THE WAR ON CRIME VS THE WAR ON DRUGS AN OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL GRANT PROGRAMS TO FIGHT CRIME

Transcription

1 THE WAR ON CRIME VS THE WAR ON DRUGS AN OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL GRANT PROGRAMS TO FIGHT CRIME Department of Economics Portland State University March 3 rd, 2017 Portland State University Economics Department Seminar

2 Outline Law Enforcement Assistance Administration: The Introduction of the War on Crime w/ Sayak Khatua The Impact of Federal Law Enforcement Grants on Drug Arrests and Incarceration Rates: Evidence from the Edward Byrne Program w/ Robynn Cox

3 Outline Questions to be addressed: Do National Crime Programs Change Local Government or Policing Behavior? How Effective are Nation Crime Programs at Reducing Crime or meeting their stated goals? Are there intended or unintended results related to race?

4 Preview of Results The results indicate that: National Crime Programs National Program w/o enforcement mechanisms are not likely to influence size of the police force as well as crime and arrests rates. National Crime Programs that focused on narcotic control increased arrests related to drug trafficking. 107 percent increase in white arrests for drug sales 44 percent increase in black arrests for drug sales

5 OVERVIEW

6 Overview The 1960 s was a decade of radical changes in the political and economic structure of the United States. War on Poverty, War on Crime, Expansion of Health Care for Poor and Elderly, Desegregation, Civil Rights Act, Voting Rights Act, Fair Housing, many more

7 Overview The 1960 s was a decade of radical changes in the political and economic structure of the United States. War on Poverty, War on Crime, Expansion of Health Care for Poor and Elderly, Desegregation, Civil Rights Act, Voting Rights Act, Fair Housing, many more WOP Established

8 Overview Reported crime started to rise dramatically in mid 1960 s Large Cohort of Juvenile between the age of 15 and 21 Exposure to lead Civil Unrest and Riots WOP Established

9 Overview These reforms also occurred during the same time that crime rates, female household headship rates, and divorce rates in the United States began to rise dramatically. Reduction in State Mental Hospitals, Expansion of Public Assistance Programs, Black Migration and White Flight, Urban Uprisings, Militarization of the Police Incarcerates began to explode in the mid 1970s WOP Established

10 Overview New evidence suggest that mass incarceration was driven by policy changes not criminal behavior (Raphael and Stoll, 2013). War on drugs led to racial disparities within the criminal justice system (Benson and Rasmussen, 1996; Blumenson and Nilsen, 1998). Intergovernmental grants and other programs (e.g., asset forfeiture programs) (Alexander, 2010; Cox, 2015) WOP Established

11 Overview - LEAA Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) Established under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act of 1968 under Title WOP Established LEAA Established

12 Overview - LEAA Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) 1. Allocated block grants to state and local law enforcement agents 9000 Rising Crime Riots and Unlawful Protest Organized Crime WOP Established LEAA Established

13 Overview - LEAA Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) 2. Grants provided aid in training, equipment, hiring new police officers WOP Established LEAA Established

14 Overview - LEAA Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) 2. Grants provided aid in training, equipment, hiring new police officers Although in existence until 1982, LEAA did not administer any grants after WOP Established LEAA Established LEAA Ended

15 Overview - Literature Review: LEAA Initially LEAA grants were touted as the center piece on the War on Crime but support of the program quickly began to wane. Public Criticism of LEAA (Horrock, 1975; Varon, 1975; U.S. Anticrime, 1976; Floundering, 1977 ; Diegelman, 1982) The lack of leadership, Mission Bureaucratic red tape Simplistic LEAA criticized for inappropriate usage of Funds. Little evidence that funds were used to increase the number of officers ( Crime Program, 1972). Funds were often unaccounted (Halloran, 1971; Varon, 1975; C.H., 1976; Diegelman, 1982).

16 Overview - Byrne By the 1980s the War on Crime was supplanted by the War on Drugs. Violence surrounding the crack epidemic created bi-partisan agreement for a federal intervention (Kerr, 1986; D Amato, 1986) WOP Established LEAA Established LEAA Ended

17 Overview - Byrne By the 1980s the War on Crime was supplanted by the War on Drugs Violence surrounding the crack epidemic created bi-partisan agreement for a federal intervention (Kerr, 1986; D Amato, 1986). The State and Local Assistance for Narcotics Control Program of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 financially supported the War on Drugs. WOP Established LEAA Established LEAA Ended Narcotics Control Program Grants

18 Overview - Byrne By the 1980s the War on Crime was supplanted by the War on Drugs. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 renamed the grant program the Edward Byrne Memorial State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance Program WOP Established LEAA Established LEAA Ended Narcotics Control Program Grants Renamed The Edward Byrne Memorial LEAP

19 Overview - Byrne Edward Byrne Memorial State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance Program (Byrne) Established by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 and initially operated as the State and Local Assistance for Narcotics Control Program. 1. To allocated block grants to state and local law enforcement agencies for drug related offenses focusing on: Apprehension Prosecution Detention and rehabilitation 2. Grants provided aid in training, equipment, hiring new police officers. Multijurisdictional drug task force units Grants had to be match by local municipalities (3 to 1).

20 Overview - Literature Review: Byrne Byrne grants went to local municipalities for variety of areas to influence law enforcement effectiveness but approximately half of all funds were used to establish multijurisdictional drug task forces (MJDTF) between 1989 and 1993 (Dunworth et al., 1996d). MJDTF were created to deal with drug trafficking that often involved multiple jurisdictions. Byrne grants through MJDTF have been championed as effective in improving communication between law enforcement agencies (McGarrell and Schlegel, 1993; Jefferies et al, 1998). By 1991, there existed 904 MJDTF which were responsible for over 250,000 arrests made in that year (Blumenson and Nilsen, 1998). Despite the MJDTF covering 83 percent of the population, there is little evidence that the Byrne grants influenced drug arrest (Smith et al., 2000; Mazerolle, 2007).

21 Research Questions Why Study Intergovernmental Grant Programs dedicated to Crime Prevention? Quasi-Experimental Research Design can estimate an elasticity of police on crime Estimates in crime literature suffers from simultaneity bias Gain Greater Understanding of Federal Funding on Local Police Initiatives COPS program has shown to decrease crime in the 1990? Riots, Riot Prevention, and Community Policing Strategies have become a topic of interest and have create tension in urban communities.

22 What is the Impact of the Intergovernmental Crime Prevention Grant Programs? More Specifically Impact of police on crime and arrest How effective was the War on Crime and the War on Drugs? How effective are these federal grant programs in enhancing local or community policing? Research Design Use variation in the timing & location of grants Difference in Difference using event-study framework Research Questions Before and After design for description of pre-trends and dynamic response for cities that receive grants

23 Y i,t = γ i + α t,s(i) + X i,t β + τ=1 Methodology p π τ D i 1 t T i = τ + q τ=1 - Empirical Strategy δ τ D i 1 t T i = τ + ε i,t The Event Study Research Design Visual/statistical evaluation of pre-treatment trends (falsification test) Describe dynamic, likely non-linear evolution of effects, reflecting set up costs, changes in use, and changes in composition of population Estimates of π and δ will be unbiased even in the presence of pre-existing and permanent difference between cities that receive grants and those that do not Eliminates potential downward bias from averaging outcomes in newly funded location with those from more established locations Uncovers estimates of the elasticity of police on crime

24 Y i,t = γ i + α t,s(i) + X i,t β + τ=1 Methodology p π τ D i 1 t T i = τ + q τ=1 - Empirical Strategy δ τ D i 1 t T i = τ + ε i,t : City (i) fixed effects : State-by-Year fixed effects X: Annual city level covariates from census linearly interpolated between census years

25 Y i,t = γ i + α t,s(i) + X i,t β + τ=1 Methodology p π τ D i 1 t T i = τ + q τ=1 - Empirical Strategy δ τ D i 1 t T i = τ + ε i,t D i 1(): Dummies for τ years before & after grant is received (T i *) Year the grant was issued is omitted: 1(t-T i * = 0) : Pre-effects Change in average difference in treated city outcomes τ years before establishment relative to the untreated cities : Post-effects Change in the average difference in treated city outcomes τ years after establishment relative to the untreated cities

26 Methodology - Data Data on Federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration Grants Federal Outlays files The date the grant was issued Geographical Codes Size of the Grants Focus on grants made from 1968 to 1975

27 Methodology - Data Data on Edward Byrne Memorial State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance Program Grants Consolidated Federal Funds Report Files The date the grant was issued Geographical Codes Size of the Grants Focus on grants made from 1986 to 2004

28 Methodology - Data Data on Reported Crime by City The Uniform Crime Reporting: Offenses Known and Clearance by Arrest (UCR), provides information on offenses submitted by law enforcement agencies to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The Uniform Crime Reporting: Arrests by Age, Sex, and Race provide information on arrest rates by offense for law enforcement agencies starting in The data compiled for the UCR is submitted voluntarily by city, county, and state enforcement agencies.

29 Methodology - Data LEAA analysis will focus on crime rates Sample Restrictions Population greater than 25,000 Byrne analysis will focus on crime and arrest rates by race Sample Restrictions Population greater than 50,000 Technical notes Weighted by population Standard errors clustered by city

30 LEAA GRANTS

31 LEAA Grants Non-LEAA Cities T-Test of Difference All Cities LEAA Cities A City Characteristics (N=609) (N=431) (N=178) Means Population 120, ,112 49,512 <0.01 Population per square mile 5,230 5,157 5, Median Income 6,180 6,008 6,599 <0.01 Proportion of residents with 12 years of education nonwhite <0.01 male between years of age <0.01 male between years of age

32 LEAA Grants Non-LEAA Cities T-Test of Difference All Cities LEAA Cities A City Characteristics (N=609) (N=431) (N=178) Means Population 120, ,112 49,512 <0.01 Population per square mile 5,230 5,157 5, Median Income 6,180 6,008 6,599 <0.01 Proportion of residents with 12 years of education nonwhite <0.01 male between years of age <0.01 male between years of age

33 LEAA Grants Non-LEAA Cities T-Test of Difference All Cities LEAA Cities A City Characteristics (N=609) (N=431) (N=178) Means Population 120, ,112 49,512 <0.01 Population per square mile 5,230 5,157 5, Median Income 6,180 6,008 6,599 <0.01 Proportion of residents with 12 years of education nonwhite <0.01 male between years of age <0.01 male between years of age

34 LEAA Grants Non-LEAA Cities T-Test of Difference All Cities LEAA Cities A City Characteristics (N=609) (N=431) (N=178) Means Population 120, ,112 49,512 <0.01 Population per square mile 5,230 5,157 5, Median Income 6,180 6,008 6,599 <0.01 Proportion of residents with 12 years of education nonwhite <0.01 male between years of age <0.01 male between years of age

35 LEAA Grants Non-LEAA Cities T-Test of Difference All Cities LEAA Cities B Offenses Known and Reported (N=609) (N=431) (N=178) Violent Crimes per 100,000 residents Murder <0.01 Rape <0.05 Robbery <0.01 Assault <0.10 Property Crimes per 100,000 residents Burglary <0.01 Larcerny 1,550 1,631 1,349 <0.01 Motor Vehicle Theft <0.01 Total Crimes per 100,000 residents 2,403 2,539 2,062 <0.01 Sworn Police per 1,000 residents <0.05 Growth from 1960 to 1965 Total Crimes per 100,000 residents Sworn Police per 1,000 residents

36 LEAA Grants Non-LEAA Cities T-Test of Difference All Cities LEAA Cities B Offenses Known and Reported (N=609) (N=431) (N=178) Violent Crimes per 100,000 residents Murder <0.01 Rape <0.05 Robbery <0.01 Assault <0.10 Property Crimes per 100,000 residents Burglary <0.01 Larcerny 1,550 1,631 1,349 <0.01 Motor Vehicle Theft <0.01 Total Crimes per 100,000 residents 2,403 2,539 2,062 <0.01 Sworn Police per 1,000 residents <0.05 Growth from 1960 to 1965 Total Crimes per 100,000 residents Sworn Police per 1,000 residents

37 LEAA Grants Non-LEAA Cities T-Test of Difference All Cities LEAA Cities B Offenses Known and Reported (N=609) (N=431) (N=178) Violent Crimes per 100,000 residents Murder <0.01 Rape <0.05 Robbery <0.01 Assault <0.10 Property Crimes per 100,000 residents Burglary <0.01 Larcerny 1,550 1,631 1,349 <0.01 Motor Vehicle Theft <0.01 Total Crimes per 100,000 residents 2,403 2,539 2,062 <0.01 Sworn Police per 1,000 residents <0.05 Growth from 1960 to 1965 Total Crimes per 100,000 residents Sworn Police per 1,000 residents

38 LEAA Grants Our identification strategy relies on pre-existing trends in crime rates being exogenous from the date of the first grant. There is no statistically significant relationship between crime rates and the date of the first grant.

39 Change in the Crime Rate LEAA Grants Pre-Trend Relationship Between Date of LEAA Grant and Crime Rates y = x Year of First Grant

40 Preliminary Results: LEAA Event Study Results Police per 1, Model 1: C & Y Model 2: C & SxY Model 3: C & SxY & Covariates

41 Preliminary Results: LEAA Event Study Results Police per 1, Model 1: C & Y Model 2: C & SxY Model 3: C & SxY & Covariates

42 Preliminary Results: LEAA Event Study Results Police per 1,000 Pre-treatment Effects Statistically Indistinguishable from Model 1: C & Y Model 2: C & SxY Model 3: C & SxY & Covariates

43 Preliminary Results: LEAA Event Study Results Police per 1, Model 1: C & Y Model 2: C & SxY Model 3: C & SxY & Covariates

44 Preliminary Results: LEAA Event Study Results Police per 1, Post-treatment Effects Statistically Indistinguishable from Model 1: C & Y Model 2: C & SxY Model 3: C & SxY & Covariates

45 Preliminary Results: LEAA Event Study Results Police per 1, Model 3: C & SxY & Covariates

46 Preliminary Results: LEAA Event Study Results Total Crime per 100, Model 3: C & SxY & Covariates

47 Preliminary Results: LEAA Event Study Results Violent Crime per 100, Model 2: Treated Only Sample

48 Preliminary Results: LEAA Event Study Results Arrests per 100, Model 2: Treated Only Sample

49 Preliminary Results: LEAA No Evidence that LEAA increased the number of police, reduced crime, or even increased arrests. Program lack mechanism to ensure proper utilization of funds. Police Community interactions could have served as a local mechanism for oversight. Neighborhood Legal Service Program often filed lawsuits against local police departments. Funding could have been used to meet the demands of poverty lawyers.

50 Preliminary Results: LEAA Event Study Results Treatment Interacted w/ Legal Services LSP & LEAA (1) (2) (3) DV: Police Years -4 to * [0.0132] [ ] [ ] Years 1 to [0.0104] [ ] [ ] Years 4 to e [0.0200] [0.0142] [0.0144] Years 7 to [0.0193] [0.0154] [0.0158] Observations 15,386 15,386 15,386 R-squared Number of Cities

51 Preliminary Results: LEAA Event Study Results Treatment Interacted w/ Legal Services LSP & LEAA (1) (2) (3) DV: Total Crime Years -4 to [0.0335] [0.0143] [0.0140] Years 1 to [0.0140] [0.0106] [0.0105] Years 4 to * [0.0251] [0.0225] [0.0228] Years 7 to [0.0297] [0.0335] [0.0338] Observations 15,386 15,386 15,386 R-squared Number of Cities

52 Preliminary Results: LEAA Event Study Results Treatment Interacted w/ Legal Services LSP & LEAA (1) (2) (3) DV: Violent Crime Years -4 to [0.0761] [0.0473] [0.0427] Years 1 to [0.0251] [0.0211] [0.0186] Years 4 to *** *** *** [0.0401] [0.0295] [0.0306] Years 7 to *** ** ** [0.0528] [0.0441] [0.0472] Observations 15,386 15,386 15,386 R-squared Number of Cities

53 Preliminary Results: LEAA Event Study Results Treatment Interacted w/ Legal Services LSP & LEAA (1) (2) (3) DV: Arrests Years -4 to [0.0399] [0.0391] [0.0366] Years 1 to [0.0235] [0.0295] [0.0235] Years 4 to ** * *** [0.0298] [0.0362] [0.0263] Years 7 to *** ** *** [0.0402] [0.0464] [0.0349] Observations 15,386 15,386 15,386 R-squared Number of Cities

54 BYRNE GRANTS

55 Byrne Grants All Cities Received Grant between Control Group T-Test of Difference ( N =407 ) ( N = 199 ) ( N = 208 ) A. Average Characteristics 1980 Population 107, ,725 52,778 <0.01 Population Per Square Mile Median Age <0.01 Median Income 17,416 15,891 18,875 <0.01 Percent of the Population with 12 or more years of education <0.01 with female head of households <0.01 Black <0.01

56 Byrne Grants All Cities Received Grant between Control Group T-Test of Difference ( N =407 ) ( N = 199 ) ( N = 208 ) A. Average Characteristics 1980 Population 107, ,725 52,778 <0.01 Population Per Square Mile Median Age <0.01 Median Income 17,416 15,891 18,875 <0.01 Percent of the Population with 12 or more years of education <0.01 with female head of households <0.01 Black <0.01

57 Byrne Grants All Cities Received Grant between Control Group T-Test of Difference ( N =407 ) ( N = 199 ) ( N = 208 ) A. Average Characteristics 1980 Population 107, ,725 52,778 <0.01 Population Per Square Mile Median Age <0.01 Median Income 17,416 15,891 18,875 <0.01 Percent of the Population with 12 or more years of education <0.01 with female head of households <0.01 Black <0.01

58 Byrne Grants All Cities Received Grant between Control Group T-Test of Difference ( N =407 ) ( N = 199 ) ( N = 208 ) A. Average Characteristics 1980 Population 107, ,725 52,778 <0.01 Population Per Square Mile Median Age <0.01 Median Income 17,416 15,891 18,875 <0.01 Percent of the Population with 12 or more years of education <0.01 with female head of households <0.01 Black <0.01

59 Byrne Grants All Cities Received Grant between Control Group T-Test of Difference ( N =407 ) ( N = 199 ) ( N = 208 ) B. Average Characteristics Crime Rates (per 1,000 Residents) Total Crime <0.01 Personnel Sworn Police (per 1,000 Residents) <0.01 Drug Arrest Rates (per 1,000 Residents) Total <0.01 Sales <0.01 Possession <0.10 Drug Arrest Rates by Race Black (per 1,000 Black Residents) <0.05 White (per 1,000 White Residents) Drug Sales Arrest Rates by Race Black (per 1,000 Black Residents) White (per 1,000 White Residents) <0.01 Drug Possession Arrest Rates by Race Black (per 1,000 Black Residents) <0.05 White (per 1,000 White Residents)

60 Byrne Grants All Cities Received Grant between Control Group T-Test of Difference ( N =407 ) ( N = 199 ) ( N = 208 ) B. Average Characteristics Crime Rates (per 1,000 Residents) Total Crime <0.01 Personnel Sworn Police (per 1,000 Residents) <0.01 Drug Arrest Rates (per 1,000 Residents) Total <0.01 Sales <0.01 Possession <0.10 Drug Arrest Rates by Race Black (per 1,000 Black Residents) <0.05 White (per 1,000 White Residents) Drug Sales Arrest Rates by Race Black (per 1,000 Black Residents) White (per 1,000 White Residents) <0.01 Drug Possession Arrest Rates by Race Black (per 1,000 Black Residents) <0.05 White (per 1,000 White Residents)

61 Byrne Grants All Cities Received Grant between Control Group T-Test of Difference ( N =407 ) ( N = 199 ) ( N = 208 ) B. Average Characteristics Crime Rates (per 1,000 Residents) Total Crime <0.01 Personnel Sworn Police (per 1,000 Residents) <0.01 Drug Arrest Rates (per 1,000 Residents) Total <0.01 Sales <0.01 Possession <0.10 Drug Arrest Rates by Race Black (per 1,000 Black Residents) <0.05 White (per 1,000 White Residents) Drug Sales Arrest Rates by Race Black (per 1,000 Black Residents) White (per 1,000 White Residents) <0.01 Drug Possession Arrest Rates by Race Black (per 1,000 Black Residents) <0.05 White (per 1,000 White Residents)

62 Byrne Grants All Cities Received Grant between Control Group T-Test of Difference ( N =407 ) ( N = 199 ) ( N = 208 ) B. Average Characteristics Crime Rates (per 1,000 Residents) Total Crime <0.01 Personnel Sworn Police (per 1,000 Residents) <0.01 Drug Arrest Rates (per 1,000 Residents) Total <0.01 Sales <0.01 Possession <0.10 Drug Arrest Rates by Race Black (per 1,000 Black Residents) <0.05 White (per 1,000 White Residents) Drug Sales Arrest Rates by Race Black (per 1,000 Black Residents) White (per 1,000 White Residents) <0.01 Drug Possession Arrest Rates by Race Black (per 1,000 Black Residents) <0.05 White (per 1,000 White Residents)

63 Byrne Grants All Cities Received Grant between Control Group T-Test of Difference ( N =407 ) ( N = 199 ) ( N = 208 ) B. Average Characteristics Crime Rates (per 1,000 Residents) Total Crime <0.01 Personnel Sworn Police (per 1,000 Residents) <0.01 Drug Arrest Rates (per 1,000 Residents) Total <0.01 Sales <0.01 Possession <0.10 Drug Arrest Rates by Race Black (per 1,000 Black Residents) <0.05 White (per 1,000 White Residents) Drug Sales Arrest Rates by Race Black (per 1,000 Black Residents) White (per 1,000 White Residents) <0.01 Drug Possession Arrest Rates by Race Black (per 1,000 Black Residents) <0.05 White (per 1,000 White Residents)

64 Byrne Grants All Cities Received Grant between Control Group T-Test of Difference ( N =407 ) ( N = 199 ) ( N = 208 ) B. Average Characteristics Crime Rates (per 1,000 Residents) Total Crime <0.01 Personnel Sworn Police (per 1,000 Residents) <0.01 Drug Arrest Rates (per 1,000 Residents) Total <0.01 Sales <0.01 Possession <0.10 Drug Arrest Rates by Race Black (per 1,000 Black Residents) <0.05 White (per 1,000 White Residents) Drug Sales Arrest Rates by Race Black (per 1,000 Black Residents) White (per 1,000 White Residents) <0.01 Drug Possession Arrest Rates by Race Black (per 1,000 Black Residents) <0.05 White (per 1,000 White Residents)

65 Byrne Grants Our identification strategy relies on pre-existing trends in crime rates being exogenous from the date of the first grant. There is no statistically significant relationship between crime rates and the date of the first grant.

66 Change in the Crime Rate Byrne Grants Pre-Trend Relationship Between Date of First Byrne Grant and Crime Rates y = x Year of First Grant

67 Results: Byrne Event Study Results Police per 1, Model 1: C & Y Model 2: C & SxY Model 3: C & SxY & Covariates

68 Results: Byrne Event Study Results Police per 1, Model 3: C & SxY & Covariates

69 Results: Byrne Using model 3 estimates, sworn per 1,000 residents increase by 2.4 (.0399/1.6719) percent three years after treatment. Four and five years after treatment, the size of law enforcement is steadily growing. The results are consistent with the grant utilization for additional personnel to conduct wide-spread apprehension of persons in violation of local and state substance abuse laws (U.S. Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1987).

70 Results: Byrne Event Study Results Arrests per 1, Model 3: C & SxY & Covariates

71 Results: Byrne Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) Per 1,000 Residents Violent Crime Total Crime Treated Only Treated Only Years -5 to * [0.339] [0.508] [1.296] [1.234] Years 1 to [0.340] [0.431] [0.866] [1.091] Years 3 to [0.513] [0.699] [1.577] [1.874] Years 5 to [0.713] [1.028] [1.906] [2.375] Observations 11,633 5,698 11,786 5,741 R-squared Number of Cities

72 Results: Byrne Possible explanations for the insignificant post-treatment effects Additional funding, it only represents a small fraction of total expenditures on public safety. Also possible that Byrne grants had spillover implications for nearby untreated cities through the establishment of multi-jurisdictional drug task forces. These multi-jurisdictional drug task forces could increase drug arrest in both treated and nearby untreated cities and the full sample specifications would under estimate the effect of the Byrne Grant Program. Both the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 outlined the grant purposes which included additional personnel, equipment, training, technical assistance, and information for the more widespread apprehension, prosecution, and rehabilitation of person who violate crime and drugs laws (Anti-Drug Abuse Act, Pub.L , 1988). Disparities in incarceration by race stems from aggressive policing strategies in high crime areas where narcotic trafficking occurs outdoors; creating the opportunity for wide-spread apprehension for drug offenses (Johnson et al., 1977). Possibility of heterogeneous treatment effects.

73 Results: Byrne Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Drug Possession Arrest Per 1,000 Residents Total Arrests White Arrests Black Arrests Treated Treated Treated Only Only Only Years -5 to [0.226] [0.228] [0.203] [0.224] [0.669] [0.681] Years 1 to [0.247] [0.289] [0.238] [0.244] [0.788] [0.861] Years 3 to [0.323] [0.363] [0.320] [0.325] [1.026] [1.164] Years 5 to [0.376] [0.438] [0.396] [0.397] [1.400] [1.558] Observations 11,732 5,709 11,400 5,544 11,400 5,544 R-squared Number of Cities

74 Results: Byrne Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Drug Sales Arrest Per 1,000 Residents Total Arrests White Arrests Black Arrests Treated Treated Only Treated Only Only Years -5 to [0.137] [0.166] [0.126] [0.162] [0.336] [0.429] Years 1 to *** 0.416*** [0.141] [0.150] [0.120] [0.111] [0.773] [0.703] Years 3 to *** 0.543*** 0.317* 0.383** [0.170] [0.185] [0.166] [0.172] [0.505] [0.455] Years 5 to * 0.505** 0.527** 0.642** [0.184] [0.219] [0.211] [0.261] [0.536] [0.545] Observations 9,868 5,023 9,524 4,853 9,524 4,853 R-squared Number of Cities

75 Results: Byrne The joint treatment effect in year 1 and 2 indicates a 43 (0.416/0.956) percent increase in drug sales arrest after the first grant is received. Arrest for drug sales increase by 9 percent 3 to 4 years after treatment. The cumulative post-treatment effect implies a 126 (1.2/0.956) percent increase in drug sales arrests 6 years after the first Byrne grant. The post-treatment effects differ dramatically by race. According to column 3, the cumulative post-treatment effect implies a 107 (0.98/0.916) percent increase in drug sales arrests for whites compared to a 44 (1.643/3.708) percent increase in drug sales arrest for blacks in column 5. Evidence that funds were utilized in communities that may have been under policed. However, the policy still could have exacerbated racial disparities in incarceration due to historically high arrest rates for blacks.

76 Results: Byrne Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) Violent Crime Arrest White Arrests Black Arrests Treated Only Treated Only Years -5 to [0.152] [0.226] [0.671] [0.751] Years 1 to * 0.328* [0.139] [0.174] [0.530] [0.644] Years 3 to ** 0.614** [0.169] [0.246] [0.750] [0.886] Years 5 to ** 0.841*** [0.210] [0.321] [0.977] [1.130] Observations 11,554 5,626 11,554 5,626 R-squared Number of Cities

77 R-squared Number of Cities Results: Byrne (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) Per 1,000 White Residents Per 1,000 Black Residents Treated Only Treated Only Treated Only A: Drug Possession Byrne Grants per Capita * (in 2000 dollars) [0.433] [0.434] [0.463] [0.370] [0.367] [0.429] [1.057] [1.122] [1.218] Covariates X X X X X X R-squared B: Drug Sales Arrest Byrne Grants per Capita 0.424*** 0.405*** 0.252** ** 0.808* (in 2000 dollars) [0.157] [0.152] [0.114] [0.185] [0.180] [0.173] [0.452] [0.427] [0.470] Covariates X X X X X X

78 Summary LEAA had minimum influence on crime and arrest rates. Some evidence that enforcement mechanism resulted in lower crime rates but evidence is weak. The implementation of the Byrne Program resulted in an An increase in police hiring, An increase in drug arrests, An increase in white drug arrests However, an increase in black/white relative arrest rates that seems to be driven by an increase in the black/white relative drug arrest rates. The Byrne Program provide evidence that funds were utilized in communities that may have been under policed. However, the policy still could have exacerbated racial disparities in mass incarceration. Although great racial disparities still exist with mass incarceration the current policy debate is related to police use of force.

79 THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME