Course Syllabus Proseminar in Comparative Politics and International Relations PSCI 6300 Spring 2014 v1.0 01062014 Course Information Dr. Brandon Kinne E-mail: brandon.kinne@utdallas.edu Web: http://www.utdallas.edu/~bxk09100 Class: Thursday 4:00-6:45pm Location: SLC 1.202 Office hours: Tues. 9:00-11:00am (GR 3.822) Course Prerequisites Students must have graduate standing in the School of Economic, Political, and Policy Sciences, or permission from the instructor. Prior coursework in political science, international studies, political economy, or the like is assumed. Course Description This course is a graduate-level introduction to the fields of comparative politics and international relations, which together define the study of world politics. The course readings place particular emphasis on commonalities and connections between the fields. We will review prominent empirical issues and theoretical disputes in the literature, and explore how political, economic, and social dynamics interact across domestic and international boundaries. Most of the readings are either established or emerging classics. Unfortunately, due to the time constraints of the course, some classics must be excluded. In such cases, other readings have been chosen to summarize important preceding literatures. Student Learning Objectives This course has two objectives. The first is for students to acquire a broad working knowledge of current academic trends in comparative politics and international relations. The second is to develop analytical skills and conceptual frameworks to think critically about the subject matter. Upon completing the course, students should not only be well-versed in the academic study of world politics, but should also be capable of intelligently engaging major debates and issues. Both objectives are intended to prepare students for original research in topics on comparative politics, international relations, or some combination of the two. 1
Required Textbooks and Materials The first few weeks of the course focus on methodological and theoretical issues, while the remainder of the course focuses on substantive topics. Journal articles, available through online archives like JSTOR, comprise the bulk of the readings. There are also three books to purchase, and a handful of book chapters on electronic course reserve. In general, you should expect to read the equivalent of five or six journal articles per week less for dense readings, more for lighter readings. I may make minor changes to reading assignments over the course of the semester. Any such changes will be announced in class. The following texts are required and are available for purchase at the usual locations: Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, et al. 2004. The Logic of Political Survival. MIT Press. Hiscox, Michael. 2002. International Trade and Political Conflict: Commerce, Coalitions, and Mobility. Princeton. Lake, David, and Robert Powell. 1999. Strategic Choice and International Relations. Princeton. Our course reserves page: http://utdallas.docutek.com/eres/coursepage.aspx?cid=1627 See elearning for password Course & Instructor Policies Reading Memos & Leading Discussion Students will submit multiple reading memos over the course of the semester, on separate weeks of their choosing. A memo consists of three elements: (1) succinct written summaries of the readings; (2) questions for discussion; and (3) brief in-class presentations of the readings. Students assigned to the same day should decide between themselves who covers which readings. The written summaries and discussion questions must be circulated to the rest of the class 24 hours prior to seminar (i.e., by 4:00pm Wednesday). Late memos will receive no credit. Students will be responsible for leading discussion on their chosen readings, and should plan to spend about five minutes introducing each reading. Memo grades are determined primarily by the quality of the written summary. However, the in-class presentations of the reading(s) and the quality of discussion question(s) will also affect the memo grade. Be sure to read the specific requirements for reading memos, which are posted on elearning. NOTE: Students may not submit a reading memo and critical essay (see below) in the same week. Critical Essays Students will write two critical essays over the course of the semester, due on two separate weeks of their choosing. Essays should be about five pages in length (± half a page), double spaced with 12-point font. A critical essay should not summarize the literature but should instead critically respond to some relevant aspect of that week s readings. Students must submit their essays by email to the professor (not the entire class) no later than start of seminar on the day they re due. Late papers will not be graded. Be sure to read the specific requirements for critical essays, which 2
are posted on elearning. NOTE: Students may not submit a reading memo and critical essay in the same week. 24-Hour Essay Exam A 24-hour take-home essay exam will be distributed at end of class on Thursday, May 1st. Essays are due at 6:45pm on Friday, May 2nd, and should be submitted to the professor via email. Late essays will not be graded. Participation Since this is a seminar course, student participation is essential. There is no lecture. Students should come to seminar prepared to discuss the readings in depth. My expectation is that every student will regularly contribute to the discussion though, of course, quality always trumps quantity. Students who are uncomfortable with extemporaneous discussion are strongly encouraged to prepare some comments and thoughts ahead of time. Attendance is mandatory; any absences will substantially lower your course grade. In addition to assigned readings, students are responsible for reading the memos circulated by their classmates, thinking about the discussion questions, and preparing to contribute to the discussion. These discussion questions will form the basis of each week s seminar. Read them carefully, and take them seriously. Grading Policy Class participation (25%) Reading memos (25%) Two critical essays (25%) Take-home exam (25%) * access via course reserves access via UTD s ejournals January 16 Introductions Part 1 Methods and Theory January 23 Models and Methods Frieden, Jeffry, and David Lake. 2005. International Relations as Social Science: Rigor and Relevance, in Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 600(1): 136-156. 3
Lake and Powell, Chapter 1 ( International Relations: A Strategic-Choice Approach ) * Fearon, James, and Alexander Wendt. 2002. Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View, in Handbook of International Relations, 52-72. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. * Braumoeller, Bear, and Anne Sartori. 2004. The Promise and Perils of Statistics in International Relations, in Models, Numbers, and Cases: Methods for Studying International Relations, ed. Detlef Sprinz and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias, 129-151. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Geddes, Barbara. 1990. How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative Politics, in Political Analysis 2(1): 131-150. January 30 Theory I: Actors, Preferences, and Strategic Environments Lake and Powell, Chapters 2 4 (Morrow, Frieden, and Rogowski chapters) * Albert, Mathias, and Lars-Erik Cederman, New Systems Theories of World Politics, chapter 1 ( Introduction: Systems Theorizing in IR ). Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and Alastair Smith. 2012. Domestic Explanations of International Relations, in Annual Review of Political Science 15: 161 181. February 6 Theory II: State, System, and Two-Level Games Krasner, Stephen. 1976. State Power and the Structure of International Trade, in World Politics 28(3): 317-347. * Powell, Robert. 1999. Bargaining in the Shadow of Power in In the shadow of power: states and strategies in international politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Fearon, James. 1994. Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes, in American Political Science Review 88(3): 577 592. Moravcsik, Andrew. 1997. Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics, in International Organization 51(4): 513-553. Putnam, Robert. 1988. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, in International Organization 42(3): 427-460. February 13 Theory III: Explaining Cooperation Jervis, Robert. 1999. Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate, in International Security 24(1): 42 63. Wendt, Alexander. 1992. Anarchy Is What States Make of It, in International Organization 46(2): 391-425. 4
Stein, Arthur. 1982. Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World, in International Organization 36(2): 299 324. Leeds, Brett Ashley, Michaela Mattes, and Jeremy S. Vogel. 2009. Interests, Institutions, and the Reliability of International Commitments, in American Journal of Political Science 53(2): 461 476. Kinne, Brandon J. 2013. Network Dynamics and the Evolution of International Cooperation, in American Political Science Review 107(4): 766 785. Part II Substantive Topics in CP/IR February 20 Institutions, Parties, and Elections Hall, Peter, and Rosemary Taylor. 1996. Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms, in Political Studies 44(3): 936-957. Pierson, Paul. 2000. Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics, in American Political Science Review 94(2): 251-267. Greif, Avner, and David Laitin. 2004. A Theory of Endogenous Institution Change, in American Political Science Review 98(4): 251-267. Stokes, Susan. 1999. Political Parties and Democracy, in Annual Review of Political Science 2: 243-267. Cox, Gary. 1999. Electoral Rules and Electoral Coordination, in Annual Review of Political Science 2: 145-162. Boix, Carles. 1999. Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies, in American Political Science Review 93(3): 609-624. February 27 Origins of Regimes I: Domestic Influences * Przeworski et al. 2000. Democracy and Development. Chapters 1 2. * Acemoglu and Robinson. 2006. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Chapters 1 3. Ross, Michael. 2006. Is Democracy Good for the Poor? in American Journal of Political Science 50(4): 860 874. March 6 Origins of Regimes II: External Influences * Schmitter, Philippe. 1986. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Chapter 1 (pp. 3-11). [Note to discussants: no memo is needed for this reading.] 5
* Whitehead, Laurence. 2001. Three International Dimensions of Democratization, in The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas. Laurence Whitehead, ed. Oxford University Press: 3-25. Brinks, Daniel, and Michael Coppedge. 2006. Diffusion Is No Illusion: Neighbor Emulation in the Third Wave of Democracy, in Comparative Political Studies 39(4): 463-489. Donno, Daniela. 2010. Who Is Punished? Regional Intergovernmental Organizations and the Enforcement of Democratic Norms, in International Organization 64(4): 593 625. Boix, Carles. 2011. Democracy, Development, and the International System, in American Political Science Review 105(4): 809 828. Freeman, John R., and Dennis P. Quinn. 2012. The Economic Origins of Democracy Reconsidered, in American Political Science Review 106(1): 58 80. March 13 Spring Break March 20 Regimes and Political Survival Bueno de Mesquita et al. The Logic of Political Survival. Read chapters 1-5, and 7 (skip chapter appendices). Clarke, Kevin A., and Randall W. Stone. 2008. Democracy and the Logic of Political Survival, in American Political Science Review 102(3): 387-392. Morrow, James D., et al. 2008. Retesting Selectorate Theory: Separating the Effects of W from Other Elements of Democracy, in American Political Science Review 102(3): 393-400. March 27 Security I: Internal Conflict Sambanis, Nicholas. 2004. What Is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition in Journal of Conflict Resolution 48(6): 814 858. Fearon, James, and David Laitin. 2003. Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War, in American Political Science Review 97(1): 75 90. Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. Greed and Grievance in Civil War, in Oxford Economic Papers 56(4): 563 595. Cederman, Lars-Erik, Nils B. Weidmann, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. 2011. Horizontal Inequalities and Ethnonationalist Civil War, in American Political Science Review 105(3): 478 495. Pierskalla, Jan H., and Florian M. Hollenbach. 2013. Technology and Collective Action: The Effect of Cell Phone Coverage on Political Violence in Africa, in American Political Science Review 107(2): 207 224. 6
April 3 Security II: External Conflict Fearon, James. 1995. Rationalist Explanations for War, in International Organization 49(3): 379-414. Morrow, James D. 1993. Arms versus Allies: Trade-Offs in the Search for Security, in International Organization 47(2): 207 233. Smith, Alastair. 1995. Alliance Formation and War, in International Studies Quarterly 39(4): 405-425. Schultz, Kenneth. 2005. The Politics of Risking Peace: Do Hawks or Doves Deliver the Olive Branch? in International Organization 59(1): 1 38. Croco, Sarah E. 2011. The Decider s Dilemma: Leader Culpability, War Outcomes, and Domestic Punishment, in American Political Science Review 105(3): 457 477. April 10 Democratic Peace Oneal, John R., and Bruce Russett. 1999. The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885-1992, in World Politics 52(1): 1-37. Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, et al. 1999. An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace, in American Political Science Review 93(4): 791-807. Rosato, Sebastian. 2003. The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory, in American Political Science Review 97(4): 585-602. Forum articles from August 2005 issue of American Political Science Review, pp. 453-472: Kinsella, No Rest for the Democratic Peace Slantchev, Alexandrova, and Gartzke, Probabilistic Causality, Selection Bias, and the Logic of the Democratic Peace Doyle, Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace Rosato, Explaining the Democratic Peace Tomz, Michael R., and Jessica L. P. Weeks. 2013. Public Opinion and the Democratic Peace, in American Political Science Review 107(4): 849 865. April 17 Institutions, Cooperation, and Compliance Abbott, Kenneth, and Duncan Snidal. 1998. Why States Act through Formal International Organizations, in Journal of Conflict Resolution 42(1): 3-32. Chayes and Chayes. 1993. On Compliance, in International Organization 47(2): 175 205. Downs et al. 1996. Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation? in International Organization 50(3): 379 406. 7
Fearon, James. 1998. Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation, in International Organization 52(2): 269 306. Koremenos, Barbara. 2013. The Continent of International Law, in Journal of Conflict Resolution 57(4): 653 681. April 24 International Trade Alt, James, et al. 1996. The Political Economy of International Trade: Enduring Puzzles and an Agenda for Inquiry, in Comparative Political Studies 29(6): 689-717. Hiscox, Michael J. 2002. International Trade and Political Conflict: Commerce, Coalitions, and Mobility. Read entire book. May 1 Globalization (TAKE-HOME EXAM DISTRIBUTED) Garrett, Geoffrey. 2000. Causes of Globalization, in Comparative Political Studies 33(6/7): 941-991. Hicks, Alex, and Christopher Zorn. 2005. Economic Globalization, the Macro Economy, and Reversals in Welfare: Expansion in Affluent Democracies, 1978-1994, in International Organization 59(3): 631-662. Neumayer, Erik, and Indra de Soysa. 2005. Trade Openness, Foreign Direct Investment, and Child Labor, in World Development 33(1): 43-63. Mansfield, Edward D., and Diana C. Mutz. 2009. Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety, in International Organization 63(3): 425 457. Lü, Xiaobo, Kenneth Scheve, and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2012. Inequity Aversion and the International Distribution of Trade Protection, in American Journal of Political Science 56(3): 638 654. University Policies http://go.utdallas.edu/syllabus-policies These descriptions and timelines are subject to change at the discretion of the Professor. 8