulf war has had a long and painful legacy. Seven years later, people displaced by it are still languishing in camps. Meanwhile, sanctions have bit hard on life inside Iraq. According to UNICEF the infant mortality rate has nearly doubled from 61 per thousand in 1991 to 117 per thousand today. The average number of children under five killed by respiratory infections, malnutrition and diarrhoea has increased from 550 a month in 1991 to 8,000 in The UN estimates that approximately 1/3 of the children in Iraq are undernourished, a figure comparable to some of the poorest countries in Africa. 68

69 Humanitarian Program Meanwhile Saddam Hussein and his cohorts continue to amass fortunes and live in the splendid palaces that are the subject of the current search order. There has been no lessening of his repressive rule and the Iraqi people continue to live either in ignorance or fear, a) Iraqis in Countries of First Asylum: There have been several waves of refugee flows from Iraq over the years, in particular in 1975, during the 1980s and in 1991 at the time of the Gulf War. Most have ended up in large refugee camps and towns in Iran where they have, by and large, found safety and a degree of assistance. It is estimated that today there are some 580,00020 Iraqi refugees in Iran, most of whom are Kurds, with some 58,400 Marsh Arabs and 33,600 Iraqi Shi'as. AS will be discussed in the following sections, Iraqis who have fled to Turkey and Jordan have fared much worse. Turkey has provided a fragile haven, with several instances of coercive repatriations and denial of access to camps for UNHCR and human rights monitors. At the hight of the crisis in 1991 Turkey closed its borders altogether to Iraqis. Jordan currently hosts well over 1/2 million Iraqis. As it is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jordan offers only temporary protection rather than asylum. Iraqis are generally given a two week residence permit on entry, which is renewable for up to six months. After that time they become illegal and must pay a penalty for each day overstayed. As most are unwilling or unable to pay, many Iraqis are driven into hiding. If detected, they are picked up and detained, running the risk of deportation and making it impossible for those in the process of being processed for resettlement. At the end of the Gulf War Saudi Arabia reluctantly admitted some 32,000 Iraqis, most of whom were prisoners of war and deserters, placing them initially in two desert camps and then consolidating the population in Rafha Camp. In 1991 over 3,000 were repatriated, without their having any contact with UNHCR or other human rights agencies. When repatriations were halted, the remaining population were identified as a resettlement caseload. Iraqi refugees have also fled to almost every other country in the Middle East. A few thousand remain in the El Hoi refugee camp in northern Syria, while unknown others have sought refuge in other parts of Syria. More than 1,00 are registered as refugees in Lebanon and many others have gone to Pakistan where there presence is only accepted on the condition that UNHCR arrange their resettlement in a third country. Thousands of others have sought asylum in Western Europe, where they are finding it increasingly difficult to have their claims recognised. UNHCR still regards Iraqis as a priority resettlement caseload, basing their assessment on current numbers and noting that the need could well increase during They are currently seeking resettlement offers for the residual Rafha caseload as well as Iraqis in Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan, Kuwait and elsewhere. 20 Figures from Amnesty International. September

70 Refugee Council of Australia b) Christians from Iraq: Repression of Christians within Iraq over the years has been well documented. While the practice of Christianity is not expressly forbidden by the state, the state condones overt acts of intolerance and provides no protection from discrimination in relation to employment. In addition, children whose parents have converted to Islam in order to secure a divorce are unable to reclaim their faith on reaching adulthood as it is a capital offence to convert from Islam to another religion. With Iraq facing the prospect of another war, Christians are placed in a particularly perilous situation. Christianity is perceived as being a "western" religion, one associated with the United States of America, ie Iraq's enemy. Already Christians are being blamed for the sanctions that have decimated Iraq's social services and led to considerable suffering. It is possible/probable that they will be blamed for any UN military offensives as well. The situation for Christians in northern Iraq has steadily deteriorated over the years. They are caught in the middle of fighting between the two major Kurdish factions. The act of taking up arms to defend themselves has led to accusations from both sides that they are aligned with the other. There are many stories of unprovoked acts of violence, including that of an incident on 13 December 1997 in a car carrying 7 Christians was stopped on the road and 6 of the people were killed on the spot. There is no rule of law in the region and no one to whom the Christians can turn for protection. As a result, many Christians from this region are seeking protection outside Iraq, crossing first into Turkey. Iraqi Christians are, however, currently finding little protection in Turkey. Whenever there is a flare up between the Turkish authorities and the PKK, all Iraqis are made to suffer. In recent months Turkish troops have been rounding up Iraqis in Istanbul and shipping those who are unable to pay bribes back to the border regions. From here there have been forced expulsions across the border. For many who manage to move onwards from Turkey, their fate is little better. For some time Greece has been repatriating Iraqis to Turkey and more recently a number of other EU states have returned both Christians and Kurds to the so called "safe havens". If an Iraqi Christian is fortunate enough to get a visa, there is the challenge of getting out of Turkey. It was explained to RCOA that people leaving have to engage the services of "middle man " to whom they have to pay considerable sums of money. The community appealed to the Australian Government, in conjunction with UNHCR and IOM, to negotiate with the Turkish authorities to enable the middle men to be bypassed. The other major destination for Iraqi Christians is Jordan, where they currently about 30-40,000. Reports indicate that the situation in Jordan is deteriorating. All Iraqis find it difficult to get employment and Christians even more so, and when they do, exploitation by employers is not uncommon. Iraqis are seen to have no rights and are scapegoated by locals for all sorts of problems. Recent reports of roundups and detention of Iraqi Christians, as well as of expulsions to Iraq and other countries, have deeply alarmed the community in Australia. Recognising the difficulty in finding a regional solution, the Assyrian and Chaldean 70

71 Humanitarian Program Recognising the difficulty in finding a regional solution, the Assyrian and Chaldean communities in Australia express concern that comparatively few Christians have received humanitarian visas to come to Australia in what is, in essence, a large program form the Middle East. In this regard, the community question reports from the Department of Foreign Affairs which are used to argue that Christians experience few difficulties in Iraq and that people are leaving for economic reasons. It is claimed that such reports do not reflect the reality of the situation and underestimate the depth of fear felt by the Christians, in particular in the current political climate. In addition, community members raised a number of issues in relation to the operation of the humanitarian program: it is argued that a way other than the mail should be found for Iraqis in Jordan to communicate with the migration post in Beirut. It is common for mail to be lost and/or tampered with and people report to being afraid that Hussein's spies will see what they have written; there are reports of people going to the post in Amman to seek information and having to wait in the sun for many hours and then being treated rudely when the time comes for them to see an official; also with regard to Amman, there is suspicion about the UNHCR office. Many Iraqis are afraid to go to the office because they believe that it is under surveillance by Iraqi agents and their visit will be recorded and family members inside Iraq could be placed in jeopardy ; when it comes time for the interview, the next hurdle has to be overcome. Many Iraqis are not used to being interviewed. If they have had had any dealings with authorities, it is more likely that they would have experienced interrogation. It is suggested that there is a fine line between interview styles and interrogation and in some cases, applicants become terrified during the interview. This makes them confused and likely to forget salient points. It is vital that the interviewing officer understands the impact he/she is unwittingly having on the applicant; as in previous years, RCOA was told about concerns about interpreters, in particular the use of Islamic interpreters. Applicants fear that what they say will be fed to Iraqi authorities and therefore are guarded in their disclosures. A report was also received of an interview in which the interpreter refused to pass on claims being made by a woman of sexual violence by authorities on the grounds that "such things would never happen in Iraq"; as from other communities, there are many stories of inconsistent decision making in the posts - people with very similar stories being treated differently. This causes confusion in the community, in particular when one recognises the desperation people feel about their current circumstances and the importance they place on being resettled; 71 it is reported too that people are being asked for proof of their persecution, eg evidence that they were in gaol/sacked from a palace staff etc, ie documentation that it would be impossible to obtain;

72 Refugee Council of Australia great disappointment has been expressed about a high incidence of rejection of applications for fiance visas, even in cases where all the documentation is y. complete and thelehurch has supported the application. Further, processing times are so slow that it becomes very expensive for the prospective husband in Australia who has to provide financial support for his fiance and her obligatory companion in Jordan for the months it is taking to process the applications; And when Iraqi Christians do receive a visa, little information is given to the community about the profile of arrivals, thus impairing their ability to provide targeted support postarrival. This feeling of marginalisation has not been helped by the trend towards privatisation of service delivery. Community members say that they feel that their contribution is no longer appreciated c) Iraqi Kurds In the dying days of 1997 a ship called the Ararat ran aground off Italy's southern coast. On board were more than 800 Kurds, mainly from Iraq and Turkey. Their arrival generated much publicity about "floods of illegals" and the "need to build higher barriers " and very little was said about the circumstances from which these people were fleeing. In November 1997 renewed fighting broke out between rival Kurdish factions in northern Iraq. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) claimed it was attacked by fighters of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) which is strongly backed by troops, planes and artillery of the Turkish armed forces. Turkey maintains its objective is the Turkish- Kurdish guerilla group, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) but diplomatic sources in the region claim that Turkish troops have been observed well inside Iraqi territory, against international law. The fighting has lead to renewed displacement, with people moving to camps in and around the cities of Irbil and Sulayamaniya. Whole families have been left without shelter during the winter months in conditions that have been described as deplorable. Both parties are said to be equally implicated in the forced relocations, with both reluctant to contribute to the relief effort. There is considerable similarity in the problems facing Iraqi Kurds in exile to those of the Christians as outlined above. In addition, community members wish to stress that they are very happy to be in Australia and greatly appreciate the freedoms this country offers. They do, however, want the following concerns to be noted: their perception that counter staff at the migration posts in Amman and Damascus are giving applicants an assessment of their claims at the time of lodgement, whereas in fact the processing is to done in Beirut; the small number of Kurds included in the humanitarian program ; the continued use of non-kurd ish interpreters when Kurds are being interviewed; the challenge for many Kurds adjusting to the very different culture in Australia and their changes social and economic status; and 72

73 Humanitarian Program the particular challenges that face Kurdish women who find themselves having to balance the expectations of the wider community about the role of women with traditional Kurdish values. In addition, concern was expressed about the impact the increase in racism the general community is having on the Kurdish community and their fears of what may happen should conflict erupt in the Middle East. In relation to Iraq, the Refugee Council recommends that: 2,200 places be allocated during ; the need for resettlement be reviewed should conflict erupt and that if additional places be required, they be allocated out of the contingency reserve; careful consideration be given to the concerns articulated by community organisations Iran a) General Situation: Since overthrow of the Shah and the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, Iran has been in the grip of fundamentalist clergy who maintain a tight grip by way of repression and intimidation on secular as well as religious society. Iran's human rights record since the revolution has been extremely poor and Iran has been the subject of many resolutions in the UN Commission on Human Rights and the appointment of a Special Rapporteur on Human Rights (Maurice Copithorne). Human rights monitoring organisations are consistent in their reports of: denial of participation in democratic processes ; a judiciary that is subject to government and religious influence; widespread abuses such as extrajudicial killings, summary executions, use of or torture and other degrading treatment and harsh prison conditions21; denial of fundamental freedoms such as association, assembly, press, movement and religion; restrictions on important workers' rights; 21 The US State Department and Amnesty International report that women are particularly vulnerable in prisons where rape is common. They report too that torture, including rape, is sometime carried out in the presence of family members as an act of intimidation. 73

74 Refugee Council of Australia discrimination against minorities; and restrictions on access to tertiary education and employment by insisting on the use of "character tests " that establish whether a peron is sympathetic to the government's ideology. There are a variety of agencies involved in maintaining security and enforcing laws. The "formal" agencies include the (infamous) Ministry of Intelligence and Security, the Ministry of the Interior and the Revolutionary Guards. There are also a number of "voluntary" groups such as the paramilitary Basijis and the Ansar e Hezbollah (Helpers of the Party of God) who are groups of street thugs who do the bidding of certain members of the clergy. Both the formal and informal security forces are linked to many serious human rights violations. The Basijis are notorious for their efforts to uphold the "moral code". They will attack women in the street because they are not sufficiently covered, are wearing make-up or are engaged in an unseemly act (such as riding a bicycle), or young people whose clothes are "too western". It is also not uncommon for Basijis to enter private homes in search of transgressions such as a woman being improperly dressed while a male is present. The security forces take action on a different level. Amnesty International22 report that "hundreds, if not thousands" of political prisoners are believed to be in gaol, including prisoners of conscience. Getting an exact figure is very hard, both because the Iranian Government restricts access to human rights monitors, even the UN Special Rapporteur, and because many political prisoners have been charged with trumped-up criminal charges such as espionage and drug trafficking. The long arm of the government does not stop at the border. Over the years evidence has mounted of involvement by the Ministry of Intelligence and Security in assassinations of Iranians abroad. In June 1997 the Ministry was implicated in murder trials in Switzerland and Germany and before that, in January, in the trial of an Iranian man on two murder charges in Turkey. In addition, the UN Special Rapporteur reported on the murder of 91 Iranians (mainly Kurds) in Iraq, most in targeted killings or armed conflict. The violence continues, with reports from Pakistan in the press at the time of writing of politically motivated assassinations of Iranians. In August 1997 President Seyed Mohammad Khatami was inaugurated after his landslide victory in the May elections. Although elected on a reformist platform, and with strong support from women and young people, the level of support that Khatami enjoys from the Ayatollah and other senior clerics suggests that the commitment to reform may be shallow. Events since the election seem to bear this out. In the early weeks there was considerable jubilation, with people keen to indulge in the promised liberalisation. The crack down was swift and severe, in particular in Kurdish areas. Groups of young people meeting in the streets were rounded up and detained. Women, adopting more relaxed dress were attacked and in some instances stoned. More than seven women were stoned to death in Iran last year. As the months have drawn on, people are realising that nothing has really changed 22 Refuge: the Middle East. Amnesty International. September

75 Humanitarian Program and that the promises made to them had no substance. This leading to anger and frustration, expressed through demonstrations in the street, which in turn is leading to more repression and the fear, by observers, of further deterioration in the already bad human rights situation. b) Baha'is in Iran: The Iranian Constitution pronounces the Ja'fari Shi'a sect of Islam as the official religion and declares that other Islamic denominations shall enjoy complete respect. Reference is made to certain other "protected minorities, including as Jews, Christians and Zoroastrians and declares all others illegal. Thus Iran's ,000 Baha'is, whose faith is not mentioned in the Constitution, have become the target of systematic state sanctioned persecution which includes: prohibition of teaching and practise of the Baha'i faith and of maintaining links with congregationalists abroad; non-recognition of Baha'i marriages which leaves the way open for women to be charged with persecution and children to be considered illegitimate, thus being denied inheritance rights; confiscation and destruction of sacred property; regular denial of compensation for injury or criminal victimisation; prohibition from government employment; and restrictions of access to tertiary education. It appears the government has a policy of keeping a small number of Baha'i in detention at any given time in order to intimidate the community. 11 Baha'is were arrested between May and December 1997 for a variety of charges including holding Baha'i meetings and working without permits. Sometimes more serious charges are laid, including espionage, apostasy (which essentially amounts to refusal to embrace Islam) and engaging in "Zionist activities", some of which are punishable by death. Despite their hopes that the new government may result in less oppression, little has charged. People are still being arrested, worship is still banned and none of the confiscated property has been returned. c) Resettlement : Along with Iraqis, UNHCR views Iranians, including Kurds and Baha'is, as the main resettlement target from the Middle East. Asignificant number of Iranians flee west into Turkey. Once there they experience difficulties very similar to those of the Iraqis as outlined above, including being detained by authorities, forced to live in border areas, are being caught up in violence and are at risk of refoulement. 75

76 Refugee Council of Australia When asked about the difficulties that Iranian refugees face in attempting to come to Australia, community members report on the following: difficulties in getting the application forms. In some cases refugees are denied access to the post and once inside, the treatment they receive is not always of a high standard, especially if the potential applicant is unable to speak English or Turkish; the fact that the forms are in English and they are expected to outline their claims in English. This results in cases being many poorly presented and decisions being made on the basis of who is the most articulate (ie has money to pay for a competent translator) rather than who is the most needy. This highlights the importance of the interview; once an application is lodged, applicants typically hear nothing for a long time (often two years or more), not even acknowledgment of receipt. For people who have fled persecution and are living in a hostile environment, the dream of resettlement dominates their life. They search for a letter every day and the waiting period becomes agony; for those who are lucky enough to get a humanitarian visa, there are other obstacles that have to be surmounted, in particular finding money for the medical and the airfare and obtaining permission to leave; cases are reported of people being denied a visa on the grounds that they "do not have a proposer in Australia" where in actual fact they do and this is clearly indicated on their application. The situation for Iranian refugees in Pakistan is, if it can be possible, more difficult than for those in Turkey, largely because of hostilities towards Iran. Iranian community members report that those seeking resettlement in Australia encounter similar problems to those in Turkey - though the challenge of getting application forms from the post in Islamabad is seen as too great and it is now common for forms to be posted from community members in Australia. Interestingly, it would seem that Baha'i refugees in Pakistan do not experience the same difficulties. The Baha'i community in Australia report that they are very happy both with the level of assistance they receive from the post and about the apparent understanding of the situation of Baha'i refugees. One common concern of communities here, however, is the lack of information they receive about prospective arrivals and the lack of information arrivals receive about community supports in Australia. This impacts on the communities' ability to provide important post-arrival assistance. d) Settlement : It is reported that the main challenges facing Iranian refugees on arrival in Australia are accommodation, employment and language acquisition. Community workers outlined the following: 76

77 Humanitarian Program considerable racism has been encountered from real estate agents, particularly in Sydney and Melbourne, when trying to rent accommodation. This happens even in cases where a letter of guarantee is supplied by a community organisation; the lack of recognition of educational qualifications is a significant barrier to finding meaningful employment. In the absence of appropriate orientation, many entrants also experience difficulty in adjusting to the different work place environment in Australia; some entrants report that their English classes are "boring" and not teaching them the things they need to know. Consequently there is a regrettably high rate of occasional attendance and several entrants are completing their courses without functional English. In addition, there are reports of inconsistencies in the level of support provided by different Centrelink and Department of Housing offices (ie different advice about or granting of entitlements). In reflecting on what could make things better for the community, one worker suggested that there needs to be more information translated into community languages about rights and entitlements. Acknowledging that quite a deal already exists from some departments, it was argued that others are dragging the chain. Important areas where is was considered gaps still existed are taxation and employees rights. When asked about settlement issues, the Baha'i community also point to language and employment issues but stress that for Baha'is things are made substantially easier because of the strength of the Baha'i community in Australia, both in terms of the way individuals are linked together and the high level of connectedness between newly arrived Baha'i refugees and wider community through the Australians (and others) who have converted to the Baha'i faith. The Refugee Council recommends with respect to refugees from Iran that 600 places be allocated under the Refugee and Special Humanitarian Program, with this number to include: at least 200 places for Baha 'i refugees; and at least 200 places for Iranian Kurds Turkey International organisations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, together with the US State Department, continue to express concerns about the human rights situation in Turkey. The Turkish Government concedes that the record is poor and during 1997 took steps to make improvements, including the appointment in July 1997 of astate Minister for Human Rights. Little progress has thus far been observed and there is general recognition that the country's human rights record is substandard and needs to be brought in line, both to meet international obligations and to comply with the aspirations of the Turkish people and the government's stated position. 77

78 Refugee Council of Australia Throughout 1997 there were reports of political and extrajudicial killings, deaths in detention and disappearances. Police and the Jandarma (antiterrorist squads) continue to be implicated in the use of torture during incommunicado detention. Implementation of reforms have been piecemeal and convictions of police and security forces are rare. Persecution of religious minorities is still widespread and human rights monitors point to Turkey's poor record in relation to providing protection against spouse abuse, child abuse and child labour. The situation in the south east of the country continues to be of concern. For over a decade Turkish authorities have been involved in conflict with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). The state of emergency that was declared in 1987 continues in 6 provinces, giving the provincial governors considerable powers. Turkish Kurds have long been denied fundamental political, cultural and social rights and the level of oppression has escalated in response to PKK activities. As part of its fight against to PKK the government has, according to the 1998 US State Department Report, forcibly displaced non-combatants, failed to resolve extrajudicial killings, tortured civilians and abridged freedom of expression. The PKK, on its part, has also engaged in acts of terrorism against civilians as well as the authorities. The population of the south east, a significant proportion of whom are internally displaced and refugees from neighbouring states, not only have to contend with the activities of the PKK and their consequences but also those of fanatical Islamic groups such as the Turkish Hizbullah and far left groups such as Revolutionary Left and the Turkish Workers' and Peasants' Liberation Army, to each of which violent and abusive acts can be attributed. The Refugee Council recommends that 250 places be allocated for refugees and humanitarian entrants from Turkey, with the target groups being ethnic and religious minorities and political opponents of the Turkish administration.

79 Humanitarian Program 4.3. EUROPE: Former Soviet Union (a) Jews from the Former Soviet Union It was anticipated that the current financial year would see the first Special Assistance Category created draw to its natural conclusion. The SAC for Jews from the Former Soviet Union was established with a particular target population in mind. The criteria were developed to match this group and the number of places allocated over the 5 years during which the program operated matched to identified need. Regrettably, however, not all of these people have been visaed. Given the expectations that have been built up in the community, it is argued that the SAC should continue for another year to accommodate, subject to eligibility, all those who have applied. In addition, it is felt that there is an ongoing need to consider resettlement of Jews from elsewhere as there is ongoing harassment and discrimination of Jews in the southern states of the former Soviet Bloc. Similarly, Jews are experiencing religious discrimination in Afghanistan, Ethiopia and parts of Europe. The community argues that the needs of those most affected are best served through the Special Humanitarian Program rather than a SAC. The Refugee Council recommends that the SAC for Jews from the Soviet Union be retained for a further year and that sufficient places be allocated to this to clear the residual caseload (estimated at about 200 people). Further, it is recommended that where individual protection cases are identified, they be accommodated in the Global Humanitarian Program. (b) Molokans from the Former Soviet Union The Molokan community reiterates its concern that the announced termination of the aforementioned Jewish SAC will mean too a termination of the program to which it was linked, and from which it has received few places. The Molokan people have been the victims of persecution since their expulsion from Russia in Their fair skin and different religious practices have made them easy targets for persecution in Armenia and Azerbaijan where the majority reside. Attempts to regain Russian citizenship have been blocked, however, as Molokans are considered to have offended the Russian Orthodox Church by not accepting its doctrine. Documented reports of persecutory acts in Armenia include: denial of police protection; disruption of church services by armed men who fired on the congregation; murders of Molokans that are not investigated by the authorities; 79

80 Refugee Council of Australia Molokans being pushed off public transport and being attacked in the streets by people with rocks and sticks; denial of employment on the basis of being Molokan; confiscation of land following the Soviet withdrawal from Armenia; threatening phone calls and attacks on homes. The Molokan community in Australia is torn between wanting to assist those still in the former Soviet states and not wanting to reveal information that would lead to reprisals against their compatriots. They are concerned that despite the existence of the SAC, only asmall number of Molokans have been granted visas in the last 6 years and many cases where there are close links to Australia have been rejected. Applications under other visa classes, in particular Class 202 (SHP) and family reunion have also been unsuccessful. In addition, the community request that their concern about the welfare of some 200 Molokan families in Starverpol in Russia be noted. These people have no access to employment or passports and their children are unable o t attend school as they are not considered to be citizens of Russia. The Refugee Council recommends that the SAC for Molokans from the Former USSR be continued and that 100 places be allocated to the program in , targeting people from within Armenia and from Starverpol who have close links to Australia, have been suffering severe discrimination and have been nominated by Molokan Charitable Services in Australia. (c) Other Areas of the Former Soviet Union Population displacement following the break up of the Soviet Union, and the potential for there to be even greater displacement, is being viewed with concern by the international community. In 1996 UNHCR sponsored a major regional conference for the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) aimed at encouraging the newly independent states to address the issue of displacement, accede to international instruments and adopt national legislation. It was further hoped to promote regional standards to minimise pull factors complicating what is considered to already be a highly complex and potentially volatile situation. Very little is reported in the Australian press about developments in the former Soviet states, save for Chechnya where May 1997 saw the signing of a peace accord after 22 months of bloody civil war. More recently there were reports from Tajikistan where in August heavy fighting broke out in the capital between rival pro-government factions in the armed forces. The fact that there are simmering tensions in other states, including Georgia and the southern republics of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgystan, not to mention Nagorno-Karabakh, goes essentially un-noticed o t all but keen Soviet observers. The reality is that this is an area of massive population displacement with the number of people displaced within the region amounting to several million, including over 2 million ethnic Russians forced out of their former homes. An inter-regional response is 80

81 Humanitarian Program considered appropriate at the present time for the majority of those displaced but the situation could change at any time. The Refugee Council recommends that developments in the former Soviet republics be monitored carefully, with the objective of responding appropriately to requests for resettlement assistance by UNHCR should they be made Former Yugoslavia The signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in late 1995 imposed a fragile peace in the Balkans, ending a conflagration that had dispersed over three million refugees within the Former Yugoslavia and throughout Europe. Now the region's devastation following the years of conflict poses major questions, not the least of these being whether and how people can return to their homes. The Dayton Accords have not meant automatic peace. There are still areas which have the potential to flare again. Kosovo, whose simmering ethnic tensions were at the core of the recent conflagration, remains volatile. A new flare up here is regarded by many as having the potential to reignite the war. Barajana is another area that people are watching with concern. Once part of Eastern Slavonia and now an enclave under UN control and populated by Serbs who fled Eastern Slavonia on its return to Croatia, Barajana could be the site of another "Operation Storm"23 if a negotiated settlement cannot be reached. Furthermore, and of great relevance, the geo-political shape of the region that was formerly united under General Tito is vastly different now. The emergent states are divided on distinct ethnic lines, and large numbers of people must now confront the reality that they are unwelcome in the town where they were born. Many people are simply not able to "go home" and pick up their lives where they left off. Added to this is the massive infrustructural devastation in most of Bosnia and in regions of Croatia and Serbia, caused not only by war but by years of embargoes. This is not just in terms of availability of basic amenities such as water, electricity and housing stock but also impacts on every aspect of life: education, medical care, employment, access to commodities etc. It will take a long time and much international investment before things approximate normality. It is not just the physical environment that suffered in the war. The Balkans War was marked by atrocious acts of violence against the civilian population such as the massacre at Srebrenica, the storming of the Krajina and the blockade of Bihac. We saw too the internment camps where men emerged as walking skeletons and in which women had been systematically raped. The people of the region have all been affected by the war and many carry psychological deep scars. 23 "Operation Storm" was the name given to the Croatian Government offensive in August 1995 that reclaimed the Krajina region from Serb control. 81

82 Refugee Council of Australia The majority of those displaced were granted temporary protection by European states, in particular Germany, where there are over 300,000 people from Bosnia Hercegovina alone. That temporary protection is now in the process of being withdrawn and there is the expectation that the people will return to the region from whence they came. The repatriation process has, however, been far from smooth and the notion that people would simply be able to return to their homes and resume normal life has proved naive in the extreme. It is acknowledged that ways will need to be found for the majority of the population to return, despite the many obstacles. Others will not be able to return and other solutions will need to be found for them. The circumstances of these two groups will be elaborated upon below. i. Return to Bosnia: UNHCR has conceded that it was over optimistic about the prospects for return to Bosnia during It was hoped at the beginning of the year that some 200,000 people would be repatriated during the year but as the months wore on and the difficulties mounted, it became clear that they would be lucky to get half this number back. The inauguration in early February 1998 of a more moderate and apparently cooperative government in the Serb controlled part of Bosnia is a ray of hope but it far from signals the end to the wave of extreme nationalism that has been a feature of the region both during the war and since the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords. Time will tell about the level of influence indicted war criminal Radovan Karadzic will continue to wield in Republica Serbska, so too is the west waiting to see whether the Bosnian Muslim leader, Alija Izetbegovic will make it easier for Bosnian Serbs to return to Sarajevo. Underlying much of what happens is a battle of wills between extreme nationalistic elements, within for the UN withdrawal so they can effect their revenge, and the moderates who want to see a lasting peace. Anumber of lessons were learnt during 1997 about return to Bosnia. These included: those people who could return easily to their homes have done so. Most of those awaiting return have complex issues to be dealt with eg return to minority areas, access to property etc. Repatriation from here on in will be slower and more difficult; for those who have been lucky enough to return to their homes, life has not been easy. The major problem has been lack of basic infrastructure. Most lack any means of earning a living or sustaining existence. Old people, families with young children and other vulnerable individuals are not receiving the level of support they require; approximately 50% of those who have returned to Bosnia have not been able to return to their former homes. Instead they are concentrated in cities and towns in majority areas, causing a drain on resources and in some cases, in particular in Sanski Most, creating a potentially destabilising element; the returns to minority areas have, by and large, not been a success. Most returnees are elderly people (rather than families) and there are many reports of 82

83 Humanitarian Program them being treated very badly. They return to find people living in their homes and are thus relegated to ghettos. In one reported case24 a group of elderly returnees were forced to live in substandard dwellings in sight of their ruined mosque and the building in which their families were massacred; spontaneous returns have caused problems for those engaged in mine clearance operations aimed at mapping and clearing the minefields that straddle the former front lines and are dense throughout the north west of the country. Their return to uncleared areas has resulted in hasty and partial clearance operations being conducted, leaving large parts of the surrounding area a potential threat; the failure to indict and bring o t justice war criminals has led to many being able to continue to intimidate local populations with seeming impunity and undermining people's confidence in the country's future. efforts by European states, in particular Germany, to force returns have exacerbated the tensions inside Bosnia and have also led to problems elsewhere as many of those "starved out" by withdrawal of benefits have not retuned to Bosnia but have gone to other European states. Anumber of things must be done if repatriation to Bosnia is to be a success. First, and most urgently, pressure must be put on European states to cease deporting people against their will or employing practices that effectively force them out. It is impossible for them to justify this on the grounds that there is peace in Bosnia and there is now sufficient evidence to suggest that the influx of people who cannot return to their former homes is placing a crippling burden on the country's infrastructure. It is also essential that substantial investment be devoted to creating the conditions that will sustain return - not only the physical infrastructure such as schools, hospitals and water services - but more importantly to restoring civil society and the rule of law, recognising too the role NGOs play in this process. At the moment there is concern that international investment will dwindle before sustainability is achieved. In the meantime, UNHCR is promoting its "Open Cities" program. This aims at getting municipalities in Bosnia to articulate clearly that they will welcome returnees and put in place services to support their return. By the end of 1997, however, only four cities had signed up: Konjic, Busovaca, Bihac and Vogosca, all of which are in Federation areas. A further 16 cities, including Sarajevo and Mostar, have been recognised as potential Open Cities. ii. Return to Croatia: In Croatia there are many signs of wealth filtering into the community, with construction taking place, businesses opening up and a growing atmosphere of optimism. Concern has been expressed, however, that the increasing affluence is being attributed to the expulsion of the Serbs rather than to the increase in international investment. "It was the Serbs", many are saying, "who drained all the wealth from the country and now they are gone, 24 British Refugee Council Mission to Bosnia

84 Refugee Council of Australia see how much better things are". The widespread acceptance of such propaganda significantly impacts on the prospects for return of Croatian Serbs. There are still some 550,000 Croatian Serbs in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, over 300,000 of whom were expelled from the Krajina region of Croatia in August About 50,000 of the refugees are in Collective Centres and the other 1/2 million are billeted with local families. As the years draw on, the social tensions created by this large number of displaced people, coming as it does in an economy seriously depressed by sanctions, must not be overlooked. It is thus far considered unlikely that most of this group will be able to return and local integration and resettlement options are being explored by UNHCR. There are increasing reports of refugees in Serbia giving up in despair and taking their own life. The years of destitution, the open public hostility towards them, repeated rejections for resettlement and the dark void they perceive to be their future mount up to the point where things become intolerable. Some 7,000 people have spontaneously returned from Eastern Slovenia to Krajina and a further 1,000 with UNHCR assistance. Krajina remains sparsely populated and there is considerable pride in sections of the populace about their "method of ethnic cleansing". The Serbs who return, and those who have remained in Croatia throughout, are not having an easy time. Reports have been received of Serbian families being totally ostracised by their former friends and neighbours who are so intimidated by public sentiment that they are afraid to talk to them. In some cases the people who spent years sheltering from the Serb bombing are now being blamed for it. For those who return there has been limited support and returnees are reported to be experiencing difficulties re-establishing themselves in what is, in essence, a harsh region. iii. Resettlement: Since the outbreak of hostilities, over 25,000 people from the Former Yugoslavia have been resettled in Australia and for several years now, this group has formed the largest single source area in each of the components of the Australian humanitarian program (refugee, SHP and SAC). UNHCR sees the need for resettlement places for refugees from the Former Yugoslavia as continuing throughout 1998 and beyond. They give priority to the following groups: "' ex-detainees; people in mixed marriages; women at risk; medically at risk; and survivors of torture and trauma. They anticipate that they will be seeking resettlement for some 5,000 Bosnian priority cases during 1998 and a further 2,500 Croatian Serbs currently in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In addition, it can be argued that there are people who do not meet the Convention definition who should be considered for resettlement. The Australian SHP and SAC 84

85 Humanitarian Program programs have played a very important and welcome role in providing assistance in such cases. It is argued that these programs should continue and target people who have links to Australia, for whom resettlement is considered the best option and: * are internally displaced within either Bosnia or Croatia; and/or _* have experienced severe hardship as a result of the conflict ; and/or can demonstrate through their activities that they are unable to accept the extreme nationalism that is emerging in the region. Community groups and humanitarian workers are quick to voice their support of the resettlement program, although they wish it to be noted that they perceive there still to be number of obstacles to its efficient operation. Most commonly raised by all affected communities are concerns about the post at Belgrade. It is recognised that it is an extremely busy post and is working under intense pressure, however, the Council heard repeated complaints about: I I I * * lengthy delays in processing - with every now and then a case being processed very quickly - which in turn leads to speculation about why this occurred; * inconsistent decision making - with seemingly identical cases being treated differently; * poor advice by the post to applicants about the various programs and their options with regard to these; lack of information available in the applicants language; ongoing rumours about corruption and the solicitation of bribes. It is recognised that where there are desperate people and long delays in processing, such allegations can occur without foundation but it is a matter that requires very careful investigation. Community representatives who raised the matter with the Council have been asked to collect documentary evidence wherever possible and forward it to the Department of Immigration. The persistence and prevalence of concerns about Belgrade, and the fact that people report few if any concerns about the two other posts dealing with the Former Yugoslav caseload, would suggest that there is a need for a thorough audit of the operations at the post. The other major issue raised about the program relates to the cut off dates included in the criteria for the Former Yugoslav SAC. Under the current program, a proposer must have been in Australia since before 30 June As a consequence, newer arrivals have been unable to sponsor close family members under the program, despite the fact that they are the ones most likely to have been most affected by the conflict and in turn separated from their families. Recognising the importance of family reunion in the settlement process for those separated by conflict, and noting that in most cases reunion cannot be achieved through other humanitarian or migration categories (either because the relative is still in the country of origin, is affected by capping etc), it is argued that the cut off date is "85

86 Refugee Council of Australia unreasonable. A far preferable situation would be to either require the proposer to have been in Australia for two years or to be able to demonstrate that they are "settled " as used in other migration programs. iv. Settlement: Following on from the above, one of the major impediments to settlement for members of this community is their inability to be reunited with family members. Thus plays heavily on their minds and exacerbates both the financial challenges of establishing themselves and the guilt they feel that they are "safe" while their family members are living in difficult circumstances. As with many communities, there are concerns about access to services, in particular interpreters and torture and trauma counselling. In addition, the Serbian community express concern that the popular perception of Serbs is that they were the aggressors and perpetrators of war crimes and that there is little understanding of the fact that Serbs too were imprisoned, tortured and were victims of ethnic cleansing. With respect to the Former Yugoslavia, the Refugee Council recommends: 2,590 places be allocated for refugees and for Special Humanitarian Program entrants; that 2, 000 places be allocated to a Special Assistance Category; that steps be taken to address the expressed concerns of the communities.

87 Humanitarian Program AFRICA: General Situation i. The Horn of Africa : The world's eyes may have been diverted recently by other events in Africa, but the fact remains that the Horn of Africa continues to be a major refugee producing region. The subsiding Western media coverage of the region's various conflicts, however, in no way reflects the reality, degree and scale of armed conflict and serious human rights abuses which uproot hundreds of thousands of people every year. The devastating and long running civil war in Sudan rages unabated and has in many respects intensified in recent years with the attempted introduction of Shari'a law over the non-muslim South. The internecine clan conflict which tore Somalia apart appears to have subsided somewhat but the country remains without a functioning state administration. As a result, the country has been divided up into clan based enclaves where security of person rests not upon the rule of law but by clan patronage. In Ethiopia, where the post-derg administration continues to pay lip-service to basic human rights and ethnic diversity, arbitrary detention, torture, and general terror remain a day-to-day proposition for the Oromo and Ogadenians who live in regions where ethnic based separatist movements are operating. Aquick glance around the region reveals that a disturbingly high proportion of the region's population reside in refugee camps or are internally displaced. UNHCR, in its most recent edition of The State of the World's Refugees, produced the following statistics on refugee numbers in the various countries in and around the Horn: Djibouti: Egypt: Eritrea : Ethiopia: Kenya: Sudan: Uganda: Yemen: Zaire: 23,000 Somalis; 2,000 Ethiopians. 3,500 Somalis; 1,500 Sudanese. 2,000 Somalis. 288,000 Somalis; 76,000 Sudanese; 18,000 Djiboutians. 171,000 Somalis; 33,000 Sudanese; 7,000 Ethiopians. 328,000 Eritreans; 51,000 Ethiopians. 224,000 Sudanese. 44,000 Somalis; 2,500 Eritreans; 1000 Ethiopians. 97,000 Sudanese. Total: 1,372,500 Furthermore, The US Committee for Refugees in their World Refugee Survey 1997 estimated that at up to 4,000,000 people are internally displaced in the Sudan alone. It is impossible to calculate accurately the number of internally displaced people over the whole area but it is well known that, in addition to Sudan, both Somalia and Ethiopia have substantial internally displaced populations. Far from being better off than those declared by virtue of their alienage as "refugees", these people suffer in conditions often 87

88 Refugee Council of Australia equal to or worse than those in officially designated refugee camps. The internally displaced often remain subjected to the very human rights abuses and violence which uprooted them in the first place. Congregated in camps or squatter settlements ringing major towns, such people enjoy neither the minimal levels of food and material aid nor the nominal security afforded by the presence of international organisations in the refugee camps. They are often subject to military strikes by warring factions and in many places in the Sudan, aerial bombardment has become a regular feature of life. Most worrying, however, is the fact that the internally displaced are more likely to be women, children, and the sick and elderly as these groups have often neither the strength nor resources in times of conflict to cross an international border in search of refuge. The situation in the Horn provides some unique challenges to resettlement countries like Australia if the fundamental nexus between human rights and their humanitarian immigration program is to be retained. For many reasons the UN Convention definition of a refugee is much too narrow to cover the reality of the suffering in the Horn of Africa. To seek out the Convention refugees as those most worthy of resettlement ignores some pertinent geo-political realities which frame the nature of conflict in the region: The concept of alienage which underpins the Convention definition is shown to be inadequate not only by the high level of internal displacement found in the Horn but by the lack of correspondence between local socio-economic networks and national borders themselves. The majority of people in the Horn are nomads and their activities respect no artificial State boundary. The difficulty of distinguishing between refugees and returnees is a well documented phenomenon in the Horn. For example, during the Ethiopian-Somali war over the Ethiopian controlled region known as the Ogaden, thousands of ethnic Somalis from the Ogaden sought refuge in Somalia proper utilising lines of clan-patronage to establish themselves there. Years later the reverse occurred with the same people (plus some) fleeing Somalia seeking refuge in Ethiopian Ogaden. Refugees or Returnees? The rot cause of much displacement in the region does not easily fit the Convention model which stresses persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality, social group or political opinion. Nor is UNHCR's expanded definition incorporating armed conflict and generalised violence always adequate. One of the most disturbing tactics that the Sudanese government has employed in its attempts to destroy resistance to its on-going attempts to Arabise the whole country, has been to use development projects to displace and scatter communities. Most recently, Khartoum has proposed to construct a huge dam in the Nubian mountain region, the result of which would uproot thousands of Nubians without any offer of compensation. The Nubians have historically been a target of more direct forms of persecution and violence but this approach might be more effective than the program of systematic rape, torture, and terror. Aid distribution, in particular food, has often been a weapon of attrition in the many conflicts in the Horn. In times of famine, governments can effectively restrict access to food to whole populations if they suspect that it will weaken the grip of rebel movements. This was a particularly tragic yet effective strategy used by the Derg in Ethiopia at the very time that the eyes of the World were watching during the famine of the early 1980s. This is also a favoured tactic of the Khartoum regime. A recent report by Medecins Sans Frontieres details the horrific 88

89 Humanitarian Program outcomes where aid organisations are refused access to rebel controlled, famine stricken regions in southern Sudan. The innocent victims of these tactics are forced to flee not only starvation but resulting endemic disease. In the Horn of Africa the distinction between economic and political refugees therefore makes little sense. To the untrained Western eye the main cause of conflict in the Horn of Africa would appear to be traced back to intractable differences between ethnic, tribal and clan groups, the origins of which are clouded in the mists of history. A more nuanced analysis reveals that such lines of conflict are much more fluid and adaptable than it first appears. The peculiarities of colonial rule combined with extreme levels of resource scarcity has meant that group alliances are formed and dissolved in competition over the control of local resources. Economic conflict in the Horn has tended o t be transferred to the political level simply because historically the control of scarce economic resources has resided solely in a centralised State administration, the occupants of which have tended to favour their own groups at the expense of others. The consequence of any continuation of such a centralised clientele State system means that in times of environmental disaster, the risk of conflict and generalised violence increases significantly. A close eye should thus be kept on Somalia as the recent devastation in the wake of floods could be the catalyst for renewed conflict over scarce resources. In light of these realities, the Refugee Council wishes to draw attention to the need for a humanitarian program which is both broad in scope and flexible in application. We maintain that it is necessary to continue and perhaps expand the in-country SHP and SAC programs for the Horn as both of these aim to compensate for the inadequacies of the Convention definition so exposed by the realities of the Horn of Africa. While we recognise that there has been much criticism of the SAC program from both government and community groups, RCOA believes that these are problems of management rather than underlying philosophy. SAC has been manipulated by individual community groups but we should be particularly careful in thinking that by abolishing or phasing out individual SAC programs that we can be certain that we are accepting only those in most need. RCOA in particular wishes to draw attention to disturbing situations in the following Horn of Africa countries. In SUDAN: The Sudan remains in the grip of a devastating civil war which bar an 11 year hiatus between has consumed the country since Although taking various guises and shapes the civil war has basically been a conflict between the Arab and Islamic north and the underdeveloped Christian/Animist south. Although, officially under a single British colonial authority, the North and South were up until independence in 1956 effectively administered as two separate zones. The North retained close administration and cultural/religious ties with colonial Egypt, while in the South the common British technique of indirect rule through tribal leaders was employed. Since 1956, the history of the Sudan has consisted of an attempt to integrate these two regions. This process of nation building has, however, largely been dominated by Khartoum s desire to see the Sudanese nation defined as predominantly Arab in culture 89

90 Refugee Council of Australia and Muslim in religion - a process fiercely rejected by the multitude of ethnic groupings in Southern Sudan. While far from homogenous themselves, the Southerners have consistently called for substantial political, economic, and cultural autonomy and have been prepared to fight a sustained war in order to achieve this goal. Since 1983, this resistance has largely been directed by the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) who, with their allies in the North, the outlawed National Democratic Front (NDF), have on a regular basis attacked government strongholds around the country. Since the start of the present chapter of the conflict in 1983 more than 1.5 million Sudanese have lost their lives. Despite various moves towards peace settlements initiated by both warring parties, the war has in fact intensified over the last 8 years with the rise of a fundamentalist Islamic regime to power in Khartoum in Under General Omar Bashir and his NIF party, the process of Arab/Islamisation has intensified and Shari 'a law has been strictly imposed in Government controlled areas, and non-muslims in these areas are subjected to harsh discriminatory measures. Avariety of credible sources such as Amnesty, Human Rights Watch, and even the US State Department in its 7997 Report on Human Rights have expressed extreme concern over the increasingly deteriorating situation in regards to basic human rights. There have been numerous well documented cases of the arbitrary detention, torture and extrajudicial killing of suspected political opponents. Freedom of movement within the country is extremely curtailed and international aid organisations are regularly denied access to war, famine and disease ravaged areas. The Government has forcibly expelled hundreds of thousands of the internally displaced from the squatter camps ringing Khartoum by bulldozing with little forewarning the entire encampments. As Medecins Sans Frontiers' recent report on the Sudan noted: "Ostensibly for industrial, agricultural and road purposes, the government has taken brutal measures to clear squatter camps. Armed police and soldiers move into areas using teargas and demolish homes with bulldozers. The victims are neither compensated nor provided -with official sites to which they can move. Relocated people are simply left on open ground, often on the extreme edges of Khartoum, with no electricity, sanitation facilities or even water. They are forced to rebuild their houses from scratch. Removals often take place in winter, forcing parents to dig holes in the hard ground so that their children can get some meagre protection from the biting wind. The main reason is to keep the displaced population destabilised." There is also strong concern about the tactics employed by the NIF to achieve its expressed ends of Islamisation and in its war effort in the South: In certain areas of the country the Government pursues a policy of direct ethnic cleansing which borders on genocide. The Nuba in particular, seen by many Northerners as primitive savages, have been the main victims of such a policy. There are substantiated reports that hundreds of Southern and Nubian women and children have been abducted and sold into slavery in the North. Both Amnesty International and the US State Department maintain that such a practice has a clear on

91 Humanitarian Program, racial aspect to it. Southern children have been forcibly conscripted into Government forces. The Government has used various strategies to weaken the resolve of populations within rebel held areas. All of these are in direct contravention of internationally recognised laws of war. These include: the aerial bombardment of civilian and displaced populations ; the raiding, looting, and raising of villages and the destruction of cultivable land by Government troops; denying aid organisations access to war, famine and disease affected areas; the use of systematic rape as a weapon of war. Rape carries a stigma of shame in many Sudanese communities and women who have been subjected to rape are often looked down upon (even cast out) by members of thenown communities. the use of "ghost houses " - places where rebels and then" alleged supporters are detained and tortured by Government forces without charge or trial. Those taken to "ghost houses " do not formally exist. While Government forces are responsible for the majority of human rights abuses in the Sudan, rebel forces aligned to the SPLM have also, according to the same sources, committed some serious abuses. These include documented cases of extrajudicial killings, bearings, arbitrary detention, the arrest of foreign aid workers, and the rape of civilian populations. The reality of Sudan today is a country torn apart by nearly 50 years of ongoing conflict with no end in sight. While we can quantify the effect of this conflict by highlighting the 1.5 million casualties since 1983 alone, the 1/2 million refugees who have found asylum in neighbouring African countries, or the 4 million internally displaced scattered around the country, there is no way of measuring the damage done to the socio-psychological fabric of Sudanese society in general. Settlement countries such as Australia make a small but important contribution in allowing a small number of victims of such conflicts to rebuild their world and start afresh. The Sudanese community in Australia has expressed the following concerns vis-a-vis settlement issues: That the present Sudanese SAC program is favouring certain Sudanese groups at the expense of others. Greater balance should be introduced by revamping the way such in-country humanitarian programs operate with greater emphasis placed on humanitarian need rather than the relative strength of the community in Australia. Many Sudanese in Australia are relatively well educated and highly skilled. Most, however, remain unemployed or underemployed with little prospects of obtaining jobs which reflect their qualifications. Members of the Sudanese communities expressed strongly that the ability to obtain such employment was as much a concern of dignity and self-esteem as it were an issue of financial security. They feel that there is somewhat of a stigma attached to being a refugee which often invokes pity but not respect. RCOA recommends that this problem be attacked from both sides. Job training and skill updating are not enough. The general public must be also be informed of the contribution that these people often can make to 91

92 Refugee Council of Australia public life in general. Many Sudanese expressed the desire to establish their own business in Australia. However, they have all found it difficult to obtain both training aimed at this end and finance since they have typically no assets or capital. They argue the need for an investigation of means of evaluating the prospects of and financing refugeerun small businesses. This would be one way of helping many highly skilled humanitarian entrants break into Australian economic life. In SOMALIA: There is both reason for hope and caution in Somalia today. There appears to be a genuine effort under way to re-build both peace and a centralised state administration following seven years of internecine conflict which has left the country not only divided into small clan based enclaves and has completely destroyed the country's infrastructure and capacity for economic production. All major warring clan groups have decided to meet at a Peace Conference in the Somali town of Baidoa at the end of March, 1998 with the backing of Cairo and the Arab league. Most importantly, included in this latest peace initiative is the South Mogadishu warlord Hussein Mohamed Aideed's clan which has been up until now absent from the negotiations. While there is widespread popular support for peace, indicated by mass public peace rallies, there is also cause for much caution as it remains to be seen how the conference will overcome the root cause of the conflict : a clientele centralised state administration. Somalia, although largely ethnically homogenous, is segmented by a system of linage derived clans through which both the political and economic life of the population is channelled. Since independence, Somalia's various administrations have been seen to deliver political and economic patronage to certain sectors of society at the expense of clan-groupings not aligned with the clan of the governing elite. This situation became particularly explosive in Siad Barre's military regime had for years ruled the country by manipulating inter-clan animosity and thus weakening organised opposition to his administration. Barre's attempt to put down by force organised opposition in the North of the country coincided with a particularly large influx of modern automatic weaponry into the country along with severe drought and famine. The ensuing war was as much an attempt by hitherto marginalised clan-grouping to gain access to increasingly scarce resources as it was an attempt to ascend to national power. The biggest question facing the upcoming peace conference is how to convince the various clan leaders/warlords to give up control of their enclaves and trust a centralised administration to provide for the needs of their clan. The present situation in Somalia is paradoxical to say the least. The clan enclaves have provided a modicum of security and peace for their inhabitants (at least outside of Mogadishu where fighting continues) and economic activity is on the rise. Islamic fundamentalism is also on the rise and many enclaves have established their own judicial systems, more often than not based on Shari'a law. Incidences of banditry and violence are on the way down through community policing but revenge killings are an increasingly accepted form of justice between clans. Some of the hundreds of thousands of Somali refugees residing in neighbouring countries are cautiously beginning to return in the hope that their own clan will provide protection. 92

93 Humanitarian Program Yet in the very existence of these enclaves resides the seeds of future conflict. Unless a future central administration can successfully mediate competing clan claims, then conflict over political and economic resources will re-appear and given the mood of participants this is likely to be in the form of armed conflict. In times of resource scarcity, such as drought and floods, the likelihood of conflict rises. The returning refugees will also put immense pressure on the country's limited resources and devastated infrastructure. For this very reason it is premature for countries like Australia to consider scaling down its commitment to resettling Somalis in need. Many Somalis residing in refugee camps in Kenya and Ethiopia can not and/or will not return to Somalia as they doubt that their clan can provide them with adequate protection in a situation which remains explosive. The Kenyan government in particular, however, is keen to be rid of refugees and has systematically closed some of its camps over the past 12 months. In August last year, camps near the Kenyan coastal town of Mombassa were closed, forcing 7,000 mainly Somali refugees to relocate. Some have returned to Somalia, the majority, fearing for their personal safety, hover in the grey zone which is the border area between Kenya and Somalia. Resettlement places should be considered for many of these unwilling to return to Somalia. Some groups in particular remain more vulnerable than others in Somalia today. These groups in particular should be targeted for resettlement places: The Bantus: While Somalia is largely ethnically homogenous, there do exist a couple of minority groups who have been traditionally treated as second-class citizens by all clans in Somalia. The Bantus are the largest of these groups. They are said to be descended from slaves and are effectively excluded from all participation in public life and are discriminated against in employment and judicial proceedings. Both Amnesty International and the US State Department have noted that along with other minority groups they are subject to regular harassment, intimidation, and abuse by armed gunmen of all affiliations. They are weak militarily and have no "zone" in the present enclave divided Somalia where their physical well-being might be guaranteed. Thousands of Bantus remain in refugee camps in Kenya and many have expressed a strong desire not to go back to Somalia. Women suffered enormously during the height of the war and although incidences of direct acts of violence against women have declined during the past year, many women returning to Somalia from refugee camps remain extremely vulnerable. Many are widowed by the war and are thus in a poor social and economic position to re-establish themselves in a strong patriarchal society. Many have suffered the traumatic experience of rape and physical violence in the refugee camps and the possibility of successful psycho-social rehabilitation in present day Somalia is unlikely. In ETHIOPIA: There are mixed signals emerging from Ethiopia today. While some reports emphasise the present regime's increasing respect for basic human rights, others point to the continuation of a vicious secret war directed against ethnic minority groups. According to both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, the situation of particularly the 93

94 Refugee Council of Australia Oromo and Ogadenians in present day Ethiopia is serious. Despite promises and repeated assertions from the Tigrayan dominated Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) that it would dramatically improve Ethiopia's human rights record following the overthrow of Mengistu's Derg military regime in 1991, the arbitrary detention and torture of suspected opposition supporters are common tactics employed by the regime to break the back of regional separatist movements. Although the EPRDF has payed lip service to ethnic diversity by introducing and promoting a system of ethnic federalism, it has in reality shored up support for its position by granting patronage to those areas which support it and by waging a secret war of terror against those which do not. Government forces regularly terrorise villages in Oromo and Ogaden areas. After provoking attacks from armed separatists groups in the regions, it would then detain hundreds of Oromos or Ogadenians without charge or trial on suspicion of supporting the armed insurgency. Human Rights Watch stressed that such detainees are particularly vulnerable to extra-judicial killings, torture, rape, bear i ngs and other inhumane treatment. There have been substantiated reports of gross discrimination and human rights abuses against Oromos, Ogadenians, and other opposition groups in Addis Ababa and other larger towns. One well-known intellectual and president of the Ethiopian Teachers Association was gunned down in an assassination like killing by police officers. Because of the strict curtailment of movement, it has been difficult for Oromos and Ogadenians to flee the area. Those who have managed to escape are to be found in Djibouti, Egypt and Kenya. Somalia has become a place of refuge for many Ogadenians due to clan links. Many of these displaced people should be serious candidates for resettlement given the level of persecution and violence directed against them. Other Ethiopian refugees who fled the country following the fall of the Mengistu regime in 1991 fear returning to Ethiopia because of stories that many of those who have returned have been killed in prison or "disappeared " because of an affiliation with the Derg. Many Derg officials and supporters are currently awaiting trial for genocide and other crimes against humanity in Ethiopia but there are some human rights organisations who fear that these are taking place without proper and fair judicial procedures. The Ethiopian community in Australia stressed to RCOA that not all those linked to the Derg regime perpetrated human rights abuses. Many in the refugee camps were simply low level government officials, school teachers or university students and serious consideration should be given to these for resettlement. General Horn of Africa Settlement Concerns: All Horn of Africa communities are small in number in Australia and settlement support networks targeted towards their specific needs reflect this fact. Some attention needs to be paid to encouraging community centred networks and service provision in areas where mainstream services are culturally inappropriate or ineffective in accessing vulnerable groups. Female genital mutilation (FGM) is extremely common in all Horn of Africa countries. Women after arrival in Australia have often found it difficult to access appropriate medical information and services. By far the majority of women 94

95 Humanitarian Program spoken to by RCOA emphasised the desire to be seen by female medical practitioners and community leaders have emphasised the importance of Australian doctors in general receiving information about the nature of FGM. ii. The Great Lakes: 1997 was another very dark year in the history of the Great Lakes Region of Africa. The year began with an escalation of the conflict in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) as Laurent Kabila fought his way towards the capital, Kinshasa, and eventual control of the country. As the fighting subsided it became apparent that over 100,000 Rwandan refugees under UN protection in the region has been massacred. These events were in themselves an immense human tragedy but they also pointed starkly to a reality of the late 1990s. UNHCR appeals for assistance had fallen on deaf ears, so too had thencalls on states to honour their obligations. Just as the UN had been unable to save the men of Srebrenica in 1995, so too was the UN unable to protect the Rwandans. UNHCR relations with the Government of the DRC remains strained, with UNHCR being expelled from Goma in October Meanwhile, the Rwandan Government is blaming UNHCR for the tragedy and for complicity with opposition forces, leaving this relationship far from productive. As 1997 ended there was little to be optimistic about in the region. On 11 December an attack on Mudende Camp in Rwanda's Gisenyi Province left over 300 Congolese refugees dead and 200 others wounded. Also in the Provinces of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri, fighting between rebels and the army have prompted thousands of Rwandans to flee into DRC, only to be met by a hostile reception on the other side of the border. There have also been recent flare -ups in northern Burundi which have affected both Brundians and Rwandan refugees. The one positive sign in the region was that the civil war in Congo- Brazzaville lasted only 5 months, paving the way for a large scale repatriation exercise that commended in mid-december. While the majority of the refugees from this region are not considered resettlement candidates, UNHCR is calling for assistance with selected individuals (after they have undergone intensive screening to determine whether exclusion clauses apply) and for mixed marriage families from Rwanda and Burundi currently in Tanzania. iii. Elsewhere in Africa : RCOA would also like to draw attention to disturbing situations in the following African countries. SIERRA LEONE: Sierra Leone has been brought to the attention of the world lately with the news that the Nigerian led peace-keeping force, ECOMAG, has successfully ousted the RUF military junta which had assumed power following a coup in mid It is impossible to predict what will happen in the country now, but it appears that the Nigerians will allow the country's ousted democratically elected President, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, to return to power. How long he will be able to remain depends heavily on the military will of the 95

96 Refugee Council of Australia Nigerian led forces as RUF, with the support of Charles Taylor's adjoining Liberian regime, are likely to regroup and resume the deadly guerilla struggle which they have waged since The world of Sierra Leone's civil war is a murky one. Up until RUF took power in mid- 1997, the people of Sierra Leone were not even sure who they were fighting or why. Nobody was even sure whether the supposed rebel leader existed as actual person or myth. The rebels communicated no demands nor expressed any ideological agenda. Their preferred tactics were to avoid direct military confrontation, instead concentrating solely on civilian targets. Villages, schools, and hospitals were popular targets with rebels leaving a trail of rape, mutilation, murder, and horror in their wake. Worse, there was much evidence that government soldiers were righting the rebels during the day and joining them on their hit and run missions of terror at night. By late 1995, there more than 300 civilian casualties per month and over 1 million or more than a quarter of Sierra Leone's terrified population were displaced. Many hundreds of thousands fled into neighbouring Guinea and Liberia during the period and there are still substantial numbers of Sierra Leone refugees in those countries. Despite the immediate success of the ECOMAG forces in deposing the junta, all evidence points towards the resumption of a deadly campaign of terror by RUF as the nature of their tactics makes a decisive military victory against them near impossible. Without such victory, the grip of the re-installed President will tenuous and the people of Sierra Leone can look forward to a return to a life of death and displacement. It is recognised that there are many logistical constraints on Australian involvement in this crisis, however, it is argued that consideration should be given to UNHCR requests for assistance with resettlement. ALGERIA The Muslim holy month of Ramadan in 1998 saw an escalation in the ongoing conflict in Algeria. During Ramadan alone, over 1,000 people were killed, most victims of large village massacres that targeted women, children and the elderly. This brings to 65,000 the number of people who have been killed in the last 6 years. The Algerian Government has tried hard to blame the Islamic radicals who have conducted an insurgency campaign to replace the military controlled regime with a pure religious state. International observers consider it probable, however, that the Government may be responsible for at least some of the massacres. The current conflict in Algeria goes back to 1992 when the Government cancelled the country's first free national elections. The Islamic Salvation Front, a broad coalition of moderates and militants that capitalised on popular fury over economic hardship and political corruption, prevailed in the first round of voting and was poised to win a commanding majority in the second. Rather than accept the outcome, Algeria's generals refused to relinquish their monopoly on power and privilege. The Front was banned and its political leaders gaoled and exiled. The initiative passed to the men in arms. Pragmatists on both sides. Government and opposition, have been marginalised - or liquidated by terrorism. Into the vacuum has come the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). Their extreme interpretation of the Koran - that 96