Sub-state nationalism and immigrant integration entwined: theorizing the nexus.

Transcription

1 Sub-state nationalism and immigrant integration entwined: theorizing the nexus. Paper prepared for the for the ISPA-ECPR Joint Conference Whatever happened to North-South, Sao Paulo, Section: Migration, Citizenship and Democracy, February 16 to 19, 2011 Ilke Adam Post-doctoral researcher Post address: Institute for European Studies Vrije Universiteit Brussel Pleinlaan Brussels t: ilke.adam@vub.ac.be 1

2 Introduction Immigrant integration policy-making raises particular dilemmas for elites engaged in sub-state nation building processes. To include newcomers could reduce the cultural homogeneity put forward in the nation building process, but to exclude them could reduce the demographic force of the region. To include immigrants and actively promote cultural diversity could damage the searched cultural homogeneity, but trying to assimilate them could show an intolerant image. Notwithstanding this interlocking of immigrant integration and sub-state nationalism, the relation between the two phenomena has not yet been very much studied in the political science literature. The separate and over-whelming literatures on nationalism and immigrant integration barely address the link between both phenomena (Kymlicka, 2001: 62; Zapata- Barrero, 2009). The very scarse and dispersed academic work can even be divided in two separate debates, a first one dealing with the normative relation between cultural demands of immigrants and sub-state nations (Zapata-Barrero, 2009; Kymlycka, 2001; Carens, 2000: Bauböck, 2001) and a second, touching upon possible types of empirical relations between sub-state nationalism and immigrant policy frames. This paper will deal with the latter. In the first section of this paper I will present three different proposed theoretical explanations of the nexus between sub-state nationalism and immigrant integration policy frames which can be found in the literature. I will highlight their shortcomings, inspired by empirical evidence on Belgium. In the second section of this paper, I will suggest a categorization of immigrant integration policy frames, stipulating how I deviate from existing categorizations. Finally, in the last section, I will suggest a fourth theorization of the nexus between sub-state nationalism and immigrant integration policy, namely the relation between sub-state nationalism and interventionist cultural integration policies. Empirical research on Belgium will be used to illustrate the heuristic device of this new theorization. The theorization of the nexus between sub-state nationalism and immigrant integration policy 2

3 The literature on nationalism evokes a first cognitive structural relation between (substate) nationalism and immigrant policy frames, by associating nationalism and racism (Nairn, 1977; Hobsbawn, 1990 Balibar, 1990). Eric Hobsbawn talks about the obvious links between nationalism and racism (Hobsbawn, 1990: 108) and the practice, at the high days of nation building, of using both as virtual synonyms. Hobsbawn refers to the excluding character of nationalism by giving the example of nationalist education there is no more effective way of bonding together the disparate sections of restless peoples than to unite them against outsiders (p 91). This example is also highlighted by Etienne Balibar stating that racism can assist nationalism in its effort to unite, namely by contrasting the racialized others (Balibar, 1990: 60). In the case of sub-state nationalism, more often ethnic then civic, the relationship between nationalism and racism is considered to be even more obvious. Will Kymlicka (2001), in a chapter on immigrant integration and minority nationalism, mentions different authors (Ignatieff, 1993 ;Hollinger, 1995; Frank, 1997) seeing minority nationalism as inherently ethnic (which he contests). Ethnic nationalism, based on common blood and descent does not allow an immigrant to enter the nation, contrary to civic nationalism, which is based on shared principles. On the basis of these writings and also because of the fear of sub-state nationalists that immigrants will prefer to integrate the majority culture and thus diminish their demographical and political force 1, one can expect that sub-state nations will rather adopt an exclusive than an inclusive policy towards immigrants. This cognitive structural link between sub-state nationalism and immigrant integration has its shortcomings. It does not allow to explain policy change in sub-state nations. Moreover, this explanation does not survive its empirical verification if one considers the immigrant integration policies in for example Québec or the attitude towards foreigners by Scottish regionalist parties (Hepburn, 2009). Even in Flanders, where civic nationalism can far from being considered as hegemonic, immigrant integration policies are often more inclusive, open or multicultural then those developed in Wallonia or Francophone 1 This has been shown to be the case with regard to the debate over the enfranchizement of foreigners in Belgium, where the Flemish were reluctant to grant this right to foreigners, fearing the immigrants would vote for Francophone parties in Brussels and its surroundings (Jacobs, 1999). 3

4 Brussels which convey a more civic or cosmopolitan identity. Examples to illustrate this are the welfare policy towards undocumented migrants and the multicultural policy promoting and subsidizing immigrant associations, both non existing in the Francophone part of the country (Adam, 2009). Will Kymlicka (2001), in a mostly normative debate, suggests a second, institutional relationship between sub-state nationalism and immigrant integration, namely the connection between the evolving degree of autonomy of the sub-state nation and the evolution towards a more tolerant multiculturalist immigrant integration policy. According to this author, minority nationalisms are not inherently illiberal, premodern or xenophobic. Some are, some are not assuming that minority nationalisms should be studied case by case by examining the nature of its self-understandings and aspirations (Kymlicka, 2001: 79). Kymlicka recognizes that it is not selfevident for minority nationalists to favour a tolerant multicultural immigrant policy because of the perceived threat of seeing their distinct culture disappear by the integration of immigrants into the majority culture. The conflictual relation between minority nationalism and immigrant integration, Kymlicka argues, will thus continue to exist. According to Kymlicka, it is possible that national minorities develop a tolerant multiculturalist immigrant integration policy if certain institutional conditions are fulfilled. Immigration as well as immigrant integration policy should be the object of devolution towards the sub-state nation. This form of self-government will then lead to a re-inforced self-esteem allowing the development of more liberal multiculturalist immigrant integration policies. This institutionalist perspective presents the advantage, contrary to the cognitive structural perspective, to make it possible to explain the change of sub-national integration policies. Primarly based on the Québec example, this institionalist link cannot be confirmed for Flanders. Due to the successive state reforms since 1980, Flanders (as well the Flemish Community as the Flemish Region) has gained a considerable package of competences whereover it has exclusive legislative power (Deschouwer, 2009). Amongst others cultural policy, educationnal policy, (partially) employment policy, housing policy, health policy and immigrant integration policy have been devolved to the sub-federal autorities. Due to this steadily growing self-government and Flanders increasing economic power, the self-confidence of the Flemish political elite seems indeed to have increased. It is expressed in the ever far-reaching demands for autonomy. Nevertheless, this grown 4

5 self-confidence seems not to have led to a more liberal multicultural integration policy as the institutionalist link would predict. On the contrary, the gained selfconfidence due to devolution seems to have been translated in an interventionnist assimilationnist integration policy, obliging new migrants and Belgians with an immigrant background to follow dutch-language and civic integration courses since (Adam, 2010). Immediately after devolution, in 1980, the first Flemish immigrant integration policies were multiculturalist, acknowledging the importance of the recognition of immigrant cultures as a means to promote the participation in mainstream society. This multiculturalist stance of the Flemish immigrant integration policy, moreover very much promoted by the (moderate) nationalists (the regionalist party, VolksUnie), can be attributed to the similar historical importance given to Flemish associations for the emancipation of the Flemish people 3. The multiculturalist character of the Flemish integration policy has also been assigned to the idea of the Flemish political elite «not to let endure others what we had to undergo ourselves», (Martiniello, 1996; Jacobs & Rea, 2004) namely cultural assimilation (by the Francophones). The multiculturalist policy frame stayed dominant until 1999, and became more and more an interventionnist multiculturalist policy, especially and paradoxically after the electoral breakthrough of the extreme right party Vlaams Blok in The ever bigger spending power of the Flemish sub-state and the gained self-confidence of the Flemish political elite allowed, contrary to what the institutionalist link would predict, to put aside the Flemish trauma of cultural domination and to assimilate the «others». A third, strategic link, between sub-state nationalism and immigrant integration policy is evoked in case-studies on immigrant integration policies of sub-state nations. These case-studies demonstrate the connection between the interest of the minority nation to enhance its demographic and political power and a particular immigrant integration policy. In several cases, this linkage can be inclusionary, namely the adoption of an inclusionary but (language) assimilationist integration policy. In these examples exclusion is turned into inclusion for strategic reasons. This strategic relation has been shown to exist for example in Québec (Carens, 1995), Brussels (Jacobs, 2000) and for the old migrants and Belgians with an immigrant background 3 The Flemish parliamentary debates with regard to immigrant integration are full of references to the historical importance of Flemish self-organisations for the emancipation of the Flemish, and the paralel treatment which should be given to immigrant associations (Adam, 2009). 5

6 Catalonia (Pujolar, 2010), especially in relation to educational policies for immigrants. The Québecois government, actively recruiting immigrants abroad, obliges immigrants to send their children to Francophone schools. This way they try to turn immigrants into minority language speakers and to increase the political and demographic force of the group. The Flemish in Brussels try to enhance their demographic and political strength by foreseeing more or less triple as much places in Flemish Brussels schools as there are Dutch speakers 4 (Naudt & Plompen, 2008), to be filled with immigrant children and non Dutch-speaking Belgians. Another example of this strategic link concerns the implementation of the Flemish civic integration policy in bi-lingual Brussels where Dutch-speakers are a small demographic minority. The Flemish Community provides extensive financial means and a prestigious location in the Brussels city centre to the Brussels welcome office BON (Brussels Onthaalbureau Nieuwkomers). Migrants and non Dutch speakers can inform about and follow Dutch language courses, they can assist civic integration courses in their native language or a contact language and they can obtain private counselling. By these means, the Flemish Community tries to enhance the prestige of the Flemish community and language in Brussels. This interest-based explanation of sub-state national policies has also been highlighted with regard to the very much related immigration policies. The open immigration policies of Catalonia, Québec and Scotland and their defence by regionalist parties (Hepburn, 2009) can be attributed to the considered interest of fortifying the sub-state nation demographically. This interest-based explanation of sub-national immigrant integration policies can nevertheless not explain the immigrant integration policy of Flanders as a whole which, with its 6 million inhabitants largely outnumbers the Francophones. Different then other «minority nations», Flanders is not a minority nation in a demographic sense. The interests of strengthening its demographic power through immigration or immigrant integration policies are thus neglectable. The categorisation of immigrant integration policy frames The scarse literature connecting sub-state nationalism and immigrant integration has not yet integrated the rich categorization exercises made in comparative immigrant 4 The official nomination of the language spoken by the Flemish is Dutch. Flemish is a variant of the Dutch language. 6

7 integration policy studies, limiting itself to the distinction between inclusionary versus exclusionary, or ethnocentric versus multiculturalist policy frames. In the second section of this paper, I will suggest a categorization of immigrant integration policy frames stipulating how I deviate from existing categorizations from the comparative immigrant integration policy literature. Rogers Brubaker (1992) study on citzienship in Germany and France was a catalyst in the research on comparative immigrant integration or citizenship policies. It meant the start of a flourishing literature categorizing different national immigrant integration policy frames. The author defends the idea that current public policies related to immigrants are conditioned by cultural idioms of nationhood which make the farreaching reorganisation of these policies unlikely, once they are in place. The conception of nationhood influencing citizenship policies in France is considered as assimilationist and more centred on the state in France, and more ethnocultural and differentialist in Germany (Brubaker, 1992: 40). Five main criticisms have been directed at R. Brubaker s research on citizenship policies in France and Germany, and at work by other authors using the same paradigm to explain integration policies. Firstly, they have been criticised for their determinism and their inability to explain changes in public policies (Favell, 2001; Feldblum, 1999; Joppke, 1999; Guiraudon, 2000; Bleich, 2003). Secondly, the approach in terms of cultural idioms does not succeed in explaining temporary or partial deviations of the dominant paradigm at certain times 5. Thirdly, it is difficult for the traditions of citizenship to account for the convergences of the different public policies with regard to their implementation. Several authors have demonstrated that independently of political debates and rhetoric at national level, the practical management of living together in diversity has often led to convergent solutions at local level (Lapeyronnie,, 1993; Weil & Crowley, 1994; Martiniello, 1997; Schain, 1999; Moore, 2001; Poppelaars & Scholten, 2008). A fourth criticism directed at Brubaker (Jacobs, 1998) concerns its underestimation of the roles of actors involved and their interests in the explanation of divergent policies. These factors, contrary to the cultural idioms of nationhood, make it possible to explain differences between nation-states with similar conceptions of citizenship. A fifth criticism made of R. 5 R. Brubaker does not succeed in explaining the period marked by the multicultural policy of the "right to be different" led by the socialist government in France in the 1980s. 7

8 Brubaker s categorisation is that it does not take into account the dimension of cultural rights, which is central to the debate on multiculturalism (Koopmans and Statham, 2000). Brubaker s analysis of integration policies is limited to the rights associated with the formal access to citizenship. Different typologies of integration policies or integration models were developed following the distinction made by R. Brubaker between the German ethnocultural model and the French assimilationist model. The distinction quoted most often defines three integration models, with varying names depending on the authors (Castles & Miller, 1993; Castles, 1994; Castles, 1995; Hollifield, 1997). It responds to the criticism that studies should not be limited to the criteria of formal access to citizenship (Koopmans & Statham, 2000). Stephen Castles (1995) makes a distinction between a differentialist model (or differentiated exclusion), also called segregationist or immigrant workers model by others (Hollifield, 1997); an assimilationist model and, finally, a pluralist or multiculturalist model, also called ethnic minorities model (Hollifield, 1997). Assimilationist and multiculturalist models are differentiated from the differentialist model by their objective of the socioeconomic and political integration of immigrants and their desire to achieve a certain degree of social cohesion (Vermeulen & Slijper, 2003). The difference between the assimilationist and multiculturalist model lies in the way of achieving the objectives of equality and social cohesion: by promoting the reduction of differences (assimilationism) or by recognising, celebrating or even promoting differences (multiculturalism) (Vermeulen & Slijper, 2003). These typologies or integration models have three disadvantages. Firstly, like the R. Brubaker citizenship model, these models are too static and do not make it possible to explain the evolution of models, policy change and the different positions of actors involved within the same state (Joppke, 1996; Koopmans & Statham, 2000). Secondly, as put forward by Koopmans and Statham (2000), if these typologies concern two dimensions of citizenship - that of formal access (ethnic versus civic) and that defining the cultural obligations which such citizenship implies (multiculturalist versus assimilationist) - they do not exhaust all the possibilities. If there are two dimensions, it should be possible to achieve four models, not three, by combining them (Koopmans & Statham, 2000: 20). To systematise these two criticisms, Ruud 8

9 Koopmans and Paul Statham (2000) developed a two-dimensional conceptual space making it possible to situate the different conceptions of citizenship. This conceptualisation helps formulate the third criticism I address to the typology of national integration models. The situation of policy frames or policy instruments within this two dimensional space makes it possible to show their varying degrees of coherence. The typologies presented above are based on the idea that policy frames are relatively coherent, quite explicit and free of contradiction. Table 1: The two dimensional conceptual space for situating conceptions of citizenship, by Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham Source: Koopmans & Statham (2000) The vertical axis of the two dimensional conceptualisation by R. Koopmans and P. Statham is a continuum going from an ideal type conception of the Kulturnation, which promotes ethno-cultural links as the basis for belonging to a political 9

10 community, to an ideal type conception of the Staatsnation, which favours a constructivist, universalist approach to the political community and awards citizenship on a territorial basis (Koopmand & Statham, 2000: 20). The cultural dimension of citizenship is found on the horizontal axis going from an ideal-type conception of cultural monism - which focuses on the safeguarding, the reestablishment or the promotion of compliance with a cultural model, at least in public, to be shared by all citizens - to an ideal type conception of cultural pluralism - which prefers to maintain or favours cultural heterogeneity and authorises citizens to express their cultural differences in public (Koopmans and Statham, 2000: 21). This leads to four ideal type configurations conceptualising citizenship resulting from the combination of these two axes: ethnic assimilationism, civic republicanism, ethnic segregationism and civic pluralism. Altough the conceptualisation of Koopmans and Statham anwers to the most important criticisms adressed to the former typologies of integration policy frames, it does highlight differences between policy frames with regard to the cultural dimension of citizenship, namely the degree of state interventionism which is considered to be necessary to achieve the objectives of assimilationism (cultural homogeneity) or multiculturalism (cultural diversity). Differences in policy frames with regard to the degree of state intervention are espacially relevant for two reasons. First, because of the trend, since the new millenium, towards more compulsory civic integration policies. These policies are generally considered as being an indicator of a trend towards an assimilationist policy (Joppke & Morawska, 2003, Joppke, 2004) and they are are clearly interventionist. It is considered a task of the state to promote cultural homogeneity, by means of the civic integration policies. This type of interventionist assimilationism must be distinguished from the more traditional French-style assimilationism with regard to immigrants, often labelled as universalism wherein general (social) policies, and not specific state interventionism with regard to the cultural dimension of the integration process, are considered to bring about the needed cultural homogeneity. The degree of state intervention is also relevant to distinguish the more the American-style multiculturalism (where cultural diversity is valued but it is not seen as a task of the state to ensure social justice or support cultural diversity) (Rex, 1997) from the explicit multiculturalist government 10

11 policies (formerly) practised in Sweden, Australia, Canada and the Netherlands (Castles, 1995; Rex, 1997: 213). A more detailed account of types of multicultural or assimilationist policies is especially relevant in situations of devolution where regions have jurisdiction on immigrant integration policy. These regional policies are generally limited to the social and the cultural dimension of the integration process, since the formal access to citizenship rules (nationality law, the attribution of social and political reights) are generally decided at state level. The addition to the distinction made between assimilationist and multiculturalist policy frames, of a new axis of analysis based on the differenciation between interventionist and laissez-faire policies, leads to an alternative bi-dimensionnal conceptual space to categorize immigrant integration policy frames. This axis of analysis is also an important indicator of other types of policy frames, most importantly with regard to macro-economic policy (Hall, 1989). The differences between policy frames which concern the cultural dimension of the immigrant integration process can thus be found in two dimensions. The first dimension is the horizontal axis going from assimilationism to multiculturalism. It makes it possible to situate the different conceptions guiding public policy which determine how to achieve the objectives of the better socio-economic and political integration of immigrants and the social cohesion of a culturally diverse society: by reducing differences to achieve a certain cultural homogeneity or by recognising, celebrating or promoting differences. The second dimension is the vertical axis which goes from interventionism to laissez-faire. This axis expresses the degree of state intervention considered to be necessary to achieve relative homogenisation (assimilationism) or maintain cultural diversity (multiculturalism): should there be active intervention of the state (interventionism) or is it a process which is achieved without the state having to promote it intensively (laissez-faire)? As regards integration policy, the combination of the degree of state interventionism with the objectives in terms of the degree of diversity makes it possible to constitute four ideal types of policy frames. 11

12 Table 2: A new two-dimensional conceptual space for immigration policies While the national model approach overestimates the coherence and clarity of policy frames, a bi-dimensional conceptual space makes it possible to integrate ambiguous or soft policy frames and instruments. By ambiguous frame, I mean a set of contradictory representations, standards and values, which lead to contadictory policy instruments with regard to their frames. These ambiguous frames are the result of the logic of aggregating interests (Leca, 1996). They are represented in my conceptual space by their multiple location (or their dispersion into multiples points). By soft frame, I mean a set of neither fish nor fowl representations, standards and values, which gives rise to policy instruments for which it is difficult to detect the representations which inspire them. These frames are the result of the lack of politicisation of the theme covered by the policy in question. Soft frames are located in the centre, between the two axes. In the following of this section I will present the four ideal types of integration frames. 12

13 Interventionist assimilationism The first works on assimilation come from the classical sociology of the Chicago school, where Robert Park and Ernest Burgess (1921) elaborate their theory on the race relations cycle which involves four stages 6 with assimilation as the outcome. It is defined there as a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memory, feelings and attitudes of other persons and groups and, by sharing their experience and history, are incorporated in a common cultural life (1921: , quoted in Rea and Tripier 2003) 7. In the R. Park and E. Burgess conception cited here, assimilation is a process which is the natural result of social life, and not an imposed attitude. However, when devised as a policy frame, those who develop such policies are less optimistic than R. Park and E. Burgess (in their early works) and believe that state intervention is required to achieve assimilation, in terms of sociocultural adaptation. Assimilationism, like multiculturalism, is aimed at the better socio-economic and political integration of immigrants and at social cohesion of a culturally diverse society. The difference between the two models is to be found on the level of the strategy selected to achieve these objectives. Interventionist assimilationists believe that they have to promote the reduction of cultural differences to achieve a certain homogeneity. The organisation of host language courses, combined with integration programmes, which insist on learnng the standards, values and history of the host country, are the examples which best illustrate such a frame. Laissez-faire assimilationism or universalism The supporters of a laissez-faire or universalist assimilationist frame believe, without specifically stating this, that a certain degree of cultural conformity is desirable. They believe, however, like R. Park and E. Burgess in their early works, that migrants achieve a certain degree of cultural conformity as a natural result of social life and not as an obligation imposed by the state (Park et Burgess, 1921, quoted in Rea and Tripier, 2003: 14). They believe that public policies should not be developed with the specific aim of immigrants achieving this objective. Laissez-faire assimilationist policies are colour-blind and are based on the principle of opposition to any specific 6 The first three being competition, conflict and accommodation. 7 As the authors became less optimistic about the process, the definition varied in other works. 13

14 categorisation of a target public and to policies which would be specifically intended for them, on the grounds that such an approach would reify cultural differences and would therefore be contrary to the implicit ideal of homogenisation. General rules are considered to be neutral. In this perspective, general social policies are supposed to contribute to the better social integration of all individuals. The social integration of immigrants would also contribute to cultural homogenisation. Associations of people from the same ethnic origin are seen to be an impediment to the ideal of cultural homogenisation. When these associations are subsidised as operators of a generalist social policy, which is rarely the case, they are invited to open up their activities to a mixed public. Interventionist multiculturalism Multiculturalism and assimilationism are both aimed at achieving socio-economic and political equality for immigrants and social cohesion in the host society. Interventionist multiculturalism differs from assimilationism by the fact that it considers that these objectives can be obtained by recognising, celebrating or even promoting differences (Vermeulen and Slijper, 2003; Castles, 1994). This recognition of cultural differences is demonstrated, according to Stephen Castles (1994), by granting collective rights and adapting general rules - which are not neutral, but on the contrary, are impregnated with the dominant culture - to new groups. The collective rights granted to immigrants are generally limited to what Will Kymlicka calls polyethnic rights (Kymlicka, 1995), namely, the funding of ethnic associations, festivals, ethnic magazines etc., which enables the recognition and promotion of these minority cultures. Interventionist multiculturalists believe that the state must actively promote this cultural diversity by means of policies for two reasons. Firstly, to avoid the disappearance of cultural diversity under the effect of the homogenising forces of the dominant culture. Secondly, to promote true equality. As examples of interventionist multicultural integration policies, one can cite 8 : the funding of organisations set up by immigrant minorities to defend their own interests and/or promote their culture of origin, the subsidising of teaching of the original language and culture, the integration into the general school curriculum of teaching on the history and culture of minorities, adapting official holidays to the cultural 8 A number of these examples are quoted in Banting et al., 2006:

15 diversification of society, the introduction of exceptions to dress codes, (in most cases) positive action or affirmative action 9 programmes which target ethnic minorities and are aimed at remedying inequalities or structural discriminations affecting these minorities 10, a policy of mainstreaming ethnic diversity in the different sectors of society (employment, especially public, the media, policy on culture, ). Laissez-faire multiculturalism Laissez-faire multiculturalism promotes cultural diversity, on the hypothesis that it does not harm social cohesion or the objective of immigrants equal participation, but rather the contrary. In this frame, cultural diversity is considered to be a characteristic of the continuous process of modernisation. However, this type of multiculturalism does not advocate active state intervention to promote cultural diversity. Cultural diversity is officially recognised, in speeches and legal texts, but is not promoted by interventionist public action, or at the very most by very low profile action. Laissezfaire multiculturalism resembles what Richard Banting et al. (2006: 58) qualify as soft multiculturalism. The notion of ethnic minorities is accepted publicly and is found in all official documents. When ethnic groups present projects in the context of generalist policies, these actions are promoted. The notion of laissez-faire multiculturalism was used by Stephen Castles (1995) and John Rex (1997) to distinguish multiculturalism in the United States where ethnic communities are accepted but the state does not take upon itself the task to ensure social justice or to support ethnic diversity, from that practised in Sweden, Australia or Canada, where a government policy involves the acceptance of cultural diversity and the state s willingness to guarantee equal rights for minorities (Rex, 1997: 213). 9 With G. Calvès, we distinguish the positive action programmes of affirmative action. Positive action is more an incentive than an obligation, and makes provision for differential treatment. It does not, however, necessarily suspend or accommodate the competition rules, which is an essential characteristic of affirmative action. Affirmative action is not only a differential treatment but also a preferential treatment. G. Calvès, La discrimination positive, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, Affirmative action can generally be considered to be a multiculturalist instrument because it publicly recognises the existence of cultural diversity and sees this recognition as a path towards better participation and social cohesion, but it can also sometimes be an instrument used for assimilation, integrating cultural minorities into mainstream institutions contributing as such to the promotion of cultural homogeneity. For more information on this subject: Banting et al., 2006:

16 Sub-state nationalism and interventionnist cultural citizenship policies. Illustration from Belgium After having presented these different categorizations of immigrant integration policy frames, I think there is sufficient reason to launch a hypothesis about a fourth linkage between sub-state nationalism and immigrant integration policies, namely the relation between sub-state nationalism and immigrant integration policies which are interventionnist on the cultural dimension of the integration process. Regions which are actively engaged in a nation-building process are intrinsically occupied with questions defining the «us» and the «others» of the sub-state nation. These two definitions constitute the central objects of immigrant integration policies. The questions and debates defining «who is the sub-state nation» especially inspire policies with regard to the cultural dimension of the immigrant integration process. It can be expected that sub-state nation-building regions will foresee an active role for the sub-state in the cultural dimension of the integration proces, more then nonnation-building sub-state regions, less preoccupied with «who are we» questions or leaving these concerns to the state level. In the following I will illustrate firstly how the Flemish immigrant integration policy, in comparison with the less in a sub-state nation-building project enagaged Francophone authorities 11, are more interventionnist with regard to the cultural dimension of the integration process. Secondly, I will demonstrate that the more interventionnist character of the Flemish immigrant integration policy can be attributed to precisely this sub-state nation-building activity. Immigrant integration policy frames of the Belgian sub-states ( ) Until the end of the eighties ( ), the integration policies of the French and the Flemish Communities pursued parallel paths. Both financed activities directed towards social and socio-judicial guidance of immigrants and their families. In addition, the organisations associated with the Catholic and Socialist pillar organized language courses and cultural activities. Both Communities supported initiatives 11 From 1980 until 1993 the French Community had juridisction over immigrant intégration policies. In 1993, compétence was tranferred from the French Community to the Walloon région and the French Community Commission of the Brussels Capital Region. From then on, two different immigration intégration policies have developed in Francophone Belgium (one in Brussels, one in Wallonia) even if the media deate, and to some extent political forums (within the parties) remain teh same. 16

17 oriented towards the preservation of the immigrants culture of origin. At that time, political attention to the immigrant integration issue remained relatively minor. Both policies, from 1980 until 1988, can be considered as slightly interventionist multiculturalism. Two different events, namely the creation of the Brussels Capital Region (1989), on the one hand, and the solid electoral gains achieved by the party extreme right Vlaams Blok (1988 and 1991), on the other, put the chapter of integration squarely and prominently on the government s agendas. Within the French Community, the greater policy attention to the integration question due to the creation of the Brussels Capital region with its high number of immigrants, led to the abandonment of the multiculturalist policy frame in favour of a laissez-faire assimilationist vision. The immigrant integration policy of the French Community from then on focuses more on the social dimension of the immigrant integration question and abandons state interventionism with regard to the cultural dimension of the integration process. In Flanders, the more prominent positioning of the integration question on the government s agenda led to a reinforcement of the interventionist character of the former multiculturalist policy frame. Notwithstanding the electoral successes of the extreme right party Vlaams Blok the multiculturalist policy framework clearly continues to inspire the Flemish integration policy until the end of the nineties. Five policy measures are witness to this: the expansion and the institutionalizing of the integration sector (1), the recognition of (bottom-up) self-organisations of immigrants and the emancipatory role assigned to activities that valorise the culture of the native country or the country of provenance (2), the setting up of a mainstream or an inclusive policy within most of the policy sectors (3), the renaming of the target group immigrants to ethnic-cultural minorities (4), and the creation of the Minorities Forum (5). This last umbrella organisation is designed to allow the self-organisations and their federations to create a negotiating framework for the preparation of their joint positions. Most of these measures were developed, or reinforced, during the nineties. The Decree of 28 April 1998 concerning the Flemish policy vis-à-vis ethnic-cultural minorities did embed them into a legal frame and context. 17

18 In 1993, the French Community undergoes a second transfer of competences. Amongst other, immigrant integration policy is transferred from the French Community to the French Community Commission of the Brussels Capital Region and to the Walloon Region. As of that moment, in Francophone Belgium a different integration policy is being developed in Brussels and in the Walloon Region, while the integration policy of the Flemish Community is likewise being implemented in Brussels. Following the transfer of the competence, the Brussels French Community Commission continues the further implementation of the social integration policy legacy (Programme d insertion sociale) of the French Community. The emphasis lies on the promotion of improved socio-economic integration. Activities that promote the culture of the country of origin are explicitly rejected from being subsidized. Actions that concentrate exclusively on a target group of one specific ethnic or national origin are also refused (Adam, 2010). The immigrant integration policy of the Brussels French Community Commission has been integrated in a legislative act by the vote of the Social Cohesion Decree of 30 April 2004 (M.B., 23 March 2005). This decree confirms the laissez faire assimilationist policy frame that inspires the integration policy of the French Community Commission. In 1993, at the time of the transfer of competences in Francophone Belgium, immigrant integration is not considered as an issue in Wallonia. Integration is seen as a Brussels Problem, with its large population of non-european foreigners, and as a problem for Flanders, with its ever expanding extreme right-wing party (Adam, 2010: 119). The Walloon immigrant integration policy developed after this transfer consists mainly in the financing of sub-regional integration centres, semi-public semi-private organizations with a vague description of the packet of mandates. This loose task description leaves a large autonomy to each of the sub-regional integration centres. This then leads to a de facto decentralisation of the Walloon integration policy, where the inspiring policy frames are not being determined at the regional but rather at the sub-regional levels (Adam, 2010: ). The Walloon integration policy furthermore provides for a local segment by its support of local initiatives towards social development. The fact that these local initiatives take for their objective, 18

19 amongst others, the support for immigrant organisations, colours this Walloon policy instrument with a very light interventionist multiculturalist tint. While the integration policy frame of the French Community Commission and the Walloon Region remains stable since 1990, a frame shift was announced in Flanders at the onset of the new millennium. Following the regional elections in 1999, the Flemish-Christian Democrats, who for years had written the Flemish integration policy, were now being relegated to the role of opposition. The Flemish liberals (VLD, Vlaams Liberalen en Democraten) began soon to act as a policy entrepreneurs (Kingdon, 1995), favourable to the setting up of a compulsory civic integration policy. Inspired by the Dutch civic integration policy, the Flemish liberals had been demanding this policy for several years, in opposition. Once in government, they succeeded in convincing their coalition partners, whereupon a compulsory integration trajectory for newcomers was introduced 12. The programme consists of Dutchlanguage courses, a civic integration course and counselling with the aim of professional integration. The emphasis on learning common social norms and values during the civic integration programme, above the language courses, gives this policy its interventionist assimilationist character. In the legislature, the sub-state intervention with regard to immigrant integration is strongly reinforced. Multiculturalist but especially assimilationist policy measures are strengthened. Amongst others, this appears from the expansion of the newcomers assimilationist policy from exclusively recent new arrivals to include previous arrivals as well as Belgians with an immigrant background who have not accomplished their school career in Flanders neither the Netherlands 13. The assimilationist policy instruments steadily took an ever more important position within the whole packet of the Flemish integration policy. As of 2008, the budget for the civic integration policy implemented only a few short years ago thus already exceeds the amount earmarked 12 Decree concerning the Flemish civic integration policy of 28 February 2003 (M.B., 8 May 2003). 13 The proposal, in the Netherlands, to also include Dutch nationals with an immigrant background as the target group of compulsory civic intégration programmes has been withdrawn after a remark of the State Council considering this would introduce discrimination amongst nationals. State Council (The Netherlands), 3 August 2006, n W /1.. 19

20 for the multiculturalistic-tinted policy measures that had been gradually developed since 1980 (Adam, 2010: 335). In this analytical description of the integration policies of the Belgian regions since 1980, I have showed that the essential difference between the Francophone and Flemish integration policy frames lies in the degree of interventionism considered necessary to achieve the objectives either of homogeneity, or cultural diversity. The current integration policy frames in French-speaking Belgium are scarcely (Walloon Region) or not at all (French Community Commission) interventionist with regard to the cultural dimension of integration. The Flemish integration policy is guided by an ambiguous policy frame since 2000, containing assimilationist and multiculturalist integration policy instruments, but both interventionist. This empirical evidence gives strength to the hypothesis that immigrant integration policies of nation-building substates will be interventionist with regard to the cultural dimension of the integration process. The attribution of Flemish interventionism on immigrant integration to its nationbuilding process Different reasons can be put forward to contend that the involvement of the Flemish authorities in a sub-state nation-building explains the more marked interventionism of the Flemish integration policies as compared with those of the Francophone substates. Firstly, and this is not specific to integration policies, the development of more and better public policies, and therefore interventionism in all the areas under its responsibility, contributes to the exercise of legitimising Flemish autonomy and the demand for greater autonomy. This nation-building incentive for public policy making is illustrated by the expression being used by the Flemish government wat we zelf doen, doen we beter 14 (Erk, 2003, Geens, 1987: 101). An extract of an interview with an adviser of the former Walloon minister responsible for immigrant integration confirms this tendency in the context of integration policy. In reply to a question on the reasons why the Walloon government had decided, in contrast with 14 "What we do ourselves, we do better". 20

21 Flanders 15, not to have an integration policy with regard to asylum seekers (which the Walloon government considered to be a federal responsibility), he replied: This is something of a constant difference between Flanders and Wallonia. Flanders wants as many areas of regional responsibility as possible, whereas we want as few as possible 16. Secondly, institutional asymmetry, contributes, in my opinion, to explain the greater interventionism of Flemish integration policies as compared with those developed in French-speaking Belgium. Flanders is characterized by a relative degree of institutional consolidation and by more institutional simplicity then Francophone Belgium. There is only one Flemish parliament and one Flemish government. Frenchspeaking Belgium is institutionally more complex, due to the coexistence of the French Community and the Walloon Region. This explanation of more interventionism because of institutional consolidation is not specific to integration policies. It has likewise been advanced to show the lesser development of administrative reform policies in French-speaking Belgium as compared with Flanders (Brans et al., 2006). The greater degree of institutional consolidation in Flanders, as compared with French-speaking Belgium, makes it possible not to be concerned anymore with the question who decides and to move on to the question who gets what, when and how (Erk, 2003). In the domain of immigrant integration policy, the question of who decides is very present in French-speaking Belgium. It has been highlighted strongly by the directors of the regional integration centres in Wallonia, who are demanding an immigrant integration mainstreaming policy in all relevant policy sectors. The French Community has responsibility for the areas of education and culture, two primordial sectoral policies that can contribute to enhance immigrant integration. Nevertheless, the French Community redirects to the Walloon Region, with specific responsibility for immigrant integration, when it is a matter of subsidizing immigrant integration policy measures in the educational or cultural sector. The Walloon Region, for its part, redirects to the French Community when faced with demands for developing integration policies in the educational and cultural policy sector. This institutional complexity and the eternal discussion of who decides contributes to explaining the lack of a mainstreaming policy on immigrant 15 Flanders had also included illegal immigrants in addition to the target group of asylum seekers. 16 Interview with the former private secretary of the Walloon minister responsible for immigrant integration, 11th January

22 integration in the different sectoral policies in French-speaking Belgium. Flemish institutional simplicity contributes to explaining the fact that it has been much easier to put into place such an interventionist mainstreaming policy in the north of the country. Thirdly, the Flemish nation-building process has led to the need to define the collective us, which in turn leads to the definition of the other. Both these definitions are central in immigrant integration policies. This definition of us is in Francophone Belgium considered to be a question for the Belgian federal state which is deemed to define the collective us with regard to its policies on nationality. By way of its interventionist integration policies, nation-building Flanders invests in the definition of the Flemish us. It is moreover in debates on immigrant integration, and not in the more general debates on extending the Flemish autonomy or the Flemish nation in general, that the modest attempts towards a de-ethnicization of the Flemish identity can be found. In 2007, the Flemish liberals proposed to replace the term allochtoon, the official term in Flemish immigrant integration policy to designate a person with an immigrant background, by the notion of New Fleming. Although this group label is far from hegemonic, it indicates the expression of an elite concept of a civic (although assimilationist) Flemish identity until now only reserved to the Belgian identity. The Flemish nationalist party N-VA has taken over this terminology in its (since 2009) yearly award for a new Fleming who contributed by its merits to the enrichment of Flanders and is an example for the new Flemings and Flemings in general 17. Fourthly, developing and maintaining an interventionist multiculturalist policy appears to to serve to counter the image of a pre-modern, illiberal and intolerant (Kymlicka, 2001) infra-state nation. This vision of Flanders is conveyed to the rest of the country (the Francophones) and the rest of the world, and also to immigrants and the entire Flemish population, not only by the success of the Vlaams Blok, but also by recent nationalist demands and interventionist assimilationist policies. The link demonstrated between the first electoral breakthroughs of the extreme right (88-91) and the development of an ever more interventionist multiculturalist policy contributes to demonstrating this. Other instruments to counter the pre-modern image 17 consulted on January