Early Recovery Assessment in Rakhine and Kachin- Myanmar Myitkyina (Kachin) and Sittwe (Rakhine) No of Consultants required 2

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1 TERMS OF REFERENCE (TOR) INDIVIDUAL CONTRACT Title Early Recovery Assessment in Rakhine and Kachin- Myanmar Duty Station Myitkyina (Kachin) and Sittwe (Rakhine) No of Consultants required 2 Duration of Contract 4 months full time for each consultant Starting date August/September 2014 End date November/December Background Rakhine: The inter-communal violence in Rakhine State in June and October 2012 resulted in massive displacement of populations, damaged assets and loss of livelihoods and lives. OCHA reports over 360,000 people were affected by the violence; at least 140,000 people displaced across 10 townships hosted in 76 camps and camp-like settings and put about 115,000 others in critical life-saving situation. Through 2013 the presence of international development and humanitarian actors has steadily increased. Despite the UN/INGOs efforts, the situation in Rakhine remains fragile and can be characterized by a series of sporadic intercommunal incidents and violence. Over the past year, while Rakhine has not witnessed a widespread violence resulting in further displacement, small scale localized violence persists. Trust between the communities has further eroded and hardline views have gained center stage over the political discourse within the Rakhine community. Within this political context lies a large scale humanitarian operation that remains at risk of being protracted due to the Government s inability to find durable solutions for the internally displaced persons (IDPs). Moreover, the Rakhine community increasingly challenged the international community s impartiality on their aid provisions. Community perceptions are increasingly mobilized by the hardline elements/social networks within the Rakhine community. While recovery/development efforts have been ongoing in Rakhine for the past 10 years or so, the scale of operation is limited, compared to the humanitarian action. The manifestation of grievances against aid agencies reached its highest peak with the attacks on the offices of UN agencies and international NGOs in March All humanitarian/development operations came to a screeching halt. Currently, agencies are able to return to Rakhine and overall operations are at approx. 65% of its operational capacity compared to pre-march attacks. This incident has forced agencies to rethink their assistance in Rakhine. There is now renewed recognition that UN agencies and INGOs need to do better and more in working beyond the camp populations, who are also as vulnerable and have many unmet needs. Currently UNDP is working through its livelihood and social cohesion programme in 62 villages in Rakhine. Kachin: Since June 2011, Kachin and Northern Shan States have been experiencing the resumption of armed conflicts, breaking the 1994 ceasefire agreement binding the Government of Myanmar and the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO). The conflict opposed the Tatmadaw to the armed wing of the KIO, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). A large part of Kachin State has been affected by the conflict that resulted in the displacement of thousands of

2 families. The conflict and related humanitarian crisis affected numbers of families in both States. Affected populations have been estimated as follows 1 : Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Camps: Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Host families: Unregistered IDPs: Isolated/Inaccessible communities: IDPs are hosted in camps or host communities across Kachin State and Northern Shan, in government-controlled areas (GCA) and non-government controlled areas (NGCA). At the onset of the humanitarian crisis, National NGOs, faith based organizations and Government departments were the first to respond. They were, later joined by international humanitarian actors (UN agencies and International NGOs). After several rounds of peace talks in a bid to end the renewed fighting, the Government of the Union of Myanmar and the KIO reached preliminary agreement that would later lead to a peace deal that would include a ceasefire. The May 2013 raised hopes among IDPs and Kachin authorities on return and resettlement, particularly since in point 4 of this agreement expressly referred to return and resettlement, which both parties agreed to continue to undertake relief, rehabilitation, and resettlement of the internally displaced persons (IDPs) in consultation with each other. This agreement was followed by the 10 October 2013 preliminary agreement that included a provision for both technical teams to work together to implement four pilot projects, in 4 villages, for the return and resettlement of IDPs. In the meantime, hopes raised by the May and October 2013 agreement led state authorities to start envisaging return and resettlement of IDPs. That is when the Pa La Na resettlement project started emerging and materialized in May 2014, fully implemented and facilitated by the government of Kachin State. In December 2013, 15 households from Won Tho Monastery IDP camp returned to San Kin village, with the facilitation of the Kachin State Government. While prospects for returns are very minimal, there are indications that other resettlements of IDPs will take place within coming months, Puta-O, Myitkyina, Bhamo and Monyihin, raising the necessity for well-informed resettlement. Communities affected by the conflict continue to struggle for recovery and development assistance either from the state government or the international community. Currently UNDP is working through its livelihood and social cohesion programme in 52 villages in Kachin. Given the contexts outlined above, Early Recovery in Rakhine and Kachin takes on a crisis prevention and recovery approach. Early Recovery Coordination: Early Recovery Sector coordination for Rakhine, led by UNDP, was initiated towards the end of quarter 3 of 2013 while for Kachin in October The sector lacks a proper needs assessment of recovery needs and a comprehensive baseline. Most of the assessments related to early recovery completed till date focuses on livelihoods and food security and undermines the comprehensive nature of recovery- governance related aspects. 1 Myanmar Humanitarian Response Planning, November These numbers are expected to have changed due to fresh displacements and marginal return and resettlements.

3 Towards the end of 2013, development of the Humanitarian Strategic Response Plan (SRP) 2014 was initiated. UNDP as ER sector lead was challenged in its efforts to integrate ER into other humanitarian cluster plans. Precisely for two reasons: i) Cluster leads had no incentive to incorporate ER and 2) Lack of evidence based approach to mainstreaming ER into humanitarian operations. In addition the structure of the SRP reinforces segregation of sectors/clusters than allowing horizontal integration of early recovery. The Strategic Response Plan of 2014 represents quantified and monetized needs of people of the vulnerable populations (mostly IDPs), with less consideration for building national ownership. 2. Duration/ Duty Station/ Travel UNDP is seeking to hire two consultants who will be based in Rakhine (Sittwe) and Kachin (Myitkyina) for a period of 4 months each on a full time basis. This assignment will require frequent travel within the Rakhine and Kachin state. It will also include travel to Yangon for consultations and report back. Extension of this contract is possible if there are delays due to external factors. 3. Institutional arrangements The Consultant will be guided by the Early Recovery Specialist based in Yangon. Day to day reporting, supervision and management will be done by the ER Managers (P4 level) at the State level. The consultant is expected to work very closely with the ER Coordination (ERC) and its partners which include government, UN agencies and NGOs. Ownership of the assessment by ERC partners is a key criterion of success. 4. Tasks/Deliverables/Output Key Tasks of the consultant is as follows: Development of methodology/relevant tools: In consultation with the ER sector members (which include UN agencies, NGOs and government), development actors and humanitarian cluster leads, the consultant will develop an assessment methodology and relevant tools nested within a conceptual framework. The state government to be engaged in each stage of the process. Ownership of the ERC members to the tools and methodology is key to success. Information collection: The actual information collection will be done through either the ER sector or through the hiring of a national research organization/ngo which UNDP will facilitate. The consultant, as the team leader, will develop the data prototypes, train the data collection team on the methodology, use of the tools, conflict sensitivity while collecting data and codification/classification of data. Analysis, validation of findings and Final report: The consultant will lead the analysis of the data and validate the findings of the assessment. The consultant will draft the final report and finalise it upon consultation with ER sector members, development and humanitarian partners before finalization. Dissemination of findings: Presentation to Union and State level governments, ER sector and Inter cluster Coordination in Yangon and within UNDP. Development of programming options: The consultant will lead two exercises.

4 o o Development of programming options for UNDP in consultation with UNDP technical teams situated in Rakhine/Kachin and Yangon. Leading to a design of an integrated ER programming for Rakhine and Kachin. In consultation with sector/cluster leads propose ER programming options for each sector/cluster. This will be used to integrate ER in the 2015 Humanitarian Strategic plan and associated sector/cluster response plans. Key products to be produced/key deliverables: 1. Assessment tool/methodology (15% payment) 2. Training materials developed and enumerators trained and creation of a database which is housed within UNDP- with possibility of eventual handover to the government (10% payment) 3. Assessment report per township (20% payment) 4. Consolidated assessment State report (20% payment) 5. An Integrated ER Programming options paper (20% payment) 6. Discussion paper on ER Integration into the 2015 Humanitarian Strategic Plan across cluster/sector response plans. (15% payment) 5. Competencies and Qualifications Competencies Strong understanding of post conflict programming, including the key post conflict (needs) assessments tools; Knowledge of the UN system, in particular UNDP Crisis Prevention and Recovery (CPR) programming as well as humanitarian partners; Strong written and verbal communication skills, in a multi-cultural setting; Objectivity and ability to analyze large complex data sets in short period; Excellent interpersonal skills and experience working collaboratively in small and large teams with tight deadlines. Qualifications Master s degree (or equivalent) in Conflict/peacebuilding, economics, business development or other relevant field. At least 10 years of relevant international development experience with proven experience in recovery programmes; Experience in conflict settings and demonstrated experience in CPR programming Familiarity with the UN supported humanitarian action and immediate response programming; Preferably some experience with UNDP programming processes Fluency in English is required with good verbal and written skills. 6. Preferred pricing option: Lumpsum The lumpsum fee will include: - Consultancy fee - Living allowance - One time travel cost (round trip) to the duty station Since the frequency of internal travel within Rakhine/Kachin and to Yangon cannot be estimated at this point and will depend on the assessment methodology, the consultant is not expected to quote of this purpose. At the time the

5 travel is made, UNDP Myanmar will pay the consultant 50% of the prevailing UNDP DSA rate and the transportation costs based on actuals. 7. Criteria for selection of best offer UNDP will use the combined scoring method for assessing the best offer. The technical proposal, qualifications and methodology, will be weighted 70% and the financial proposal 30%. Only candidates obtaining a minimum of 49 points in the technical evaluation will be considered for the financial evaluation. The technical criteria shall be as follows. 1. Master s degree (or equivalent) in Conflict/peacebuilding, economics, business development or other relevant field. (10 points) 2. At least 10 years of relevant international development experience with proven experience in recovery programmes; (15 points) 3. Experience in conflict settings and demonstrated experience in CPR programming (20 points) 4. Familiarity with the UN supported humanitarian action and immediate response programming; (10 points) 5. Preferably some experience with UNDP programming processes (15 points) 6. Report/Methodology (gauged through the sample provided): 30 points 7. Recommended Presentation of Offer The following document is requested: - CV/ P11 indicating all professional past experiences - Financial proposal - A sample of an assessment methodology/tool developed by the applicant - A sample of an assessment report written by the applicant