The problems of the Italo-Croato-Slovene border delimitation in the Northern Adriatic

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1 GeoJournal 52: , Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. 129 The problems of the Italo-Croato-Slovene border delimitation in the Northern Adriatic Mladen Klemenčić&AntonGosar Department of Geography, University of Ljubliana, Slovenia; Lexicographical Institute, Zagreb, Croatia Received 13 February 2001; accepted 8 April 2001 Key words: delimitation, maritime border, mutual agreement, territorial claims Abstract The Adriatic Sea, and its northern part in particular, is a highly illustrative example of the changing political geography of the sea. In the 1990 s the changing political map was influenced by the break-up of Yugoslavia. As a consequence two successor states, Croatia and Slovenia, started delimitation of their common and new international border. In spite of the fact that a joint boundary commission managed to resolve disputes along almost the entire length of the land border, there are several disputed points remaining as well as unresolved issues of maritime delimitation. The authors analysed the existing claims of the two countries and suggested a possible solution. Regardless of existing problems, there are favourable conditions to develop intensive cross-border cooperation. Borders in the Northern Adriatic in time and space Multiple borders in the Northern Adriatic and in its hinterland are a fairly new phenomenon. The part of the Mediterranean Sea between the Istrian Peninsula and the Venetian Lagoons was not divided among states until far after WW2. It was Republic of Venice s property until its surrender to Napoleon; later, Austria took control of it to the point in time (1919) when Italy expanded its post-ww1 borders to the East and incorporated the ethnically mixed land area of Istria into its own state. The delayed post-ww2 boundary settlement in the Northern Adriatic divided land, sea and people among two states, different in their composition and global orientation: a unitary nation-state, democratic and western Italy and a uniquely communistic and non-aligned eastern federation of Yugoslavia. That was not all! A temporary variety of intermediate sub-state forms (The Free Territory of Trieste) and administrative divisions, which matched none of the former states units, were put in place. A few warthreatening situations and the following peace settlement and cooperation agreements between Yugoslavia and Italy finally set the state border. In 1975 the Osimo accords were signed. In the hinterland of Trieste and Gorizia and at sea major development projects were put into the planning stage, but they were rarely realised. As a consequence of the devolution of the multi-ethnic federation two decades later (1991), two nation-states Croatia and Slovenia gained control of the previously Yugoslav territory of the Northern Adriatic. The geopolitical relationship was modified, not always to the better of the inherited situation. The disputed maritime border between the two newly established democracies is a major obstacle to prosperity and cooperation in the Northern Adriatic. This paper is using the general term Northern Adriatic for the maritime area to the north of the line connecting peninsula Rt Kamenjak - South of Pula in Istria (in the east) and the delta of the River Po (Bocca del Po di Goro) - South of Venice, thus defining the southern limit of the area, and considering the opposite, Trieste coast, with its karstic hinterland plateau, to be the area s northern limit. This is the Mediterranean s most northern part, stretching its Trieste Bay into the core of the European continent. Its strategic importance is therefore undisputable. The maritime area encompasses a stretch of international waters while the rest of the sea has the status of the territorial waters of Italy, Croatia and Slovenia. The last two maritime areas have not yet been precisely delimited. Croatia and Italy may face each other in the Northern Adriatic, depending on the outcome of the negotiations between Croatia and Slovenia. An eventual Italo-Croato boundary dividing their territorial waters will surely be a rather short one. However, there is the agreed dividing line between the continental shelves of the two states. Between Croatia and Slovenia there is an undefined maritime border (the Bay of Piran) and minor disagreements over the land border (the Dragonja Valley). The Italo-Slovene border experiences and inherited border regime on its 29 km long maritime section (and on the 62 km long land border from Gorizia/Nova Gorica in the North to Muggia/Ankaran in the South). Fishing rights were granted to Italian fishermen (based on the number of boats) in Croatia granted Slovenian fishermen rights to fish in their territorial waters as well. The Italian coast line in the provinces of Veneto and Friuli - Venetia Giulia is relatively shallow (exception: the Trieste karstic coastal plateau), the Croatian coast

2 130 stretches along the carstic Istrian peninsula, the Slovenian part of Istria consists mostly of gentle slopes on flysh sediments and encompasses 47 km of the North-Adriatic coastline. Three major ports handled traffic (mid-1990s): Venezia (Mestre/Marghera) with 23.7 million BRT and Trieste with 36.6 million BRT within the state of Italy, and Koper-Capodistria, sole port within the borders of Slovenia, with 5.3 milllion BRT. Pula-Pola and some other harbours along the Croatian (Porec-Parenzo, Rovinj-Rovigno, Umag-Umago) and Slovenian (Portorož-Portorose, Izola- Isola) Istrian coast serve predominantly as tourist ports (marinas). In several bays of the Northern Adriatic fishermen have recently intensified the so called seafruit gardening (mari-culture), in particular in the Bay of Piran. All the above is occasionally the subject of the Croato- Slovene border dispute discussion, possibly impacting the delineation process and future border. It is also a key factor of mutual understanding and cooperation (in politics, culture and economy) of the countries sharing the North Adriatic space. Nevertheless, the Italian government elected in 1994 questioned the already established relationship, the Osimo Agreements, especially in regard to the restrictive real-estate laws in the new democracies (Figure 2). The Italo-Slovene border The Italo-Slovene Border is in its full length (199 km on land, 29 km on sea) a result of the post-ww2 negotiations of the super-powers. It does not coincide with ethnic delineations or common cultural space, it does not recognise functional areas, it is not a physiographic border, nor is it a geometric boundary. It denies all the commonly known principles of border settings. This provides the theory of political geography with an excellent example of an exception. The border is mainly a result of the cold war. Yugoslavia and Italy, losing more than 9,000 km 2 of their pre-ww2 territory, have had to recognize the arbitrary decisions made by representatives of the Soviet Union, France, the United Kingdom and the United States. Between May 1, 1945 and September 15, 1947 a transitional zone was put in place: Zone A became a protectorate of the western allies and Italy, Zone B was put under the control of the winning Yugoslavian partizan army (and its ideological supporter, the Soviet Union). The division line soon became a reality, in particular in the North Adriatic section, whereas elsewhere watershed, strategic and ethnic principles were arguments for the final border delineation. In Paris (1947) and London (1954) final drawings on the map were made. Despite good economic and, in part, cultural relationships and the recognition of an open border principle, it was not until 1975 that both countries recognized the reality and mutually agreed to it. Following Osimo, several protocols were signed: in Trieste (1980) on the type of border crossings, in Udine (1982) on the special, custom modified border-zone size and on (unrestricted) exchange of people, goods and traffic, and in Ljubljana (1988) on tourism development and crossborder farming, mountaineering and skiing in the Alps. The post-independence meeting of diplomats of both countries in Rome (1992) resulted into an agreement by which established accords, made by Italian and Yugoslav counterparts, should be recognized and implemented fully in the future Italo-Slovene relationship. This includes the border and fishing agreements in the Trieste Bay as well. The Italo-Slovene border functions as an outer border of the European Union with a modified regime. The implementation of the Schengen agreements is enforced, but due to bilateral agreements special privileges are granted to Slovene citizens and in particular to people living in the 10 km border zone. The Italo-Slovene border has 60 border crossings, among which 14 are meant to handle (all) the international traffic (one on every 16.5 kilometers), 24 are established to support local cross-border exchange (for Slovene and Italian citizens), 20 have the function of an agrarian border crossing, two border crossings enabling (unrestricted) tourism exchange across the border in the Alps. All the borderposts combined handled in ,332 lorries, 36,756 busses, 7,471,930 automobiles and 18.7 million passengers a year (1995). The border-crossings of the Northern Adriatic are the busiest ones - Sežana/(Fernetti) Opicina (1,586,033 tons of goods, 4,471,930 passengers), Nova Gorica (Vrtojba)/Gorizia (986,641 tons of goods, 2,457,852 passengers), Škofije/Muggia (196,831 tons of goods, 3,236,938 passengers) - as they handle almost 90% of the traffic between Italy, Slovenia and Croatia. The first two border crossings are major entry/exit points on the Europe s Sun Belt traffic corridor, making grounds for the projected European development axis Barcelona - Milan - Budapest Kiev or corridor V according to the Pan-European transport network as defined at Crete in 1994 and in Helsinki in Bulk shipment of goods between harbours in Italy or Slovenia is rare. Regular connections by ferries (passenger boats) do not exist. During the tourist season (May - September) several tourist agencies charter ships (hydrofoil and catamarans) to link the Istrian coastal resorts in Croatia and Slovenia with Venice in Italy. Tourist yachts seldom decide for the trans-adriatic crossing, most boats of that kind prefer sailing/traveling along the Istrian peninsula by crossing the Croato-Slovene border. But several regatas are arranged in such a manner that they start or finish in a Slovene or Italian tourist port or marina, like in Grado (Italy) or Portrož-Portorose (Slovenia). The Italo-Croatian border Geographical conditions and political divisions created a rare spatial relation between Italy and Croatia. They do not share a common land boundary. However, the two countries occupy most of the Adriatic coastline and therefore have a long maritime boundary which divides respected continental shelves. The boundary was delimited in 1968 as the then Italo-Yugoslav boundary. Croatia inherited former Yugoslavia s claim and reinforced it by declaring its succession to the 1958 Geneva Continental Shelf Convention on 3 August 1992 defining the limits of its continental shelf claim in accordance with that Convention. Whether two countries will share a maritime boundary between their respective territorial waters in the Northern Adriatic is still an open issue which can be fully resolved

3 131 only after the final settlement of the Croato-Slovene maritime boundary. At the present stage it is clear that Croatia is keen to share, at least symbolically, a border with Italy. It would be the only border shared with a EU member for Croatia. The Croato-Slovene border Despite earlier plans for a custom union, in 1991 Slovenia and Croatia agreed to create an international border. The former republican (Yugoslav interior) boundary line was transformed into an international boundary. Its length is 546 kilometers along which 26 (now 36) border crossings were designated. On both sides of the line exit/entry-posts were constructed. A joint boundary commission was formed and tasked to precisely delimit, and demarcate the line. The task to define the border was, it seemed, easy, as most of the border was designated as such since the Middle Ages. It remained the southern border of the (Holy Roman) Empire and, until 1919, a provincial and dual-monarchy border within Austria. Later it became the border of two provinces within the Yugoslav Kingdom (Dravska/Savska banovina) and thereafter, during WW 2, the western border of the Croatian quasi-state NDH (Nezavisna država Hrvatska). The internal administrative borders between the territorial units of the post WW 2 South Slavonic federation were delineated in the mid-1950s and socialist republics were created. Internal border delineation has often followed historical paths. But, in some areas they were not in accordance with the territorial divisions made by the church, nor have they observed functional areas (school, work, recreation). As the Croat and Slovene ethnic communities were completely separated by the administrative (republic s) border of the federation, a rare exception within Yugoslavia was put in place. The established internal, provincial (i.e., republic) boundaries of Ex-Yugoslavia were not recognized internationally, despite the fact that their autonomy was relatively high. As the boundary between the former Yugoslav republics of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991 became a state border, they soon developed into a political, economic and monetary division line, separating the two most prosperous entities of the former federation. In 1992 almost 2.9 million tons of goods have crossed Croato-Slovene borders. This amounted to 38.7% of the Slovene exchange. Despite war-like conditions in Croatia in those days, the economies of both states were inclined to cooperation. As the process of defining, determining, designating, and demarcating the Slovene- Croatian border continued, problems have risen. They had their grounds in juridical theory, geography, history, and politics. The following major obstacles have been identified: views on the principles of the boundary definition differ; past natural / regional / urban development has altered socio-geographic grounds underpinning the former republic border; regional prosperity is closely linked to border and interstate arrangements. Problems occurred in areas where the demarcation was short-lived or has never been precisely delimited. Designating the boundary in the Danubian lowlands of the former Magyar part of the Dual-Monarchy and in Istria, where Italy was the administrator until 1945, has become a test of fairness and endurance. In Istria the division had to be made within the once multi-ethnic region (Slovenes, Croats, Italians, Germans and Jews) of the former Austrian province Istrien und Kuestenland, or better, within the post WW 1 province Pola of Italy. Before 1991, the only state border separating the north and south of Istria was arranged by the Allies (the Free Territory of Trieste ) and was short lived (until 1947). It followed the Mirna river. In places the ecclesiastical boundary and the republic border were not identical with the provincial boundaries of the past, nor with lower-hierarchy administrative borders (communal, cadastral). Since 1992 the border delineation process has made several turns, but has, in general moved forward. By the end of the second year of negotiations, in 1994, more than 90% of the borderline problems were solved. In spring 1997 mutual agreement was close to 95% of the border length. Solutions for the remaining 6 major and several smaller (Slovenia acounts 12) border line disagreements are to be found either through a bi-lateral accord or by international arbitration (Figure 1). The problem of the Bay of Piran is heading in that direction. Maritime boundaries of the Northern Adriatic While the maritime boundary and the border regime between Croatia and Italy, including fishing, remain the same since 1991, the delimitation of the Croato-Slovene maritime boundary remains open. In theory, the Republic of Slovenia claims a 12 nautical mile wide territorial sea. The sea-based maritime zone was not determined yet: Slovenia s maritime coastline is 47 km long whereas Croatia s stretches for 1,778 km - including islands, 5,790 km. The continental shelf boundary between Italy and ex- Yugoslavia was delimited in 1968 (continental shelf) and juridically enforced since Basically, the boundary was equal to the equidistant line. It was the first continental shelf boundary in the Mediterranean to be put into effect. In the Northern Adriatic the maritime boundary was exactly defined in 1975 (Osimo agreements: November 10, 1975) and set into force in 1977 (April 3, 1977). The line divided territorial waters of both states in the Gulf of Trieste. The parties reached a solution which can be called the semi-effect of straight baselines. Because of the length and direction of the Italian baselines in the Gulf of Trieste, a delimitation according to equidistance from such lines would have favoured Italy. On the contrary, equidistance from the coast would have favoured Yugoslavia. The parties agreed on a boundary line that is generally an intermediate line between the lines produced applying both above mentioned criteria (Scovazzi, 1993). Both Italo-Yugoslav boundary agreements were widely seen as a fair and mutually satisfactory delimitation (Blake, 1994). Based on the principle of succession, the present day Italo-Croato and Italo-Slovene maritime boundary accepted

4 132 Figure 1. Croatia-Slovenia border. the initially integral boundary line. The succession was not confirmed by a document yet, but it is most unlikely that the sides involved (Slovenia, Croatia) or vice versa (Italy) would claim any legal, political or geographic revisions or ask for new negotiations of the maritime boundary. On the other hand, the Yugoslav republic (internal) borders on sea were not precisely defined. The needs for delimitation of republican juridistriction at sea were not that great, although in practice jurisdiction was generally known. Mutual agreement, proposed and enforced on the local level, has produced wide zones of (police/militia) control in the republic s border areas. Successor states now need to delimit initially integral territorial waters. Technically, the task should be easy to realize if terminal points on land would be known. Subsequently, the implementation of the Law of the Sea (LOS), especially the 1982 convention, would enable a quick resolution. However, the reality has been different. The present-day Italy-Slovenia and Croatia-Italy maritime border As already stated, the present-day maritime boundary system of the Northern Adriatic is inherited from the Italo- Yugoslav delimitations. The final shape of the boundary system will be known after final settlement of the Croato- Slovene maritime boundary. As long as that issue is unresolved, several outcomes are possible. The only certain element is that former delimitations between Italy and Yugoslavia have not been questioned so far and therefore will provide a good basis for future maritime boundaries. 2.2 The Croatia-Slovenia maritime delimitation The Slovene-Croatian maritime boundary is a special problem. The land border reaches the sea in the small Bay of Piran. The maritime boundary is unlikely to be more than eight miles long. Croatia prefers a maritime boundary based on equidistance. Article 15 of the 1982 Sea Convention states that the median line is to be adopted unless parties agree to the contrary. Each point of the median line is to be equidistant from the nearest points on the baseline from which the breadth of the maritime zone of each state is measured (Blake, 1994). Slovenia would like to invoke Article 12 of the 1958 Convention on Territorial Waters, stating that an outlet to the open sea (international waters) is essential for a country. The median line in the Bay of Piran would hinder the Slovene state s economy (fishing, tourism) and would not enable a free passage towards the sole Slovenian maritime harbour Koper. During the Yugoslav federation the Bay of Piran administrative and legal institutions were predominantly (and still are) Slovene, which supports Slovenia s position. In the 1980s Slovenian fishermen arranged maricultures (mussels, clams, crabs) in the Bay of Piran close to the Croatian coast. Two general juridical principles - sui generis and uti possedetis iuris (he who uses, owns) - could be implemented in this case.

5 133 Figure 2. Free territory of Trieste. Proposals for solution of the Croato-Slovene border dispute in the Northern Adriatic At present the delimitation of the Slovene-Croatian state border is still in its first stage: a bilateral commission is defining criteria while geodetic field work is also being conducted. The next two concluding stages will ascertain the final and complete border delimitation and its demarcation. Experiences from other countries suggests this might take years or even decades. The Croato-Slovene delegation has developed the following criteria for a general discussion (in regard to problems) and, subsequently, the base for the border delineation: A. Basic criteria A 1: BORDERS OF CADASTRAL COMMUNES - since most of the border was a province/state boundary throughout history, cadastral communes were bounded by it as well; B. Supplemental criteria: B 1: NATURAL BORDERS, where geographic reality is in favour of such divisions; areas of cadastral communes which fall into the neighbouring state should be exchanged for territory of the same size elsewhere; B 2: OTHER CRITERIA in regard to history, geography, economy, ecology, etc. in areas where the basic criteria is not applicable; B 3: PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS - minimal border corrections (up to 500 metres) where favoured by the local population Pending criteria on which definite agreement was reached, the following borderline trouble-spots in the Northern Adriatic between Croatia and Slovenia have to be solved:

6 134 Figure 3. Borders in the Northern Adriatic. precise delimitation of the land boundary along the Dragonja River from its source to the sea; the issue includes problems of the old cadastral evidence as well as changes of the main river-bed following the drainage works in the 1950s; recently it was subject of a dispute between the two states which is known as the Four hamlets question (Klemenčić and Schofield, 1995), the Bay of Piran maritime boundary; the issue depends on the solution of the land boundary which will determine a terminal point for the maritime boundary, The land delimitation in Istria Basic criteria principles, on which Croat and Slovene negotiators (scientists and diplomats) agreed in the autumn of 1994, were immediately implemented, and in the Croatian view misused, as the Slovenian parliament (politicians) judically annexed four hamlets on the banks of the Dragonja river, all but one to the south of the 1991 demarcation line, located in the river bed. The border of the Piran cadastral commune of 1910, encycling Bužini/Bužin, Mlini, Škodelin/Škudelin and Škrile/Škrilje, actually crossed the river, keeping the alluvial plain (agricultural use) on both sides of the river within one administrative unit. Further, towards the south, the elevated carstic plain of the Savudrija peninsula was (later) part of the cadastral commune Kašteli. Croats opposed sharply to the Slovenian move stressing that the Cadastre of 1946 lists three out of four hamlets in the Croatian cadastral commune Kaštel, which later belonged to the Buje district and, consequently, to Croatia (Klemenčić and Schofield, 1995). Further investigations of the post WW 2 situation showed a rather confusing picture: settlers were called up to vote in the commune (občina) Koper in Slovenia and had to pay taxes in the commune (općtina) Buje in Croatia. Furthermore: four telephones used the Slovene telecomunication net, two the Croatian; electricity was of Croatian origin, water use had to be settled with the Slovenes; identity cards and licence plates were issued in Buje (Croatia), children visited elementary schools in Slovenia. The landlease by a farmer (Virgillio Babič) was revoked by Buje stating that the land to the south of Dragonja is Piran s property. As he approached Slovene administrators (Piran) they have stated that the land, he is interested in, is Croatian. The envisioned Slovenian exclave, encompassing 0.92 km 2 and settled by 24 families, has not been realized on the ground. The Slovenian parliament voted a special amendment by which Slovenian authority was frozen for the hamlets Škudelin, Škrilje and Bužin because they are territorialy disputed. Two days after the act was voted in the Slovenian parliament, the Croatian parliament responded with a declaration in which it sharply condemned the act, stating its invalidity by international law and stressing that the Croatian Parliament expects that the Croatian government will take the steps needed to secure and

7 135 protect the state s integrity. For the sake of good relations so far and in the future, we expect that the Slovenian Parliament will pay due to our claims. This citation is significant as it officially stated that both sides have territorial claims and are not pleased with the demarcation line. The sovereignity on the territory of the nation-state remains for both democracies a case of primary importance. The land based delineation and the future border in the Northern Adriatic (Istria) is under heavy pressure of Croatian and Slovenian claims. In negotiations, the Commission agreed to eliminate outspoken nationalistic claims and decided to consider exclusively claims based on common law and international principles. Taking this into account, only two claims must be mentioned: the Croatian claim to implement the border line on the (old) base river flow, and the Slovenian claim to implement the basic criteria, based on divisions in In the four hamlets case (also: Lower Dragonja or territory under double evidence ), Slovenia claimed a boundary line on the southern limits of the third cadastral commune of Piran (Pirano III), lawfully registered in From the Croatian perspective this act was then viewed as a radical shift in Slovenian policy. From the Slovenian standpoint the judical annexation can be viewed - as an answer to the official claim by Croatia in regard to the Old Dragonja river bed; - as a legal step towards the announcement of the claim on the territory of Northern Savudrija (and therewith strenghten the negotiating position). Croatia claims the de facto boundary on the Dragonja river. Initially, this statement could be understood by the Slovenian side as unprecise because Croatian scientists and politicians expressed occasionally diverse views on the river case (Klemenčić and Schofield, 1995). Slovenes could regard this as a threat as long as the Croatian claim could be understood to include and take away almost 5 km 2 of the land, including the airport of Portorož. The fact is that at present several natural and man-made channels form the Dragonja s mouth. The pre-ww 2 major river bed, the St. Jernej s Canal runs toward NW, having the delta on its left bank - to the south. Croatia might find grounds to claim the boundary on the St. Jernej s Canal as, for example, at the time of the formation of the Ex-Yugoslav republics the St. Odorick Canal was not operational yet. The water-rich St. Odorick Canal, where the provisonal Croato-Slovene border was placed upon, is the southern most channel of all six. In the delta a natural park was proclaimed, in the 1960s the airport was constructed and salt-beds continue the tradition of salt-mining. However, during 1995 and 1996 Croatian officials stated very clearly that Croatian claims refer to the St. Odorick s Canal. This is in accord with mutual agreement that the provisional demarcation line should remain in place where the republic s juridistriction ended on June 25, 1991 (on the St. Odorick s Canal) until the delineation of the border will be finished. The vigorous insistence of Slovenia on the 1910 cadastral commune (in those days the Koper/Capodistria district communes: Kaštel and Savudrija) land-based delineation and future border settlement has something to do with the Slovenian main interest - namely, the border free passage towards international waters. The boundary line south of the Dragonja river, possibly using the Savudrija watershed, would not only provide a favorable base to claim sovereignty over the (majority of) Pirano Bay but would also support the most often used delineation method in seas and therewith enable Slovenia an outlet (door/window) to the desired oceans. Some other motives prevail as well: such a solution would enable landing and take-off to and from the air-strip of Portorož/Portorose without de facto entering into Croatian airspace, several hundred second homes in Slovenian ownership could be reached by land and sea without crossing the boundary (not reporting it in harbours Piran or Umag previously, and therewith making a detour of several miles), Slovene fishermen would be able to continue the use of favorable waters (a mixture of sweet and salt waters) for their mari-cultures in the bay. The land area in question is relatively insignificant to either state purely in terms of area. Therefore the Upper and Lower Dragonja border disagreements between Croatia and Slovenia should not be categorized under the term major territorial disputes. Nevertheless, the parties involved are at the moment further from resolution than they were at independence. On the other side, Croatia will surely refuse talks on any territorial concessions to Slovenia, which makes Slovenian claims and expectations unrealistic. Croatia s jurisdiction over the Savudrija peninsula is unlikely to be questioned on any really effective basis. Borders, territory and integrity are highly sensitive issues even among really stable and old natons. Croatia s firm position and defensive reaction reflects this fact and was not motivated in part by the significance of the area concerned but precisely because of Croatia s traumatic experince on its eastern boundaries. As a consequence Croatia is very unwilling to concede a part of what is internationally recognized to be its territory, however apparently small and insignificant. The whole situation is occasionally worsened by the nationalistic claims put by the Slovene National Party which envisions a border on the Mirna River, about 20 km to the south, as that was the southern limit of the only internationally recognized border in the area - namely the short-lived ( ) Free Territory of Trieste (Figure 2). The maritime delimitation in the Bay of Piran The borderline issue on the Dragonja mouth - St. Jernej s or St. Odorick s Canal (and the cadastral communal border of Piran III) - will necessarily have a major impact on the Croato - Slovene maritime boundary. It could be disregarded as a problem if the proposed watershed solution on the Savudrija peninsula, 2 kilometers to the south of the Dragonja river, would become a base for discussion and final resolution. In that case the Bay of Piran would remain under Slovene jurisdiction (would not be divided by a border into a Croatian and Slovenian part) and Slovenia may gain access to international waters.

8 136 There never was a maritime boundary between Croatia and Slovenia. Ex-Yugoslavia declared a closing line for the Bay of Piran as part of its straight baseline claim of The consequence of this action was to give the Bay the status of internal waters. Thus, the land based Croato- Slovene republican boundary was not extended offshore and the bay remained undivided. The bay and its shores was for centuries Piran s (Venetians ) major economic source. Continuing the tradition, deriving from the times of ex- Yugoslavia, the Slovenian side mostly controlled the integral Bay. The Croatian and the Slovenian police signed hours before (February 26, 1991) the devolution of ex-yugoslavia a memorandum stating the sole Slovenian presence in the Bay. If the present provisional land based boundary would remain in effect and would become the starting point for the maritime boundary, Slovenia would regard itself as a geographically disadvantaged state with limited access to the sea. The geographic position of the Piran Bay (open towards north-west) is such that the future maritime delineation, based on Article 15 of the LOS (baseline principle), would cut off one third of the area under its jurisdiction. In that case the Croato-Slovene maritime boundary is likely to consist of a territorial sea boundary extending 8 nautical miles as far as to the former Italo-Yugoslavian boundary in the Gulf of Trieste. If the base line principle would to be put into effect, Croatia would extend its territorial waters just to a couple of miles away from the harbours of Trieste and Koper. The article 15 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea states where the coasts of two states are opposite or adjacent to each other neither of the two states is entitled, failing agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its territorial sea beyond the median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two states is measured. The same article does, however, include a deroute as it states The above provison (i.e. a median line) does not apply, however, where it is necessary by reason of historic title or other special circumstances to delimit the territorial sea of the two states in a way which is at variance therewith. It should be stated that during negotiations Croatia s representatives expressed willingness to accept a line within the Bay which would be more favorable for Slovenia. It would divide the Bay roughly in proportion 2:1 in favour of Slovenia. The Slovenian side has not been attracted very much because such delimitation does not meet the main Slovenian claim - territorial waters extended as far as international waters begin. At present, it appears that the Croato-Slovene maritime boundary in the Piran Bay is the biggest obstacle to complete the delimitation between the two states. Meanwhile, the disputed maritime boundary does not cause any problems in reality. All ships passing through Croatian territorial waters on their route to the Slovenian commercial port of Koper (to the north of the Piran Bay) enjoy the right of innocent passage. No obstacles from Croatia have been recorded. There is also lively tourist transboundary activity within the bay during summer. The rare presence of Croatian navy vessels in the Piran Bay during the height of their confrontation with the Serbs was, despite mutual understanding of the situation, met with anger and fear by the Slovene media and public. In addition to the above, the future of the joint fishing zone in the Northern Adriatic could become a future tri-state s primary concern. Namely, in 1987 Italy and ex- Yugoslavia concluded an agreement to establish a joint fishing zone in the Gulf of Trieste. A restricted number of vessels are entitled to fish in an area which extends across the maritime boundary into Italian and into ex-yugoslavian territorial waters. In the event of a Croato-Slovenian agreement on the maritime delimitation on the base line principle (with the base at the St. Odorick s Canal), it is likely that the portion of the zone on the former Yugoslav side of the border will be divided between Croatia and Slovenia. What is the mutually satisfactory solution? Both sides threatened each other with international arbitration. On the other hand, both sides are aware that a bilateral solution is much better than very costly and drawn out alternatives like arbitration or particularly referring the case to the International Court of Justice in the Hague or recently established International Court of the Law of the Sea in Hamburg. Present-day proposals are contradictory and if both sides continue insisting on them, they are not a basis for a mutually agreed solution. They even agreed to nominate former US Defence Secretary William Perry as mediator, but he has not proposed a solution yet. Arbitration procedure or litigation as an advanced stage of mediation are certainly not best solutions. That would not contribute to the image of two states, and their prospects for European integration. Additionally, international mediation would cause expenses that could have been avoided. A negotiated settlement appears to be the most attractive option giving the best chance of a swift resolution to the dispute and improving the position of both states within the international community. This paper is a modest attempt to contribute to the solution. If two sides cannot find a satisfactory division after which none of the sides will feel itself handicaped, they do not need to quarrel over any division. They may establish a joint maritime zone which would encompass the Bay of Piran and the contiguous maritime area as far as the limit of the Italian territorial waters (Figure 3). They would share the sovereignty over the zone. They can jointly develop tourism and other activities of economic importance. Slovenia would have an access to the international waters through the Slovenian territorial waters, while Croatia would not make any territorial concession. The implementation of joint zones is known worldwide and a recently widely recommended mode of resolution of potentially stressed situations. The best known examples are to be found on the northern maritime boundaries of Australia (Glassner, 1996). Australia and Indonesia agreed in late 1988 to a provisional settlement of the Timor Gap issue. A Zone of Cooperation was established in which revenues from exploitation of petroleum and natural gas would be shared in different proportions in the

9 137 three areas of the zone. In the Torres Strait Australia and Papua New Guinea agreed to respect ancestral fishing rights of the Torres Strait islanders regardless of the international maritime boundary. As a creative solution it is also to be mentioned that Argentina and UK recently signed the Joint Declaration on cooperation concerning offshore activities in the south-west Atlantic. The two sides avoided the issues of sovereignty and conflicting claims in order to push cooperation encompassing Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime areas. Of course, the above mentioned cases cannot be transplanted into Northern Adriatic but they may serve as examples how once difficult problems can be resolved creatively and peacefully. We can imagine Croatia and Slovenia cooperating in the Bay of Piran. Conclusion The emergence of new coastal states in the 1990s made maritime delimitation in the Adriatic Basin more complex. Although the former Italy-Yugoslavia boundaries remain in place throughout much of the length of the Adriatic Sea, a number of fresh maritime boundary disputes emerged. This statement refers partially to the northernmost part of the Adriatic, too. Croatia and Slovenia, two successor states of Yugoslavia readily inherited already existing offshore boundaries, but faced difficulties to delimit what previously was considered to be part of Yugoslav territorial waters or even internal waters. The dispute remains unresolved for more than five years even though the political, strategic and economic stakes are not particularly high. The existing dispute over maritime delimitation is just a part of the complex politico-geographical relationship between two states. Other issues include completition of the territorial delimitation, rivalry regarding transportation routes, property ownership, exploitation of the Krsko nuclear power-plant (built in Slovenia as a joint venture in the former Yugoslavia). The authors do believe and suggest that the policy of transboundary cooperation is clearly more fruitful and therefore preferable to confrontation. They also believe that the main political powers of both sides are also aware of the fact and that the dispute over maritime delimitation will not reach the level of the international conflict. Once, hopefully soon, when the solution of the dispute is reached, the Northern Adriatic will be a zone of peaceful cooperation between three coastal states. Nevertheless, even now, their main challenge in the long-term perspective does not lie in the political delimitation. Environmental issues, particularly large quantities of industrial and domestic liquid waste which enter the sea from the rivers, especially Italy s River Po, are surely more serious threats. In order to succesfully resolve them, settled maritime boundaries are needed. References Blake G.H., 1994: Croatia s Maritime Boundaries. In: Croatia - A New European State. pp University of Zagreb, Zagreb. Blake G.H. and Topalovic D., 1996: The Maritime Boundaries of the Adriatic Sea. Maritime Briefing 1,8. International Boundaries Research Unit, Durham. Francalanci G. and Scovazzi T., 1994: Lines in the Sea. Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht. Glassner M.I., 1996: Political Geography. 2nd edition. John Wiley & Sons, Inc, New York. Klemencic M and Schofield C.H., 1995: Croatia and Slovenia: The Four Hamlets Case, Boundary and Security Bulletin 2(4): International Boundaries Research Unit, Durham. Scovazzi T., 1993: The Agreements for the Delimitation of the Italian Coastal Zones, Mediterr. Soc. Sci. Rev. 1,2: Foundation for International Studies, Valleta.