Negotiating local livelihoods: Scales of conflict in the Se San River Basin

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1 Asia Pacific Viewpoint, Vol. 45, No. 1, April 2004 ISSN: , pp51 68 Negotiating local livelihoods: Scales of conflict in the Se San River Basin Philip Hirsch and Andrew Wyatt Abstract: The Se San is an important tributary river basin of the Mekong. In 1993, Vietnam began building the Yali 1 Falls Dam 80 kilometres upstream of the point at which this westward flowing river enters Cambodia. Ninety indigenous communities along the Se San River in two provinces of north-eastern Cambodia have been impacted severely by flooding, and a dramatically altered hydrological regime that affects fisheries and all other aspects of livelihood, such as river bank agriculture. Since 2000, when the first turbines were commissioned, the affected communities have been increasingly vocal regarding the impacts of Yali and the plans for several more dams on upper reaches of the river. A complex set of actors including non-governmental organisations, village, district and provincial authorities, national committees in Cambodia and Vietnam, the Mekong River Commission and a range of international players have become involved in a two-track process, which has nevertheless allowed little space for negotiation over the Se San River on the part of those most directly affected. This case has fundamental implications for governance and conflict management in the Mekong and more widely. The Australian Mekong Resource Centre has been working with local actors to document the Se San case as part of an international project on River Basin Management: a negotiated approach, in support of six cases that involve up-scaling of grassroots river basin initiatives in Africa, Latin America and Asia. In this article, we illustrate the significance of and problematise negotiation as a socially and politically embedded conflict management principle, with reference to the Se San case. Keywords: conflict management, Mekong, negotiation River basin management has increasingly engaged with approaches and discourses of participation and community involvement (Newson, 1997; Heathcote, Authors: Philip Hirsch and Andrew Wyatt, Australian Mekong Resource Centre, School of Geosciences, University of Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia. hirsch@mail.usyd.edu.au Victoria University of Wellington, Published by Blackwell Publishing.

2 Asia Pacific Viewpoint Volume 45 No ; Both ENDS, 2000; McNally and Tognetti, 2002). Multi-jurisdictional river basin authorities, including those with responsibilities in international basins, have similarly bought into an engaged, stakeholder-focused process of management, although experience has been quite mixed (Chenoweth and Bird, 2000). There is a pervading sense in many institutions that all stakeholders now have a say and an opportunity to negotiate in defence of their interests. Caution is required. Multi-stakeholder forums and processes bring both promises and pitfalls to less powerful actors, requiring careful and strategic approaches to negotiation by, and on behalf of, less powerful groups (Edmunds and Wollenburg, 2001), recognising that devolution of resource management as commonly practiced can be disempowering as well as empowering of the poor (Shackleton et al. 2002). Apparent multi-stakeholder processes and frameworks may in fact be more about managing resource politics by government than about resolving resource conflict in favour of affected groups (Lane, 1999). When it comes to significant conflict, in particular, the challenges to community participation are immense. Indigenous communities affected by river basin development projects that have transboundary impacts are thus faced with compounded processes of marginalisation, in the sense that they need to negotiate not only with their own governments (Howitt et al. 1996), but also through their own governments with neighbouring (and sometimes more powerful) states authorities. To date, international agencies supporting such projects have taken little account of this double whammy in their processes of project planning, despite subscribing to a participatory rhetoric. Of 254 international river basins, the Mekong River Basin (Figure 1) has one of the most significant institutional histories of river management. The Figure 1. The Se San River, Ratanakiri and Stung Treng Province and its location within the Mekong 52 Victoria University of Wellington 2004

3 April 2004 Scales of conflict in the Se San River Basin Mekong Committee was established in 1957, and its successor Mekong River Commission (MRC), established in 1995, is in principle committed to a sustainable approach to river basin management that is inclusive of all riparian members. Recently, the MRC has developed a public participation strategy (Mekong River Commission Secretariat, 1999). In practice, however, deference to riparian governmental priorities and donor sensitivities has kept the Commission quite a cautious actor. Much of the attention to international management of the Mekong has focused on the mainstream, and early plans for dams were based around the Mekong Cascade (Mekong Secretariat, 1989; Hirsch, 1996). However, the only dams being developed on the mainstream of the Mekong are in China, which is not a member of the MRC. At the same time, there has been a rapid increase in planning and construction of dams on Mekong tributaries. Many of these are not seen as international projects, even though their incremental alteration of hydrological regimes can have a transboundary downstream impact. Yet, some projects do have a quite immediate impact across national borders. The Yali Falls Dam on the Se San River is one such dam. In this article, we describe the impacts of Vietnam s Yali Falls Dam on communities living downstream along the Se San River in Cambodia. We discuss the communities organised response and their support by non-governmental organisations, together with the official response of governmental and intergovernmental agencies. The case represents an attempt to negotiate outcomes, not only on behalf of the affected communities, but also by them through establishment of direct negotiation by a network established in response to the cross-border impacts. However, under current management arrangements in their social-political context, we suggest that negotiation opportunities are highly constrained, representing a crisis of governance and a challenge to the mainstream agencies that purport to support participatory river basin management and conflict management. We also identify tentative openings for a more inclusive river management approach. SE SAN, THE MEKONG AND YALI FALLS DAM The Se San River is one of the largest tributaries of the Mekong. It is an important transboundary river with its headwaters in Gia Lai and Kon Tum Provinces in the fast developing Central Highlands of Vietnam. From these mountainous areas the river winds its way southwest into Ratanakiri Province in Cambodia and then onto Stung Treng Province where it converges with two other large tributaries, the Sre Pok and the Sekong, before the latter flows into the mainstream Mekong River. The greater length of the Se San River is located within Cambodia. The Se San and Sre Pok Rivers contribute 10.4 per cent of the total flow of the Mekong River (Halcrow and Partners, 1998). The hydropower potential of the Se San River has made it the target of external development interventions involving large-scale hydropower since the late 1950s. Resource planning in the 1970s by the Mekong Committee, envisaged a grand plan of 180 dams on the tributaries of the Mekong River, Victoria University of Wellington

4 Asia Pacific Viewpoint Volume 45 No 1 including 16 possible hydropower development sites in the Se San River Basin five projects in Cambodia, ten in Vietnam, and one border project. Following the beginning of construction of the first dam, the Yali Falls Dam, various optimisation studies by the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) have refined the choices down to five dams in the upper Se San River Basin. These are the Se San 3, Se San 4A, Dak Bla, Plei Krong and Upper Kontum in Vietnam (Halcrow and Partners, 1998). Of these, the Vietnamese Government has prioritised the 260MW Se San 3, located approximately 30 km downstream of the Yali Falls Dam, for construction. Originally earmarked for financing from the ADB, construction of this US$260 million dam has since begun in May 2003 with financing from the Vietnamese and the Russian governments following the withdrawal of the ADB for reasons outlined below. The 720 MW Yali Falls Dam was estimated to have cost US$1 billion (CRES, 2001). Construction began in November 1993 on a tributary of the Se San River the Krong Poko. The dam s implementation consists of a 65-mhigh earth dam resulting in the formation of a 64.5 sq km reservoir at full supply level of 515 m above sea level. Power from Yali and other Se San dams that are being planned and constructed is delivered to the southern industrial regions centred on Ho Chi Minh City via a 500 KV transmission line that was funded as a part of a US$575 million World Bank loan for transmission and distribution facilities. The construction of the Yali Falls Dam began to modify the river hydrology and water quality of the Se San River from as early as mid By 12 May 2000, when the first two of four turbines were commissioned and put into operation, it had caused large-scale environmental, social and economic impacts to the communities living along the Se San River in Kon Tum Province, Vietnam and Ratanakiri and Stung Treng Provinces, Cambodia. Unmitigated and uncompensated large-scale environmental, social and economic impacts remain with these communities almost three years after the first turbines were commissioned and a little over nine years since construction began. The impacts on the Vietnamese side are reported in a 2001 Centre for Natural Resources and Environmental Studies (CRES) study. Until the communities and their civil society supporters took matters into their own hands, the impacts on the Cambodian section of the river had gone largely unassessed and unreported. OFFICIAL ASSESSMENT OF IMPACTS ON YALI When Electricity of Vietnam (EVN), the Vietnamese state-owned electricity utility responsible for building the Yali Falls Dam, and its Swiss based consultant, Electrowatt Engineering Services Ltd, finalised the environmental impact assessment (EIA) for the dam in 1993, the assessed downstream project impact area extended no further than 8 km downstream. Construction and operational effects beyond the downstream project impacted area were either not assessed or stated to have no impact (Electrowatt, 1993). This study was funded by Swedish aid agency SIDA and the Swiss government, and coordinated 54 Victoria University of Wellington 2004

5 April 2004 Scales of conflict in the Se San River Basin by the Interim Mekong Committee (a predecessor to the MRC). In its defence, EVN has explained that the reach of the Se San in Cambodia was not accessible at the time because of security concerns but this does little to explain why the 80 km stretch of the Se San to the Cambodian border was not assessed or why studies were not carried out in Cambodia once the security situation had improved by the mid-1990s. Indeed, EVN s plans for the downstream Se San 3 dam which had involved the preparation of EIAs by consultants, Worley WTL Ltd., with the financial support of the Asian Development Bank, also omitted to carry out assessments in Cambodia. The Se San 3 EIA, which was drafted in April 2000, has not been made public, and Vietnam refused a request from the ADB in response to a request from an independent researcher to publicly release the EIA. These studies reveal that the consultants and the ADB have recognised that severe to catastrophic but unspecified impacts in Cambodia have resulted from Yali s construction and operation (Asian Development Bank, 2000a). The EIA goes on to recommend that downstream impact assessments in Cambodia be carried out including an assessment of the impacts from Yali with the view to setting up negotiations over compensation for damages. However, by late 2000 the Vietnamese government formally announced that it no longer needs ADB s assistance to proceed with the Se San 3 hydropower project (Asian Development Bank, 2000b). According to the ADB (Nielsen, 2000), ADB was not formally advised of the reason for this decision. However, we believe that it is due to concerns that further studies would result in further delays and there was still no guarantee that ADB would be in a position to finance Se San 3 once the downstream studies had been completed. LOCAL RESPONSE TO TRUNCATED ASSESSMENTS AND KEY FINDINGS There were no official assessments of downstream impacts in Cambodia by the dam builder, EVN, the Cambodian national government, the Mekong River Committee Secretariat (MRCS), or the ADB. Following large scale flooding and loss of property in early 2000 that were reported to have been the result of large uncontrolled releases of water associated with commissioning tests of the dam s spillway (Asian Development Bank, 2001), it was left to the initiative of local and international Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) working in collaboration with the provincial and district governments, and communities in Ratanakiri and Stung Treng Province to document the impacts. During an initial move to investigate and document local reports of widespread flooding in Ratanakiri Province in February 2000, a loosely bound coalition of international and local NGOs formed the Se San Working Group (SWG) to coordinate the investigative work. Founding members were the Non-Timber Forests Products Project (NTFP), a key Ratanakiri based NGO assisting communities address threats to their natural resources and livelihoods, Phnom Penh based Oxfam America East Asia Regional Office who took the Victoria University of Wellington

6 Asia Pacific Viewpoint Volume 45 No 1 lead to coordinate and resource the group, 2 NGO Forum of Cambodia (NGOF), 3 and Centre d Etude et de Dévelopement Agricole Cambodgien (CEDAC) who led a preliminary fact finding mission to Ratanakiri in March The report of this mission contributed to the above impact analysis. Representatives from other NGOs would join later as the initiative gained momentum, including Partners for Development in Cambodia (PFD), Fisheries Action Coalition Team (FACT), Oxfam Great Britain, and the Culture and Environment Preservation Association (CEPA). This group commissioned two impact studies. They were carried out through the provincial fisheries offices with the assistance of a Canadian fisheries expert with many years of experience working with riverine fishing communities in the region. The studies consisted of rapid rural appraisals (RRA) of all 90 communities located along the Se San River in Cambodia. The first was in Ratanakiri Province in May 2000, and the second in Stung Treng Province in March The findings of these studies (Fisheries Office and NTFP, 2000; Baird et al., 2002) are summarised below. 4 Impacted communities The impacted communities consist mainly of indigenous peoples, totalling approximately 50,000 people. In Ratanakiri Province nine different ethnic groups have been impacted including the Lao, Jarai, Kachok, Tampuan, Brao, Kreung, Khmer, Kavet, and Chinese (Fisheries Office and NTFP, 2000) while in Stung Treng Province seven different ethnic groups have been impacted including the Lao, Lao Deum, Khmer, Khmer Kho, Khmer Padeum, Pnong (Bu Nong) and Kreung (Baird et al., 2002). The following discussion outlines the physical changes in the river and the related impacts of these changes on the affected communities. Unusual flooding events People living in riverine communities along the entire length of the Se San first noticed unusual flooding events in late They initially attributed the unusual river conditions to the spirits that are part of their animist belief systems. This event was later traced back to a construction-related failure of a diversion dam built to facilitate Yali s construction. The community impact at this time was loss of property, livestock, and crops, but those living along the river had no idea that a dam was being constructed upstream. Since then wet season flooding events, which occur naturally and to which communities have long been attuned, have, according to communities, continued to be unusually severe and unpredictable, catching unwary river-users by surprise. According to an associated study, conducted by a human rights lawyer, that collected testimonial evidence, 39 deaths by drowning are attributable to these unpredictable and rapid changes in river flow and height (Lerner, 2002). The impact studies partly attribute these unusual flooding events to wet season flood control operations at Yali, but unusual and rapid water level rises are 56 Victoria University of Wellington 2004

7 April 2004 Scales of conflict in the Se San River Basin also reported to occur in the dry season months. Such unpredictable floods have also caused livestock to drown, boats and fishing nets to be washed away, and loss of crops. The unpredictable nature of the river has created uncertainty within communities and some villages have moved inland into forested areas, creating a different set of impacts. Increased dry-season flows In the dry season months since Yali began operations in 2000, communities have observed that the river level is higher than normal, and this is not related to any unusual rainfall. The impacts of increased dry season flows include disruption to fishing practice utilising normally exposed deep pools, shellfish collection from exposed riverbeds, agricultural production along exposed and fertile river banks, and collection of wild vegetables that grow along exposed river banks during the dry season. While increased dry season water levels have also had a minor positive impact on dry season motorboat travel, communities have pointed out that the negative impacts far outweigh the minor benefits to navigation caused by increased dry season flows. Unpredictable fluctuations in river flow and height Year-round unpredictable fluctuations in river flow and level unrelated to seasonal rainfall also occur at shorter intervals. This has been attributed to the operations of the Yali Falls Dam, which generates electrical power to serve varying Vietnamese electricity demand. In a hydropower plant such as Yali, electricity generation has a direct and positive correlation with the amount of water passing through the turbines and hence with river flow and levels. Such fluctuations in the river flow and level occur sometimes on a diurnal basis (Figure 2) and at other times less predictably separated by days. These unpredictable fluctuations disrupt Se San communities and create a sense of uncertainty and fear, continuing to cause property loss by washing away boats and fishing nets, and affecting livelihood activities such as the ability to use certain fishing practices that rely on a stable river level. These fluctuations have also made it near impossible for communities to practice riverbank agriculture 5 that makes widespread use of exposed fertile riverbanks and sand bars to grow supplementary seasonal crops. This form of agriculture, which is practiced along much of the Mekong and its tributaries, normally forms an important source of communities food security, particularly during the dry season (Blake 2001). Water quality and health impacts At certain times of the year, particularly in the wet season months, water quality in the Se San River is reported to be generally more turbid than it was a decade ago. This has been attributed to increased riverbank erosion and possible riverbed scouring associated with fluctuating river flows and levels. At certain Victoria University of Wellington

8 Asia Pacific Viewpoint Volume 45 No 1 Figure 2. Diurnal fluctuations in river level on the Se San at Andong Meas, 110 km downstream from Yali Falls Dam Source: Data provided by the Mekong River Commission Secretariat, Phnom Penh. times throughout the year, communities report that the river exudes a bad smell, particularly after wet season floods. River water has customarily been utilised along the Se San River for drinking and bathing but since 1996 communities have reported an increase in health-related problems associated with the unusual fluctuations in flow and in particular with unusual water-level rises during both the wet and dry seasons. Reported ailments include itchiness, bumps and eye irritation after bathing in the river, and stomach problems after drinking river water. Fisheries impacts Fish catches have reportedly declined drastically, with larger fish species being affected disproportionately. While the impact studies call for further study, they suggest a number of reasons for the decline. The first is that increased turbidity and sediment loads (from increased riverbank erosion) have reduced the light available for algal growth or smothered bottom-growing algae which are an important food source for some species. High sediment loads have also damaged important fish habitat such as deep pools through sediment deposition and in-filling. The increased turbidity also affects species that are not tolerant to high sediment loads, causing gill irritation. A second reason is that non-seasonal fluctuations in Se San river flows can cause migratory disorientation in fish species where migration is triggered by monsoonal cycles. The Se San villagers are highly dependent on fisheries for food (a major source of protein) and income, and any loss severely affects their food and income security. 58 Victoria University of Wellington 2004

9 April 2004 Scales of conflict in the Se San River Basin CONSOLIDATING AND UP-SCALING LOCAL STRATEGIES At the local level and prior to the formation of the SWG, a Ratanakiri Province Se San Working Group consisting of individuals from various local and international NGOs working in Ratanakiri Province including NTFP and Health Unlimited, and from the government SEILA 6 programme had been investigating and holding meetings at the local level. This group coordinated many of the early initiatives to create consensus at the local level on the need for an investigative study. The first systematic studies (the previously mentioned RRAs) of the impacts of Yali Dam in Ratanakiri Province were carried out from April to May 2000 with the support of the SWG and the Ratanakiri Provincial Se San Working Group. The latter group eventually dissolved as the SWG and later the secretariat of what was to become the Se San Protection Network took on the task of supporting local initiatives. Official responses to the February 2000 reports outlining the impacts consisted of a brief (four-day) Mekong River Commission (MRC) initiated factfinding visit to Ratanakiri Province during March 2000, and a subsequent April 2000 meeting between the Cambodian and Vietnamese Governments, neither of which had led to any effective outcomes by mid Concerned about the apparent inaction at official levels, and based on reports of continuing impacts being experienced in Ratanakiri and Stung Treng Provinces, Oxfam America East Asia Regional Office and partners in the SWG responded by taking a more strategic approach in support of affected communities beyond the already completed studies. Following discussions between representatives of the SWG, communities, and provincial and district governments from Ratanakiri and Stung Treng Provinces during the first half of 2001, a proposal to set up a Se San Protection Network (SPN) 7 spanning Ratanakiri and Stung Treng was prepared cooperatively between NTFP and the Global Association for People and Environment (GAPE), and was subsequently received at Oxfam America East Asia Regional Office in July Despite what they perceive as an ambiguous and ineffective response from the MRC, Cambodian National Mekong Committee (CNMC) and Vietnam National Mekong Committee (VNMC) to the Se San problem, the SPN has assessed that engagement and negotiation through these key agencies and other donor-related agencies would be central to their strategy. A phased approach was envisaged. The first one-year phased work programme began in December 2001 and was designed to consolidate and develop a sound research base that would provide evidence to back up community concerns and claims. This aspect of the strategy arose out of initial provincial government concerns that further studies were required to provide scientifically sound evidence of the link between Yali Hydropower Dam and the impacts being felt by communities. At the same time, it was realised that there was a need in this first phase to assist with the formation of a community network able to drive, coordinate and legitimise various consultation, planning and representational processes related to further studies and negotiations. Finally, to support the studies and Victoria University of Wellington

10 Asia Pacific Viewpoint Volume 45 No 1 communities with technical and advocacy support, a strategy involving coalitionbuilding at the local, national, regional and international level was also seen as essential. A strategy was developed and the SPN was formed in December A Se San Secretariat was established and based at NTFP, Ratanakiri Province. The primary task of this Secretariat is to implement the components of the SPN work programme at the local level. Providing local strategic advice to the Secretariat is the Se San Steering Committee, consisting of senior indigenous members associated with NTFP. This Secretariat, while based in Ratanakiri, coordinates and assists with activities in Stung Treng Province together with PFD. By mid-year 2002, CEPA had taken over responsibility from PFD to provide local implementing and strategic capacity in Stung Treng Province. At the central level in Phnom Penh, Oxfam America East Asia Regional Office and members of the SWG supported the Ratanakiri-based Se San Secretariat with national advocacy support and coordination. However, Oxfam America East Asia Regional Office was keen to move this responsibility to a local NGO. By the end of 2002, the SPN had shifted the primary responsibility for national advocacy support and coordination to NGOF. Oxfam America East Asia Regional Office has also played a pivotal role in coordinating, building, and working with the regional and international coalition providing technical, advocacy, and advisory support to the SPN. At the core of the international coalition is the Se San Project Advisory Board, an informal and non-executive group of individuals and organisations including NGOs and academics. This coalition has played a role in providing networking opportunities and co-organising national and international forums where the SPN could present its views. With the establishment of the SPN in December of 2001, development and strengthening of the community network began in earnest, in particular to develop a legitimate in the eyes of local communities representational structure able to voice a unified message and appeal. Three rounds of formal district meetings took place during Participants in these meetings included district governors, commune chiefs, village chiefs, village elders, village focal persons, and a number of local officials representing education, health and agriculture offices of the district government, and the Se San Secretariat. Initially, the SPN set up seven focal villages or reference villages with which to consult and to implement monitoring activities. By the third set of meetings held in October 2002, the SPN made a significant move toward extending the network beyond the seven focal villages. Discussions in the district meetings turned to the representational structures and members that would become key once the communities began to take on opportunities to negotiate outcomes. It was decided that a committee dealing with Se San issues would be formed based on commune-level representation, since this would make use of an existing formal local governance structure already in place. 8 Some villagers had recommended that the committee be formally convened and represented by the commune government. However, this was vetoed at meetings by a majority of villagers who felt that their Commune Council duties might not allow enough 60 Victoria University of Wellington 2004

11 April 2004 Scales of conflict in the Se San River Basin time for them to work on Se San issues. A final resolution settled on nominations of unencumbered and respected villagers who were then approved by the village elder councils. The first test of the commune-level Se San Committees came shortly after, when the SPN successfully presented a unified statement of concerns and demands at the first National Se San Workshop held on 27 November Although key Cambodian government representatives from relevant national agencies such as the CNMC and the Ministry of Water Resources and Meteorology were invited to participate in the workshop, they declined to attend, citing other commitments. Conspicuously absent also were the MRCS who declined an invitation to participate lest it be seen to be partisan since Vietnam had not been invited. 9 However, the workshop was attended by a large contingent of government representatives from the two provinces, including the Governor of Ratanakiri Province and the Vice Governor of Stung Treng Province. At the workshop, SPN representatives from Ratanakiri Province requested assistance in five areas (Ratanakiri Se San Communities, 2002). 1. We request that the government along with organizations (international) help stop the construction of hydropower dams on the Se San River, particularly Se San 3 and Se San We request that the natural flow of the river be restored. 3. We request that the dam builders and stakeholders who have funded the construction of the dam compensate villagers for all lost and destroyed property and equipment. 4. We request that the government of Cambodia negotiate with the government of Vietnam to find a solution. 5. We request that the MRC and stakeholders come to the provinces to study the impacts in consultation with the people along the Se San River. Similar requests were made by the SPN representatives from Stung Treng. These requests have arisen against a background of growing frustration and impatience on the part of the Se San villagers who continue to face a future with no resolution in sight almost three years after national-level decisionmakers had been made aware of the problems and some seven years since they first began to experience unusual water flows and changes in water quality. At the workshop, a member of the Se San Steering Committee told the audience that the Se San had become a hot area (AMRC, 2002b). OFFICIAL RESPONSES TO NON-OFFICIAL POST-FACTO ASSESSMENTS In both Ratanakiri and Stung Treng Provinces, the Provincial Governments have provided strong support for the initiatives of the SPN. They have requested, approved, and supported the various studies through active participation, provision of personnel, and hosting of workshops. The Ratanakiri Governor was Victoria University of Wellington

12 Asia Pacific Viewpoint Volume 45 No 1 the first to announce the problems along the Se San to the media (Roeun, 2000) and the third Deputy-Governor of Stung Treng Province was the first to do a field survey along the Se San River in Stung Treng Province. In publicly released statements at the National Se San Workshop, the Ratanakiri and Stung Treng governments have supported the findings of the Ratanakiri and Stung Treng impact studies, arguing that the reported impacts were not present before Yali was built. Cautiously they have supported the view that the wide range of impacts is partly caused by the operations of Yali Dam and that this was causing economic hardship for communities. Reflecting their own impotence in solving the problem, the Provincial Governors have appealed to the national government to work with the Vietnamese Government to find a resolution and for the MRCS to assist the two governments. Supporting community views, the Ratanakiri Governor and Stung Treng Deputy Governor appealed for the Se San River to be returned to its natural state. Feeling community impatience, the Ratanakiri Governor supported the earlier view expressed by the member of the Se San Steering Committee that the Se San issue had become a hot issue and that the responsible parties needed to treat the issue with urgency (AMRC, 2002b). The MRCS response has been to claim to be hamstrung by its own mandate. From 2 to 3 September 2002, Secretariat members, together with the Regional Director of Oxfam America East Asia Regional Office attended the Australian component of The Dialogue on River Basin Development and Civil Society in the Mekong Basin. At this one-and-a half day workshop organised by a number of the SPN s international coalition partners that included the Australian Mekong Resource Centre from the University of Sydney the Se San Secretariat were able to directly question the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the MRCS with regards to the role of the MRC in resolving the impacts of Yali. While pointing out that the genesis of the Yali problem preceded the formation of the MRC in 1995, he advised that the matter was out of his hands and that the SPN should take their concerns directly to the Cambodian Government. He also pointed out that the MRC s 1995 Agreement had established a dispute resolution process involving the respective member governments and asserted that the MRC was beholden to follow this process. These views were similarly repeated by the MRCs at the second stage of the dialogue held in Ubon Ratchathani, Thailand, held on 8 12 November At the MRC s 7 th Council Meeting in October 2000, the MRC facilitated the establishment of the Cambodia-Vietnam Joint Committee for the Management of the Se San River (referred to as the Cambodia-Vietnam Joint Committee from hereon). The MRCS s mandate (see MRC, 1995) to initiate the matter between the two members at council level is addressed under Article 34, 18C, 24F, and 35 of the 1995 Agreement. Under Article 34, the process is driven by the MRC. If no resolution is achievable, the next step in the process, Article 35, mandates that the governments in dispute enter into a government-togovernment negotiating process. Accordingly, resolution of the Se San issue is now taking place under Article 35 through the meetings of the Cambodia-Vietnam Joint Committee. 62 Victoria University of Wellington 2004

13 April 2004 Scales of conflict in the Se San River Basin The establishment of this committee is a significant test case for the MRC s dispute resolution mechanisms. The Se San case is the first to invoke Articles 34, 18C, 24F and 35. To date, this Joint Committee has sat twice. The 26 July 2001 meeting was hosted by the VNMC at Nha Trang, and the 9 April 2002 meeting was hosted by the CNMC in Phnom Penh. The MRCS participates in these meetings by providing facilitators, language interpreters, and neutral technical advice/data. Significantly the SPN and the provincial governments, as key stakeholders in the Se San dispute, have not been invited to participate in these meetings. Crucially, there is no political representation in the Cambodia- Vietnam Joint Committee. Cambodian negotiators represent the Department of Water Resources, the CNMC, and the Ministry of Environment while Vietnamese negotiators represent the Ministry of Industry, EVN, VNMC, and the Yali Falls Dam management, all of whom are technocrats. At the first meeting, the first agenda item focused on discussions to improve Vietnamese-Cambodian communications regarding water releases that had earlier been agreed to during the first MRC sponsored April 2000 meeting between the two governments, but which had not been working effectively because of poor physical communications infrastructure in Ratanakiri Province (pers. comm., 2 September, 2002a). An agreement to carry out water quality analyses was also agreed to. These were carried out by Cambodia and Vietnamese government agencies in May and November 2001 respectively. Both concluded that there were no problems with water quality. The Ratanakiri Governor later singled out the Cambodian study, stating that it was inadequate (it took only two days!) and called for more comprehensive studies. Through his own personal experience, he had witnessed deteriorating water quality in the river that had affected the health of his constituents (AMRC, 2002b). The second item on the agenda centred on the proposed Terms of Reference (ToRs) for the hydrodynamic modelling of the Se San Basin and an EIA of the Se San River from the Vietnamese border to Voen Sai District in Ratanakiri Province, Cambodia. If carried out, this would be the first nationally sanctioned cross-border impact study carried out in the Se San River Basin. The Cambodians were asked to comment on the ToRs as soon as possible. These ToRs were subsequently provided to the MRCS and to SPN, both of whom provided the government with detailed recommendations in early 2002 that were subsequently taken to the next Cambodia-Vietnam Joint Committee meeting. At the second Cambodia-Vietnam Joint Committee meeting on 9 April 2002, information exchange on Yali s operations continued, the ToRs were further discussed, and the MRCS provided prepared graphs of hourly data of Se San River levels for year 2001 for discussion. In the negotiations on the ToRs, the Vietnamese agreed to Cambodian demands to extend the scope of the studies to the entire length of the Se San River in Cambodia and for a study on fisheries impacts to be included these were recommendations that the MRCS and SPN had made. However, disagreement remained as to the consultants that would carry out the studies and Cambodian involvement. Vietnam had proposed Sweco and Statkraft Growner, two consulting companies who have been involved in previous Se San 3 studies, deemed inadequate by the ADB Victoria University of Wellington

14 Asia Pacific Viewpoint Volume 45 No 1 (2001), and in present studies related to Vietnam s National Hydropower Plan. The Cambodians were concerned about the potential conflict of interest, and resolution was not reached. The final ToRs have still to be agreed to since the first draft, at least three drafts have shuttled back and forth unsighted by the SPN. According to the Vietnamese delegation at the Ubon Dialogue, they were still awaiting final comments from the Cambodians (AMRC, 2002a). Cambodian representatives to the Cambodia-Vietnam Joint Committee have often claimed that they are unable to raise community concerns because they do not have adequate scientific evidence to present a case and as a result the Vietnamese have just talked around their concerns (pers. comm., 2 September 2002b). Yet the hourly river level data provided by the MRCS showing diurnal fluctuations of river levels that vary by as much as one meter in a 24 hour period would constitute hard scientific evidence of significant changes in the river hydrology (Figure 2). According to members in the Cambodian delegation (pers. comm., 2 September 2002b) there has been no discussion, recognition and analysis of the impacts of such large diurnal fluctuations in the meetings. Rather, discussion within the Joint Committee meetings has focused on increased minimum dry season flows. The Vietnamese delegation at the Ubon Dialogue, consisting of key members from Vietnam s Ministry of Industry, EVN and the Vietnam National Mekong Committee, similarly ignored the issue of diurnal fluctuations and instead concentrated on arguing the benefits of increased annual dry season flow to which they verbally agreed to ensure in the second Joint Committee meeting, though no details were forthcoming at the meeting (Cambodia-Vietnam Joint Committee, 2002). However, some of the major concerns of villagers have related to the loss of land for in-river agriculture from both increased dry season flows and diurnal fluctuations, loss of boats and fishing gear as a result of unpredictable changes in river flow and levels, the difficulties of setting overnight fishing lines in the river in the face of unpredictable diurnal fluctuations, and the psychological impact of unpredictable river flows and levels. According to representatives of the Cambodian delegation (pers. comm., 2 September 2002a; 2 September 2002b) neither the Cambodian government nor the MRCS has provided any interpretation or analysis of the data and how it might relate to the impacts that villagers have experienced. DISCUSSION: NEGOTIATION, CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNANCE The Se San case represents a clear test case for an international river basin authority s ability to respond to community concerns in the management of a shared river. The river basin development in question is located in the territory of one riparian state Vietnam and its benefits are largely confined within that country. The impacts are felt in both Vietnam and Cambodia, but the majority of affected communities are located in the downstream riparian state. Vietnam has admitted responsibility for the most destructive water releases in early 2000, but is continuing to press ahead with further dams on the Se San 64 Victoria University of Wellington 2004

15 April 2004 Scales of conflict in the Se San River Basin River, while to date no compensation for affected communities in Cambodia has been forthcoming. At one level, it would seem that there is an impasse with non-negotiable positions on each side. The affected communities in SPN are adamant that no further dams should be built and that the operating regime of Yali Falls should be adjusted so that the river s hydrological regime returns closer to its natural state. Vietnam appears to have no intention of cancelling its plans for building further dams on the Se San River. International agencies including the World Bank and the ADB continue to provide loans to connect these projects to Vietnam s national power grid, while maintaining that they are not involved directly in the hydropower projects. The Mekong River Commission limits interpretation of its mandate to responding to the governments, rather than civil society voices, of the riparian states. The Se San communities have attempted to deal with the existing dam and influence the future direction of development on the Se San River by seeking to build a coalition of governmental and non-governmental interests within Cambodia who would be in a position to engage Vietnam in dialogue or bring pressure to bear through the Mekong River Commission and other agencies. To date, these attempts have been truncated at the provincial government level. Within the wider context of unequal power relations between Cambodia and Vietnam, there is reluctance on the part of the Cambodian government to make an issue out of Yali Falls and other developments on the Se San River. In turn, the Mekong River Commission has no government complainant to whom a response is mandated. Together with SPN, we have been documenting the Se San case as part of an international project on River basin management: a negotiated approach. The project seeks to showcase promising approaches employed by grassroots groups and communities that involve up-scaling local action in order to involve river basin communities in sustainable and equitable management of their rivers. To date, there has been little that could realistically be termed negotiation between the communities and SPN, on the one hand, and Electricity of Vietnam on the other. Governance arrangements entered into by the intermediaries in whom the communities placed some hope at the outset, notably CNMC and MRCS, have not proven responsive to community concerns. However, the Se San communities dilemma and increasing frustration is not only a result of inadequate governance arrangements. Basic questions over the status of knowledge brought to bear in the process are also crucial. On the one hand, shoddy EIA, latterly critiqued strongly even in a mainstream agency s document (Asian Development Bank, 2000a) has underpinned a project over which those affected by the predictable but unpredicted impacts have no recourse. The same company that carried out this EIA is the preferred tenderer, employing public funds, to carry out further studies for future projects on the same river. On the other hand, the knowledge of the affected communities has been systematically denigrated as unscientific and unverifiable. This knowledge status gap further disempowers the Cambodian side in the formal intergovernmental forum established by MRC to negotiate on the issue. Victoria University of Wellington

16 Asia Pacific Viewpoint Volume 45 No 1 Clearly, river management and conflict management in the Mekong River Basin needs to be more responsive to the river users themselves. If this is to happen, the Mekong River Commission, the donor agencies that fund it, the consultants who staff its projects and the non-governmental voices whose advocacy may have some influence over its future directions, need to broaden their understanding of the Commission s riparian constituency. They need to acknowledge the power plays inherent in transboundary committees that are constituted at a governmental level, moving away from stakeholder configurations that are structured mainly by government-to-government relations. In terms of governance, this suggests a fundamental rethink of the relationship between the river basin commission and the riparian actors to whom it is accountable. Ultimately, the relationship between civil society actors, notably riparian communities such as those along the Se San, and their national governments (especially National Mekong Committees) will help determine the level of buy-in to a different sort of river basin organisation that is more responsive to a multi-layered stakeholder constituency. In the shorter term, international development assistance donors who support the MRC are much more likely to have a significant influence. This will require careful analysis of the shortcomings of current governance structures, and the Se San experience is an excellent case in point from which to draw and move forward. NOTES 1 Spelt as Ialy in Vietnamese. 2 Formerly known as Oxfam America South-East Asia Regional Office (SEARO). 3 A key umbrella NGO representing a network of over 60 active Cambodian and international NGOs, and working to advocate on issues of concern to the Cambodian people and NGOs working in Cambodia. 4 It is worth noting that a study (CRES, 2001) carried out in February 2001 by the Centre for Natural Resources and Environmental Studies, Vietnam National University, of downstream areas of the Yali Dam on the Vietnamese side has reported that 306 households (likely to be more households since only two out of the three downstream villages were surveyed) have been impacted by the Yali Falls Dam. The reported impacts are similar to those reported in Cambodia. These have included property, livestock and agricultural losses from unpredictable and unusual floods, water quality changes affecting health, and impacts on fisheries. 5 Also known as flood zone agriculture. 6 The government sponsored SEILA Program is an experimental national decentralisation process that began in It has provided provincial and district governments with a platform to work together with local communities and in cooperation with NGOs, in developing village, commune and district development plans addressing issues such as resource mapping, collective land ownership, protection of economic, social and cultural rights, and co-management (Ojendal et al., 2002). 7 More correctly the Se San River Protection Community Network project and sometimes referred to as the Se San Project. 8 Cambodia introduced Commune level government for the first time in post Khmer Rouge Cambodia in February of 2002 during which Commune government representatives were elected from candidates put up by Cambodia s major political parties. 9 The VNMC and MRCS had previously been invited and had accepted but a late decision by the Se San Steering Committee to only have the Cambodian Government (and 66 Victoria University of Wellington 2004

17 April 2004 Scales of conflict in the Se San River Basin MRCS) present in order to build and gain initial support from the Cambodian government led to a hasty withdrawal of the VNMC invitation. This was a strategic decision by the Se San Steering Committee who felt that without consolidation of support from within the Cambodian national government. A prematurely inclusive forum would in fact undermine any attempt to engage with the Vietnamese. REFERENCES AMRC (Australian Mekong Resource Centre) (2002a) Video recording of Dialogue on River Basin Development and Civil Society in the Mekong: Ubon conference. AMRC (2002b) National Se San Workshop, Mi Casa Hotel, 27 November 2002, Phnom Penh. Workshop minutes, Australian Mekong Resource Centre (AMRC). Asian Development Bank (2000a) Se San 3 Hydropower Project, Yali/Se San 3 Environmental and Social Impact Analysis Study, PPTA VIE, April 2000, Worley WTL Ltd., Asian Development Bank. Asian Development Bank (2000b) Se San 3 Update, Manila, Asian Development Bank, [ documents/ profiles/ ppta/se San3.asp]. Accessed 2 January 2003b. Asian Development Bank (2001) Phase II Final Report Environmental, Social and Technical Analysis for Se San 3 Hydropower Project: Volume 6, Minority Peoples Development Plan, Manila, Asian Development Bank. Baird, I., M. Baird, C.M. Cheath, K. Sangha, N. Mekradee, P. Sounith, P.B. Nyok, P. Sarim, R. Savdee, H. Rushton, and S. Phen (2002) A Community-Based Study of the Downstream Impacts of the Yali Falls Dam Along the Se San, Sre Pok and Sekong Rivers in Stung Treng Province, Northeast Cambodia, March 2002, Ratanakiri: Report published by Se San Protection Network Project, Partners For Development, Non Timber Forest Products Project, Se San District Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry Office, and Se San District Office. Blake, David (2001) The status, threats to, and potential flood zone agriculture in the Lower Mekong Basin, with reference to a case study on two major lowland rivers in northeastern Thailand, unpublished MSc dissertation, Imperial College at Wye, University of London: London. Both ENDS (2000) Towards People Oriented River Basin Management: An NGO Vision. Input to the World Water Vision process, the Framework for Action and the World Water Forum, Both ENDS: Netherlands. Both ENDS (date?): Cambodia-Vietnam Joint Committee (2002) Minutes of second meeting between Cambodian and Vietnamese Committees for the Management of the Se San River, Nha Trang, 9 April CRES (2001) Study into impact of Yali Falls Dam on resettled and downstream communities, February 2001, Hanoi: Centre for Natural Resources and Environmental Studies, Vietnam National University. Chenoweth, J. and Bird, J. (2000) Public participation in multi-jurisdictional river basins: the Murray Darling and Mekong River Basins, paper presented at the Tenth World Water Conference, March 2000, Melbourne, Edmunds, D. and E. Wollenburg (2001) A strategic approach to multi-stakeholder negotiations, Development and Change, 32(2): Electrowatt (1993) Environmental and Financing Studies on the Yali Falls Hydropower Project (Basin wide). Volume 1. Executive Summary, May 1993, Bangkok: Mekong Secretariat and Ministry of Energy, Socialist Republic of Viet Nam. Fisheries Office and NTFP (2000) A Study of Downstream Impacts of the Yali Falls Dam in the Se San River Basin in Ratanakiri Province, Northeast Cambodia, Ratanakiri Province: The Fisheries Office, Ratanakiri Province. Halcrow and Partners (1998) Sekong-Se San and Nam Theun River Basins Hydropower Development Study, Manila: Asian Development Bank. Victoria University of Wellington