BROKEN WINDOWS IN THE BIG APPLE: HOW A CONSERVATIVE RENAISSANCE CHANGED THE POLITICS OF NEW YORK CITY IN THE EARLY 1990S. A Thesis.

Transcription

1 BROKEN WINDOWS IN THE BIG APPLE: HOW A CONSERVATIVE RENAISSANCE CHANGED THE POLITICS OF NEW YORK CITY IN THE EARLY 1990S A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of San Diego State University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts in Political Science by Aida Lissette Abril Spring 2015

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3 iii Copyright 2015 by Aida Lissette Abril All Rights Reserved

4 iv DEDICATION This thesis is dedicated to my mother, may she rest in peace.

5 v ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS Broken Windows in the Big Apple: How a Conservative Renaissance Changed the Politics of New York City in the Early 1990s by Aida Lisette Abril Master of Arts in Political Science San Diego State University, 2015 The Giuliani Administration embraced tenets of the Broken Windows Theory (BWT) to mollify wealthy and influential power brokers within the city who demanded change without regard to public input. To be sure, alternate theories exist to explain the implementation of enhanced enforcement guidelines, to include a genuine desire on Giuliani s part to effect crime reduction within the city, as well as these changes resulting largely from public outcry. A myriad of variables impact each of these theories, to include political influence, public opinion and intense lobbying, but after conducting an extensive literature review, I concluded that insufficient evidence exists to support my thesis. Similarly, while public pressure undoubtedly influenced the mayor s actions, no clear and convincing evidence exists to suggest that it was the basis for adopting policies derived from the BWT. Instead, based on Giuliani s appointment of William Bratton as the city s police chief, whose previous work in the transit department yielded tangible results, he demonstrated a sincere desire to reduce crime for all those living in New York City. While these policy initiatives benefited the city s elites, thus satisfying their safety demands, these quality of life improvements were incidental to the overall campaign to restore order in the Big Apple. KEYWORDS: Broken Windows Theory, public policy, quality of life initiative, Giuliani administration, Manhattan Institute, police commissioner William Bratton, George Kelling, crime reduction, financial collapse, NYC working class, conservative renaissance, elections, NYPD.

6 vi TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE ABSTRACT...v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS... vii CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION LITERATURE REVIEW...2 Defining the Broken Window Theory...2 Evaluating the BWT METHODS THE NEW YORK ELITE AND THEIR INFLUENCE OVER PUBLIC POLICY...24 Economic Crisis...24 Fund-Less City...25 The Working Class in New York City...26 The Era of Neoliberalism...27 The Creation of the Association for a Better New York-ABNY...30 The Manhattan Institute THE PUBLIC WANTED THE QUALITY OF LIFE INITIATIVE THE GIULIANI ADMINISTRATION WANTED TO REDUCE CRIME CONCLUSION...40 REFERENCES...42

7 vii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank the chair of my thesis committee Professor Ronald King for providing me with the confidence and opportunity to pursue my graduate thesis. I am also indebted to my thesis committee Professors Brian Adams and David Kamper and would like to thank them tremendously for their suggestions and advise on this dissertation. I would also like to thank the excellent political science Professors at San Diego State University for intellectually inspiring me and helping me become a better scholar, in particular Professors Kristen Maher and Latha Varadarajan. I am most grateful to my partner in crime at SDSU, Stephanie Velarde. Her encouragement helped me believe that the completion of this thesis was possible even when it seemed that the finish line was miles away. Additionally, I would like to extend my heartfelt appreciation to my colleague Jared Kramer for taking the time from his busy life to guide and provide me with suggestions when my brain could do no more. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Hugh Moore and David Morrison. Their mentorship, leadership and enthusiasm motivated me during these stressful times. Their guidance helped me become a better person and made my stay in San Diego a memorable one. Most importantly, I wish to express my deepest gratitude to my dear husband Freddy Abril for his support and encouragement. His endless love and dedication to our marriage is what has made this journey possible for me. Finally, I am most grateful to my son Jordan Alfredo Abril for his patience with me through graduate school and the completion of this dissertation during pregnancy, his birth and infancy.

8 1 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION The Broken Windows Theory (BWT) was put into effect as a policy named Quality of life initiative in New York City (NYC) under Mayor Rudolph Giuliani the 1990s. This policy elevated minor offenses to become major criminal offenses. It is important to understand who implemented this theory due to the fact that it is used in various cities and countries and the effects it has on society today can be understood and improved. Some scholars argue that the BWT was implemented because the Giuliani Administration believed it would lower crime and because the public supported it. I argue that the Giuliani administration adopted the Broken Windows Theory at the behest of the elites, rejecting the idea that it was implemented as an honest effort to reduce crime or because the public supported it. Therefore, my hypothesis is that the BWT was implemented because the elites wanted it as a means to clean up the city. My research question focuses on analyzing why the BWT was implemented in NYC in the 1990s and what led to this.

9 2 CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW DEFINING THE BROKEN WINDOW THEORY In this literature review I will be defining the Broken Window Theory (BWT) the meaning of its implication and the motives. In order to further define this theory, I will be presenting the logic behind the BWT. BWT is a theory of why crime happens and how it can be prevented. This theory needs to be described accurately in order to understand its main argument, which is that crime can be reduced after its implementation. In the Atlantic monthly in an article titled Broken Windows by James Wilson and George Kelling (1982, 2) the safety of a neighborhood is evaluated in order to generate a theory that assesses the reduction of crime. What most often frightens people in public places?. This question is investigated in a neighborhood that doesn t show signs or data of improvements. It is discovered that disorderly people and not criminals are what most frightens people in public places. The people who fit into this category of disorderly are those who do not fit the profile of reputable citizens of society. This group consists of disreputable or obstreperous or unpredictable people: panhandlers, drunks, addicts, rowdy teenagers, prostitutes, loiterers, the mentally disturbed (Wilson and Kelling 1982, 2). How are these disorderly people controlled? It is the police officers who are on foot patrol who bring a great amount of order into disorderly neighborhoods (Wilson and Kelling 1982, 3). To define order one of the scholars (Kelling) accompanies a foot patrol officer to one New Jersey neighborhood known as Newark in order to evaluate and asses this definition. The findings suggests that the dynamics that keep the order in place lies on a set of guidelines that the citizens and the police have a mutual understanding about. One group of citizens are called the regulars, who are defined as the people who live in the neighborhood. The strangers defined as

10 3 unknown outsiders, were just people passing by the area to get home. Special attention would be paid to these strangers by the police when they lingered to make sure nothing out of the ordinary occurred. The regulars would help the officers maintain the order by making sure the set of guidelines known to these regulars were also being followed by the strangers (3). Tolerance was limited in the officer s daily agenda, these guidelines were known to everyone in the community and any violator would be prosecuted. To support the claim that the guidelines were to be closely followed, the police would even arrest people who asked for money on the bus stop for disturbing the peace of the people waiting for the bus. It was observed that these guidelines did indeed keep the order in that neighborhood; but many actions taken by the police officers in order to keep these guidelines in effect in that neighborhood would not be considered legal in a court of law (Wilson and Kelling 1982, 3). If these guidelines to keep the order were not considered to be legal in a court of law then why would the police intend to even apply them? James Wilson and George L. Kelling coined the term Broken Windows Theory as an order maintenance approach in order to evaluate what leads to crime and to effectively reduce it in society. The main factor that leads to broken windows is untended behavior because it leads to chaos in a neighborhood (Wilson and Kelling 1982, 5). A good neighborhood can drastically change by the departure of well-established families which leads to a sequence of events that ensue people on the street to be approached by beggars. This doesn t mean that violent crime will happen, it means that people who live on a street like this will stop seeing their neighborhood as their home and just as a place of residence and the sense of community and safety will be gone causing them to eventually leave causing the neighborhood to deteriorate (5). What happens after there are broken windows in a neighborhood? Once there is broken windows in a neighborhood, crime and disorder will greatly prevail, according to the author one broken window leads to many broken windows. Established families will leave and the community will become devastated (Wilson and Kelling 1982, 5). Surveys show that people prefer to stay away from signs of disorder rather than crime, one example is staying away from crowds of adolescents because of their obscene nature, and not because of a crime (6). To support the argument that crime will prevail due to broken windows a study proves

11 4 that when there are visible signs of vandalism like graffiti, the passengers feel unsafe in the environment for the reason of not knowing what can happen to them during the ride, for if the vandal who made the graffiti got away with the act of vandalism, then the logic follows that they can get away with more serious crime (6). Therefore, the authors assume that correcting every minor disorder is worth it in the case of the police officer who take extralegal steps to reduce crime. In order to support the BWT with further empirical research a study was conducted by psychologist named Philip Zimbardo. This observation was conducted in one city in both New York and California. The study proved that windows were broken by respectable whites and not necessarily the vagabonds, criminals or inappropriate individuals as expected (Wilson and Kelling 1982, 4). Why is fear imminent when there are broken windows? When the police are called they can only correct one problem at a time. When the police cannot solve all the other problems that occur in the neighborhood, faith in the police as being resourceful to solve the neighborhoods problems is lost and this is when fear starts to creep in and trust is eliminated (Wilson and Kelling 1982, 13). Since the logic follows that one broken window can lead to several broken windows this logic also allows for the thinking that bad behavior that goes unchecked is an invitation to more chaos (Wilson and Kelling 1982, 13). Therefore, the criminal may realize that if the beggar is not stopped for begging and disturbing the peace then a crime can be committed without police interference, so disorder is an open invitation to crime (9). Criminalizing disorder is found to be important, in order to prevent disorder not doing so is a big error (Wilson and Kelling 1982, 11). An example of inebriated people on the street is given and leaving them unattended on the street can cause harm to a community. The logic follows that if a single case of disorder is left unattended then many cases will be left unattended causing further disorder (11). Fairness and how it is empirical that the police should be properly trained so there s no accusation of racism is discussed as well (Wilson and Kelling 1982, 12). The issue of racism is analyzed within the context of preventing disorder. It is concluded that keeping the neighborhood safe from lawlessness and preventing minor disorders has nothing to do with ethnic justification. To examine this the bad relationship the police had with some residents is analyzed in the projects of Southside Chicago. The cops who were interviewed responded

12 5 of feelings of alarm and tension that existed between the residents and them. Their relationship improved a few years later, when improvement was present the residents expected the police to act on and solve all imminent crime. The police were capable of solving only a small amount of the problems, this led the residents to feel that the police were not very helpful (12). If police officers cannot solve all the imminent problems in a neighborhood then who can? Two groups of citizens that can attempt to keep their communities safe are volunteer watchmen and the vigilante (Wilson and Kelling 1982, 14-15). The problem with these groups of citizens that can aid in the safety of the community is that the only group that can actually maintain the order are the police officers for it entails a great deal of accountability that only a police officer is trained to have in the neighborhood (16). Therefore, in order to be effective in doing this job the police department concentrates its efforts in placing the officers in the areas where crime is more prevalent (17). As you have seen, according to Wilson and Kelling (1982), police officers need to correct every minor disorder in order to prevent even greater crime. One minor disorder left unattended will only lead to greater disorder being unattended and the invitation to greater lawlessness and crime becoming available. Therefore, if one individual can cause a broken window, this needs to be prevented so there are no broken windows in the neighborhood (17). The broken windows theory premise relies on every minor disorder being corrected and police officers in the community engaging with the citizens in order to create a sense of safety correcting minor disorders and reducing crime. In Making Neighborhoods Safe (Wilson and Kelling 1989) the logic of the Broken Windows Theory and its utility is explained even further. This is done with examples of how the theory should be implemented in major cities in order to reduce disorder and crime and increase its citizen s sense of feeling safe (47). Traditional policing methods that police departments in major cities engage in order to reduce crime are analyzed. Traditional policing methods rely on investigating only major incidents and the authors believe that this is not the appropriate way to reduce crime, instead it involves addressing every single incident that occurs in the neighborhood no matter how small the incident is, such as eliminating any signs of vandalism. This would permit the appearance of a clean community without vandalism which gives the impression that it is a

13 6 good community even if this is not the truth. Therefore, keeping alleyways clean and buildings graffiti free will cause a decrease in crime, hence the reason that police departments should focus their efforts in changing the way police handles matters (Wilson and Kelling 1989, 47). Even though it seems unconventional to assign police to do minor jobs besides investigating a major crime that normally the police department wouldn t handle, it is important for the reduction of crime to do this. It is instrumental that police departments should address minor disorders in order for there to be a change in the way that crime is handled (48). The authors give examples of how the BWT started to be implemented in some police departments around the country and point out the attention that was paid to the correction of small disorders such as graffiti in Los Angeles where the police department made extra efforts to be involved with the community to reduce and eliminate vandalism (Wilson and Kelling 1989, 48). Another example is police officers engaging with the citizens and increasing their sense of feeling safe and disorders in the neighborhood decreasing (48). In the Atlantic Monthly The Broken Windows Theory is revisited 25 years later by its two original authors James Wilson and George Kelling. In an article titled Decency the main topic of the issue of the magazine the American idea is discussed (Wilson and Kelling, 2007). How much freedom the public should be given is measured with how much order is necessary for there to be decency in the streets of America. The main premise of the BWT is that people feel unsafe due to visible signs of disorder and correcting disorder can decrease crime if addressed. Besides major crime being corrected, vandalism should also be addressed because signs of disorder cause fear in people and reduces crime rates in neighborhoods. It is acknowledged that people do feel unsafe due to signs of disorder but it is pointed out that correcting disorder has never been proven or tested to reduce crime. The authors point out that how order should be implemented is a matter of morality and politics. This is very different from their original argument in the BWT which they encourage every minor disorder to be corrected in order to reduce crime by the police and support their claims with the study conducted by Phillp Zimbardo on which proved that one broken window leads to many broken windows hence the prevalence of disorder. As you can see the logic behind broken windows captures the main argument of what is most important in the reduction of crime, according to James Wilson and George Kelling

14 7 (1982). BWT rests on the disposition that every minor disorder needs to be addressed in order to prevent further disorder and greater crime. Therefore, the key to preventing crime from occurring lies on the theorized assumption that every minor incident being attended to by the police such as vandalism will prevent further crime. Signs of disorder leads to fear in people s sense of safety, therefore every broken window needs to be addressed and corrected in order to prevent more broken windows in this case further disorder, because disorder is an open invitation to crime. I have presented the BWT and what the author s focus of analysis was in the reduction of crime which is the correction of every minor disorder. In Making Neighborhoods Safe (Wilson and Kelling 1989) I presented their suggestion for the appropriate implementation of the practices suggested in the BWT which was the addressing of every minor disorder and increased interaction of the police within the community. In Decency I present where the authors opinions of the theory rests today which is acknowledging that the theory has not been proved to reduce crime, on this note now I will discuss the literature assessing whether the theory is sound and discuss various authors comments and critiques on the functionally of the BWT. To analyze if the BWT is a sound theory, I will analyze case studies and the critiques/comments that have been generated about the BWT by its proponents and opponents. There are various scholars that have analyzed and criticized the BWT authors James Wilson and George L. Kelling (1982) presented. One such scholar is Bernard E. Harcourt in Illusion Of Order (2001) this scholar explains that he finds the BWT hypothesis to be weak for the theory itself is not well established and unproven. One example he uses to prove the weakness of the theory is shown in comparing the similarities this theory has with other theories that foundations and origins are conservative (11). The author points out that the BWT is just like the theory of incapacitation due to the fact that the BWT focuses on the punishment of the disorderly, just like the theory of incapacitation emphasizes the punishment of the criminal (16). The author adds that the rhetoric of the BWT points to the disorderly and wrong doer as criminals that need to be punished for disorder is linked to bad and order is linked to good (17). Bernard E. Harcourt (2001) further challenges the definition of order and disorder and points out that they are not properly explained in the order maintenance approach presented

15 8 by Wilson and Kelling (1982). The reason he makes this claim is due to the fact that he finds that disorder and order are only attributed by Wilson and Kelling to certain types of people and categories and does not find ample evidence in their theory to make these categorizations in fact he urges that they define order in terms of serious crime (19). Other authors who note that the meaning of disorder is not properly attributed and is linked to crime are Gau and Pratt (2008) in Broken Windows or Windows Dressing? The authors explain that citizen s view of disorder is one that leads to identifying with fear and crime (Gau and Pratt 2008, 164). The authors consider that crime and disorder cannot be linked or understood in relation with one another; however this perspective can be problematic to understanding the BWT (164). The authors note that disorder without the proper supplementation of community policing can lead to low class neighborhoods to become criminalized (184). Through surveying citizens, the authors found that citizens do not understand the difference or the logic between disorder and crime, which led to the authors pointing out that crime cannot logically be asserted to cause itself (181). Therefore they suggest against the use of the BWT. I have briefly analyzed the definition and critique of disorder by scholars, now I will look at the external factors that influence disorder. In The irony of Broken Windows Policing: A Micro Place Study of the Relationship Between Disorder, Focused Police Crackdowns and Fear of Crime by Joshua Hinkle and David Weisburd (2008) the authors look at the external factors that can lead to the fear of disorder such as the impact of police presence on the people living in the community. The authors found that fear is increased with the police presence more substantially than with disorder itself because people feel that police presence is available due to high crime in their neighborhood. The authors feel this effect is not positive because if by reducing disorder, fear is elevated then it offsets the benefits of reducing disorder (509). To understand this further and to analyze why people link disorder to crime and criminals in Seeing Disorder: Neighborhood Stigma and the Social Construction of Broken Windows by Robert Sampson and Stephen Raudenbush (2004) their question focuses on answering What makes disorder a problem? (319). They stated that the problem lies in the fact that through disorder a social construction of the environment is also created. Their method of analysis consists of empirical evidence and consultation with the residents and

16 9 analysis in the streets of Chicago (319). The strength in this article is that the authors observe how the BWT helps form the perception of disorder which claims disorder is socially constructed and not a reality (320). Maggie Dickinson (2008) adds to this argument, in The Making of Space, Race and Place: New York City s War on Graffiti 1970-The Present by making the justification that social constructions are fueled by the political leadership. She explains that the culture of poverty theory asserts that the values adopted by the underclass differ greatly from the rest of society and this makes the underclass vulnerable to social constructions by the leadership in charge (41). Now that I have analyzed the theory in qualitative terms I will present one case study that allows analyzing the theory in quantitative terms. In fact, Bernard E. Harcourt also contradicts the effectiveness of the BWT by displaying the contradictions the theory demonstrates by analyzing its quantitative aspects. He recreates the same study as Wesley Skogan (1990) in Disorder and Decline: Crime and the Spiral of Decay in American Neighborhoods. Here, the author finds that the results are not the same while recreating the study for he finds missing and inconsistent data. For example the survey is faulty and not specific when asking the survey taker in the neighborhood where the crime occurred to them happened in the same neighborhood as the one they reside in and was being studied. The most prominent detail indicates that the functionality of the BWT relies on the study conducted in the Newark neighborhoods. Bernard Harcourt (2001) points out that there are certain variables available in the Newark neighborhoods that are not consistent when replicating the study elsewhere In fact, without the Newark neighborhoods, the relationship between robbery victimization and disorder vanishes if race alone is held constant (73). Therefore he makes the decision not to include them in his analysis. His replication of the study proves that disorder is not linked to crime statistically therefore he finds the BWT to be unsupported quantitatively (78). As you have seen the authors present mixed findings and controversial views of the BWT proving that the BWT is not a sound theory. Now that I have analyzed if the theory is sound, I will evaluate the BWT and its effectiveness. In order to do this I will discuss the literature assessing whether it actually works to reduce crime.

17 10 EVALUATING THE BWT Now I will evaluate the BWT by discussing the literature assessing whether BWT actually works to reduce crime. I will do this by analyzing the research that presents variables that are operationalized to test if a BWT approach in policing can aid in the reduction of crime and assess the research that presents policy derived from the BWT. I want to point out that in my research I found that many scholars have diverse ways of measuring and testing BWT and its effectiveness. In the following I will provide different examples of their methods and explanations. In Broken Windows, crumpled feathers and crime by David Giacopassi and David Forde (2000) the authors hypothesize that officers engaging in correcting minor infractions performing traffic stops can reduce greater crime from occurring. They explain that aggressive drivers who don t have much respect for others in the road translate to disorderly people who in the future are more prone to committing greater crimes like homicide. The authors found a trend in the research that facilitates the argument that both traffic fatalities and homicide have a tendency to correlate and to occur. Their methods consist of gathering six years of data then analyzing traffic fatalities and homicide occurrences. The most important finding in this study is that the connection between traffic fatality rates and homicide rates did exist (Giacopassi and Forde 2000, 401). The authors explain that the reason for this finding is based on their assumption that people who cause traffic incidents are more likely to engage in aggressive behavior that can lead to not following the law to an extreme measure, operationalized here as homicide homicide is used as an indicator of overall lawlessness (Giacopassi and Forde 2000, 402). The authors claim that a BWT approach in policing would reduce traffic casualties by police officers taking the initiative to correct any visible sign of disorder. They claim traffic stops are more critical to reducing crime because a car provides a sense of anonymity and empowerment (Giacopassi and Forde 2000, 404) to an individual who would not display the same aggressiveness as they would display being in a car towards others not being inside a car. I think this claim is not valid but just an assumption which the authors don t legitimize with any facts or research to support this claim in in their study. On the other hand, the data analyzed and research they perform allows them to arrive at the conclusion that performing traffic stops leads to less incivility and future meaningful crime therefore they have a reason

18 11 to claim the BWT theory works for the theory is based on the correction of minor disorders to reduce crime overall. The authors fail to provide evidence or show data that explains how BWT policing would reduce people committing traffic incidents. They make their claim on the presumption that if minor disorders are corrected then individuals would not engage in greater crime. I believe this study would have had more validity if the authors went into detail explaining what specific minor disorder was corrected and how a BWT approach in policing translated into an actual policy would be helpful. Now that I have presented a study that analyzes the benefits that correcting minor disorder would bring in traffic stops, I will present an article that supports the same premise as the above article that traffic stops would reduce further crime but on the contrary to my critique above does complement the study with a BWT approach in policing. This will contribute to this assessment of crime for we will be able to see if implementing BWT approach in traffic stops reduces crime rates. In Discouraging window breakers: The lagged effects of police activity on crime by Jonathan W. Caudill et al. (2013), the relationship between the police officer and traffic stops is established as a method that allows for community involvement with the citizens of the neighborhood as described in the BWT article Wilson and Kelling (1982) presented. This article does not engage in showing the implementation of a policy derived out of the BWT, but instead the focus is showing the methods used to assess the reduction of crime. To measure the reduction of crime using the BWT approach, police officer performance is operationalized using variables that involved the use of traffic and non- traffic summonses by precinct level. The hypothesis is that the BWT approach in policing causes less serious crime. They point out that the difference from previous studies was that instead of measuring variables by the years it was done on a monthly basis, the downside of this was decreased observation time and this affected other variables that are obtained when the observation times are longer such as population estimates (Wilson and Kelling 1982, 20). Their findings prove that crime was not reduced with the attempt to reduce minor disorder with the issuing of summonses (Wilson and Kelling 1982, 23). Therefore BWT approach in policing as a means of crime reduction was not successful. They point out that

19 12 another reason that their study was not accurate was due to the fact that the data collected was official and was scrutinized to police officer discretion and policing jurisdictions (22). As you have seen this article explores that traffic stops does not lead to lower crime rates. This article presented the BWT approach in policing as a possible source of crime reduction and did not have positive results to support the hypothesis. This finding can be due to there not being an actual policy derived out of the BWT to study. Measuring the BWT with variables such as issuing of summonses to assess the reduction of crime is probably not justifiable for this theory. Therefore, in the following article I will present a city that did implement a policy derived out of BWT and I will asses if in this case crime lowered due to a policy derived out of the BWT instead of relying on variables that assume would work in measuring the BWT. In Policing the Homeless an Evaluation of Efforts to Reduce Homeless Related Crime by Richard Berk and John MacDonald (2010) the authors evaluate the BWT by taking a close look at how it was implemented in the city of Los Angeles. The name the program was given there was Safer Cities initiatives and the Main Street pilot project (Berk and MacDonald 2010, 816). These initiatives were practiced in a place called Skid row known as the largest homeless community in Los Angeles. Even though the authors disagree with a homeless community as a target of crime reduction fines and citations their goal is to examine if this policy derived out of the BWT actually reduces crime (814). The methods used to analyze crime reduction were the examinations and close observation of the LAPD data on Skid Row during the years the initiatives was put in effect. Their findings indicated a crime reduction, but they did emphasize other possible reasons for the crime reduction besides the BWT policy such as the media speculation that occurred and communication within the neighborhood residents. Besides the reasons listed already other significant reasons that contribute to the study being erroneous is the fact that the methods used to clean up the crime by the police were neither documented nor studied. We can only speculate on what happened (836) only leads me to think that the authors didn t feel compelled to believe that proper procedure and practices ensued to reduce crime in the homeless community by the police. In this example we saw that the authors present how a policy derived out of the BWT brought upon crime reduction in a homeless community but regardless of the results, this does not explain other factors such as the practices the police officers used to achieve the

20 13 crime reduction or the media speculation that occurred. As you have seen in this article, I explored the notion of crime reduction with a policy derived out of the BWT. The BWT is plagued with mixed findings, the studies I have analyzed have been subject to rely on data and departmental and officer discretion and jurisdictions. Despite these findings, there are scholars whose approach departs from this style of research and focus is based more on data and observations that did not face the limitations the studies above did. In Policing Crime And Disorder Hot Spots: A Randomized Controlled Trial By Anthony Braga and Brenda J. Bond (2008) the authors analyze the reduction of crime in Lowell, Massachusetts using the strategies suggested by Wilson and Kelling (1982). They found that implementing disorder correcting strategies as suggested by the BWT lowered crime significantly. Their methods consisted of analyzing systematics observations and calls made to the 911 phone line by the residents of Lowell, Massachusetts. The authors note the margin of error in this study can be that calls are not necessarily a very resourceful measure due to the discrepancies a call can encounter, for example a call for one accident can turn into many calls therefore to measure one incident per call is not very accurate. The authors like this method regardless of its minor flaw due to the fact that it has not been subject to officer discretion or official jurisdictions. Another method of analyzing the authors ascribe to is first hand observation by accompanying undercover officers in cars to observe places where disorder was taking place, taking notes and putting together data to be studied later. The result of the study of the implementation of disorder prevention policy the BWT provides was successful in reduction of crime rates in Skid Row, Los Angeles. The most notable difference was seen with loitering incidents decreasing by 71.6%, there was also no displacement of crime to other areas two blocks surrounding the studied area was monitored for this. The authors point out that the BWT can reduce crime rates but suggest to the readers that the policy was used in a high crime ridden city and in one specific high crime place where crime was relevant (Braga and Bond 2008, 598). As you can see this study of the BWT was more first hand in the testing involving the scholars, compared to the other studies that used already available data to conduct their analysis. Now I will present another article in which the author argued the BWT was effective in reducing crime.

21 14 In Broken Windows New Evidence From New York City and a Five City Social Experiment by Bernard E. Harcourt and Jens Ludwig (2006). The authors point out that other measures need to be used to analyze if a policy based on correcting disorders like the BWT is appropriate. They analyze a program implemented in 1994 called Moving to Opportunity (MTO) that is used in NY, Chicago, Los Angeles, Baltimore and Boston to assist people with better opportunities that live in low income housing (Harcourt and Ludwig 2006, 276). They closely analyze the results for the people who under the program are moved to neighborhoods with less disorder and account to see if their arrest rates decrease. As the premise of the BWT suggests after reviewing the data collected from people who remained in disorderly neighborhoods and the people who were moved to less disorderly neighborhoods it was found that crime committed by these individuals did not decrease or change arrest rates for the individuals (Harcourt and Ludwig 2006, 307) therefore the authors find that BWT does not decrease crime Nevertheless from a public policy perspective, the faith that many policy makers place in the efficacy of broken windows policing is in the end just faith, rather than the results of convincing empirical evidence (307). The authors point out that BWT is a theory that should be studied and considered before any policy is derived from it and that other methods of studying it should be employed such as theirs as an example. I have evaluated the BWT by assessing the literature on the topic to discuss whether it reduces crime. To do this I gave examples of the cities that implemented a BWT approach in policing and cities that actually adopted policy derived out of the BWT such as Safer Cities initiatives and the Main Street pilot project (Berk and MacDonald 2010, 816) in Los Angeles. I explain its effectiveness and discuss whether it reduced crime. Another trend that was present in this analysis was the varying methods the authors use to measure and evaluate the effectiveness BWT has in reducing crime rates/disorder. I found that there is no standard to measuring and testing the BWT, therefore these scholars engage in various methods of studying it. The studies range from analyzing data to find a link between traffic fatalities and homicide to studies that involve the scholars accompanying undercover police officers to the scene of disorder to take data. With this said, I will reemphasize that the findings of the literature assessing the BWT were mixed and unclear. The reason for mixed and unclear findings was that there were many variables the scholars found to be present that would not

22 15 allow making a justifiable conclusion such as data that was exposed to police officer discretion and jurisdictions. I presented different methods scholars take to analyze the theory in order not to have a bias assessment and provide different points of views and perspectives. Now that I have presented this evaluation of the BWT which assessed whether the theory reduces crime rates in different cities of the United States, I want to specifically focus on New York City (NYC) and the effects BWT had there in crime reduction. Interestingly enough after the implementation of the BWT in NYC in 1995 crime rates began to drop. Alike, the literature review above assessing whether the BWT caused a crime reduction, I will investigate the different methods of investigation a few authors embrace and seek to analyze whether the implementation of the BWT actually reduced crime rates in the 1990s-2000s in NYC. Not surprisingly enough, I found that the literature assessing the crime rate reduction varies in methods and observation styles. Below I will explain the studies and findings scholars present when assessing the reduction of crime that started in the 1990s in NYC. In Theorizing policing: The drama and myth of crime control in the NYPD by Peter K. Manning (2001), the author presents his analysis of the crime reduction that occurred in NYC in the 1990s-2000s using a dramaturgy approach, a method whose formula relies on the use of symbols to explain and express meanings to the public. His hypothesis is that crime reduction that occurred in the 1990s in NYC was simply a spectacle put together by the media and officials and not the result of the implementation of Quality of Life derived from the BWT. The author contends that the image and press the public was exposed to by the media regarding the NYPD had been really bad due to all the scandals and corruption that predominated the police department for about two decades before the Giuliani administration took over. Peter Manning (2001) claims that the media and public officials intentionally glorified the Giuliani Administration in particular Police Commissioner Bratton for the crime reduction with second intentions that were aimed at legitimizing the Quality of Life initiative to the public. To support the argument the author suggests that crime reduction actually started ten years earlier and not after the Quality of Life initiative was implemented like the media

23 16 presented to the public. The author adds that crime reduction figures can be easily manipulated since they are easily gathered and distributed by police officers implying that crime reduction figures can be misguiding. His recommendation for this not to occur is further independent gathering of data as a more credible source of information to study and follow. The author contemplates factors that may give credibility to the Quality of Life crime reduction argument and why it can be misguiding. One of them is the decision-making role given to police officials which broke down hierarchical boundaries that used to exists within the NYPD. Another factor was when police officers who were not in gang units were given the ability to effect drug arrests and further loosening of their discretionary roles. The authors explain that these were significant changes for the police department but it did not address the training given to the new recruits in the police academy or for officers already on the job on how to reduce crime using the Quality of Life initiative. Instead there was pressure placed on the officers to reduce crime with no training on forming a better relationship with the community or in the name of crime reduction for the Quality of Life initiative to be effective (Manning 2001, 330). The author concludes his argument by claiming that police interference does not reduce crime rates and in fact how police reduce crime is a mystery (Manning 2001, 330) because they were not trained to reduce crime using the Quality of Life initiative but given more authority to correct minor disorders and reduce crime at their own discretion and he does not see this methods as effective in crime reduction. Therefore, crime reduction according to the author was just a spectacle put together by public officials and the media to convince the public that crime reduction had gone down due to the implementation of the Quality of Life Initiative to give the impression that NYC was a safer place to live in. As you have seen, I have presented one scholar s argument on why the Quality of Life initiative was not successful in New York City in the reduction of crime due to the policy not being properly presented in the police officers training and instead merely a spectacle to convince the public that NYC had a crime reduction. With this in mind, I will now present a case in which the BWT was put into effect as a policy in a city that did train its police force to implement the theory in the community. I will explain how the BWT was put into effect in this city which approach was quite different than NYC. I will discuss and assess

24 17 the similarities and differences of how the BWT was put into effect in both cities and the results of crime reduction in the 1990s-2000s, to assess if the crime reduction that occurred in NYC was due to the implementation of Quality of Life. In the city Bogota, Colombia the police force training consisted of community relations and interactions with the public on their rights and prevention (Beckett and Godoy 2010, 286). This was a very different strategy from the one used in NYC, therefore I will discuss both cases and explain their results. In A Tale of Two Cities: A Comparative Analysis of Quality of Life initiatives in New York and Bogota by Katherine Beckett and Angelina Godoy (2010) the authors show the effects Quality of Life had in Bogota, Colombia and how it lowered crime rates. This was achieved without using the same police enforcement NYC promoted but instead relied on innovative efforts that required community involvement and cooperation. In Bogota, officials were inspired by the crime reduction Quality of Life promised. Upon reviewing the benefits the BWT offered as explained in George Kelling and James Wilson (1982) article they decided to implement an initiative derived out of the theory. The initiative became known as Mision Bogota (Beckett and Godoy 2010, 287) an attempt to replicate the Quality of life initiative used in NYC in correcting minor disorders and the disorderly but would be slightly different in the way it was implemented in the community to handle disorders and the disorderly. First, I will explain the similarities and differences both cities have in order to be able to establish why the policy had the different effects it had in both cities. The similarities both cities have is that the population size is similar. Both cities hold estimates of over 8 million people (Beckett and Godoy 2010, 280). Another important similarity is that both cities have increasingly high crime rates leading to people fearing for their safety in the streets in the time frame addressed here before the early 1990s (280). The cities police departments hold meetings where the precincts and supervisors need to present crime reductions they have made to represent their activity in the mission of crime reduction. The neighborhood s businesses districts have formed public-private partnerships where consistent police presence is made available (Beckett and Godoy 2010, 285). Now that I have presented the similarities, I will proceed to present their differences. The differences are in the amount of police officers employed in the NYC police department triples the amount of officers in Bogota (Beckett and Godoy 2010, 286). Bogota sought to

25 18 expand government involvement and expansion by funding and cleaning up parks and public spaces (287). In NYC former Mayor Giuliani strived to decrease public spending and decrease services and enhance privatization (289). This privatization combined with Quality of Life initiative which increased the punishment of minor disorders created fines and increased incarceration rates for the repeat offenders, homeless and prostitutes for they fit in the category of disorderly as the BWT describes. In contrast, the way the disorderly were handled in Bogota was differently instead of punishment being handed out to this category of people they were handed out jobs and responsibilities, which emphasized community involvement and cooperation. I need to point out that prostitution is not only legal in Bogota but so is the possession of some narcotics and disorders such as vandalism which are not punishable by the law in the city of Bogota as they would be in NYC where fines and jail time would be issued. The BWT was implemented differently in Bogota encouraging visionary and stimulating efforts in the initiatives such as involving community members to participate in peace appeasement efforts. For example, the volunteers would take to the streets and act as mimes to relocate the vehicles that were double parked and help the elderly with their bags (Beckett and Godoy 2010, 287). The public in Bogota received these initiatives very graciously. Whereas in NYC the communities only report animosity and racial profiling and the budget was implemented on efforts to apprehend criminals (287). The results this initiative had in Bogota was that a major decrease in crime rates occurred. NYC had a crime reduction of 72 percent in the 1990s -2000s (Beckett and Godoy 2010, 291). The crime rate reduction in Bogota was very similar with figures of 72.5 percent in crime reduction for the time periods of (293). As you can see both Bogota and NYC implemented the BWT with different approaches and with the same goal, which was seeking crime reduction. NYC focused on correcting minor disorders and the disorderly with the use of increased police enforcement while in Bogota the focus was on correcting disorders and the disorderly with the use of initiatives that increased community involvement and creative reforms. This articles proves that the crime reduction in NYC in the 1990s-2000s was not due to the implementation of the Quality of Life initiative, for Bogota also had a similar crime reduction and did not engage in

26 19 the same practices as NYC did with the heavy police enforcement of minor disorders known as the Quality of Life initiative. As you can see the results for the BWT have been mixed. I will now present another study which questions if the BWT has a role in reducing crime rates in s. In order to assess if the Quality of Life initiative lowered crime rates in NYC in the s, I have given an example of why Quality of Life was not successful there and explained why this policy was attributed to crime reduction. I have also analyzed the way the BWT was implemented into a policy in a city where minor disorders are not penalized and used creative reform instead to decrease crime rates. The success BWT had in Bogota proved that NYC s approach in enforcing Quality of Life disorders did not reduce crime rates. Now I will take a look at other cities in the United States in the s and explain why they encountered a great reduction in crime and analyze if BWT had a role in this. Bernard Harcourt (2001) contradicts the claim that the Quality of Life initiative in NYC reduced crime rates in s. He supports this claim by presenting that there were five other cities that experienced a major crime reduction and did not implement the BWT at all (Harcourt 2001, 92). One of these cities is San Diego, California which had a substantially different policy than NYC. Unlike the New York City Police Department (NYPD) the police department in San Diego trained its police force on creating neighborhood relationships with the residents. Along with the police force the residents were also encouraged to train and cooperate addressing disorder and problems in the goal of crime reduction (Harcourt 2001, 92). This tactic was successful for San Diego had a significant crime reduction in the range of % (91). This example proves that a city that did not implement a policy derived out of the BWT and crime rates reduced substantially in the s proving that the argument that the BWT reduces crime rates is not necessarily true according to the author. As you have seen according to my brief assessment the crime reduction that occurred in NYC in the s was not due to the BWT. In this brief review, I analyzed the claim made by a scholar who presents that the crime reduction was merely a spectacle for the public to believe they were safer due to the fact that the police department had not made the changes necessary in implementing the Quality of Life in presenting it to the officers. Additionally another study rested on the fact that the author suggests that figures can be