Military Centre for Strategic Studies - Rome ZTBW. Bundeswehr Transformation Center - Berlin. Rubbettino

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2 Military Centre for Strategic Studies - Rome ZTBW Bundeswehr Transformation Center - Berlin

3 Mediterranean security after EU and Nato enlargement A joint research project between Military Centre for Strategic Studies (Rome) and Bundeswehr Transformation Center (Berlin) ZTBw team Ralph Thiele, Wolf Kinzel, Frank Kolstelnik, Gerd Föhrenbach CeMiSS team Carlo Finizio, Olga Mattera, Paolo Quercia Rubbettino

4 Copyright by CeMiSS Centro Militare di Studi Strategici Piazza della Rovere, Roma (RM) Rubbettino Editore Soveria Mannelli - Viale Rosario Rubbettino, 10 -Tel. (0968)

5 Sommario 1 Foreword p. 7 2 Executive Summary 9 3 Part One: Introduction 3.1 Creating the Common Security Area Europe Living the EU-NATO Strategic Partnership 19 4 Part Two: Perceptions of the enlargements 4.1 Effects of EU and NATO Enlargements on the Mediterranean: Italian and German Points of View Italian interests German interests Core Findings of selected national perceptions The new EU member states Cyprus Malta Slovenia The Would-be EU-Members Turkey Bulgaria Core findings on regional points of view The Mediterranean Dialogue Countries and NATO The Eastern Mediterranean Countries: Egypt, Jordan and Israel The Western Mediterranean Countries: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya 55 5

6 4.3.2 The Mediterranean Dialogue Countries and the European Union p The Mediterranean - Adriatic Dimension: Croatia, Serbia Montenegro, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina 68 5 Part Three: Initiatives to enhance the security situation in the Mediterranean. An Analysis of effectiveness and development options 5.1 Upgrading the Mediterranean Dialogue Programmes Options for Future Development The EU and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Security Interests of the EU An emerging New Policy ESDP and the Mediterranean An EU Strategy Against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Options for Future Developments 86 6 Conclusions 6.1 EU-NATO Security Co-operation in the Mediterranean - 87 A Strategic Partnership Conflict prevention and crisis management within sub-regional security regimes through different comprehensive approaches Encouraging and Supporting developments towards good governance, human rights and democracy Policy options to induce development within the Mediterranean Dialogue Partner countries 94 6

7 1. Foreword Europe s security landscape has changed profoundly since While the region s two pre-eminent political organisations, NATO and the EU, have achieved remarkable success in promoting stability and democracy in the Eastern and South-Eastern part of the continent, the security situation which Europe is facing today in the Southern Mediterranean is in many respects worse than a decade ago. It is now the time to broaden Europe s strategic perspective. The Southern Mediterranean is still politically unstable and economically weak. The hope of a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the wake of the 1993 Oslo Accords has all but vanished. Nevertheless, militant Islam is spreading. Terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile technology are changing the strategic environment of the whole region. Yet there are also encouraging signs. Libya recently decided to stop its nuclear programme and open it to international inspections. Iraq is no longer ruled by a ruthless dictator and will certainly develop into a more democratic state, despite the efforts by some groups to incite chaos. Most importantly, as the 2002 Arab Human Development Report of the U.N. Development Programme illustrates, the call for democratic reforms in the Arab world, though still feeble, is getting louder. This study shows that there is a need for a new approach to the region, despite of the various European programmes, partnerships and dialogues which have been evolving in the Mediterranean and proven to be useful up to a point. Put simply, NATO and EU members should push harder for political and economic reforms in the Mediterranean. Key objectives of this new approach should be to reinforce good governance, i.e. the commitments to democratic reforms, human rights and the rule of law, and enhance regional and co-operation subregional Co-operation as a major prerequisite for stability and prosperity. The two main instruments for advancing these key objectives would be firm conditionality and a strategic partnership between NATO and the EU. To be sure, conditionality has been a tool of the EU s co-operation with part- 7

8 ner countries for a long time. However, with regard to the Mediterranean it has been employed reluctantly in order not to jeopardise modest progress. A new understanding of conditionality would lead to a more vigorous application of that principle. The recognition that NATO lacks economic incentives and that the EU is not yet perceived a serious security policy actor should prompt both organisations to fuse their initiatives into one common strategy for the region. A strategic partnership between NATO and the EU towards the Mediterranean would create the maximum synergy of resources by making all tools at their disposal available for the implementation of the strategy. This study presents the findings of a research project conducted jointly by the Centro Militare di Studi Strategici (CeMiSS) and the Bundeswehr Transformation Center (ZTransfBw). CeMiSS and ZTransfBw held several workshops in Rome and Berlin during the 2003 Italian presidency of the European Union. We would like to thank our staff for carrying out the research for this project. Particular thanks go to Olga Mattera and Paolo Quercia at CeMiSS and Wolf Kinzel, Frank Kostelnik and Gerd Föhrenbach at ZTransf- Bw. Brigadier General Carlo Finizio Director, CeMiSS Rome Colonel Ralph Thiele Commander, ZTransfBw Berlin / Waldbröl 8

9 2. Executive Summary This study examines the possibilities of an intensification of the co-operation between NATO and the EU on the one side and the Mediterranean Arab countries and Israel on the other. At the same time it constitutes a practical instrument that could stimulate both the co-operation within NATO and the ESDP process of the EU. This study could not only help to explain the Italian and German interests and positions vis á vis the Mediterranean countries but it could also lead to the development of joint initiatives that would profit from the respective Italian and German experiences and contacts since the foundation of NATO and the EU. As the conference of the Cairo Library with Non Governmental Organisations in March 2004 opened by the Egyptian President Mubarak showed, the Arab states are beginning to feel the need for modernisation and sustained development. Disquieting developments in the socio-economic and demographic fields have been going on for decades. The problems have accumulated and are now forming fertile soil for the growth of militant Islamist fundamentalism. NATO and the EU have reached a watershed in history by opening up for new member states from the Baltic to the Mediterranean. At the same time NATO and the EU have agreed to enhance their co-operation concerning the developing of the ESDP-dimension and of common security policy initiatives. Therefore they have created a Common Security Area Europe where stability, peace and development are guaranteed for the time being. This new enlarged Security Area will enable NATO and EU to enter in a new phase of dialogue and co-operation with the Mediterranean countries. The terrorist attacks on 11 March 2004 in Madrid once more demonstrated that the security of the European countries is closely linked and interrelated to the security and stability of the Mediterranean countries and that Islamist fundamentalist terrorism is a common enemy to all our societies. 9

10 In order to enhance co-operation and promote mutual trust and understanding, NATO in 1994 and EU in 1995 began to develop partnership and co-operation programmes (NATO s Mediterranean Dialogue and EU s Barcelona Process) with the countries in the Mediterranean region. Lately both organisations have intensified their efforts by establishing the 2003 Work-programme and the so-called Option Paper of February Since 2001, new developments have taken place. This fact should be seen as an encouragement of the intensification of the Mediterranean dialogue with our partner countries: 1) the security concern related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the war on terrorism, the spread of Islamist fundamentalism and illegal immigration and the trafficking of drugs and small arms in combination with the concerns about guaranteed energy supply and free access to the Mediterranean markets; 2) the need to remedy the shortcomings of the existing dialogue that are constituted by the following factors: - the self funding basis for the Mediterranean partner countries - the lack of possibilities for the Mediterranean countries to influence the work programme - the still existing mistrust of the Mediterranean countries. They fear that the dialogue might be a postcolonial attempt of the west at gaining influence in Arab countries - the limited dimensions of the respective dialogue programmes. NA- TO s dialogue lacks the social and economic dimension and the EU s agenda lacks the security dimension 3) the growing understanding in the Mediterranean countries that democratic reform and good governance are essential prerequisites for sustained development and stability 4) the development of a Mediterranean dimension of NATO and the EU with the new member states in the region in Eastern Europe and the Balkans (where security is now guaranteed) and with new partnerships that have been established with the Russian Federation and the Ukraine As regards to their interest in a Mediterranean dialogue, Italy and Germany have many perceptions in common: both countries prefer a multilateral not a national approach to the Mediterranean dialogues and they are trying to engage international or supra-national institutions. Both countries see the solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a prerequisite for substantial progress in the Mediterranean dialogue process. Both countries also prefer a multidimensional approach to Mediterranean security; this means that socio-economic factors 10

11 would play an important role at the same time as great attention would be paid to the security dimension (e.g. arms control and confidence building measures). However, they are reluctant to see an exclusively military dimension. Since it is a Mediterranean country Italy has greater economic and trading interests in the area than Germany. The same regards the security of the energy supply. Good relations to the main suppliers of Italy s energy like Libya, Algeria and Egypt is of vital importance. Illegal immigration via the Mediterranean is also a major problem to Italy, which is dealt through a special unilateral dialogue with selected Mediterranean countries. Although Germany has smaller economic interests in the region, it has a special relationship as a consequence of its national history to the state of Israel and is emotionally committed to the survival and security of the Jewish State. However, Germany is not neglecting its good relations to the Arab states for the sake of the abovementioned reasons. After having analysed the perceptions and wishes of the Mediterranean dialogue countries, the shortcomings of the existing dialogues and the new opportunities and security concerns CeMiSS and ZTransfBw (and their experts and researchers) will make the following four propositions. 1) Forming a strategic Partnership between NATO and the EU for joint initiatives concerning the Mediterranean 2) Dialogue A strategic partnership between NATO and the EU would capitalise on the strength of both organisations and avoid their respective weaknesses. This would constitute one more concrete step to the Berlin plus agreement. The aim of this new strategic partnership is to: - formulate a common security concept for the region - co-ordinate initiatives in order to attain a maximum of collaboration - form a joint working group with a secretariat as well as a common council (PSC - NAC) for the formulation and implementation of the joint policy. The already existing programmes and initiatives have to be reviewed and assessed in the light of the common goals ( Meda-Acquis ). The organisation that is best suited to take on a specific part of the strategy will be tasked to do so by the EU-NATO Co-ordination Council. Policy areas that are in the realm of both organisations will be handled jointly and co-ordinated by EU-NATO working groups.this would create a Win-Win situation for all participants in the Mediterranean dialogue. 11

12 Benefits for the EU - the frictions within the EU regarding its relationship to NATO could be reduced - it would become more capable in the field of preventive action and crisis management - the EU would become a true partner of the transatlantic partnership - this would strengthen European influence in regions with predominant US influence - this would co-opt the U.S. into a more multilateral and more comprehensive approach Benefits for NATO - co-operation would expand the scope of NATO s policy dimensions - co-operation would increase the influence of NATO where the traditional influence of the U.S. is low (i.e. North Africa except Morocco) Benefits for the MP/ MD-countries - transparency in EU and NATO matters relating to the Mediterranean - no overlap between EU and NATO initiatives - country-specific co-operation programmes including political, economic, social and military aspects in support of good governance 3) Conflict prevention and crisis management in sub-regional security regimes through a comprehensive approach In order to be able to cope with the complex security problems of the region, a comprehensive approach that encompasses economic, social, political and security related issues will be necessary. However, the geographical aspects of the co-operation and integration have to be diversified since the Mediterranean countries are too different between themselves to deal with them with a single set of measures. A single great Mediterranean approach has to be put aside since the ultimate aim of a single geo-economical MP/MD-region is almost impossible to reach. For this reason the Mediterranean-dialogue countries should be subdivided into three sub-regional groups of countries with similar geopolitical interests and socio-economical structures. The sub-regions are the following: - The eastern Mediterranean/ Adriatic Sea countries: Slovenia, Croatia, Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro. - The Southwestern Mediterranean-countries: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya 12

13 - The Southeastern Mediterranean countries: Egypt, The Palestinian Provisional Authority, Jordan, Syria and Israel. These sub-regions should be addressed with specifically tailored sets of political, economical and security related instruments. Although there already are some sub-regional organisations, neither integration in the economic field nor progress in the field of arms-control and confidence building measures is satisfactory. Consequently, a joint NATO/ EU policy should be tailored to encourage and support sub-regional economic and infrastructure integration and to establish sub-regional security regimes. These security regimes could encompass: - road maps that would help to solve regional conflicts - The establishment of arms control regimes for conventional arms as well as for weapons of mass destruction - confidence building measures like advance notice of military exercises and information about the state of readiness of the military forces - conflict management and conflict prevention through joint crisis management centres - NATO/ EU commitment to regional peace keeping-and observer forces In the long run these initiatives could lead to the establishment of a Mediterranean security community that would support Euro-Atlantic security effectively. 4) Encouraging and Supporting developments towards good governance, human rights and democracy Bad governance and the violation of human rights can easily lead to civil disturbances, anarchic conditions and even to the collapse of states. These factors promote terrorism, organised crime and illegal immigration and cause interstate conflicts. As stipulated in the European Security Strategy A Secure Europe in a better World from December 2003 the EU will... promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and co-operative relations. The MP/MD-countries themselves stress the importance of economic and structural changes and of good governance for the stabilisation of the region. Of course, the initiatives for this must come from within the Mediterranean countries. All the more it is necessary for NATO and EU to encourage any sign of change and to strengthen and support these changes efficiently and unbureaucratically with the appropriate means. Many analysts believe that 13

14 there are indigenous forms of democracy, which combine democratic principles with traditional forms of legitimacy, like religion, tribe, neighbourhood or syndicates. Nevertheless, NATO and EU should expect the Mediterranean dialogue countries to end their anti-western rhetoric and to give up their double standard in the fight against the internal Islamist opposition. As long as these groups are tolerated and even supported when they fight Western influence and values only by the local governments but when they threaten the governments themselves they are dealt with politically or by law enforcement. In 2001/2 the African Union started several encouraging initiatives that seem to lead in the direction of good governance, pluralism and free elections. Several African countries have joined the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) which is an instrument for the implementation of good standards of democracy and good governance. At the moment only one Mediterranean dialogue country Algeria is part of the voluntary APRM-process. A joint NA- TO/ EU initiative ought to encourage the MP/MD-countries to join this promising initiative. 5) Policy options to induce development within the Mediterranean Dialogue Partner countries Although the Mediterranean dialogue partners are becoming aware of the fact that they need democratic reforms, NATO and the EU should improve their ability to induce and influence change in the direction of good governance in the dialogue countries. Both the National Security Strategy of the United States (September 2002) and the European Security Strategy (December 2003) propose the conditionality of development assistance and targeted trade measures in order to induce good governance and freedom. Since the imposition of Western patterns of government and society models would be highly counterproductive this study proposes the implementation of subtle forms of incentives and pressure, based on cross-issue linkage. For this purpose NATO and the EU should elaborate the following issues: - a common yardstick to specify the expectations that regard reforms and the development of civil societies - subtle forms of using conditionality tools on the basis of gradualism and cross-issue linkage - the possibility to co-operate with Western and Mediterranean NGO s in order to strengthen the starting points for the development of civil societies. 14

15 This kind of conditionality should be effectively introduced into all aspects of the NATO/ EU relations to the region. Consequently the development aid would not only help to improve the standard of living in the region, but it would also safeguard certain standards that would guarantee the constant progress of human rights and good governance in the Mediterranean dialogue countries. 15

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17 3. Part One: Introduction 3.1 Creating the Common Security Area Europe The barbaric attacks in Madrid on 11 March 2004 by a Moroccan terrorist network have once more demonstrated that European security is closely connected to the security of the states in the Mediterranean region. Terrorism is the worst common enemy of our western civilisation as well as of the legitimate governments and the populations of all the countries around the Mediterranean basin. Together with the Middle East the Mediterranean is one of the unstable regions of the world today. Many conflicts in this area catch the attention of the world. It could easily become fertile soil for even greater threats like weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists and large-scale illegal immigration. At the same time the Mediterranean once the cradle of Western civilisation is a strategically important region, with roughly 25% of the energy supply of the EU coming from the countries around the Southern Mediterranean. The region is also important as a trading partner for the Southern NATO and EU countries. After the end of the East-West conflict NATO started its Mediterranean dialogue (February 1995) with an invitation to Egypt, Israel, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia to take part in bilateral dialogues with NATO. The dialogue would also allow for multilateral action on a case by case basis. NATO wanted to make use of the positive effects of the Middle East peace process that seemed promising at the time. Later on Jordan and Algeria joined the dialogue. In 1995 the EU began its Barcelona process, which has an even more multi-dimensional approach. It focuses on economic issues and includes twelve dialogue countries. 17

18 Although both dialogue mechanisms gathered momentum after 11 September 2001 they still have their shortcomings. The main aim is to develop both forms of dialogue into one single, multidimensional approach that will lead to mutually beneficial co-operation with the Mediterranean countries. This kind of collaboration would combine the strength of both organisational and compensate for their weaknesses. At the moment, the Mediterranean dialogue countries are beginning to feel the need for substantial change inside their states and societies in order to be able to achieve sustained economic growth, better education and greater social justice. Now that a historic step has been taken and both NATO and the EU have been joined by many former Warsaw Pact member countries it is time to intensify the dialogue with the Mediterranean states in order to develop a true, beneficial partnership for all participants. In the long run this might lead to the extension of areas of equal security from the EU-and European-NATO countries to the Mediterranean partner countries. In this manner one single Common Security Area Europe with equal security for all participants would be formed. Since 2001 four new developments have taken place that have spurred on the work on the intensification of the Mediterranean dialogue with our partner countries: 1) The security concern related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the war against terrorism, the spread of Islamist fundamentalism and illegal immigration and the trafficking of drugs and small arms in combination with the concerns about guaranteed energy supply and free access to the Mediterranean market 2) The need to remedy the shortcomings of the existing dialogue which are: - The self funding basis that constitutes a problem for the Mediterranean partner countries - The lacking possibilities for the Mediterranean countries to influence the work program - The still existing mistrust of the Mediterranean countries that the dialogue is a postcolonial Western attempt to gain influence over Arabic countries - The limited dimensions the respective dialogue programs as NATO s dialogue lacking the social-and economic dimension and EU s agenda lacking the security dimension 3) The fact that the Mediterranean countries are beginning to realise that democratic reform as well as good governance are essential prerequisites for sustained development and stability 18

19 4) The development of a Mediterranean dimension of NATO and the EU with the new member states in the region in Eastern Europe and the Balkans (where security is now guaranteed) and with new partnerships that have been established with the Russian Federation and the Ukraine. 3.2 Living the EU-NATO Strategic Partnership With the 16 December 2002 EU-NATO joint declaration on ESDP (the so-called Berlin Plus Agreement) both organisations established a strategic partnership on the basis of shared values and the indivisibility of their security in order to be able to meet the challenges to the Euro-Atlantic security of the 21 st century. In this sense, both organisations stressed the importance of effective mutual consultations, dialogue and co-operation. The main goal of this strategic partnership is to engage in common initiatives that reinforce both sides but still respect the different nature of the two organisations. At the same time the strategic landscape of European security has changed considerably. Seven new member states will be joining NATO on 2 April. The EU enlargement with 12 new member states will be taking place on 1 May. Consequently, the fluent and ambiguous situation in Eastern and Southeastern Europe will be stabilised by the incorporation a whole region with a long history into the Euro-Atlantic community of common values and common security. For a long time this region was artificially separated from the centre of Europe. Now that most security problems in Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans have been solved and strategic partnerships to the Russia and the Ukraine have been established, the dialogue and co-operation with the Mediterranean states becomes increasingly important. It is now generally recognised that the security of the Euro-Atlantic region is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean and that the Mediterranean dimension is one of the security components of the European security architecture. Although the states around the Mediterranean are geographically united by the sea the various states on the southern and eastern shores differ considerably as regards their economic and demographic development, their resources, their political systems and their political orientation. The attacks of the 11 September 2001, the fundamentalist terrorist threat, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, illegal immigration into the EU, the ongoing war against terrorism and the commitment of the Bush-administration to democratic change in the sphere of Islam has made the 19

20 Mediterranean region the focal point of attention and of the kind of preventive co-operation that aims at inducing economic and political development. Naturally NATO and the EU enhanced their efforts to intensify their Mediterranean dialogues. The EU s so-called Option-Paper, the declaration of the Thessaloniki EU-summit and the first meeting of the Political and Security Committee (PSC), in which high ranking representatives of the Mediterranean partner states participated, provided additional momentum to dialogue and co-operation process. The Mediterranean states that participate in NATO s Mediterranean Dialogue have been invited to the NATO summit in Istanbul in June 2004 where the Alliance is planning to inaugurate the Istanbul Initiative that is intended to enhance the status of the Mediterranean dialogue. Nevertheless, the NATO Work Programme of the Mediterranean Dialogue (MDWP) of 2003 and the EU s Option Paper that was elaborated within the framework of the Barcelona Process are two separate efforts that lack the benefits of collaboration. Close co-operation between the two organisations could combine through joint initiatives NATO s impressive security dimension with the more comprehensive approach of the EU-Mediterranean dialogue. In this manner the weaknesses of the respective organisations would be compensated for and their specific strengths taken advantage of. Equally, the different NATO and EU member states have different interests and take different views on many things, not the least in the case of their relations to the states of the southern and eastern Mediterranean. Especially the southern NATO states like Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Greece and Turkey have developed close links to the Islamic states in the Mediterranean. However, the northern NATO or/and EU member states have shown quite limited interest in the abovementioned area. When they have shown interest it has mainly regarded the energy supply and illegal immigration. For historic reasons the Federal Republic of Germany has developed a special relationship to the state of Israel. Nevertheless both NATO and the EU as a whole take a strong interest in stability, peaceful change and development in the Mediterranean. The Italian Centro Militare di Studi Strategici (CeMiSS) of the Centre for High Defence Studies of the Italian Armed Forces and the Bundeswehr transformation center (ZTBw) of the German Armed Forces have developed the present study. The project is intended to promote co-operation between the different NA- TO countries and support the developing European Security and Defence Policy. At the same time it is an opportunity to take advantage of the many different points of view and to develop joint policy options in the Mediterranean region. 20

21 The terrorist attacks of 11 September and the subsequent terrorist activities in Europe and other parts of the world have focused the attention on the threatening security scene that has developed in the Mediterranean, both for the EU states and for the countries in the region. The lack of economic development, the explosive birth rates and the urbanisation have created very young societies and high rates of unemployment. In combination with social injustice these factors are leading to a very unstable socio-economic situation, which is exploited by fundamentalist Islamic groups. At the same time, the pan-arab and socialist ideology of the former revolutionary regimes has lost (mainly because of the repeated defeats in the wars against Israel) its legitimacy and attraction. The Seven Days War in 1967 caused a renaissance of fundamentalist Islamic which have affected parts of the educated middle classes and the lower strata of the Islamic societies. This movement dreamt of a renaissance of Islamic power and influence. The Shiite revolution in Iran in 1979 meant that, for the first time, a fundamentalist Islamic movement was able to form a government and transform the society into an Islamic country. Almost all other Islamic states are facing dangerous Islamist opposition movements, ranging form the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt to the terrorist GIA in Algeria that has caused ten thousands of casualties in a bloody civil war. Unresolved disputes (like the dispute over the West-Sahara region between Morocco and Algeria) and rivalries among the Mediterranean Arab states add to the instability of the region. Since September 2000 the peace process between Israel and the Palestinian Provisional Authority has come to a halt and violence has flared up with little hope for a satisfying solution in the near future. Therefore, the continuing dramatic situation between the Israeli and the Palestian peoples remains the main reason for the estrangement of the Arabic-Islamic world vis-a-vis the western countries of NATO and the EU. The emergence of the Al-Quaida terrorist network has revealed a new dimension of the terrorist threat. This new form of terrorism does not only seek to overthrow moderate Islamic governments but also strives to spread its ideology to areas outside the traditional Islamic world. The strategy of this new kind of terrorism is to achieve a maximum of psychological shock and terror by maximising the number of innocent, civilian casualties. For the Al-Quaida terrorists weapons of mass destruction would not be weapons of last resort, but of prime choice. NATO s weapons of mass destruction initiative of April 1999, the EU s Thessaloniki Declaration of a strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction of June 2003 and the National Security Strategy of the Unit- 21

22 ed States of September 2002 demonstrate the deep concern of the western world, that such weapons might be made available to terrorists by rogue states or through international criminal activities. Another major threat to European security as listed in the EU-document European Security Strategy of December 2003 is constituted by the networks of organised crime that deal in drug trafficking, smuggling of small arms and illegal immigration. Failing states that might collapse through bad governance, corruption, civil war or secession, are also closely connected to the abovementioned threats. The emerging new threats are but one side of the coin. At the same time as east-and southeast European security is strengthened, the EU is enlarging its Mediterranean dimension with the entry of Cyprus and Malta into the Union. The winds of change are blowing around the globe. In part this can be explained with concepts like globalisation and new information technologies. The reinforced presence of the United States in the greater Middle East pushes some former enemies of the west towards internal reform and a better conduct concerning international law. After the end of the east-west conflict both the EU and NATO have initiated a fruitful dialogue with the non-eu and non-nato states of the Mediterranean through the Barcelona Process and the Mediterranean Dialogue. Now it is time to take advantage of all chances and opportunities to transform this dialogue into a kind of co-operation that will be even more beneficial for all the participants. The Methodical Approach The goal of this joint research project is to work out more effective ways of organising co-operation in the field of mutual security with the non-eu and non-nato states of the Mediterranean, to devise new forms and procedures of joint NATO and EU initiatives and to do research on intelligent ways of supporting changes in the direction of extended democracy, human rights and good governance that have already been started by the Mediterranean non EU/NATO states on their own. To achieve this goal, the research project was subdivided into the following chapters: - Italy s perceptions and interests concerning the Mediterranean situation - Germany s perceptions and interests concerning the Mediterranean situation 22

23 - The perceptions and interests of the non-nato/eu Mediterranean states concerning the enlargement of NATO and EU and the western countries in general subdivided into the following regional groups: - The Maghreb-states - The Eastern Mediterranean states - The Adriatic states - A stock-taking of NATO s Mediterranean dialogue - A stock-taking of EU s Mediterranean dialogue - The specific security problems after 11 September Options for improving NATO and EU co-operation - Options for improving regional security - Options for supporting political, economic and social change in the region - Means for supporting political, economic and social change in the region. Each of these chapters deals with an important aspect of the overall aim. Seen in concert, they enable the reader to adopt a comprehensive approach to this complex problem. For the analysis of the regional perceptions Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya were selected among the Maghreb states while Egypt, Jordan and Israel were selected among the eastern Mediterranean states. The Adriatic dimension will be analysed through an analysis of the points of view of Bosnia Herzegovina, Serbia-Montenegro, Croatia and Albania. Furthermore, useful research has been done on the points of view of the new EU or NATO member states and on the potential EU member Turkey. Although not directly linked to the research interest of this study, these perceptions give a useful background and framework for the overall analysis. These perceptions can be found in the appendix. Chapter 4 evaluates the more general perceptions and interests of the Mediterranean dialogue countries.chapter 5 deals specifically with the Mediterranean dialogue of NATO and EU. It analyses the perceptions, the means of participation and the interests of the different partner countries. Chapter 5 also analyses the upgrading of the Mediterranean dialogue that is the result of NATO s Work Program 2003 and of the EU s Option-Paper. European security interests concerning the Mediterranean dialogue countries after 11 September 2001 will also be analysed. The final topic of Chapter 5 is constituted by an evaluation of both the chances of survival and the obstacles that a reinforced Mediterranean dialogue 23

24 will encounter in a time that is characterised by the onset of growing threats and at the same time by new opportunities. After having evaluated the present setting of co-operation of NATO and the EU with the Mediterranean dialogue countries CeMiSS and ZTBw propose four final conclusions that might improve the existing dialogue and make use of the opportunities in this historically important epoch. These are: 1) A strategic EU-NATO partnership concerning the Mediterranean dialogue 2) Sub-regional security systems for conflict prevention and crisis management 3) Methods of encouraging and supporting developments towards good governance, human rights and democracy 4) Policy options to induce development in the Mediterranean dialogue partner countries 24

25 4. Part Two: Perceptions of the enlargements 4.1 Effects of the EU and NATO Enlargement on the Mediterranean: Italian and German Points of View Italian interests Italy has always had a special relationship to the Mediterranean Sea due to its peculiar geographical position 80% of its landmass borders the Mediterranean Sea. As a consequence of its geographical position Italy has often voiced the interests of the Mediterranean region inside the European institutions. In this manner it has tried to remind Europe of the importance of the Mediterranean region for Europe s well being. During the historic era between the end of the Second World War and the end of the Cold War, Italian foreign policy was inspired by three different visions that can be considered the pillars of our country s international policy during the last fifty years: the establishment, maintenance and strengthening of a solid Atlantic link, the construction of an integrated European community and the process of pursuing an open door policy towards the two main areas of tension and potential crisis, namely the Mediterranean basin and the Soviet bloc. The three pillars of Atlantic integration, European co-operation and the open door policy towards East and South were considered prerequisites for the modernisation and economic growth of the country. During the cold war due to the limited contacts to the East the Mediterranean region became the third Italian foreign policy arena after the Transatlantic and European ones. Whereas the first pillar of the Italian foreign policy (the NATO Alliance) was needed to provide strict security for our country, the second pillar (EU integration) was considered to be the best framework for the creation of the social and economic conditions that would be necessary for the modernisation 25

26 of the country. The third pillar was constituted by the Mediterranean that was perceived of by several Italian governments as the ideal arena for a limited national foreign policy. As a matter of fact, the lack of organised military and economic regional structures in the Mediterranean area gave Italy bigger margin for attempts at autonomous initiatives. This could be done through the establishment of separate relations to states like Libya, Egypt and Algeria but also to an organisation like the PLO. Italy s main interests were to secure its energy supply with the help of friendly relations to energy exporting countries and to open these markets to large Italian state industries like FIAT, ENI and Olivetti. Italy and the Mediterranean in the Nineties After the end of the Cold War one of the main aspirations of the Italian foreign policy has been the hope that Italy would be able to take full advantage of its geographical position in order to spread the influence of multilateral institutions like the EU and NATO to the North African countries. The creation of the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue in 1994 was one of the first achievements of this policy. Even if the EU and NATO enlargement to the East has attained important and strategic results, Italy has remained one of the most convinced supporters of the diversion of political interest and resources to the South. Despite Italy s strong political commitment the effects of its lobbying have been modest and for the most part, Italy s Mediterranean policy has remained inconsistent and has not been able to mobilise sufficient political energies and resources to sustain a high-profile policy in the area. One of the reasons for this is related to the great changes that have affected all the three pillars from 1990 onwards: - The first pillar of the Italian foreign policy has been radically transformed by factors like the disappearance of the Soviet Union and the East bloc, the inclusion of the former Warsaw Pact countries in NATO and the EU and the reshaping of the strategic direction of NATO. At the same time threat perceptions concerning hard security have shifted dramatically from conventional and nuclear warfare to the asymmetric threat of terrorist attacks. In its turn this has given way for the growing concern of nonmilitary challenges like illegal trafficking of drugs, arms and human beings and the connections of organised crime to international terrorism. All this has shifted the concept of security from traditional territorial selfdefence to crisis prevention abroad. 26

27 - The second pillar of the Italian foreign policy the deepening and widening of the European Union also underwent profound changes through the drafting of a European constitution and the enlargement of 2004 with ten new member states. Even with the accession of Slovenia, Malta and southern Cyprus the Mediterranean dimension of the EU will shift to the East by strengthening the Nordic and Baltic geopolitical element, whereas the accession of further states with a Mediterranean orientation seems to be not clear and straight enough to allow to predict if they will join the Union by the end of the decade. The most recent division among the European countries regards their position on the issue of the US policy towards Iraq. This will make it more difficult to formulate a common perception of and strategy against the Mediterranean countries in the foreseeable future. - With regards to the third pillar the Italian capacity for an autonomous political Mediterranean initiative has been substantially reduced both by the new global security issues that NATO is confronting and by the increasingly active role of the United States in the Mediterranean. The new enlarged dimension of the EU and the protracted process of developing a common European Security and Defence Policy had the same effect. The great changes that have affected the EU and NATO (the first two pillars of Italian foreign policy) both with regards to their extension and nature and the new developments in the Mediterranean region have resulted into a reduction of the political margins that for a long time allowed Italy to develop its own Mediterranean initiatives. Both the political exclusion of Italy from US attempts at settling the Israeli-Palestinian question and the failure of the Conference on Security and co-operation in the Mediterranean launched by Italy and Spain at the beginning of the nineties are clear signs of the obstacles that Italian foreign policy in the Mediterranean is facing now that the political and economical conditions of the last fifty years have been modified completely. The margin of political initiatives that Italy has pursued in the past in the Mediterranean region has been clearly shaped by the fact that the southern dimension of NATO has been of a secondary importance compared to the Eastern one, leaving therefore political space for an original and partially autonomous Italian Mediterranean foreign policy. Italy s national role in the Mediterranean remains marginal. Basically it is restricted to the following areas: the maintenance of a politically sustainable energy supply policy towards Algeria, Libya and Egypt, the introduction of good governance, the regulation 27

28 of the immigration fluxes and last but not least, the ambition to contribute to the solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through economic initiatives (by striving for the adoption of a European Marshall Plan for Palestine and the creation of a European Investment Bank for the Reconstruction and Development of the Mediterranean Region). Policy Approaches and Interests It has already been mentioned that the key Italian interest in the Mediterranean is to extend the degree of involvement of multilateral institutions like the EU and NATO in the main political and security issues that are affecting the security and stability of the Mediterranean region. The main reasons for this include the following factors: - The moral superiority of the multilateral approach over the national one. It has a far greater legitimacy and does not remind of neo-colonialism. - With this approach many more resources can be mobilised compared to what a national approach could do. Only a multinational effort makes it possible to mobilise enough resources to address the main regional problems. However, the greatest weakness of a multilateral approach is the difficulty to achieve permanent political consensus among all the states that can guarantee the necessary efficiency. In terms of security, the main Italian concerns are for the risk of an escalation of terrorist activities in the Mediterranean. Even if terrorism has been present in abundance in the Mediterranean region during the last decades, the present phase of global terrorism and the rise of rampant violent Islamic Militancy is extremely dangerous not only because it represents a challenge to the West and to the non-islamic world but also because it is aimed at destabilising the Islamic moderate governments. The risk of the multiplication of Algerian style crises is one of the worst scenarios that can be imagined for a country like Italy that will be one of the first to be affected by the eventual collapse of state institutions on the Northern African coast. Another serious problem for Italy is related to the phenomenon of the trafficking of human beings across the Mediterranean Sea. Especially during the last few years the Mediterranean has become a suitable conduit for the smuggling of refugees and immigrants to Western Europe. Nevertheless, in recent years substantial progress has been made in this field through the bilateral relations between Italy and Tunisia that are now considered a model for co-operation on migration issues in the area. After having taken successful 28

29 measures against illegal immigration, Italy and Tunisia are now working on second generation agreements that will include the cultural and professional formation of legal migrants. With regards to the Arab-Israeli conflict the Italian point of view is that the only way out of the crisis is to pursue a parallel path that could put an end to violence in the area through mutual concessions on security issues and the reciprocal acceptance of the right of both Israel and Palestine to exist as states. This process would be sustained by an economic reconstruction plan for Palestine. A reasonable and effective policy could be to increase the efforts that are made at isolating the conflict from the rest of the region and to put into force a strategy aimed at reducing the consequences of the conflicts in the other Mediterranean states. Since the stability, security and prosperity of the Mediterranean region remains the first priority of the Italian Mediterranean policy, Italy is particularly keen to nourish the dialogue with the governments of Southern Mediterranean not only in terms of Security hard or soft but also in terms of opportunities and cultural exchange. From an Italian standpoint these two factors have the same priority as the security related measures. Economic development in the Mediterranean states is a prerequisite for peaceful change and stability. For this reason Italy is a strong supporter of horizontal integration among the North African economies. This kind of economic integration could be achieved by a grouping of countries into smaller units like the Agadir Group (Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan). This approach has been stressed by the special relevance that Italy attaches to the Dialogue (Italy, France, Spain, Portugal, Malta, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Libya and Mauritania) that started in 1990 in Rome and that Italy contributed to resume in 2001 after it had been suspended from 1992 to 1999 due to UN sanctions against Libya. Unlike most countries in the EU Italy attaches high importance to the economic factor as an opportunity for its own economy as well as an instrument for the creation of conditions for stability. As a whole, the importance of the Mediterranean markets for the total of EU commercial trade is minimal: in 2001 it amounted to only just 189,578 millions of Euro which represents only about 3.0% of the exports and about 3.4% of the imports of the EU. Nevertheless, for some EU countries the importance of the Mediterranean in commercial terms is higher in the case of Greece, significantly higher than the EU average. Among the EU countries Greece is the biggest exporter to the MEDA area with a preponderance of the Mediterranean markets on its economy of 15.2%. In proportion to their total national exports 29

30 Italian, French and Spanish exports to MEDA countries are higher than the EU average, being respectively 5.8%, 5.1% and 4.6%. On the import side, it is Italy who is the first European commercial partner for Mediterranean countries. Italy imports almost 7% of its total import from the (non-european) Mediterranean countries with a relevant weight on energy products (almost 70%), which provides them with relevant revenue in Euros: 17.5 Million Euros yearly. The country that is getting the biggest share of this amount (28%) is Libya, followed by Algeria (24.3%) Turkey (16.8%) Tunisia (8.7%) Syria (6.9%) and Egypt (6.4%). The sub-regional dimension The Mediterranean basin does not constitute a coherent and integrated regional system. The reasons for this lies in the profound cultural, linguistic, legal and social differences that in their turn are the products of different and complex historic experiences. Every assessment of the political and security situation in the Mediterranean requires a different and more complex approach than the one usually employed in the study of other regional international systems. Consequently the Mediterranean basin should be seen as a cluster of different sub regional systems that are composed by states bound together by historical, cultural, geographical and linguistic ties. Thus the analysis of the regional economic integration is an important aspect not only because it is possible to measure the variables more accurately, but also because economic co-operation is one and the one that has gained most ground of the three pillars that were introduced when the Barcelona Process was initiated in 1995 (the first pillar refers to political and security co-operation and the third to social and cultural co-operation). Although the idea of achieving economic integration among Mediterranean countries is an old project of the Barcelona process, the failure to achieve a comprehensive, coherent, integrated Arab development and the consequent reliance on limited domestic markets or integration with foreign markets have adversely affected Arab economic and social development. Probably the impossibility of attaining horizontal integration is the result of both a lack of political will among the political elites and the lack of complementarity between the national economies of the region. If we consider the economic structures of the five North African Maghreb countries it is clear that they have little to sell to each other, as can be seen by the insignificant share that intra-regional trade represents in any single country s external trade (table below). 30

31 Intra Regional Mediterranean Trade. Source: FEMISE 2002 Annual Report Intra regional trade in the Southern Mediterranean can be considered marginal since exports are 7 times lower than exports to Europe and more than 12 times lower for imports; the largest share of south south trade is composed of petroleum products. This fact can be explained by the: - Weak complementarity of the economies which means that these countries have little to offer and are of very little importance to the economies of the neighbouring countries - The protectionist attitude of most of the MEDA countries that results in high trade tariffs - The lack of a horizontal transport infrastructure which in its turn results in very high transport costs A comparison of average custom duties evidentiates the protectionist attitude of most MEDA countries whose duties are not only much higher than those of the EU, USA and Japan but also higher than those of the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The Barcelona process initiated a pattern of dialogue and integration with the Mediterranean countries that is mainly based on economic and social integration. The most significant aim of this integration process is the creation of a free trade area in the Mediterranean based on economic and political principles of liberal democratic origins. The strategy of creating a single Mediterranean geo-economic region is encountering enormous problems and until now it has yielded no positive results. It seems that the soft issue of a single MEDA geo-economical region cannot be considered a short to medium turn goal, not even inside the framework 31

32 Average of custom Duties applied to manufactured goods, minerals and metals. Source The impact of EU enlargement on the Mediterranean Partners, Femise Report 2003 of the Barcelona process (the creation of a North South/EU MEDA free trade area by 2010). Viewed from the Italian perspective, one should put aside the greater Mediterranean approach and encourage, develop and promote the geopolitical differentiation of the Mediterranean in three sub-regional areas. It will then become a realistic policy to approach each of them with a different mixture of political and economic instruments, in order to reshape the bilateral relations to this end and to search for different partnerships with third countries in all of these areas. By encouraging the division of the Mediterranean into different regional political and economic sub-entities Italy feels that it is contributing towards the isolation of potential sources of tension. At the same time this is a way of allowing for the extension of co-operation between the EU and those (Arab) Mediterranean countries that are prepared to make the strategic choice of a EU integration model. The selected sub-regions are: - The southeastern Mediterranean countries: Egypt, the Palestinian Provisional Authority, Jordan, Syria, and Israel. (See Chapter ) - The southwestern Mediterranean countries: Marocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya (See Chapter ) - The eastern Mediterranean and Adriatic Sea countries: Croatia, Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro (view Chapter 4.4.) 32

33 Recent developments The birth of the Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for Dialogue between Cultures, the evolution of the Euro-Mediterranean Investment Facility and Partnership and the inclusion, with consultative functions, of the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly in the Barcelona Process, are some of the more significant results achieved on the occasion of the 6th Euro-Mediterranean Conference that was held in Naples on 2 and 3 December The Naples Conference, whose participants included the Foreign Ministers of the enlarged EU and the Foreign Ministers of Third Mediterranean Countries in the Barcelona Process (Israel, PNA, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey) contributed to a relaunching of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership that was launched in Barcelona in 1995 with the 1st Euro-Mediterranean Conference. The new Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly will be a consultative forum made up of 240 Deputies: 120 from Mediterranean partner countries and 120 from the EU (75 appointed by national parliaments and 45 by the European Parliament). The first session will be held in Greece during the first semester of The sessions will be structured internally into three 33

34 parliamentary committees that will have it as their task to develop the three Euro-Mediterranean areas of competence: political co-operation and security, economic and financial co-operation and social, human and cultural co-operation. The Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for Dialogue between Cultures was also founded in Naples. The Foundation is intended to act as a catalyser for all those initiatives that aim at increasing the dialogue and work for reciprocal understanding between the peoples that live along the shores of the Mediterranean. Rome was proposed as a candidate for the Foundation s headquarters, and is presently in competition with Alexandria, La Valletta and Nicosia for the position. As regards the Euro-Mediterranean Investment Facility and Partnership (FEMIP) the foreign secretaries have approved the decision with which the ECOFIN Council in November reinforced its structure. In this manner the range of operative instruments and financial endowments was enriched. Economic co-operation between the EU and MEDA countries under the auspices of the Barcelona process is one of the mainstays of the Italian approach to the Mediterranean region. For this reason Italy is actively working for closer collaboration in the field of counter terrorism between NATO and the MEDA countries. In this regard Italy is in favour of including some ME- DA countries in the PFP programme. Italy proposes military co-operation with those countries that are wishing to join a strategic partnership for Security and Stability in the Mediterranean. In this context Italy is in favour of including Libya in the strategic alliance against terrorism. The first step of this policy could be to include Libya in the Barcelona process German interests Since the end of the cold war and the reunification of Germany, the German government has seen itself faced with the responsibility of pushing forward the European project. During the era of chancellor Helmut Kohl, the main interests of the German foreign policy concerning the integration process were focused on the foundation of a Monetary Union and the stabilisation of eastern and southeast Europe. For the further development of the Union various geographical, cultural and historic aspects have led to different opinions and interests among the member states. The Mediterranean policy is only one of several policy fields where these differences have become apparent. 34

35 The Mediterranean Dialogue of the EU was established at the Council s meeting in Barcelona in November With the Barcelona declaration 1 a co-operative framework was established that encompassed social, cultural, economic and security issues. In a way it was seen as a counterweight to the integration process of the Union towards the East. In the beginning German interests focused on the stabilising effects of that kind of co-operation, but the federal government was unwilling to spend too much effort on the process. The German focus was still concentrated on the enlargement project in Eastern Europe and the stability-and security-building initiatives in the Balkans. On the one hand there were historical reasons for this (especially as regards the German policy towards Poland and the Czech Republic), on the other hand there were also economic reasons. Being faced with the establishment of a new EU border in the East, Germany was very interested in securing the financial and economic prosperity of the new member states, so that there would be no uncontrolled migration that could affect the German labour market negatively. Security issues were also seen as primarily concentrated to the southeast corner of Europe that was proving itself to be very unstable and was falling into a wide range of civil wars and ethnic conflicts. Therefore, the German interests and points of view as regards the Mediterranean Dialogue were only very vague and left the main approach to southern EU member states like Italy, Spain and Greece. In 2002 the Euro Med Dialogue countries adopted the Valencia Action Plan 2 that stresses the security aspects of the Barcelona process. This decision went along with an overall new threat assessment, in the wake of the terrorist-attacks of 11 September This era of new security thinking enforced the already existing integration process of the European foreign and security policy (CFSP). Considering the new challenges the EU had to face, Germany became more aware of the broad range of policy-fields that were directly or indirectly linked to the field of security. National interests German foreign interest cannot be analysed by looking at German foreign policy alone. Germany considers itself part of a European family, where national foreign policy concepts accumulate into a common European point of view, especially regarding the foreign policy towards regions that are not in one s direct or traditional sphere of strategic security interest (Africa, Asia, Middle East). German security interests in the Mediterranean can only be analysed by linking it to a bi-or multilateral focus

36 Germany is truly interested in gaining a more active role in formulating the international security policy agenda. The top-down approach of the Solana Paper is consequently seen as a first step towards the establishment of a European grand strategy. At the same time German politicians are afraid of getting drawn into a crisis that they are not capable of dealing with. For this reason the German government appreciates the ongoing process without specifying clear objectives at present. Main Focus The German policy towards the Mediterranean area is primarily focused on the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli conflict. This has two main reasons. The first is Germany s historic and moral responsibility to guarantee the existence of the sovereign state of Israel. Since the first diplomatic contacts between the Federal Republic of Germany (under chancellor Konrad Adenauer) and Israel, and especially since the reunification in 1990, the diplomatic efforts of Germany have been led by a sense of affirmation and strengthening of this special relationship that is based on the devastating loss of lives that was the result of the genocide of the European Jews during the Nazi Regime. Secondly, the German government recognises the Arab-Israeli conflict as the main source of violence and destabilisation in the region and that this influences the whole Southern and Eastern Mediterranean region and could again, after 1972, threaten the energy resources that Europe is dependent on. Without finding a solution for the Middle East peace process there cannot be a long-term stabilisation effect in the Middle East. A positive influence on the whole Mediterranean area is therefore closely linked to the resolution of this conflict. Security Considering this focus on the Eastern Mediterranean it does not come as a surprise that the German government has always attempted to combine national perceptions concerning the peace process with European foreign policy initiatives in the area. But this dual approach has proven to be of poor progress, mainly due to the fact that the EU countries do not share a common view of how to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. During the council s presidency in 1999, the German foreign minister Joschka Fischer represented the Union s criticism against Israel s settlement policy, which forced him to be more radical in his statements than the official national German position on that issue. The balance between a strong commitment for Israel s security and German acceptance of the Palestinian right of self-determination is not always easy to achieve, even when it is argued that the latter serves Israel s own security. 36

37 During periods of violent conflict, especially since the beginning of the second Intifada in 2000, also known as the Al-Aqsa Intifada, this balancing approach often results in a more passive policy towards the region. Since a one-sided approach could give both parties in the conflict the impression of being neglected, German attempts have always aimed at putting forward a comprehensive initiative. In order to be recognised, such an initiative has to be supported by the EU, the United States or Russia. The important role of the so-called Middle East quartet (EU, US, Russia and the UN) must not be forgotten. This leads to a multilateral policy that renders national efforts in the fields of foreign and security policy towards the Mediterranean region almost impossible and undesirable. Security in the Mediterranean is closely connected to the issue of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the uncontrolled spreading of small arms. Most of this is connected to the Middle East that is the main source of new conventional threats. The strict German export controls are the only national measures that can be taken in order to prevent negative influence on the armament market in the area. Stricter control of the proliferation of WMD can first and foremost be guaranteed by the implementation of the kind of multilateral systems that will be analysed later. Terrorism The terrorist attacks on the Tunisian island of Djerba (11 April 2002) and the diplomatic struggle for the liberation of the German hostages in Algeria and Mali (2002/2003) confirmed that the new threat assessment that was developed after 9/11 was right. Both cases show the risks for Europe and Germany. These risks can trace their ultimate sources to the Mediterranean. Religious fundamentalists are using the vast spaces of the desert for the training and recruiting of their terrorist groups. These spaces are practically beyond the control of the regular police and military forces. Failed states add to this problem. On the one hand they are of no help to the Western world in its fight against terrorism. What is even worse is that the lack of social, political and economic reforms in the Southern Mediterranean could drive even more people towards radical groups. Those sympathisers of the radicals that are already living in the EU represent a great peril to Germany and Europe. It is consequently in Germany s interest to support the stabilisation of the Mediterranean area. Otherwise several southern states in the Arab-Mediterranean region might be facing serious internal problems that could result in civil war (Algeria, etc.) and open the door for military conflicts. By helping the North African and Middle East states in their fight 37

38 against terrorist groups that are operating on or from their territory, the German policy could help stabilise and secure the region as a whole and at the same time help prevent a spill over effect that would find its outlet in the European continent. The German government is prepared to do anything in its might in order not to become involved in military conflicts in the area. At present a German military commitment in the Mediterranean is far from realistic. Migration Security is also related to the migration of people from North Africa and the Middle East to Europe. The importance of this aspect can be discerned by its inclusion in the Solana-Strategy Paper 3, which is a first draft of a future European strategic concept. The relevance of this issue does not only depend on the fact that terrorist groups might cross the German borders, but also on the destabilising effect of the uncontrolled migration of ten thousands of people who seek a better future in the EU and Germany. With the Schengen Treaty 4 in place no EU member country is left alone with the responsibility for its migration problems. Member states have to act together with the rest of the EU if they want to secure their borders from illegal immigrants effectively. Considering the fact that most of the current immigration has economic grounds, the problem of migration must be addressed not only by looking at its consequences, but also by dealing with its roots. Therefore, the Barcelona Process serves as a development project for the region. Territorial conflicts, economic and social injustice and the growing importance of religiously motivated terrorism create an urgent incentive for people in the region to leave their home in order to look for a more secure future in Europe. The security of Southern Europe is closely connected to the social, economic and security problems of the southern (Arab-) Mediterranean states. The new threat assessment has given the German policy a new awareness. Open internal borders in Europe, uncontrolled migration through its outer borders and unstable security conditions outside Europe are all factors that are closely connected to Germany s own security. Therefore it has the same interests in dealing with the migration flows as the rest of Europe. 3 A secure Europe in a better world, presented by Javier Solana at the European Council in Thessaloniki on 20th of June

39 Economy Concerning the economic interests in the region it can clearly be said that Germany could profit from a more active role in the Mediterranean. If the establishment of a free-trade-zone that includes the states of North Africa and the Middle East is to take place by the year 2010 (a main objective of the Barcelona Process) a huge amount of investments is needed in order to prepare the area even for small-scale economic integration with Europe. Gaining access to the regional markets and securing the free access to energy resources are major factors for the EU. As long as there is no political progress towards a deepening of the Mediterranean Dialogue there will not be any big business rush towards the region either. Nor will there be any foreign investments. Stabilisation is the key aspect for investment in this area but it can only be attained through prosperity and social, economic-and prudent political reforms. Regarding the security interests, the dilemma for the German policy shows itself in the difficult balance between maintaining economic ties with the Arab states and a special relationship with Israel at the same time. Focus Considering the four different approaches towards the Mediterranean Dialogue interests security, terrorism, migration and economy the main focus of the German policy is concentrated on solving the Arab-Israeli conflict and stabilising the whole Mediterranean region. Only good progress in resolving this conflict will help push forward the Barcelona Process as a whole instead of restricting it to economic relations. Major economic and security interests will be influenced by it. Therefore German diplomatic and political advances that refer to the European foreign policy are of great concern. National German initiatives (trade aspects apart) that propose a further intensification of the Euro Med Dialogue have almost no chance of success. This is mainly due to Germany s fear of having to face the disapproval of either side of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the several European structures dealing with the economic or security aspects of the Mediterranean Dialogue. Activities on the multilateral level Germany is participating in the United Nations Conference on the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons. In July 2001 a programme was signed by this conference that focuses on preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit small arms trade in all its aspects. The participating states agreed on the necessity to undertake measures on a national, regional and global level. One major aspect concerning the implementation of the programme encourages the 39

40 states to establish and strengthen co-operation and partnerships at all levels among international and intergovernmental organisations 5. Interestingly enough the EU countries coordinated themselves very well and constituted the only group of states to submit an overall plan of action 6. Once again it seems obvious that the options are very limited for national interests within the framework of multilateral bodies that deal with specific security related issues. In its 2003 national report on the implementation of the UN Programme of Action, Germany did not mention the role of the Mediterranean Dialogue or the Barcelona Process with one word. Instead the German policy that supported the Action Programme was mainly directed towards southeastern Europe. No southern member state of the Mediterranean Dialogue is mentioned in the report. Germany is part of four major proliferation control regimes (The Massena Arrangement, The Nuclear Supplier Group, The Australia group and The Missile Technology Control Regime). As a participant, Germany always expresses great concern about the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons in conflict areas like the Middle East and East Africa. If one takes a look at the annual plenary meeting reports it becomes clear that most of these control regimes focus their work on gaining new co-operation possibilities with former Soviet states like the Ukraine and Belarus. Iraq and the Arab world are seen as a region of serious conflicts, but a Mediterranean policy is not on the agenda. The Enlargement of the EU Effects on the German Mediterranean Policy The enlargement process will not be finished with the entry of ten new member states in Several other states in eastern and southeastern Europe are hoping to become candidates in the next enlargement process. This will keep the attention and major German interests directed towards the east and southeast of the European continent. And yet, a new awareness can be discerned in the German policy: an awareness of the way in which the Mediterranean directly influences European and German security. Germany welcomes the efforts to strengthen the dialogue and co-operation with the southern Mediterranean states, especially in the field of security matters. At the same time, the German policy is not interested in raising false expectations inside those countries. In contrast to the economic integration, the establishment of ESDP is not yet finalised. The EU is taking its first small 5 UN Document (A/CONF.192/15), Programme of Action to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects. 6 Official Journal of the European Community (2001/C351/01), Third annual report according to operative provision 8 of the EU Code of Conduct on arms export. 40

41 steps on its way to become an international security actor. However, the problems of capabilities, standardisation and interoperability have not yet been solved. In Germany an all too fast security related approach to the Euro Med Dialogue is seen as a potential risk for the establishment of a common ESDP. It is feared that the inclusion of too many partners will water down the European self-definition in the field of its security policy. Therefore, German interests aim at a further intensification of the Barcelona Process as a whole and at a more comprehensive approach to the Mediterranean area, whilst avoiding misperceptions and over-hurried steps. Transparency is a key objective for achieving both. Outlook Various factors are responsible for the German perceptions and interests in the Mediterranean region. The German policy concerning the Euro Med Dialogue does not define itself from an isolated national point of view. Instead it is given substance by a mixture of national and multinational initiatives. They all have their main objective in common: namely that of stabilising the region by finding a solution to the Middle East conflict that has been identified as the major obstacle to the intensification of the dialogue. Consequently, German interests in the Mediterranean are closely connected to the development of the peace process. It is very difficult for the German policy to play a major role in this process; a good economic relationship with the Arab states, acceptance of the Palestinian right to self-determination, and the special relationship with Israel do not always fit together when it comes to proposing security related issues and initiatives for the Middle East. This line of action easily leads to misinterpretations and might be mistaken for partiality. Nevertheless it might be an advantage that Germany is seen in a positive light by all the conflict parties and has no special economic interests in the region. For this reason Germany would be suited to take over the role of mediator, if this is desired. As a result, the German Mediterranean policy is closely connected to European initiatives. Within the Euro Med Dialogue specific changes towards a more comprehensive approach to the region are regarded with sympathetic caution. Nevertheless, the integration of the southern Mediterranean states into ESDP is stalled at any price. The main focus lies on information exchange and on the confidence-building effects of the dialogue. A more active role for Germany could be provided by the inclusion of security relates issues in the dialogue on a multinational level. 41

42 4.2 Core findings on selected national perceptions The new EU member states Cyprus With the entrance of Cyprus and Malta the European Union is strengthening its Mediterranean dimension but it is also getting nearer to the potential trouble spots in the region. The island of Cyprus itself constitutes one of those spots. Since 1974 the island has been divided into the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and the Greek Republic of Cyprus in the south. Since then about Turkish troops with 300 tanks are deployed in the North of the island. There exists a UN peace plan from November 2002 that would lead to the reunification of the island. This plan envisions the creation of a bi-state federation, territorial adjustments between the two entities, and a phased right of return for displaced Cypriots and a notable reduction of Turkish troops on the island. Since 1974 the Republic of Cyprus bases her security on a close co-operation with Greece which is based on the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960 and the Joint Defence Doctrine of 1993 which provides for automatic military assistance by Greece in case of a (Turkish) attack. It has been hoped that the entry into the EU could help solve the problems in so far as it will add incentives to the north to join the more prosperous southern part and thus to enjoy the same access to markets and the same EU subsidies, and so forth. The Republic of Cyprus is a staunch supporter of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). It sees the ESDP as a suitable tool for the strengthening of Europe s credibility in the Mediterranean Region. As the Republic of Cyprus is aware of the strong military preponderance of Turkey in general and the Turkish forces on the island in particular it is trying to solve its security problems with the EU Membership and its trust in the United Nations. Excessively close relations to NATO are seen as detrimental but Cyprus is also aware of the fact that certain NATO capabilities are indispensable for independent EU operations; the decision to use the ESDP should be free from NATO influence. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus The TRNC s security analysis is predominantly focused on the Cyprus issue and what it perceives as a massive military build-up by the Republic of 42

43 Cyprus within the framework of the Joint Military Doctrine of the Republic of Cyprus and Greece. The entrance of the Republic of Cyprus into the EU before a settlement has been reached and before the entrance of Turkey into the Union, is actually seen by the TRNC government as a major hindrance to the solution of the Cyprus question and a generally destabilising act for the region. It will disturb the external balance between Turkey and Greece in Cyprus and the internal balance between the two peoples on the island. The TRNC believes that the entrance of the Republic of Cyprus into the EU without the entry of the TRNC or Turkey into the European Union will lead to a permanent division of the island. The TRNC is determined to counter any threat to her sovereignty or any crises will be answered in consultation with Turkey Malta Malta consistently plays a very active role in the international organisations such as the UN, OSCE and within the Barcelona process and as a member of the Mediterranean Forum. It is also a vigorous proponent of a Conference on Security and co-operation in the Mediterranean. The Maltese foreign policy has the goal of achieving as many bilateral agreements as possible that will facilitate good neighbourly relations integration into the European Union is the preferred means of achieving this. Malta plays a consistent and very active role within international organisations such as the UN, OSCE and within the Barcelona process as well as a member of the Mediterranean Forum and as a vigorous proponent of a Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean. Malta supports the mechanism of enhanced or deepened co-operation within the Barcelona process and suggests that the whole process should be made more flexible especially concerning the sub-regionalisation. (i.e. the creation of subregional free trade zones as a first step). Maltese high court judges have seen no contradiction between neutrality and participation in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) of the EU, since both are voluntary and not binding. Consequently Malta wants to play the role of an active neutral agent. The role Malta envisions for the CFSP and ESDP in the region is one of cooperative security and confidence building; a goal that fits into the pattern of traditional Maltese efforts. As Malta sees itself as a bridge to the Mediterranean countries and as a mediator it also considers itself a real asset for the EU s Mediterranean dialogue. Malta promotes so-called enhanced co-operation inside the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean dia- 43

44 logue at the same time as it is pursuing a policy of qualified pacifism, a combination of neutrality and a strong reluctance to resort to the use of military force. In the military field Malta is cooperating closely with Italy. The Maltese contribution to the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) was trained in Italy and will, in case of an operation, be deployed as part of an Italian unit and with access to the Italian chain of supply. The professional Army of Malta aims at achieving complete inter-operability with the Italian Army and emphasises its CIMIC duties that constitute its contribution to the EU-operations. A further strengthening of the political union is seen with scepticism. Especially the aim of some members to include a mutual defence clause (ART. V) in the EU treaties that would change the EU into a military alliance is very difficult to accept for neutral Malta and it would entail constitutional amendments. The relationship of Malta to NATO seems rather strained. The Government of Prime Minister Adami has not entered the Partnership for Peace programme again since the Labour government left the programme in 1996 in order to concentrate its attention on the EU activities. Good relations to Libya and Tunisia are of great importance for Malta, primarily for economic reasons. The creation of a free trade area between Malta and Tunisia and, in the long run, with Libya will create a sub-region that, it is hoped by Malta, will spread its beneficial effects to the whole region. Malta enters the EU with the clear goal of being an advocate for Mediterranean concerns inside the union. Nevertheless, Malta s Trans-Mediterranean security relations are advantageous for the EU s long-term goal of a further integration of the European, North African and Eastern shores of the Mediterranean. Malta sees the creation of a triangle of prosperity and security between itself, Tunisia and Libya as a long-term goal Slovenia From the very beginning of its independence, Slovenia s national interests have been strategically oriented towards the entrance into NATO and the EU. This has been so not only because Slovenia sees itself as politically, economically and culturally deeply rooted in the European context, but also because Slovenia wanted to solve the pressing security problems in the Balkans. A national consensus that includes all parties has been reached on these issues. In the referendum of 23 March % of the population voted in favour of 44

45 EU membership and 66% voted in favour of NATO membership. Nevertheless it seems that most of the benefits for Slovenia will be gained by entering the NATO military alliance. According to Slovenia s point of view NATO membership would greatly increase its chances of access to the leadership in the allied capitals and it would also give Slovenia an important role in the most authoritative forum where the future of the transatlantic relations will be take shape. The integration into the EU is seen as a process that in the long run will result in economic gains for Slovenia; the costs connected to the upgrading of the Slovenian country system to EU levels are partly compensated by the access to structural funds. Otherwise, the NATO integration process is generally considered too expensive compared to the country s security risks. Recent polls indicate that the population is feeling more secure as regard to conventional military threats, whereas it has become more aware of nonmilitary threats. This is especially the case with ecological and socio-economic threats but it also regards crime and political instability. From a geopolitical point of view, Slovenia does not see itself as a country of the Balkans or South-Eastern Europe but mainly as the most southern part of central Europe and as an important juncture between Mediterranean and Southeast Europe; Slovenia is also a link between two NATO members: Italy and Hungary. Even if Slovenia prefers not being included in the geopolitical region of southeastern Europe, the country s ambition is to become the gate to Southeastern Europe and to act as a herald and interpreter of the transatlantic policy in the region. Slovenia unreservedly supports the activities of the EU in the framework of its Common Foreign and Security Policy at the same time as it is lobbying for increased focus on the Balkans and the Mediterranean region in the Common European Security and Defence Policy. The political and economic knowledge of Slovenia in this region could be an asset for the EU. Slovenia does not want the European CESDP-process to construct a new military union in Europe that would try to compete with NATO or even replace it. For this reason Slovenia warmly welcomed the Laeken Agreement in which the CESDP s partial operational status was declared. The main trends of Slovenian foreign policy in the nineties have been concentrated on a strengthening of the links to the Central European states and mostly with its neighbours Austria, Hungary and Italy. Although it constitutes a natural hinterland for the Republic of Slovenia, the Mediterranean dimension was given too little weight for a while due to the need to concentrate the political and economic resources elsewhere. But now it is foreseeable that in 45

46 the future more resources and efforts will be dedicated to the creation of a national Mediterranean policy. Special attention will be paid to crisis areas and illegal migration in this region. These are two other elements of increasing importance for the Slovenian national security. As early as the end of 1994 Slovenia expressed its interest in increased participation in the European Mediterranean policy. Now, as the integration into the EU is drawing to a close, Slovenia has officially stressed the importance of rediscovering its maritime dimension. The problem is that the Mediterranean focus of Slovenia s foreign policy should not be completely absorbed by the bilateral relations to Croatia. The two countries have a number of unresolved disputes between themselves, especially as regards the still undefined maritime border between them and Slovenia s access to the international waters through a passage right (or a corridor) across the Croatian territorial waters The Would-be EU Members Turkey During the Cold War Turkey was part of the Western alliance. For a long time it has contributed to European and regional security and consequently to the strengthening of freedom and democracy. Turkish importance for NATO during the cold war was relevant due to its geopolitical position: it shares its longest border with the former Soviet Union and it was consequently responsible for the defence of one third of the Alliance s land frontiers against the Warsaw Pact. The disappearance of a great conventional enemy after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union gave place for the rise of a number of non-traditional, asymmetric security threats and risks. These threats and risks include terrorism, regional instabilities, separatist micro-and ethnic nationalism, fundamentalism, organised crime, drug-and human trafficking, mass migration and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means. The terrorist attacks of September 11 against the US and the recent attacks in Istanbul have clearly showed that terrorism can no more be considered a domestic issue that should be take care of by the different national states. As Turkey lies at the centre of a triangle that can be drawn between the conflict-ridden Balkans, Middle East and Caucasus and at the same time at crossing points of several borders its strategic relevance remains high. The Turkish point of view stresses the importance of safeguarding the country s territorial integrity, of combating asymmetric threats like terrorism, 46

47 sabotage, organised crime, the disruption of the flow of vital resources and the uncontrolled movements of large numbers of people as a consequence of armed conflicts. Turkey considers stability and security as two pillars for crisis prevention. For this reason Turkey promotes regional economic co-operation in order to address economic challenges at an early stage. In this context Turkey has pioneered the creation of the Black Sea Economic Co-operation Zone. In recent years Turkey has contributed considerably to specific regional initiatives such as the southeast European co-operation Process (SEECP) that is composed by Turkey, Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania, FYROM/Macedonia, Greece, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia (as an observer). Another Turkish initiative in the Balkans is the Multinational Peace Force of Southeast Europe (MPFSEE) that originates from a Turkish proposal in This force consists of Turkey, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Macedonia, and Romania. USA, Slovenia and Croatia participate in the MPFSEE as observers. Since September 1989 its headquarters have been situated in Plovdiv/Bulgaria. The location of the MPFSEE headquarters will rotate among member countries and will be situated in Istanbul in Under this force operates an on-call brigade (SEEBRIG) composed of forces assigned by the participant countries. This brigade has been declared operational as of 1 May The main objective of the MPFSEE is to contribute to the security of the Euro-Atlantic area and to foster good neighbourly relations, co-operation and interoperability among the southeastern European countries. Through its role as an important confidence-building measure the MPFSEE also contributes to the maintenance of peace and stability in the region. In the Balkans Turkey has participated in all operations led by NATO since 1995: IFOR, SFOR, KFOR, Essential Harvest, Amber Fox and Allied Harmony. Turkey continued to contribute to the peace and stability in Macedonia when operation Allied Harmony was taken over by the EU under the name of Operation Concordia. Ten personnel represent Turkey in this operation that is the EU s first military crisis management operation. Approximately 1300 Turkish troops have been serving in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania. 101 Turkish police officers took part in the International Police Task Force (IPTF) in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the UN Mission in Kosovo. From 1 January 2003 Turkey has also contributed with 12 personnel to the EU s first civilian crisis management operation, the EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The NATO enlargement process will result in a strengthening of Turkey s geopolitical position, particularly so due to the effects that the entry of Roma- 47

48 nia and Bulgaria will have on the strategic scenario of south-eastern Europe and the Black Sea region. For this reason Turkey supports the present enlargement process and is confident that NATO s enlargement process will strengthen the Alliance and enhance security in the Euro-Atlantic region. Turkey has dedicated considerable resources to the reinvigoration of the Turkish PfP Training Centre (BIOEM) and to opening it to all Mediterranean Dialogue countries. The Turkish General Staff established the centre in Ankara on 29 June Its main task is to organise courses and seminars that aim at providing the military and civilian personnel with strategic and tactical training and education. From its establishment till the end of December 2003, the Centre hosted 3796 participants from 17 NATO countries (1299), 24 partner countries (2455) and 4 Mediterranean Dialogue (42) countries. Turkey s approach to the EU enlargement process is particularly interesting due to the fact that Turkey is a NATO member but not or not yet a EU member. Turkey has shown political support of the idea of EU enlargement, not the least because Turkey itself could benefit from the process. For these reasons the Turkish approach to the development of a European Security and Defence Policy is to be understood as a way of strengthening the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within the frames of the NATO Alliance rather than facilitating the creation of autonomous EU defence capabilities. Basing its efforts on the vested rights and status that it enjoyed in the Western European Union, Turkey has contributed to the development of the ESDP through its efforts to render the ESDP more inclusive to non-eu member countries. These efforts produced the so-called Ankara Document (December 2001) that was negotiated by Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. This document defines the modalities of participation of non-eu European allies in the ESDP and it has become the basis of the NATO-EU strategic partnership. The EU heads of state and government finally agreed to accept the Ankara Document during the Brussels European Summit of October Since 1994 Turkey has provided NATO s Mediterranean dialogue initiative with staunch support. Turkey shares the Alliance s view that the dialogue with the Mediterranean partner countries should be intensified. Turkey enjoys good and friendly relations with all the dialogue countries (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia) and has signed with them various bilateral technical co-operation agreements in the military field. Turkey wants to focus the Mediterranean dialogue on those issues that have a direct effect on security matters and on those fields where joint action 48

49 is necessary such as international terrorism and organised crime. To prevent these hard security risks from becoming a threat to national security Turkey focuses her attention on soft security matters in the first place. A constant goal of the Turkish foreign policy is the strengthening of the economic cohesion of the MD/MP-countries through the elimination of trade barriers and the improvement of the conditions for foreign investment. Nevertheless the Turkish attitude towards the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has been characterised by a degree of indifference all since its foundation in This is mainly due to the fact that Turkey feels that the dialogue has developed into an exclusive Euro-Arab dialogue that has been taken hostage by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Thus the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue is not on the immediate agenda of Turkish foreign policy and sometimes Turkey behaves as an affiliate but reluctant partner. In combination with the difficulties in the management of MEDA EU funds these problems have contributed to cause Turkish disappointment and doubts about the future possibilities of the Euromed process. In the nearest future Turkey can be expected to follow EU initiatives within this framework but not to play a very active role. The Turkish view of the Mediterranean is more similar to that of the US than to the EU s definition of the region. Just like the United States Turkey gives priority to Eastern Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf and the Caucasus in defining its priorities in the security environment of the Mediterranean. Moreover, the Americans give utmost importance to Turkey while the Europeans are still uncertain about Turkey s place in the EU. It seems that Turkey is more sympathetic to US led initiatives regarding Mediterranean security issues, although it supports the EMP in the economic sphere and is willing to contribute to this process. Ankara in general doesn t see the EMP as a promising initiative in the political and security fields since Turkey was not given a clear prospective of full EU membership in Helsinki where it was placed between the second category countries for a future EU enlargement. In geopolitical terms Ankara perceives the Mediterranean as composed of the Middle East, Greece and Cyprus, the Balkans plus Europe. In terms of Turkish strategic thinking the concept Mediterranean means Eastern Mediterranean. This is primarily so because the Eastern Mediterranean displays a variety of problems that are seen as important threats directed against Turkish territorial integrity and vital national interests. The problems with Greece and Syria, the Cyprus issue, the spill over of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the region, Iraq and Iran and the instability in the Caucasus constitute the 49

50 main preoccupations pf the Turkish foreign policy. The relatively stable western Mediterranean, from which Turkey does not anticipate any serious direct threats, is not considered a priority area Bulgaria Bulgaria no longer feels threatened by state actors rather than by international terrorism and organised crime. Therefore it actively supports the United States in the fight against terrorism and on the policy over Iraq. Since the end of the east-west conflict Bulgaria has become a major transit country for organised criminal groups that smuggle drugs, weapons and human beings. Nevertheless, the area around Bulgaria contains many frozen conflicts, weak states and potential points of tension the Balkans and Moldova. Concerning the Balkans Bulgaria sees herself as a very useful new NATO member with excellent relations with Southeastern Europe who has earned the trust of all conflicting parties. Together with its Southeastern neighbours Bulgaria has initiated the South Eastern Defence Ministerial Process (SEDM) that introduces security and defence issues on the level of regional co-operation. Bulgaria also participates in the SEEBRIG multinational peace force of southeastern Europe that is composed of military units from Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Macedonia, Romania and Turkey. Bulgaria welcomes the decision of the EU-Council at its meeting in Thessaloniki to offer the Balkan states a future perspective of integration into the EU ad the only solution to the region s latent conflicts. Concerning its own position in the international organisations Bulgaria regards membership of political and military security structures like NATO, EU, WTO or IMF as the only way to deal with the security threats Bulgaria is facing. NATO is seen as the primary guarantor for Bulgaria s survival and territorial defence, while the EU is seen as a prerequisite for development and prosperity. Thus NATO and EU membership remained the highest priorities of the Bulgarian foreign policy until the nation s entry in April and May The relations to the United States are considered of utmost importance; Bulgaria has been a staunch supporter of President Bush s Iraq Policy and has now deployed 470 troops under Polish command. The improvement of Bulgaria s image through her membership in NATO and the EU has already led to better creditworthiness and has also attracted foreign investors. Should there be a conflict of interests between NATO obligations and the European Security and Defence Policy, it is likely that the trans atlantic interest may prevail in Bulgarian politics. But it is clear that it is the goal of Bulgar- 50

51 ia to pursue a foreign policy that will enable it to avoid choosing between the two. The European Union s CFSP and ESD are only supported as long as they are not damaging the transatlantic relationship. Nevertheless Bulgaria sees the ESDP in a positive light and believes that it will certainly get rid of its paper tiger status. Most of the new asymmetric threats cannot be met by military force alone, so Bulgaria sees an important role for the EU as an agens movens for sustained development and prosperity. Bulgaria would like to see a clearer definition of the spheres of interest of NATO and the EU respectively. For a long time NATO s and the EU s Mediterranean dialogue has been only of general interest to the Bulgarian security policy. The Balkans have absorbed most of its energies. It is only with the entry into NATO and the EU that Bulgaria has started to become familiar with issues like the non-proliferation policy and asymmetric threats. 4.3 Core findings on regional points of view The Mediterranean Dialogue Countries and NATO The Eastern Mediterranean Countries: Egypt, Jordan and Israel General Perceptions of Europe Egyptian and Jordanian political analysts have frequently expressed the expectation that once the enlargement process is concluded the Union will be able to dedicate more attention and resources to its non-candidate neighbours in the same way as it has assisted the Central and Eastern European countries during the last ten years. They hope that the Barcelona Process (the economic basket in particular) will be revived and accelerated. It is doubtful whether it is realistic to believe that this could really take place. A second hope of the Arab dialogue countries is that, once enlarged, the European Union will become a heavy weight actor on the global stage, since it is one of the largest, if not the largest, regional bloc in the world. According to the Arab point of view this increasing international importance could be used in a number of ways that, directly or indirectly, would benefit the southern Mediterranean countries too. In this context Israel often has different point of view: it has always considered Europe as clearly pro-palestinian and pro-arab, especially so during the last decades. The scandal about the European financial flows to Palestinian terrorism is only one among Israel s con- 51

52 cerns. Consequently, Israel has never shown any interest in seeing the European Union become a major political actor in the Middle East. A third expectation of the (non-member) Mediterranean states is that the new Mediterranean EU members (Malta and southern Cyprus in the first round and perhaps Turkey in a later round) could be of great use in focalising the attention on other Mediterranean issues on the EU agenda. As a consequence the NATO and EU enlargements are seen with contradictory feelings. One of the most pressing concerns that the EU enlargement has caused is an inevitable feeling of exclusion and of being refused to join the EU. Some Southern Mediterranean countries would also like to join the EU since they feel that this would be an easy solution to the majority of their socio-economic problems. The mere fact of not being accepted as an eligible country for EU membership causes a certain amount of frustration. As the ESDP has accelerated considerably at least in terms of declarations it is perceived with some kind of suspicion by the Arab dialogue countries: on the one hand it is desired as a counterweight to US politics, but on the other hand it is feared that it might be a European post-colonial instrument of influence or, even worse, an instrument of intervention. During the regular meetings of the Senior Officials of the Barcelona Process a large-scale information campaign has been held in order to explain the ESDP to the neighbours of the European Union. The campaign has been designed in order to reassure the Southern Mediterranean countries of the advantages of a regular Euro-Mediterranean defence and security dialogue within the framework of the Barcelona Process. Nevertheless, the political and security dialogue is still the most stagnant area of the partnership. And it will continue to be considered as such until the EU becomes more clearly involved in the solution of urgent conflicts, mainly in the Middle East crisis that, up until now, has obstructed the approval of the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability. After the war in Iraq it will require more than cosmetic efforts on the part of the EU to rebuild its trust in the Southern Mediterranean countries, not only as regard to their governments but also as regard to the peoples of those countries. There is a structural imbalance in the level of integration of the two dialogue partenership, since the countries of the Eastern and Southern Mediterranean participate to the processes individually, in order to negotiate or sign association agreements or to discuss security matters with NATO. This is a case of what is called bi-multilateralism : on the one hand they are united, on the other they keep their individualistic attitude. This was their way of proceeding 52

53 even before Barcelona. In spite of its multilateral dimension the Barcelona process has not managed to produce a new, more balanced formula. One has to be careful not to transpose the CSCE Helsinki process into the Mediterranean. When the process was established in 1975 there were two alliance blocs; consequently the structural conditions were quite different from the present ones in the Mediterranean countries. The main source of instability stems from a number of unresolved conflicts that need to be solved and that are all occurring one side of the Mediterranean and they have never been south vs. north conflicts. Moreover, many southern countries strongly believe that they do not really need confidence-building measures across the Mediterranean. What they need, according to themselves, are processes of conflict solution and crisis management. In the opinion of the Mashrecki countries, the defining issue is Europe s ability and willingness to play an active and efficient role in the solution of these conflicts. Although a stronger and a more cohesive link to NATO and the EU is often seen as highly desirable, Israel, Egypt and Jordan do not demand membership in the EU or NATO; nor do they expect financial aid packages or appropriations that can be compared to those of the PHARE and TACIS programmes. The Mashrek countries have a full understanding of the special treatment that is offered the candidate countries of Eastern Europe that are now about to enter the EU and they do not consider it detrimental to the South. From a conceptual point of view they do not believe that the enlargement will have any negative consequences for the Euro-Mediterranean relations. In the same manner, they do not expect the EU to give them lists of criteria similar to the Copenhagen criteria or other conditions for partnership although they have occasionally encountered something like this attitude during their interactions with the EU. Another point of complaint of the Mediterranean dialogue countries is that most crucial decisions regarding the Mediterranean are normally made outside the Barcelona framework; as they see it, the Europeans settle this kind of issues within the framework of ELI and NATO. A third complaint regards the slow decision-making processes and lengthy procedures of several EU bodies and their programming and implementation capacity. Israel s Special Position Even if Israel participates in the Barcelona process as a Southern Mediterranean country, it differs notably from its neighbours in terms of its socio-eco- 53

54 nomic features that are more similar to those of the EU countries. After the 1 May enlargement of the EU, all non Arab Mediterranean countries except Israel will be members of the EU so that the pressure to transform the Mediterranean partnership programme into an exclusively Euro-Arab partnership will grow. In that event, the EU and Israel will have to revise their type of relationship to each other. There are three possible scenarios for that kind of new relationship: 1) To enhance the attractiveness of the Barcelona process for Israel. At the present state of affairs the gains for Israel from the EU s Barcelona process are rather marginal in economic as well as in political terms. Consequently it is important to increase the benefits for Israel in the long run. However, one has to bear in mind that the basis of the EU-Israel relations should remain bilateral in accordance with the bilateral association agreement of ) Economic integration only. The Mediterranean dialogue has failed to provide any benefits for Israel and to stabilise the Arab economies. The Euro-Mediterranean dialogue has focused too much on form and procedure and too little on content. The enlargement of the EU will increase Israel s trade dependence on the EU; this has been the case with every enlargement in the past. Consequently Israel would benefit greatly if it applied for entry into the European Economic Area. In that case Israel would become part of the EU s single market for EFTA countries. These are countries like Norway and Iceland that do not want to become full members of the EU. This alternative implies full economic integration without political integration into the EU and it might suit both parties. Although no political integration is required, the political consequences would be enormous. A stronger connection to Europe would mean that the Israelis would no longer be able to accuse the Europeans of being biassed against Israel. Israeli lawmakers would probably take a more positive view of the idea of participating in the EU s decision-making process. They might even adjust to the Acquis communautaire in the domain of trade in goods, services and capital. In fact, no major efforts would be needed in most cases. 3) The third scenario is full membership in the EU In spite of the failures of the past some members of the Israeli Peace Camp and of the secular left still believe that the idea of a New Middle East and the development of a Mediterranean identity could still make a comeback. According to them Israel should leave the door open to this 54

55 option. Nevertheless, full access to the EU constitutes an identity problem for a large part of the population The Western Mediterranean Countries: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya This chapter deals exclusively with Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. These countries are all involved in NATO s Mediterranean Initiatives, the EU Mediterranean Partnership and the Barcelona Process. Libya s perceptions and posture will be mentioned in general terms. All since the UN sanctions were suspended in April 1999, Libya has been participating as an observer at the EU Mediterranean conferences. Basic Attitudes: Relationship to the West Morocco and Tunisia have always oriented themselves towards the West and are consequently seen as unproblematic partners by the West. Independent Algeria and revolutionary Libya used to be closer to the Soviet Union and as a result they were seen as problematic although neither country allowed the Soviet Union to establish military bases on their territory. After the end of the East-West conflict, Algeria and Libya have become more open to the West so that this opinion has gradually begun to change. Morocco Friendship between Morocco and the USA has long traditions. The still valid Treaty of Friendship between Morocco and the USA dates from The king decided to leave it unchanged when Morocco won is independence in Morocco has also been trying hard to pursue the political objective of integrating Morocco s economy into the world economy since the mid- 1990s. Fortunately the population has not questioned Morocco s Western leanings. Despite political criticism of the US foreign policy in the Near East and the unilateralism of the US administration, the Western leanings of the Moroccans have remained unaltered. Tunisia During the East-West conflict Tunisia tended to seek co-operation with Europe. Tunisia even went so far as to co-operate closely with the French and American Mediterranean armed forces. These forces have supported the Tunisian military and security forces during internal political conflicts and when there has been tension with Libya (e.g and 1984). All since the 55

56 1970s Tunisia has had a capitalist orientation and it has sought to integrate the Tunisian economy into the world market. The economic ties to the European states and the EC/EU have been carefully expanded since There are no widespread culturally based anti-western movements in Tunisia. There are two main reasons for this: Tunisia s economic dependence on the West and its general openness to Europe. Nevertheless, politicians, representatives of civil society and large sections of the population are very sensitive to any US activities in North Africa and the Near-and Middle East that may be construed as attempts at re-colonisation or domination. Algeria Since Algeria gained its independence in 1962 it has striven to steer clear of both the Eastern and Western blocs and keep an independent course. Nevertheless the enforced continuance of historic ties with Europe has weakened antagonism and focused it on certain issues. From the 1980s onwards, a strong Islamist opposition has grown up around this question of identity and the accompanying issues of state and social structure. Parts of this opposition went underground in 1991/92 in order to use armed resistance and terrorism against the ( Western ) state and social structures that they rejected. Algerian society contains a certain potential for the disruption of the leadership s pro- West foreign and economic policies. Even among those who favour favouring the government s pro- West orientation there is substantial unease about the fast pace of the process since it might destabilise internal politics. Libya When Mohammed Gheddafi took over the reins of power in 1969 he tried to free Libya from western influence. The population supported the Libyan leadership s revolutionary anti-strategy enthusiastically. From the 1970s onwards the national leadership and the majority of the population considered the USA as the Arabs Number One Enemy. To them the US not only played the role of Libya s No.1 enemy but it was a bastion of reaction and the head of a crusading campaign of destruction that was directed against all Arab nations per se. At the moment Libya is in the middle of liberating itself from an ideological strain of politics and economics. It has renounced on the production and possession of weapons of mass destruction and has established friendlier relations to Western countries like the UK and Italy. 56

57 General Perceptions of NATO and NATO s enlargement In the Maghreb states there is general agreement among the members of the government, the politicians and the political representatives of civil society that NATO lost its right to exist when the East-West conflict ended. After all, that conflict had been the original motivation for its creation. NATO is seen as a political and military power on their doorstep. Nevertheless, after the end of the Cold War all the Maghreb States, with the exception of Libya, have been involved in discussions with NATO. Their willingness to carry on the dialogue with NATO originates in pragmatic and realistic considerations that are free from illusions about the global balance of power. Although the further development of NATO as a military organisation after 1990/91 has been viewed with suspicion, it does offer non-members a forum for the exchange of information and gives them the opportunity to profit from the programmes that NATO offers. Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya do not see the NATO enlargement as a problematic development. Nor do they consider it of particular security relevance to the states in the region. The enlargement is regarded as beyond their influence and as an internal matter for NATO. Nevertheless they realise that the new Eastern European member states will increase the influence of the United States in the Alliance. Both the NATO discussion about the new risks in the Southern Mediterranean that began in the 1990s and NATO s new strategic concept that was launched in November 1991 have made the North Africans feel that they are being threatened. This fear has not subsided yet. This fear and mistrust were intensified in the mid-1990s when North Africa was openly referred to as a threat to the security of NATO. The creation of the NATO Response Force that is planned to be on partial service in 2004 and on complete service in 2006 has been closely followed by the Maghreb states. The insecurity that is associated with NATO s out of area missions has not led to a reduction of their mistrust of NATO s intentions. The perception that America s foreign policy since 11 September 2001 has been offensive and aggressive has only served to strengthen this mistrust. It is feared that NATO will become more interventionist in the Mediterranean region. This scepticism as to the plans of the US administration and of NATO as an institution dominated by the USA was intensified by the war in Iraq in To the media and to the politicians and scientists in the Maghreb states NATO is the threat from the north. One Moroccan political scientist, Mustafa Sehimi, describes NATO as the machine de guerre of the West. Although this seems to be exaggerated, there is a certain fear that NATO is being reconstructed as a substitute of the United Nations. Nevertheless, Alge- 57

58 ria, Morocco and Tunisia maintain their determination to communicate and co-operate with NATO. Political realism is important to them. These are the main concerns about the future role of NATO: - The unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict in which the Arab states see NATO as pro-israeli biased - There is a fear that the new NATO that has emerged since the NATO summit in Prague might conduct world-wide missions and interfere in the internal affairs of Arab countries; this fear has a great effect on the public opinion of the Mediterranean dialogue countries - The more aggressive foreign policy pursued by the US administration after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September The dominant position of the USA within NATO. The Attitude of the Maghreb States towards the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue NATO started its Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) in the early 1990s. At that time, the so-called Ad-Hoc Group on the Mediterranean, which had been monitoring Soviet-related issues in the area since the 1970s, began to focus on the new security challenges that were emerging in the Mediterranean region. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and growing concerns about the transfer of missile technology from the former Soviet sphere of influence to North African and Middle Eastern states resulted in the need for a more active role in the region. At the Brussels summit meeting in January 1994 NA- TO Heads of States and Governments welcomed the progress of the Israeli- Palestinian question, which opened the way for a Mediterranean Dialogue initiative. The first contacts between the representatives of the participating states were established in February 1995 when invitations to participate in a dialogue with NATO were sent to Egypt, Israel, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. This invitation was extended to Jordan in November 1995 and Algeria in February Information exchange between the seven dialogue countries and NATO takes place in bilateral meetings (19+1) or multilateral conferences (19+7). The main objective of the dialogue is to raise the level of attention on the Mediterranean within the alliance and to encourage the introduction of modern concepts of good governance and co-operative patterns of international behaviour in the area. Only Libya, the fifth member of the Arab Maghreb, does not participate in the dialogue. NATO s announced intention to either intensify (1997) or un- 58

59 dertake an upgrading of the Dialogue (e.g. at the NATO Summit in Prague in 2002), have been welcomed. However, the expectations that were raised by such announcements have been mixed with some scepticism. A positive Maghreb response to NATO s announcements and proposals concerning the intensification of the dialogue between NATO and the Mediterranean states does not automatically mean a more active involvement in the individual programmes of NATO s Mediterranean Initiative and doesn t imply a more positive (less mistrustful) attitude towards NATO as an organisation. Algeria To Algeria co-operation with NATO is only one pillar among others in its security architecture. Algeria wants to be embedded in a system of collective security that will increase stability in the region. One building block would be NATO s Mediterranean dialogue and its contribution to Algeria s efforts to modernise and professionalise her armed forces. Algeria shows a high willingness to support the international war on terrorism; it has signed a security treaty with NATO that outlines the kind of co-operation that will be needed in that war. Officially, Algeria has often stated that privileged bi-lateral relations between NATO and the individual Dialogue partners in North Africa are very positive. An essential prerequisite for the intensification of such co-operation is the incorporation of the Dialogue partners into the conceptualisation of the programmes. For this reason Algeria has reacted positively to the exchange programme that has allowed its parliamentarians to visit their NATO colleagues. This exchange is part of the programme of the North Atlantic Assembly. Algerian officials have referred to NATO s Mediterranean Dialogue as complementary to the Barcelona Process, which has not dealt with military issues so far. Algeria does not expect the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU to make rapid progress. Because of the unsolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict the EU Security Charter cannot be considered a part of the Barcelona Process at the moment. However, it has been stressed that Algeria accepts NATO s Mediterranean Dialogue because it precludes a direct tête-à-tête with the USA. Morocco Officially Moroccans believe that good relations with NATO are important. Participation in NATO s Mediterranean Dialogue, military co-operation, and parliamentary exchange within the framework of the North Atlantic Assembly are elements of a development that is seen in a positive light. Howev- 59

60 er, NATO s negotiators encounter more difficulties when they raise issues that regard migration terrorism, and security. Morocco does not want to discuss illegal migration merely in terms of its security implications. It would prefer to look for the causes of illegal migration (and illegal drug trafficking and terrorism) so that common solutions can then be investigated. Morocco finds it almost impossible to find the funds that would be necessary for its participation in NATO s partnership programmes. Tunisia Tunisia has good relations to the individual NATO member states. Its efforts to promote good relations between itself and the southern Mediterranean through the Mediterranean Dialogue have had a positive response. But there exists a feeling that Tunisia, along with other participants, has not received offers of co-operation commensurate with her needs. This is the case with the Barcelona Process. NATO s dialogue is perceived as being guided from above. There has been talk of dictation. The fact that the states that participate in the Dialogue are only expected to react to pre-prepared offers is seen as very negative. Tunisian officials wish to be incorporated into the preparation of concepts and programmes that relate to the Mediterranean dialogue. Criticism and suggestions made by the Maghreb Dialogue Partners All three countries formulate identical criticisms of NATO s Mediterranean dialogue. Their only major differences were constituted by the intensity of the language that was used when they criticise the Mediterranean Dialogue. The main aims of their verbal attacks were the lack of consultation in the creation of programmes and in the construction of the Dialogue s general framework. In brief, the following aspects of NATO s Mediterranean Dialogue were criticised: - Firstly, the lack of consultation in the development of the concept and programmes. Algeria criticised the imposition of the concept, and Tunisia complained because the programmes are being dictated to them. - The programmes had not been devised in order to address the needs and problems of the participating states in an adequate way. - The failure of NATO to keep the Dialogue partners adequately informed (lack of transparency) about developments that regard the Mediterranean (e.g. discussions about strategy and the organisational re-structuring of NATO). - The lack of transparency about the intentions and aims of NATO in the Mediterranean. In connection with this it became clear that the feeling of 60

61 not being informed about NATO s real aims significantly increased fears and mistrust. These fears revolved around one main possibility, that of interference in internal affairs (or even military intervention), and consequently, the disregard of national sovereignty. The self-funding-principle for the participation in the dialogue programmes. Accordingly, all three participants agree on the following points: - They would like to participate in the elaboration of concepts and programmes. In other words, they do not want a programme that is prepared in advance. They would all rather take part in its elaboration. Participation is seen as an essential element of a genuine partnership that can be characterised as a relationship between equals. This aspect is regarded as extremely important. - The Dialogue should be continued on a ministerial level. Algeria, in particular, would like to see the creation of a consultative structure at the highest level in which civil and military representatives participate. - They would like to see a solution of the problems of financing the participation in the programmes (abolition of the self-funding-principle). - All participants respect the fact that international law and the UN will be strengthened. Factors that Obstruct the Intensification of NATO s Mediterranean Dialogue Specific measures have been employed to encourage the Dialogue all since the NATO summit in Madrid in In the Rand Report 7 on NATO s Mediterranean Dialogue that was published in 2000 the authors confirmed that there was a continuing ambivalence among the Arab Dialogue partners in relation to the Dialogue initiative. In this context ambivalence means that there is considerable interest in building a more constructive relationship with NATO and in exploring opportunities offered within the framework of the Initiative but that attitudes remain mixed. These mixed attitudes refer to the mixture of caution and mistrust that the Arabs in the Dialogue countries feel towards NATO as an organisation and towards its aims. Two main factors that obstruct the intensification of NATO s Mediterranean dialogue were identified: 1. Political factors, i.e. factors that are closely connected to the respective political cultures (comprising among other things: political experience, 7 Lesser, Ian et.al.: The Future of NATO s Mediterranean Initiative, Santa Monica (CA) 2000, p

62 self-identification, regional and international positioning, the political system) and to the internal political situation; 2. Structural factors i.e. factors that have to do with the capacity, the training and the competence of the personnel that is sent to the programmes that are offered as part of NATO s Mediterranean Dialogue. Political factors Both the leadership and the people of the Maghreb states are very sensitive to any kind of interference in their national sovereignty. Given this background the following states of mind and attitudes also obstruct the intensification of dialogue: - Mistrust of the NATO s intentions in the Mediterranean region; especially as regards the new strategic concept and the dominant role of the United States that are thought to have been conducting an aggressive foreign policy all since 9/11. - The strong nation state mentality that is characterised by a reluctance to cede sovereign rights to supranational institutions even when it is the matter of transnational co-operation. This kind of mentality impedes the forming of co-operative structures on a Maghrebian regional level. Lack of experience of multi-lateral co-operation on a regional level also has a negative impact on the use of the multi-lateral programmes offered by NATO s Mediterranean Initiative. The most popular form of co-operation still is bilaterality. This situation will probably not change in the foreseeable future. - The feeling that the Mediterranean dialogue is an asymmetric North- South relationship and that the stronger partner dictates the partnership program and that these programs do not really address the needs of the dialogue countries. - Public opinion sees NATO as pro-israeli biased. This is a fact that political leaders have to take into account. - The perception that the Initiative has not achieved sufficient progress because it did not receive full support from all NATO member states (in comparison to the Partnership for Peace programme). - The Maghreb states share the impression that the intensification of their co-operation with NATO s Mediterranean Dialogue programme will not provide them with sufficient advantages. Algeria has gone on the offensive. The government has defined two areas of co-operation: the fight against terrorism and the modernisation of the armed forces. It can be assumed that Algeria s involvement in the Mediterranean Dialogue will be intensified if co-operation in the two abovementioned fields is intensified. - Divergent security perceptions between NATO and its Mediterranean di- 62

63 alogue countries; When discussing security related issues like the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile technology, NATO emphasises the destabilising effects on the region, but hardly ever mentions Israeli WMDs. To the Arab states WMDs are mainly a question of strategic competition with Israel. Structural Factors These are the most important structural factors that have prevented the Maghreb countries from taking full advantage of NATO s Mediterranean Initiative: - The personnel: there are not enough adequately trained personnel with a sufficient knowledge of English to be eligible for the programmes of NA- TO s Mediterranean Dialogue. As a result only limited use can be made of programmes on offer. - The self-funding principle: for the use of the programmes and the limited financial resources that NATO can make available to cover costs. All three states emphasise the weak state of their own finances and claim that the funding problem is a concrete obstacle to the participation in some of the programmes. The fact that neither cost-free schemes nor scientific cooperation programmes that receive extra financial support have been fully expploited proves that cost plays a role but is not the main factor. - The authoritarian mentality and control mechanisms of the Maghreb governments are softening gradually but hesitantly. The application of new patterns of behaviour in state institutions and organisations is lagging behind even in those cases when the legal basis has already been put in place. The security organisations are the least transparent institutions and the most tightly controlled. Contacts abroad and on the international stage have always been strictly controlled. This will probably not change fundamentally in the near future. The express wish of the Algerian government that NATO should help modernise and professionalise its army does not mean that this mistrust has faded away but it is simply the matter of technical and organisational assistance. - This mistrust of foreign states also dominates the relations between the Maghreb states themselves and between them and states in the Near East. However, during the last few years some progress has been made in the field of bi-lateral relations. The mistrust has not completely disappeared. This kind of mistrust diminishes the willingness of the Maghreb states to participate in multi-lateral activities. Consequently they still prefer bi-lateral relations. 63

64 Structural Improvements of the Maghreb-NATO Mediterranean Dialogue In spite of these limiting factors Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia are in principle willing to link themselves to NATO s Mediterranean Dialogue. The current boundary of co-operation is determined by the characterisation of NA- TO s Mediterranean Dialogue as a concertation framework. It is simply a matter of political pragmatism and realism to be in contact with a powerful military organisation at one s own front door especially given the current global political situation. Co-operation on matters of common concern (as described by Algerian President Bouteflika in December 2002) has not been refused but it must meet needs and take national interests into consideration. NATO will have to reduce mistrust and clarify its aims and intentions in the Maghreb and the Mediterranean area. These intentions might be expressed through the following measures: Measures that could be taken to improve the flow of information and to increase transparency in all matters relating to the Mediterranean. A more precise definition of NATO s strategic concept for the Mediterranean as well as the pre-conditions for preventative military measures; The linkage of NATO out-of-area-missions to a mandate of the Security Council of the United Nations; The inclusion of the Maghreb Dialogue partners in the preparation of programmes as it has already happened in the Work Program 2003 to a certain extend so that these will suit the needs of the individual participants better. Nevertheless the NATO member states ought to accept the fact that, within the foreseeable future, the dialogue will be used bi-laterally by the Maghreb states. The Maghreb states will continue to use intensive bi-lateral relations to individual NATO member states as the central axis of their co-operation abroad. In this context all Maghreb states have emphasised that they would like Germany to show more interest in co-operation in all areas The Mediterranean Dialogue countries and the European Union Perceptions of the EU Enlargement of 2004 In Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia the EU enlargement of May 2004 mostly provokes fears about the medium term negative effects on their own national economies, even if they realise that a geographically enlarged EU theoretically implies greater opportunities for export. However, none of the Maghreb states denies the possibility that enlargement might develop positive long-term effects. 64

65 The Maghreb states see the enlargement of the EU as a competitive challenge for - Political attention - Governmental development aid and money - Foreign private investment - Competition about the agricultural markets and about textile products Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia expect medium-term economic and social consequences. The extent of these consequences cannot be predicted. Algeria and Morocco stress the consequences for the economic and social security and consequently also for the political stability if the economic and financial co-operation of the EU with the Maghreb states were to diminish as a result of the expansion to the east. They highlight the favourable conditions that poverty and under-development would create for terrorism and (illegal) migration. The significance of regional co-operation is quite clear to the Maghreb states. The EU enlargement has heightened their awareness of the importance of regional co-operation. And yet they do not believe that the Arab Maghreb Union will develop into a stable and effective regional organisation in the short-term. For this reason the co-operation on soft security issues within the framework of the EU Mediterranean partnership and with individual partners is driven forward by the Maghreb states. Consequently, the bilateral relations to individual EU member states are given a great deal of importance. The Mediterranean countries also prefer bilateral relations in the field of military cooperation. The Attitude to the EU Mediterranean Partnership Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia stress the importance of the economic, social and developmental dimension of the EU s Mediterranean dialogue. Algeria signed an Association Treaty in December The Algerian government has also described the Barcelona Process as a series of irreversible and strategic choices that are seen as prerequisites for the necessary liberalisation of the Algerian economy. In a similar manner Morocco considers the economic dimension a priority. Algeria particularly values the EU Mediterranean Process because it is not dominated by the USA. All three states pretend to have a comprehensive notion of security (economic and social security included). Consequently they consider co-operation as a means of getting help to obtain economic and financial stability. They expect their EU partners to support them in their struggle against the causes of terrorism and the environment that encourages it. It has been emphasised 65

66 more than once that the military aspects of security should not have priority over other areas of co-operation and the EU Mediterranean Dialogue. For a long time the Maghreb states have regarded the strategic discussions and organisational development inside NATO as more relevant to the Mediterranean s security than EU discussions about the CSDP/ESDP. The development of a common European foreign and security policy was welcomed by the Maghreb states since they are quite interested in co-operating on soft security issues as long as the measures are designed to fit the needs of the countries that are involved. They would like to see combined approaches that contain security and developmental measures and aid. Although progress within the EU concerning the CFSP/ESDP may open up for new opportunities for co-operation on security with the Maghreb partner countries, their active involvement will depend on the recognisable (national) advantages they can gain from such co-operation. The Maghreb partners believe that a more animated discussion of EU related security issues might be provoked in the Maghreb states if the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) continue to make dynamic progress. Nevertheless, they do not expect the CFSP/ESDP to make rapid progress. The EU s positive assessment of the CFSP does not mean that the mistrust of the aims of the CFSP/ESDP and the European Intervention Forces in the southern Mediterranean has disappeared. An intervention force concept is perceived as diametrically opposed to the common aims of stability and security in the Mediterranean. Suggestions Made by the Maghreb States The Maghreb states see the EU s approach to soft security issues as too limited. They would like the security measures to be supplemented by developmental policies. In addition, the EU should provide the means and offer the measures that the Maghreb states would need in order to be able to carry out effective policing tasks and security duties (technical equipment, training etc.). They would like both sides to clarify these aspects together in an intensive bilateral dialogue. The implementation of a variable geometry of the EU Mediterranean Partnership would be welcomed and there is also a desire for greater flexibility in this area of co-operation. However, a duplication of the EU and NATO initiatives is feared. They wish the EU to organise a permanent ESDP consultation mechanism for the Mediterranean partner states. In this way contacts and the exchange of information would be improved. Since it is a long-term process the Barcelona Process should support the integration of the Maghreb states. All 66

67 the member states of the Arab Maghreb Union, including Libya, should participate in the Barcelona Process. In order to make this possible Tunisia has proposed using and promoting the 5+5 Talks; a proposition that Libya regards favourably. Recommendations: The recommendations can be discerned from the ideas, criticisms, and wishes that the Maghreb states have expressed publicly. The following conclusions can be drawn from the joint research project that has been conducted by the CeMiSS and the ZTBw concerning EU s Mediterranean dialogue: - An optimisation of the existing co-operation in the field of soft security would be in the EU s interest. In order to be able to pursue this aim it would be necessary to take the suggestions and needs of the individual states into account and to adopt a more partner-like and trusting attitude. In its turn, this kind of trust might prepare the way for future military co-operation within the framework of the EU Mediterranean Partnership. In this process, development should be given equal priority to security. - The optimisation of the co-operation in the field of soft security should take full advantage of the Maghreb states willingness to strengthen the bilateral dialogue. As a consequence of the intensification of the co-operation on security issues more attention should be paid to the implementation of (surveillance) technology and to the kind of professional training that would be necessary in order to improve border security. Financial contributions that would sponsor the return of illegal migrants to their countries of origin should also be taken into consideration. - Efforts should be made to include Libya in the security co-operation projects in the fight against terrorism and illegal migration. The incidents close to the Italian island of Lampedusa in June 2003 made this even more urgent. Since Libya is not an active participant in the Barcelona Process it should be offered bilateral support by the EU members (e.g. border security). This kind of support should first be co-ordinated by the EU states. - Germany should participate actively in the construction of an institutionalised European Security and Defence dialogue with the Maghreb states. All of the Maghreb states (including Libya) have said that they would like this to happen. - If the Barcelona process should develop a security policy dimension then co-operation would only be attractive to the Mediterranean dialogue countries if: - They would gain significant advantages - There would be a more intensive exchange of information 67

68 - They could have a significant influence on the co-operation agenda - There were increased flexibility to meet the needs of the individual states 4.4 The Mediterranean Adriatic Dimension: Croatia, Serbia-Montenegro, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina Earlier in this report it was mentioned that the Mediterranean could be divided into three parts or sub-regions. For the purposes of this research project particular attention should be paid to the Mediterranean Adriatic Dimension. The six countries that border on the Adriatic Sea (Italy, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania) make part of the same geopolitical context. These countries form a sub region of the Mediterranean that is of special interest due to its importance as a crossing point of strategic interests, different foreign policy orientations and potential crises scenarios for the artificially stabilised Balkans. After having divided the Mediterranean region into 3 main geopolitical sub-regions the study will now focus on the area of the Eastern Mediterranean that can be described as a three-sea-system (the Adriatic the Aegean the Black Sea). Italy borders this region through the Adriatic Sea and the countries that constitute its hinterland are the Stability Pact countries. According to Calafati 8 there are at least three spheres at which the relationships between the different natural and social elements of the Adriatic Sea Region are so strongly interconnected as to justify their enclosure within the boundaries of a single system. Firstly, there is the ecological indivisibility of the Adriatic Sea. Secondly, there is the emerging interrelation of the territory: private and above all public investment is forming an integrated artificial landscape. Thirdly, there is the growing density of the economic relationships (transaction of commodities and capital flows) among the local systems of the area. In this context the states that border on the eastern shore of the Adriatic Sea form an area of growing political interest for Italy and the EU, especially in the context of a future stabilisation of these countries and their progressive acession in the EU and NATO. The Adriatic dimension will be the only Mediterranean dimension that can and probably will be successfully incorporated into NATO and the EU in the nearest future. 8 Antoni G. Calafati, Perspective on the Adriatic Sea Region: A Preliminary Analysis, Paper at the International Adriatic Confernce, University of Trieste, July

69 In the three-sea-system the Adriatic dimension is the most relevant for the Mediterranean dimension amongthe three seas. The Aegean Sea can be reduced to a bilateral and problematic relation between two NATO countries (Greece and Turkey). As far as the Black Sea, it can be said that both Romania and Bulgaria are lacking of a specific Mediterranean dimension and strong political and economic factors connect them closely to their western neighbours, so to the Adriatic Sea. Bulgaria and romania can be consdired part of the Adriatic hinterland. The political and economic activities that took place in Romania ad Bulgaria during the past ten years reveal how efficient this attraction effect (from the Adriatic to the Black Sea) has been. The development of political and economical bridges towards the Adriatic and the Danube took place under the auspices of the European Commission and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. Since both Romania and Bulgaria will become NATO members in April 2004 and plan to gain entrance into the EU in 2007 their political orientation is clearly directed towards western integration as main goal and only subordinately to maintain regional linkage to the western Balkan states. To maintain Eu integration compatible with regional co-operation the Stability Pact worked on the creation of a Free Trade area in South Eastern Europe. This was completed, after more than 3 years of negotiations, in the Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Trade of South Eastern Europe that took place in Rome in November This free trade area has laid down the ba- 69