EUROPEAN VALUES AND CYPRUS ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION BETWEEN OPTIMIST EXPECTATIONS AND DISENCHANTMENT WITH ETHNO POLITICAL CONFLICT

Transcription

1 ROMANIAN REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, VI, 1, 2014 EUROPEAN VALUES AND CYPRUS ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION BETWEEN OPTIMIST EXPECTATIONS AND DISENCHANTMENT WITH ETHNO POLITICAL CONFLICT Laura M. Herța Abstract: The article explores the evolution of the EEC/EU relations with Cyprus and uses constructivist interpretations to show the potential for norm internalization and appropriation of European values. The main objective of the article is to analyze whether the attitude, reactions and efforts of two main international institutions, the United Nations and the European Union, contributed to the lack of conflict resolution in the Cyprus dispute. The chief aims herein are to problematize whether the UN and the EU non deliberately contributed to the frozen Cyprus conflict, thus leading to the transference of a protracted ethno political conflict into the European Union, and to investigate the correlation between the relevance of borders in the social and political dynamic in Cyprus and the development of EU Cyprus relations. Key words: ethno political conflict, European Union, United Nations, social constructivism, Cyprus Introduction The main objective of the article is to analyze whether the attitude, reactions and efforts of the international community contributed to the lack of conflict resolution in the Cyprus dispute. The term international community is controversial in International Relations (IR) literature 1, but, Laura Maria Herța holds a PhD in History and is currently Lecturer in International Relations within the Department of International Relations and American Studies, Faculty of European Studies, and member of the Centre for African Studies (Babeș Bolyai University). Contact: laura.herta@euro.ubbcluj.ro 1 The controversy is built around the following questions: who constitutes the international community? What does it stand for? Is it the totality of states or actors within world politics? Or is it more than a structure comprising different elements (i.e. the sum of its components)? The latter view indicates the existence of norms, rules that regulate behaviours and shape interactions at the international level. According to such a Constructivist view, the international community is not solely represented by states or material factors, but also by ideational factors, norms, rules and shared knowledge. Within

2 24 Laura M. Herța according to the structure and research design of this article, we herein include two major actors which represented the international community when addressing the Cyprus peacemaking efforts, namely the United Nations (UN) and the European Community/European Union (EEC/EU). The pivotal aims of the article are: to problematize whether the UN and the EU non deliberately contributed to the frozen Cyprus conflict and to investigate the correlation between the relevance of borders in the social and political dynamic in Cyprus and the development of EU Cyprus relations 2 The structure of the article is tailored around two chief research questions focused on the Cyprus case study: May traditional peacekeeping result in a deadlock in conflict resolution? And, if so, is the Cyprus dispute relevant in this respect? What constituted the gap between the optimist expectation of Cyprus s accession to EU (i.e. re unification) and the disenchantment with the frozen ethno political conflict? this understanding there is a shift from what Realists call the international system to what English School theoreticians coined as an international society. According to the Liberal view in IR, the international community is correlated to cooperation among actors (which are both states and international institutions) and to international regimes. According to this view, the increasing interactions between actors and the globalization of world affairs lead to a compound of complementary and mutually reinforcing international organizations (such as EU, NATO, OSCE, UN) that promote peace. According to the traditional view or to the Realist theorizing, the international community is represented by major powers. According to the Neorealist perspective, the anarchy that prevails within the international system determines the proclivity of states for self help and the ubiquity of conflict. So, the argument is that strong states (and here strength translates via military power) actually decide the agenda of the international community and weak states bandwagon. According to the Marxist views in International Relations, the international community is a term used by the Western discourse in order to promote the interests and justify the decisions of the United States and its allies. Also, the argument says that the term rarely refers to the will of the majority of states or the UN General Assembly for example. Instead, it is used by strong, developed states who often try to legitimize their neo imperialist behaviour by employing the term international community. 2 The part of the article which concentrates on the role of the EU was previously presented at the 12 th international conference European Culture (Barcelona, October 2013), under the title European values and Cyprus accession to the European Union Between optimist expectations and disenchantment with frozen conflict.

3 European Values and Cyprus Accession to the European Union UNFICYP and Cyprus perpetuating internal division In a previous article, we tackled the role of the United Nations in addressing the peacemaking in Cyprus and we focused on the role of the UN mission in Cyprus, UNFICYP (United Nations peace keeping mission in Cyprus). 3 The main argument supported therein was that the UNFICYP has become the archetype of traditional peace keeping operations (PKOs), but it also contributed to the separation of the two communities. In a brief reiteration of major claims, we only mention that the UN mission was successful in de escalating the dispute from violence to separation. Also, keeping the peace proved to be successful as far as the essentials of PKO s are concerned, but it also non deliberately weakened the efforts for making the peace, namely achieving conflict resolution. The 1960 Constitution, which marked the existence of independent Republic of Cyprus (hereinafter RoC), was not constructed in a way that would instil a common Cypriot identity 4 and was based on the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Alliance (among Great Britain, Greece and Turkey) and the Treaty of Establishment, which provided for military intervention by Britain, Turkey or Greece to guarantee the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. 5 Therefore, Cyprus s independence was dependent on outside powers and was instantiated in its internal bi communal character. In fact, the two communities in Cyprus shaped and strengthened their respective communal identities even prior to independence and the power sharing arrangement from 1960 (with its ratio system and power allocation of 7:3) fortified ethnic identities, but did not help construct loyalties to a wider or more abstract state identity. There is no surprise, then, that the Republic of Cyprus was functional only for three years, between 1960 and 1963, and even these years were marked by an uneasy power sharing between the Greek and 3 See Laura Maria Herța, Peacekeeping and (Mis)management of Ethnic Disputes. The Cyprus Case, in Studia Europaea, LVII, 3, 2012, pp Susanne Baier Allen, The Failure of Power Sharing in Cyprus. Causes and Consequences, in Ulrich Schneckener, Stefan Wolff (eds.), Managing and Settling Ethnic Conflicts, London: Hurst & Company, 2004, p Ronald J. Fisher, Cyprus: The Failure of Mediation and the Escalation of an Identity Based Conflict to an Adversarial Impasse, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 38, no. 3, May, 2001, p. 310.

4 26 Laura M. Herța Turkish Cypriot communities. 6 The result was inter communal strife and bloody encounters between members of the two groups which erupted in 1963, indicating the constitutional breakdown and leading to displacement of hundreds of Greek Cypriots and the creation of Turkish Cypriots enclaves. The increasing level of violence led to the deployment of United Nations peacekeeping troops on the island (UNFICYP/the United Nations Force in Cyprus). Oddly enough, as Oliver P. Richmond emphasized, the UN force was often overwhelmed in the period 1964 to 1974 in its actions among the mixed population and the image of impartiality was jeopardized by the perceptions and different views regarding its objectives. After the events of 1974, the situation ironically eased somewhat, as the force was now simply to patrol the demarcation line between the two sides and concentrate on its humanitarian role. 7 According to the author, since the 1960 s, there has been much concern that UNFICYP, while fulfilling its mandate of preventing violence and providing suitable conditions for negotiations to take place, has also created a comfortable stalemate and provided one or both parties with a lessened incentive to settle the problem. 8 Writing about the UN peacekeeping operation in Cyprus, James Stegenga was already anticipating in 1970 that UNFICYP (United Nations Force in Cyprus) may have been successful in calming the tension and reducing the violence, but the unintended consequence might prove to be reducing also the sense of urgency about seeking solutions. 9 Therefore, the author claimed, UNFICYP, with all its admittedly salutary effects and humanitarian contributions, may actually have helped to accentuate and prolong the division, consolidate the unhappy stalemate, and inhibit the honourable and lasting settlement Baier Allen, op. cit., p Oliver P. Richmond, Mediating in Cyprus: The Cypriot Communities and the United Nations, Great Britain: Bookcraft Ltd., 1998, pp. xxiii. 8 Ibidem, p. xxiv. 9 James A. Stegenga, UN Peace Keeping: The Cyprus Venture, Journal of Peace Research, 7:1, Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, 1970, pp Ibidem.

5 European Values and Cyprus Accession to the European Union In a previous article 11 we argue that, despite its efforts to reach a peaceful solution to the conflict, the United Nations, through the presence of UNFICYP and its subsidiary tasks, actually contributed to the preservation of internal borders. According to Anastasiou, observers of the Cyprus phenomenon have noted that while the separation of people by natural barriers [...] is understandable, the separation that occurs along artificial lines of hostility is horrifying and therefore one could easily conclude that the borders are not just geographic, but they are sometimes the very enemies of communication and interaction. 12 Our main conclusion is that the positive consequences of the deployment of UN peace keeping troops were undermined by unintended negative outcomes. On the positive side, the UNFICYP achieved the following: its very presence constituted a pivotal deterrent the use of persuasion managed to prevent the killings and attacks that might have occurred events could be verified and supported by the personnel s testimonies and later included in the official reports acted as a neutral third eye or third party presence and hence the emergence of distorted, biased versions of events was discouraged provided counterweight for potential extreme reactions generated by the mental borders separating the two identity groups However, the unintended negative outcomes of UNFICYP are the following: UN presence accommodated old mental borders by acknowledging the ethnic separation The UNFICYP maintained the status quo which consisted of existing internal borderlines UN stabilization, immediately achieved in Cyprus, in many respects froze the conflict, allowing disputants to lose devotion in the mediation process. 11 Herța, op. cit., pp Harry Anastasiou, Communication across Conflict Lines: The Case of Ethnically Divided Cyprus, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 39, no. 5, September, 2002, p. 582.

6 28 Laura M. Herța UNFICYP was not perceived as a challenge to tear down the walls separating the communities UNFICYP secured the pathways and checkpoints the peacekeeping personnel were perceived as gate keepers which also contributed to a stalemate in Cyprus. When analyzing the role of UNFICYP the main argument is built around the following normative dilemma: in trying to safeguard and assist the internally displaced persons the UN force also helped strengthen the ethnic separation. Basically, the result was the re contextualization of old mental borders and the flawed aspect of the peace keeping force derives from the following colliding issues: successfully keeping the peace but separating the two parties from each other and from the making of peace which means settling the problem on the long run. Development of EU Cyprus relations The Republic of Cyprus entered into association with the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973 and this followed the Association Agreement signed in The essence of this relationship was economic, but entailed political and strategic motivations: the necessity of reaching stability in the Mediterranean area (implicitly in Cyprus as well) offered prospects for securing the European Community. At that time, the EC negotiated with the internationally recognized government of Cyprus (i.e. Greek Cypriots) and adopted a policy of neutrality towards each community on the island [which] was a stance that would become prominent in the EU s strategy and thinking towards Cyprus in the future. 13 The agreement, dealing mostly with issues of trade, was complemented by a protocol concluded in 1987, providing the framework for EU Cyprus relations. 14 A Customs Union Agreement between Cyprus 13 George Christou, The European Union and Enlargement. The Case of Cyprus, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, p Marc Andre Gaudissart, Cyprus and the Long Road to Accession apud Olga Demetriou, EU and the Cyprus Conflict. Review of the Literature, in Working Papers Series in EU Border Conflicts Studies, no. 5, January 2004, United Kingdom: The University of Birmingham, p. 6.

7 European Values and Cyprus Accession to the European Union and the EEC was reached by 1987 and became part of the accession process during the In July 1990 the Republic of Cyprus applied for EEC membership and the application was presented to the European Council by the Greek Cypriots acting on behalf of the RoC. In 1993 the European Commission considered Cyprus eligible for membership and, in expectation of progress on the political front, confirmed that the European Union was ready to start the process with Cyprus that should lead to its eventual accession. 16 At this point, as far as the European Union was concerned, Cyprus represented a potential candidate but also a country divided between two communities and separated by an internal division line secured by the UNFICYP (ever since 1964). Therefore, an unsolved ethnopolitical conflict was still looming behind the application for membership. As far as the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communal leaderships were concerned, the accession of Cyprus to the EU was perceived in two different ways: on the one hand, as a solution to the Cyprus conflict that would ensure that the new status of Cyprus as EU member would override the ethnic split and, on the other hand, as simply illegal because it overwrites the Cypriot constitution of 1960 that requires both communities on the island to agree before the state can join any other state. 17 The crucial decision to be taken was whether to accept a unilateral application to EU and the centre of attention was placed on the intertwining of EU membership with the resolution of the conflict. At that time there was will to incorporate both communities in the workings of a future common state that would operate within the EU. 18 Also, there was hope that the road to accession (and its inherent positive prospects) would trump particularistic communal interests. But when analysing the decision retrospectively, we could argue that the acceptance of a unilateral application (which represented the southern part of the island and which was criticized by the 15 See Demetriou, EU and the Cyprus Conflict. Review of the Literature, p. 6; Christou, op. cit., pp Doga Ulas Eralp; Nimet Beriker, Assessing the Conflict Resolution Potential for the EU: The Cyprus Conflict and Accession Negotiations, Security Dialogue, vol. 36(2), 2005, p Olga Demetriou, EU and the Cyprus Conflict. Review of the Literature, p Idem, EU and the Cyprus Conflict. Perceptions of the Border and Europe in the Cyprus conflict, in Working Papers Series in EU Border Conflicts Studies, no. 18, June, United Kingdom: The University of Birmingham, 2005, p. 8.

8 30 Laura M. Herța northern part) already indicated less incentives for the Greek Cypriots to compromise and more sticks for the Turkish Cypriot community, which was perceived as more intransigent. Also, it diluted the focus on the settlement of the conflict since the resolution of the dispute was not highlighted as pre condition for accession. In 1994 the European Council announced that Cyprus becomes part of the next phase of the enlargement, at its Corfu Summit, and reiterated the decision to initiate talks with the Republic of Cyprus, at its Essen Summit. In 1995 Cyprus suitability for membership was decided. 19 In 1997 at the European Council meeting in Luxembourg the decision to start accession talks was taken and negotiations began in Concomitantly to this evolution in EU Cyprus relations, Turkey was denied candidate status to EU accession while Turkish Cypriots withdrew from UN negotiations and demanded the suspension of talks with Greek Cypriots. A joint declaration of Turkey and TRNC (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) emphasized that: the EU has disregarded international law and the Agreements on Cyprus by deciding to open negotiations with the Greek Cypriot administration of Southern Cyprus and has dealt a blow to the efforts for a solution. 20 In 1999 at the European Council meeting in Helsinki two decisions prevailed and they were meant to pressure for settlement. On the one hand, Turkey s candidacy was granted and new prospects for EU Turkey relations were induced. On the other hand, in contrast to the Luxembourg decision wherein the EU s hope for a final solution to the dispute and the accession of the whole island was stressed, at the Helsinki meeting a solution was preferred before accession (but not specified as mandatory). Moreover, the Union indicated that as long as the failure to reach such a solution did not fall onto the shoulders of the Greek Cypriot side, Cyprus 19 Doga Ulas Eralp; Nimet Beriker, op. cit., p See also, Demetriou, EU and the Cyprus Conflict. Review of the Literature, p. 7; Demetriou, EU and the Cyprus Conflict. Perceptions of the Border and Europe in the Cyprus conflict, p. 9; Olga Demetriou, The EU and the Cyprus Conflict. The View of Political Actors in Cyprus, in Working Papers Series in EU Border Conflicts Studies, no. 9, July, United Kingdom: The University of Birmingham, 2004, p. 7; Nathalie Tocci, The EU and Conflict Resolution. Promoting peace in the backyard, London and New York: Routledge, 2007, p Quoted in Doga Ulas Eralp; Nimet Beriker, op. cit., p. 183.

9 European Values and Cyprus Accession to the European Union could accede before a solution. 21 According to the specific clause, the European Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the completion of the accession negotiations, the Council s decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition. 22 As Doga Ulas Eralp and Nimet Beriker argued, the result was that, in fact, this was the moment when the EU delinked membership and the requirements for a settlement to the conflict. 23 By the years , Cyprus accession process was launched and conducted by the Greek Cypriot RoC [while] the Turkish Cypriots were excluded from the process 24 and this development was strengthened by the statement of Günter Verheugen, Chief of Enlargement of the EU Commission. In an address delivered to the UK House of Commons, he assured that the RoC would be accepted by 2004, even if no solution for to the conflict was found. 25 In 2002, at the European Council meeting in Copenhagen, divided Cyprus was invited to join the Union and in 2003 the Republic of Cyprus signed the Accession Treaty. 26 Finally, on 1 st of May 2004, Cyprus became member of the EU, thus importing a frozen ethno political conflict into the Union. The whole island joined the EU but the acquis communautaire would remain suspended in the north. 27 Other major events occurred in First of all, in February Tassos Papadopoulos won the presidential elections in the RoC and replaced Glafkos Clerides. Then, in April the crossing points on the Green Line were 21 Demetriou, EU and the Cyprus Conflict. Perceptions of the Border and Europe in the Cyprus conflict, p Quoted in Christou, op. cit., p Doga Ulas Eralp; Nimet Beriker, op. cit., p Cf. Tocci, op. cit., p Doga Ulas Eralp; Nimet Beriker, op. cit., p See details in Tocci, op. cit., pp ; Demetriou, EU and the Cyprus Conflict. Perceptions of the Border and Europe in the Cyprus conflict, p. 9; Christou, op. cit., pp Although the entire island joined the Union, under Article 3 of Protocol 10 to the 2003 Accession Treaty: ʺThe application of the acquis shall be suspended in those areas of the Republic of Cyprus in which the Government of the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control.ʺ See European Parliament, Working Document on the Commission proposal for a Council regulation on special conditions for trade with those areas of the Republic of Cyprus in which the Government of the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control, , [

10 32 Laura M. Herța open for the first time ever since 1974 and this was perceived as a major concession from the Turkish Cypriot leadership. But, as Engin Karatas showed, real political change in Turkish Cypriot politics and policy began in December 2003 when the pro solution party led by Mehmet Ali Talat, whose promise had been to reunite the island, won the parliamentary elections in the TRNC. In parallel to this development, in Turkey Erdogan had successfully transformed Turkey s sacrosanct dogmas on the conflict and had weakened the position of the military circles, consolidating Turkish backing of the Annan Plan. 28 All these led to the resurrection of the Annan Plan on 24 January 2004, when Erdogan asked Annan to relaunch negotiations to reach an agreement before 1 May The Annan plan was revised five times and came to public vote on April 24, As Nathalie Tocci observed, while Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots were shifting towards moderation in , the Greek Cypriots turned to nationalism and intransigence. 30 The referenda took place in both communities and the results were a huge blow to conflict resolution optimists. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus accepted the plan (65%) while 76% of people in the Republic of Cyprus rejected it. Optimist expectations and disenchantment with ethno political conflict One theme pertaining to the expectations of the European Union was that the EU, acting as important international actor, would work to catalyse a solution to the conflict through the accession process. As Christou underlined, ever since 1993 the EU institutions have reiterated the view that the accession process could act as a catalyst for the solution of 28 Engin Karatas, The Politics of Accession, in James Ker Lindsay; Hubert Faustmann; Fiona Mullen (eds.), An Island in Europe. The EU and the Transformation of Cyprus, London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2011, pp Ibidem. For relevant political analyses on the Annan Plan, see also Andrekos Varnava; Hubert Faustmann (eds.), Reunifying Cyprus. The Annan Plan and Beyond, London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2009, pp On precise legal aspects of the Annan Plan, see also Frank Hoffmeister, Legal Aspects of the Cyprus Problem. Annan Plan and EU Accession, Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Tocci, op. cit., p. 37.

11 European Values and Cyprus Accession to the European Union the Cyprus issue. The EU has consistently argued that both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots could benefit from the accession process if a solution was found before Cypriot s entry to the EU family. 31 The optimist expectation was that the catalyst role of the EU would be complementary to the peace plans designed under UN auspices and thus both international actors would trigger a solution to the Cyprus conflict. The result was not envisioned by the optimists. Olga Demetriou argued that the theorists of catalysis chose a perfect metaphor: the process was speeded up, the catalyst remained unaffected by the process, and the end result did not substantially differ from its slow process alternative. 32 The optimist belief of the European Union was based on the following assumptions: de facto division between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots could be turned into de jure unity facilitated by the accession to the EU identification with the EU as a larger entity would trigger the overall society in Cyprus to commit to universal and European values and would assure the construction of a common Cypriot civic identity intense interactions with EU institutions would enhance a process of norm internalization and European values assimilation (both echoing peace, i.e. peaceful resolution of conflict, security, prosperity) A strong belief was correlated to the core European values, which are capable of activating behavioural change and compliance, once states, elites, communities are drawn to them. The result would indicate the distancing from intransigent attitudes of the two Cypriot communities and a genuine and gradual attraction to and appropriation of European identity, European values, and all its implicit aggregated attributes. This optimist 31 Christou, op. cit., p Demetriou, EU and the Cyprus Conflict. Perceptions of the Border and Europe in the Cyprus conflict, p. 5.

12 34 Laura M. Herța belief is visible in the Commission Opinion on the Application by the Republic of Cyprus for Membership: Until recent years the diplomatic efforts conducted under United Nations auspices to bring about a mutually acceptable institutional solution had been blocked by the intransigence of both sides [...] Cyprusʹs geographical position, the deep lying bonds which, for two thousand years, have located the island at the very fount of European culture and civilization, the intensity of the European influence apparent in the values shared by the people of Cyprus [...] all these confer on Cyprus, beyond all doubt, its European identity and character and confirm its vocation to belong to the Community. 33 One chief objective of the Treaty on European Union was to enhance the role of the EU in global politics (more specifically, to assert its identity on the international scene ). Moreover, a key goal within the Common Foreign and Security Policy was stressed: To safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union. 34 When approaching the European Union s role in world politics, socialconstructivist arguments tackle the capacity and proclivity of EU to set and export norms. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink showed that the generally accepted definition of norms refers to the standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity. 35 One pivotal theme of research was centred on the way in which European institutions are able to establish norms, diffuse them and act upon reactions to such normativity. Analyzing European preferences and norms, Zaki Laïdi explained that norms are standards aiming at codifying the behaviour of actors sharing common principles and they are meant to generate collective disciplines and to dissuade undesired conduct in fields of public 33 EEC Opinion Paper (June 1993), Archive of European Integration, p. 16, available at [ 34 See details in Christou, op. cit., p. 7 and ff. 35 Martha Finnemore; Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, in International Organization, 52, 4, Autumn, 998, p. 892.

13 European Values and Cyprus Accession to the European Union policies. 36 An extended work on the socializing potential of international institutions was provided by Jeffrey T. Checkel who examined the conditions under which, and mechanisms through which, institutions in Europe socialize states and state agents, leading them to internalize new roles or group community norms. 37 Elaborating on the impact of the EU on the Cyprus conflict, Olga Demetriou stressed that it did not come from the EU itself, as an agglomeration of states, institutions, officials, and associated structures, but rather the notion of the EU. She sharply argued that in the Cyprus case, the EU impacted as both the sum of governance structures and as a conceptual construct [...] related to other conceptualisations, centred on the idea of progress such as towards democracy, stability (economic and political), rights, and above all, peace. 38 Social constructivist literature emphasizes the way in which sociallearning produces norm internalization. Socialization is based on ideational factors, meaning that agents gradually internalize norms, patterns of behaviour and rules and become elements of certain structures (such as the EU) irrespective of material facts (i.e. financial gains, sanctions or carrots and sticks relations). For a successful outcome, intensified and prolonged interaction is needed, but also voluntary, genuine and solid internalization of normativity, because of its inner value and inter subjective meanings. Thomas Diez explained that socialization has a more indirect impact and it is the more likely, the more compatible those norms are with already existing norms within the domestic context, as research on Europeanization of identities has shown. In his study from 2002, he showed that there was at least a good chance that the political elite of Cyprus, or parts of it, will in the long term accept norms such as shared sovereignty and multiple identities. 39 In his 2004 book, George Christou also developed the argument that the EU can be an effective global and 36 Zaki Laïdi (ed.), EU Foreign Policy in a Globalized World. Normative power and social preferences, London and New York: Routledge, 2008, p Jeffrey T. Checkel, International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework, in Jeffrey T. Checkel (ed.), International Institutions and Socialization in Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p Demetriou, EU and the Cyprus Conflict. Review of the Literature, p Thomas Diez, Why the EU can nevertheless be good for Cyprus, in Journal on EthnoPolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, Issue 2, 2002, p. 11.

14 36 Laura M. Herța regional actor through the power of attraction and inclusion (soft security and enlargement) to the European club, contending that it will have a positive impact on the resolution of the Cyprus issue. 40 The prospective EU membership of Cyprus was meant to activate norm internalization, adherence to European values, and consequently induce genuine devotion for and efforts towards conflict settlement. The EU Cyprus relations revealed two variations (and correlative hopes): 1) accession process would lead to a solution for the conflict; 2) accession of RoC will proceed with a rapprochement and a final resolution of the dispute. Both failed. Instead, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots shaped and fortified their separate communal identities, perpetuated an identity based conflict within a divided society, and remained entrenched in mental, physical and cultural dividing borders Basically, the expectation that entering the European Union could and would re unify the island by also deconstructing the mental borders has ended in disenchantment. In 1993, the European Commission announced its opinion on the Greek Cypriot application, declaring the Republic of Cyprus eligible for EU membership: Cyprus integration with the community implies a peaceful, balanced and a lasting settlement of the Cyprus conflict a settlement that will make it possible for the two communities to be reconciled, for confidence to be reestablished and for their respective leaders to work together. 41 As previously mentioned, the European Council, at its Corfu Summit, announced that Cyprus and Malta would be included in the enlargement process. However, the core debate centred on Cyprus during the summit did not refer to the need for a settlement before accession took place. Therefore, the re unification and conflict resolution were not 40 Christou, op. cit., p. xii. 41 EEC Opinion Paper (June 1993). See full text of The Commission s Opinion on the Application by the Republic of Cyprus for Membership in the Archive of European Integration, available at [

15 European Values and Cyprus Accession to the European Union preconditions for accession. The question then is raised: was it an error to start negotiations without intertwining a peaceful solution to the conflict with the accession? In a way this was implicit in the so called Annan Plan. 42 Both sides agreed to negotiate on the basis of the plan. It was built on the idea of a United Cyprus Republic which would join the European Union as a federal state. Consequently, the optimist expectation that negotiations for accession would foster a more pluralistic and tolerant society in Cyprus and would prove conducive to a solution for the dispute 43 turned into disenchantment. The belief was that identification with the EU as a larger entity would trigger adherence to universal values and would strengthen a common Cypriot civic entity. According to Peristianis, there was a valuable opportunity for cultivating a common Cypriot European civic identity which could overcome the antagonistic Greek and Turkish nationalisms of [...] Cypriot communal identities. 44 In fact, the two communities remained embedded in their respective communal identities. Despite all these optimist beliefs, by the time accession was approaching, the influence on the southern part of Cyprus dissipated, and this occurred precisely when the value of EU Turkey ties was rising, increasing considerably the appeal of membership also to the Turkish Cypriot. 45 According to Nathalie Tocci, the new leadership of the RoC felt unconstrained in rejecting the Annan Plan, once the EU membership was secured, and the lack of pre conditions for accession led to the stalemate: lifting conditionality on the Greek Cypriots eliminated all constraints from the next Greek Cypriot leadership to bluntly turn down the Annan Plan by the time the referendum was held. 46 Engin Karatas stressed the idea that any chance for the EU to exert conditional pressure on the Greek Cypriots had been lost long before the referendum and showed that Papadopoulos formulated it in his famous televised statement on 7 April 2004: 42 Basis for Agreement on a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem 43 Nicos Peristianis, A federal Cyprus in a Federal Europe, quoted in Demetriou, EU and the Cyprus Conflict. Review of the Literature, p. 19; See also Demetriou, EU and the Cyprus Conflict. Perceptions of the Border and Europe in the Cyprus conflict, p Ibidem. 45 Cf. Tocci, op. cit., p Ibidem, p. 46.

16 38 Laura M. Herța One can reasonably ask what will be the repercussions if the people vote No at the referendum. If the sovereign people reject the Plan by their vote, the Republic of Cyprus will become a full and equal member of the European Union. We would have achieved the strategic goal we have jointly set, i.e. to upgrade and shield politically the Republic of Cyprus. 47 It was also the conclusion of Doga Ulas Eralp and Nimet Beriker that the European Union was too dependent on the catalytic effect of the membership negotiations on the resolution of the Cyprus negotiations and by so doing it brought into its political domain a protracted ethnic conflict. 48 Conclusion The long term international peace making efforts in Cyprus, culminating with the Annan Plan, were meant to provide successful international involvement in the resolution of the conflict. Moreover, we argue that the UN s consistent and strenuous implication in finding a solution was correlated to a strong belief in inducing and building commitment to the peace process. Consequently, the expectation was that the more international actors (i.e. UN and EU) proved allegiance to conflict resolution and assisted the conflict parties in reaching a solution, the more the disputants would have intensified their own commitment to the peace plans. Instead, psychological, social cultural and political borderlines remained intact, separating disputants from one another and distancing them from the final solution. As previously mentioned, we also strongly support the idea that the stabilization, immediately achieved in Cyprus after the deployment of UNFICYP troops, in many respects froze the conflict, allowing disputants to lose devotion in the mediation process and to replace a positive attitude with one characterized by mistrust both towards the other party and the UN interference. 47 Engin Karatas, op. cit., p Doga Ulas Eralp; Nimet Beriker, op. cit., pp

17 European Values and Cyprus Accession to the European Union Another expectation was built around the potential of joint UN and EU efforts to determine the leaderships of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities to visualize the benefits of resolution and to overcome intransigence and mistrust. Such expectation was linked to the prospective EU accession, namely to the conflict parties proclivity to both responsiveness to the UN peace plan and to European values appropriation. The optimism reflected in the EEC/EU actions towards the Cyprus dispute stemmed from the following prognosis: the exposure to and the increasing interactions with the European Union s institutions would gradually determine the incorporation of European values which would result in transcendence of intransigent positions and adherence to universal and European principles (such as human rights, peaceful resolution of conflict, prosperity, security). A social constructivist interpretation would indicate the potential of international institutions to create normative frameworks, to set up and diffuse norms, and the ability of non EU states or elites to respond to such normative constructs by appropriating its intrinsic attributes. This kind of appropriation is based on the sharedknowledge related to constitutive rules (which create the very existence of structures like EU and agents such as candidate states) and to proper behavioural patterns. It is also based on the willingness and capacity of agents (in our case the political leaderships of the two communities in Cyprus) to compliantly modify behaviours according to the norms through socialization. In this process, the formerly conflict parties do not surrender to an outside carrot and stick acting power; rather, they comply to norms because they are more attracted to the benefits of such behaviour and they genuinely and voluntarily internalize aggregated bodies of values, rules, and norms because they want to be associated with them. The Cyprus case revealed the prerequisites for this type of development but also the disappointment of the international community with the referenda results on the Annan Plan. The rejection of the Plan in the southern part indicated the precarious norm internalization and the danger of overreliance on proper behaviour inducement, which strongly needs the willingness of the agents to change pattern of behaviour and transcend adversarial positions.

18 40 Laura M. Herța Bibliography: Anastasiou, Harry (2002), Communication across Conflict Lines: The Case of Ethnically Divided Cyprus, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 39, no. 5, September, pp Baier Allen, Susanne (2004), The Failure of Power Sharing in Cyprus. Causes and Consequences, in Ulrich Schneckener, Stefan Wolff (eds.), Managing and Settling Ethnic Conflicts, London: Hurst & Company, pp Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2007), International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework, in Jeffrey T. Checkel (ed.), International Institutions and Socialization in Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Christou, George (2004), The European Union and Enlargement. The Case of Cyprus, New York: Palgrave Macmillan Demetriou, Olga (2004), EU and the Cyprus Conflict. Review of the Literature, in Working Papers Series in EU Border Conflicts Studies, no. 5, January, United Kingdom: The University of Birmingham Demetriou, Olga (2004), The EU and the Cyprus Conflict. The View of Political Actors in Cyprus, in Working Papers Series in EU Border Conflicts Studies, no. 9, July, United Kingdom: The University of Birmingham Demetriou, Olga (2005), EU and the Cyprus Conflict. Perceptions of the Border and Europe in the Cyprus conflict, in Working Papers Series in EU Border Conflicts Studies, no. 18, June, United Kingdom: The University of Birmingham Diez, Thomas (2002), Why the EU can nevertheless be good for Cyprus, in Journal on EthnoPolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, Issue 2 EEC Opinion Paper (1993), Archive of European Integration, available at [ Eralp, Doga Ulas; Nimet Beriker (2005), Assessing the Conflict Resolution Potential for the EU: The Cyprus Conflict and Accession Negotiations, Security Dialogue, vol. 36(2), pp Finnemore, Martha; Kathryn Sikkink (1998), International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, in International Organization, 52, 4, Autumn

19 European Values and Cyprus Accession to the European Union Fisher, Ronald J., (2001), Cyprus: The Failure of Mediation and the Escalation of an Identity Based Conflict to an Adversarial Impasse, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 38, no. 3, May, pp Herța, Laura Maria (2012), Peacekeeping and (Mis)management of Ethnic Disputes. The Cyprus Case, in Studia Europaea, LVII, 3, 2012, pp Hoffmeister, Frank (2006), Legal Aspects of the Cyprus Problem. Annan Plan and EU Accession, Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers Ker Lindsay, James; Hubert Faustmann; Fiona Mullen (eds.) (2011), An Island in Europe. The EU and the Transformation of Cyprus, London, New York: I.B. Tauris Laïdi, Zaki (ed.) (2008), EU Foreign Policy in a Globalized World. Normative power and social preferences, London and New York: Routledge Loizides, Neophytos G., (2002), Greek Turkish Dilemmas and the Cyprus EU Accession Process, Security Dialogue, vol. 33(4), pp Michael, Michális S., (2007), The Cyprus Peace Talks: A Critical Appraisal, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 44, no. 5, September, pp Mirbagheri, Farid, (1998), Cyprus and International Peacemaking, London: Hurst and Company Pace, Michelle (2005), EU Policy Making towards Border Conflicts, in Working Papers Series in EU Border Conflicts Studies, no. 15, June, United Kingdom: The University of Birmingham Pace, Michelle (2005), Images of Border Conflicts within EU Policy Making Circles and their Impact on Policy, in Working Papers Series in EU Border Conflicts Studies, no. 16, June, United Kingdom: The University of Birmingham Richmond, Oliver P. (1998), Mediating in Cyprus: The Cypriot Communities and the United Nations, Great Britain: Bookcraft Ltd. Stegenga, James A. (1970), UN Peace Keeping: The Cyprus Venture, Journal of Peace Research, 7:1, Oslo: International Peace Research Institute Tocci, Nathalie (2007), The EU and Conflict Resolution. Promoting peace in the backyard, London and New York: Routledge Varnava, Andrekos; Hubert Faustmann (eds.) (2009), Reunifying Cyprus. The Annan Plan and Beyond, London, New York: I.B. Tauris

20 42 Laura M. Herța