African Union JHUMUNC

Transcription

1 African Union JHUMUNC

2 African Union Topic A: African Peacekeeping Operations Topic B: Combatting the Threat of Boko Haram Committee Overview Established 52 years ago, the African Union is a continental union consisting of 54 states in Africa. The African Union (AU) was established to achieve greater unity between African nations, to protect each nation s sovereignty and to promote democratic principles, among other objectives. The AU originated from the ideals set forth by the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and was established in Addis Ababa in May The AU today consists of almost all the African states, with the exception of Morocco. The organs of the AU include the Assembly, Executive Council, the Commission, Peace and Security Council, Pan African Parliament, Economic Social and Cultural Council, Court of Justice, Specialized Technical Committees, and financial institutions. Within the union, there exist over 2,000 official languages and a population of about 1.1 billion people. With recent atrocities such as the Rwandan genocide and the situation in Darfur, Africa has been the center of conflict for decades. Conflict management and cooperation are key issues facing the AU today. However, the AU lacks sufficient resources, including finances and member participation. Despite these challenges, the AU is increasing its capabilities and working to achieve greater effectiveness and cooperation towards a vision of a unified, self-sufficient Africa. 1 AU in a Nutshell, African Union. Web. 23 Oct. 2016, 2

3 Topic A: African Peacekeeping Operations Introduction The AU was established to unite the African states, protect each state s sovereignty, and to promote peace and stability on the continent. With an overarching goal of unity, the AU aims to promote international and regional cooperation within the framework of the UN. The AU works closely with the UN on many matters, most notably to coordinate peacekeeping efforts to maintain regional peace and security. Civil wars and rebellions throughout Africa s recent history have prompted a response from international organizations such as the UN to take action. The AU plays an increasingly critical role in the function of peacekeeping, and strives to be more independent from the UN in protecting its citizens. Formerly known as the OAU, the AU s Commission plays a central role within the AU. One of the main portfolios of the Commission is peace and security. The objectives of the AU include to promote peace, security, and stability on the continent; to promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance; and to promote and protect human and peoples' rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and other relevant human rights instruments. 2 As such, peacekeeping is one the main functions and abilities of the AU, and coordination with UN peacekeeping operations is essential. Of the 16 current UN peacekeeping operations, nine are on the African continent. Increasing instability and governmental transitions leave African countries in danger of more conflict, and 2 AU in a Nutshell, African Union. Web. 20 Sept. 2016, that is where peacekeeping operations step in. With each conflict unique, peacekeeping operations have to be specific and adaptive to their ever-changing missions. It is crucial to constantly reevaluate and assess the needs and capabilities of each peacekeeping mission. Modern crises are dynamic and require enhanced technologies, training, funding, and more from bodies such as the UN and AU to meet peacekeeping operations mandates. Historical Background Principles of Peacekeeping Peacekeeping operations (PKOs) are a function of the UN to maintain international peace and security. PKOs are deployed to support conflict prevention, peacemaking, and peacebuilding. 3 The three main principles of peacekeeping are: consent of the parties, impartiality, and the non-use of force except in self-defense or defense of the mandate. Consent of the parties means all those involved in the conflict, such as the host state, agree for a UN PKO to be deployed there. However, this does not guarantee consent from local parties, such as enemy armed groups. Consent upholds each nation s right to sovereignty. Sovereignty is the right of each state to govern and have authority over its territory and citizens. As such, PKOs do not infringe on the sovereignty of states, but rather assist states in their abilities to protect civilians and promote peacebuilding in their state. To maintain consent, impartiality is crucial so that peacekeepers do not take sides in the conflict. Their job is to carry out the mission s mandate without being partial to one party or another. Lastly, part of 3 Peace and Security, United Nations shtml 3

4 impartiality in PKOs is the non-use of force, meaning no offensive military action can be taken unless in the self-defense of the peacekeepers, or if it is in the mission s mandate. Certain volatile situations are given a robust mandate by the UN, authorizing them to use all necessary means to deter forceful attempts to disrupt the political process, protect civilians under imminent threat of physical attack, and/or assist the national authorities in maintaining law and order. 4 Force is always used as a last resort in peacekeeping. The consequences of using force are immense and unforeseen. This third principle of peacekeeping is among the most disputed aspects of peacekeeping today. Contemporary conflicts are dynamic, with multiple armed groups and terrorist organizations presenting harm to populations. The protection of civilians is central to many PKO mandates, and often peacekeepers are left empty-handed in the face of violent attacks, unable to protect those they are sent to protect. The UN is constantly faced with the question of whether to allow peacekeepers to use force to prevent the loss of both peacekeeper and civilian lives. United Nations Mandates Peacekeeping operations are deployed based on mandates from the Security Council. In order to approve a mission, nine of the 15 members of the Council must vote in favor, without a veto from one of the five permanent members. The Security Council can vote to extend or end a mission as it sees fit. The Security Council has authorized over 70 PKOs since its beginnings after the 4 Principles of UN Peacekeeping, United Nations Peacekeeping. Web. 17 August, ples.shtml Cold War. 5 PKOs can be mandated to prevent the spread of conflict, facilitate peaceful transitions after a ceasefire, and lead states towards a stable government based on democratic principles. 6 Peacekeepers are also tasked with peacebuilding activities such as disarmament, electoral guidance, security sector reform, and the promotion of economic and social development. Peacekeepers take into account the role of women in the political sphere, and often have specific mandates to protect women against sexual violence during conflict. They are also charged with protecting children, including preventing the recruitment of child soldiers in armed conflict. Peacekeepers help with voter registration during elections as well, such as in the mission in Cambodia under the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). 7 Mandates therefore involve specific country instructions mixed with a wide range of thematic issues discussed in monumental Security Council resolutions such as 1325, 1612, and ,9,10 5 Post Cold-War Surge, United Nations shtml 6 Mandates and the legal basis for peacekeeping, United Nations ndates.shtml 7 United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, United Nations. Web. 17 Aug. 2016, ac.htm 8 Resolution 1325 (2000), United Nations Security Council, 31 October pdf?OpenElement 9 Resolution 1612 (2005), United Nations Security Council, 26 July pdf?OpenElement 10 Resolution 1774 (2006), United Nations Security Council, 28 April

5 Financing The General Assembly (GA) is in charge of financing peacekeeping. Through its Fifth Committee, the GA determines and oversees the budget for peacekeeping. 11 The GA divides the finances of peacekeeping based on specific scales of wealth for each Member State. Under Article 17 of the UN Charter, all states are required to pay their share towards peacekeeping. 12 The permanent members of the Security Council pay a majority of the budget, as they have a special responsibility towards international peace and security. 13 Member States also provide, voluntarily, the personnel required for PKOs. Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan send the most troops to UN peacekeeping missions, while the United States, Japan, and France are the top funders. 14 Peacekeepers are paid a salary both by their home government as well as the UN. This steady income is often an incentive for people in lesser-developed states to become peacekeepers. The first UN PKO, the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), was deployed in 1948 during the start of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The first PKO in ny.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n06/331/99/pdf/n pdf?OpenElement 11 Background Resources, General Assembly of the United Nations: Administrative and Budgetary-Fifth Committee. Web. 17 Aug. 2016, 12 Financing peacekeeping, United Nations ing.shtml 13 Role of the General Assembly, United Nations 14 Danielle Renwick, Peace Operations in Africa, Council on Foreign Relations, 15 May Web. 17 Aug. 2016, Africa, the UN Operation in Congo (ONUC), was deployed in There have been 23 PKOs in Africa since then, more than any other region, ranging from Western to Central to East Africa. 80 percent of all peacekeepers are currently deployed on the African continent. 16 Past operations have set a precedent for many current PKOs, however their weaknesses highlight many of the issues still plaguing UN and African peacekeeping today. Some current operations are even in states where a PKO was previously deployed, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR). Past African PKOs The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) represented a prominent UN PKO, although it was mainly known for its failures to carry out its mandate. In Rwanda, many human rights abuses occurred as peacekeeping troops failed to intervene and withdrew in the midst of the Rwandan Genocide; due to this lack of action, many argue that peacekeeping troops failed to prevent genocide against the Tutsis. In 1990, fighting broke out in the border of Rwanda and Uganda in a civil war between the Hutu government and the Tutsi Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF). The UN became involved in 1993, when Rwanda and Uganda requested the deployment of military observers along the common border to prevent the military use of the area by RPF ; UNAMIR was established and stationed at the Uganda border to make sure 15 Peacekeeping operations timeline, United Nations tionslist.pdf 16 Peacekeeping Fact Sheet, United Nations cs/factsheet.shtml 5

6 military assistance did not reach Rwanda. 17 In 1994, as they were coming back from peace talks in Tanzania, both presidents of Rwanda and Burundi were killed; setting off a tidal wave of political and ethnic killings: the Prime Minister, cabinet ministers, and UNAMIR peacekeepers were among the first victims. 18 The Security Council, through Resolution 912, reduced UNAMIR's numbers from 2,548 to 270 and although Resolution 918 imposed an arms embargo against Rwanda, called for urgent international action and increased UNAMIR's strength to up to 5,500 troops, no action or assistance arrived for about six months. 19 Though the UN and other international forces knew that the Rwandan forces were killing Tutsis, they withdrew troops and refused any joint intervention to save Rwandan lives. 20 An independent inquiry conducted in 1999 by then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan concluded that the overriding failure in international community s response was the lack of resources and political will, as well as errors of judgment as to the nature of the events in Rwanda and expressed deep remorse over the failure to prevent the genocide. 21 This passiveness and lack of intervention on the UN and peacekeeping troops part prolonged the genocide and led to much more deaths. The Rwandan genocide is 17 Rwanda- UNAMIR Background, United Nations. Web. 17 Aug. 2016, htm 18 Rwanda- UNAMIR Background, United Nations. Web. 17 Aug. 2016, htm 19 Ibid. 20 Ignoring Genocide, Human Rights Watch. Web. 17 Aug. 2016, 01.htm 21 Ibid., Rwanda- UNAMIR Background often viewed as one of the pinnacle failures of not only peacekeeping and the UN, but the international community as a whole for failing to prevent the horrible genocide. Another PKO in Sierra Leone riddled peacekeepers in the mission with accusations of murder and other human rights offenses against local populations. Civil war broke out in Sierra Leone in 1991 when fighters of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) launched a war from the east of the country near the border with Liberia to overthrow the [Joseph Momoh] government. With the support of the Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Sierra Leone's army tried at first to defend the government but, the following year, the army itself overthrew the government. 22 The fighting led to the establishment of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in 1999, in which the Security Council deployed 6,000 military personnel, including 260 military observers, to assist the Government and the parties in carrying out provisions of the Lome peace agreement. 23 Though ECOMOG and UNAMSIL are in large part known as successful by resulting in fair national elections, disarmament of thousands of former fighters, rebuilding the police force, and more, they have also been plagued with human rights offenses. The United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) is also implicated in human rights abuses. MONUSCO started in 1999 and continues through today. MONUSCO 22 Sierra Leone- UNAMSIL- Background, United Nations, Web. 17 Aug. 2016, background.html 23 Sierra Leone- UNAMSIL- Background, United Nations, Web. 17 Aug. 2016, background.html 6

7 was established following the Rwandan genocide, in which Hutus fled to the DRC, which had a large ethnic Tutsi population. 24 In 1998, fighting began between rebel forces and the Laurent Désiré Kabila government. In response, the Security Council called for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of foreign forces, and urged states not to interfere in the country s internal affairs. 25 The peacekeeping mission first began under Resolution 1279 to maintain the ceasefire and to assist with local issues, such as ensuring fair elections and rule of law. MONUSCO s tasks expanded to include the protection of civilians, humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders under imminent threat of physical violence and to support the Government of the DRC in its stabilization and peace consolidation efforts. 26 Despite how successful MONUSCO is perceived to be, peacekeepers actions in the region have negated such success. Troops have been accused of many crimes, including child abuse and sexual assault, among others. Despite the many peace building and protective functions of the mission, sexual assault allegations against peacekeepers place MONUSCO and UN peacekeeping in a negative light. Peacekeepers from the DRC are also the main perpetrators of sexual abuse against young girls in the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). 27 Abuse allegations are 24 Background, MONUSCO. Web. 17 Aug. 2016, 25 MONUSCO Background, United Nations o/background.shtml 26 Ibid. 27 New allegations of sexual abuse emerge against UN peacekeepers in the Central African Republic, UN News Centre, 4 February Web. 17 Aug. 2016, unfortunately common in African peacekeeping, prompting call for justice and to end impunity by the UN and troopcontributing countries. AU Peacekeeping Similar to the UN Security Council, the AU mandates peace support operations through its Peace and Security Council (PSC). 28 Unlike UN PKOs however, there is no need for AU mission to remain impartial. AU PKOs are set to launch under the conditions of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. The PSC created the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), a set of institutions that includes the African Standby Force (ASF). The ASF is a permanent reserve of peacekeepers ready for rapid deployment. 29 The ASF serves as a quick reaction capacity to respond swiftly to crises rather than go through the lethargic process of mandating a full-on UN or AU PKO. The ASF s headquarters are in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and its Continental Logistics Base is in Douala, Cameroon. 30 The ASF has multiple Standby Forces and Brigades in different regions throughout Africa including the North, East, and West, ready to intervene in crises when needed. 63#.V6tETGVSjdk 28 Peace and Security Council, African Union Peace and Security, 22 November Web. 17 Aug. 2016, secretariat-psc 29 The African Standby Force (ASF), African Union Peace and Security, 28 May Web. 17 Aug. 2016, african-standby-force-asf-amani-africa-1 30 Decision on the Report of the Fifth Ordinary Session of the Specialized Technical Committee on Defence, Security, and Safety, African Union. Web. 17 Aug. 2016, 7

8 Issues with Peacekeeping In the past, the AU has conducted two PKOs in Burundi and Sudan. The AU currently has a mission of more than 20,000 personnel in Somalia called AMISOM, as well as a joint mission with the UN in Darfur known as UNAMID, one of the largest current UN PKOs. Past peacekeeping operations have shown the separation between mandates and reality on the ground. 31 The objectives laid out in mission mandates may not be realistic when the mission is actually deployed. This disconnect leads to poor guidance and training once missions are deployed. Broad and vague mission objectives leave peacekeepers lost when they reach the ground with minimal instructions. Peacekeepers should be well-versed on the history and root causes of the conflict where the PKO is deployed. For this reason, interaction and communication between host communities and peacekeeping personnel is critical. Past operations lacked cultural sensitivity when in the field as well. Knowing the local area s culture, traditions, and way of life is crucial to providing adaptive support. This disconnect between mandate and mission has led to the deaths of scores of people in the presence of UN PKOs. In South Sudan, despite a 7,500 plus personnel presence, peacekeepers were unable to contain the violence that destroyed the region and continues to plague the country to this day. 32 Ensuing violence in the midst 31 Robert Feldman, Problems Plaguing the African Union Peacekeeping Forces, Defense & Security Analysis, September Vol. 24, No. 3, pp Web. 17 Aug. 2016, ms-plaguing-the-au-forces.pdf 32 Sudarsan Raghavan, Record number of U.N. peacekeepers fails to stop African wars, The Washington Post, 3 January Web. 17 Aug. 2016, inadequate resources in peacekeeping camps leads to failure by the UN to prevent conflict. Enhanced training, resources, and mandates are needed to meet the modern challenges of African peacekeeping. Leadership Well-trained leadership and administration is another hurdle of contemporary peacekeeping. Those in command are often not well-versed in the mission mandate, leading to a misunderstanding with the mission s entire chain of command. 33 Force Commanders and Heads of Missions are in charge of a mission s operations. They are responsible for conveying information on the ground to the UN and Security Council, so those in charge of the mandate can make the necessary provisions. Peacekeepers are also partial towards the central command, ignoring the PKO leadership in favor for their home government. More efficient training programs are in need to ensure loyalty to peacekeeping missions, and to prevent peacekeepers from being partial while deployed on a mission. Equipment Due to the lack of funding for peacekeeping in general but even more so for African PKOs, missions do not have the necessary technology and equipment to carry out their mandate. Technologies such as helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles number-of-un-peacekeepers-fails-to-stop-african- wars/2014/01/03/17ed e ef e_story.html 33 Jean-Marie Guéhenno and Jake Sherman Command and Control Arrangements in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, International Forum- Challenges of Peacekeeping Operations, 9 November Web. 17 Aug. 2016, ~v~Command_and_Control_Arrangements_in_ United_Nations_Peacekeeping_Operations.pdf 8

9 (UAVs) provide critical surveillance and greatly assist intelligence capabilities. 34 AU mission technologies are inadequate to tackle the problems at hand. Communication equipment is also critical to the success of PKOs. In the AU Darfur Mission (AMIS), military maps are missing from equipment packages. 35 An imbalance in proper equipment also led to an 18-man AMIS patrol and 20-man rescue team being captured in the fighting in West Darfur. 36 Transmitters, receivers, etc. are crucial for commanders to rely information to troops, and vice versa. Radios convey information to headquarters as well. Vehicles are always in need as they tend to be the target of armed attacks in PKOs and are important for transportation between bases. Finally, with enhanced equipment comes the need to train peacekeeping personnel on this new technology. Courses designed to train and familiarize peacekeepers on new technologies should be integrated into predeployment training programs. Contemporary Conditions With the overwhelming majority of peacekeepers deployed in Africa, peacekeeping remains in need of increased assistance and resources. Nine of the sixteen current PKOs take place on the African continent. However, AU and UN missions are often ill-trained, ill-equipped, and underfunded. Linguistic and cultural barriers pose an issue when African peacekeepers from various ethnic backgrounds are deployed in different African states. Given the dynamic and steadily growing nature of 34 Contingent Owned Equipment, United Nations rt/equipment.shtml 35 Ibid., Problems Plaguing the African Union Peacekeeping Forces 36 Ibid. conflicts in Africa, peacekeeping is an essential tool for maintaining peace and stability on the continent. Therefore, it is incredibly important for African peacekeeping forces to be stable and reliable. UNAMID The AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) is a joint PKO between the UN and AU in Darfur, Sudan established in UNAMID is mandated to protect civilians as well as contributing to security for humanitarian assistance, monitoring and verifying implementation of agreements, assisting an inclusive political process, contributing to the promotion of human rights and the rule of law, and monitoring and reporting on the situation along the borders with Chad and CAR. Recently, the Security Council voted to extend UNAMID s mission through June There are currently over 19,000 uniformed peacekeeping personnel in Darfur, tasked with protecting civilians from conflict as well as ensuring humanitarian access to vulnerable populations. 38 AMISOM The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is a peace support operation by the AU with approval from the UN. It was created in 2007 to support transitional government structures, train police and security forces, and reduce the 37 Security Council extends mandates of UN peacekeeping operations in Darfur, Golan and Mali, UN News Centre, 29 June Web. 17 Aug. 2016, 57#.V6tHqGVSjdk 38 UNAMID Facts and Figures, United Nations /facts.shtml 9

10 threat of the terrorist group Al Shabaab. 39 There are currently over 22,000 peacekeeping personnel in AMISOM, and its mandate is through May In addition to the two main PKOs by the AU, the UN has PKOs in South Sudan (UNMISS), the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), Mali (MINUSMA), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), Cote d Ivoire (UNOCI), and more. PKOs in Africa are deployed to monitor ceasefires, ensure smooth governmental transitions, and protect civilians from the threat of armed insurgent groups. 41 While some PKOs are considered successes, many of the current PKOs in Africa have not proved to stabilize the region. Peacekeepers are continually blamed for failing to stop massive attacks, and even guilty of sexual abuse against civilians near their camps. Such problems and abuses place UN and AU peacekeeping in a bad light, and highlight the immense efforts to be taken by the international community to improving overall peacekeeping. As one of the UN s primary functions, peacekeeping must prove to be effective in order to further the UN s goals of maintaining peace and security. Past UN and International Action In 2000, the Secretary-Generalappointed UN Panel on Peace Operations released the Brahimi Report, which illustrated the challenges to peacebuilding 39 AMISOM Mandate, AMISOM. Web. 17 Aug. 2016, 40 Security Council extends African Union mission in Somalia, UN News Centre, 7 July Web. 17 Aug. 2016, 11#.V6tJs2VSjdk 41 Ibid., Peace Operations in Africa. and peacekeeping and addressed the challenges to implementation. 42 The findings of the Panel in the Report reiterated the importance of the principles of peacekeeping. The Report touched on key issues within peacekeeping such as how to deploy a robust mission with realistic mandates. The Panel recommended new headquarters capacity for information management and strategic analysis to improve the operational capacity of mission HQs. An important feature of the Brahimi Report was its call for a definition of a rapid and effective deployment capacity that would serve as a ready-to-deploy reactionary force should immediate conflict arise, similar to the AU s ASF. The Panel also recommended the establishment of Integrated Mission Task Forces to help plan and support missions in coordination with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS). The Brahimi Report was monumental in calling on states to renew their commitment to the ideals of peacekeeping and share a common vision for the future of the work of the UN. 43 The Security Council later adopted Resolution 1327 on the effective implementation of the Brahimi Report. Among the key points the resolution were the strengthening of relationships between PKOs and field missions as well as with other UN bodies Brahimi Report - Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (2000), United Nations. Web. 17 Aug. 2016, rt.shtml 43 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, United Nations General Assembly, 21 August l=a/55/ Reports United Nations Peacekeeping. Web. 17 Aug. 2016, 10

11 One of the most important Security Council resolutions ever adopted is Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security. 45 This resolution was instrumental in addressing the disproportionate impact of conflict on women and their unique role in the peacebuilding process. It calls for more active participation and full involvement of women in each step of the peace process. Most notable is the need for more female peacekeepers and peacekeeping personnel. Security Council Resolution 1820 explicitly linked sexual violence as a tactic of war and constituted sexual violence as a war crime. 46 As a follow up, Resolution 1888 was adopted to mandate that PKOs protect women and children from sexual violence during times of armed conflict. The resolution also called on the Secretary- General to appoint Special Representatives and Advisers on Sexual Violence in Conflict. 47 Specifically on African peacekeeping, the Secretary-General issued a Report in 2004 on the Enhancement of African peacekeeping capacity. 48 The report noted the role of African regional and subregional organizations in peacekeeping in Africa as well as the role of the ASF as a flexible response system. The Report recognized the importance of UN support to the AU in its peacekeeping capacities as the Secretary-General stated, Africa is now the 45 Women, peace and security, United Nations ps.shtml 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 48 Enhancement of African peacekeeping capacity, United Nations General Assembly, 30 November l=a/59/591 major theatre of peacekeeping operations. 49 In his 2009 Report on Support to African Union peacekeeping operations authorized by the UN, the Secretary-General elaborated on the importance of communication between the UN and AU, especially in terms of financial and resource contributions. 50 The Security Council is the principle UN actor in mandated and extending the mandate of a PKO. Similarly, the AU s Peace and Security Council regularly holds meetings on its missions such as AMISOM. PKOs are often mandated in a Resolution for a period of 6 months or one year, and their mandates are extended each subsequent year if needed. Over time, missions can change their mandates and take on new goals, such as incorporating the protection of civilians. Missions can change names to take on new meanings as well, such as the transition of MONUC of MONUSCO in the DRC. Questions a Resolution Should Answer 1. How can cooperation be strengthened between the AU and the UN? The UN and AU play mutually beneficial roles when it comes to peacekeeping. Numerous resolutions have confirmed the importance of a strong relationship between the two bodies. How can the UN better provide resources and guidance to the AU s Peace and Security Council? What mechanisms can the AU use to better support the UN s PKOs in providing information? 49 Ibid. 50 Support to African Union peacekeeping operations authorized by the United Nations, United Nations General Assembly, 18 September l=a/64/359 11

12 2. How can PKOs adapt to the changing nature of the conflicts on the ground? Dynamic conflicts in Africa range from civil wars to terrorist insurgencies. How can peacekeeping personnel adapt to the changing nature of violence? What kinds of capacities, logistical or technical, are needed to serve their missions? 3. How can States be motivated to provide more support to peacekeeping? PKOs are drastically under-resourced and underfunded, especially in Africa. Without the funds necessary, PKOs cannot properly carry out their mission. What can the UN and AU do to ensure States are providing all they can towards peacekeeping budgets? 4. What needs to be done to prevent human rights abuses by peacekeepers? Peacekeepers are deployed to help populations from human rights abuses, not be the perpetrators themselves. Widespread allegations of sexual abuse plague the reputation of blue helmets. What can the AU and UN do to ensure such abuse does not happen? 5. How should peacekeepers be held accountable for human rights abuses? The prevalence of sexual abuse cases by peacekeepers has been considered a cancer in the UN system by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. Should the UN be responsible for prosecuting peacekeepers guilty of crimes? Or should the peacekeepers home government hold them accountable? 6. How can emergency response be more effective in times of grave crisis? When a conflict rises to the point of genocide or crimes against humanity, the PKO deployed in the state is faced with a daunting challenge. What capacities, such as the AU s ASF, can be utilized to respond to emergencies? How can the capabilities of the ASF be strengthened? 7. What does your country contribute to peacekeeping? Every country in the UN has a responsibility to not only fund the peacekeeping budget, but also be involved in the assessment of mission mandates, as well as send troops. What does your African country do in terms of troop and police contributions? 8. What are some solutions to the major challenges of peacekeeping from the past? Past atrocities such as Rwanda showcase the weaknesses of the UN system and UN peacekeeping. What lessons can be learned from these events, how has peacekeeping evolved since then, and what still needs to be done to ensure peacekeeping is as efficient and effective as it can be? Bloc Positions Figure 1: Africa Map (See Appendix) 51 Northern Africa States in Northern Africa face a variety of threats with unstable governments and increasingly powerful terrorist organizations. Northern African states share a common language, Arabic, and a common religion, Islam. There are a few peacekeeping operations in North Africa, including the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), and UNAMID in Darfur. MINURSO was established in 1991 to monitor the ceasefire and conduct a 51 Africa Regions Map ThingLink. Web. 17 Aug. 2016,

13 referendum to allow the people of Western Sahara to choose between integration with Morocco or independence. 52 With just 460 military personnel, MINURSO is one of the smallest UN PKOs. Although organization of the referendum has not been successful, the ceasefire has been maintained quite peacefully. 53 Peacekeepers in the Western Sahara continue to work to reduce the threat of mines and IEDs in the region. UNISFA is a PKO in the Abyei region of Sudan, deployed since 2011 with a total force of 4,779 personnel. UNISFA is mandated to protect civilians, ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid, as well as demilitarize the disputed border region between Sudan and South Sudan. 54 The Ethiopian Army is the largest contributor to the mission in terms of personnel. UNAMID is one of the UN s largest PKOs, in coordination with the AU. The mission was established in 2007 to support the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement and protect civilians. UNAMID has an extensive and important mandate, including support for the peace process and good offices, security, rule of law, governance, human rights, and humanitarian assistance. 55 With 20,639 total uniformed personnel, UNAMID continues to be a key PKO in one of Africa s most conflict-ridden regions. 56 Western Africa States in Western Africa also have several important PKOS, including the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the UN Operation in Côte d Ivoire (UNOCI), and the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). MINUSMA is one of the most recent PKOS, being deployed in It is also one of the largest, with over 13,000 total personnel. 57 The mission was established to support the transitional political process in the country, but has shifted to ensure the protection of civilians in the wake of multiple insurgencies. MINUSMA is known for peacekeepers successful use of new technologies, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). It is also known for having the most peacekeeper fatalities of any PKO, with 44 peacekeeping personnel killed in Mali since UNOCI was established in Côte d Ivoire to monitor the political crisis since UNOCI has a robust mandate, meaning peacekeepers can use all necessary means to carry out their mandate to protect civilians from the threat of violence. UNOCI has a large disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) program and works to monitor the arms embargo in the country. 59 With about 4, MINURSO Mandate, United Nations o/mandate.shtml 53 Ibid. 54 UNISFA Mandate, United Nations mandate.shtml 55 UNAMID Mandate, United Nations /mandate.shtml 56 UNAMID Facts and Figures, United Nations /facts.shtml 57 MINUSMA, United Nations Peacekeeping. Web. 17 Aug. 2016, ma/ 58 Peter Dörrie, The World s Deadliest Peacekeeping Mission, War is Boring, 19 January Web. deadliest-peacekeeping-mission e5d5acf#.rl1nhy1oa 59 UNOCI Mandate, United Nations Peacekeeping. Web. 17 Aug. 2016, mandate.shtml 13

14 peacekeepers, Côte d Ivoire has been considered successful thus far. UNMIL was established in 2003 with 3,279 personnel, with the protection of civilians at the priority of its mandate. The mission is tasked with assisting justice and security institution reform, as well as humanitarian assistance support. 60 Strengthening of security agents and national police is important for the state of Liberia to exercise its sovereignty and practice the rule of law. Central Africa States in Central Africa have long endured the brutal repercussions of conflict as state and government systems struggle to establish their authority. Some of the largest peacekeeping missions- both in personnel and budget- are in Central Africa such as the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in CAR (MINUSCA), the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), and MONUSCO in the DRC. MINUSCA has only been in place for two years but has about 13,000 total personnel, continuing on the previous mission of MISCA. 61 MINUSCA has the protection of civilians at the core of its mandate, as well as support for the transitional process of the State authority. 62 CAR has long faced a religious conflict between Muslim and Christian militias vying for land and power. MINUSCA is 60 UNMIL Mandate, United Nations Peacekeeping. Web. 17 Aug. 2016, mandate.shtml 61 MINUSCA Facts and Figures, United Nations a/facts.shtml 62 MINUSCA, United Nations Peacekeeping. Web. 17 Aug. 2016, a/index.shtml well-known for sexual abuse scandals by the hands of peacekeepers. There have been at least 57 reported claims of misconduct by peacekeepers. 63 The UN has repeatedly condemned the abuses, citing the zerotolerance policy of tolerance towards human rights abuses by peacekeepers. Southern and Central Africa While there are no PKOs in the regions of Southern or Eastern Africa, states in this region play an important role in African peacekeeping. Ethiopia and Rwanda are two of the largest troop-contributing countries (TCCs), after Bangladesh and Pakistan. 64 Most of the peacekeeping forces in African states are African locals. In the past, there have been PKOs in Mozambique, Rwanda, and Uganda. 65 Conclusion Peacekeeping is an essential tool of the UN to assist states in navigating the difficult path from conflict to peace. 66 The major presence of peacekeeping in Africa places the AU in a crucial position to take greater action and improve effectiveness in 63 UN receives new allegations of rape by Minusca peacekeepers in CAR, The Guardian, 19 August Web Troop and police contributors archive ( ), United Nations Peacekeeping. Web. 17 Aug. 2016, cs/contributors_archive.shtml 65 Past peacekeeping operations, United Nations html 66 What is peacekeeping?, United Nations keeping.shtml 14

15 the maintenance of peace and security on the continent. African states are in a critical moment in history in terms of development and conflict. Conflict-torn areas are in need of more assistance now than ever as violence in the region is dynamic. Effective peacekeeping in Africa is essential to achieving international peace and security. There have been many challenges in the past, and new challenges that challenge the traditional function of peacekeeping. In every step of the system, there is work to be done. From the Security Council mandated missions, to states upholding their responsibilities, to peacekeepers on the ground- changes must be made to adapt to the contemporary conditions of AU peacekeeping. Topic B: Combatting the Threat of Boko Haram Introduction The AU was formed from the OAU, established on 25 May 1963 from the 32 newly independent African states. The OAU operated based on the 1991 Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community- also known as the Abuja Treaty- and on the OAU Charter. The AU s goal is to continue the OAU s work, while it would additionally accelerate the process of integration in Africa, support the empowerment of African states in the global economy and address the multifaceted social, economic and political problems facing the continent. 67 While the last century has seen a tremendous increase in African quality of life, from independence from colonizers to the strengthening of economic systems, the AU has recently been seriously tested by a variety of pressures, including that of terrorist organizations. Boko Haram, a terrorist group based out of Nigeria with ties to the Islamic State, has been a major challenge to Nigeria and neighboring states, to the AU, and to the world. 68 In the last two years, their deadly and bloody attacks have attracted a large following, and an even larger group of enemies. However, Boko Haram continues to terrorize West Africa, despite the Nigerian government s commitment to eradicating the group. Boko Haram seeks to destroy the governments in place and kill all of those who do not comply with its wishes, 67 History of the OAU and AU, African Union. Web. 2 August The Historical Background of Boko Haram, Genocide Watch, Web, 24 February

16 meaning that a vast majority of West Africans are in danger. Boko Haram groups have become commonplace in the area, and with the group s growing power, are not expected to subside soon. The most alarming part of Boko Haram is the fact that over the last several years, it has risen to become the largest source of violence in Nigeria by a wide margin. This violence has led to a spillover effect as refugees flee the country in search of peace. Boko Haram s continued growth has also led it to expand into different nations as well, and in recent years has attacked Chad, Cameroon, and Niger. Boko Haram has become a major threat in West Africa, and hundreds of thousands are in danger. Figure 2: See Appendix Fatalities in Nigeria from Social Violence, by Category, Historical Background Inception Nigeria s history and evolution over time have made it the perfect breeding place for an organization such as Boko Haram. In the early 19th century, prior to Nigeria s birth as a nation, jihadi groups brought Islam to the Hausa majority in the north. 70 This population resisted British colonization and the Christian missionaries it brought with them, especially because these missionaries imposed Western education on the local populations. Even after Nigeria achieved statehood in 1960, the North remained primarily Muslim, while the South was Christian. Islamic fundamentalist movements emerged in Northern Nigeria 69 Fatalities in Nigeria from Social Violence, by Category, , Nigeria Social Violence Project, Web Ibid., The Historical Background of Boko Haram. with leaders like Mohammed Marwa, known as Maitatsine. Maitatsine denounced Western education and claimed that reading any book except the Koran was sinful, and lead his followers in a series of riots during the 1970s and 1980s. 71 These armed clashes led to the deaths of about 4,000 Nigerians, including Marwa himself. In 1999, Nigeria drafted a constitution that gave more power to states and allowed them to impose Sharia law at will. This step away from secular government forever scarred Nigeria, which is still divided between an Islamic North and a Christian South. The deep religious rift and high levels of corruption have left Nigeria without proper infrastructure. 72 The North has especially struggled, and today much of the North badly trails the South in terms of education and wealth due to a complex list of historical, cultural and other factors. 73 Out of the religious tensions, economic disparity, weak governance, and corruption in Nigeria arose Boko Haram. 74 Inspired by Maitatsine, a charismatic Muslim cleric Mohammed Yusuf formed Boko Haram in Maiduguri in He set up a religious complex, which included a mosque and an Islamic school. 75 Yusuf had a strict, fundamentalist interpretation of the Qur an, and traced back Nigeria's problems to the imposition of Western values on Nigerians by British colonialists. When many poor Muslim families from the surrounding regions enrolled their children at Yusuf s school, he began to spread his message of Islamic extremism. Boko Haram began in 2003 when some of Yusuf s followers withdrew to a remote province in Northeast Nigeria. There, they fought with 71 Ibid. 72 Ibid., FACTSHEET: Explaining Nigeria s Boko Haram and its violent insurgency. 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid., The Historical Background of Boko Haram. 75 Ibid., Who are Nigeria s Boko Haram Islamists? 16

17 authorities, and while Yusuf denies having lead them, this has become known as the first instance of Boko Haram violence. 76 Rise to Power For the next several years, the group kept a relatively low profile. They accomplished occasional attacks until 2009, when they launched attacks against police stations and other government offices in Maiduguri. In response, authorities from a task force confronted Yusuf s followers. This led to an uprising against the military that lasted five days and ended with Yusuf s capture, imprisonment, and death, as well as the deaths of over 800 people. 77 Following the uprising, Boko Haram laid low for a year. Yusuf s right-hand man, Abubakar Shekau, announced himself as the new leader in a video posted in July Later that month, Boko Haram released a second video expressing solidarity with al-qaida and threatening the United States. 79 Boko Haram re-emerged much stronger, and gained notoriety for more violent attacks with more advanced technology, such as their increasing use of IEDs. Their first IED was used in an attack in June Since then, the group has also utilized vehicleborne IEDs (VBIEDs) and female suicide attacks. On 26 August 2011, Boko Haram performed its first attack against a Western target. The group bombed the UN headquarters in the capital city of Abuja, killing at least 23 and injuring over A statement released by Boko Haram following the attack announced that they would continue to target Western and Nigerian government forces. 76 Ibid., FACTSHEET: Explaining Nigeria s Boko Haram and its violent insurgency. 77 Ibid. 78 Ibid., Boko Haram. 79 Ibid. 80 Ibid. Attacks continued to increase in violence and frequency. In 2013, the group also added kidnappings to their arsenal when a splinter faction of Boko Haram, called Ansaru, began kidnapping foreigners. The main sect followed suit, kidnapping a French family of seven in February Since then, kidnapping has become one of its characteristic tactics, especially that of schoolgirls and women. They intend to convert these women and girls to Islam and marry them off to their fighters. Boko Haram used this new method as a template for their most infamous attack, the Chibok Schoolgirls Kidnapping. Aims Boko Haram, which translates to Western education is forbidden, is an Islamic extremist organization based in Nigeria that dedicates itself to eradicating Western ideology and establishing a caliphate with allegiances to the Islamic State terrorist organization. 82 The group is considered by Genocide Watch to be a genocidal criminal movement [which] has vowed to destroy every Christian school in Nigeria, and to carry out terrorist attacks on Nigerian government police and government officials. 83 The group opposes all religious groups other than those which follow the strict, militaristic, by-the-book form of Islam that they follow, and even see more contemporary Muslims as non- 81 Ibid., FACTSHEET: Explaining Nigeria s Boko Haram and its violent insurgency. 82 Boko Haram at a Glance, Amnesty International Charity Unlimited, Web, 29 January o-haram-glance/ 83 The Historical Background of Boko Haram, Genocide Watch, Web. 17

18 believers. Boko Haram is opposed to the Nigerian government because of its secular nature, and have over time begun to target people associated with it, in an effort to overthrow the government and replace it with a regime based on Sharia law. 84 The group is so opposed to non-sharia governments that it has made it haram (forbidden under religion) to participate in any Western activities, including voting in elections, wearing shirts and trousers or receiving a secular education. Instead of receiving secular education, students are taught in approved schools which serve as recruiting grounds for future jihadists. 85 Boko Haram has two main focuses: creating an Islamic state, and releasing Boko Haram prisoners held by the Nigerian government. While Boko Haram has allied with the Islamic State terrorist organization, its energy has been concentrated within West Africa, where it has preyed on already unstable conditions within the area. 86 Operational Method of Boko Haram Created in 2002 in the northeastern part of Nigeria, Boko Haram has quickly risen to be one of the world s most notorious terrorist organizations. It currently holds the most territory now captured by an army, and produces almost daily attacks 84 Boko Haram, National Counter Terrorism Center, Web Farouk Chothia, Who are Nigeria s Boko Haram Islamists?, British Broadcasting Corporation, Web, 4 May Mike Smith, FACTSHEET: Explaining Nigeria s Boko Haram and its violent insurgency, Africa Check, Web. within Nigeria s borders. 87 While it was originally founded as an effort to combat Western education, the group has recently changed its mission. Since 2009, Boko Haram has taken a more combative approach, with an emphasis on creating a caliphate and destroying their opponents. The group has been fighting the Nigerian state through an escalating campaign of bomb attacks, hit-and-run raids of towns and villages and the capture and occupation of larger towns in the north-east of the country. Boko Haram has battled over the last few years to obtain and maintain territory in northeastern Nigeria, and has had great success in the last two years. In some of these occupied areas, residents are kept in certain houses and are required to obtain permission from fighters in order to travel. As of 2015, Boko Haram troops were numbered at about 15, In attacks, troops ride in on motorcycles, round-up male villagers, and execute either all of the men of fighting age, or only those with links to the government. Women and children are occasionally kidnapped. In 2014, Boko Haram became infamous for [attacking] a government secondary boarding school in Chibok, Borno state, which lead to a worldwide outburst against the organization also saw the organization s biggest gains: they saw an escalation in attacks with at least 230 raids and bombings in which at least 4,000 civilians were killed. 89 Boko Haram continues to operate in Western and North-Central Africa, and since 87 Ibid., Who are Nigeria s Boko Haram Islamists? 88 Ibid, Boko Haram at a Glance. 89 Nigeria Chibok abductions: What we know about the missing girls, British Broadcasting Corporation, Web, 14 August

19 the Chibok attack, has pledged its allegiance to the Islamic State and carries attacks out in its name. While it would be easy to assume that such a powerful organization would be well organized, this is not entirely the case. The group has an umbrella-like structure, in which true organization only exists at the top of the ranks. The lower ranks are divided into cells, which operate freely, recruiting soldiers and carrying out raids at their own will and expense, except for in the case of larger attacks. For this reason, it is difficult to estimate the exact number of soldiers, how much they are under the control of the leaders of Boko Haram, and thus, what the group s next move will be. This umbrella structure also makes their defeat very difficult to accomplish, because it makes the organization extremely versatile. 90 There has been much confusion regarding Boko Haram s financing. The group is now understood to have financed itself through illegal activities, such as bank robberies and ransom kidnappings. While there have been accusations of political sponsorship, it is impossible to know the legitimacy of these claims due to the complexity of the group s structure. Boko Haram has also been linked to other terrorist organizations. Since 2004, small groups of Nigerian Islamists have been traveling to Mali in order to train with what would later evolve into groups like Al- Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). It has been implied that Boko Haram and AQIM have directly trained together and that Boko Haram fighters have formed links with Al-Shabaab. Most recently, and most publicly, Boko Haram announced its support for the Islamic State, which has named Boko Haram the Islamic State West Africa Province Ibid., FACTSHEET: Explaining Nigeria s Boko Haram and its violent insurgency. 91 Ibid. Contemporary Conditions In April 2014, Boko Haram raided a boarding school in Chibok, a village in northeastern Nigeria. The secondary school in Chibok was one of the few schools in the area still open- most had faced attacks at the hands of Boko Haram before, and had since shut down. Boko Haram fighters arrived late at night in a blaze of gunfire and headed straight to the school. 92 There, it kidnapped 276 schoolgirls, generally aged between 16 and18 years of age. 93 While some girls managed to escape, either that night or over the next few years, 219 of them are still missing. Boko Haram announced it would convert the girls to Islam, take them as slaves, and marry them off to its followers, a reference to an ancient Islamic belief that women captured in conflict are considered war booty. 94 One of the escaped girls told the press that she had been told that she was being kidnapped solely for the purpose of prostitution, and that she shouldn t be in school, because it is forbidden. 95 News of the attack spread worldwide, and an awareness movement arose on social media, using the hashtag #BringBackOurGirls. Public figures and governments from across the globe condemned the attack. Since the kidnapping, Boko Haram has released several public statements involving the girls, including a May 2014 video that showed most of the girls together reciting the Koran. The most recent news of the girls was released by Boko Haram in April 2016, and shows 15 of the girls, whom say they are 92 Ibid., Nigeria Chibok abductions: What we know about the missing girls. 93 Ibid., FACTSHEET: Explaining Nigeria s Boko Haram and its violent insurgency. 94 Ibid., Boko Haram. 95 Ibid., Nigeria Chibok abductions: What we know about the missing girls. 19

20 being treated well, but [want] to be with their families. 96 After the Chibok attacks, Boko Haram took advantage of its new platform and launched a series of new, deadlier attacks, the first of which being a campaign in Cameroon. On 16 May 2014, Boko Haram militants attacked a Chinese roadconstruction company in the town of Waza, a Cameroonian town on the Nigerian northeastern border. The fighters killed one Cameroonian soldier, kidnapped ten of the workers and stole vehicles and blasting material from the company. This attack marked a new age of cross-border battles, in which Boko Haram began an expansion that would put the world to test. 97 On 1 September 2014, Boko Haram soldiers attacked the town of Bama, located only 45 miles from the capital of Borno state, Maiduguri. Nigerian soldiers fled the town, and it was captured by Boko Haram, leading people to fear that the group was aiming to take the Maiduguri as well. A week later, the Nigerian army had reported that a Boko Haram commander had been killed in battle. While this small victory shed hope on the situation, the few weeks leading up to the UNHCR s statement saw Boko Haram s capture of a string of towns over 320 kilometres alongside Nigeria s northeast border with Cameroon. While, reportedly, no Nigerian soldiers were hurt, it was becoming evident that Boko Haram was becoming a challenge that the Nigerian government could not handle on its own Ibid. 97 FACT SHEET: U.S. Efforts to Assist the Nigerian Government in its Fight against Boko Haram, British Broadcasting Corporation, 14 October Boko Haram commander reportedly killed in clash with Nigerian forces, The Guardian, 13 September In October 2014, the Nigerian government announced that it had reached a ceasefire deal with Boko Haram, and that it was working on bringing back the Chibok girls from their kidnappers. However, days after the announcement, Boko Haram militants killed dozens of people in five attacks on Nigerian villages. 99 In the first attack, suspected insurgents attacked the village of Abadam on Friday night, killing at least one person and ransacking homes, while another assault on the village of Dzur on Saturday morning left at least eight people dead. Three other attacks in Adamawa state on Saturday killed dozens of people, witnesses and a local politician said. 100 Following the kidnappings, the US State Department designated Boko Haram as Foreign Terrorist Organizations under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, and as Specially Designated Global Terrorists under section 1(b) of Executive Order designation allowed the US to pursue the organization, paving the way for international This response. The US feared that Boko Haram was developing ties to other terrorist organizations within the area. o-haram-commander-reportedly-killed-in-clash-withnigerian-forces 99 Ibid. 100 Lanre Ola, Suspected Boko Haram fighters mount deadly attacks after Nigeria ceasefire, Reuters, 18 October Terrorist Designations of Boko Haram and Ansaru, U.S. Department of State, Web, 13 November

21 Past UN and International Action The United Nations Security Council has continuously worked with the AU, Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in condemning the actions of Boko Haram, which have ranged from violations of human rights to violations of international law. Past events of conflict within the region have led the UN to make a number of decisions, including mobilizing a dedicated force against terrorism. The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) was established in 1998 as a dedicated Nigerian force to combat banditry activities and to facilitate free movement of the member states of the Lake Chad Basin Commission across their common border. 102 As instability became more apparent in the region, groups such as Boko Haram were formed. It was not until 2004 that African leaders, mainly based in the Sahel area, finally requested help. In response, the African Peace Facility (APF) was introduced in order to support peace and security in Africa, specifically the Sahel region. 103 This agreement expanded the MNJTF throughout the region and grew it to what it is today. The MNJTF was quickly able to deter terrorist groups such as Boko Haram for some time, but eventually could not control the growth of the group in some areas. Even with the MNJTF present, Boko 102 Sagir Musa, Multinational Joint Task Forces, BHTs And Host Community, Sahara Reporters, Web, 7 May African Peace Facility, International Cooperation and Development, Web, tal-cooperation/african-peace-facility_en Haram continued to pose a threat to the region with consistent raids, kidnappings, and threats. While Boko Haram has been present for more than 10 years, it has only gained worldwide notoriety as of recently. After recent events, such as the kidnapping of 276 schoolgirls, international pressure has been placed on the AU to address Boko Haram. On January 2015, the AU finally approved a force of 7,500 troops to combat Boko Haram after a string of raids on Nigerian settlements. 104 While the force was able deter Boko Haram from the Nigerian border at first, it soon became clear that the presence of the troops was only exacerbating the problem. 105 Raids became more frequent and as a result; fights between the deployed troops and Boko Haram resulted in thousands of displaced people and hundreds of abandoned villages throughout the region. 106 UN Security Council resolution 2253 acknowledged the growing threat of terrorism in the Middle East and North Africa by reaffirming, The need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law, including applicable international human rights law, international refugee law, and international humanitarian law, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, stressing in this regard the important role the United Nations plays in 104 AU calls for regional force to fight Boko Haram, Al Jazeera, Web, 29 January calls-regional-force-fight-boko-haram html 105 Hilary Matfess, African Union forces may exacerbate Boko Haram threat, Al Jazeera America, Web, 7 February Ibid. 21

22 leading and coordinating this effort 107 Such a resolution was instrumental in addressing the growing threat of Boko Haram in the region. It called for cooperation between states, international organizations, and regional organizations in order to address the humanitarian crisis. Similarly, the resolution put an emphasis on the support of non-governmental organizations that are able to interact with the population on a much lower level. 108 In doing so, the Security Council hoped to alleviate the growing humanitarian crisis. During the 7692 nd meeting, held on May 13, 2016, the Security Council stressed, the need for Member States in the Lake Chad Basin region to complement the regional military and security operations against Boko Haram by national and regional efforts, with the assistance of bilateral partners and multilateral organizations. 109 In order to do so, the Security Council called upon United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) and the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) to work with the AU and other regional groups in order to assess the extent of the problem and to recommend a course of action. 110 Similarly, during the Second 107 Resolution 2253 (2015), United Nations Security Council, Web, 17 December l=s/res/2253%282015% Ibid. 109 Statement by the President of the Security Council, United Nations Security Council, Web, 13 May FCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_prst_2016_7.pdf July 2016, Security Council briefing on the situation in the Lake Chad Basin Region, Under- Secretary-General Jeffrey Feltman, United Nations Department of Political Affairs, Web, 27 July Regional Security Summit for the Lake Chad Basin, the UN along with five countries from the Sahel region- Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Nigeroutlined a plan to build a framework for counter-terrorism and prevention of violent extremism. 111 Yet, Jeffrey Feltman, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, told the Security Council during a briefing on the Security of Africa that, A military approach, while essential, will not bring end to the Boko Haram threat. The Boko Haram crisis must be addressed holistically and beyond an exclusively security lens and that Lake Chad Basin countries Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria need international support so that military operations are followed by stabilization measures and restoration of state authority. 112 Instead, Feltman demanded the Council to consider supporting a humanitarian response, especially in the northeastern Nigerian region; since there had been consistent funding of military action, there has been a neglect of addressing the needs of the population in the region. 113 While Boko Haram still poses a threat, pressure on the UN to pursue either humanitarian actions or military actions will continue to grow until the conflict is resolved. Questions a Resolution Should Answer 1. Should this develop into a Peacekeeping Operation (PKO)? While the MNJTF has had a presence in combating Boko Haram in 111 Root causes of Boko Haram threat in Lake Chad Basin must be tackled UN political chief, UN News Centre, Web, 27 July #.V_p7UjLMxsN 112 Ibid. 113 Ibid. 22

23 most areas, it has caused the displacement of thousands of people. Would developing this into a PKO result in a similar effect? How should the UN and African states coordinate to ensure the safety and protection of its populations in dealing with Boko Haram? Would a PKO be effective in efficiently eradicating the threat of Boko Haram? (see topic A) 2. What can your state contribute? While some countries are not as directly affected by Boko Haram as others, Boko Haram has been able to indirectly harm countries where it does not have a significant presence. What are some ways in which your state can contribute to dealing with the humanitarian and military crisis? 3. Is military action the best solution in dealing with Boko Haram? The MNJTF has been successful in combating Boko Haram in some areas, yet Boko Haram still poses a problem in some areas. With the recent kidnapping of school girls and the constant raids in the Lake Chad Basin region, the MNJTF has proven to be ineffective at preventing recent attacks. Would utilizing more troops be effective in deterring Boko Haram? Would your state help in funding a larger military presence to combat Boko Haram? 4. What can be done to ensure the safety of individuals in areas where attacks are common? Boko Haram is known for daily attacks on villages in Nigeria and the surrounding areas. Even though this has been a known problem for the past few years, little has been done to address it. What are some ways in which the AU can help prevent these attacks on a community-level? 5. Should priority be given to humanitarian aid or military aid? As Boko Haram continues to disturb the region, it has created a humanitarian crisis. Thousands of people have been forced to leave their homes and seek refuge elsewhere as fighting ensues. Should the AU focus on ensuring the safety of these refugees or should it focus on combating Boko Haram first? 6. How can the AU prevent the recruitment of new members of Boko Haram? Boko Haram has been known to recruit younger individuals from impoverished areas into its organization. While this has been a known issue, it has gone unaddressed for far too long. How can the AU prevent the recruitment of new members from uneducated, impoverished areas? 7. What are some ways in which the AU can help the humanitarian crisis? Even though Boko Haram continues to harm the region, there is already a large number of individuals who have fled their homes in fear. These individuals are left with no place to go and no way to provide for themselves. What can the AU do to help alleviate this crisis? 8. What can incentivize states who are not directly affected by Boko Haram to help? Although Boko Haram has committed many atrocities, the group is limited to attacks in the Lake Chad region. As a result, only a select few countries are affected by the actions of Boko Haram. What can the AU do to incentivize other countries to act? 23

24 Bloc Positions Figure 1: Africa Map (See Appendix) Northern and Western Africa While states in North Africa suffer from unstable governments and various jihadist groups, there has been little to no presence of Boko Haram. 114 Yet, that does not mean that states in North Africa have not acknowledged the Boko Haram as an issue that harms Africa as a whole. In order to deal with radical jihadist groups in North Africa, American and French troops have been deployed in countries throughout North Africa. 115 Troops deployed were able to secure and surround smuggling routes in order to limit resources these radical groups needed to carry out attacks. However, unstable governments make it harder for external support to coordinate deployment. As a result; Jihadists groups still continue to carry out attacks. Recently, new jihadist groups with connections to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have begun to recruit individuals in Northern African countries such as Morocco. 116 This is due to the fact that a large number of the population is uneducated and live in impoverished areas. Similarly, Western Africa has been plagued by a number of terrorist groups who have caused turmoil in the region. PKOs such as MINUSMA have proven to be a success in 114 Carlotta Gall, Jihadists Deepen Collaboration in North Africa, The New York Times, Web, 1 January adists-deepen-collaboration-in-northafrica.html?_r=0 115 Ibid. 116 Morgan Winsor, As ISIS Expands In North Africa, Morocco Faces Rising Threat Of Islamic State Group Terrorism, International Business Times, Web, 14 January the region, but at the cost of the highest number of peacekeeper deaths. With the continued support of peacekeepers, Western Africa has seen a drastic reduction in the number of organized attacks over the past 10 years. 117 Lake Chad Basin Region States located in this region are in the epicenter of Boko Haram attacks. Almost daily attacks occur on Nigerian soil and have recently been moving to surrounding countries. While the MNJTF has been successful in the past in deterring attacks by Boko Haram, it has recently been unable to keep up. In order to help combat Boko Haram, United States President Obama deployed 300 United States troops to Cameroon in order to help defend against Boko Haram. 118 Yet, even with the troops deployed, little has been done in deterring Boko Haram. Similarly, as a result of the constant attacks in the region, individuals have been forced to flee from their homes in order to avoid being caught in the crossfire between troops deployed to fight against Boko Haram. 119 This has put a burden on the AU to come up with a solution in order to help these displaced individuals and to combat Boko Haram at the same time. Figure 3: Incidents of violence (Green- Boko Haram) 114 (See Appendix) Central Africa While not necessarily due to radical groups, states in Central Africa have also faced conflict as a result of government 117 Ibid., Jihadists Deepen Collaboration in North Africa 118 Ibid. 119 Will Ross, Nigeria s Boko Haram crisis reaches deadliest phase, British Broadcasting Corporation, Web. 12 June

25 systems establishing themselves as the head of authority. Due to the extent of the conflict, states have also seen PKOs deployed to deal with the turmoil. The conflicts that occurred here have proven the negative sides of establishing PKOs. MINUSCA has been well known for the scandals as a result of peacekeepers. While states located here acknowledge the fact that Boko Haram is a growing threat, it is unlikely that a PKO will be a popular solution among them. Eastern and Southern Africa While Boko Haram has not affected these regions, they play a key role in combating terrorism in the country. Ethiopia and Rwanda have contributed a large number of troops in order to combat terror in the region. However, these regions are plagued by a number of factors that could lead to future conflict. Poverty, unorganized attacks, insecure borders, and inequality all contribute to a growing conflict in these areas. While PKO are uncommon here, it is more likely that states in these regions will rely on military action as the key to combating Boko Haram. Conclusion specific area. As a result of the constant fighting, there exists a humanitarian crisis that the AU must address. Similarly, the AU must not forget that unless Boko Haram is dealt with, the problem will only be exacerbated. It is up to the AU to decide whether humanitarian aid or military aid is needed more in the region. The AU will have to decide on priorities of response in order to design a strong strategy for response. In order to begin this series of discussions, it will be essential for the AU to address the expected involvement of unaffected states in organization. From there, the future discussion of possible responses will determine the outcome of the crisis. The benefits and drawbacks of humanitarian versus military aid will need to be heavily considered, especially as Boko Haram increasingly gains power and military might. A less pressing, but equally crucial, concern is Boko Haram s recruitment of new members and the AU s possible role in limiting this process. A final debate will involve all of the other questions, and will revolve around the possibility of this response needing to be developed into a PKO. Only after all of the options are considered will the AU be able to progress in the conflict against Boko Haram. For the past 10 years, Boko Haram has harassed the Chad Basin region of Africa. With consistent daily attacks, kidnappings, suicide bombings, and raids, Boko Haram continues to disrupt the region. In order to deal with this group, the UN has coordinated with local governments in creating a military force dedicated to combating Boko Haram. While military action has worked in the past, it has displaced thousands of individuals as a result of the fighting. Yet, a military presence has proven to be important and effective in pushing Boko Haram back to a 25

26 Appendix Figure 1 Figure 2 26

27 Figure 3 27