The Politics of Migration and Integration in Systems of Multi-Level Governance

Transcription

1 1 Oliver Schmidtke (University of Victoria) and Andrej Zaslove (Radboud University Nijmegen) The Politics of Migration and Integration in Systems of Multi-Level Governance Presentation at the ECPR General Conference Section: Themes and Challenges to Multi-Level and Regional Politics Panel: Immigration and Multi-Level Party Politics Reykjavik, August 2011 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Draft please do not cite xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

2 2 Oliver Schmidtke and Andrej Zaslove The Politics of Migration and Integration in Systems of Multi-Level Governance Introduction The politics of migration in Europe has taken a critical turn in recent years: While attempts to install modern immigration policies similar to those that regulate the recruitment of newcomers in, for instance, Australia, Canada, or the USA have widely stalled in reaction to pervasive political opposition, the attention has shifted to issues of integration. This is driven by two pivotal developments. First, most European societies have realized and politically accepted that they have become countries of immigration. As a result, issues of managing migration and integration have taken a far more central position in political debates and policy deliberations than in the past. Second, dramatic events such as the attacks of 9/11 and subsequent forms of violence related to Islamic fundamentalism have critically changed the political climate in which debates about the terms and societal preconditions for successful inclusion of newcomers. In the 1990s the widely shared assumption was that Europe would gradually, albeit persistently move toward multicultural policies. Yet, what the 2000s have brought as well are deep concerns about the status of cultural and religious diversity articulated both in the political establishment of liberal democracies and by populist radical right parties that have exploited these concerns and fears for their political mobilization across Europe (Triadafilopoulos 2011; Mudde 2007). In the post-9/11 climate the perception of migrants primarily as a threat and burden that need to be contained gained public support and resonance in competitive party politics. What can be observed in policy terms across Europe is how to use a rather dramatic depiction a recent backlash against multiculturalism (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2009) has decisively changed the political opportunity structure for launching initiatives to accommodate cultural diversity and promote integration. In this political environment integration policies have moved away from a public endorsement of cultural diversity (as prominently represented by the Canadian multicultural model) toward an assimilationist model with a strong emphasis on state-monitored processes of integration. 1 The move from multiculturalism to integration has created a lively scholarly debate. Several lines of research are detectable. On the one hand, there is a growing body of research that focuses on the politicization of immigration. Although this research does not deal per se with integration, given the focus of many of the actors, especially within the populist radical right, on integration, this line of research sheds important light on the political context in which 1 Integration is a politically highly controversial term whose meaning very depends on a particular framing of what constitutes successful and desirable inclusion of migrants. In this paper we rely on a distinction between coercive integration policies that follow an assimilationist logic on the one hand and liberal integration policies that are based on the multiculturalist idea of publicly endorsing cultural diversity. Banting and Kymlicka (2010) show how these different interpretations of integration are also shaped by different national lenses through which the challenges of successfully including newcomers are diagnosed and framed in terms of policy priorities.

3 3 integration policies are debated and implemented. Although politicization if often linked with the populist radical right (Zaslove 2004), other political scientists have also focused on the role of center-right parties and even in some cases left-wing parties (Bale 2008; Bale 2009). To be sure, there is evidence that since the 1980s and the 1990s that immigration has become politicized, however, at the same time the tangible influence of populist radical right may be over stated (Mudde 2007; Ivaldi 2011). Another line of research is to point to the double edged sword of integration policies. As Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos notes, despite the influence of the mainstream and the radical right on integration policies, the policies are also in some cases justified by the center-left. Here terms such as repressive liberalism and Schmittian liberalism are used to convey the tension between policies that seen to force migrants to integrate and liberal justifications for these same policies (Joppke 2007 and Triadafilopoulos 2010). It is within this context that Christian Joppke speaks of a gradual convergence of European integration policies. The focus and purpose of these policies is on integrating immigrants into the norms and values of the liberal democratic polity and within the socio-economic structures of a market society. Although migrants are forced to conform to European political, social, and economic norms, if they agree to do so they can expect legal protection from discrimination (Joppke 2007). Another line of argumentation is to focus on the link between nationalism and integration. For example, Semin Suvarierol speaks of a nationalist resurgence. This line of research has more in common with a previous focus on national models as purported by the likes of Favel, Hollified, and Castles (Entzinger 2000). However, this approach also differs from the previous focus on national models. Suvarierol argues that the recent surge of nationalism is based upon a new form of nationalism, one that differs from traditional nationalism s attempted to construct new national identities from local, elite, and folk cultures (3). Rather the goal of this new nationalism is to freeze existing national identities into a unitary and static concept. This new nationalism is visible within the recent surge of integration courses. A series of common assumptions emanate from these three perspectives: 1) there is a focus on the politicization and the highly controversial nature of the recent rise of integration courses, and; 2) despite an emphasis on the dual nature of the integration courses, a common assumption is that these policies have a conforming and even disciplining nature that has move the focus away from cultural differences (Brubaker 2006). Yet, social reality is more nuanced and complex than the interplay between different national models or, as Banting and Kymlicka (2006: 281) formulate succinctly in more theoretical terms, the exaggerated claims about the triumph of new models of postnational multiculturalism alternate with equally exaggerated claims about the resurgence of nativist populism and the death of multiculturalism. And indeed, the situation in Europe is puzzling in light of such oversimplified interpretative framework: In spite of the adverse political climate more pronounced during the recent economic crisis Europe has seen, at least in some countries, some

4 4 remarkable progress in promoting the integration of newcomers from non-eu member states. Similarly, integration policies do not squarely fall into distinct national models but also vary according to levels of governance. What we find is a notable heterogeneity across Europe in approaches and an array of integration policies formulated and implemented at the sub-national level. What we can observe in Europe is evidence of increasing divergence in forming integration policies not only across but even within nation-states. 2 This observation provides the background for the paper s main research question: What is driving these initiatives in the field of integration policy? Where does the political impetus for more liberal integration policies come from? Under what conditions and through what processes do these initiatives succeed in an environment in which competitive party politics and public opinion tend to oppose them? In order to explain the dynamics behind the making of integration policy in Europe, it is necessary to move beyond a conceptualization that is restricted to national politics and its institutional arrangements and actors. It is no longer possible to speak of a single national model for forming, deliberating, and implementing immigration and integration policies. Relating key aspects of the literature on multi-level governance (Hooghe and Marks 2001, Schmidtke 2006) to immigration policy allows us to gain a better understanding of the opportunities for actors at different levels of governance to engage in debates and policy formation. From this perspective the central aim of the proposed research is to highlight the increasingly polycentric, non-hierarchical, and deliberative nature of the policy process and the challenges that new political forces in particular at the sub-national level. According to our key hypothesis, the sub-national level of governance has developed into a meaningful arena of political debate and policy formation in the field of integration policy; regions and cities have become important laboratories for deliberating, developing and implementing integration policies (significant sites of policy innovation). In a nutshell, the emerging system of multi-level governance in Europe has a structuring effect on the conceptual design and practice of integration policies in Europe. Empirically we concentrate a comparative case study based on two case studies, namely Emilia- Romagna and North-Rhine Westphalia in Germany. Our cases are selected with a view to a similarly pronounced tradition of having been a leader in developing innovative approaches to designing comprehensive and innovative integration policies in the respective national context. At the same time, both regions are situated in different nationally shaped political contexts: Germany is a federal state, while Italy is a unitary state, though federalizing. Both countries are characterized by a comparable diffusion of policy competence at the sub- and supra levels of governance with related historically-rooted forms of urban-regional political cultures; they have also witnessed similar controversial debates over recent reforms of immigration and integration policies (Bozzini and Fella 2008, Caponio 2008, Colombo and Sciortino 2003, Goodman 2007, 2 For Germany: Baraulina 2007, Bommes 2007, Gesemann and Roth (2009).

5 5 Zincone 2006). Immigration has been highly politicized, in part through populism in Italy, while the politicization of immigration by populist parties has been less so in Germany. As a result in this paper we investigate whether there are similar processes of politicizing immigration and the emergence of similar political initiatives at the municipal and regional political arenas in both national contexts. We examine policy documents, legislative debates at the regional level, and we have conducted interviews with civil servants and civil society organizations in the two regions. The paper begins with a theoretical discussion, combining immigration and integration policies with the literature on multi-level governance. We then focuses on the evolution of immigration and integration policies in Germany and Italy, highlighting two important developments: the politicization of immigration at the national level and the growing space for integration policies at the local and regional level. The paper then turns to our cases, focusing on the North-Rhine Westphalia and Emilia-Romagna. This discussion addresses the emerging opportunity structures for multi-level integration policies in the two regions in question. In particular the paper examines the political process that has lead to regional integration policies and contrasts this with the often highly charged national debate. We pay special attention to the important advocacy role of civil society organizations. In the conclusion, we identify some structural similarities in both regions in terms of taking advantage of emerging political opportunities in this policy field and in advancing innovative approaches to integrating newcomers. Managing migration and integration in a system of multilevel governance The concept of multi-level governance has been developed in research on European integration (Hooghe and Marks 2001, Walzenbach 2006). Its central task is to better understand fundamental changes in the locus of political authority provoked by the deepening of European integration, changes that tend to pose increasingly effective constraints on the sovereign power of individual nation-states and its policy-making capacity. Challenging a state-centric perspective, the model assumes that decision-making competencies are increasingly shared by actors at different levels rather than monopolized by actors in the national domain. With insights from multi-level governance, it is possible to conclude that the new political reality in Europe is shaped by the interplay between different levels of political authority, each of which cannot act unilaterally (Scharpf 2001, Risse 2001). Policy formation: challenging the exclusive national models for governing migration The idea that governance in Europe is a multi-layered form of generating binding collective decisions beyond the exclusive authority of the nation-state offers a valuable interpretative framework to come to terms with the research question under investigation. Immigration might

6 6 not be the most pertinent example of how authority in a particular policy field has shifted towards the European Union but there are clear signs that, in spite of the vigorous defence by member states over sovereign authority in the field, the EU has taken on a much more pronounced role in setting the agenda for legislation in the field of immigration and asylum (Geddes 2003; Lavenex and Kunz 2008; Monar 2004). While the ambitious plan to move immigration and asylum into the first pillar under community competence has not materialized to the degree laid out in the Amsterdam Treaty, the EU has taken important legislative initiatives (for example, directives on family reunification, returning illegal migrants, and policy initiatives such as the Blue Card for attracting highly skilled migrants, and initiatives on integration); in addition, important benchmarks for national policy making have been formulated. 3 Across the continent there appears to be widespread recognition for the need to demonstrate more consistent regulation of migration. Even if the EU possesses limited policy prerogatives in the domain of immigration policy, it has indirectly promoted change in national legislation and continues to be instrumental in bringing immigration onto the political agenda in many of its member states. We posit that emerging EU policies create new opportunity structures at the local and regional level for social movements, while the EU is in the process of forging common policy standards, enhancing its own capacity as a relevant political actor within the field of immigration and integration policy. For the purpose of our research question this is important in two respects. With respect to providing new political opportunities for the sub-national levels of governance there is the direct support in terms of financial and organizational resources made available to authorities at this level as well as more indirect modes of support or incentives. First, the increasingly significant European level of governance has challenged the idea that attracting and integrating migrants is an exclusive domain of national authorities. The emerging EU citizenship status, the Blue Card initiative, and guidelines (and funding) concerning integration illustrates this subtle challenge to exclusive national models of regulating migration: civic rights become gradually decoupled from the nation-state and patterns of integration are partly re-defined by a broader supra-national community. The way in which issues of immigration and integration are perceived and addressed at different levels of governance widens the options for developing legislative initiatives in the field. New opportunities for policy formation appear whose origins and feasibility is closely linked to the respective territorial unit of governance. Second, the growing competence of the EU has empowered actors at the regional and municipal level of governance. According to its principle of subsidiarity the EU has promoted strategic partnerships between the Commission in Brussels and levels of governance below the national state (both in terms of policy implementation and research). In addition the EU has committed itself in the Commission s White Paper on European Governance (EU Commission 2001) to the 3 See Justice and Home Affairs:

7 7 principle of participation by means of an open consultation process with its citizens a promise that NGOs can at least use as political capital in trying to make their voices heard. The EU s partnership with cities across its member states is an intriguing example of how the supranational level can instigate processes of forming integration policies in the urban context and setting benchmarks for their successful implementation at lower levels of governance. In this respect the EU has established normative expectations regarding the appropriate treatment of third-country nationals (be it via the emerging European citizenship status see Maas 2010 or its relatively recent initiatives in the field of integration). For instance, at Tampere the EU committed to the principle of bringing third country nationals to near equality with Union citizens (Halleskov 2005). These standards can have empowering effect on sub-national actors (also vis-à-vis national authorities) when it comes to launching its own programs in this policy fields. This process of coordinating policies in a system of multilevel governance also means that there are greater degrees of flexibility in shaping the concrete measures on the ground while implementing policies formulated at a higher level of governance. This again contributes to a process of widening the options for initiating and developing policies in the field of immigration and integration. These developments coincide with the growing importance of the regions within nation-states. 4 In the case of federal states, such as Germany, regions (i.e. Länder) have long played an important role in formulating and implementing public policy. However, this trend towards regionalization has also dramatically restructured unitary states such as Italy. Since the 1990s, Italy has significantly decentralized political power; in 1993 mayors were directly elected, and in 2001 the centre-left government passed a new law that sought to redistribute powers and enhance the powers of the regions; most notably the central state no longer has the power to use it commissioners to force the regions to comply, it must turn to the constitutional court (Cotta and Verzichelli 2007, ). More recently, the center-right government has passed legislation that would decentralize fiscal policies, what is referred to as fiscal federalism (Cento Bull 2009; Albertazzi and McDonnell 2010). Regional actors across Europe currently possess more resources, higher levels of political legitimacy, and the political desire, to enact public policy at the local and regional level, to influence national policy, and to interact directly with the European Union. These developments lead us to highlight one of the key assumptions of the multi-level governance literature; elite actors in the national arena no longer exclusively determine policy formation and that this has important repercussions on the way in which the decision-making process is organized in the European polity. In a nutshell, the expectation is that the relationship between state and non-state actors become more 'polycentric and non hierarchical' (Jachtenfuchs 4 In Europe regions and cities have become important laboratories for deliberating, developing and implementing immigration and integration policies (Hudson 2007, Karapin 1999, Vertovec 1998; for the cities see the EU-funded project: Multicultural Democracy and Immigrants Social Capital in Europe: Participation, Organisational Networks, and Public Policies at the Local Level; or the Cities for Local Integration Policies (CLIP) project).

8 8 1995, 115) compared to those structures of governance dominant in the state-centered model. The claim is indeed that the system of multi-level governance is likely to be qualitatively different from the model established on the national level that dominated the framework for politics and state-society relations in the 20 th century (Joerges 1999; Neyer 2003). New forms of governance are expected to allow more fully for the mobilization of citizens, private groups, and office holders to secure policy outputs closer to their interests and preferences. Community groups and stakeholders in civil society are expected to face more concrete opportunities to engage in bottom-up political mobilization and exert a greater degree of political pressure on those in positions of political power. This sheds light on a more implicit, albeit critical assumption of the MLG model: The emerging features of a multi-level European polity can be seen as producing different patterns of democratic legitimacy, empowering groups and actors that formerly had no direct effect on the formation of policies (Hix 1998). As such it creates new opportunities for political mobilization and co-operation while simultaneously imposing constraints on the power of national actors. Electoral politics and the emerging policy context: between politicization and regional opportunity structures Germany and Italy have manifestly followed very different trajectories in terms of managing migration and integration. Until recently Italy was a country of emigration whose key policy challenge in this field was to properly address concerns of the Italian diasporas abroad. Given the low number of newcomers immigration was simply not a political concern in Italy. In a peculiar way this mirrors the political context in Germany: While having turned into one of the most attractive destinations for migrants in Europe over the course of the last 50 years, Germany has only recently acknowledged that it has become a country of immigration (Thränhardt 1995). In stark contrast to this reality of post-war German society, the issue of citizenship, immigration, and nationhood has not played a prominent role in political discourse or policy-making until the 1980s. This can be widely attributed to the fact that in the immediate post war era there was a consensus among all major parties that immigration was not an issue that was critical to German society; rather, this issue was dealt with in terms of accommodating foreigners and, as it was commonly put in euphemistic terms, of welcoming guests who were expected to leave after the end of their professional assignments (Münz and Ulrich 1997; Schönwälder 2001, Zank 1998). However, this started to change in the late 1980s and the 1990s. On the one hand, immigration was politicized; the CDU/CSU discovered anti-immigrant rhetoric as a winning formula for electoral politics. This was part and parcel of growing political pressure from the regions. The rise of the extreme right-wing, anti-immigrant party Republikaner in the late 1980s (with particular success at the Länder level) can be directly linked to the efforts of the established

9 9 conservative parties in Germany to give weight to an agenda highly critical, if not outright hostile, to immigrants and foreigners (Karapin 1998, 1999). The change in federal government from the 16 years of conservative rule to the Red-Green coalition government under Gerhard Schröder provided new opportunities for dealing with the challenges related to migration. One of the first pieces of legislation that the new centre-left introduced was the revision of the century-old citizenship law. The second major reform project of the Red-Green coalition was a new immigration law. The debate on the new immigration law which after a long political and legal battle came into effect in a much-watered down version in 2005 is indicative of how immigration is politicized in party politics at the national level (Bauder 2008, Zimmermann 2007). At the same time the issue of immigration and national identity has recently been employed as a polarizing and mobilizing tool in party politics. In stark contrast to the CDU/CSU s willingness to get involved in modernizing Germany s Citizenship Law the conservative party engaged in a campaign designed to discredit any attempt to call into questions features of loyalty to, and identification with, the national community. National borders were portrayed as demarcating the fundamental allegiance of individuals to their collectivity. In their political campaigns the CDU/CSU repeatedly depicted (excessive) immigrants as a genuine threat to German society and employed a nationalistic rhetoric based on the idea of ethnocultural homogeneity. This direction of framing issues related to immigration and integration in national political discourse has become dominant also irrespective of immediate strategic considerations of major parties. After September 2001 and with a view to influx of migrants from Eastern Europe migration is widely portrayed primarily as a matter of security concerns (from illegal migration and organized crime to religious fundamentalism). As a result, immigration has been influenced by two dominant developments: 1) at the national level, the politicization of immigration has led to a convergence between the left and the right regarding law and order, security, and the need for immigrants for economic and demographic purposes and; 2) new spaces for multilevel governance have begun to materialize showing a different logic of politicizing the issue. The second point will be illustrated with Germany s most populated province (Land) North-Rhine Westphalia a bit later. Once the fierce debate about the main objectives and scope of the new immigration law was settled the attention of public and political debate shifted to the issue of integration. The first key question driving the agenda was how to promote successful social, civic and political inclusion of the population with a migrant background in Germany. With a view to the policy process it is noteworthy that, for instance, the Enquete-Kommission of the Red-Green government underlined prominently in 2002 that the collective representation of migrants interests is a key to their successful integration into German society. 5 One of the key initiatives of the governments led by 5 Enquete-Kommission. Zukunft des bürgerschaftlichen Engagements des Deutschen Bundestags. Bericht. Bürgerschaftliches Engagement: auf dem Weg in eine zukunftsfähige Bürgergesellschaft. (Schriftenreihe Band 4) (Opladen, 2002). Translated by the authors.

10 10 Angela Merkel in this respect has been to call for an integration summit in 2006 and 2008 that was designed to provide a forum for debating the issue among representatives from different levels of government and civil society groups. Yet, these integration summits unfolded as a highly staged event that left very little room for grass-root initiatives or the input of nongovernmental agencies. What this summit led to was a national integration plan 6 designed to promoted initiatives to foster integration in a variety of arenas. Critical for our argument is that the plan provided for a measured empowerment of actors at the regional and municipal level. For instance, under the auspices of the plan both levels of government can apply for model projects in the field of integration in the multi-million euro range. Equally important is that municipal and regional authorities were invited to join in a partnership with the federal level to address this issue. With this act the federal government acknowledged a trend that over the last ten to fifteen years has seen more and more initiatives and policies targeted at migrants developed and executed at the local and regional level. Indeed, regions (Länder) such as North-Rhine Westphalia have developed a distinct profile in terms of government legislations and programs in the field of accommodating newcomers. The tendency to give more power to these regions in addressing migration-related issues also results from the nature of German federalism: The focus on improving the integration of newcomers has drawn the attention of policy makers to the school system and the labour market. This in turn empowers regions in Germany as education and labour market polices fall into their (shared) policy domain. With integration posing challenges for policy domains with a shared regional-federal competence the sub-national level has gained considerable flexibility in defining what integration means on the ground and developing policy approaches. In contrast to Germany, Italy s transition to an immigrant-receiving state is a more recent development. In the early 1980s when Italy was in the process of becoming a country of immigration it did not possess an immigration law; immigration was treated as a law and order issue (Veugelers 1994). However, in the late 1980s and in the early 1990s Italy gradually passed a series of laws addressing its recent transition to an immigrant-receiving country. In 1986 it passed an immigration law that sought to regularize and legalize immigration by granting immigrants legal status and rights to state provisions regarding work, health, and other social services (Einaudi 2007, 129). In 1990, this law was supplemented with the 1990 Martelli immigration law which sought to better protect the legal status of immigrant workers, in particular self-employed workers, family members, and those requesting asylum while also attempting to improve the visa system and setting quotas for immigrants (Einaudi 2007, 155). At this early stage of immigration policy development it was not possible to speak of integration policies or of a level of multi-level governance, even though pressures to create more suitable 6 A copy of the National Integration Plan can be found at: /NationalerIntegrationsplan/nationaler-intregrationsplan.html

11 11 immigration laws did emanate from the lower levels, from social and political organizations within civil society, in particular the unions and religious organizations (Einaudi 2007, 112). Italy s transition towards a country of immigration was rather dramatic in the 1990s. The presence of immigrants increased substantially, growing from just over 600, 000 in 1991 to 1,334, 889 in 2001 (Einaudi 2007). In addition, fears and apprehension regarding immigration among Italians also increased, while new political forces such as the Lega Nord and Alleanza Nazionale sought to politicize immigration. This created new tensions between the left and the right and within the left and the right (Zaslove 2011; Zaslove 2006). In 1998 the newly elected (1996) center-left government introduced the Turco-Napolitanto law. Some of the most distinguishing elements of the law were the increased flexibility of work permits and entrance visas for family members. Important provisions such as a work-seekers permit, an increased length for residence permits, and the introduction of a permanent resident permit were introduced. (Einaudi 2007, 215-6). The law also placed more emphasis on immigrant migration. Even though it did not reform the citizenship law or give immigrants voting privileges at the local level as some on the center-left had hope for, it created a National Fund for integration which was to be allocated at the regional level (Andall 2007; Campomori and Caponio 2011). As a result possibilities for regional integration policies emerged (Campomori and Caponio 2011). In 2001 the center-right coalition was returned to government, - this time with the support of the Lega Nord. Immigration had become a growing prime concern of the LN as it moved from a regionalist populist to a regionalist and populist radical right party; the influence of the LN was reflected in a new immigration law passed in This new immigration law made it more difficult to receive a work permit (linking immigration with employment), it restricted family reunification, and it increased the ability of the state to expel illegal immigrants (Colombo and Sciortino 2003). In 2008 when the center-right was returned to government additional changes were made to Italian immigration laws. For example, in 2009, a highly controversial security package was passed. This new law criminalized immigration, raised barriers for immigrants to enter, made marriage and family reunification more difficult, and sought to create civilian patrols to enhance local security (Cento Bull 2010, ). In addition, in 2010 language requirements were implemented for immigrants to obtain a permanent residence permit. 7 Immigration and integration policies in Germany and Italy can be summarized as follows: At the national level immigration and integration have become politicized. More so in Italy than in Germany which is in part due to the presence of the LN and to a lesser degree AN, - two parties that, to different degrees, have openly employed anti-immigrant rhetoric. In addition, the move towards integration in Germany and Italy has produced mixed results. In Germany despite the 7 See Italian Interior Ministry for the legislation: _DM_ html

12 12 early intentions, at the federal level, to facilitate immigrant integration this process has more recently stalled and not resulted into a coherent policy approach. In Italy there has been a notable trend towards making integration more difficult and linking integration with assimilation. In the later case, despite earlier attempts to slowly move towards what might be categorized as the beginning of multicultural policies (i.e. Turco-Napolitano), since 2001 the center-right governments have passed legislation which makes it more difficult for immigrants to remain in Italy. For example, it more difficult to obtain and retain a residence permit, provisions for family reunification were restricted, a clear link between migration and work was established, there has been a reduction in funds for integration, and new language requirements have been introduced. New integration requirements have shifted the emphasis in this policy field on monitoring and controlling. Integration as an emerging policy field at the regional level North-Rhine Westphalia and Emilia-Romagna and are both regions that have experienced considerable immigration over the past years. North-Rhine Westphalia (NRW) is Germany s most populated state and its traditional industrial heartland that has attracted migrants for much of the 20 th Century. During the years of the post-war economic miracle NRW with its extensive manufacturing sector was one of main regions for the guest worker immigration. In spite of the official stop of the recruitment policy in 1974 newcomers continue to come to NRW which is reflected in the fact that almost one quarter of the population has a migration background (first or second generation). Of its almost 18 million inhabitants, 2.5 million are born outside of Germany; about one third of Germany s Turkish-born population lives in NRW. In NRW s major cities the foreign born population reaches around 20% (about 10% live in NRW as foreigners; see second part of the table below). Emilia-Romagna is one of the most dynamic economic Italian regions. It boasts highly competitive small and medium businesses located in a dense network of industrial districts, a high standard of living, and a low level of unemployment. These socio-economic developments have contributed to the growth in the number of immigrants within the region. The presence of immigrants in the region has consistently increased since the 1990s; in 2007 it possessed 8.55% immigrants (in comparison with 5% nationally), second only to Lombardy (Campomori and Caponio 2011). In addition, the diversity of origins and the multigenerational aspect of migration has dramatically transformed Emilia-Romagna into a well-established immigration destination (Quaderni di Statistica). Immigrant Resident Population in Emilia-Romagna and Italy (measured as total and percentage of total population, regional and national) and Foreign Population and Naturalizations in NR ( )

13 13 Emilia- Romagna 462, , , , , , , ,838 (10.5%) (9.7%) (8.5%) (7.4%) (6.9%) (6.2%) (5.1%) (4.0%) Italy 4,235,059 3,891,295 3,432,651 2,938,922 2,670,514 2,402,157 1,990,159 1,549,373 (7.0%) (6.4%) (5.7%) (4.9%) (4.5%) (4.1%) (3.4%) (2.7%) NRW (10.1%) Nationalizatio n in NRW Data collected from: demo.istat.it (Italy) and Statistisches Landesamt NRW (Germany) North-Rhine Westphalia as a trendsetter in Germany s integration policy NRW has been a pioneer in promoting its own immigration and integration policy. A pro-active integration policy was developed under social-democratic rule before 2005 and continued under the Christian-Democratic premier minister Jürgen Rüttgers. 8 In this respect NRW takes advantage of a gradual empowerment of the regional and local level within the German federal state structure with regard to integration policies (the 2004 Immigration Law - Zuwanderungsgesetz - leaves considerable legal space for a new form of collaboration between the federal and the regional level; it is in this context that more and more funds have been made available to regional and local authorities). It is somewhat surprising to realize that it was a member of the CDU who became the first minister for integration at the state level in 2005, namely the North-Rhine Westphalia's Minister for Intergenerational Affairs, Family, Women and Integration 9 (or as he is referred to as Integrationsminister ), Armin Laschet. In this respect, North-Rhine Westphalia has been a trendsetter for the introduction of similar ministries in other, often CDU governed states (Lower Saxony, Hesse, Schleswig Holstein and Berlin). NRW also spearheaded the idea of a conference for integration ministers at the state level against considerable resistance from other Länder 10. Reflecting on the process of launching and implementing such policies it is remarkable how in stark contrast to the highly controversial and emotional debate in the national political arena the CDU-led government and its 8 Korte (2009) speaks of a pronounced integration culture and a tradition of openness characteristic of NRW. 9 "Minister für Generationen, Familie, Frauen und Integration des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen 10 With its regular integration conferences at the regional level NRW has created considerable pressure for other Laender to follow suit. These conferences have by now developed into an important forum for policy coordination among Germany s Laender and with the federal government.

14 14 integration minister Laschet addressed the challenge of incorporating migrants more fully in widely pragmatic policy terms. 11 Under his leadership and continued by the current Red-Green government, North-Rhine Westphalia has developed innovative approaches to promoting integration designed to attract and retain newcomers (one of the most prominent recent examples is a comprehensive program for language training for pre-school children). Most recently (2011) the new Red-Green government and its current integration minister Guntram Schneider in Düsseldorf have started the process of launching a new Teilhabe- und Integrationsgesetz (Participation and Integration Law) whose goal is to give integration policies a more binding, legally enshrined character. The region of NRW is the first to embark on such an ambitious legislative initiative and might well set the agenda for governments at various levels in Germany s federal system. Towards a multi-level integration policy: the case of Emilia-Romagna Not surprisingly given the evolution of Italian immigration policy, until recently Emilia- Romagna s ability to control its own immigration and integration policy has been limited. The region did include provisions in a 1985 regional law regarding social assistance for immigrant services, a 1990 regional law provided housing initiatives for immigrants, and a 1991 law included immigrants in the category of social disadvantaged (Calavita 2007, 83-4). Nevertheless, the legal powers of the region regarding immigration remained limited, this was especially the case regarding integration. It was not until after the 1998 Turco-Napolitano law that the region began to formulate its own integration policies. For example, in the post 1998 environment more funds were filtered to the region to address integration and as a result Emilia-Romagna began to create annual programs addressing the needs of immigrants (Interview Andrea Stuppini; Campomori and Caponio 2011). These new opportunity structures allowed for the introduction of the region s first integration legislation, the 2004 integration law (Norme per l integrazione delgil immigrati extracomunitari). Subsequent legislation was also passed in 2006 and 2008 to amend the law and to ensure the effectiveness of its policies in integrating immigrants. As a result, Emilia-Romagna was the first region to create its own integration policy and has, therefore, held a leadership role in this regard. Since 2003 Emilia-Romagna has ranked in the top five regions for integration capacity, while in 2009 it was ranked number one (Campomori and Caponio 2011). The 2004 law lays the groundwork for integration policies at the regional level. It focuses on the legal, cultural, and the institutional aspects of integration. In the preface written by the regional president Vasco Errani four clear references, references that remain in the law, are articulated. First, it is noted that there is a need for the region to play a leadership role. Second, the practical 11 It should be mentioned though that Laschet s political course has been controversial within the CDU itself.

15 15 need to integrate immigrants into housing and social services is highlighted. Third, the cultural need to address the growing de facto multi-ethnic nature of society and the need to create a process of dialogue is articulated. And finally, the changing European and national context of immigration and integration, and the desire to place the region on the forefront of these developments, is emphasized (Norme per l integrazione sociale 2004). These four themes are articulated in the law. The clear need for a new law based upon economic and demographic developments is emphasized, focusing on the economic dimension of the migration process. The law places the immigration process within the context of the economic need for immigrants, due to the low level of unemployment and given the extent to which the region regularly fulfils its yearly quotas for labour migrants. In addition, and in contrast with the national discourse, the framers of the law clearly emphasized that labour migrants do not take jobs from locals since for the most part they are employed in jobs that Italians do not want to do (Norme per l integrazione sociale 2004). The goal of the integration project is clearly laid out. From this it is possible to identify a plain philosophy. Integration is framed in terms of universalism. The documents states that the social integration of immigrant foreign citizens, integration that is considered, by all who have undersigned the Agreement, is an essential element for guaranteeing foreign citizens the same rights and obligations as those of the citizens of the Emilia-Romagna region, and facilitating access to the existing services within the framework of a universalist policy capable of addressing and adapting to the needs of individuals from different cultures (Norme per l integrazione sociale 2004, 73). In order to accomplish this the region seeks to accomplish six goals: 1) to increase immigrant participation in public life; 2) to prevent discrimination; 3) the creation of an institute to monitor the developments of migration in the region; 4) to provide provisions (monetary) for the provinces and municipalities; 5) to ensure housing, health, and social services (i.e. equal access); and; 6) to support cultural integration especially in the schools (Norme per l integrazione sociale 2004, 74). Recognizing the changing nature of immigration and the changing needs of immigrants, the law calls for the creation of a series of three year plans to address the changing integration requirements. In the first three year plan, the key goals are to raise consciousness around immigration and the needs of immigrants, to create a positive and constructive intercultural dialogue, to guarantee equal access to services, and to create a climate of legalization. This was addressed through key policy areas such as recognizing needs for families (such as child care services), education and professional training, fighting prostitution and social and cultural exclusion (Programma triennale per l'integrazione sociale dei cittadini stranieri). After the completion of the first three year term, the continued presence and the economic need for immigrants increased. Several trends were identified: the diverse origins of immigrants, the

16 16 continued presence of immigrants in schools, and the growing challenges of integrating this very diverse population and meeting their wide-range of needs. Reflecting these challenges, the most recent three year plan focuses on language acquisition, cultural mediation, and antidiscrimination (Interview Andrea Stuppini; Programma Triennale per l'integrazione sociale dei cittadini stranieri). The dynamic of promoting liberal integration policy at the sub-national level In this section we focus on the process of forging integration policies at the sub-national level. Two trends are clear from the discussion thus far: 1) at the national level there has been a clear politicization of immigration, with a move towards making it more difficult to integrate (especially in the case of Italy) or by reinforcing an assimilatory thrust in integration initiatives (i.e. Germany), and; 2) legislation for integrating immigrants at the regional level in North-Rhine Westphalia and in Emilia-Romagna has become increasingly complex, variegated, and proactive. The question becomes: what is the driving logic behind these very diverse policy trajectories as the regional level? NRW: the pragmatic turn in integration policy Compared to the national level, issues of immigration and integration follow a distinctly different logic of politicization and making them subject to the policy process. It is noteworthy that it is under the CDU government of Jürgen Rüttgers that a pro-active integration policy has been developed and implemented based on a broad bipartisan consensus. At the regional level there is hardly any populist attempt to exploit of the issue and rather a thorough commitment to developing pragmatic, problem-oriented approaches to the challenge of integration: Parliamentary debates in Düsseldorf on this issue follow a different discursive script than national ones; general debates on the allegedly threatening effects of foreign cultures (as articulated in the Leitkultur-debate or, more recently, the discussion sparked by Thilo Sarrazin book) are largely absent from the regional political arena. Such identity and culture-oriented issues and the exclusionary rhetoric often accompanying them were also widely missing from the last electoral campaign in NRW. In short, the discourse on immigrants is de-dramatized and rarely subject to being exploited as an emotional mobilizing device in competitive party politics. Instead, the political rhetoric used by state authorities from the centre right as well as the centre left is strongly shaped by pragmatic concerns resulting primarily from day-today issues emanating from local communities and a long term strategy to perceive newcomers as an asset for the state s economic future. What is highly contested as a strategy at the national level has largely materialized at the state level in NRW: Immigration and integration are dominantly framed in terms of the state s socio-economic needs; the discourse is strictly interest-driven and widely refrains from employing identity frames.

17 17 The following figure summarizes the frame analysis of parliamentary debates and policy documents in the national and regional (NRW) arena. 12 Three distinct framing strategies were identified and were used as a coding device: identity frames relating to conflicts and concerns emanating from cultural and religious diversity (for instance, illegitimate cultural or religious practices); security frames relating to an alleged threat both in terms of crime and religious-political extremism; and interest frames that are guided by socio-economic concerns mainly related to the labour market and the educational sector (for instance issues of equitable inclusion of minorities, etc.). While identity frames shape debates and policy initiatives only to a minor degree (these are almost absent in the regional context), security frames are prominent in particular in the national arena. The difference between the regional and the national level is particularly striking with respect to interest frames: unmistakably this mode of addressing issues of cultural diversity and integration, namely to describe them in terms of equitable inclusion and participation, dominates the thematic orientation and interpretative lens of the debate at the regional level. Figure: Distribution of frames (in %) in parliamentary debates and policy documents at the national and regional level in NRW ( ) National level Regional level 10 0 Identity Frames Security Frames Interest Frames The emergence of innovative approaches to governing migration and integration can also be linked to a functionalist logic driving the agenda at the regional and local level. NRW is a Land 12 In total 79 documents (parliamentary debates and policy documents addressing issues of integration and the management of diversity) were coded at the regional and 56 at the national level. These documents were coded on the basis of competing framing strategies in the above described diagnostic frameworks. Each text/ document could contain various frames and was not coded as one unit.