Flint Water Crisis Case Study

Transcription

1 1 Flint Water Crisis Case Study Harmoni Grant Tyler Andrew Kanitz Kelsey Daria Tayler Sierra

2 2 Executive Summary The Flint Water Crisis refers to the poisoning of thousands of residents in Flint, Michigan due to the contamination of lead and other harmful chemicals detected in the city s drinking water source for a course of more than two years. Although Flint residents reported issues with the water quality, city officials failed to communicate the health risk to the public, using denial, blame, and other deceitful communication tactics. Examples of this include Snyder denying knowledge of the contamination until the final months of the crisis, blaming the Flint City Council for the decision to switch to Flint water, and blaming lower level officials. This case study finds that government officials, all the way up to Governor Rick Snyder, along with environmental protection agencies, failed to serve the public good and instead caused harm to their residents, specifically the children, by not acting quickly to inform the public and resolve the problem. The 100,000 people that live in Flint could have been prevented from the lifelong damage of lead poisoning if the people in charge had listened to their public, been honest about the situation immediately, and taken urgent preventative action. Introduction The Flint Water Crisis began in March 2014, when state officials switched the city of Flint s water supply to the Flint River. Water from the Flint River was planned to be a temporary source until the city could access the new Karegnondi Water Authority pipeline to the Huron River. Failure on multiple levels of government, including Governor Rick

3 3 Snyder, Flint Mayor Dayne Walling, state employees, emergency financial managers and city council members, along with the negligence of the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality and the United States Environmental Protection Agency, lead to the poisoning of thousands of Flint residents with lead and other chemicals due to the improper treatment of the Flint River water before usage. One year prior, in March 2013, state and city officials made the decision to change the water supply from its current supplier, the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department, to the Karegnondi Water Authority as a long term, cost saving measure. The Flint City Council voted 7-1 to change Flint s water source to the KWA, and the decision was overseen and approved one month later by emergency financial manager Ed Kurtz and State Treasurer Andy Dillon (Yan, 2016). However, the new pipeline that would connect Flint to the KWA could not be completed for another three years. Ed Kurtz and the DWSD couldn t come to an agreement over a new contract, and after Kurtz denied a second offer from the DWSD, the department gave the city of Flint notice that they would stop selling water after April 2014 (Fonger, 2013). Although the state government was unclear about who ultimately made the decision to switch the water supply to the Flint River, blaming the city council and others, Kurtz was the one who denied the offers from the DWSD and then contracted an engineering firm in June 2013 to determine how to draw water from the Flint River. Flint s second emergency financial officer, Darnell Earley, sent a letter to Detroit on March 7, 2014, refusing the DWSD s final short term contract offer (The Center for Michigan Bridge Magazine, 2016). The Flint Water Advisory Task Force Final Report says The

4 4 Flint water crisis occurred when state-appointed emergency managers replaced local representative decision-making in Flint, removing the checks and balances and public accountability that come with public decision-making. Emergency managers made key decisions that contributed to the crisis, from the use of the Flint River to delays in reconnecting to DWSD once water quality problems were encountered (Davis, Kolb, Reynolds, Rothstein, & Sikkema, 2016). On March 12, 2014, the process of switching over to the Flint River Water supply began, and residents started using the water from the Flint River on April 25. What followed for the next 18 months consisted of hundreds of complaints about the water quality from residents, a pediatrician discovering high lead levels in Flint children, multiple water boil advisories, an e-coli outbreak, a Legionnaires disease outbreak and a cover up by the government and DEQ before the city finally switched back to Detroit water in October, This case study will analyze how the state and city government handled the Flint Water Crisis. It will analyze how they communicated about the crisis with the residents of Flint and discuss the cover up and the management of the crisis. It will highlight key issues, judgment and communication errors, make recommendations on what should have been said and done, and provide solutions for what can be done now. Key Issues/Goals Throughout this case there were many issues. The main issue began in March 2014 when Flint temporarily switched their water supply to the Flint River. Both the city and

5 5 state officials made this decision in order to save the region $200 million dollars over the next 25 years. While city and state officials were trying to save money, their decision to switch water supplies resulted in the contamination of their resident s water with high levels of lead. Once the switch happened, the residents of Flint immediately responded by complaining about the taste and smell of Flint s new water. City and state officials ignored the concerns and denied for months that there was anything wrong with the water supply. This was a major issue because while residents were being poisoned and expressing their concern for their health, city officials ignored them and acted as if their concerns didn t exist. Snyder, city officials and state officials did not respond to Flint s water issues or take action until it became a nationally recognized problem. Snyder explained he didn t know there was a problem with Flint s water supply, while s were released that was not true at all. Snyder then made the decision to switch Flint s water supply back to Detroit s. Once Snyder and officials were forced to acknowledge this problem and fix it, their goals began to change. Their new goal was to switch Flint's water supply back to Detroit s, take responsibility of their negligence and do what it takes to fix the catastrophe that they created. By this time, the damage was done. Residents not only of Flint but throughout the world were outraged and upset. Victims were already affected by the crisis and high levels of lead.

6 6 Forms of IMC and Use As the Flint water crisis began to unfold, public relations tactics were nonexistent. Instead of actively seeking an ethical PR firm to help resolve the situation and figure out how to talk to the people in Flint, the government officials decided to cover up the situation, and act like everything was alright for several months. Because Governor Snyder knew about the contamination, but decided to keep it to himself, he set the precedent for the distrust within the community that would soon arise. Many people in the community voiced concerns about the water, but they were ignored. The s were later revealed that included a few of his office s responses to the initial contamination information. The governor s office said, The city has bigger issues on their agenda right now (Hohn, 2016). After the governor finally acknowledged the problem, he decided on a $12 million plan to switch back to the Detroit water supply. At this time, his message to the public was that the situation was much worse than he understood, that he accepted responsibility for the water crisis and that they would work until every person in Flint had clean water. He also promised an additional $28 million to expedite the process. Snyder proceeded to reach out to the federal government to request a state of emergency in Flint. By this time, the damage was insurmountably larger than he could have imagined, and continues to grow worse (Oosting, J, 2016). As the crisis continued, people began to become angry. Information about the governor s negligence began to surface, and the public was confused and outraged. There are schools and businesses all over Flint, and no one knew for sure if the water they were drinking was safe. Protests outside of his office began to ensue, and many

7 7 even said he should be put in jail. The mix between the power of social media and the crisis involvement with the federal government gave the Flint water crisis a national stage. People all around the country were beginning to talk about Flint, and millions of bottles of water were being sent by celebrities, nonprofits and people who wanted to help. Because of the scrutiny he was under, Snyder decided to hire two PR firms to help with the crisis management, Mercury Public Affairs and Bill Nowling. He said, This helps our staff stay focused on helping the people of Flint. State funds are not being used. The Michigan Moving Forward fund website was updated to include a logo and a donation form. The responses to the public relations hirings were very negative. The public believes that this is not something that can be smoothed over with PR, but it is a real public safety issue that needs to be taken seriously. Snyder also appeared on the television talk show Morning Joe, in which he placed the blame on the employees of the state s Department of Environmental Quality. A result of hiring the PR firms was a long press release deliverable that was released on March 21, The three goals main goals of the release were to clarify the roles of everyone involved in the water s neglect, highlight the causes for the government's failures and provide Flint s residents with suggestions to improve their quality of life. The press release accepted the blame for the government s negligence, and tried to provide the openness that should have been present from the beginning (Office of Governor, 2016). Assumptions

8 8 The assumptions in this case are the driving force for the citizens of Flint. Since the beginning, nearly every one of them have been impacted by the water corrosion, and there are no concrete plans for resolution. There are many more questions than answers, and instead of leaving, the residents have assumed it will all work out or accepted this as their new reality. Due to the blame being placed on multiple people, and the promise of a better future, the residents in Flint have nothing to believe in, and turn to the media to create their own stories. There is the assumption that this began as a race driven crisis. Many of the residents in Flint are African American and of low socioeconomic standing. Some people believe that this would have been taken more seriously if it was in a city with predominantly caucasian people. There have been references to the Tuskegee experiment, that tested on African American men under false pretences, and caused many fatalities between 1932 and Many people in Flint are not sure they can trust the government, and this distrust causes the horrible situation to feel like a personal attack (Maher, 2016). The worst part about the assumptions in this case is that there is no clear indicator of the truth. The conclusions made by the citizens of Flint, and the people watching from all over the country could all be right. The situation has not been resolved at all, and the overarching assumption is that it will take billions of dollars and many years for the crisis to be completely fixed. Alternatives with Preferred Rationale

9 9 The city stopped buying water from Detroit on the 25 th of April 2014 and instead started procuring it from the Flint River; a river that was infamous for being polluted (Hohn, 2016). The water that Flint acquired from Detroit had been treated after being sourced from both Lake Huron and Detroit River. Problems with water from Flint River started when it was discovered that the water was heavily polluted with lead and thus unsafe for human consumption. Lead from the aging pipes had dissolved into the water hence becoming a public health issue especially amongst the children. Although several officials were tried concerning the issue, the major undertaking was to ensure that Flint water was safe for human consumption as it had various health effects on the city s population. Those that were charged concerning the issue were held liable for criminal charges since they failed to report the issue of water contamination to relevant authorities so that action could have been taken hence protecting the public from harm (Haimerl & Goodnough, 2016). According to Haimerl and Goodnough (2016) thousands of Flint children are still being examined because of the effects of the polluted water. Although the city stopped acquiring water from Detroit with the aim of cost cutting on its budgetary allocations, Flint could have continued buying water from the same source until such a time when the officials were ready to implement the city s plan of obtaining water from Flint River. Before disengaging the city from Detroit treated water, processes to ensure that Flint water was safe for human consumption should have been taken so that the transition could have been seamless and without the problems that later arose. It is thus important to note that while cost saving was important for the city, the

10 10 health of its people should have been considered first before any shortcuts were undertaken and misinformed decisions made. Secondly, since the existing water pipes had been laid several years back, the city should have made an effort of replacing existing ones as they were already old and probably corroded. Although this could have cost the city considerable resources, it could have ensured that the lead poisoning issue was addressed. Given that this was not undertaken, it was easier for the water to corrode the aging pipes thus contaminating it. Currently, although the water pipes are being replaced, there is the general feeling that the population is reluctant to use the water given the past few years that they have experienced. Though these fears are settling with the passage of time, the replacement of the pipes was a process that could have been undertaken when the city realized that using the river s waters could be effective in meeting cost cutting goals (Hohn, 2016). Moreover, Flint s water department could have ensured that corrosion inhibitors were used as this would have made sure that the inside of the pipes was coated thus preventing corrosion and thus managing lead contamination. According to Hohn (2016) if the city had used corrosion inhibitors, this could have created a prophylactic barrier; one that could have made it hard for the coating of the pipes to disintegrate hence contaminating the water. Hohn (2016) noted that if the inside of the pipes was left untreated, water had agents that corroded water pipes thus releasing lead into it; therefore in the case of Flint water, it was more corrosive and hence ate away the coating, consequently leading to the crisis. The other issue that Flint needed to address was the staffing needs of its water department. Hohn (2016) reported that the department

11 11 was understaffed and as a result, this could have been one of the problems that led to the water contamination with the assumption that they were strained. Further, Flint water could have been filtered so as to make it safe for public consumption. According to a Reuters (2016) report, federal officials had reported that the water was safe for human consumption provided it was sufficiently filtered. Moreover, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) reported that it had tested the filtered water and it had been found that the lead levels present in it were below levels that had been considered harmful to human beings (Reuters, 2016). While this was helpful, given that the home piping systems in Flint had not been replaced, the city s water and Sewerage Company could also work on a plan of bottling the water so that the residents could access it from various outlets. To show that filtered water was safe for the Flint population, when president Obama visited, he drank some of the filtered water (Chuck & Bacon, 2016). This move was essential in bringing back the confidence of the residence in using filtered water. Looking at how the issue of the contaminated water was handled, there was need for the city to restructure its response mechanisms because its reaction to the water contamination issue was slow and uncoordinated. According to Hohn (2016), although this issue had been reported by the residents much earlier, little was being done to rectify the issue before it escalated. There was need for accountability on the part of the leaders and those that were responsible for the city s water supply. Although the city has made efforts to address this issue, much still needs to be done so as to fully earn the trust of the population.

12 12 Data Analysis Perhaps the most significant part in this case study has to do with data. Often times in public relations we look for data to explain the why and how a situation came about, as well as the results.it can also often reveal patterns in communication that may or may not be effective. The majority of the stakeholders and influencers for this crisis included the Department of Environmental Quality, governor s office, Department of Health and Human Services, Michigan State Police, Department of Talent and Economic Development, and Department of Treasury and Management and Budget. The Flint Water crisis had several factors of data that contributed to its results. Below they have been sorted by proprietary, commissioned and curated data. Proprietary: According to the City of Flint, $200 million was to be saved over the course of 25 years to create Flint s own pipeline in In 2012, the average cost of a pipeline in the U.S. was $3.1 million. Funds played a huge part in how the city and government went about problem solving. In September 2014, three boil water advisories were sent out to residents in the course of 22 days. This is the beginning of information about the water being sent to residential houses/buildings.

13 13 In February of 2015, Mayor Walling appealed Flint's water conditions to The White House, instead of governor Snyder. In March the city voted 7-1 to go back to Lake Huron water, but the request was denied due to emergency manager authority. Walling later requested $30 million in aid for water. Brad Wurfel, an employees and spokesperson of the Department of Environmental Quality, defended the water quality in July of 2015, and later resigned after s were leaked. Perhaps the most interesting data from this situation is that Wurfel wife was also the spokesperson for Governor Snyder at the time. This shows that there may have been some conflict of interest on a government level. The state of emergency resulted in 28,000 liters of water being donated to Flint. Flint became a hot political debate topic and was trending across the nation. An election year made all eyes in the nation turn towards Flint. 53% of the population of Flint is African-American. This statistic caused many to believe that something like this would never happen in a predominately white neighborhood, thus there was a racial bias in question. Commissioned Data: Upon switching to Flint River water, many residents began complaining. As a result, Michael Prysby, an engineer at the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality, became involved. He reported in late April 2014 that the water met all state standards, despite it being twice as hard. According to Michigan Live, hard water is often a result of calcium, magnesium and other metals.

14 14 In January 2015, the Department of Water Safety Division offered to reconnect Flint with its previous clean water source for $4 million. Snyder then awarded the city $2 million to find problems in the water system. The state also offered $1 million for testing and filters for the water. In 2015, in an emergency administrative order, the Environmental Protection Agency revealed that Flint did not have a corrosion control treatment plan. These plans are submitted to the state yearly and require project diagrams, land use compatibility, pre-treatment water quality parameter results, as well as construction plans and specifications in case of an emergency. After this information became public, the lawsuits began. In the nation's capital the EPA advisory board and the city issued 1,800 water shutoff notices to people who were delinquent in their bills for water they could not drink. Curated: In 2014, GM Reported the water as too corrosive to build cars with. This marked the beginning of large businesses and employment being affected by water conditions. The Center of Disease Control became involved in 2015, and stated that Flint was in violation of the Safe Drinking Water Act. A public notification was then issued to residents; each of these notifications were signed by the water safety assistant supervisor. These notifications became required information for the public due to the Michigan Safe Drinking Water Act in 1976.

15 15 In February 2015, Virginia Tech researchers found lead levels at 13,200 parts per billion, and according to the CDC, water is considered hazardous at 5,000 ppb. Later, they reported that the lead levels in infant and children had doubled. Decision Criteria/ Recommendations During the Flint Water Crisis, it seems as if the people who were in control of specific organizations did not have solid ground for making the decisions that they did. Governor Snyder s congressional hearing led many to believe that he was out of touch and blatantly ignoring the pleas from the city administrators that there was a pending problem with the water. This case study offers many opportunities for constructive criticism with the way that the Flint water crisis was handled. From the start, there was an issue with clarity and responsiveness from state officials, such as Governor Snyder and his staff. The negligence that was exhibited by him and his staff was unacceptable and proved to be faulty throughout this entire crisis. Due to the fact that this was an issue, a proper response would have been to give weekly updates on the crisis at via or phone from Governor Snyder himself or his office to ensure that proper messages were being conveyed on the status of the community. The reason being, in order for the community of Flint to hear that their voices are being heard, they must be able to get a response back from state officials. Decision criteria for a plan of action must include the input of those who live in the community of Flint. The website that was dedicated to the Flint Water Crisis is not up-to-date and lacks the proper information that the residence of Flint need in order to be informed (website: ). This is a

16 16 key feature to the response plan for this crisis, and it is failing because it is not a current reflection of the events. Another recommendation is to create active press releases about the current state of the crisis in both digital and print versions to distribute to the community. This will ensure that residents have a digital and physical way to receive updates on the crisis. Overall, decision criteria for this crisis should have a focus on clarity, transparency and attentiveness to the community s distress calls. The message should be cohesive, consistent and clear on all official sources in hopes to establish trust with the community. Transparency should be exercised by releasing weekly test results of the water, along with providing transcripts of the correspondence with state officials that mention the water crisis in any context. Biweekly or monthly town hall meetings should be held to provide updates and also create a time for residents to ask questions about the crisis. All of these criteria should be enacted in order to maintain trust and provide a sense of order during this crisis. Conclusion Even though the Flint Water Crisis is a horrible ongoing problem, the whole situation sounds more like a situation comedy than reality. The sheer number of lies, cover-ups, secret initiatives and damage is unconscionable. Throughout the crisis Flint officials had a number of opportunities to improve this situation. These include hiring a public relations firm to explain the situation to others, distribute

17 17 safe water, accepting Detroit s offer to reconnect their water line and countless other things. Instead we re left with a situation that proves problems won t just go away. What could ve been solved by admitting fault, attempting to rectify the situation and trying to rebuild trust is now a witch hunt where countless people were negatively impacted by the lies officials told, with almost no hope to rebuild trust in the foreseeable future.

18 18 References Chuck, E., & Bacon, P. (2016, May 4). Obama in Michigan: 'Turn This Into An Opportunity to Rebuild Flint'. NBC News. Accessed 16/10/16 at ild-flint-n Davis, M., Kolb, C., Reynolds, L., Rothstein, E., & Sikkema, K. (2016). Flint Water Advisory Task Force Final Report (pp. 1-29, Rep.) Environmental Protection Agency. (2016, January 1). Emergency Administrative Order: Flint, Michigan. Retrieved October 14, 2016 from _admin_order_ pdf Fonger, R.. (2013, April 19). Detroit gives notice: It's terminating water contract covering Flint, Genesee County in one year. Retrieved October 17, 2016, from Haimerl, A., & Goodnough, A. (2016, July 29). 6 More State Workers Charged in Flint Water Crisis. The New York Times. Accessed 16/10/16 at

19 19 Hohn, D. (2016, August 16). Flint s Water Crisis and the Troublemaker Scientist. The New York Times. Accessed 16/10/16 at entist.html Office of Governor. (2016, March 21). Flint Water Advisory Task Force [Press release]. Retrieved from _7.pdf Oosting, J. (2016, January 22). Snyder hires two PR firms amid Flint crisis. Retrieved October 16, 2016, from t-crisis/ / Kennedy, Merritt (2016,April 20). Lead-Laced Water in Flint: A Step by Step Look at the Crisis. Retrieved October 13, 2016 from p-by-step-look-at-the-makings-of-a-crisis

20 20 Lawler, Emily (2015, December 30). Michigan Live, DEQ spokesman also resigns over Flint water crisis, says city 'didn't feel like we cared'. Retrieved October 13, 2016 from Maher, K. (2016, January 21). Flint's Water Woes Make Residents Feel Like 'the Walking Dead' Retrieved October 17, 2016, from Reuters (2016, June 23). Feds Say Filtered Flint Drinking Water Is Safe to Drink. NBC News. Accessed 16/10/16 at afe-drink-n Smith, Christopher (2013,February 4).Worldwide Pipeline Construction: Crude, Products, Plan. Retrieved October 16, 2016, from truction/worldwide-pipeline-construction-crude-products.html

21 21 The Center for Michigan Bridge Magazine. (2016, January 21). Michigan Truth Squad: Who approved switch to Flint River? State's answers draw fouls. Retrieved October 16, 2016, from Torossian, R. (2016, January 21). PR Scandal for Michigan Governor after Flint Water Crisis. Retrieved October 16, 2016, from Yan, H. (2016, January 20). Flint water crisis: How years of problems led to lead poisoning. Retrieved October 17, 2016, from Appendices

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