Shakeela is a Dalit woman living in Villupuram District in

Transcription

1 Economic & Political Weekly EPW Published on Saturday, june 27, 2015 vol l nos 26 & Debt Bondage and the Tricks of Capital Isabelle Guérin, G Venkatasubramanian, S Kumar Migrant labourers, free from rural bondage, are now bonded to other sources of debt, contracted from the agro-industry or construction sectors. The flows of migration in the brick-making and sugar cane sectors in Tamil Nadu, where bondage coexists with many public welfare schemes, illustrate the persistence and renewal of this phenomenon. The welfare schemes play the role of a safety net, but also contribute to low wages, and impunity on the part of employers. Alliances between capital and the state, through the politicisation of employers, are instrumental in the continuation of all forms of labour exploitation. When workers resist, employers tighten working conditions and start recruiting migrants from North India. And even if these forms of labour management obey a capitalist logic, they are inseparable from the caste hierarchy. Isabelle Guérin (isabelle.guerin@ird.fr) is with IRD-Cessma, Paris, and the French Institute of Pondicherry; G Venkatasubramanian (gk@mumu.com) is with the French Institute of Pondicherry; S Kumar (sk@mum.com) is an independent researcher. Shakeela is a Dalit woman living in Villupuram District in coastal Tamil Nadu. For the past 30 years, like most people in her Dalit settlement, she has migrated for six months each year to a Chennai suburb to mould bricks. The working and living conditions are terrible, but she is mainly motivated by the large advance she receives in the off season (around Rs 60,000 in 2014 for her and her husband). This obliges her and her family to work for the same employer until the debt is repaid in full, and they end up with empty hands most of the time. For the last couple of years, she has worked during the off season under the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS). She had to open a bank account in 2014, and withdraws her wages with an ATM card. She also has two health insurance cards, a labour welfare board card, a savings passbook and card for a farmer scheme. All these cards are carefully stored in a plastic bag. On paper, she is financially included (with a bank account, an ATM card, and a savings passbook). She participates in a public employment programme and is eligible, at least in theory, for health insurance. Despite all these measures, Shakeela continues to migrate, and she thinks she will have to do so until she is too old to make bricks. We examine this contradiction. In a state such as Tamil Nadu, characterised by continuous economic expansion and a whole range of welfare programmes, how can the persistence of debt bondage arrangements be explained? Drawing on 11 years of fieldwork on brick kiln workers and sugar cane cutters, the paper sheds light on the constant renewal of the processes of exploitation and bondage. Thanks to welfare schemes, the pressure exerted by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and social movements, and an increasing exposure to new living standards, bonded labourers (mostly Dalits and Adivasis) have a growing agency and willingness to resist and contest domination. But, in return, capitalism shows a fascinating capacity to renew its methods of control, discipline and labour exploitation. Public intervention, useful as it might be, acts as an indirect way of subsidising capital. As for civil society initiatives, they have the merit of alerting public opinion, but their room for manoeuvre in terms of action is limited. Caste and debt, though probably in different ways compared to the past, are still powerful determinants of labour domination. This article draws on fieldwork carried out with a research team between 2003 and 2014 in several areas in Tamil Nadu. 1 Research was conducted in two production sectors brick kilns and sugar cane harvesting. These sectors were chosen because they were strategic in terms of employing a significant number of labourers (brick kilns), and producing an

2 12 Published on Saturday, june 27, 2015 vol l nos 26 & 27 EPW Economic & Political Weekly important food item (sugar). 2 Residential area fieldwork was carried out in 15 Dalit settlements in Villupuram and Cuddalore districts, which had pockets of brick kiln workers and sugar cane harvesters. For cane cutting, we studied two sites in Cuddalore and Villupuram Districts, which have specialised in sugar cane production for almost half a century, and a newer site near Madurai in the south of the state. For brick kilns, we selected various sites the largest industries were concentrated in the Red Hills area on the outskirts of Chennai (Tiruvallur District) and are now increasingly in Changalpettu (around 60 kilometres south-west of Chennai) of Kanchipuram District), while smaller and more artisanal industries are spread over Walajapet taluk of the same district. Various data collection methods were used statistical household surveys (280 households were surveyed in two rounds in 2004 and 2014); 3 ongoing qualitative interviews with various stakeholders (mostly labourers, recruiters, and managers, but also employers, NGOs, unions, and local politicians); and detailed analyses of production units and the villages from which the workers came. More than 200 interviews were conducted over the period, mostly informally and with participatory observation. We spent time in the home villages of the migrants, during the off season, and at the times of departure (a time of numerous conflicts with recruiters) and return. We also spent time on the worksites (where migrants work and live). We attended employers association meetings and also spent time with employers, mostly in an informal manner. Persistence of Debt Bondage Labour arrangements in brick-making and sugar cane cutting are typical forms of neo-bondage (Breman 1996). In contrast to rural forms of bondage, they do not guarantee a rent or help defend political status, but are mostly profit driven. They are often short term and non-hereditary, linked to seasonal migration and labour intermediaries. The oppressor is not a landlord but a capitalist entrepreneur, defined here as an economic agent that exploits labour in the pursuit of profit and accumulation, while labour has to work for capital to subsist. Like historical forms of bondage, these contemporary forms of oppression remain embedded in the caste hierarchy. In both sectors (brick-making and sugar cane), the great majority of bonded labourers are Dalits, a few are Adivasis, and their employers are from the dominant castes (Kongu Vellalar, Nattukottai Chettiars, and Naidus for sugar mills, and Reddiyars, Naidus and Nadars for brick kilns). As widely documented in the Indian context, contemporary forms of bondage are not a remnant of the past, but a key feature of present-day capitalism. 4 More specifically, and as we Table 1: Wages and Occupations (Per individual) Brick Kilns Sugar Cane Agriculture Construction MGNREGS Transport Yearly wage (Rs) 24,000 24,000 13,000 15,000 14,000 18,000 Daily wage (Rs) Equivalent hourly wage (Rs) Type of wage Piece rate Piece rate Piece rate or Daily wage Daily wage Daily wage daily wage Daily working hours Source: IOW-FIP survey have shown in our previous work, bonded labour in the two sectors studied results from a specifi c regime of accumulation characterised by cheap labour, increased domestic demand leading to the persistence of household debt, and modes of confl ict, contestation, and worker identity formation that engage with both government programmes and consumerism (Guérin 2013). Our last round of fi eldwork largely confi rms these fi ndings while highlighting the evolving nature of bondage arrangements and the growing agency of labourers. There are growing tensions between labourers and employers, and multiple ways through which employers resist, confront, and bypass labourers agency. Debt-bonded labourers are those whose freedom, wages, and bargaining power are signifi cantly restricted by debt. 5 Signifi cantly is a rather vague term, but it is diffi cult to be more precise given the diversity of the degrees of restriction. In the places studied here, the conditions of bondage can be summarised as follows. In 2014, the average annual household income from seasonal migration (whether for bricks or sugar cane) was Rs 53,000. This was roughly the offi cial poverty level for a rural household, but it is well known that the offi cial criteria for poverty levels are very low (Patnaik 2013; Subramanian 2013). Compared with the alternative occupations available locally (in agriculture, the MGNREGS, or construction), annual incomes from brick-making and cane-cutting are high, which is what motivates workers. The prospect of regular work for six to seven months and the advance provided during the monsoon, before the start of the working season, encourage workers to accept harsh working conditions. Their income comes at the cost of very long working days (12 to 14 hours for brick workers, half of which are at night; 14 to 16 hours for cane cutters). Most migrants work six days a week. Labourers in 2014 earned the equivalent of Rs 180 per day in brick kilns and Rs 160 per day in sugar cane, which was roughly similar to what an agricultural labourer made (Rs 170 on an average), higher than the MGNREGA (Rs 140), but less than in construction (around Rs 500). 6 Taking into account the number of working hours a day (Table 1), the gap for the hourly wage is two to fi ve. If we compare the wage of bonded labourers (piece rate) with those who are not bonded in the same sector (local workers recruited on a daily basis and without an advance), the gap is 22% for brick kilns (against 30% in 2004), and 52% for sugar cane (against 57% in 2004). Most households combine brick kiln or sugar cane work with another occupation, either during the monsoon or throughout the year if they stay in the village. In 2014, on an average, the total annual income per household was Rs 65,750 (20% higher than in 2004 at constant prices). Working conditions are very harsh. The physical intensity of the labour, the exposure to the sun and dust, the lack of drinking water, and the low quality of food exposes brick workers to illnesses such as dysentery, allergies, skin diseases, fever, and muscular pain. The

3 Economic & Political Weekly EPW Published on Saturday, june 27, 2015 vol l nos 26 & work of cane cutters is also very demanding physically, and living conditions are miserable (collective housing in tents, a high level of promiscuity, and a total lack of hygiene). From the point of view of workers, taking an advance on wages goes with the logic of survival (Table 2). A large part of the advance is used for food. In 2004, as in 2014, most households (around 90%) used the advance or part of it for food. Between a fifth (2004) and a quarter (2014) used it for medical Table 2: Use of Wage Advance, 2004 and Households (%) Share (%) Households (%) Share (%) Food Household goods Health Investment in agriculture Housing Ceremonies Investment in non-agriculture Other Total Total percentage of households (HH) exceeds 100% as the advance can be used for multiple purposes. Source: IOW survey expenses. But the advance was also used for investment, especially in agriculture by the few who owned a small piece of land 18.8% in 2004 (14.1% in agriculture) and the proportion was roughly similar in 2014 (17% in agriculture). The use of the advance also illustrates a willingness to integrate with consumerism more than one-fourth of the households mentioned consumer goods, and the importance of ceremonies kept growing, with 14.1% of the households mentioning it in 2004 and 24.1% in Looking at shares, food represents roughly half the use of the advance (slightly less in 2014, with 45.3% against 50.4%). Next come household goods, which include motorbikes (13.5% in 2014); health (12.4% in 2014); ceremonies (11.6%, four percentage points more than in 2004); and investment in agriculture (9.1% in 2014). We see that the advances keep going up (Table 3). 7 In 2014, the average amount was equivalent to the average income for the whole season (Rs 53,000), which was 2.6 times more than in 2004 at constant prices. Real wages (piece rates in both sectors) increased, but at a much slower rate 34% for brickmaking and 12% for cane-cutting (at constant prices). However, income from migration increased at the same pace as advances, simply because the number of members per household increased to pay off their large debts, workers brought in more family members to produce more. Table 3: Advances, Wages, and Incomes, 2004 and 2014 (Rupees, at constant prices 2014) Wage advance 20,400 52,400 Piece rate for sugar cane cutting (per tonne) Piece rate for brick-making (per 1,000 bricks) Annual household wage from migration (brick kiln or sugar cane) 21,200 52,800 Total household wage 46,500 65,750 Source: IOW-IFP Survey, Contrasted Changes To appreciate the evolution of bondage over time, we looked at three types of indicators. The first category concerns the degree of workers dependency how far does migration result from a constrained choice? As mentioned, the bondage situations described here do not result from coercion but from a voluntary servitude motivated by economic rationale. Voluntary servitude covers, however, a wide range of situations is migration continuous or transitory? Is it individual or family based? Do workers have local alternatives in terms of employment and credit? Comparisons between 2004 and 2014 reveal interesting changes. Migration is more occasional. In 2004, roughly half the workers (52.8%) migrated without fail. This has dropped by half, and they are now a quarter (24.2%). Migration is very often family based. In 2004, roughly half the workers (52.1%) migrated with family members; this is now the case for almost all of them (99.2%). Labour recruiters (maistries) remain a rule (98.1% of workers went through a labour recruiter in 2004, and it was 97.4% in 2014). With regard to borrowing, the number of opportunities is the same (but debt amounts have exploded, as we shall see later). The number of employment opportunities has greatly improved. In 2004, 82.3% of the sample said they did not have enough work in the village. This fell to 59.2% in This shift has two main explanations the rise of non-farm labour in surrounding towns and the MGNREGS. In other words, it seems that migration is less constrained (alternative employment opportunities allow a growing number of workers to migrate occasionally rather than continuously). At the same time, the sharp rise in the advance obliges workers to bring in several members of their household, almost systematically. The second component concerns working conditions. Here too interesting changes are observed. A lack of transparency prevailed more than half the workers (56%) did not know their wage before migrating and this proportion has remained stable. What is notable is that harassment has significantly increased. While 73% of the workers said they were harassed in 2004, this was the case for all workers in This may reflect either a real deterioration in working conditions or a better awareness of labour rights. Both explanations are valid here. Open and informal discussions with labourers, maistries, and managers indicate growing tensions. The proportion of workers who consider they have been cheated has increased by 10 percentage points (from 44.2% to 55.8%). If the same question is asked to maistries or managers, it would probably elicit a similar answer. Harassment by supervisors or maistries can be physical or verbal. Very few reported sexual harassment in the survey, though it seemed common among maistries and women labourers. Production constraints imposed by the manager or the maistrie were still prevalent (around 80% of the workers mentioned it). Last, but not the least, despite frequent discourses on eradicating child labour, it remained

4 14 Published on Saturday, june 27, 2015 vol l nos 26 & 27 EPW Economic & Political Weekly surprisingly stable and was found among one-third of the families 32.8% of them brought at least one child in 2004, and 28.3% in 2014, which was slightly less, but the difference was not very significant. The third component deals with living conditions at working sites, which are improving but remain very rough. Workers consider they have better freedom of movement, which means they are allowed to quit the work camp temporarily 72.8% said they were free to move around in 2004, against 88.3% in 2014 (Table 4). This freedom is highly relative. Workers are requested to stay day and night in working camps, and only allowed to quit for a few days for legitimate reasons, which they must justify (ceremony, death, illness, or any other urgent problem to be solved), often after long and arduous negotiations. A relative improvement is seen in housing among brick kiln workers. In 2014, all migrants had some sort of housing, against 92.5% in 2004 (Table 4). In some cases, the quality of housing has improved instead of small huts, a growing number of houses are permanent structures. Workers have better access to electricity (88% in 2014 against 62% in 2004), which is used for lighting, listening to the radio, watching television, and recharging mobile phones. All households now have access to water (against 86% in 2004) for cooking, washing, cleaning, and drinking (though it is not really drinking water). Access to healthcare is also better. Three-quarters of households said they had access to healthcare in 2014, while they were only 20% in Here too, the value of these positive changes is quite relative. In the best case, housing is very rough. In brick kilns, four or five people commonly share a room of 3 or 4 square metres in stifling heat. Healthcare is often limited to first-aid kits. In sugar cane work, none of these facilities exist. Workers move from field to field. Fields are small and workers stay only a few days in each. They move according to the orders from mills and sleep in makeshift camps or simply outside. We believe that these contrasted evolutions illustrate an underlying trend of increasing tensions between labourers, maistris, and employers. Workers agency and voice keep growing, probably for two main reasons alternatives available in terms of employment and an increasing awareness. Political movements of NGOs and Dalits, some of which are strongly articulated, have been active over the last 30 years in Tamil Nadu and have contributed to building up the capacity to claim rights and assert dignity (Mosse 2013; Gorringe 2005). The adoption of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act (1989 in India, 1995 in Tamil Nadu), according to which untouchability is a criminal offence, is now a possible tool and many workers know it. Increasing frictions characterise relations, as also observed in another part of the state between landowners and workers (Vijaybaskar and Wyatt 2013). We shall come back to employers reactions later, but we can see working conditions have become more tough. This is, we believe, an illustration of growing conflicts and tensions. Employers have taken some measures aimed at improving living conditions (which remain very rough). Real wages have increased, but working conditions have not changed. Further, the feeling of harassment is now widespread. It is likely that workers complain more openly now than 10 years ago, and discussions and observations confirm this. Exasperated by workers who have no gratitude (this expression is frequently used in employers discourses), employers react with more discipline, mostly through maistries or supervisors. Some talk about it openly. Controlling labour is increasingly difficult, they say. The risks of evasion are now legion, and they have no other choice but to monitor labourers very carefully. In the past, workers respected the hierarchy, they lowered their head, and obeyed. This is over, we were told several times. Welfare Benefits, Debt and Capital Subsidies A notable change is observed households have more assets. Landownership (23% of households) has not altered, whether in terms of purchase, sale, or loss. Housing in contrast has significantly improved. The percentage of permanent houses is far higher and their quality has improved. Our own monetary evaluations, approximate as they might be, show that the average value has multiplied by four (at constant prices). Houses are bigger, with several rooms, sometimes a floor. Yet, these assets have no real market value. Sales are rare, and there is no real real estate market for Dalit settlements. Living conditions, in general, are better. We noticed that land speculation, which is very prevalent in the region, excludes Dalits. As elsewhere in Tamil Nadu, housing remains spatially segmented and Dalit settlements are located away from the main village. Real prices for residential land are similar to what they were 10 years ago, which means that at constant prices, Dalit households are losing money. Assets have increased, as can be seen with livestock (doubled), vehicles (multiplied by 2.7, mostly motorbikes), and productive assets (multiplied by 1.5). Jewels (mostly gold), which play a key role in precautionary and investment savings, have remained stable. Wage advances may have contributed to the increase in assets. We believe, however, that welfare benefits and household debt (outside the advance) also explain a great part of this. On welfare benefits, it is well known that Tamil Nadu is slightly better off than most other Indian states, whether for mid-day meals, the public distribution system (PDS), or the MGNREGS. 8 In the villages studied here, in 2014, 27% of the Table 4: Household Assets, 2003 and 2014 households benefited (Rupees, at constant prices 2014) from the MGNREGS Assets and earned an average annual wage of Housing 29,851 1,25,236 Livestock 7,248 17,449 Rs 14,000, which was Jewels 16,206 14,593 the maximum they Vehicle 7,368 20,184 Productive material 28,552 45,049 were eligible for. Vessels 11,073 14,751 That was a year before the state elec- Household consumer goods 5,171 4,997 Source: IOW-FIP survey tion, so these figures are probably exceptional. In normal years, it seems that the annual wage ranged between Rs 5,000 and Rs 7,000. In housing, subsidies have increased over the last decade. In 2014, they ranged from Rs 1,00,000 to Rs 1,80,000 per

5 Economic & Political Weekly EPW Published on Saturday, june 27, 2015 vol l nos 26 & household, combined with regularising property titles. Many households that began building hope to complete the work in the future. To this are added subsidies for livestock (one cow or two goats), funerals, and girls marriages; health insurance; free gas connections; various free consumer goods (televisions, grinders, fans, bicycles, and uniforms and books for students); and a wide variety of other goods at preferential prices. From 2011 to 2014, Tamil Nadu Chief Minister J Jayalalithaa s image could be seen everywhere in villages and small towns as a recurring reminder of her generous support to the working poor. Some of these schemes were already in place in 2004, but procedures have been simplifi ed and amounts increased, making them more attractive. For instance, the proportion of households benefi ting from the housing scheme (whether a subsidy or regularisation of titles) went up from 9.6% in 2004 to 83% in Similar fi gures are found for marriage subsidies (3% in 2004 and 83.4% in 2014) and for livestock (31.5% and 82.2%). Some schemes are still mostly on paper, such as the insurance scheme. Though many households have an offi - cial-looking card which is supposed to facilitate access to free healthcare, very few have been using it since they are eligible for very few types of care. At the same time, it seems that marriage subsidies (Rs 25,000 or Rs 50,000 depending on the girl s education) have contributed to raising marriage expenses. As for housing, subsidies cover only a part of the real cost, and it encourages households to borrow large amounts (including large advances). Despite these limitations, it is clear that this set of schemes partly compensates for low wages, thus constituting indirect subsidies to capital We also found that debt has considerably increased. Without taking advances into account, the average outstanding per household was Rs 5,851 in 2014 (median Rs 2,625) against Rs 49,333 at constant prices in 2014 (median Rs 40,869), which means a ratio of from one to eight. The ratios debt/income and debt/assets have been both multiplied by six. As in 2004, the wage advance represents only one part of a house-hold s debt. And, as in 2004, households are in debt to various sources, mostly people from the higher castes (local elite, pawnbrokers, professional moneylenders). 9 The explosion of debt, confi rmed by qualitative analysis and case studies, is explained both by growing aspirations and growing creditworthiness. Housing and marriages are key aspects of the trend towards upward mobility and integration. Our survey indicates that the average cost of marriages, for instance, has increased enormously. Costs represented, on an average, two years of household wages in 2004 (Rs 45,000). In 2014, it was four years of household wages (Rs 3,00,000). At the same time, borrowing is easier. Some households have managed to regularise their property title and can mortgage their house (or their land in the case of the few landowners). Migration is more occasional, and some lenders lend more easily to households whose members stay in the village. The pronounced rise in advances is an important factor mentioned by both lenders and borrowers. Lenders know that in case of a default, workers can ask for a new advance and pay off their debt. Ironically, borrowing alternatives do not help workers free themselves from bondage, but have the opposite effect. Many households are pulled into a debt circle that cannot be easily escaped. This was already the case in 2004, but the relative amounts were much smaller. Tricks of Capital As documented by many other studies on contemporary forms of bondage in India, bonded labourers belong to marginalised communities while their employers are from the higher echelons of society. 10 This skewed distribution is partly due to that Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST) are overrepresented among the poor, the underemployed, and the landless. The social gap, which divides employers from workers, also comes into play. Even if the working relation is mainly of an economic nature, and even if these labour management methods obey capitalist rules (controlling labour and compressing costs), bondage arises in communities where the vertical ties of subordination, historically and socially rooted in the consciousness of both employers and workers, are still strong enough to make it acceptable (Servet 2007). Sugar mill employers are mostly Kongu Vellalars, Nattukottai Chettiars, and Naidus. Interestingly, working conditions for sugar cane cutters is something nobody cares about. The main reason is probably that workers are entirely managed by labour recruiters without any contact with mills and that they do not stay in fixed camps. They are simply invisible. But brick kilns are regularly under attack. Since the early 2000s, often initiated by international organisations, condemnation campaigns have been organised, but with limited effect. Brick kiln employers are mostly Reddiyars, Naidus, and Nadars. Their power is based on land and agriculture. Among those we met, many criticised the modernisation of their caste and abandoning the traditional values related to working on the land and feeding (and controlling) labour. They were proud to produce bricks from sand, water, and human sweat. At the same time, they combined brick-making with other occupations, mostly urban based, such as construction, real estate, transport, and finance. All of them were also involved in politics, and this was a key component of their entrepreneurial strategy. Politics All those we met made the same comment they were not really interested in politics, but they needed politics to run their business. It was like a shield, one said. For public contracts, which still represent a major share of the building industry, political connections are a must. With growing liberalisation of the building market, brick kiln employers deploy new strategies, for instance, investing in real estate companies themselves. Some educate a son as a civil engineer. Notwithstanding market contracts, political connections are crucial for other reasons accessing raw material (sand), limiting taxes, getting (or avoiding) conformity certificates to environmental rules, and avoiding labour laws.

6 16 Published on Saturday, june 27, 2015 vol l nos 26 & 27 EPW Economic & Political Weekly With the boom of the construction industry in the 1990s, sand mining has become a burning issue and an arena of corruption. Increasingly controlled for environmental reasons in the last few years, sand mining is one of the major challenges to industry. Employers have three options extraction on their own land, but at a limited depth; extraction on public land, on the basis of a licence granted for a limited period of time; and illegal extraction. The last option is by far the most common and employers openly acknowledge it. According to some estimates, the real quantity of sand extracted would be 20 or 35 times higher than official records show, and the income generated by contractors would be roughly 80 times higher than the Tamil Nadu government s revenue from sand mining (Sivan 2013). Illegal arrangements with the public work department and local municipalities are thus the rule rather than the exception. The former is in charge of issuing licences for public land and the latter of controlling sand extraction from employers own lands (the depth, in particular). Apart from revenue loss for the government, the consequences of illegal sand mining for soil depletion are disastrous. 11 Since the late 1990s, with a view to conserving top soil, brick kilns near coal or lignite-based thermal plants were requested to use fly ash discharged from them (instead of sand). 12 In the first years of our fieldwork ( ), employers complained about this new restriction but none of them observed the rule. It seems that the restriction is purely formal today. In addition to plundering top soil and water, brick kilns rely heavily on non-renewable fossil energy (mostly coal) and produce huge quantities of carbonic gas. According to the law, brick kilns have to obtain a clearance from the pollution control board before setting themselves up and renew their consent to operate certificate every year. Anti-pollution measures have to do with stack height and appropriate ventilation systems. Brick kilns are also required to be away from water sources and forests, and this comes under the Ministry of Environment and Forests. However, these provisions seem to be rarely enforced. Investigations are also carried out by the revenue department and during labour inspections. Brick kilns come under the agricultural sector and are exempted from income tax. They are, however, supposed to pay taxes on raw materials, and this is another area for illegal practices. As for labour laws, brick kilns are exempted from providing provident funds and from rules related to working hours because they come under the agricultural sector. Many inspections are fictitious, and others focus on minor issues such as the availability of emergency medical care (for which employers may be fined a few hundred rupees). Child labour and bonded labour, where employers risk significant losses, criminal records, and sometimes jail (we found one case) are seldom looked into. A criminal record has to be avoided as it may prevent access to bank loans. Arrangements for all this are mostly made under the table. Inspections are sometimes conducted on the initiative of officials willing to bear the responsibility. According to our informants, however, inspections are mostly initiated by officials who feel wronged in the distribution of bribes and end in private arrangements. Former municipal chairman in Tiruvallur explained how the system operated in Red Hills, We were receiving the complaints, we were going there RDO [revenue district officer] and DC [district collector] were the services in charge. Every three months, they get around Rs 50,000 from each brick kiln, and they redistribute to various services. He said each one received a specific amount according to his or her responsibilities. This system exists everywhere. This avoids investigations and pleases everyone (interview, November 2013). Arrangements with the public administration are only one piece of a complex puzzle. Affiliations to political parties are a key component, probably the most important one. At election time, employers fund a party, which will facilitate their relations with administrative bodies, contractors, and also banks. Employers are expected to regularly fund various events organised by the party (meetings, visit of a member of the legislative assembly [MLA], and so on). Though state elections are key, municipal elections also matter because municipalities are in charge of controlling sand extraction. On market competition, some employers told us that elections were the main component. Those who do not support the right side will struggle to access raw materials, contracts, and bank loans, and will most likely be annoyed by tax, forest, and labour inspections. To reduce risks, employers often build alliances with networks on opposite sides. We came across cases where different family members supported different parties (Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam [DMK], All-India Anna DMK [AIADMK], or possibly the Congress). One of them told us he resisted for a long time but finally gave in, exasperated by administrative troubles. The access road to his brick kiln was blocked a few years ago. The district collector claimed that his trucks were damaging the road (which was probably true) and he was asked to pay a fine of Rs 5 lakh. He negotiated through a friend affiliated to the ruling party to pay a reasonable sum and decided to involve himself in politics. He is now a secretary of the party at the ward level. He has no specific political ideas but he is very clear that his main objective is to do business. He has a flag of the party and a picture of Jayalalithaa on his car. He does not like it, he said, but it makes a huge difference (interview, September 2013). Relocation Settling in more remote areas facilitates illegal practices. Over a few years, brick kiln employers from Red Hills have moved part of their production to Chengalpettu, 60 km south-west of Chennai. The first industries settled there in the 1990s. Since 2007, new units have moved in. Most of their owners were already established in Red Hills. The reason is purely economic. With the Palar River and the Kolavai Lake, Chengalpettu enjoys a soil rich in clay and water compared to Red Hills. It is one of the biggest places of sand mining in Tamil Nadu. Land is cheaper than in Red Hills (in 2014, prices per acre were about six times cheaper).

7 Economic & Political Weekly EPW Published on Saturday, june 27, 2015 vol l nos 26 & Remoteness is another reason. Compared to Red Hills, Chengalpettu is a sparsely populated area, relatively distant from public administration (and from NGOs). It seems like one of the main roles of the brick kiln employers association in Chengalpettu is to maintain this (relative) remoteness. The association plays a key role in controlling the local land market. As elsewhere, there is growing land speculation, but employers organise themselves to avoid real estate promoters. They bribe local municipalities to avoid any improvement in the transport infrastructure (as it might attract newcomers). They fear private housing, which are frequent sources of conflicts over road use and the harmful effect of trucks. If a private individual is willing to sell land, they try to buy. Over the last few years, they have used their political connections to stop a project to support small and medium enterprises, which would act as subcontractors to the automobile industry located nearby. This, they say, will open the region to numerous unwanted visits from officials. In addition, as also observed in Red Hills, the association is involved in procuring sand mining licences that most employers cannot afford on their own. New Channels of Migration As mentioned, employers increasingly complain about workers lack of gratitude. As we argued earlier (Guérin and Venkatasubramanian 2009), they deny everything related to bonded labour. We are bonded, they claim, referring to the advance they are obliged to give. They fail to mention that they were the ones who introduced the system to control labour. It is true that no labourer will now work for a season without an advance. But this is because working conditions are very hard, and wages lack transparency and are uncertain. They talk with great contempt about NGO initiatives against bonded labour. 13 The sums they have to pay to appease the labour department or NGOs are often ridiculous compared to the huge amounts ploughed into politics. But public accusations of ill-treating workers are hard to bear. It encroaches on their status as local big men. Some compare their millions in annual turnover with the minuscule budgets of most NGOs How many NGOs can I buy with this?, one asked us. Others claim that they had to stop their business because of disturbances created by NGOs. Meanwhile, rumours of false NGOs circulate. The most credible threat comes from Dalit movements. The Dalit Panther Iyyakka movement, in particular, is very active in Tiruvallur. 14 It intervenes in conflicts between employers and workers. It also negotiates financial compensations, most of which goes to it. It also regularly threatens employers with accusations of child labour and bonded labour. Here too, negotiations end with financial compensation as employers know they could incur serious losses. These strategies are fairly efficient in extracting funds from employers. There is no doubt that, overall, Dalit movements have contributed to raising awareness of Dalit rights. It is less clear, however, whether they will contribute to improving working conditions. Faced with growing labour problems, employers have their resistance strategies. One is resorting to north Indian workers (from Bihar and Odisha in a case we encountered). North Indian workers are cheaper and more docile. It is easier to control them, they don t want to return to their villages during the season, they ask for much lower advances, as one employer put it. Tamil workers claim more freedom, annoying managers and employers struggling to manage production flow and orders. People from villages hundreds of kilometers away, unfamiliar with the local language, are of course much more captive. Far beyond brick kilns, this is a growing trend in Tamil Nadu. According to certain estimates, there should be one million north Indian workers, from Assam, Bihar, Odisha, Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, and Nepal, in the state on building sites, manufacturing, and also in services (such as in restaurants) and as manual workers, helpers, or guardians. Unions complain about this unfair competition and so does public opinion, and there are regular conflicts with, and ostracism of, these labourers, who are accused of stealing food out of Tamil hands. 15 In Tiruvallur District, according to estimates by an NGO, in 2011, 14% of brick kiln workers were from Odisha. In the brick kilns we visited, north Indian workers were confined to secondary tasks (loading charcoal, preparing for the work during the monsoon), and were living in the minuscule huts earlier occupied by Tamil workers (who now live in permanent houses). One may assume that in coming years they will come in larger numbers. Conclusions In the 1970s, drawing on fieldwork in Gujarat, Breman (1996) shed light on the growing importance of footloose labourers, free from rural bondage but now bonded to other sources of debt, contracted from the agro-industry or the construction sectors. Despite abundant local labour, Breman highlighted the preference of employers for migrant labour, which is both floating and captive, mobile and immobile, coming and going according to the needs of the market. The flows of migration described here in similar sectors (brick-making and sugar cane harvesting) in Tamil Nadu illustrate the persistence and the renewal of the phenomena. In Tamil Nadu, bondage co exists with many public welfare schemes. These play the role of a safety net, but they also contribute to legitimate low wages, the lack of social protection, and the impunity of employers. As we have seen, alliances between capital and the state, through the politicisation of employers, are instrumental in the persistence of these forms of labour exploitation. Confronted by the growing resistance of workers, especially with regard to the freedom to move, we see that employers tighten working conditions and start shifting to other migration channels. Here, north India remains an immense labour pool. And even if these forms of labour management obey a capitalist logic, they are inseparable from the caste hierarchy. Our analyses also reveal another facet of bondage the role of social aspirations and consumerism. Motivated by a growing willingness to climb the ladder of social hierarchy, subaltern groups here mostly Dalits engage in a social

8 18 Published on Saturday, june 27, 2015 vol l nos 26 & 27 EPW Economic & Political Weekly competition based on consumerism and ostentatious social and religious rituals. They are not only hungry stomachs desperate to make ends meet, but also seek to acquire, preserve, or improve their dignity, even if this means sacrificing their own freedom. It is to be hoped that these forms of individual resistance will be able to transform into collective resistance, which is a key to combating the alliances between capitalism and the state, which are at the root of these forms of bondage and exploitation, and, more broadly, of labourers vulnerability. Notes 1 Fieldwork was carried out between 2004 and 2013 under the French Institute of Pondicherry s labour, finance and social dynamics research programme. The latest fieldwork was supported by the Indian Ocean World project (Human Bondage in the Indian Ocean World: Roots, Structure and Transformations), and funded by the French National Agency for Research (ANR). 2 For more details on the importance of these two sectors, see Guérin and Venkatasubramanian (2009) for brick kilns and Guérin et al (2009) for sugar cane. 3 Among a preselected sample of bonded households, households were randomly selected. The same households were interviewed in 2004 and 2014, without any attrition. 4 See, for instance, Breman (1996); Breman et al (2009); Lerche (2007); Srivastava (2009). 5 Here, we draw on Srivastava (2009) and Guérin (2013). 6 In the villages studied here, daily wages in agriculture in 2014 ranged from Rs 125 to Rs 220 depending on the type of task and gender. 7 Real income in 2014 prices inflated over 2004 by a factor of 2.27, estimated from the annual report on Consumer Price Index Numbers for Agricultural and Rural Labourers. These numbers are generally considered to underestimate actual inflation, and do not take into account changes in access to common property resources and the increase in needs, which have implications for the real value of labour incomes. Therefore these figures may overstate the increase in real incomes since The estimation of wages and advances are based on crossinterviews between labourers and recruiters (and we were able to access some record books). On other sources of income, interviews with labourers were cross-checked with the analysis of local labour markets. Overall, the figures given here can be considered reasonable rough estimates. 8 See, for instance, Kalaiyarasan (2014); Dreze and Khera (2013); Carswell and De Neeve (2013). 9 This has been explored elsewhere (Guérin et al 2012). 10 For a review of the literature, see Srivastava (2009). 11 For a quantification of the consequences of soil depletion through sand mining for brick production in north and south Tamil Nadu, see Kathuria (2015). 12 The first notification, published in September 1999 (S [E]), indicates that fly ash must be used by brick kilns located within 50 km of thermal power plants. In the notification of Nov 2008 (S.O [E]), the distance is 100 km. 13 For more details, see Guérin and Venkatasubramanian (2009). 14 It was transformed into a political party in 1999 and renamed Liberation Panthers, but in the places studied here, people still use the term Dalit Panther. 15 Their complaints are regularly published in the press. References Breman, J (1996): Footloose Labour: Working in the Indian Informal Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (2007): Labour Bondage in West India: From Past to Present, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (2011): Outcast Labour in Asia. Circulation and Informalisation of the Workforce at the Bottom of the Economy, New-Delhi: Oxford University Press. Breman, J, I Guérin and A Prakash eds, (2009): India s Unfree Workforce, Old and New Practices of Labour Bondage, New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Carswell, G and G de Neve (2013): Women at the Crossroads: Implementation of Employment Guarantee Scheme in Rural Tamil Nadu, Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 48, No 52. CSE (2015): Anil Agaurwal Dialogue 2015: The Poor in Climate Change, New-Delhi: Center for Social Environment. Dreze, J and R Khera (2013): Rural Poverty and the Public Distribution System, Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 48, Nos GoI (Government of India) (2011): Annual Report , Ministry of Labour and Employment, New Delhi. (2012): Informal Sector and Conditions of Employment in India, NSS 66th Round (July 2009 June 2010), New Delhi: National Sample Survey Office. Gorringe, H (2005): Untouchable Citizens: The Dalit Panthers and Democratisation in Tamil Nadu, New Delhi: Sage. 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Old and New Practices of Labour Bondage, J Breman, I Guérin and A Prakash (eds), New Delhi: Oxford University Press, pp Kalaiyarasan, A (2014): A Comparison of Developmental Outcomes in Gujarat and Tamil Nadu, Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 49, No 15, pp Lerche, J (2007): A Global Alliance against Forced Labour? Unfree Labour, Neo-liberal Globalisation and the International Labour Organisation, Journal of Agrarian Change, 7, pp Mosse, D (2013): Uncertain Networks: NGOs, Dalit Rights and the Development Agenda in South India, Caste Out of Development Research Project, com/2013/07/david_uncertainnetworks.pdf Patnaik, P (2013): A Critique of the Welfare Theoretic Basis of the Measurement of Poverty, Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 48, No 14, pp Srivastava, R S (2009): Conceptualising Continuity and Change in Emerging Forms of Labour Bondage, India s Unfree Workforce. Old and New Practices of Labour Bondage, in J Breman, I Guérin and A Prakash (eds), New Delhi: Oxford University Press, pp Servet, J-M (2007): Entre Protection et Surexploitation: l ambiguïté de la rémunération par avance en Inde, Autrepart, (43), pp Sivan, J (2013): Illegal Sand Mining in Tamil Nadu Worth Rs 15,000 Crore? Times of India, 21 August. Subramanian, S (2013): The Poverty Line: Getting It Wrong Again and Again, Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 46, No 48. Vijaybaskar, M and A Wyatt (2013): Economic Change, Politics and Caste: The Case of the Kongu Nadu Munnetra Kazhagam, Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 48, No 48, pp The Economic and Political Weekly Research Foundation has added a module on Insurance to its online database EPWRF India Time Series (EPWRFITS). The Insurance module provides time series and company-wise data under Life and Non-Life Insurance, seperately for both public and private sectors, starting from The module covers a large number of variables such as the number of offices, policies issued, premium, claims settled, and solvency ratios. Under the category of Life Insurance, company-wise data at the state-level on the number of offices and individual new businesses underwritten is included. Cross-country indicators like insurance density and penetration are given to enable international comparison. The periodicity of data for all variables is annual and has been sourced from publications such as the Insurance Regulatory Authority of India s Handbook on Indian Insurance Statistics and annual reports. With this, the EPWRFITS now has 14 modules covering a range of macroeconomic and financial data.