May Max Security Solutions Ltd. Office:

Transcription

1 May 2016 Max Security Solutions Ltd. Office:

2 Executive Summary Piracy recorded an uptick off the coast of Nigeria s Bayelsa State. This, together with political protests in Abuja and severe intercommunal violence, has eclipsed discussion of Boko Haram militancy. In contrast, in Mali the threat of Islamist militancy has persisted, both in the north with the kidnapping of ICRC in Kidal, and in Bamako, with warnings by the US Embassy and local authorities. The increasingly transnational threat emanating from Mali has led Ghana to adopt new security measures, while violent invasions by artisanal miners threatens the operations of foreign owned gold mines in the country. A security crackdown has been recorded in Senegal s Casamance area, underscoring regional insecurity amid criminal and separatist activity. The impasse over the Gambia-Senegal border closure remains unresolved, and contributes to interstate tensions. In Guinea, recent failed attempts at mobilization by the UFDG have reflected the waning power and influence of the opposition following the election loss. In Congo Brazzaville, an attack in the capital has been blamed on the disbanded Ninja militia, HIGH and RISK triggered a large scale operation in the Pool Department. In the DRC, a government crackdown on opposition protests in Lubumbashi highlights a shift to active expression of dissent and reflects the threat posed by Moise Katumbi. CAR s new government enjoys relative stability, while militia-led criminal activity, localized violence in outlying areas point to major challenges in next phase of peacebuilding. In Chad, incumbent President Deby was reelected for a fifth term in office amid growing activism and political tensions. In Equatorial Guinea, President Obiang too was reelected for a fifth term with 93 percent of votes, facing an opposition boycott. In Niger, however, the opposition coalition COPA 2016 canceled their parliamentary boycott, as civil society organizations attempted to stage anti-government protests. The prolonged political crisis in Burundi witnessed an increase in assassinations and grenade attacks in Bujumbura, likely aimed at provoking an international response as the UNSC mulls sending in a police force, the ICC begins investigations, and the Arusha dialogue is set to 2 P a g e start. Encouragingly, a unity government was formed in South Sudan, yet entrenched tensions and distrust are liable to undercut political progress. In Sudan the government was victorious in the Darfur Referendum, and the SRF rebel coalition announced a unilateral ceasefire, and called for new negotiations. Border volatility in Ethiopia was highlighted by a large scale cross-border raid in Gambella, as well as localized, unrelated inter-ethnic violence in the same area. The Islamic State claimed its first attack in Somalia, while al-shabaab maintained it offensive in Mogadishu. In Mozambique, despite sustained unrest, concrete efforts by Renamo to unseat the government remained limited in scope. Still, Maputo comes under scrutiny due to protests over a previously undisclosed debt. In Angola, FLEC separatists claimed to have killed 47 soldiers in Cabinda, and several foreigners were kidnapped in Luanda. In Zambia, widespread xenophobic riots in poorer parts of Lusaka have been triggered by alleged foreign involvement in ritual killings, but are indicative of broader grievances fostered by dire economic outlook. 2Page Finally, in South Africa, EFF leader Malema reiterates pledge to take up arms in case of elections rigging, as regional polls are about to start.

3 The following list contains countries in the region with notable developments from the past month. Please choose your country of interest by clicking on its name below. EXTREME RISK CAR... 4 Somalia... 5 South Sudan... 6 HIGH RISK Burundi... 7 DRC... 8 Mali... 9 Nigeria Sudan MEDIUM RISK Angola Chad Ethiopia The Gambia & Senegal Guinea Kenya Mozambique Niger Senegal South Africa LOW RISK Equatorial Guinea Ghana Zambia Zimbabwe for May Page

4 EXTREME RISK CAR New government enjoys relative stability, while militia-led criminal activity, localized violence in outlying areas point to major challenges in next phase of peacebuilding. Travel to the CAR should be restricted to essential purposes only given the volatile security situation while avoiding all travel to outlying regions and Bangui's PK5 area. Armed militias in outlying areas pose most serious threat to continued stability The month of April was characterized by another period of relative stability in the CAR, punctuated by the appointment of a new, broad-based government, while outlying regions continued to experience localized violence involving militia elements. For example, the Kaga-Bandoro cattle market witnessed two such incidents on April 2 and 15. The first resulted in two deaths after clashes within the ex-seleka faction who control the market. The second also left two dead after local youth involved in the transportation of cattle refused to share their profits with the militiamen. Separately, on April 20, antibalaka elements burned houses and looted the village of Gamandji, 40 km from Bambari, in an apparent retaliatory attack for the death of their leader. Notably, the aforementioned violence was contained and did not involve any of the main militia factions, who have largely abided by non-aggression agreements and refrained from destabilizing the Touadera government. However, these incidents also underscore the serious challenges in the next phase of nation-building and ensuring lasting peace and stability. These include the widespread proliferation of weapons, prevalence of armed groups who refuse to disarm, their financially-motivated criminal activities as witnessed in Kaga-Bandoro, and the lack of security infrastructure outside Bangui that enables the kind of cyclical, vigilante justice experienced in Gamandji. This fragile stability will be further tested with the slated withdrawal of French troops by the end of the year. On April 24, French forces left their base in Sibut to the control of UN Integrated Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA), the last French military contingent outside of Bangui. Following a series of sexual abuse claims and a perception amongst the local population that its peacekeepers have failed to protect civilians from armed groups, segments of the local population view MINUSCA with mistrust or outright animosity. We therefore assess that MINUSCA will be unable to contain a major renewal of sectarian violence, should it occur. This was evidenced on April 17, when a local mob killed a Moroccan peacekeeper who was guarding an injured Lord s Resistance Army (LRA) fighter in Rafai, situated 600 km east of Bangui near the DRC border, following a nearby looting and kidnapping raid by the LRA. Thus, while signs point to a continued period of relative stability overall, significant security risks remain, particularly in outlying regions, owing to the limited capacity of national and international security forces to counter the well-armed local militias. 4Page

5 EXTREME RISK Somalia At least eight VBIED attacks attempted in Mogadishu, while IS claims its first attack. Puntland, Somali Federal Government (SFG) agree on model for August elections. We advise against all travel to Somalia at this time with the exception of the Puntland and Somaliland regions. Travel within these regions should be restricted to cities and be for essential purposes only, while avoiding travel to outlying regions. Al-Shabaab maintains offensive against Mogadishu, as IS claims its first attack in Somalia The spate of attacks in Mogadishu that commenced in late March intensified in April. In addition to shootings, drive-by assassinations and mortar shelling, there were at least four vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) explosions and five other instances of car bombs being discovered prior to detonating. Confrontations persisted elsewhere, and the militants continued targeting coal workers, with claims that approximately 90 coal laborers were conscripted to fight for the group after ignoring al-shabaab s ban on the trade. Concomitantly, the US confirmed that it killed Hassan Ali Dhoore, a commander of al-shabaab s Amniyat intelligence unit, in airstrikes on March 31. On April 11-12, the US struck militants it claimed posed an imminent threat to US and Somali forces near Kismayo. Meanwhile, African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali forces claimed to retake numerous locations in southern and central Somalia. In addition, on April 24 the Islamic State (IS) issued a claim of responsibility for its first attack in Somalia, an improvised explosive device (IED) detonation targeting an AMISOM convoy in the outskirts of Mogadishu. On April 7, a group calling itself Jabha East Africa publicly pledged allegiance to IS and denounced al-shabaab s persecution of IS supporters. A connection between the two groups remains unclear. The high number of successful and attempted VBIEDs in Mogadishu, combined with other forms of militancy recorded, continue to underscore the elevated capabilities possessed by al-shabaab in terms of planning, coordinating and executing attacks. The group remains troubled by counterinsurgency operations by Somali and regional forces, as well as US airstrikes, which increased in recent months. Furthermore, there are indications that the group is having problems recruiting new fighters, and relying more on child soldiers and conscripted individuals. While the threat posed by IS elements in Somalia remains unclear, their emergence further increases the pressure on al-shaabab to assert itself as the primary militant force in the country, and thus we assess that the latter group will sustain its offensive against high-profile targets in the capital and elsewhere. 5Page Puntland agrees to 4.5 clan system for August elections on April 3 Puntland received a guarantee that this is the last time the model is used. The deal removes a notable deadlock, yet several important details regarding the vote still need to be decided upon by the federal states, and the possibility of a postponement of elections persists.

6 EXTREME RISK South Sudan Unity government formed on April 29 following return of Machar to Juba, yet entrenched tensions, distrust liable to undercut political progress. Those traveling to South Sudan should restrict essential travel to Juba, while maintaining heightened vigilance and adhering to stringent security protocols, given high levels of crime and insecurity. Unity government formed after Machar returns to Juba The month of April achieved important milestones in the implementation of the August 2015 peace agreements, yet this progress was marked by repeated hurdles along the way. By April 10, the 1,370 Sudan People s Liberation Movement-In Opposition (SPLM-IO) troops tasked with security Juba jointly with government forces arrived to the capital, followed two days later by the arrival of the rebel s deputy chairman Alfred Lado Gore. The Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) announced that SPLM-IO leader Riek Machar would arrive on April 12, yet the rebel leader postponed this until April 18. His arrival was repeatedly postponed over conflicting reasons during that week, and finally transpired on April 26, a day after the arrival of the SPLM-IO chief of staff. Machar was inaugurated as first vice president, and on April 29 the cabinet of the Transitional Government of National Unit (TGoNU) was formed. That same day, the government requested funding from foreign donors, which replied that this was contingent on an improvement in the political and security situation in the country. Amid other developments, the repeated delays until the arrival of Machar, blamed by each side on the other, underscores that, despite the formation of the unity government, partisan tensions persist at the political and military levels. The new government must now deal with deeply polarizing issues such as the redivision of the country s territory into 28 states, which the rebels strongly oppose. In addition, power struggles over future elections, which largely motivated the civil war in the first place, will resurface as President Salva Kiir, Machar and other actors maintain ambitions to rule the country. Furthermore, poor discipline among government and opposition troops may lead to clashes either in Juba or in outlying regions. Together, these elements may lead to the collapse of the peace agreements and to renewed fighting between the sides. A main factor pushing in the other direction, however, is the need for international assistance, since low oil prices have strained the government s finances. Thus, we assess that the international community will use this tool to gain leverage and forcefully maintain stability South Sudan. 6Page

7 HIGH RISK Burundi Recent increase in assassinations, grenade attacks in Bujumbura likely aimed at provoking international response as UNSC mulls police force, ICC begins investigation. Travel to Burundi should be restricted to essential purposes only given the volatile security situation while avoiding all travel to outlying areas and those in the capital prone to opposition unrest, including the Cibitoke, Jabe, Kanyosha, Musaga, Mutakura, Ngagara and Nyakabiga neighborhoods. Uptick in assassinations of government ministers, army officers in Bujumbura Burundi witnessed an uptick in political violence in outlying regions over recent weeks, as well as a more recent spike in targeted killings of government and military officials and a mix of gunfire and grenade attacks in Bujumbura. Most notably, General Athanase Kararuza, the security adviser to the First Vice President, was assassinated along with his wife and child in Gihosha on April 25, one day after a failed attempt to kill a government minister at a church in Rohero and five days after an army colonel was killed in Kinama. This spate of assassination attempts coincided with an uptick in grenade attacks and gunfire in the Jabe, Kinama, Gihosha, Ngagara and Musaga neighborhoods. By way of context, the UN estimates that at least 430 people have been killed and 250,000 have fled the country since the political crisis erupted in April 2015 over Nkurunziza s plans to run for a third term. While the precise reasons behind the recent uptick remains to be seen given the disparate groups and strategies of insurgents, we assess that it may be related to increased international scrutiny as the UN Security Council (UNSC) considers deploying an international police force to the country. Three options have been presented to the UNSC, ranging from 20 to 50 personnel to assess the Burundian police, a monitoring presence of 228 police, or a civilian protection and monitoring mission of up to 3,000 officers. Meanwhile, Burundian officials have agreed to around 20 unarmed police experts. By intensifying their attacks, the insurgents are countering the government narrative that the security situation is under control and increasing the pressure for a robust UN police force. The heavy-handed security crackdowns in response to such attacks also increase the pressure for international action and accountability, particularly now that the International Criminal Court has begun a preliminary examination as of April 25 into human rights abuses committed in Burundi. Lastly, the violence also adds a sense of urgency to the dialogue talks slated for May 2-6 in Arusha to be mediated by former Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa. While action by the UNSC, ICC and dialogue mediators may be one of the goals of destabilizing acts by the armed opposition, such tactics are unlikely to result in a negotiated end to the violence, given the intransigence by the Nkurunziza government. This hardline stance is in turn related to the lack of political will by the African Union and UN to intervene militarily against a hostile Burundi, pointing to continued political violence ahead. 7Page

8 HIGH RISK DRC Government crackdowns on opposition protests witnessed in Lubumbashi; highlights shift to active expression of dissent, reflects threat posed by Moise Katumbi Travel to Kinshasa and Lubumbashi can continue while adhering to standard security precautions regarding criminal activity. We advise against nonessential travel to outlying areas, given the high risk of criminality and insecurity posed by armed groups. Security forces deploy teargas against political opposition rallies in city of Lubumbashi During the morning hours of April 20, a demonstration took place outside the provincial headquarters of the National Union of Federalists of Congo (UNAFEC), with participants reportedly chanting slogans against incumbent President Joseph Kabila. Reports indicate that approximately 5,000 people were present, although conflicting sources assert that only 500 individuals took part. The event was broken up by security forces, who deployed tear gas and arrested participants. Nine of those arrested were later sentenced to prison terms of between two and ten years on April 22. The event was reportedly catalyzed by the vandalism of images of Moises Katumbi, former governor of Katanga Province and presidential candidate for the G7 opposition coalition, by members of the police the previous evening. A second protest took place in Lubumbashi on April 24, led by Katumbi and G7 parties, despite a ban by the Lubumbashi mayor on all political gatherings, enacted on April 23. This event was also cracked down upon, with tear gas and arrests once again put into effect. Meanwhile, opposition rallies transpired without incident in Kinshasa, Goma, and Bakuvu. Following the crackdown, the G7 reportedly stated its intention to mount protests on a weekly bases. The above incidents highlight two notable trends. Firstly, whilst significant political tensions currently exist within the DRC, centered on electoral delays and the resulting likelihood of the postponement of the November 2016, challenges to incumbent President Kabila s rule in Lubumbashi and its surrounding areas have thus far been largely passive. Against this backdrop, the two demonstrations in swift succession, and the declared intention to stage more, marks a distinct escalation in the opposition coalition s modus operandi vis-a-vis protest action and the active vocalization of political opposition in Katumbi s stronghold of Lubumbashi. Secondly, the localized nature of the crackdowns reinforces assessments that Katumbi is perceived to pose a significant political threat to Kabila and his administration. Taken together, these trends point to the likely emergence of a pattern of unrest in Lubumbashi over the coming months, particularly in the likely even that elections are one again officially postponed. With this, there exists the potential for similar incidents to take place in Kinshasa. 8Page

9 HIGH RISK Mali Ansar Dine kidnaps, later releases three aid workers for International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Kidal Region in return for aid workers local guide arrested previous day, highlighting group s entrenchment in local community. US Embassy warning, local intelligence service statements underscore continued threat of attacks in Bamako. Travel to Bamako may continue at this time while adhering to stringent security precautions regarding criminal activity and potential militancy. Ansar Dine kidnap, release three aid workers in Kidal Region The aid workers were kidnapped near Abeibera, Kidal on April 16 after their local guide was arrested by French forces in the area. As the aid workers were returning to Kidal, they were reportedly intercepted and brought to the custody of Ansar Dine, who demanded the release of the arrested guide. The workers were all released, with the ICRC claiming that this was done unconditionally. Furthermore, there is no indication at this time that the local guide was released from French custody. Notably, the event comes amid an intensified French-led counterinsurgency in northern Mali, which was largely centered in Kidal. The counterinsurgency operations led to unruly protests in Kidal airport on April 18. Details surrounding the arrest of the guide, as well as the kidnapping and release of the aid workers are scarce at this time. Particularly, it is unclear whether the guide is a member of Ansar Dine. In this context, given Ansar Dine s efforts to gain favor with the local communities they operate in, it is possible that they were taking the lead in seeking the guide s release as part of this public relations strategy. This is particularly timely in light of the local grievances against the French arrest operations, as highlighted by the protests in Kidal. Overall, whether the guide is an Ansar Dine associate or not, the fact that Ansar Dine became involved in pushing for his release highlights their deep entrenchment within the local community. This entrenchment is further emphasized by the fact that Ansar Dine was able to stop the aid vehicle almost immediately after the guide s arrest, likely pointing to strong intelligence and communication capabilities in the area. Also of concern is the fact that the individual, who was likely in some ways in touch with Ansar Dine was employed as a guide for such a prominent international organization. US Embassy, local security force statements highlight threat of militant attacks in Bamako Throughout April, local security forces claimed to have arrested several militant affiliated with the al-mourabitoun attacks in Bamako on March 21, and on November 20 and March 7 of Security forces added that the arrests revealed plans to orchestrate additional attacks in the capital in the near term. Meanwhile, on April 8 the US embassy in Bamako claimed to receive information concerning threats of attacks against foreign affiliated locales. These events, along with the overall increase in militancy in Mali since late 2015 all underscore the continued and real threat of militant attacks in urban centers in Mali, including Bamako. 9Page

10 HIGH RISK Nigeria Uptick in piracy propels security operations, onboard measures most effective defense. Occupy NASS sustains several days of protests in central Abuja. Intercommunal violence recorded in Enugu, Cross Rivers State, despite various initiatives. Travel to Abuja, Lagos, and Port Harcourt may continue while maintaining heightened vigilance and stringent security protocols regarding criminal and security threats. Amidst uptick in Gulf of guinea piracy, Nigeria launches augmented security operations Multiple open water attacks have been reported against vessels off the shores of Bayelsa State over recent months, including several notable upticks in attacks in April. For example, five attacks in a 48 hour period on April We assess that the uptick in attacks stems from longstanding lack of international interest in the Gulf of Guinea and Nigeria s inability to fill the maritime security vacuum, yet the immediate trigger for the current rise is President Buhari s crackdown on the Niger Delta s ex-militants and corruption in energy and security sectors. Nigeria has launched operation Tsare Teku to combat piracy and criminality in the Niger Delta region, and has increased enforcement on a ban of outboard motors with over 200 horsepower. Still, recent events underscore that security measures undertaken by the captain and crew of attacked vessels remain the most effective form of defense at this time. Opaque budget delays, personal corruption of legislators attract protests On April 26-29, the movement Occupy NASS maintained a protest outside the National Assembly in Abuja. Protestors called for the resignation of Senate President Bukola Saraki over allegations of graft, yet a spokesperson for the group reportedly described Saraki as a symptom for more deeply rooted corruption. Some disruptions to the normal operations of the National Assembly were reported, yet the protest did not attract a significant crowd. Thus, despite the centrality of the protest site and extensive media coverage, Occupy NASS is unlikely to transform into a large scale movement. It is, however, effective in highlighting growing discontent with the opaque and delayed confirmation of the federal budget. For many in the general public, this is a testimony to the inefficiency and lingering corruption in the federal system, while to at least some domestic and foreign commentators, it is a testimony to Buhari acting as a bottle neck in time sensitive financial decisions. Intercommunal violence in Enugu, Cross Rivers, initiative to erect grazing reserves fumbles Incidents of intercommunal violence in outlying regions of the country have continued in April, most notably in the southern Enugu State, where at least 40 people have been killed, and Cross River states. Augmented discussion of an initiative to establish grazing reserves has been criticized by local governments and herders alike. Such initiatives, as well as the surgical deployment of forces to individual hotspots, are unlikely to have widespread impact at this time due to poor law enforcement, interlinked nature of political tensions and intercommunal disputes, and the highly organized nature of some of the actors involved in the fighting. 10Page

11 HIGH RISK Sudan Government-backed option victorious in Darfur Referendum, SRF rebel coalition announces unilateral ceasefire, calls for new negotiations. Travel to Khartoum can continue at this time while practicing security precautions regarding the threat of criminality. Darfur Referendum results favor government, as SRF rebels announce new ceasefire Official results of the Darfur Referendum, which took place from April 11-13, indicate that almost 98 percent of voters opted against the creation of a semi-autonomous province, which was the government s preferred outcome. According to Khartoum, this demonstrates that the Darfur crisis has ended. The result means that the Darfur Regional Authority (DRA) will be dissolved, and control over the region will be transferred to the central government. Furthermore, President Omar Bashir spoke of plans to collect illicit weapons from the war-torn region. Prior to the vote, the US cited concerns regarding the conduct of the referendum, and warned that its results could not be considered a credible expression of the voters will and that the referendum would "undermine the peace process now under way". Additionally, the referendum was boycotted by rebel groups in Darfur, and while Sudanese officials also pointed to a high turnout, this was claimed to be a lie by some opposition and civil society representatives. Meanwhile, sources indicate that the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF), which encompasses the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), the Sudan People s Liberation Army-Minni Minnawi (SPLA-MM) and the Sudan People s Liberation Army-North (SPLA- N), announced a new six-month unilateral ceasefire, effective since April 24. The SRF further called on the African Union (AU) High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) to facilitate new negotiations with Khartoum. In accordance with its history, we assess that the Sudanese government will ignore criticism of the referendum by local and international actors. Furthermore, the overwhelming results of the referendum are likely to be used by Khartoum to justify an intensified crackdown on rebel groups in the region, as already alluded by Bashir, which is likely to be resisted by the rebel groups and thus may further worsen instability in Darfur. Meanwhile, the ceasefire and call for new negotiations follow the end of a similar cessation of hostilities announced in October 2015, and the rejection by the rebels of an AUHIP-mediated Roadmap Agreement, which was accepted by Khartoum. As such, we assess that the new SRF announcement is an attempt to reopen discussions on the roadmap in attempts to obtain a more favorable result. Given the government s general intransigence, even if new talks take place, we assess they are unlikely to improve the rebel s hands, particularly following the government s victory in Darfur. 11Page

12 MEDIUM RISK Angola Several foreign nationals kidnapped for ransom in and around Luanda in April. Military official rejects death claims of 47 Angolan soldiers during clashes with FLEC. Travel to Luanda can continue at this time while adhering to basic security precautions Four foreign nationals targeted in abductions for ransom in separate incidents in Luanda Abductions of foreign nationals have increased over recent months in Angola and especially in the capital Luanda and its environs, forcing the French and British embassies to put out warnings to their citizens. In the latest incident, two Chinese nationals were kidnapped on April 19 in Kilamba New City district, situated approximately 20 km southeast of Luanda. Around the same time, a French worker for an international shipping company was abducted and reportedly released for a ransom of 250,000 US Dollars (USD). On April 3, a Lebanese- Belgian businessman was reportedly released, four days after being abducted in Luanda for ransom. A ransom payment of 500,000 USD was demanded, however, it remains unknown how much was eventually paid in exchange for his release. Additionally, a Portuguese national was killed during a home invasion on April 22. The continued trend of abductions of foreigners for ransom in Angola, as well as robberies underscore the government s inability or unwillingness to detect the related criminal networks. Moreover, many reports point to the worsening economy of Angola as a significant reason for the increase in this type of crimes, which target foreign nationals since they are perceived as lucrative targets. Thus, abductions for financial gain are likely to continue and possibly exacerbate in the near term, mainly given the probable payment of the requested ransom, which encourages further abductions. Separatist FLEC movement announces killing of 47 Angolan soldiers, army denies claims Reports released on April 21 cite the General Chief of Staff of the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) as dismissing the April 17 claims of the separatist Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC) movement, that 47 Angolan soldiers were killed during armed clashes in Cabinda in the previous weeks. Furthermore, the General Chief of Staff claimed that there were no incidents of fighting since 2011 in Cabinda and that the situation in the region is stable. In spite of the army s claims that these incidents did not take place and that the region has been tranquil since 2011, given past FLEC assaults, we assess that the group does have a capacity to stage attacks and that some sort of clashes have been witnessed over recent years and likely months despite possible exaggerations of casualty figures. That said, there remains a potential that the FLEC is attempting to publish false information regarding a high casualty number of Angolan security personnel in order to present themselves as a more legitimate and powerful force. In any case, if recent statements by the group are accurate, they demonstrate a modus operandi of focusing on military targets in relatively outlying areas. We continue to assess that the threat of attacks outside the borders of the enclave in mainland Angola is significantly lower. 12Page

13 MEDIUM RISK Chad Incumbent President Idriss Deby reelected for fifth term in office amid growing activism, political tensions; highlights grip on power, potential for protests in coming weeks Travel to N Djamena and Mondou may continue at this time while adhering to stringent security measures regarding potential militant attacks, civil unrest. President Idriss Deby wins April 10 presidential elections, as significant political friction witnessed in lead-up In contrast with the passive measures adopted by political opposition to the Deby regime in March, two active events were witnessed in the days prior to the April 10 elections, both catalyzed by the arrest and continued detention of four civil society leaders over the course of March The first, a march slated for April 5, in defiance of a ban by the Minister of Public Security and Immigration on March 30, was poorly attended and prevented from moving by a heavy security presence. The second, a demonstration outside the N Djamena Palais de Justice on April 7, sparked a crackdown during which security forces fired teargas and warning shots to disperse the crowd. Meanwhile, on April 4, seven of 13 opposition parties signed a pact to establish a parallel electoral commission and support single candidate in second round of voting. Nevertheless, voting took place on April 10 without notable incident, amid allegations by presidential challenger Saleh Kebzabo of irregularities. Following the elections, 47 soldiers thought to have voted for opposition candidates reportedly went missing, and a French author critical of the regime was deported. According to results released on April 21 by the National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI), Deby won 61.5 percent of the vote, thus eliminating the need for a second round, following threats by opposition candidates led by Kebzabo to form a national salvation government should CENI announce the results in favor of Deby. Deby s reelection was unsurprising, despite the growing opposition activism witnessed in the lead up to the elections. This comes as a result of his tight grip over Chad s public institutions, significant majority in the National Assembly, and an ineffective, fractured opposition. With that said, it should be noted that the anti-deby campaign is not been entirely based on resistance to his continued rule, but has also come to encompass issues including the continued detention of civil society leaders and the rape of the daughter of an opposition leader by the sons of senior military officers. Thus, whilst the absence of a second round of voting in and of itself creates the potential for further opposition action, particularly given the threats by the opposition, the broader scope of the issues used as platforms for criticism against the government heightens Chad s post electoral volatility, both in the immediate weeks after the polls, and the following months. Consequently, we assess that there continues to exist the potential for opposition protests and security crackdowns. 13Page

14 MEDIUM RISK Ethiopia Ethiopian forces enter South Sudan in pursuit of Murle militiamen following large-scale raid of 13 villages, killing of 140 ethnic Nuers in Gambella as fighting between Nuers and local Anuak ethnic group results in attacks on UN, international relief organization facilities, highlighting spillover effects of conflict in South Sudan, vulnerability of border. Travel to Addis Ababa may continue at this time while adhering to standard security precautions and avoiding the vicinity of all large gatherings and demonstrations given elevated likelihood for unrest at such events. Border volatility highlighted by large scale cross-border raid in Gambella, as well as localized, unrelated inter-ethnic violence On April 15, a group of mostly Murle gunmen from South Sudan crossed into Ethiopia s Gambella Region and killed at least 140 Nuer civilians and abducted Nuer children, a South Sudanese ethnic group that historically reside along the border with Ethiopia, and to a lesser degree in Ethiopia. Their numbers in Ethiopia have been increasing in light of the South Sudanese civil war. Ethiopia s communications minister, Getachew Reda, reportedly stated that security forces killed 60 of the assailants during the attack. Additional reports indicate that the Murle also stole over 2,000 livestock during the raid. Following the raid, Ethiopia requested approval from the South Sudanese government for an offensive against the militia and by April 21 reports indicate that Ethiopian forces entered the country and surrounded the area suspected to host the abducted children, reportedly with support from South Sudan. Meanwhile, on April 22 a vehicle belonging to an NGO struck and killed two Nuer children in Gambella s UN administered Jawi refugee camp. The Nuer retaliated, and reportedly killed local ethnic Anuaks, who in turn attacked and killed four Nuer. The aforementioned facilities were targeted as the Anuak accused them of aiding the Nuer.\ While Murle raids are not uncommon, this particular incident is notable in light of the unusually large scale of the attack as well as the response it garnered from Ethiopian forces. Although this development is not likely directly related to the conflict in South Sudan, the lack of governance in the country as well as the fact that approximately 250,000 Nuer, a historical rival of the Murle, have reportedly fled to Ethiopia as a result of the violence across the border has likely contributed in part to such cross-border violence. This is further highlighted by the clashes involving the Nuer and Anuak, with the latter having expressed resentment in recent years over what they perceived as the intrusion of the Nuer into their land. In any case, these development highlights the precarious nature of Ethiopia s border with South Sudan, while further violence, including retaliatory attacks by the Nuer may also be recorded. In any case, in light of the heightened tensions involving various ethnic groups and Ethiopian security forces, who themselves have at times fought along ethnic lines, we anticipate further violence to be recorded along the Ethiopia-South Sudan border in May. 14Page

15 MEDIUM RISK The Gambia & Senegal Impasse over Gambia-Senegal border closure remains unresolved, contributes to interstate tensions Travel to Banjul and Dakar may continue while adhering to standard security precautions relating to criminal activity. Blockade of Gambia-Senegal border over Gambian tariff increase persists In February, Senegalese truckers launched a blockade of the Gambian border in response to Gambian authorities decision to raise customs duties from around 7 USD to 700 USD per truck. Vehicles are consequently forced to drive around The Gambia, rather than being able to pass through it. A two-man Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) fact finding mission was deployed in early April, and met with the Gambian minister of trade on April 4, but their findings have yet to be released. As such, and despite reports that Gambia will lower the tariffs back to their original levels, the heightened levy remains in place The decision to raise the tariff highlights the weak position of the cash-strapped Gambian government, yet is simultaneously likely to pose a threat to the Gambian economy at large, given the country s geographical position inside Senegal. Within Senegal itself, the move has underscored the isolation of the restive Casamance region, and thus carries the potential to negatively impact Senegal s efforts to bring separatist elements within the region under control. Meanwhile, the scale of the increase may reflect an attempt by the Gambian government to establish a bargaining position ahead of any negotiations with Senegal. However, given the absence of pressure by ECOWAS or unilateral efforts by either Senegal or Gambia to engage in dialogue over the issue, and despite Gambia s announcement that it would lower the fee, we assess that the tariff, and the associated blockade, is likely to persist over the coming weeks. More broadly, the ongoing border closure comes amid, and contributes to, heightened political tensions between the two countries. This friction has recently been intensified by factors including Senegal s critique of Gambia s crackdown on an opposition protest on April 14, and the arrest of four Senegalese environmental officials by Gambian authorities on April 16 near the border village of Niaming. Whilst the tension currently appears unlikely to result in a significant dispute between the two states, it may nevertheless continue to manifest itself in the form of limited diplomatic altercations. 15Page

16 MEDIUM RISK Guinea UFDG party fails to mobilize Conakry residents for April 16 dead city protest over fuel prices; reflects waning power, influence of opposition following election loss. Travel to Conakry may continue at this time while adhering to stringent security precautions regarding heightened criminal activity and political unrest. UFDG s waning power, divisions hinder efforts to mobilize public The month of April was relatively calm amidst largely failed attempts of the opposition Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea (UFDG) party to capitalize on issues of public dissatisfaction to mount anti-government protests. This was most evident on the April 14 dead city day, in which the UFDG asked residents to stay home from their workplaces to pressure the government to reduce fuel prices, improve the fight against impunity, and respect the August 20 accords over the electoral calendar for local elections. While there were some limited traffic disruptions and business closures in Conakry, most activities carried on as normal, most notably in the opposition stronghold of Ratoma. Additionally, young protesters barricaded a main road in the Hamdallaye area of Conakry, leading to a heavy security force deployment. Meanwhile, on April 19, around a hundred women from the UFDG party who had gathered at the Autonomous Port of Conakry were prevented by security forces from marching to the Ministry of Justice to demand the release of detained opposition activists. The reaction to the banned march was muted and no further unrest was witnessed during the remainder of the month. The UFDG has struggled to regain its ability to mobilize its supporters in Upper Conakry following the largely peaceful re-election victory of President Alpha Conde in October Intra-party divisions have undoubtedly contributed to this phenomenon, triggered by the return to Guinea of UFDG founder Bah Oury in January after receiving a pardon from President Conde for a 2011 assassination attempt. Since then, he has been banned from the party with subsequent unrest between rival supporters. This was witnessed as recently as April 16 when gunfire was witnessed outside a meeting of the Bah Oury faction in Hamdallaye. The lack of party unity and coherence of UFDG post-elections demands, with grievances ranging from fuel prices to the electoral calendar to releasing detained opposition members, have failed to mobilize the public in the attempted dead city protests of March 30, 31 and April 14. We therefore assess that the potential for largescale opposition unrest has been largely reduced, although the poor, restive areas of Upper Conakry remain volatile due to the tendency of youths in these pro-opposition districts to adopt violent, albeit localized, protest tactics. 16Page

17 MEDIUM RISK Kenya NIS cites western Kenya as focus for al-shabaab recruitment, while security forces alert over alleged militant plans to use VBIEDs in eastern Kenya. CORD beings series of protests against IEBC, as police displays little tolerance. Travel to Nairobi and Mombasa may continue at this time while adhering to stringent security protocols due to high levels of criminality. Western Kenya claimed militant recruitment hotspot, whereas east under VBIED threat On April 15, sources cited a report by the National Intelligence Service (NIS) report indicating that the Rift Valley, Nyanza and Western provinces are now focuses for al- Shabaab recruitment efforts, joining the coastal and northern regions. Secondary schools, universities and prisons are pinpointed as locales for radicalization, and social media cited as a main tool for recruitment. Separately, NIS also alerted security forces in Mombasa and Tana River counties over al-shabaab plans to use vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) to attack public places in Mobasa and Garsen towns during the rainy period between April and June, when monitoring of the Somali border is considered more difficult. A threat by suicide bombers was also reported in Malindi. While reports on the arrest of al-shabaab militants in western Kenya are not rare, the NIS report points to a more concentrated effort by al-shabaab to expand its footprint beyond the eastern and northern region areas typically associated with militancy. Meanwhile, the threats to eastern Kenya should not be disregarded, and an implementation of heightened security measures in these regions will likely follow, yet it must be noted that similar such alerts are common yet rarely materialize. In addition, Kenyan security agencies failed to act on prior intelligence regarding the large-scale attacks in Nairobi s Westgate Mall, the Garissa University College and in El-Adde, Somalia. As such, while at times alerts are exaggerated, the absence of an alert does not exclude the possibility of an attack. Coalition for Reform and Democracy (CORD) commences wave of protests against IEBC The opposition CORD launched a campaign against the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), claiming that the latter could not be trusted to conduct the August 2017 general elections. The party, led by Raila Odinga, called on supporters to force IEBC workers to evacuate their offices in central Nairobi on April 25, with tear gas used to disperse the protesters. CORD protests in Kisumu County on April 26 were similarly dispersed. The opposition, whose representatives have vowed to defy court orders, is now planning weekly protests against the IEBC, with the next instance slated for May 9. This new wave of protests marks a significant departure from CORD s recent modus operandi, and we assess they are aimed at raising the opposition s profile ahead of the elections at the strategic expense of the ruling party and the IEBC. The party has adopted a defying stance, and is thus likely to go through with protests in Nairobi and outlying areas, which will continue to be met with forceful dispersal methods as long as a direct threat to national officials is present. 17Page

18 MEDIUM RISK Mozambique Renamo's concrete efforts to undermine government control remain limited in scope. Donors restrict access to foreign funds due to undisclosed debt, calls for protests are met with large scale preemptive police deployment in Maputo and Matola. Travel to Maputo and other urban centers in Mozambique may continue under necessary security protocols due to the high level of criminal activity and persistent threat of kidnapping. Renamo briefly capture town in Sofala Province, sabotage travel along EN7 Road The March ultimatum presented by the armed opposition movement Renamo for the government to address its demands pertaining to greater autonomy in six central and northern provinces has expired, yet the opposition's threat to unilaterally assume control of these regions has not come into fruition. One exception to this came at April 24, when Renamo gunmen reportedly captured the town of Chiramba, in the Chemba District of Sofala Province. Opposition fighters took control of a state building and a police station, patrolled the streets, and announced a change in government over the local radio. However, control of the town was short lived. Reports citing police officials indicate that government forces regained control of the area during the overnight hours of April Multiple other incidents of localized unrest were recorded in April. Notably, on April 17 Renamo forces reportedly dug a crater blocking the EN7 Road between the towns of Vanduzi and Catandica. Similarly, two armed Renamo men were reportedly killed on April 18 while attempting to sabotage a bridge in Honde, Barue District of Manica Province, in order to disrupt travel along the EN7. Thus, following the expiration of its ultimatum, Renamo undertakes concrete efforts to undermine state authority, yet our assessment that the movement does not wield a capacity to gain and maintain control over swaths of territory has been reinforced. This status quo is likely to continue over the coming months, with both sides entrenched in their positions and persisting localized violence, predominantly along the EN1 and EN7 roads. International bodies, donors cut assistance over undisclosed debts, as protests threatened The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has revealed that "an amount in excess of 1 billion USD of external debt guaranteed by the [Mozambican] government had not previously been disclosed". Subsequently, the IMF, World Bank and the UK have suspended Mozambique's access to funds and development loans pending debt sustainability analysis. Recently, anonymous messages on social media reportedly called for protests over the issue, singling the end of April and early May, allegedly May 3-7. As a result, heavy security deployment was reported in Maputo and nearby Matola since April 28. At this time, there are no reports of established opposition or civil society actors endorsing the call for protests, and thus they may remain, at least initially, limited in scale. That said, given the large scale preemptive deployment already recorded, any size anti-government manifestation over the coming days and weeks carries a high potential to witness forcible crackdown. 18Page

19 MEDIUM RISK Niger Opposition coalition COPA 2016 cancels parliamentary boycott, as civil society organizations attempts to stage anti-government protests. Travel to Niamey may continue at this time, while adhering to stringent security precautions given the threat of militancy and criminal activity. Opposition Coalition cancels parliamentary boycott as civil society group organizes protest On April 18, the Opposition Coalition for Alternance 2016 (COPA 2016) decided to cancel its boycott of parliamentary proceedings and National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI) proceedings, which it initiated in protest of alleged fraud and irregularities during the March 20 elections. According to COPA 2016 s spokesman, the decision to reverse the boycott was aimed at minimizing the effects of re-elected President Mahamadou Issoufou s alleged fraudulent re-election. While similar motions and boycotts still remain possible, we assess that the move was likely orchestrated in order to increase the opposition s chances in the local elections slated for May 9. That said, local accounts hint that several members of parliament belonging to COPA 2016 had collected their bounty for being elected, and the move was consequently undertaken to avoid embarrassment. Meanwhile, on April 24, a civil society march, which was organized by the Citizen s Resistance Collective was banned by local authorities for security reasons. Security forces also deployed along the march s intended route in order to prevent it from manifesting. In response, the group rescheduled their march for April 30, but this too was banned by authorities. Additionally a dead city protest was slated to take place on April 28, but was largely not adhered to. The protests were intended to denounce the perceived irregularities of March 20 elections. The links between the COPA 2016 and the Citizen s Resistance Collective are unclear at this time, but we assess that the common goal of denouncing the electoral irregularities is likely to engage supporters of both groups, particularly with COPA 2016 s efforts to mobilize the public in advance of local elections on May 9. That said, the cancelation of the boycott, as well as the failed protest actions underscore the weakness of the opposition in Niger, both in parliament and on the ground. In this context, while the Citizen s Resistance Collective will likely attempt again to stage demonstrations in the lead-up to the May 9 local elections, we assess that these will largely be unsuccessful, although localized protests and scuffles with security forces can be expected over the coming week. 19Page