Crisis in Ukraine: A Quest for Moldovan Territorial Integrity

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1 Südosteuropa 62 (2014), n. 2, p Dossier: Perspectives on the Ukrainian Crisis Svetlana Suveica Crisis in Ukraine: A Quest for Moldovan Territorial Integrity Abstract. The author explains the implications of the Ukrainian crisis for Moldova s territorial security. Recognizing that the Euromaidan events were triggered by the division of opinion in Ukrainian society with respect to joining the EU vs. the Russia-led Eurasian Customs Union, the Moldovan public reacted similarly with an appropriation of such alternatives, reflecting the country s long-term search for a political, economic, and security policy. The Ukrainian crisis added significant tension to the Moldovan context. The separatist Transnistrian region has declared its readiness to become part of Russia and contribute to the revival of the Russian world. Clearly, such pro-russian separatism has, during the last two decades, represented a discursive playground for destabilizing rhetoric in the region, affecting the Ukraine as well as Moldova. External circumstances, in which the EU plays a crucial role, have led both Moldova and Ukraine to counter their territorial vulnerabilities. Both seem interested in making an effort to defreeze the Transnistrian conflict. Svetlana Suveica is an Associate Professor in the Department of History and Philosophy of Moldova State University in Chisinau. Between 2012 and 2014, she was a Humboldt Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for East and Southeast European Studies in Regensburg. Shortly after its escalation, the crisis in Ukraine was hardly viewed by anyone as an internal one. The peaceful protests in Kiev and other cities against the refusal of Ukrainian ex-president Victor Janukovich to sign the EU Association Agreement in November 2013 in Vilnius turned into a wave of pro-eu protests, known as Euromaidan. These events were followed by anti-eu and anti-maidan actions, which subsequently brought Crimea into Russia and animated separatist forces in the southeastern region of the country. Outside Ukraine, the crisis generated a harsh diplomatic confrontation between the EU and the US, on the one side, and Russia, on the other side, and brought a series of political and economic sanctions to bear against the latter. The crisis had enormous consequences for the countries in the neighborhood and the region. In the polemics over the crisis in Ukraine, to which a solution pleasing the parties involved has not yet been found, one often encountered the name of neighboring Moldova. It was precisely the crisis in Ukraine that propelled Mol-

2 A Quest for Moldovan Territorial Integrity 209 dova back onto the geopolitical stage of Eastern Europe, raising the interest of the EU and the US toward the country. During the last months of 2013 and up to 27 June 2014, when Moldova signed the Association Agreement with the EU, the country was visited by a significant number of foreign officials and diplomats, and the media worldwide simultaneously published more about Moldova than during the entire previous decade. At the same time, the polarization of society inside Moldova attained a new scale. How the crisis in Ukraine echoed in Moldova; what reactions it generated at the governmental, political and societal levels; why and in which way Moldova s territorial integrity was challenged; and how these matters are expected to be overcome in the new internal and external circumstances these and other questions will be examined in the following pages. Ukrainian Crisis and Reactions in Moldova Almost immediately after Moldova signed the Association Agreement with the European Union (Vilnius, 29 November 2013), pro-eu and anti-eu rhetoric intensified and turned into vivid contradictory debates, both in the political sphere and in the media. Because Ukraine was considered an important actor in the Eastern Partnership Agreement (EaP), Yanukovich s refusal to sign the agreement and free trade pact caused, first, worries, and then disappointment among Moldovan officials. The Moldovan media expected that the refusal would reduce the EaP to a mechanism of economic development, without leading to visa liberalization facilities or a future possibility of EU enlargement. 1 The moment of Moldovan success in Vilnius was merely presented as a contrast to the Ukrainian failure to sign the agreement, rather than as a result of an intense negotiation process of the Moldovan authorities with the EU that had paid off. 2 The media reported daily on the protests in Kiev and the Euromaidan unrest, and awareness of the events in the neighboring country further conditioned opinions inside Moldova. While the government representatives declared solidarity with the new Ukrainian leaders, the authorities of the separatist Transnistria and the autonomous Gagauzia, as well the leaders of the Moldovan Party of Communists, expressed support for Yanukovich and approved his decision to use force against the Euromaidan activists. 3 Certain media channels urged that 1 Dungaciu: există șanse reale ca Ucraina să nu semneze Acordul cu UE, Jurnal.md, 15 November 2013, available at < All Internet sources were accessed on 21 August I refer here to the negotiations on the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), launched in January 2010, then the negotiations on the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) as a core element of the Association Agreement that started in Ana Ilie, Comuniștii moldoveni se aliază cu Ianucovici: Teroriștii sunt legitimați ca cetățeni democrați, Ziare.com, 21 February 2014, available at <

3 210 Svetlana Suveica Source: Kamil Calus, Gagauzia: Growing Separatism in Moldova? OSW Centre for Eastern Studies Warsaw, Commentary n. 129, 10 March 2014, 9, available at < files/commentary_129.pdf>, accessed 20 June the Moldovans keep an open mind regarding the events in Ukraine that took a dramatic turn, as well as on Moldova s European integration, which government representatives started to promote openly. Rather than providing solutions moldova/comunistii-moldoveni-se-aliaza-cu-ianukovici-teroristii-sunt-legitimati-ca-cetatenidemocrati >.

4 A Quest for Moldovan Territorial Integrity 211 for Ukraine, the debates inside Moldova focused on the internal situation of the country and its future prospects, shaped by the new external circumstances. The main focus of the debates, a goal supported by the political leaders as well the opinion-makers, remained European integration as a future engine of development. Supporters argued that integration into the EU would bring political, economic, and strategic benefits for the country, each move toward the EU being a step away from Russia. In contrast, the anti-eu forces emphasized the potential economic and political drawbacks for Moldova. The Russia-led Eurasian Customs Union (ECU) was described as a more pragmatic alternative, based on the historical relations and economic ties with former Soviet republics, as well as Moldova s significant energy dependency upon Russia. The contradictory arguments that were advanced by pro-eu or pro-ecu partisans, though often based on the same data, were aimed at persuading the public to support the one or the other view. Between 28 March and 11 April 2014, the Slovak Atlantic Commission (SAC), in cooperation with the Central European Policy Institute (CEPI), had conducted a qualitative survey to discover the perceptions of Moldovans with respect to the EU, the EaP, and the ECU. The conclusion was that EU narratives are making inroads into Moldova s public attitudes. Although public opinion about immediate economic benefits, preferences and market accessibility of the EU and the Eurasian Customs Union (ECU) may be divided, there was no doubt amongst respondents that cooperation with the EU offered a more stable outlook into the future. The European direction is now decisively regarded as part of Moldova s national interest and strongly associated with living better and facing the future with more confidence. 4 The partial results of the survey were published by the Moldovan media under the title, More Moldovans Want into Eurasian Customs Union. 5 At the same time, the polarization of Ukrainian society led to the development of new approaches intended to diminish confrontation and enhance social cohesion. One such approach, promoted by a joint initiative by an NGO and the government The National Convention for European Integration of the Republic of Moldova, organized public discussions with the aim of informing ethnic minorities about the advantages of European integration. Such integration was presented as a national idea that could be supported by all levels of society in various parts of the country. 6 4 Slovak Atlantic Commission, Qualitative Survey: Make Moldova a Home, 5 June 2014, available at < 5 Tot mai mulți moldoveni vor în Uniunea Vamală Euroasiatică, Unimedia, 12 February 2014, available at < 6 Convenţia Naţională pentru Integrarea Europeană a Republicii Moldova, Discuții cu privire la avantajele integrării europene la Universitatea de Stat din Comrat, 21 February 2014,

5 212 Svetlana Suveica The rise of tensions inside Ukraine and the subsequent loss of Crimea to Russia channelled the debate toward a new topic. Although the focus remained the advantages and disadvantages of European integration, it was the issue of territorial integrity that dominated political discourse and media coverage. The topic of Moldova s territorial integrity was formulated in the most dramatic way since 1992 when, in the eastern part of the country, known as Transnistria, a military conflict escalated. At that time, in the so-called Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic (PMR), a separatist regime had been installed with the support of Russia, and the region became Russia s Western outpost. Transnistria, Gagauzia, and the Revival of the Russian World The annexation of Crimea by Russia brought an immediate reaction by the Transnistrian authorities. An official communiqué of 19 March 2014 stated that the Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic is very encouraged by a decree of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin On the recognition of the Republic of Crimea, as well as the address by the Russian leader dedicated to the accession of two new constituent entities to the Russian Federation: the Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol. The return of Crimea to Russia is a highly just decision based on the consolidated position of the people of Crimea and of all Russians. 7 The communiqué stated further that the result in Crimea s referendum corresponds exactly with the results of Transnistria s referendum of September 17, At that time more than 97 per cent of voters supported independence, to be followed by Transnistria s free accession to Russia; more than 78 per cent of voters took part in the voting. Such a clear correspondence of the will of the Crimean and Transnistrian people shows that the Russian World is reviving and people s wish for unity will not be inhibited. 8 Transnistria figures in the list of so-called frozen conflicts in the post-soviet space, stimulated by Russia with the aim of keeping the former Soviet republics in its sphere of influence. After a three-month-long ceasefire in the summer of 1992, in which Russian and Moldovan soldiers were involved, around 1,000 people lost their lives, and thousands became refugees, a Russian peace-keeping mission was established in Transnistria together with one in southern Ossetia. It was gradually transformed into a state-building mission that supported, available at < 7 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic, Statement by the PMR s Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the Accession of the Republic of Crimeea to the Russian Federation, 19 March 2014, available at < 8 Ibid.

6 A Quest for Moldovan Territorial Integrity 213 through its military presence as well as financially, the establishment of the separatist regime with all the trappings of statehood. Moldova rejected federalization as a solution for the conflict, as professed in 2003 by the Russian side, 9 and subsequently adopted the Law on the Legal Status of Transnistria, according to which the conflict can be resolved only by granting the region a special status. 10 The 2006 referendum shows that the de facto Transnistrian authorities never abide by Moldovan laws, but search instead for ways to secede and obtain a legal status within the Russian Federation. The March 2014 statement mentioned above was issued immediately after the Crimea affair and was followed by a resolution of the Transnistrian social organizations addressed to the Russian State Duma, with a request that it reviewed the legislation to allow the admission of the new political subjects into the Russian Federation. Despite the hope expressed by the Transnistrian side and the Russian media, which were ready to develop the successful Crimean scenario for the endangered Transnistrian Russian-speaking population, the application effort in the Transnistrian case failed. The long-asserted goal of the Transnistrian authorities for the recognition of independence was not in line with Russia s plans: undoubtedly, Russia had strategic interests in the region, but did not show any readiness to expand its territories further. The referendum episode, which greatly served the propaganda machine, did not end there. Upon his visit to the region on 9 May 2014, the Russian deputy prime minister and special representative of the Russian president for Transnistria, Dmitry Rogozin, made an unsuccessful attempt to take to Moscow lists with 30,000 signatures of Transnistrian inhabitants who sought recognition of Transnistrian independence. The lists were confiscated by the Moldovan authorities. 11 In the new political situation, the worries of the Transnistrian authorities related to the recognition of the independence of the PMR were based on fears that with the conflict in Ukraine and the worsening of Russian-Ukrainian relations, Russia s support free gas to consumers since 1992, regular financial contributions to the state pension fund, and cheap foodstuffs would cease. 9 The full name of the document, known as Kozak Memorandum, is: Memorandum ob osnovnykh printsipakh gosudarstvennogo ustroistva objedinennogo gosudarstva (2003), cf. Regnum.ru, 23 May 2005, available at < 10 Republica Moldova, Parlamentul, Lege cu privire la prevederile de bază ale statutului juridic special al localităților din stânga Nistrului (Transnistria), n. 173, 22 July 2005, published in Monitorul Oficial, n , 29 July 2005, available at < action=view&view=doc&id=313004&lang=1>. 11 Vitalie Călugăreanu, Moldova a prins Rusia în flagrant în timp ce uneltea schema de recunoaștere a Transnistriei, DW-World, 12 May 2014, available at < moldova-a-prins-rusia-%c3%aen-flagrant-%c3%aen-timp-ce-uneltea-schema-derecunoa%c8%99tere-a-transnistriei/a ?maca=rum-rss-rom-moldova-4125-xml-mrss>.

7 214 Svetlana Suveica People s attraction to Russia, partially to be explained by demographic, social, and cultural changes during the Soviet period, was deepened by two decades of Russia s constant presence, from military troops to financial assistance and propaganda. Owing to the massive Russian propaganda in the media, successfully adopted by local TV channels and newspapers, popular support appeared to have turned into a pro-russian stance against the fascist Euromaidan, and against European integration as a future scenario for Moldova. While the Transnistrian media portrayed the mood of the population in this way, one can only wonder what the position of the Transnistrians with respect to these issues actually was. After the escalation of the crisis in Ukraine, NATO, US, and EU officials repeatedly warned of Russia s threat to Moldova s territorial integrity. The international media engaged in an anti-russian campaign took from the politicians the message that Transnistria could be the next Crimea. 12 Moldovan political experts warned that Russia could open a second front in Transnistria to take control of the Odessa region of Ukraine. 13 In turn, Ukraine had ample reason to be concerned about the possibility that the PMR could play a destabilizing role for the Odessa region: besides the pro-russian declarations, the presence of around 1,500 active Russian military troops and a small number of Transnistrian soldiers, as well a weapons depot left in Transnistria by the Russian 14 th Guards Army, was taken into account. Indeed, the March 2014 events in Odessa that ended in tragedy revealed the role of the Transnistrian and Russian citizens who had apparently been involved in previous separatist actions in the breakaway Transnistria on the side of the separatist forces. 14 Joint Ukrainian-Moldovan measures to control the number of Russian citizens crossing the border ensued, characterized by the Russian Duma as a blockade directed against the Transnistrian citizens. 12 Carol Morello / Karen DeYoung, NATO General Warns on Russia s Further Aggression, The Washington Post, 24 March 2014, available at < nato-general-warns-of-further-russian-aggression/2014/03/23/2ff63bb6-b269-11e b2d790b3c9e1_story.html>; Kit Gillet, Fears that Moldova s Breakaway Transdniester Republic Could Be The Next Crimea, The Telegraph, 23 March 2014, available at < David Kashi, Could Moldova Be the Next Crimea? Ethnic Russians in Transnistria Call on Moscow for Accession, International Business Times, , available at < 13 Russia May Open Second Front in Transnistria, Moldovan Expert Says, Ukrinform, 11 March 2014, available at < front_in_transnistria_moldovan_expert_says_318364>. 14 Poboishche v Odesse organizovali uchastniki sobytii v Pridnestrov e, Turchinov, Ipress.ua, 5 May 2014, available at < uchastnyky_sobityy_v_prydnestrove turchynov_62827.html>.

8 A Quest for Moldovan Territorial Integrity 215 The concerns of the Moldovan authorities were not limited to Transnistria. The actions and reactions of autonomous Gagauzia in southern Moldova were also a source of unease. Whereas Transnistria showed an almost immediate readiness to contribute actively to the revival of the Russian world, both through declarations of support and by becoming part of it, Gagauzia claimed that it supported Moldova s territorial integrity and unity, and warned at the same time that it would secede if the country changed its political status. In February 2014, the referendum carried out in the region revealed the great support of the population for the Eurasian Customs Union option (98 per cent of a 70 per cent turnout). 15 While the Moldovan governmental coalition declared that only integration into the EU could improve the living standard of citizens, the Gagauz leader argued that only joining the ECU would bring economic opportunities as well as ensure the territorial unity of the country. To the question how the Gagauz themselves contemplated the development of the region, there was no definite answer. Despite the constant critique of the EU option, the Gagauz leader seemed less opposed to the EU than concerned about losing ties with Russia. These ties were mainly related to the threat of a closing of the Russian labor market to Gagauz workers, numbering around 25, In an interview on 2 June 2014 during a visit to Turkey, the Gagauz Bashkan (leader) declared that Moldova s membership in the EU would threaten not only the Gagauz economy, but also the autonomous status of the region. He said that if Russia stops supporting us, we will be ruined. This is why, should the Moldovan government reach an agreement with the EU, we will secede and declare our independence. 17 The declaration was said to have been provoked by the constant pro-union rhetoric of Romanian President Traian Basescu and the liberal Moldovan circles, whose representatives affirmed that Moldova s road toward EU membership would be much easier through a union with Romania. The Moldovan authorities rushed to the Gagauz capital of Comrat to give assurances that these ideas were pure speculations and that there is no motive for organizing referendums in the region. 18 Destabilization factors were thus present in both the eastern and the southern parts of Moldova. On the one hand, both Transnistria and Gagauzia claimed 15 Gagauzia Voters Reject Closer EU Ties for Moldova, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, 3 February 2014, available at < 16 Simion Ciochina / Maximilian Grosser, Moldova s Gagauz Region Leans toward Moscow, DW-World, 18 March 2014, available at < 17 Sami Kohen, Gagavuzlar ne istiyor? Milliyet, 3 June 2014, available at < milliyet.com.tr/gagavuzlar-ne-istiyor-/dunya/ydetay/ /default.htm>. 18 Declarațiile lui Băsescu au turnat benzină peste focul din Găgăuzia Igor Corman, Ziare. com, 23 January 2014, available at <

9 216 Svetlana Suveica that Moldova s orientation toward the EU was leading to the territorial dismemberment of the country. On the other hand, the crisis in Ukraine revealed Moldova s lack of territorial security. The Moldovan political coalition in power faced tremendous internal pressure, backed by Russia in both cases through different channels. The presence of Russian troops in Transnistria was the primary source of worry, as Russia could use the territory to further destabilize the situation in the region. Moreover, the pro-eu orientation of the Moldovan government was met with a growing critique in Russia, followed by warnings that bilateral relations would be affected in every domain. Moldova: Quo Vadis?! The crisis in Ukraine contributed to the dilemma confronting the Moldovan authorities, whether to act to embrace the EU option or to step down. One of the challenges directly related to the dilemma was growing threats to the country s territorial integrity, coming both from outside and inside the country, namely, from the Transnistria and Gagauzia regions. The Moldovan governmental coalition openly supported Moldova s advancement toward the EU, a strategy seen as offering a guarantee of the territorial and economic security of the country. This position was backed by an impressive number of EU as well as US officials who visited Moldova during the recent months, often on their way to Kiev through Chisinau. They showed an open support for Moldova that could stand up to Russia s economic, military, and informational pressure, and they encouraged Moldova to continue making efforts toward EU integration. Together with political declarations, the visa liberalization for Moldovans who travel in the EU, starting on 28 April 2014, contributed to the intensification of the pro-eu rhetoric in the country. This resulted in an increase in the positive perception of the European Union among the population. Thus, according to the 2013 EU Neighborhood Barometer for Moldova, 55 per cent of Moldovans considered the EU an important partner that would substantially contribute to the development of their country. 19 Nevertheless, Moldovan society was and still is far from united in its attitude toward the EU option and the evolution of relations with Russia, which were expected to worsen. Many people showed less sympathy toward Russia, but remained convinced that Moldova should stay within the Russian sphere of influence, essentially because of the direct dependence upon energy resources. Others, nostalgic for the Soviet past, showed little awareness of Russia s struggle to get the former Soviet republics back under its control and cared little about the striking similarities between the Ukrainian crisis and the Georgian war in 2008, in which 19 EU Neighbourhood Barometer Factsheet Moldova, Autumn 2013, available at < euneighbourhood.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/fs-enpi-wave-4-md-en.pdf>.

10 A Quest for Moldovan Territorial Integrity 217 Russia used the same tactics, deliberately falsifying media reports to nourish the enemy image, deploying and encouraging paramilitary units, and denying a military presence. 20 The Moldovan opposition, represented by the Socialist Party and the Party of the Communists, consistently showed sympathy for Russia, and supported the ECU as an alternative to the EU. The opposition, quite visible in the media, played an important role in the dissemination of the anti-eu message among the population. The course of events in Ukraine did not change the preferences of the opposition leaders; nevertheless, their rhetoric underwent an interesting shift with the election of Petr Poroshenko as Ukraine s new president. Suddenly, the Moldovan Communists declared that visa liberalization had had a positive outcome for citizens, including Transnistrians holding a biometric Moldovan passport. Subsequent events in the eastern part of Ukraine, with clear signs that Russia supported the separatist forces, left the Moldovan opposition rather silent. In Transnistria, the situation looked different. The media used every opportunity to present erroneous information about Ukraine and Russia s involvement or noninvolvement in the conflict in the eastern part of the country, the situation inside Moldova, the visa liberalization, and further plans for signing the Association Agreement with the EU, planned for the end of June The 9 May 2014 visit of Russian Vice Prime Minister Rogozin in the Transnistrian capital of Tiraspol helped boost the pro-russian mood among the population. In his public speech, delivered on a day that bears an enormous symbolic connotation, Rogozin stressed that Transnistria is under Russia s protection and she will not allow anyone to bother her. He also warned that signing the Association Agreement with the European Union could have very serious consequences for the Republic of Moldova, 21 thus hinting that Moldova would definitely lose Transnistria by choosing EU membership. Another loss could be the visa regime for Moldovan citizens, directly affecting the status of Moldovans working in the Russian Federation. 22 The message reconfirmed Russia s support for the idea of a federalization of Moldova, which could be achieved only by 20 See, in this regard, Alexei Sekarev, The Third Republic: Ukraine Struggles Its Way through to Europe, Estonian Center of Eastern Partnership, Policy Paper 17, April 2014, 3, available at < 21 Rogozin amenință RM: semnarea Acordului cu UE va avea consecințe grave, Jurnal.md, 10 May 2014, available at < 22 According to an official from the Moldovan Bureau for Relations with the Diaspora, in 2013 around 300,000 Moldovans worked in the Russian Federation, which is 68 per cent of the total number of Moldovan citizens who worked abroad; see Liliana Barbăroşie, Cîți moldoveni lucrează în Rusia? De ce nu se potrivesc cifrele de la Moscova cu cele de la Chișinău, Radio Europa Liberă, 9 April 2013, available at < article/ html>.

11 218 Svetlana Suveica refusing to sign the Association Agreement with the EU and redirecting efforts toward joining the ECU. Simultaneously with the visit of Rogozin, the Transnistrian government issued a press release on the economic risks that Moldova could face as a result of signing the agreement. Among them were restrictions on the duty-free importation of goods produced in Moldova, the need to comply with EU sanitary and technical standards, the compulsory procedure of certification of goods by competent Moldovan bodies, the limitations related to products that could be exported, and the abolishment of the dual pricing practice. Judging from the text, the main concern of the Transnistrian authorities was related not to the required adjustment to EU compliance, but rather to the fact that the decisions on export quotas would be made by Moldovan authorities, who could intentionally punish Transnistrian economic agents. 23 Currently, Transnistrian manufacturers, mainly in metallurgy, energy, and light industry, benefit fully from autonomous trade preferences 24 that enable them to export into the EU market duty-free products within the quotas set for Moldova, such representing 64 per cent of total Transnistrian exports. The media that advocate the European option for Moldova present this reality as a paradox for the separatist region, whose authorities and population continue to fearfully reject EU membership for Moldova while insisting on a civilized divorce from Moldova. 25 The opinions of Moldovans regarding the future development of their country remain divided. Despite the efforts of the Moldovan government, the population is not fully convinced of the desirability of integration with Europe, which is considered synonymous with distancing from Russia. One of the arguments invoked is the definitive loss of Transnistria on the road to EU accession. Old Transnistrian Conflict, New Circumstances Since the 1992 military confrontations, the Moldovan authorities have not controlled the situation in the so-called Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic. In 2005, when the 5+2 format of negotiations (OSCE, Russia, and Ukraine as mediators, and the European Union and the United States as observers) was adopted to resolve the Transnistrian conflict, the agenda of the talks revolved 23 Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic, Riski i ugrozy v sviazi s planiruemym podpisaniem Soglasheniia ob Assotsiatsii mezhdu Evropeiskim Soiuzom i Respublikoi Moldova, 8 May 2014, available at < 24 Council of the European Union, Council Regulations (EC), 55/2008, 21 January 2008, available at < 08:en:PDF>. 25 Paradoxul numit Transnistria: de ce alipirea de Rusia ar însemna un șoc economic, Independent, 16 June 2014, available at <

12 A Quest for Moldovan Territorial Integrity 219 around socioeconomic problems, humanitarian and human rights issues, and institutional, political, and security issues. Neither this format, officially considered the most appropriate until now by all involved, nor the suggested reform of the Russian peace-keeping mission 26 can be considered as possibly leading to a definitive settlement of the conflict. The advent of negotiations on the Transnistrian conflict was closely related to the position of the external actors, including Ukraine. In December 2005, following a joint request by the Moldovan and Ukrainian governments, an EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) was established on the Moldovan- Ukrainian border. While reconfirming its support of Moldovan territorial integrity, Ukraine cannot boast of a valuable contribution to regional security, of which the Transnistrian issue is a key indicator. Ukraine s diplomatic efforts as OSCE chairman in 2013 to advance the negotiations brought few results. As an author of a policy brief puts it, all the conflicts in the post-soviet area are different and have their own peculiarities, but all of them have one common element: the Russian Federation. 27 To this reality must be added the fact that during the past two decades, the Moldovan political and governmental leaders with a pro-russian orientation have shown no willingness to resolve the conflict. On 27 June 2014, Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia signed the Association Agreement with the EU. Although the final goal, accession, is far from being reached, the leadership of all three countries expressed their determination to work toward EU membership. The Moldovan authorities announced that an official request for the accession of the country to the EU will be formulated in the near future. Such a scenario would sound more optimistic, and the pro- Russian rhetoric of the Transnistrian and Gagauz authorities would be taken less into consideration, if not for the Transnistrian conflict, which makes Moldova vulnerable in its intention to join the EU. The crisis in the neighboring Ukraine, the loss of Crimea to Russia, and the escalation of the military conflict in the eastern Ukraine added much tension to the situation inside Moldova and the country s relations with the Transnistrian authorities. The latter showed their determination to work toward a definitive separation from Moldova and to become part of the Russian Federation. One should not forget that Ukraine is one of the most important players in the 5+2 negotiations on the Transnistrian conflict. During the crisis, the preoccupation of the Ukrainian authorities with the potential risks of destabilization 26 On the possible outcomes of the reform, see the analytical report: Cornel Ciurea et al., The Reform of the Peace-keeping Mission in Transnistria: A Premise for Conflict Settlement. Institute of World Policy, Kyiv 2014, available at < php?l=en&id=4364&idc=295>. 27 Leonid Litra, Ukraine s contribution to regional security: The case of Transnistrian conflict. Institute of World Policy, Kyiv 2013, 9, available at < brief_0913_eng.pdf>.

13 220 Svetlana Suveica coming from Transnistria led to the enhancement of control of the Transnistrian perimeter of the Ukrainian-Moldovan border. In a recent interview with RFE, the Moldovan expert with respect to the Transnistrian conflict stated that the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine created an unprecedented situation for the regime of Russian marionettes from the left bank of the Dniester. Whereas Russia wants to support the separatist regime, thus keeping blackmail leverage in the region and tensions in the west, Ukraine wants the evacuation of the Russian military forces from Transnistria. To attain the goal, Ukraine could thus reject the two bilateral treaties that regulate the transit of military troops and transportation of military equipment for Transnistria, so that the region, isolated from its main military and economic supplier, would go bankrupt. 28 Instead of a Conclusion Although the EU has shown no intention for a closer involvement in the conflict resolution with respect to Transnistria, it has repeatedly declared support for the preservation of Moldova s territorial integrity and political stability. Recently, the US Senate also adopted a resolution with the aim of supporting Moldova s territorial integrity. The resolution calls on the Government of the Russian Federation to refrain from using economic coercion against the Republic of Moldova, cease support for separatist movements in the territory of the Republic of Moldova, and fulfil its commitments made at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 1999 summit in Istanbul to withdraw its military forces and munitions from within the internationally recognized territory of the Republic of Moldova. 29 In the new external circumstances, closely related to the crisis in Ukraine, the separatist region of Transnistria that has challenged Moldova s territorial integrity for more than two decades has become a potential destabilizing element for Ukraine as well. The raised awareness of the Ukrainian as well the EU and US authorities concerning the potential risks of destabilization of security in the region emanating from Transnistria opens new prospects for resolving the conflict. The willingness of Moldovan authorities to resolve the Transnistrian conflict and thus to ensure the territorial unity of the country could join that of other countries and produce common efforts to defreeze the Transnistrian conflict. 28 Liliana Barbăroşie / Alexandru Canţîr, Oazu Nantoi: Agresiunea Federației Ruse contra Ukrainei a creat o situație fără precedent pentru regimul de marionete rusești din stânga Nistrului, Radio Europa Liberă, 24 July 2014, available at < org/content/article/ html>. 29 The text of the Resolution of the US Senate (S.Res.500, 23 July 2014) is available at < beta.congress.gov/113/bills/sres500/bills-113sres500ats.xml>.