Charmian J.M. GOH Research Assistant, Asian Migrations Cluster, Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore

Transcription

1 Charmian J.M. GOH Research Assistant, Asian Migrations Cluster, Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore Within the Migrating Out of Poverty Research Project Consortium, Charmian Goh conducts research on the Migration Industry for domestic workers in Singapore and the formulation of the Day-Off policy. Besides migration, her research interests include the sociology of inequalities, deviance, and futures. Brenda S.A. Yeoh Dept. of Geography, National University of Singapore Brenda S.A. Yeoh is Professor (Provost s Chair), Department of Geography, as well as Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, National University of Singapore. She is also the Research Leader of the Asian Migration Cluster at the Asia Research Institute, NUS. Her research interests include the politics of space in colonial and postcolonial cities and she also has considerable experience working on a wide range of migration research in Asia, including key themes such as cosmopolitanism and highly skilled talent migration; gender, social reproduction and care migration; migration, national identity and citizenship issues; globalising universities and international student mobilities; and cultural politics, family dynamics and international marriage migrants. She has published widely in these fields. Abstract Managing Low-skilled Labour Migration in Singapore 17 December 2015 Singapore is singled out as an archetype of a country that operates high numbers low rights policies toward low-skilled migrants in the trade-off between numbers and rights (Ruhs and Martin 2006). Indeed, Singapore has long depended on low-skilled labour migrants to fuel its economic growth and restructuring. Relying on low-skilled migrants eases the upward pressure on wages, contributes to the competitiveness of Singapore s economy, and transcends the local limits on economic growth. Despite slowing rates of growth, 38.1% of the total labour force in 2015 comprised foreign workers, of which construction workers and domestic workers formed the two largest groups. While low-skilled labour migrants are regulated by a use-and discard contract labour system that enshrines their transience, new developments signal an overall shift in Singapore s policy toward calibrated numbers and increasing rights for migrants. Using the migration industry for domestic workers along the Indonesia-Singapore corridor as a case study, we interrogate the brokerage interface of regulation and also the salient policy questions contract labour migration raises. We examine the costs imposed on workers through the work of brokers as well as regulations designed to protect them.

2 MANAGING LOW-SKILLED LABOUR MIGRATION IN SINGAPORE CHARMIAN GOH AND BRENDA YEOH

3 SINGAPORE S CONTEXT Year Total Labour Force Total Foreign Workforce (High and Low Skilled) ,892 20, % of Foreign Workers (High and Low Skilled) Construction workers (24%) and domestic workers (17%) form the largest groups in the foreign workforce. Sources: National Population and Talent Division (2015); Ministry of Manpower (2015) ,077, , ,537, , ,192, , ,135,900 1,088, ,530,800 1,345,

4 SINGAPORE S CONTEXT Singapore has depended on low-skilled labour migrants to fuel its economic growth and restructuring historically. Labour demands of an export-led industrialization programme and rapid economic growth in the first two decades Subsequently, the recession of the mid- 1980s prompted a shift toward a knowledgebased economy. (Yeoh 2013, Kaur 2010; Coe and Kelly 2000).

5 SINGAPORE S CONTEXT The high demand for migrants in sectors such as manufacturing, construction, marine industries, and domestic work stems primarily from the unwillingness of Singaporeans to engage in manual labour or shift work. This demand is likely to increase with a. Increasing educational and socio-economic levels of Singaporeans b. Limited labour productivity Relying on low-skilled labour migrants contributes to Singapore s economic growth.

6 SINGAPORE S MIGRATION REGIME The state enshrines the transience of low-skilled migrant workers through a use-and-discard contract labour system Together, these measures regulate the inflows of migrants according to domestic market conditions without imposing on Singapore unbearable, long-term social and political costs (Devashayam 2010, Kaur 2007, Pang 1992). Work permit system Dependency ceiling Foreign worker levy

7 SINGAPORE S MIGRATION REGIME Work permit system Tied to a one or two-year contract with a specific employer and occupation Ensures easy repatriation Multiple restrictions including: Suppression of family formation a social quarantine (Teo and Piper 2009) Regular medical examinations Work permit system Dependency ceiling Foreign worker levy

8 SINGAPORE S MIGRATION REGIME Dependency ceiling (quota) Depends on the sector-specific ratio of local to foreign workers Foreign worker levy To ensure that the wages for each foreign worker reflect labor market conditions and not simply the marginal cost of hiring foreign workers (Low 1995: 753) Nudges employers toward hiring skilled foreign workers Additional costs borne by employer Work permit system Dependency ceiling Foreign worker levy

9 NUMBERS VS RIGHTS: TRADE-OFFS AND GUEST WORKER PROGRAMS NUMBERS RIGHTS Trade-off between the number and rights of migrants employed in low-skilled jobs in highincome countries (Ruhs and Martin 2006, 2008) More rights for migrants, higher costs for employers, who reduce their demand for lowskilled labour. Singapore as an archetype of high numberslow rights

10 LOWER NUMBERS, BETTER RIGHTS?

11 IT S COMPLICATED

12 MIGRATION INDUSTRY Having considered the context and migration regime of Singapore, we now turn to the middle space of migration where brokerage and recruitment occur (Lindquist, Xiang and Yeoh 2012) as an acknowledgement of how intertwined source and destination country migration policies are Using a case study of the migration industry along the Indonesia-Singapore corridor for prospective domestic workers, we consider the gendered debt regime (Lindquist 2010, 2012) that prospective domestic workers enter into, as well as the effects of subsequent migration management on women.

13 MIGRATION INDUSTRY A domestic worker s loan comprises 2 components: 1. Placement fee (minimum 13.9 million Rp ~ S$1400) 2. Agency fee (around S$1000) According to the Employment Agencies Act, the employment agent can only charge each domestic worker up to 1 month of her salary per year. So for a two-year contract, each domestic worker can be charged up to 2 months of her salary. Costs snowball along the recruitment pathway

14 MIGRATION INDUSTRY Transfer of payments Brokers finance a domestic worker s loan until the employer shoulders it Payment arrangements between the Singaporean employment agent and the Indonesian training centre tend to be highly variegated and based on trust. Domestic workers are sometimes charged usurious interest rates of up to 54%.

15 MIGRATION INDUSTRY In the case of Indonesian domestic workers, regular migration amounts to a protracted salary deduction period. Many of these bureaucratic requirements as well as costs arise from the Indonesian authorities impulse to protect their citizens. As such, some domestic workers have opted to circumvent these procedures altogether in order to avoid the predations of gate keepers who extract money, both official and unofficial, at every stage of the migration process (Hugo 2009). Ethically inclined agents facilitate their migration on the grounds that these workers salaries would only be deducted for 3 months. While Indonesian authorities may consider such routes as irregular migration, these migrants are usually considered legal direct hires in Singapore.

16 CONCLUDING THOUGHTS Brokerage and the migration industry impinges heavily on the numbers vs rights trade-off Brokerage is necessary to move large numbers of migrants, but also exacts a cost from migrants Costs accrue for domestic workers because of source countries attempts to protect their workers Does this onus to secure migrants rights fall disproportionately on sending countries? What is the role of destination countries? This case study compels us to reconsider innovative ways of balancing the numbers and rights of migrants across state/ market, formal/ informal, and regular/ irregular distinctions.