Strategy Research Project. AWC Fellows. The U.S.- Mexico Partnership: Evaluating Ten Years of the Merida Initiative

Transcription

1 AWC Fellows Strategy Research Project The U.S.- Mexico Partnership: Evaluating Ten Years of the Merida Initiative by Lieutenant Colonel Jason W. Dickerman U.S. Army Under the Direction of: Dr. Karen Feste, Professor and Dr. Craig Bullis While a Fellow at: University of Denver, Korbel School of International Studies United States Army War College Class of 2018 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT: A Approved for Public Release Distribution is Unlimited The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

2 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved--OMB No The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports ( ), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS. 1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) TITLE AND SUBTITLE 2. REPORT TYPE FELLOWS STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT.33 The U.S.- Mexico Partnership: Evaluating Ten Years of the Merida Initiative 6. AUTHOR(S) Lieutenant Colonel Jason W. Dickerman U.S. Army 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Faculty Adviser: Host Institution: Dr. Karen Feste, Professor University of Denver, Korbel School of International Studies 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Faculty Mentor: Dr. Craig Bullis U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Avenue, Carlisle, PA DATES COVERED (From - To) 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution A: Approved for Public Release. Distribution is Unlimited. To the best of my knowledge this FSRP accurately depicts USG and/or DoD policy & contains no classified information or aggregation of information that poses an operations security risk. Author: Mentor: 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES Word Count: ABSTRACT The Merida Initiative, a U.S.-Mexico bilateral security partnership established in 2007 under four pillars (objectives): disrupt transnational organized crime, build rule of law capacity in Mexico, create a border structure, and construct strong and resilient communities, faces new challenges under the current Trump administration. Interviews with twenty-one officials who have worked with the program were conducted to evaluate its decade-long successes and remaining challenges. All respondents agreed that the Merida Initiative should continue, pointing to its achievements such as increased capacity of the Mexican military and programs for at-risk youth, while noting that police professionalization and consolidating the new judicial system, need more attention. On this basis, three recommendations were put forth: (1) consolidating security cooperation with Mexican military and police into a single program; (2) expanding support for Mexican judicial system reform; and (3) implementing a line of effort within the United States to demonstrate that the Initiative is a real partnership, where challenges on the US side of the border are addressed with equal emphasis as those in Mexico. 15. SUBJECT TERMS Security Cooperation, Homeland Defense, Drug Cartels 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE UU UU UU SAR 18. NUMBER OF PAGES 29 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON 19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (w/ area code) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8/98), Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

3 The U.S.- Mexico Partnership: Evaluating Ten Years of the Merida Initiative (7993 words) Abstract The Merida Initiative, a U.S.-Mexico bilateral security partnership established in 2007 under four pillars (objectives): disrupt transnational organized crime, build rule of law capacity in Mexico, create a border structure, and construct strong and resilient communities, faces new challenges under the current Trump administration. Interviews with twenty-one officials who have worked with the program were conducted to evaluate its decade-long successes and remaining challenges. All respondents agreed that the Merida Initiative should continue, pointing to its achievements such as increased capacity of the Mexican military and programs for at-risk youth, while noting that police professionalization and consolidating the new judicial system, need more attention. On this basis, three recommendations were put forth: (1) consolidating security cooperation with Mexican military and police into a single program; (2) expanding support for Mexican judicial system reform; and (3) implementing a line of effort within the United States to demonstrate that the Initiative is a real partnership, where challenges on the US side of the border are addressed with equal emphasis as those in Mexico.

4 The U.S.- Mexico Partnership: Evaluating Ten Years of the Merida Initiative Introduction The United States-Mexico relationship is strategically important for American National security. The long common border, extensive economic, security, and cultural ties between the two countries, makes continued bilateral cooperation a vital component of a holistic homeland defense strategy. This strategy, based on defense in depth, means the United States works together with its neighbor countries to interdict, degrade, and neutralize mutual threats before they can have an affect or influence on the homeland, in order to enhance overall security of North America. Political stability in Mexico and promoting effective democratic institutions in its domestic environment are integral to this policy. America and Mexico reached another crossroads in their relationship when Donald Trump was inaugurated as U.S. President in The new administration has advocated critical changes to key policies that have potential to reduce cooperation and create tension between the two states. For example, constructing a border wall for the purpose of completely stopping illegal immigration and drugs would ultimately reduce security cooperation and trust; the threat to withdraw from the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), established in 1993, could dramatically impact the economic livelihood in both countries; and the elimination of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) protection could jeopardize the lives of thousands of Mexican nationals brought to the U.S. as children and know no other home. These political issues suggest a future American foreign policy based more on American selfinterests than a viable partnership. If the U.S. government values its relationship with

5 Mexico, it means that cooperation is critical to ensure that security challenges are faced together in the context of mutual benefits for both states. Since 2008 the Merida Initiative (MI) has served as the framework for the U.S.- Mexico bilateral security partnership. It has helped strengthen cooperation and build mutual trust between the two countries, yet challenges remain: violence in Mexico is at historic levels, Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs), namely drug cartels, continue to operate with impunity in the face of weak institutions and police forces. The U.S. has committed $2.5 billion through the MI; Mexico has spent more than $100 billion on security and public safety 1, but there has been little progress regarding their mutually stated goals. What accounts for the limited achievements? What are the obstacles preventing a fuller enhancement of joint security objectives? The purpose of this paper is to examine and evaluate the development, goals, effectiveness, and current challenges associated with the Merida Initiative. Primary sources for this effort consisted of more than twenty unstructured interviews with officials who have been involved with the MI program, including active and retired diplomats and military leaders, plus scholarly experts. These perspectives, combined with analysis of congressional testimony, policy assessments, and academic research provided the basis for addressing the issues facing the U.S.-Mexico security partnership. The analysis is organized as follows: a brief background on current problems of security; an overview of the Merida Initiative (history, current programs, areas of success and challenges); an assessment of the factors preventing implementation of Merida plans, and finally, some recommendations offered to shape future policy. 2

6 Current Problems in U.S.-Mexico Relations The bilateral economic relationship between the U.S. and Mexico is important for both countries. Mexico is America s second largest export market and third largest trading partner. 2 In 2016 alone, an estimated $579 billion dollars in legal goods and services were traded. The total amount of trade between the U.S. and Mexico border states alone would constitute the fourth largest economy in the world. Since 1993, and the creation of NAFTA, there has been a six-fold increase in trade between the U.S. and Mexico, with NAFTA-related trade currently supporting five million jobs in the U.S. 3 Forty percent of Mexico s trade is with the United States. The extensive bilateral economic linkage could be threatened by Trump administration proposals to alter the NAFTA agreement, an issue bearing some connection to U.S.-Mexico security issues. In the December 2017 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, President Trump outlined several Priority Actions that could affect our relationship with Mexico. First, the need to reduce drug and human trafficking.deter, disrupt, and defeat potential threats before they reach the United State to include targeting transnational criminal organizations at their source and dismantle their networks of support. 4 Securing the borders and defending the land approaches are key components of U.S. homeland defense strategy. The document specifies that U.S. agencies and foreign partners will target TCO leaders and their support infrastructure, [and] assist countries, particularly in the Western Hemisphere, to break the power of these organizations and networks. 5 3

7 The U.S. southern border continues to be extremely vulnerable to infiltration and exploitation by a host of threats including drug cartels and other TCOs. Despite President Trump s emphasis on building a wall along the border, the most important component of a holistic defense is cooperation with a willing partner who can interdict, degrade, and neutralize threats, before they get to the border. 6 The gravest threat to national security interests in both countries continues to be Mexican drug cartels. These TCOs are the number one suppliers of illegal drugs in the U.S. In 2016, drug overdoses killed approximately 64,000 people setting a new record for the U.S., with fentanyl-related deaths up 540% in past three years. 7 Profits from illegal drugs return an estimated $39-64 billion dollars a year to the TCOs who use these resources to wage war on anyone who would oppose them. 8 This problem has led to over 200,000 homicides in Mexico since 2006, it is estimated that about half are linked to drug cartels. 9 The deadliest year on record in Mexico, 2017, resulted in over 29,000 recorded homicides, a conservative figure based on open investigations, not individual deaths. 10 The Merida Initiative: Progress Overview The genesis of the MI dates back to 2006, shortly after Felipe Calderon was elected President of Mexico. As president-elect, he had his first meeting with President George W. Bush in Washington D.C. that November where he expressed the need for a partner in his fight to improve security in Mexico and asked for America support in this effort. 11 With that, the door opened to build a strong bilateral security relationship focused on a common threat. 12 Approved by the U.S. Congress in late 2008, the Merida Initiative, named after the city in the Yucatan Peninsula where Presidents Bush and 4

8 Calderon met to finalize the framework, ushered in a level of security cooperation between the U.S. and Mexico not seen since World War II. 13 When President Obama took office in 2009, the MI was revised: shifting from security force assistance priorities towards increased support for criminal justice reform and strengthening communities through violence prevention programs. 14 The Trump Administration has not made formal changes to the MI, but the President has signed Executive Orders (Fight TCOs) and (Border Security), signaling an intent and desire to return to a more security-oriented strategy. 15 One of the positive outcomes of the MI, albeit indirectly, has been the positive growth of the military-to-military relationship. The first visit by a senior U.S. Defense official to Mexico was just 25 years ago; the level of trust, cooperation, and mutual understanding that exists in the current partnership developed in just the last ten years in the wake of the MI. 16 In 2017, James Mattis was the first Secretary of Defense to participate in Mexico s Independence Day celebration, another notable first given the historical significance of that day. While mutual military cooperation and trust is the good news story of the MI, possibly the single greatest overarching criticism of the program is the lack of performance measures linked to target dates or specific goals to measure success. 17 There are no publicly available performance measures. Instead, what is highlighted is the amount of funding a program has received or the number of personnel who were trained. These data points are useful but do not provide an adequate understanding to help determine the effectiveness of the overall MI strategy. What appears to be missing is the outcomes. For example, what are the effects of the money invested to build 5

9 capacity? Practitioners acknowledge that outcomes are sometimes hard to determine and that a there may not be a direct correlation between equipment delivered, or training provided, and a set number of arrests, or persecutions, or a marked reduction in crime. However, with each engagement, or delivery of equipment, doors are opened for the possibility of a deeper trusting relationship based on mutual security concerns. 18 These are qualitative outcomes are harder to capture as metrics, but still important. The MI has four pillars that form the overarching framework of the partnership. Each pillar focuses on short and long-term programs to address a particular aspect of security challenges facing the U.S. and Mexico. 19 Pillar One, Disrupt Capacity of Organized Crime to Operate, has mainly focused on combating the drug cartels directly, building security force capacity, establishing intelligence sharing agreements, and providing equipment. 20 America has given more than $590 million dollars to supply the Mexican Military (MEXMIL) and Police with fixed and rotary winged aircraft. These aircraft greatly improved the Mexican security forces ability to conduct operations by extending their range and reach into cartel-controlled areas previously only accessible by land. 21 Communications equipment was installed between ten U.S. and Mexican sister cities allowing law enforcement on both sides of the border to coordinate directly on criminal investigations. 22 Technology transfers and extensive intelligence analysis and forensics training further enhanced Pillar One objectives. One success story, the MEXW34 program, helped the Mexican Army, SEDENA, (Secretaria De la Defensa National), to measure illegal crop eradication efforts via GPS tools, and immediately send results to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the international body that tracks such data. Illegal drug cultivation in 6

10 Mexico is in rugged terrain; accurately measuring the size of fields was often a guessing game in the past, but with MEXW34, markers can be placed around the field to capture precise dimensions. Earlier, information came directly from SEDENA and the results were viewed as unreliable. SEDENA s implementation of MEXW34 is another indication of the strengthening partnership. The single biggest positive effect of the MI and the military-to-military relationship has been the transition from an assistance-based perspective to one of mutual cooperation. 23 NORTHCOM Commander, General Lori Robinson, highlighted in 2017 Congressional testimony that the command s warrior-diplomats and their Mexican counterparts have built trust and confidence through a cooperative partnership. 24 That trust resulted in intelligence sharing efforts that since 2006 has netted over 100 of the top cartel leaders and over 900 extraditions to the U.S., including Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán, the leader of the Sinaloa Cartel. 25 In a broader sense the cooperation has led an evolution of the Mexican military from an internally focused force to one that is willing and increasingly capable of providing security leadership in Latin America. 26 While there continues to be some steady progress, challenges remain with Pillar One efforts. A significant criticism is the militarization of the fight against the cartels. In December 2017 Mexico passed the Internal Security Law (ISL) providing a legal framework for the MEXMIL to continue their law enforcement mission. This law is seen by many, including Human Rights Watch and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, as a mechanism to further justify or solidify the military s role in public security. Critics say the new law risks weakening incentives for civilian police forces to do their job. 27 7

11 Finally, restrictions under the guidelines of the Leahy Amendment, a 2006 Congressional act designed to restrict training of foreign security forces found to be perpetrators of gross human rights violations, continues to impact cooperation efforts. 28 The intent of the law is grounded in sound principles and values, however, uneven implementation and an unclear remediation process for those accused continue to pose challenges. 29 In some cases, whole units are banned from training because one individual from that unit is alleged to have committed a violation. The dilemma facing the U.S. is that some banned MEXMIL units are located in the heart of cartel territory and along the smuggling routes to the U.S. Restrictions on partnering with those units creates a vulnerability gap, and the ineffective remediation process delays the the performance of important tasks. Additional review and refinement of the process is required to return cleared units to training as well as encourage Mexico to seek justice in cases where evidence is presented. While Pillar One enabled rapid growth and a new level of cooperation in the mil-to-mil relationship, obstacles to implementing the expanded and changing roles of security forces under the new justice system remain. Pillar Two, Institutionalize Capacity to Sustain Rule of Law, is focused on raising standards across various criminal justice institutions, helping consolidate the new justice system, police professionalization, and working with Mexico to curb human rights abuses and corruption. 30 Through certification and accreditation based on internationally recognized norms, measurable improvements are evident. For example, following the accreditation of all prisons in the state of Chihuahua, a process which altered the conditions and management of these institutions, homicides fell by 65%, and extortions and kidnappings fell by 90%. 31 8

12 However, human rights abuses and corruption in Mexico continue. Outside of war zones around the world, Mexico was the deadliest place for journalists in 2017: according to Reports without Borders, 12 were killed, most of whom were writing about corruption or cartels. Under Pillar Two, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has focuses on protection mechanisms for journalists and human rights defenders, and helped support the Government of Mexico s development of an action-oriented National Human Rights Plan. Other programs seek to address corruption, but with little success. The National Anti-Corruption System, laws and reforms meant to reduce impunity in corruption-related crimes, has not been put into effect. As of January 2018, three years after approval, the Mexican Senate has yet to name the special prosecutor or fill key vacancies to positions designed to investigate and prosecute misconduct. 32 Police professionalization is a central requirement to achieving the Pillar Two end state, yet without prioritization by Mexican leaders, it continues to be one of the most challenging programs to implement. With over 360,000 police officers spread across 1800 agencies, the scope of the requirement is vast and complex. While there are pockets of excellence across Mexico, most police have not received adequate training. Under the new justice system, police are required to be investigators, but there seems to be a general unwillingness or inability to adapt to this critical role. Previously, the main role of the police was to deter crime, and failing that, to gather witness statements and confessions to support prosecutions. Prosecutors, not police, served as investigators. Under the new system, the police, as first responders to a crime scene, must take ownership of the scene, collect evidence, and work with prosecutors to build 9

13 a case, a process foreign to them. In many instances, police resist this new role and additional duties to collect evidence and support prosecutions, so prosecutors find themselves reverting back to their old roles as investigators, creating additional challenges. 33 In addition to increased requirements under the new justice system, low wages, the lack of an established career path and pension system, and an ineffective disciplinary system, continue to facilitate corruption and slow professionalization efforts. 34 Finally, the U.S. Department of Justice and USAID support for Mexico s transition to a new judicial system are major parts of Pillar Two. Begun in 2008, the transition from an inquisitorial system has been a monumental undertaking, one that started with constitutional reforms, changes to over 450 national and state laws, and a complete overhaul of law school curriculums. June 18, 2016 was the deadline for implementing all reforms, however the lack of continuity in the Mexican Attorney General position has precluded a clear long-term vision or wholesale implementation for the new system. The Mexican government has invested over $1.2 billion in this effort, but there is considerable work required to complete the consolidation phase. USAID has provided nearly $100 million dollars to support training for judges, prosecutors, investigators, defense attorneys, as well as changes to law school curricula and other initiatives focused on educating the public on new system. 35 By one estimate it could take 20 years for the new system to work effectively. 36 In Mexico there are over 1,700 law schools, but there is no standard educational curriculum, nor an entity in Mexico similar to U.S. Bar associations, to set admissions and practice standards for lawyers. Further, many judges, defense attorneys, 10

14 prosecutors, and investigators currently serving are not trained or prepared for their responsibilities under the new system, and a lack of standards for evidence or case review are complicating legal day to day legal proceedings. 37 Consequently, some criminals go free on technicalities making it tempting to sustain corrupt practices to secure convictions. 38 To help address some of these challenges, the U.S. Department of Justice Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training section oversees a ride along program that pairs appellate court judges with their counterparts in Puerto Rico and several U.S. states, to observe how U.S. judges do their job. Appellate court judges are strongly vested in Mexico s old system, so getting their cooperation is critical for long-term success. Pairing them with their peers under this program has helped build trust and provides opportunities to convince key leaders in the Mexican government that there is a need to institutionalize training for the new judicial system. Support to judicial reform provides the U.S. a unique opportunity to effect lasting change in Mexico and is a process through which both countries can better understand each other. Pillar Three, Create a 21st Century Border Structure, is an effort to move away from viewing the border as a geographic line, but as a vibrant, dynamic area that ensures a secure cross flow of goods, services, and people. 39 Programs for training in Non-Intrusive Inspection Equipment as well as the delivery of over 500 canines trained to detect a wide range of substances, are part of the plan. 40 Mexican customs and Inspection capability has increased in key cities away from the actual border, allowing cargo bound for the U.S. to be checked and secured for the final leg of the export 11

15 journey. This procedure has greatly reduced the processing time at ports of entry and allowed agents on both sides of the border to increase searches of other suspicious vehicles and persons. 41 While there has been improvement in inspections of cargo moving north, a lack of infrastructure development at ports of entry on the Mexican side have limited the volume of inspects of cargo moving south, enabling TCOs to move bulk cash shipments and weapons into Mexico with minimal interruption. Mexico s Southern Border Strategy has been key to their overall migration and counter-network policies and a focus for MI funding under Pillar Three. It has served as a mutually beneficial effort that supports Mexico s priority to strengthen their border security, while virtually extending the U.S. border an additional 1,100 miles allowing for the early detection and interdiction of threats. 42 Pillar Four, Build Strong and Resilient Communities, is focused on developing Mexican communities that can survive, thrive, and stand against organized crime. 43 USAID has overseen programs that helped create drug treatment courts in five Mexican states as well as education programs focused on teaching children the importance of the rule of law. The Culture of Lawfulness education programs are now part of junior high school curricula in all Mexican states. While these programs have proven effective at addressing the challenges facing at-risk youth, implementation has only been in three large urban areas, and the national government has yet to take ownership of these initiatives and expand them to other parts of the country

16 The Complex Operating Environment Despite all the progress made across the four MI pillars, conditions in Mexico have not changed substantially over the last ten years. The level of violence in Mexico is at an all-time high, cases of human rights violations are increasing, and corruption and impunity continue to plague Mexico s institutions. 45 What are the key events and terms of reference that shape perceptions and the realities of the conflict in Mexico? At least three important events are notable. 1. The timing of the NAFTA agreement in In the mid-1990s just as NAFTA was enacted, the Mexican cartels began to assume dominance over their rivals in Colombia. Cooperation between the two countries cartels had been expanding as traditional cocaine routes through the Caribbean and Florida were shut down by U.S. law enforcement. Mexico provided an opportunity to keep the drugs flowing with less risk of interdiction given the established drug routes of the Mexican cartels. With NAFTA, the easing of restrictions on trade provided great opportunities for the cartels to get their drugs into the U.S. through the ports of entry. 2. The election of Vicente Fox as the president of Mexico in His party, Partido Accion Nacional (PAN), marked a dynamic shift in the political-criminal nexus that defined the previous 70 years of one-party rule under the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI). 46 During the PRI-era, drug cartels operated with the tacit approval and support of government officials and law enforcement. An elaborate system of bribery and collusion helped maintain a permissive environment with the understanding that as long as some of the money flowed to the PRI and the drugs flowed north, there would be no trouble. This all began to change with the election of Fox and the gradual 13

17 transition of PAN officials into offices and governorships previously held by PRI politicians. This political shift forced the drug cartels to negotiate new deals with new officials and in instances where officials resisted bribes, resort to violence to ensure uninterrupted drug flows. In response to the increased violence, Fox sent the army into several border towns to fight cartels The election of Felipe Calderon as president of Mexico in Once in office he declared war on the drug cartels. He sent the army into some of the most highly contested areas in what became known as the Kingpin Strategy based on the idea that removing the heads of the drug cartels would cause disorganization and thus facilitate dismantlement. This seemed to make sense, but resulted in two side effects: expansion of the number of cartel and splinter criminal groups, and sky-rocketing levels of violence between the army and drug criminals. As top cartel leaders were killed or captured from one group, other groups tried to take over rivals or expand their territory. In 2006, there were four main cartels. A decade later, they have fractured into eight large cartels, with an estimated sixty to eighty smaller drug trafficking gangs. 48 As many of these criminal groups lack direct access to the U.S. drug market, they fight for resources and territory across the country, and have transformed into broader criminal organizations, adding kidnapping, extortion, and oil theft to their activities. The violence and tactics of the TCOs has come with labels such as narco-terrorists or narcoinsurgents, neither of which accurately describe the cartels or their goals, and if used could have serious strategy implications. 49 By definition, these TCOs are neither terrorists nor insurgents. They are not in the drug business to change governments or control terrain for political reasons; their 14

18 goal is to make money. They are willing to use violence against anyone or any group that interferes with that goal, not just the state. In Mexico, only ten percent of deaths attributable to the cartels were state agents, while the preponderance of violence is focused on other cartels, gangs, and civilians who are seen as threats. Paul Kan characterized the conflict as a mosaic cartel war, stating that the conflict of cartels among each other, the conflict within cartels, cartels against the Mexican state, cartels and gangs against the Mexican people, and gangs versus gangs. 50 They are criminal groups engaged in high-intensity crime, using violence to ensure freedom of action and warlike activities to keep themselves in business. 51 Challenges to Implementation Frustrating Mexico s ability to fight this mosaic cartel war is the largely ineffective judicial system. It has been estimated that as many as 75 percent of murders go unsolved. 52 The weak police force is ill-equipped, undertrained, and underpaid further undercutting efforts to stop escalating violence. A low level of trust in the federal police is the reason President Calderon and subsequently President Enrique Pena Nieto (now in office) have relied heavily on the nation s military forces to combat the cartels. 53 Police salaries are as low as $500 a month and at the local level the cartels plata or plomo (literally silver or lead meaning, bribe or bullet ) strategy has led to widespread corruption % of Mexicans viewed corruption as a major problem and in its latest report on corruption, Transparency International ranked Mexico 123 out of 176 countries surveyed on perceptions of corruption, giving them a rating of 30 out of 100, with 0 being Highly Corrupt and 100 being Very Clean. 15

19 The U.S. Side of the Merida Equation The illegal drug trade is a two-way street. Leaders in both the U.S. and Mexico acknowledge this problem and realize that the blame game will not solve it. Former U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson stated, "We Americans must own this problem. It is ours," and [the U.S.] will work with Mexico to refocus assistance on better disrupting the business model of the traffickers. 55 While the U.S. continues to call the MI a partnership, almost all the programs have been focused in Mexico, despite the fact that a good portion of the problem lies squarely in the United States. The U.S. must send a strong signal to Mexico that it is committed to doing more to reduce the demand for drugs, aggressively go after money laundering, and make the hard choices about how to better curb the flow of illegal arms to Mexico. While this has been part of the dialog, incorporating specific language in a revised MI would set the right tone for future cooperation and trust building. As a Mexico officer commented to me in a recent visit, If you look at our history, our relationship has been at its highest points when we put things in writing. 56 Reducing demand through the prohibition strategy has proven ineffective since the U.S. started regulating drugs with the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act of The recent introduction of synthetic opioids like fentanyl has flooded the market with increasingly lethal results. The ease with which these drugs can be purchased on line and delivered through the mail increases the complexity of stopping this increasingly deadly threat. 57 The opioid epidemic public health emergency provides an opportunity to focus on alternative solutions to incarceration such as drug courts and treatment programs. 16

20 Drug courts have proven effective by striking a balance between helping addicts and public safety. In one three-year study, New York state, which implemented drug courts in every county, realized an estimated savings of $254 million in incarceration costs by diverting 18,000 drug offenders into drug courts. Over the 15-year period that drug courts have been operational, New York state has witnessed historic reductions in crime. 58 This is but one recommendation that could support LOE 3. President Trump s Commission on Combating Drug Addiction and the Opioid Crisis provided a host of recommendations that could also be evaluated to support this portion of LOE Money laundering and bulk cash transfers are at the core of TCO operations and should be at the core of LOE 3 efforts. The Mexican cartels bring an estimated $39-64 billion a year from their activities, yet each year barely $1 billion is intercepted. 60 Robert Mazur, a retired DEA agent and certified expert in international money laundering, recommends that the DEA lead a multiagency and multinational effort to put in place undercover money laundering operations at a rate of one operation per year. He assesses that it would take 2-3 years for a solid operation to yield sufficient evidence to do real damage to the cartels. His experience demonstrates that undercover operations are the most likely to succeed given the level of secrecy involved, and estimates that after ten years it would result in a lethal blow to the cartels and send a message to banks and businesses that turn a blind eye to money laundering. 61 Finally, asset seizure should continue to be a major focus in addition to the operations described above. This would continue to go after the thing the cartels value most, their money. A 2016 GAO report highlighted that 70% of guns seized by Mexican authorities between originated in the U.S. 62 Reducing the flow of illegal weapons to 17

21 Mexico is a multifaceted challenge that requires action on several fronts. First, stronger legislation could be drafted to better regulate informal gun sales, but this and other legislative actions have not proven to be politically untenable. With a large number of agencies involved in tackling this challenge, improved partnership between all involved should be emphasized, especially along the border. 63 One concept that has been discussed in at least two research documents, and warrants renewed consideration, is a Joint Inter-Agency Task Force for the South West Border Region. A JIATF-BP (Border Protection) or JIATF-SW (South West), would enable smarter border security through a holistic multi-agency approach to border interdiction. 64 It should be led by the Department of Homeland Security, and loosely modeled after JIATF-South, which has proven to be an effective model in the Caribbean corridor of the drug trade. 65 The main benefit of this task force would be to bring all the disparate agencies that have missions focused on border security under one roof to coordinate border security operations, synchronize priorities, and gain efficiencies with the deployment of critical assets. It would also streamline the request and approval process for use of DoD assets in support of law enforcement. 66 Taking the JIATF concept a step further, the U.S. should consider some level of Mexican military and law enforcement involvement, making at Combined JIATF (CJIATF). It would be another trust building measure and could enhance the current cross-border investigations into money laundering and corruption that are ongoing with DoJ. The CJATF model would harden the existing wall, in its many forms, and ultimately affect a better point defense along the border. After all, if the U.S. cannot defend at a point, then what good is a defense in depth? 67 A CJIATF-SW would 18

22 certainly help improve our point defense at the border, and at a fraction of the cost of a 2,000-mile physical wall. Implementing these or similar initiatives as part of a revised MI will demonstrate stronger U.S. commitment to the bilateral security partnership. Pursuing new policies and strategies to attack the TCO networks on the U.S. side of the border should be given serious consideration in light of the uneven success of the prohibition strategy. The TCOs form the current focal point of the U.S.-Mexico bilateral security partnership, however, the end goal and main effort of the U.S.-Mexico security relationship must be focused on the cooperative defense of North America. While the MI is not a cure-all for what ails the U.S.-Mexico Partnership, it has sustained cooperation through six administrations across four political parties in both countries. It has served to break down barriers to trust, and allowed both sides to address mutual security challenges together. The Merida Initiative framework offers a prudent course of action allowing flexibility for updates and adjustments. Insight From Experts Speaking to practitioners and analysts with direct experience or expert knowledge on Merida Initiative progress, I sought their personal insights and candid views of its value, successes, and challenges. I talked to over twenty professionals that had direct involvement with MI, or had expertise and knowledge of the U.S.-Mexico military-to-military partnership, or had published scholarship related to U.S.-Mexico cooperation. These interviews were designed to gain an understanding of the smoothness and rough spots of the cooperative efforts of the Merida Initiative and to try 19

23 to extract stories and commentary of true feelings. I learned what they thought was working well and why; the major challenges, and their ideas for program improvement. Their responses, without attribution, a deliberate clause to encourage honest straightforward views, have shaped the set of recommendations listed in the concluding section of this paper. Altogether, four general assessments emerged: 1. The Merida Initiative has fostered considerable cooperation and trust in U.S.- Mexican relations. Most respondents stated it was hard to quantify the impact or outcome of certain efforts, but conveyed a strong sense that MI was valuable and should be sustained due its general positive impact. 2. The Merida Initiative is a long-term partnership and thus a long-term approach should be applied to its evaluation. Policy-makers cautioned against using short-term gains to judge MI impact, pointing to time frames, budgets and results. 3. MI success depends on Mexican political will. The desire of the Mexican partner to institutionalize program goals is critical; without clear impetus there will be little progress 4. MI failure can be attributed to priority shifts. Staff turnover in key Mexican government institutions remains a major challenge across various MI programs, reducing cooperation and the ability to carry out long range plans. Priorities change as new leaders and managers come into office. The following points were stressed with respect to specific programs: On Police Professionalization: Public security not a government priority 20

24 According to polling data, public security is not a civil priority, unless respondents have been victims of a crime, then 100 percent of respondents stated that it was a top concern. 68 Police fail to understand their role as investigators under the new judicial system, to the detriment of prosecution efforts, facilitating impunity. Train the trainer programs have not proven effective for police training. Until a credible police force is created, the military will continue to serve as the primary internal security force; precluding their ability to focus on other defense sector priorities and goals. Major Challenges: Low pay, lack of training, and lack of job security all create tremendous obstacles, which facilitate corruption and impunity. Political change often brings turnover of police leadership, reducing incentives to do a good job and facilitating corruption. Lack of tort liability law prevents police leaders from being held responsible for incompetence or negligence. No police pension program reduces incentives for officers to see their work as a lifelong career worthy of their best efforts for fear of being fired and losing their retirement benefits. MI programs focus at the federal level, but the bulk of the work is at state and municipal level, which are the most susceptible to corruption. On judicial system reform: 21

25 A lack of an overarching national plan to bring Mexico on-line with the new judicial system has created a lack of trained judges, defense lawyers, prosecutors, and investigators resulting in uneven implementation of requirements; each jurisdiction progressing at its own pace. MI programs led by DoJ focus at the federal level and USAID work at the state level creating a good examples of interagency cooperation. Mock trials and ride along programs with U.S. counterparts are proving very helpful, but it is estimated that it will take years for system to be fully functional. Major Challenges: Mexico s slow progress on institutionalization requirements to include standardizing law school curriculum and admissions and practice standards for lawyers means slow and uneven implementation of justice. Standards of evidence are not codified into Mexican law, leaves a wide margin for what can and cannot be presented in court. No standards of review: On appeal, how cases are reviewed can be seriously influenced by the old system, to the detriment of defendants. Many judges and lawyers do not understand their obligations under the new system. On Military to military cooperation: New cooperation strategy is focused on building Mexican military into a regional leader with capabilities to support international combined operations. (Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief, Peace Keeping) 22

26 The level of interagency cooperation is personality driven. Turnover of key personnel and a lack of a Chief of Staff at the Embassy leaves interagency cooperation to willing partners, potentially reducing unity of effort and effectiveness. Uneven implementation of Leahy Law vetting, specifically a clear path for remediation are needed. Remediation for those cleared of wrongdoing is slow and continues to frustrate partnerships and reduce trust. Convincing partners to invest in long term sustainment aspects of programs continues to challenge effective use of technology and equipment. On Civil Society, Human Rights, and Transparency Cooperation: USAID uses a local systems approach to address development that involves government, police, private sector and community actors to increase sustainability of their programs. Key programs, while proven successful, have largely only been implemented in Tijuana, Ciudad Juarez, and Monterrey. Providing training and support for the Government of Mexico s development of a proactive human rights protection plan as well as protection mechanisms for threatened actors continues to be a major focus. Major Challenges: With limited budgets and personnel, current MI programs concentrate in the northern part of Mexico because it is assessed that outcomes in those areas will have the greatest impact on U.S. citizens. 23

27 Mexican officials seem reluctant to implement sustainable programs in other areas of the country. Government of Mexico is slow to fully implement the requirements of the National Anti-Corruption System Recommendations For Future Policy and Strategy The current four-pillar Merida Initiative framework has been the focus of the U.S.- Mexico partnership for the last five years. Based on views from experts, some revision of the MI is in order. The following recommendations carry over some current MI efforts, consolidating other programs to encourage interagency cooperation, and introduce new focus areas, all designed to enhance the bilateral security partnership while reducing threats to prosperity and stability on both sides of the border. Pillars are replaced by following Lines of Effort (LOEs): Synchronization of military and police training that returns the police to primacy for internal security; support to Mexico s consolidation of the new judicial system and renewed emphasis on challenges on the U.S. side of the border. Corresponding Lines of Operation (LOOs) outline key initiative required to achieve the end states of each LOE. First Line of Effort: Building a Defense in Depth. This LOE brings together of the Department of Defense and Department of Justice security programs under one roof to enhance synchronization and coordination of defense capacity building and intelligence sharing with Justice-led police professionalization programs. The intent is for the DoD and the DoJ to co- lead this LOE to ensure unity of effort and unity of action to reach the end state: A professional, competent Mexican police force reassuming its 24

28 primacy for internal security, with a stronger, more capable defensive-focused military serving as a regional leader and focused on its traditional roles. Line of Operation 1: Military-to-Military Cooperation. Programs and training should focus on the following: 69 Domain Awareness: Force modernization, improved command and control, and expanding regional intelligence sharing and interoperability. Domain Control: Port security and military police professionalization, develop enhanced protocols, operational procedures, and interoperability; participate in combined exercises Capability Projection: Increase participation in regional initiatives and exercises, develop enhanced capability to support Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations as well as contribute to multinational UN operations. Improve the Vetting Process: Expanded training and streamlined processes for vetting and remediation of accused personnel and units. Line of Operation 2: Police Professionalization. Programs and Training should focus on the following: Information campaign directed at Mexican leaders stressing the importance of implementing necessary changes to the law enforcement institution (wages, pension, career path, etc.) Exchange or partnership programs between US agencies and Mexican leaders showing how a professional police force conducts investigations, and assists prosecutors in bringing criminals to trial. 25

29 Expanded training programs that build investigative, forensics, interview and interrogation skills and military tactics and techniques training for specialized units Second Line of Effort: Judicial System Consolidation. This LOE will incorporate efforts from the current pillars two and four. Ensuring effective and timely consolidation of the new judicial system is critical to reestablishing public trust in the rule of law and combating impunity. Equally critical will be law enforcement s ability to support the judiciary, respect human rights, and promote transparency in all its actions. The end state for this LOE: The consolidation of a Mexican judicial system that delivers fair and impartial justice, supported by competent law enforcement agencies that protect human rights and promote transparency. Line of Operation 1: Institutionalize Training of Justice System Stakeholders. Establish an Information Campaign to encourage Mexican leaders to institutionalize training Maintain and expand Partnership Programs that help train and educate judiciary stakeholders. Line of Operation 2: Establish Universal Standards. Work with Mexican leaders to standardize law school curriculums. Work with Mexican leaders to establish accreditation standards. Help Mexico establish Rules of evidence, case review, and a judicial record keeping system. Line of Operation 3: Promote Transparency and Human Rights Encourage Mexican leaders to fully implement the requirements of the National Anti-Corruption System 26